Torts & Damages Cases: Contract and Delict

8/10/2019 Torts & Damages Cases: Contract and Delict

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Contract and Delict

Cases

19.Regino vs. Pangasinan Colleges of Science and Technology, et.al., G.R. No. 156109,

November 18, 2004;

20.Spouses Guanio vs. Makati Shangrila-Hotel and Resort, Inc., G.R. No. 190601,

February 7, 2011;

21.Padilla, et.al.vs. CA, G.R. No. L-39999, May 31, 1984;

22.PNCC vs. CA, G.R. No. 159270, August 22, 2005;

23.NPC vs. Heirs of Noble Casionan, G.R. No. 165969, November 27, 2008;

24. Ilocos Norte Electric Company vs. CA, G.R. No. L-53401, November 6, 1989;

25.Sanitary Steam Laundry, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals;

26.Tison and Jabon vs. Spouses Pomasin, et.al., GR No. 173180, August 24, 2011;


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19. Regino vs. Pangasinan Colleges of Science and Technology, et.al., G.R. No.156109, November 18, 2004;

THIRD DIVISION [G.R. No. 156109. November 18, 2004]KHRISTINE REA M. REGINO, Assisted and Represented byARMANDO REGINO, pet i t ioner, vs.PANGASINAN COLLEGES OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, RACHELLE A.

GAMUROT and ELISSA BALADAD, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

PANGANIBAN, J.:Upon enrolment, students and their school enter upon a reciprocal contract. The students agree to abide by the

standards of academic performance and codes of conduct, issued usually in the form of manuals that are distributed to theenrollees at the start of the school term. Further, the school informs them of the itemized fees they are expected to pay.Consequently, it cannot, after the enrolment of a student, vary the terms of the contract. It cannot require fees other thanthose it specified upon enrolment.

The Case

Before the Court is a Petition for Review under Rule 45,[1]

seeking to nullify the July 12, 2002[2]

and the November 22,2002

[3]Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Urdaneta City, Pangasinan (Branch 48) in Civil Case No. U-7541. The

decretal portion of the first assailed Order reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the instant motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action.[4]

The second challenged Order denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.

The Facts

Petitioner Khristine Rea M. Regino was a first year computer science student at Respondent Pangasinan Colleges ofScience and Technology (PCST). Reared in a poor family, Regino went to college mainly through the financial support of herrelatives. During the second semester of school year 2001-2002, she enrolled in logic and statistics subjects underRespondents Rachelle A. Gamurot and Elissa Baladad, respectively, as teachers.

In February 2002, PCST held a fund raising campaign dubbed the Rave Party and Dance Revolution, the proceeds ofwhich were to go to the construction of the schools tennis and volleyball courts. Each student was required to pay for twotickets at the price of P100 each. The project was allegedly implemented by recompensing students who purchased ticketswith additional points in their test scores; those who refused to pay were denied the opportunity to take the finalexaminations.

Financially strapped and prohibited by her religion from attending dance parties and celebrations, Regino refused topay for the tickets. On March 14 and March 15, 2002, the scheduled dates of the final examinations in logic and statistics,her teachers -- Respondents Rachelle A. Gamurot and Elissa Baladad -- allegedly disallowed her from taking the tests.

According to petitioner, Gamurot made her sit out her logic class while her classmates were taking their examinations. Thenext day, Baladad, after announcing to the entire class that she was not permitting petitioner and another student to taketheir statistics examinations for failing to pay for their tickets, allegedly ejected them from the classroom. Petitioners pleasostensibly went unheeded by Gamurot and Baladad, who unrelentingly defended their positions as compliance with PCSTspolicy.

On April 25, 2002, petitioner filed, as a pauper litigant, a Complaint[5]

for damages against PCST, Gamurot andBaladad. In her Complaint, she prayed for P500,000 as nominal damages; P500,000 as moral damages; atleast P1,000,000 as exemplary damages; P250,000 as actual damages; plus the costs of litigation and attorneys fees.

On May 30, 2002, respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss[6]

on the ground of petitioners failure to exhaust administrativeremedies. According to respondents, the question raised involved the determination of the wisdom of an administrative policyof the PCST; hence, the case should have been initiated before the proper administrative body, the Commission of HigherEducation (CHED).

In her Comment to respondents Motion, petitioner argued that prior exhaustion of administrative remedies wasunnecessary, because her action was not administrative in nature, but one purely for damages arising from respondentsbreach of the laws on human relations. As such, jurisdiction lay with the courts.

On July 12, 2002, the RTC dismissed the Complaint for lack of cause of action.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

In granting respondents Motion to Dismiss, the trial court noted that the instant controversy involved a higher institutionof learning, two of its faculty members and one of its students. It added that Section 54 of the Education Act of 1982 vestedin the Commission on Higher Education (CHED) the supervision and regulation of tertiary schools. Thus, it ruled that theCHED, not the courts, had jurisdiction over the controversy.

[7]
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In its dispositive portion, the assailed Order dismissed the Complaint for lack of cause of action without, however,explaining this ground.

Aggrieved, petitioner filed the present Petition on pure questions of law.[8]

Issues

In her Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues for our consideration:

Whether or not the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies applies in a civil action exclusively for damages based

on violation of the human relation provisions of the Civil Code, filed by a student against her former school.Whether or not there is a need for prior declaration of invalidity of a certain school administrative policy by the Commissionon Higher Education (CHED) before a former student can successfully maintain an action exclusively for damages in regularcourts.

Whether or not the Commission on Higher Education (CHED) has exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for damagesbased upon violation of the Civil Code provisions on human relations filed by a student against the school.

[9]

All of the foregoing point to one issue -- whether the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is applicable.The Court, however, sees a second issue which, though not expressly raised by petitioner, was impliedly contained in herPetition: whether the Complaint stated sufficient cause(s) of action.

The CourtsRuling

The Petition is meritorious.

First Issue:

Exhaust ion of A dminis t rat ive Remedies

Respondents anchored their Motion to Dismiss on petitioners alleged failure to exhaust administrative remedies beforeresorting to the RTC. According to them, the determination of the controversy hinge on the validity, the wisdom and thepropriety of PCSTs academic policy. Thus, the Complaint should have been lodged in the CHED, the administrative bodytasked under Republic Act No. 7722 to implement the state policy to protect, foster and promote the right of all citizens toaffordable quality education at all levels and to take appropriate steps to ensure that education is accessible to all.

[10]

Petitioner counters that the doctrine finds no relevance to the present case since she is praying for damages, a remedybeyond the domain of the CHED and well within the jurisdiction of the courts.

[11]

Petitioner is correct. First, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies has no bearing on the present case.In Factoran Jr. v. CA,

[12]the Court had occasion to elucidate on the rationale behind this doctrine:

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is basic. Courts, for reasons of law,comity, and convenience, should not entertain suits unless the available administrative remedies have firstbeen resorted to and the proper authorities have been given the appropriate opportunity to act and correcttheir alleged errors, if any, committed in the administrative forum. x x x.

[13]

Petitioner is not asking for the reversal of the policies of PCST. Neither is she demanding it to allow her to take herfinal examinations; she was already enrolled in another educational institution. A reversal of the acts complained of wouldnot adequately redress her grievances; under the circumstances, the consequences of respondents acts could nolonger beundone or rectified.

Second, exhaustion of administrative remedies is applicable when there is competence on the part of the administrativebody to act upon the matter complained of.

[14]Administrative agencies are not courts; they are neither part of the judicial

system, nor are they deemed judicial tribunals.[15]

Specifically, the CHED does not have the power to awarddamages.

[16]Hence, petitioner could not have commenced her case before the Commission.

Third, the exhaustion doctrine admits of exceptions, one of which arises when the issue is purely legal and well withinthe jurisdiction of the trial court.

[17]Petitioners action for damages inevitably calls for the application and the interpretation of

the Civil Code, a function that falls within the jurisdiction of the courts.[18]

Second Issue:

Cause of Act ion

Suf f ic ient Causes of Act ion Stated in the Al legat ions in the Com plaint

As a rule, every complaint must sufficiently allege a cause of action; failure to do so warrants its dismissal.[19]

Acomplaint is said to assert a sufficient cause of action if, admitting what appears solely on its face to be correct, the plaintiffwould be entitled to the relief prayed for. Assuming the facts that are alleged to be true, the court should be able to render avalid judgment in accordance with the prayer in the complaint.

[20]
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A motion to dismiss based on lack of cause of action hypothetically admits the truth of the alleged facts. In their Motionto Dismiss, respondents did not dispute any of petitioners allegations, and they admitted that x x x the crux of plaintiffscause of action is the determination of whether or not the assessment of P100 per ticket is excessive or oppressive.

[21]They

thereby premised their prayer for dismissal on the Complaints alleged failure to state a cause of action. Thus, areexamination of the Complaint is in order.

The Complaint contains the following factual allegations:

10. In the second week of February 2002, defendant Rachelle A. Gamurot, in connivance with PCST,forced plaintiff and her classmates to buy or take two tickets each, x x x;

11. Plaintiff and many of her classmates objected to the forced distribution and selling of tickets to thembut the said defendant warned them that if they refused [to] take or pay the price of the two ticketsthey would not be allowed at all to take the final examinations;

12. As if to add insult to injury, defendant Rachelle A. Gamurot bribed students with additional fifty pointsor so in their test score in her subject just to unjustly influence and compel them into taking thetickets;

13. Despite the students refusal, they were forced to take the tickets because [of] defendant RachelleA.Gamurots coercion and act of intimidation, but still many of them including the plaintiff did not attendthe dance party imposed upon them by defendants PCST and Rachelle A. Gamurot;

14. Plaintiff was not able to pay the price of her own two tickets because aside form the fact that she couldnot afford to pay them it is also against her religious practice as a member of a certain religiouscongregation to be attending dance parties and celebrations;

15. On March 14, 2002, before defendant Rachelle A. Gamurot gave her class its final examination in thesubject Logic she warned that students who had not paid the tickets would not be allowed toparticipate in the examination, for which threat and intimidation many students were eventually forcedto make payments:

16. Because plaintiff could not afford to pay, defendant Rachelle A. Gamurot inhumanly made plaintiff sitout the class but the defendant did not allow her to take her final examination in Logic;

17. On March 15, 2002 just before the giving of the final examination in the subject Statistics, defendantElissa Baladad, in connivance with defendants Rachelle A. Gamurot and PCST, announced in theclassroom that she was not allowing plaintiff and another student to take the examination for theirfailure and refusal to pay the price of the tickets, and thenceforth she ejected plaintiff and the otherstudent from the classroom;

18. Plaintiff pleaded for a chance to take the examination but all defendants could say was that the

prohibition to give the examinations to non-paying students was an administrative decision;19. Plaintiff has already paid her tuition fees and other obligations in the school;

20. That the above-cited incident was not a first since PCST also did another forced distribution of ticketsto its students in the first semester of school year 2001-2002; x x x

[22]

The foregoing allegations show two causes of action; first, breach of contract; and second, liability for tort.

Reciproci ty of the Scho ol-Student Con tract

InAlcuaz v. PSBA,[23]

the Court characterized the relationship between the school and the student as a contract, inwhich a student, once admitted by the school is considered enrolled for one semester.

[24]Two years later, in Non v. Dames

II,[25]

the Court modified the termination of contract theory inAlcuazby holding that the contractual relationship between theschool and the student is not only semestral in duration, but for the entire period the latter are expected to completeit.

[26]Except for the variance in the period during which the contractual relationship is considered to subsist, bothAlcuaz and

Nonwere unanimous in characterizing the school-student relationship as contractual in nature.

The school-student relationship is also reciprocal. Thus, it has consequences appurtenant to and inherent in allcontracts of such kind -- it gives rise to bilateral or reciprocal rights and obligations. The school undertakes to providestudents with education sufficient to enable them to pursue higher education or a profession. On the other hand, thestudents agree to abide by the academic requirements of the school and to observe its rules and regulations.

[27]

The terms of the school-student contract are defined at the moment of its inception -- upon enrolment of the student.Standards of academic performance and the code of behavior and discipline are usually set forth in manuals distributed tonew students at the start of every school year. Further, schools inform prospective enrollees the amount of fees and theterms of payment.
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In practice, students are normally required to make a down payment upon enrollment, with the balance to be paidbefore every preliminary, midterm and final examination. Their failure to pay their financial obligation is regarded as a validground for the school to deny them the opportunity to take these examinations.

The foregoing practice does not merely ensure compliance with financial obligations; it also underlines the importanceof major examinations. Failure to take a major examination is usually fatal to the students promotion to the next grade or tograduation. Examination results form a significant basis for their final grades. These tests are usually a primary and anindispensable requisite to their elevation to the next educational level and, ultimately, to their completion of a course.

Education is not a measurable commodity. It is not possible to determine who is better educated than another. Nevertheless, a students grades are an accepted approximation of what would otherwise be an intangi ble product ofcountless hours of study. The importance of grades cannot be discounted in a setting where education is generally the gatepass to employment opportunities and better life; such grades are often the means by which a prospective employermeasures whether a job applicant has acquired the necessary tools or skills for a particular profession or trade.

Thus, students expect that upon their payment of tuition fees, satisfaction of the set academic standards, completion ofacademic requirements and observance of school rules and regulations, the school would reward them by recognizing theircompletion of the course enrolled in.

The obligation on the part of the school has been established in Magtibay v. Garcia,[28]

Licup v. University of SanCarlos

[29]andAteneo de Manila University v. Garcia,

[30]in which the Court held that, barring any violation of the rules on the

part of the students, an institution of higher learning has a contractual obligation to afford its students a fairoppor tun i t yto complete the course they seek to pursue.

We recognize the need of a school to fund its facilities and to meet astronomical operating costs; this is a reality inrunning it. Crystal v. Cebu International School

[31]upheld the imposition by respondent school of a land purchase deposit

in the amount of P50,000 per student to be used for the purchase of a piece of land and for the construction of newbuildings and other facilities x x x which the school would transfer [to] and occupy after the expiration of its lease contractover its present site.

The amount was refundable after the student graduated or left the school. After noting that the imposition of the feewas made only after prior consultation and approval by the parents of the students, the Court held that the school committedno actionable wrong in refusing to admit the children of the petitioners therein for their failure to pay the land purchasedeposit and the 2.5 percent monthly surcharge thereon.

In the present case, PCST imposed the assailed revenue-raising measure belatedly, in the middle of the semester. Itexacted the dance party fee as a condition for the students taking the final examinations, and ultimately for its recognition oftheir ability to finish a course. The fee, however, was not part of the school-student contract entered into at the start of theschool year. Hence, it could not be unilaterally imposed to the prejudice of the enrollees.

Such contract is by no means an ordinary one. In Non, we stressed that the school-student contract is imbued withpublic interest, considering the high priority given by the Constitution to education and the grant to the State of supervisoryand regulatory powers over all educational institutions.[32]Sections 5 (1) and (3) of Article XIV of the 1987 Constitutionprovide:

The State shall protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality education at all levels andshall take appropriate steps to make such declaration accessible to all.

Every student has a right to select a profession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonableand equitable admission and academic requirements.

The same state policy resonates in Section 9(2) of BP 232, otherwise known as the Education Act of 1982:

Section 9. Rights of Students in School.In addition to other rights, and subject to thelimitations prescribed by law and regulations, students and pupils in all schools shall enjoy the followingrights:

x x x x x x x x x

(2) The right to freely choose their field of study subject to existing curriculaand to continue their course therein up to graduation, except in cases of academicdeficiency, or violation of disciplinary regulations.

Liabi l i ty for Tort

In her Complaint, petitioner also charged that private respondents inhumanly punish students x x x by reason only oftheir poverty, religious practice or lowly station in life, which inculcated upon [petitioner] the feelings of guilt, disgrace andunworthiness;

[33]as a result of such punishment, she was allegedly unable to finish any of her subjects for the second

semester of that school year and had to lag behind in her studies by a full year. The acts of respondents supposedly causedher extreme humiliation, mental agony and demoralization of unimaginable proportions in violation of Articles 19, 21 and 26 of the Civil Code. These provisions of the law state thus:
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Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, giveeveryone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.

Article 21. Anyperson who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs orpublic policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

Article 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace o f mind of his neighbors and otherpersons. The following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of actionfor damages, prevention and other relief:

(1) Prying into the privacy of anothers residence;

(2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another;

(3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends;

(4) Vexing or humiliating another on account of his beliefs, lowly station in life, place of birth, physicaldefect, or other personal condition.

Generally, liability for tort arises only between parties not otherwise bound by a contract. An academic institution,however, may be held liable for tort even if it has an existing contract with its students, since the act that violated the contractmay also be a tort. We ruled thus in PSBA vs. CA,

[34]from which we quote:

x x x A perusal of Article 2176 [of theCivil Code] shows that obligations arising from quasi-delicts or tort, alsoknown as extra-contractual obligations, arise only between parties not otherwise bound by contract, whetherexpress or implied. However, this impression has not prevented this Court from determining the existence of a torteven when there obtains a contract. InAir France v. Carrascoso(124 Phil. 722), the private respondent was

awarded damages for his unwarranted expulsion from a first-class seat aboard the petitioner airline. It is noted,however, that the Court referred to the petitioner-airlines liability as one arising from tort, not one arising form acontract of carriage. In effect,Air Franceis authority for the view that liability from tort may exist even if there is acontract, for the act that breaks the contract may be also a tort. x x x This view was not all that revolutionary, foreven as early as 1918, this Court was already of a similar mind. In Cangco v. Manila Railroad(38 Phil. 780), Mr.Justice Fisher elucidated thus: x x x. When such a contractual relation exists the obligor may break the contractunder such conditions that the same act which constitutes a breach of the contract would have constituted thesource of an extra-contractual obligation had no contract existed between the parties.

Immediately what comes to mind is the chapter of the Civil Code on Human Relations, particularly Article 21 x xx.

[35]

Academic Freedom

In their Memorandum, respondents harp on their right to academic freedom. We are not impressed. According topresent jurisprudence, academic freedom encompasses the independence of an academic institution to determine for itself

(1) who may teach, (2) what may be taught, (3) how it shall teach, and (4) who may be admitted to study. [36]InGarcia v. theFaculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology,

[37]the Court upheld the respondent therein when it denied a

female students admission to theological studies in a seminary for prospect ive priests. The Court defined the freedom of anacademic institution thus: to decide for itself aims and objectives and how best to attain them x x x free from outsidecoercion or interference save possibly when overriding public welfare calls for some restraint.

[38]

In Tangonan v. Pao,[39]

the Court upheld, in the name of academic freedom, the right of the school to refusereadmission of a nursing student who had been enrolled on probation, and who had failed her nursing subjects. Theseinstances notwithstanding, the Court has emphasized that once a school has, in the name of academic freedom, set itsstandards, these should be meticulously observed and should not be used to discriminate against certain students .

[40]After

accepting them upon enrollment, the school cannot renege on its contractual obligation on grounds other than those madeknown to, and accepted by, students at the start of the school year.

In sum, the Court holds that the Complaint alleges sufficient causes of action against respondents, and that it shouldnot have been summarily dismissed. Needless to say, the Court is not holding respondents liable for the acts complained

of. That will have to be ruled upon in due course by the court a quo.WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the assailed Orders REVERSED. The trial court is DIRECTED

to reinstate the Complaint and, with all deliberate speed, to continue the proceedings in Civil Case No. U-7541. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio-Morales, andGarcia, JJ., concur.

Corona, J., on leave.
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20. Spouses Guanio vs. Makati Shangrila-Hotel and Resort, Inc., G.R. No. 190601, February7, 2011;

THIRD DIVISION

SPOUSES LUIGI M. GUANIO and

ANNA HERNANDEZ-GUANIO,Petitioners,

G.R. No. 190601

- versus -

Present:

CARPIO MORALES,Chairperson, J.,

BRION,BERSAMIN,VILLARAMA, JR., andSERENO, JJ.

MAKATI SHANGRI-LA HOTELand RESORT, INC., also doingbusiness under the name of Promulgated:SHANGRI-LA HOTEL MANILA,

Respondent. February 7, 2011

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

D E C I S I O N

CARPIO MORALES, J .

For their wedding reception on July 28, 2001, spouses Luigi M. Guanio and Anna Hernandez-Guanio (petitioners)booked at the Shangri-la Hotel Makati (the hotel).

Prior to the event, Makati Shangri-La Hotel & Resort, Inc. (respondent) scheduled an initial food tasting. Petitionersclaim that they requested the hotel to prepare for seven persons the two of them, their respective parents, and thewedding coordinator. At the scheduled food tasting, however, respondent prepared for only six.

Petitioners initially chose a set menu which included black cod, king prawns and angel hair pasta with wild mushroomsauce for the main course which costP1,000.00 per person. They were, however, given an option in which salmon, insteadof king prawns, would be in the menu at P950.00 per person. They in fact partook of the salmon.

Three days before the event, a final food tasting took place. Petitioners aver that the salmon served was half the sizeof what they were served during the initial food tasting; and when queried about it, the hotel quoted a much higher price(P1,200.00) for the size that was initially served to them. The parties eventually agreed on a final price P1,150 perperson.

A day before the event or on July 27, 2001, the parties finalized and forged their contract.[1]

Petitioners claim that during the reception, respondents representatives, Catering Director Bea Marquez and SalesManager Tessa Alvarez, did not show up despite their assurance that they would; their guests complained of the delay inthe service of the dinner; certain items listed in the published menu were unavailable; the hotels waiters were rude andunapologetic when confronted about the delay; and despite Alvarezs promise that there would be no charge for theextension of the reception beyond 12:00 midnight, they were billed and paid P8,000 per hour for the three-hour extension ofthe event up to 4:00 A.M. the next day.

Petitioners further claim that they brought wine and liquor in accordance with their open bar arrangement, but thesewere not served to the guests who were forced to pay for their drinks.

Petitioners thus sent a letter-complaint to the Makati Shangri-la Hotel and Resort, Inc. (respondent) and received anapologetic reply from Krister Svensson, the hotels Executive Assistant Manager in charge of Food and Beverage. Theynevertheless filed a complaint for breach of contract and damages before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City.

In its Answer, respondent claimed that petitioners requested a combination of king prawns and salmon, hence, theprice was increased to P1,200.00 per person, but discounted at P1,150.00; that contrary to petitioners claim, Marquez and

Alvarez were present during the event, albeit they were not permanently stationed thereat as there were three other hotelfunctions; that while there was a delay in the service of the meals, the same was occasioned by the sudden increase ofguests to 470 from the guaranteed expected minimum number of guests of 350 to a maximum of 380, as stated in theBanquet Event Order (BEO);

[2]and that Isaac Albacea, Banquet Service Director, in fact relayed the delay in the service of

the meals to petitioner Luigis father, Gil Guanio.
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Respecting the belated service of meals to some guests, respondent attributed it to the insistence of petitionerswedding coordinator that certain guests be served first.

On Svenssons letter, respondent, denying it as an admission of liability, claimed that it was meant to maintain goodwillto its customers.

By Decision of August 17, 2006, Branch 148 of the Makati RTC rendered judgment in favor of petitioners, disposing asfollows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and

against the defendant ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiff the following:

1) The amount of P350,000.00 by way of actual damages;

2) The amount of P250,000.00 for and as moral damages;

3) The amount of P100,000.00 as exemplary damages;

4) The amount of P100,000.00 for and as attorneys fees.

With costs against the defendant.

SO ORDERED.[3]

In finding for petitioners, the trial court relied heavily on the letter of Svensson which is partly quoted below:

Upon receiving your comments on our service rendered during your reception here with us, we are in fact,very distressed. Right from minor issues pappadums served in the soup instead of the creutons, lack of

valet parkers, hard rolls being too hard till a major one slow service, rude and arrogant waiters, we havedisappointed you in all means.

Indeed, we feel as strongly as you do that the services you received were unacceptable and definitely notup to our standards. We understand that it is our job to provide excellent service and in this instance, wehave fallen short of your expectations. We ask you please to accept our profound apologies for causingsuch discomfort and annoyance.

[4](underscoring supplied)

The trial court observed that from the tenor of the letter . . . the defendant[-herein respondent] admits that the servicesthe plaintiff[-herein petitioners] received were unacceptable and definitely not up to their standards.

[5]

On appeal, the Court of Appeals, by Decision of July 27, 2009,[6]

reversedthe trial courts decision, it holding that theproximate cause of petitioners injury was an unexpected increase in their guests:

x x x Hence, the alleged damage or injury brought about by the confusion, inconvenience and disarrayduring the wedding reception may not be attributed to defendant-appellant Shangri-la.

We find that the said proximate cause, which is entirely attributable to plaintiffs-appellants, set thechain of events which resulted in the alleged inconveniences, to the plaintiffs-appellants. Given thecircumstances that obtained, only the Sps. Guanio may bear whatever consequential damages that theymay have allegedly suffered.

[7] (underscoring supplied)

Petitioners motion for reconsideration having been denied by Resolution of November 18, 2009, the present petitionfor review was filed.

The Court finds that since petitioners complaint arose from a contract, the doctrine of proximate cause finds noapplication to it:

The doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in actions for quasi-delicts, not in actionsinvolving breach of contract. x x x The doctrine is a device for imputing liability to a person where there isno relation between him and another party. In such a case, the obligation is created by law itself. But,where there is a pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, it is the parties themselves whocreate the obligation, and the function of the law is merely to regulate the relation thus

created.[8](emphasis and underscoring supplied)

What applies in the present case is Article 1170 of the Civil Code which reads:

Art. 1170. Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence ordelay, and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages.

RCPI v. Verchez, et al.[9]

enlightens:

In culpa contractual x x x the mere proof of the existence of the contract and the failure of itscompliance justify,prima facie, a corresponding right of relief. The law, recognizing the obligatory forceof contracts, will not permit a party to be set free from liability for any kind of misperformance of thecontractual undertaking or a contravention of the tenor thereof. A breach upon the contract confers upon
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the injured party a valid cause for recovering that which may have been lost or suffered. The remedyserves to preserve the interests of the promissee that may include his expectation interest,which is hisinterest in having the benefit of his bargain by being put in as good a position as he would have been inhad the contract been performed, or his reliance interest,which is his interest in being reimbursed forloss caused by reliance on the contract by being put in as good a position as he would have been in hadthe contract not been made; or his restitution interest,which is his interest in having restored to himany benefit that he has conferred on the other party. Indeed, agreements can accomplish little, either fortheir makers or for society, unless they are made the basis for action. The effect of every infraction is tocreate a new duty, that is, to make RECOMPENSE to the one who has been injured by the failure ofanother to observe his contractual obligation unless he can show extenuating circumstances, like proof ofhis exercise of due diligence x x x or of the attendance of fortuitous event, to excuse him from his

ensuing liability. (emphasis and underscoring in the original; capitalization supplied)

The pertinent provisions of the Banquet and Meeting Services Contract between the parties read:

4.3 The ENGAGER shall be billed in accordance with the prescribed rate for the minimumguaranteed number of persons contracted for, regardless of under attendance or non-appearance of theexpected number of guests, except where the ENGAGER cancels the Function in accordance with itsLetter of Confirmation with the HOTEL. Should the attendance exceed the minimum guaranteedattendance, the ENGAGER shall also be billed at the actual rate per cover in excess of the minimumguaranteed attendance.

x x x x

4.5. The ENGAGER must inform the HOTEL at least forty eight (48) hours before the scheduled

date and time of the Function of any change in the minimum guaranteed covers. In the absence of suchnotice, paragraph 4.3 shall apply in the event of under attendance. In case the actual number ofattendees exceed the minimum guaranteed numberby ten percent (10%), the HOTEL shall notinany way be held liable for any damage or inconveniencewhich may be caused thereby. TheENGAGER shall also undertake to advise the guests of the situation and take positive steps toremedy the same.

[10] (emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)

Breach of contract is defined as the failure without legal reason to comply with the terms of a contract. It is alsodefined as the [f]ailure, without legal excuse, to perform any promise which forms the whole or part of the contract.

[11]

The appellate court, and even the trial court, observed that petitioners were remiss in their obligation to informrespondent of the change in the expected number of guests. The observation is reflected in the records of thecase. Petitioners failure to discharge such obligation thus excused, as the above-quoted paragraph 4.5 of the partiescontract provide, respondent from liability for any damage or inconvenience occasioned thereby.

As for petitioners claim that respondent departed from itsverbalagreement with petitioners, the same fails, given

that the written contract which the parties entered into the day before the event, being the law between them.

Respecting the letter of Svensson on which the trial court heavily relied as admission of respondents liability butwhich the appellate court brushed aside, the Court finds the appellate courts stance in order. It is not uncommon in thehotel industry to receive comments, criticisms or feedback on the service it delivers. It is also customary for hotelmanagement to try to smooth ruffled feathers to preserve goodwill among its clientele.

Kalalo v. Luz holds:[12]

Statements which are not estoppels nor judicial admissions have no quality of conclusiveness, andan opponent whose admissions have been offered against him may offer any evidence which serves as anexplanation for his former assertion of what he now denies as a fact.

Respondents Catering Director, Bea Marquez, explained the hotels procedure on receiving andprocessing complaints, viz:

ATTY. CALMA:

Q You mentioned that the letter indicates an acknowledgement of the concern and that there was-thefirst letter there was an acknowledgment of the concern and an apology, not necessarilyindicating that such or admitting fault?

A Yes.

Q Is this the letter that you are referring to?

If I may, Your Honor, that was the letter dated August 4, 2001, previously marked as plaintiffsexhibits, Your Honor. What is the procedure of the hotel with respect to customer concern?

A Upon receipt of the concern from the guest or client, we acknowledge receipt of such concern, andas part of procedure in service industry particularly Makati Shangri-la we apologize for whatever
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inconvenience but at the same time saying, that of course, we would go through certaininvestigation and get back to them for the feedback with whatever concern they may have.

Q Your Honor, I just like at this point mark the exhibits, Your Honor, the letter dated August 4, 2001identified by the witness, Your Honor, to be marked as Exhibit 14 and the signature of Mr. KristerSvensson be marked as Exhibit 14-A.

[13]

x x x x

Q In your opinion, you just mentioned that there is a procedure that the hotel follows with respect to

the complaint, in your opinion was this procedure followed in this particular concern?

A Yes, maam.

Q What makes you say that this procedure was followed?

A As I mentioned earlier, we proved that we did acknowledge the concern of the client in this caseand we did emphatize from the client and apologized, and at the same time got back to them inwhatever investigation we have.

Q You said that you apologized, what did you apologize for?

A Well, first of all it is a standard that we apologize, right? Being in the service industry, it is apractice that we apologize if there is any inconvenience, so the purpose for apologizing is mainlyto show empathy and to ensure the client that we are hearing them out and that we will do abetter investigation and it is not in any way that we are admitting any fault.

[14] (underscoring

supplied)

To the Court, the foregoing explanation of the hotels Banquet Director overcomes any presumption of admission ofbreach which Svenssons letter might have conveyed.

The exculpatory clause notwithstanding, the Court notes that respondent could have managed the situation better,it being held in high esteem in the hotel and service industry. Given respondents vast experience, it is safe to presume thatthis is not its first encounter with booked events exceeding the guaranteed cover. It is not audacious to expect that certainmeasures have been placed in case this predicament crops up. That regardless of these measures, respondent still receivedcomplaints as in the present case, does not amuse.

Respondent admitted that three hotel functions coincided with petitioners reception. To the Court, the delay inservice might have been avoided or minimized if respondent exercised prescience in scheduling events. No less than qualityservice should be delivered especially in events which possibility of repetition is close to nil. Petitioners are not expected toget married twice in their lifetimes.

In the present petition, under considerations of equity, the Court deems it just to award the amount of P50,000.00

by way of nominal damages to petitioners, for the discomfiture that they were subjected to during to the event .[15]

The Courtrecognizes that every person is entitled to respect of his dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind.[16]

Respondentslack of prudence is an affront to this right.

WHEREFORE, the Court of Appeals Decision dated July 27, 2009 is PARTIALLYREVERSED. Respondent is, inlight of the foregoing discussion, ORDERED to pay the amount of P50,000.00 to petitioners by way of nominal damages.

SO ORDERED.
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21. Padilla, et.al.vs. CA, G.R. No. L-39999, May 31, 1984;

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-39999 May 31, 1984

ROY PADILLA, FILOMENO GALDONES, ISMAEL GONZALGO and JOSE FARLEY BEDENIA, petitioners,vs.

COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.

Sisenando Villaluz, Sr. for petitioners.

The Solicitor General for respondent.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J .:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of a Court of Appeals' decision which reversed the trial court's judgment of convictionand acquitted the petitioners of the crime of grave coercion on the ground of reasonable doubt but inspite of the acquittalordered them to pay jointly and severally the amount of P9,000.00 to the complainants as actual damages.

The petitioners were charged under the following information:

The undersigned Fiscal accused ROY PADILLA, FILOMENO GALDONES, PEPITO BEDENIA, YOLLYRICO, DAVID BERMUNDO, VILLANOAC, ROBERTO ROSALES, VILLANIA, ROMEO GARRIDO, JOSE

ORTEGA, JR., RICARDO CELESTINO, REALINGO alias "KAMLON", JOHN DOE alias TATO, andFOURTEEN (14) RICARDO DOES of the crime of GRAVE COERCION, committed as follows:

That on or about February 8, 1964 at around 9:00 o'clock in the morning, in the municipality of JosePanganiban, province of Camarines Norte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,the above- named accused, Roy Padilla, Filomeno Galdones, Pepito Bedenia, Yolly Rico, DavidBermundo, Villanoac, Roberto Rosales, Villania, Romeo Garrido, Jose Ortega, Jr., Ricardo Celestino,Realingo alias Kamlon, John Doe alias Tato, and Fourteen Richard Does, by confederating and mutuallyhelping one another, and acting without any authority of law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, andfeloniously, by means of threats, force and violence prevent Antonio Vergara and his family to close theirstall located at the Public Market, Building No. 3, Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte, and bysubsequently forcibly opening the door of said stall and thereafter brutally demolishing and destroying saidstall and the furnitures therein by axes and other massive instruments, and carrying away the goods,wares and merchandise, to the damage and prejudice of the said Antonio Vergara and his family in theamount of P30,000.00 in concept of actual or compensatory and moral damages, and further the sum of

P20,000.00 as exemplary damages.

That in committing the offense, the accused took advantage of their public positions: Roy Padilla, being theincumbent municipal mayor, and the rest of the accused being policemen, except Ricardo Celestino who isa civilian, all of Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte, and that it was committed with evident premeditation.

The Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte, Tenth Judicial District rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of whichstates that:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court finds the accused Roy Padilla, Filomeno Galdonez, Ismael Gonzalgo and JoseParley Bedenia guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of grave coercion, and hereby imposes upon them to suffer animprisonment of FIVE (5) months and One (1) day; to pay a fine of P500.00 each; to pay actual and compensatory damagesin the amount of P10,000.00; moral damages in the amount of P30,000.00; and another P10,000.00 for exemplary damages,

jointly and severally, and all the accessory penalties provided for by law; and to pay the proportionate costs of thisproceedings.

The accused Federico Realingo alias 'Kamlon', David Bermundo, Christopher Villanoac, GodofredoVillania, Romeo Garrido, Roberto Rosales, Ricardo Celestino and Jose Ortega, are hereby orderedacquitted on grounds of reasonable doubt for their criminal participation in the crime charged.

The petitioners appealed the judgment of conviction to the Court of Appeals. They contended that the trial court's finding ofgrave coercion was not supported by the evidence. According to the petitioners, the town mayor had the power to order theclearance of market premises and the removal of the complainants' stall because the municipality had enacted municipalordinances pursuant to which the market stall was a nuisance per se. The petitioners stated that the lower court erred infinding that the demolition of the complainants' stall was a violation of the very directive of the petitioner Mayor which gavethe stall owners seventy two (72) hours to vacate the market premises. The petitioners questioned the imposition of prisonterms of five months and one day and of accessory penalties provided by law. They also challenged the order to pay fines of


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P500.00 each, P10,000.00 actual and compensatory damages, P30,000.00 moral damages, P10,000.00 exemplarydamages, and the costs of the suit.

The dispositive portion of the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals states:

WHEREFORE, we hereby modify the judgment appealed from in the sense that the appellants areacquitted on ground of reasonable doubt. but they are ordered to pay jointly and severally to complainantsthe amount of P9,600.00, as actual damages.

The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the acquittal of the defendants-appellants as to criminal

liability results in the extinction of their civil liability. The Court of Appeals denied the motion holding that:

xxx xxx xxx

... appellants' acquittal was based on reasonable doubt whether the crime of coercion was committed, noton facts that no unlawful act was committed; as their taking the law into their hands, destructing (sic)complainants' properties is unlawful, and, as evidence on record established that complainants sufferedactual damages, the imposition of actual damages is correct.

Consequently, the petitioners filed this special civil action, contending that:

I

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR OF LAW OR GRAVELY ABUSED ITSDISCRETION IN IMPOSING UPON PETITIONERS PAYMENT OF DAMAGES TO COMPLAINANTS

AFTER ACQUITTING PETITIONERS OF THE CRIME CHARGED FROM WHICH SAID LIABILITYAROSE.

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING IN ITS RESOLUTION DATED DECEMBER 26, 1974THAT SINCE APPELLANTS' ACQUITTAL WAS BASED ON REASONABLE DOUBT, NOT ON FACTSTHAT NO UNLAWFUL ACT WAS COMMITTED, THE IMPOSITION OF ACTUAL DAMAGES ISCORRECT.

III

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A LEGAL INCONSISTENCY, IF NOT PLAIN JUDICIALERROR, IN HOLDING IN ITS APPEALED RESOLUTION THAT PETITIONERS COMMITTED ANUNLAWFUL ACT, THAT IS TAKING THE LAW INTO THEIR HANDS, DESTRUCTING (sic)'COMPLAINANTS' PROPERTIES', AFTER HOLDING IN ITS MAIN DECISION OF NOVEMBER 6,1974THAT THE ACTS FOR WHICH THEY WERE CHARGED DID NOT CONSTITUTE GRAVE COERCION

AND THEY WERE NOT CHARGED OF ANY OTHER CRIME.

IV

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ORDERING THE PETITIONERS HEREIN, APPELLANTS IN CA-G.R. NO. 13456CR, JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY, TO PAY COMPLAINANTS P9,600.00 IN SUPPOSED

ACTUAL DAMAGES.

The issue posed in the instant proceeding is whether or not the respondent court committed a reversible error in requiringthe petitioners to pay civil indemnity to the complainants after acquitting them from the criminal charge.

Petitioners maintain the view that where the civil liability which is included in the criminal action is that arising from and as aconsequence of the criminal act, and the defendant was acquitted in the criminal case, (no civil liability arising from thecriminal case), no civil liability arising from the criminal charge could be imposed upon him. They cite precedents to the effectthat the liability of the defendant for the return of the amount received by him may not be enforced in the criminal case butmust be raised in a separate civil action for the recovery of the said amount (People v. Pantig, 97 Phil. 748; following thedoctrine laid down in Manila Railroad Co. v. Honorable Rodolfo Baltazar, 49 O.G. 3874; Pueblo contra Abellera, 69 Phil. 623;People v. Maniago 69 Phil. 496; People v. Miranda, 5 SCRA 1067; Aldaba v. Elepafio 116 Phil. 457). In the case before us,

the petitioners were acquitted not because they did not commit the acts stated in the charge against them. There is nodispute over the forcible opening of the market stall, its demolition with axes and other inst ruments, and the carting away ofthe merchandize. The petitioners were acquitted because these acts were denominated coercion when they properlyconstituted some other offense such as threat or malicious mischief.

The respondent Court of Appeals stated in its decision:

For a complaint to prosper under the foregoing provision, the violence must be employed against theperson, not against property as what happened in the case at bar. ...

xxx xxx xxx

The next problem is: May the accused be convicted of an offense other than coercion?


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From all appearances, they should have been prosecuted either for threats or malicious mischief. But thelaw does not allow us to render judgment of conviction for either of these offenses for the reason that theywere not indicted for, these offenses. The information under which they were prosecuted does not allegethe elements of either threats or malicious mischief. Although the information mentions that the act was bymeans of threats', it does not allege the particular threat made. An accused person is entitled to beinformed of the nature of the acts imputed to him before he can be made to enter into trial upon a validinformation.

We rule that the crime of grave coercion has not been proved in accordance with law.

While appellants are entitled to acquittal they nevertheless are liable for the actual damages suffered bythe complainants by reason of the demolition of the stall and loss of some of their properties. Theextinction of the penal action does not carry with it that of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from adeclaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. (Rule 111, Sec. 3(c), Rev. Rules of Court; Laperal v. Aliza, 51 OG.R. 1311, People v. Velez, 44 OG. 1811). In the instantcase, the fact from which the civil might arise, namely, the demolition of the stall and loss of the propertiescontained therein; exists, and this is not denied by the accused. And since there is no showing that thecomplainants have reserved or waived their right to institute a separate civil action, the civil aspect thereinis deemed instituted with the criminal action. (Rule 111, Sec. 1, Rev. Rules of Court).

xxx xxx xxx

Section 1 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court states the fundamental proposition that when a criminal action is instituted, thecivil action for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with it. There is no impliedinstitution when the offended party expressly waives the civil action or reserves his right to institute it separately. (Morte Sr.

v. Alvizo, Jr., 101 SCRA 221).

The extinction of the civil action by reason of acquittal in the criminal case refers exclusively to civil liability ex delic to foundedon Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code. (Elcano v. Hill, 77 SCRA 98; Virata v. Ochoa, 81 SCRA 472). In other words, thecivil liability which is also extinguished upon acquittal of the accused is the civil liability arising from the act as a crime.

As easily as 1942, the Supreme Court speaking through Justice Jorge Bocobo in Barredo v. Garcia, et at. 73 Phil. 607 laiddown the rule that the same punishable act or omission can create two kinds of civil liabilities against the accused and,where provided by law, his employer. 'There is the civil liability arising from the act as a crime and the liability arising from thesame act as a quasi-delict. Either one of these two types of civil liability may be enforced against the accused, However, theoffended party cannot recover damages under both types of liability. For instance, in cases of criminal negligence or crimesdue to reckless imprudence, Article 2177 of the Civil Code provides:

Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from thecivil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twicefor the same act or omission of the defendant.

Section 3 (c) of Rule 111 specifically provides that:

Sec. 3. Other civil actions arising from offenses. In all cases not included in the preceding section thefollowing rules shall be observed:

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

(c) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceedsfrom a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. In othercases, the person entitled to the civil action may institute it in the Jurisdiction and in the manner providedby law against the person who may be liable for restitution of the thing and reparation or indemnity for thedamage suffered.

The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of the accused for damages only when it includes a declaration that the

facts from which the civil might arise did not exist. Thus, the civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal where the acquittal isbased on reasonable doubt (PNB v. Catipon, 98 Phil. 286) as only preponderance of evidence is required in civil cases;where the court expressly declares that the liability of the accused is not criminal but only civil in nature (De Guzman v. Alvia,96 Phil. 558; People v. Pantig, supra) as, for instance, in the felonies of estafa, theft, and malicious mischief committed bycertain relatives who thereby incur only civil liability (See Art. 332, Revised Penal Code); and, where the civil liability does notarise from or is not based upon the criminal act of which the accused was acquitted (Castro v. Collector of Internal Revenue,4 SCRA 1093; See Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, 1983 ed., p. 623). Article 29 of the Civil Code also provides that:

When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been provedbeyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted. Suchaction requires only a preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of the defendant, the court may requirethe plaintiff to file a bond to answer for damages in case the complaint should be found to be malicious.


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If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the court shall so declare.In the absence of any declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from the text of the decision whether ornot the acquittal is due to that ground.

More recently, we held that the acquittal of the defendant in the criminal case would not constitute an obstacle to the filing ofa civil case based on the same acts which led to the criminal prosecution:

... The finding by the respondent court that he spent said sum for and in the interest of the CapizAgricultural and Fishery School and for his personal benefit is not a declaration that the fact upon whichCivil Case No. V-3339 is based does not exist. The civil action barred by such a declaration is the civilliability arising from the offense charged, which is the one impliedly instituted with the criminal action.(Section 1, Rule III, Rules of Court.) Such a declaration would not bar a civil action filed against anaccused who had been acquitted in the criminal case if the criminal action is predicated on factual or legalconsiderations other than the commission of the offense charged. A person may be acquitted ofmalversation where, as in the case at bar, he could show that he did not misappropriate the public funds inhis possession, but he could be rendered liable to restore said funds or at least to make a properaccounting thereof if he shall spend the same for purposes which are not authorized nor intended, and in amanner not permitted by applicable rules and regulations. (Republic v. Bello, 120 SCRA 203)

There appear to be no sound reasons to require a separate civil action to still be filed considering that the facts to be provedin the civil case have already been established in the criminal proceedings where the accused was acquitted. Due processhas been accorded the accused. He was, in fact, exonerated of the criminal charged. The constitutional presumption ofinnocence called for more vigilant efforts on the part of prosecuting attorneys and defense counsel, a keener awareness byall witnesses of the serious implications of perjury, and a more studied consideration by the judge of the entire records and ofapplicable statutes and precedents. To require a separate civil action simply because the accused was acquitted would

mean needless clogging of court dockets and unnecessary duplication of litigation with all its attendant loss of time, effort,and money on the part of all concerned.

The trial court found the following facts clearly established by the evidence adduced by both the prosecution and thedefense:

xxx xxx xxx

(9) In the morning of February 8, 1964, then Chief Galdones, complying with the instructions contained insaid Memorandum No. 32 of the Mayor, and upon seeing that Antonio Vergara had not vacated thepremises in question, with the aid of his policemen, forced upon the store or stall and ordered the removalof the goods inside the store of Vergara, at the same time taking inventory of the goods taken out, piledthem outside in front of the store and had it cordoned with a rope, and after all the goods were taken outfrom the store, ordered the demolition of said stall of Antonio Vergara. Since then up to the trial of thiscase, the whereabouts of the goods taken out from the store nor the materials of the demolished stall havenot been made known.

The respondent Court of Appeals made a similar finding that:

On the morning of February 8th, because the said Vergaras had not up to that time complied with theorder to vacate, the co-accused Chief of Police Galdones and some members of his police force, went tothe market and, using ax, crowbars and hammers, demolished the stall of the Vergaras who were notpresent or around, and after having first inventoried the goods and merchandise found therein, they hadthem brought to the municipal building for safekeeping. Inspite of notice served upon the Vergaras to takepossession of the goods and merchandise thus taken away, the latter refused to do so.

The loss and damage to the Vergaras as they evaluated them were:

Cost of stall construction P1,300.00

Value of furniture and equipmentjudgment destroyed 300.00

Value of goods and equipment taken 8,000.00

P9,600.00

It is not disputed that the accused demolished the grocery stall of the complainants Vergaras and cartedaway its contents. The defense that they did so in order to abate what they considered a nuisance per seis untenable, This finds no support in law and in fact. The couple has been paying rentals for the premisesto the government which allowed them to lease the stall. It is, therefore, farfetched to say that the stall wasa nuisance per se which could be summarily abated.

The petitioners, themselves, do not deny the fact that they caused the destruction of the complainant's market stall and hadits contents carted away. They state:


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On February 8, 1964, despite personal pleas on Vergaras by the Mayor to vacate the passageways ofMarket Building No. 3, the Vergaras were still in the premises, so the petitioners Chief of Police andmembers of the Police Force of Jose Panganiban, pursuant to the Mayor' 6 directives, demolished thestore of the Vergaras, made an inventory of the goods found in said store, and brought these goods to themunicipal building under the custody of the Municipal Treasurer, .. .

The only supposed obstacle is the provision of Article 29 of the Civil Code, earlier cited, that "when the accused in a criminalprosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action fordamages for the same act or omission may be instituted." According to some scholars, this provision of substantive law calls

for a separate civil action and cannot be modified by a rule of remedial law even in the interests of economy and simplicityand following the dictates of logic and common sense.

As stated by retired Judge J. Cezar Sangco:

... if the Court finds the evidence sufficient to sustain the civil action but inadequate to justify a conviction inthe criminal action, may it render judgment acquitting the accused on reasonable doubt, but hold him civillyliable nonetheless? An affirmative answer to this question would be consistent with the doctrine that thetwo are distinct and separate actions, and win (a) dispense with the reinstituting of the same civil action, orone based on quasi-delict or other independent civil action, and of presenting the same evidence: (b) savethe injured party unnecessary expenses in the prosecution of the civil action or enable him to takeadvantage of the free services of the fiscal; and (c) otherwise resolve the unsettling implications ofpermitting the reinstitution of a separate civil action whether based on delict, or quasi-delict, or otherindependent civil actions.

... But for the court to be able to adjudicate in the manner here suggested, Art. 29 of the Civil Code should

be amended because it clearly and expressly provides that the civil action based on the same act oromission may only be instituted in a separate action, and therefore, may not inferentially be resolved in thesame criminal action. To dismiss the civil action upon acquittal of the accused and disallow the reinstitutionof any other civil action, would likewise render, unjustifiably, the acquittal on reasonable doubt without anysignificance, and would violate the doctrine that the two actions are distinct and separate.

In the light of the foregoing exposition, it seems evident that there is much sophistry and no pragmatism inthe doctrine that it is inconsistent to award in the same proceedings damages against the accused afteracquitting him on reasonable doubt. Such doctrine must recognize the distinct and separate character ofthe two actions, the nature of an acquittal on reasonable doubt, the vexatious and oppressive effects of areservation or institution of a separate civil action, and that the injured party is entitled to damages notbecause the act or omission is punishable but because he was damaged or injured thereby (Sangco,Philippine Law on Torts and Damages, pp. 288-289).

We see no need to amend Article 29 of the Civil Code in order to allow a court to grant damages despite a judgment ofacquittal based on reasonable doubt. What Article 29 clearly and expressly provides is a remedy for the plaintiff in case the

defendant has been acquitted in a criminal prosecution on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonabledoubt. It merely emphasizes that a civil action for damages is not precluded by an acquittal for the same criminal act oromission. The Civil Code provision does not state that the remedy can be availed of only in a separate civil action. Aseparate civil case may be filed but there is no statement that such separate filing is the only and exclusive permissiblemode of recovering damages.

There is nothing contrary to the Civil Code provision in the rendition of a judgment of acquittal and a judgment awardingdamages in the same criminal action. The two can stand side by side. A judgment of acquittal operates to extinguish thecriminal liability. It does not, however, extinguish the civil liability unless there is clear showing that the act from which civilliability might arise did not exist.

A different conclusion would be attributing to the Civil Code a trivial requirement, a provision which imposes an uncalled forburden before one who has already been the victim of a condemnable, yet non-criminal, act may be accorded the justicewhich he seeks.

We further note the rationale behind Art. 29 of the Civil Code in arriving at the intent of the legislator that they could not

possibly have intended to make it more difficult for the aggrieved party to recover just compensation by making a separatecivil action mandatory and exclusive:

The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case also releases him from civil liability is oneof the most serious flaws in the Philippine legal system. It has given rise to numberless instances ofmiscarriage of justice, where the acquittal was due to a reasonable doubt in the mind of the court as to theguilt of the accused. The reasoning followed is that inasmuch as the civil responsibility is derived from thethe criminal offense, when the latter is not proved, civil liability cannot be demanded.

This is one of those cases where confused thinking leads to unfortunate and deplorable consequences.Such reasoning fails to draw a clear line of demarcation between criminal liability and civil responsibility,and to determine the logical result of the distinction. The two liabilities are separate and distinct from each


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other. One affects the social order and the other, private rights. One is for the punishment or correction ofthe offender while the other is for reparation of damages suffered by the aggrieved party... it is just andproper that, for the purposes of the imprisonment of or fine upon the accused, the offense should beproved beyond reasonable doubt. But for the purpose of indemnifying the complaining party, why shouldthe offense also be proved beyond reasonable doubt? Is not the invasion or violation of every private rightto be proved only by preponderance of evidence? Is the right of the aggrieved person any less privatebecause the wrongful act is also punishable by the criminal law? (Code Commission, pp. 45-46).

A separate civil action may be warranted where additional facts have to be established or more evidence must be adduced

or where the criminal case has been fully terminated and a separate complaint would be just as efficacious or even moreexpedient than a timely remand to the trial court where the criminal action was decided for further hearings on the civilaspects of the case. The offended party may, of course, choose to file a separate action. These do not exist in this case.Considering moreover the delays suffered by the case in the trial, appellate, and review stages, it would be unjust to thecomplainants in this case to require at this time a separate civil action to be filed.

With this in mind, we therefore hold that the respondent Court of Appeals did not err in awarding damages despite ajudgment of acquittal.

WHEREFORE, we hereby AFFIRM the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals and dismiss the petition for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Makasiar, Guerrero, Abad Santos, Melencio- Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Relova and De la Fuente,JJ., concur.

Aquino, J., concur in the result.

De Castro, J., took no part.

Concepcion, Jr. J., is on leave.


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22. PNCC vs. CA, G.R. No. 159270, August 22, 2005;

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 159270. August 22, 2005]

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, pet i t ioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, RODRIGOARNAIZ, REGINA LATAGAN, RICARDO GENERALAO and PAMPANGA SUGAR DEVELOPMENT COMPANY,INC., CORPORATION, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorariof the Decision[1]

of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 47699affirming, with modification, the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila in Civil Case No. 93-64803.

The Antecedents

Pampanga Sugar Development Company, Inc. (PASUDECO) transports sugarcane from Mabalacat and Magalang,Pampanga. When the Mount Pinatubo eruption of 1991 heavily damaged the national bridges along Abacan-Angeles andSapang Maragul viaMagalang, Pampanga, it requested permission from the Toll Regulatory Board (TRB) for its trucks toenter and pass through the North Luzon Expressway (NLEX) via Dau-Sta. Ines from Mabalacat, and viaAngeles fromMagalang, and exit at San Fernando going to its milling factory .

[2]The TRB furnished the Philippine National Construction

Corporation (PNCC) (the franchisee that operates and maintains the toll facilities in the North and South Luzon TollExpressways) with a copy of the said request for it to comment thereon.

[3]

On November 5, 1991, TRB and PASUDECO entered into a Memorandum of Agreemen t[4]

(MOA), where the latterwas allowed to enter and pass through the NLEX on the following terms and conditions:

1. PASUDECO trucks should move in convoy;

2. Said trucks will stay on the right lane;

3. A vehicle with blinking lights should be assigned at the rear end of the convoy with a sign which should readas follows: Caution: CONVOY AHEAD!!!;

4. Tollway safety measures should be properly observed;

5. Accidents or damages to the toll facilities arising out of any activity related to this approval shall be theresponsibility of PASUDECO;

6. PASUDECO shall be responsible in towing their stalled trucks immediately to avoid any inconvenience to theother motorists;

7. This request will be in force only while the national bridges

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