Hartmut Esser
Toward a General Theory of Action:The Model of Frame-Selection
University of MannheimFaculty of Social SciencesMannheim Centre for European Social Research
Conference„Game Theory and Society“Zürich 27th-29th July 2011
A challenging (and meanwhile classical) example fromrational choice theory…
Cooperation and Punishment
Cooperation and Punishment in a Collective-Good-Game (Fehr&Gächter 2000; Fehr & Gintis 2007)
Cooperation and Punishment in a Collective-Good-Game (Fehr&Gächter 2000; Fehr & Gintis 2007): Proportion „Cooperation“
0
20
40
60
80
100
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Period
withpunishment
withoutpunishment
50%!
„Altruists“ start with cooperationand adapt (rationally) to
the exploitation by „Egoists“
„Egoists“ and „Altruists“anticipate possible punishment by
some „irrationals“ and thisinitiates (full) cooperation
Cooperation and Punishment in a Collective-Good-Game (Fehr&Gächter 2000; Fehr & Gintis 2007): Proportion „Cooperation“
no last roundeffect!
„RCT“?
… and a (completely) different explanation:Wallstreet and Community
The „Wallstreet-Game“ (Liberman, Samuels & Ross 2004)
67
33
75
33
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
Community Wall Street Game Game
% C
oope
ratio
n Fi
rst R
ound
"Most Likely Cooperators"
"Most Likely Defectors"
„Personality“
„Definition“of the situation
Symbols activate certaincultural „models“, which governbehavior regardless of individual
preferences/incentivesFrame of the
Game
… and another classics (modified):Kahneman&Tversky: Save or Die?
20
40
60
80
100
01 2 3 4 5
Experiments
num
bers
/pro
port
ions
50
A/C: save withcertainty/risk
B/D: die withcertainty/risk
All programs have thesame objective efficiency:
200 rescued people
… but responses arevery different
depending on its verbalpresentationK&T
original
Difference in efficiency of programs
200
0
20
40
60
80
100
1 2 3 4 5
Experiments
num
bers
/pro
port
ions
50
A/C: save withcertainty/risk
B/D: die withcertainty/risk
Norm „die“:never let die someone
with certainty!
All programs have thesame objective efficiency:
200 rescued people
… but responses arevery different
depending on its verbalpresentation
Difference in efficiency of programs
Norm „save“:If you can save someone,
do it with certainty!
K&Toriginal
What happens ifefficiency changes?
200
0
20
40
60
80
100
1 2 3 4 5
Experiments
num
bers
/pro
port
ions
50
Difference in efficiency of programs
K&Toriginal
200
0
20
40
60
80
100
1 2 3 4 5
Experiments
num
bers
/pro
port
ions
50
Difference in efficiency of programs
K&Toriginal
number of rescued(more) by A/C vs B/D
Replication&Variations
objective incentiveto vote for A/C
200201
210
250
300
RCT-Expectation:with increasing incentivesdifferences will disappear
0
20
40
60
80
100
1 2 3 4 5
Experiments
num
bers
/pro
port
ions
50
number of rescued(more )by A/C vs B/D
objective incentiveto vote for A/C
strong increase in incentives,slight increase in choice,
almost no change in differences
Difference in efficiency of programs
RCT-Expectation:with increasing incentivesdifferences will disappear
200201
210
250
300K&T
originalReplication&
Variations
… even for extremely high costs:Rescue of Jews in WWII
The Rescue of Jews in Nazi Europe (Varese & Yaish 2000)
Factors of rescue behavior (logistic regression coefficients)
Variables
Age (1940)Gender (male)Education (high)Religiosity (no)Many neighborsCellar in houseNumber roomsUrban/rural„Resistance“
„RC“-Factors
Model 1
0.078**-0.959**-0.1960.468**-0.890-0.7230.295-1.08710.205
2.847**
Model 2
0.109**1.890**-0.2290.501**-1.153-0.0610.261-0.97911.378
Personal call
most importantsingle factor!
„… I could notdeny!“
… and a reminder from (classical) Sociology:Talcott Parsons
The „Unit Act“
RC
(„Structure of Social Action“ 1937)
„Definition of the Situation“
ActorsEndsSituation: Conditions (not under control)
Means (under control)
Normative Orientation
Every action is somehow „framed“ by a binding orientation
„Rational choice“ takes always place within such anormative orientation (and constitutes sometimes such aframe itself)
Most important: integration of utilitarian, normative andcultural aspects of actions to ONE comprehensive concept!
Assumptions and Perspectives:
„Correcting explanation“ of special theories by „reduction“to a more general one (Popper)
„Toward a General Theory of Action“ (Parsons et al. 1954)
Two (completely) different mechanisms
The difficulty:
mechanism 2
activationof a
„programme“
decodingof the past
consideration ofconsequencesin the future
mechanism 1
calculationof
cost&benefits
… including„social“ motives!
rational choicenormativebehavior
„Rational action – be it economically or politicallymotivated – is concerned with outcomes. Rationalitysays‚ 'If you want to achieve Y, do X’..“ (Elster 1989(“Nuts and Bolts”): 113)
„I define social norms by the feature that they are notoutcome-oriented. ... The imperatives expressed in socialnorms ... are unconditional.“ (Elster 1989 („The Cementof Society“): 98)
rationalchoice
normativebehavior
conditional!
unconditional!
decodingof the past
activationof a
„programme“
mechanism 2mechanism 1
calculationof
cost&benefits
rational choicenormativebehavior
conditional unconditional
condideration ofconsequencesin the future
… regardless thekind of motives! … any new incentive
could beat the norm!
… no incentive canbeat the norm!
… and a third one
mechanism 1
calculationof
cost&benefits
mechanism 1Homooeconomicus
rational choice
conditional
mechanism 2
activationof a
„programme“
mechanism 2Homosociologicus
decodingof the past
normativebehavior
unconditional
„interpretation“&
„symbolic interaction“
mechanism 2mechanism 2Homo
culturalis
„meaning“of symbolsand „cues“
mindfulorientation
„creative“
condideration ofconsequencesin the future
„logic ofcalculativeness“
„logic ofappropriateness“
Homoreciprocans
… and One for All:… and One for All:The Model of Frame-Selection
Main intuition
Situational Objects/Mental Models
Frame-Selection
Script-Selection
Action/Behavior
visibleresponses
internalmechanisms
Ideas/Concepts/Categories/Schemes
Habits/Routines/Standard Procedures
Symbols with„Meaning“
(un-)reflected(re-)actions
Three Roots
Rational Choice Theory&Theory of Reasoned Action
Attitude-Theory&Program Based Behavior
Categorization&Schema-Theory
Coleman/Fishbein&Ajzen
Allport/Homans; Mayr
Mead/Abelson
Three mechanisms
Situational Objects/Mental Models
Frame-Selection
Script-Selection
Behavior/Action
VariableRationality
Definitionof Situation
PatternRecognition
1. Pattern Recognition
Pattern Recognition
(Mis-)Match between mental models and situational objects Activation of biological/socialized reaction-programsBackground: Schema-Theory/Cognition-Theory/Neuro-Science
Situational Objects/Mental Models
Frame-Selection
PatternRecognition
(Mis-)MatchObject/Mental Model
„cues“„symbols“„triggers“
2. Variable Rationality
Variable Rationality
Selection of different degrees of „elaboration“two extremes: automatic-spontaneous vs reflexive-calculating Background: Dual-Process-Theory/Schütz; Mead; Goffman; Garfinkel
Situational Objects/Mental Models
Frame-Selection
VariableRationality
Degree ofelaboration
with „RC“ as oneextreme … … and physiological
reflexes as the other
3. Definition of Situation
Definition of the Situation
Selection of a certain „view“ of the situation („Framing“)… with different degrees of „rationality“ and „conditionality“Background: Attitude-Theory/Schema-Theory/
Thomas, Allport, Abelson
Situational Objects/Mental Models
Frame-Selection
Definitionof Situation
Selection of the„view“ on the
situation
… in differentdegrees ofelaboration
The process
perfect match
normativebehavior
mindfulinterpretation
rationalchoice
notsuitable
suitable
match not perfect
Motivation Opportunity
Effort
VariableRationality
Frame-Selection Definition
of Situation
Pattern Recognition
… and: “Action!”
Situational Objects/Mental Models
Frame-Selection
Script-Selection
Definitionof the Situation
VariableRationality
Behavior/Action
link?
link?
PatternRecognition
sameprocedure …
sameprocedure …
The formal core of the MFS
Pattern Recognition/Categorization: match or mis-match?
Modus-Selection: which degree of elaboration?
Model-Selection: which frame, script and action?
Three steps:
Pattern Recognition/Categorization: match or mis-match?
Modus-Selection: which degree of elaboration?
Model-Selection: which frame, script and action?
Three steps:
(1-mi)*(Ur+Cw)*p – C > 0
Categorization/(Mis-)Match
Opportunities
Effort
gain right„frame“
loss wrong„frame“
Everything is given inthe actual situation!
… or an objectiverestriction!(pre)knowledge
timeressources
Conditions to change to „elaboration“
(1-mi)*(Ur+Cw)*p – C > 0
Categorization/(Mis-)Match
Opportunities
EffortMotivation
Everything is given inthe actual situation!
… or an objectiverestriction!(pre)knowledge
timeressources
Conditions to change to „elaboration“
analogous stepwise for script- and action-selection …
… depending on the activation weight of the respective frame/script
An Illustration
rationalcalculation
of costs/benefits
spontaneousreaction
followinga „program“
futureconsequences
encoding/decoding
(mis)„match“with a„model“
e.g. a branch ina forest looking
like a snake
… for a laymen hotemotion
concentratedroutine
… for asnake expert
cooldecision
… if time andinformations are
available
Main implication: (un)conditionality
decodingof the past
activationof a
„programme“
mechanism 2mechanism 1
calculationof
cost&benefits
rational choicenormativebehavior
conditional unconditional
condideration ofconsequencesin the future
… regardless thekind of motives!
Two Cases
Case 1: Perfect Match
(1-mi)*(Ur+Cw)*p – C > 0
Categorization/(Mis-)Match
Conditions to change to „elaboration“
(1-mi)*(Ur+Cw)*p – C > 0
perfect match
Conditions to change to „elaboration“
(0) *(Ur+Cw)*p – C > 0
mi = 1
Conditions to change to „elaboration“
Alfred Schütz:Everyday Behavior
– C > 0
Conditions to change to „elaboration“
Alfred Schütz:Everyday Behavior
„automatic“
Case 2: No Opportunities
(1-mi)*(Ur+Cw)*p – C > 0
Opportunities
Conditions to change to „elaboration“
(1-mi)*(Ur+Cw)*p – C > 0
noopportunities
Conditions to change to „elaboration“
(1-mi)*(Ur+Cw)*0 – C > 0
p = 0
Conditions to change to „elaboration“
– C > 0
Conditions to change to „elaboration“
„automatic“
(0) *(Urc+Cw)*0 – C > 0
perfectmatch
noopportunities
all incentives aresuppressed!
strong framing
automaticreaction
Conditions to change to „elaboration“
… and a typical statistical interaction effect
strong
weak
Framing
incentiveslow high
-4
-2
0
2
4
actiontendency
The interaction of framing and RC-incentives
with strong framing„rational“ incentives
are ignored
unconditional!
conditional!
Empirical evidence?
Divorce, Embeddedness and Church Wedding(Esser 2002)
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
TR
ate
Network dense
Opportunities
Network not dense
Opportunities
Transition Rates to Divorce
Frame 1 (weak)
Frame 3 (strong)
Frame 1 (weak)
Frame 3 (strong)
unconditional!
unconditional!
A strong marriage frameprevents divorce for all conditions
conditional!
The Rescue of Jews(Kroneberg, et. al. 2010)
0.2
.4.6
.81
Pr(R
escu
eing
)
-2 -1 0
Perceived Risk Index (z-scores)
High Prosocial Orientation (Empirical Max.)Low Prosocial Orientation (Empirical Min.)
unconditional!
conditional!help is
(in)dependent ofperceived risks
Risk!
Voting and „civic duty“(Kroneberg et. al. 2010)
Pr(V
otin
g)
0.2
.4.6
.81
-2 -1 0
Political Preference Index (z-scores)
High Civic Duty Norm (Empirical Max.)Low Civic Duty Norm (Empirical Min.)
unconditional!
conditional!
participation is(in)dependent ofpossible gains!
Incentives!
More examples:
Stability of (non-marital) partnerships (Hunkler&Kneip 2008)Respondent behavior (Stocké 2006)Educational decisions (Stocké 2009)Environmental behavior (Best 2009)Participation in high culture (Weingartner 2009)Cultural Differences in Fertility (Nauck 2010)Criminal Behavior (Kroneberg 2010)Trust (blind vs reflected) (Rompf 2010)…
… and the first case again: A re-interpretation
0
20
40
60
80
100
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Period
withpunishment
withoutpunishment
Cooperation and Punishment in a Collective-Good-Game (Fehr&Gächter 2000; Fehr & Gintis 2007): Proportion „Cooperation“
two „types“:A and E
„punishment“sets the A-frame new!
A: „Community“ E: „Wallstreet“
A´s start with C,E´s with D
continuation of Dserves as mis-matchfor „Community“
„social“ framing and„rational“ rewards!
… incentivesbecome important
for all
… (re-)framing to„Wallstreet“ for all
„punishment“sets the A-frame new!
And for all!
punishment-costsare ignored!
What Else?
DPT?
no (formal) model for the integrationof categorization and MOE
but: strong empirical evidence for MOE for „variable rationality“
(wide) RCT?
no addition of new motives in utility functions, but suppression of incentives and „rational“ choice („variable rationality“)
different mechanism: categorization and pattern recognition instead of „calculation“
(wide) RCT as special case (as all other main approaches) with its own fields of applicability (and its merits there!)
Goal Framing?
incomplete: no theoretical place for cue-effects
imprecise: no model for the interaction of frames and incentives andtherefore (no) precise derivation of special implications (eg of „socialframing“ or „modularity“ and „porosity“)
special case of (wide) RCT with some (ad hoc) assumptions on basic frames, activated somehow by „goals“/needs and/or „cues“
A „General“ Theory of Action?
Three Models of Man
mechanism 1
calculationof
cost&benefits
mechanism 1Homooeconomicus
rational choice
conditional
mechanism 2
activationof a
„programme“
mechanism 2Homosociologicus
decodingof the past
normativebehavior
unconditional
„interpretation“&
„symbolic interaction“
mechanism 2mechanism 2Homo
culturalis
„meaning“of symbolsand „cues“
mindfulorientation
„creative“
condideration ofconsequencesin the future
„logic ofcalculativeness“
„logic ofappropriateness“
Homoreciprocans
… three main structural aspectsof social situations
mechanism 1
calculationof
cost&benefits
mechanism 1Homooeconomicus mechanism 2
activationof a
„programme“
mechanism 2Homosociologicus
decodingof the past
mechanism 2
„interpretation“&
„symbolic interaction“
mechanism 2Homoculturalis
„meaning“of symbolsand „cues“
Interests InstitutionsIdeas
rational choice
conditional
normativebehavior
unconditional
mindfulorientation
„creative“
condideration ofconsequencesin the future
„logic ofcalculativeness“
„logic ofappropriateness“
Homoreciprocans
… three conceptions of „rules“/„norms“/„roles“
mechanism 1
calculationof
cost&benefits
mechanism 1Homooeconomicus
Interests
mechanism 2
activationof a
„programme“
mechanism 2Homosociologicus
decodingof the past
Institutions
mechanism 2
„interpretation“&
„symbolic interaction“
mechanism 2Homoculturalis
„meaning“of symbols
Ideas
rational choice
conditional
normativebehavior
unconditional
mindfulorientation
„creative“
condideration ofconsequencesin the future
… asincentives
… asimperatives
… ascues
Homoreciprocans
… three social-science paradigms
mechanism 1
calculationof
cost&benefits
mechanism 1Homooeconomicus
Interests
mechanism 2
activationof a
„programme“
mechanism 2Homosociologicus
decodingof the past
Institutions
mechanism 2
„interpretation“&
„symbolic interaction“
mechanism 2Homoculturalis
„meaning“of symbolsand „cues“
Ideas
rational choice
conditional
normativebehavior
unconditional
mindfulorientation
„creative“
condideration ofconsequencesin the future
„logic ofcalculativeness“
„logic ofappropriateness“
… asincentives
… asimperatives
… ascues
UtilitarianParadigm
NormativeParadigm
InterpretiveParadigm
Homoreciprocans
A General Theory of Action?
A General Theory of Action!
