Trade Reform and the Corn Market: Prospects for the World Trade Organization Negotiations on...

Agricultural & Applied Economics Association

Trade Reform and the Corn Market: Prospects for the World Trade Organization Negotiationson AgricultureAuthor(s): Jeff KingSource: Review of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 23, No. 1 (Spring - Summer, 2001), pp. 47-67Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of Agricultural & Applied Economics AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1349906 .

Accessed: 28/06/2014 15:13

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

Agricultural & Applied Economics Association and Oxford University Press are collaborating with JSTOR todigitize, preserve and extend access to Review of Agricultural Economics.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 193.105.245.159 on Sat, 28 Jun 2014 15:13:08 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=oup

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=aaea

http://www.jstor.org/stable/1349906?origin=JSTOR-pdf

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp


Review of Agricultural Economics-Volume 23, Number 1-Pages 47-67

Trade Reform and the Corn Market: Prospects for the World Trade Organization Negotiations on Agriculture

Jeff King

Government support and trade restrictions on agricultural commodities are among the most globally distorting protectionist policies. This is especially true with regards to corn. Vast production subsidies and import barriers, primarily within the European Union and China, have artificially inflated the global supply of this commodity, while restricting the available consumer markets. This impact is augmented by the preferential treatment granted in these countries to the production and importation of the best available substitute to corn, soybeans. Using an econometric model with commodity data over the past 20 years, this article predicts the likely impact of potential World Trade Organization (WTO) trade pacts on these corn trade distortions. Despite the WTO setback in Seattle, the vast global benefits resulting from agricultural trade liberalization in corn alone validate a continued push towards freer trade.

Government assistance to agriculture has been a high priority topic for decades. Whether through import restrictions, export subsidies, price con-

trols, or direct income payments, many governments provide significant financial support to their farmers. These protectionist regimes have been extremely expensive and highly trade-distorting. While domestic reforms and the first broad General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) inclusion of agriculture in 1993 have helped mitigate this support dilemma, agriculture still receives more government assistance as a proportion of net sales than any other economic item.

This fact and Uruguay Round obligations for further negotiations placed agriculture at the forefront of the December 1999 World Trade Organization (WTO) plenary conference in Seattle. Due largely to the heated domestic politics of agriculture and the bitter national disagreements over the desirable character- istics of future farm subsidies, these talks failed. While less pronounced failures

U Jeff King, MPhil, University of Cambridge, is currently affiliated with Yale Law School.



48 Review of Agricultural Economics

had doomed other international trade negotiations for years, the member-states responded to this setback by immediately restarting discussions on creating a WTO mini-round devoted to agricultural issues. This determination, combined with the continuing agricultural commodity price crisis, highlights the increasing importance of agricultural trade reform (Olson).

With these issues in mind, numerous studies have examined the ramifications of proposed reforms. These studies tend to focus on the implications of reform on agriculture as a whole, or on certain high profile sectors such as wheat and sugar. While these and many other products need addressing in the context of trade reform, this article will focus on an area of growing importance: corn.'

This report will take the following approach to the study of trade reform and the corn market. The first priority is to briefly discuss global corn supply and demand, including the use of soybeans as a corn substitute. The next section pro- ceeds through a historical account of market changes over the past two decades. This discussion will highlight the basic nonpolicy factors that influence corn prices and production, focusing on the four major corn trading states: Argentina, the United States, China, and the European Union (EU).2 The third section will examine the significant impact that government actions can have both domestically and on the global corn-trading regime. The following section will introduce a basic model for estimating the corn market effects of potential proposals at the WTO negotiations on agriculture. This discussion will conclude with basic rec- ommendations based on the modular results and the preceding research.

Corn Production and Consumption Overview Supply and Demand

Having established the need for and the viability of this corn market analysis, a basic understanding of this commodity is essential. Approximately two-thirds of corn is used for feed purposes.3 This feed-dominated market helps account for the global increase in corn demand over the past two decades, despite a sizeable drop in its use as a human dietary component. Likewise, world production of corn expanded to 613 million metric tons (MMT) in 1998, a 55% increase since 1980 (USDA, 2000).

Until recently, most studies predicted a continued demand increase, deriving largely from the developing world (Josling, Tangermann, and Warley, p. 44). Incomes in these countries, especially in Southeast Asia, increased rapidly over most of the past 15 years. According to development economics theory and actual events, as incomes rise, so does meat demand. This trend occurs because poor households that desired, but previously could not afford, meat acquire the money to purchase it. Since corn is a primary feed component for virtually every type of livestock and, to a lesser extent, poultry, this increased meat consumption bolsters corn demand.

However, the short-term picture differs dramatically from this growth-oriented extended forecast. Dual supply and demand shifts caused a sharp increase in the amount of excess corn available on world markets. Corn demand decreased significantly in the latter half of 1998, primarily due to the Asian financial crisis. This demand shift was coupled by increased global corn supply emerging



Trade Reform and the Corn Market 49

from the initial shock effects of the 1996 Farm Bill. This legislation ended large- scale government grain storage, forcing farms to privately finance all grain stocks. Given the high costs of carrying inventory, most U.S. farmers instead utilized the marketing loan mechanism, which had received sparse use prior to the abolition of government-financed grain storage. With global corn demand shrinking, this marketing loan acted as a "clearance sale" for corn, discounting prices to a level sufficient to ensure disposal of the surplus crop. Given that U.S. production increased by 12%, exports decreased by 19%, and stocks diminished by 59% between 1996 and 1998, corn prices had to be severely discounted in order to sell all past stocks and current production placed in the marketing loan program (UN, 1999). The subsequent supply glut caused corn and many other grain and oilseed prices to reach their lowest real levels in the past half century.

By the summer of 2000, however, this picture had brightened. The world had recovered substantially from this regional depression, which spread to Latin America and most of the former Soviet Union. World corn consumption once again neared 1997-1998 levels. Furthermore, recent production stabilization and the elimination of the corn glut in storage prior to the 1996 Farm Bill also bol- stered hope for reduced reliance on the marketing loan and subsequent corn price increases.

Despite these optimistic reports, the global economic slowdown dampened expectations of extensive corn demand growth. These diminished projections derive from the fact that the reductions in regional per capita income could cur- tail the income effect on meat consumption. Additionally, increased protectionist rhetoric in many of these countries has raised fears of a political backlash against core foreign imports. Likewise, the ongoing foreign exchange concerns caused by this crisis, if continued long-term, could limit import potential in recovering nations. This would force domestic livestock producers to find feed alternatives to imported corn or to decrease total livestock and poultry raising. In essence, the future prospects for corn depend greatly upon the economic expansion in developing countries. Given the pervasive optimism for this economic growth and the sectoral underutilization of corn as a feed commodity, most experts predict a medium-term increase in global corn demand and prices (EU, 1999, pp. 97-9).

Soybeans-The Corn Substitute To properly recognize how price shifts can alter corn supply and demand, one

must account for corn consumer and producer substitutes. For instance, if no producer substitute existed for corn, farmers would produce corn until its production cost equaled the price plus government assistance given to the farmer. In other words, corn growing would occur until profit reached zero.4 With substitutes, however, farmers grow corn only until its profit equals that achievable with the substitute crop. Assuming that farming is a profitable exercise, the inclusion of a substitute crop would increase the price elasticity and decrease the anticipated supply of corn.

Similar logic applies to corn consumption. A feed substitute allows consumers to use corn only when its cost per nutritional and caloric unit is lower than or equal to the viable substitute. Since livestock and poultry prices shift with regard to feed costs, ignoring potential substitutes would result in meat prices being




overly responsive to domestic corn price shifts. On the production side, and to a somewhat lesser extent in the consumption arena, soybeans provide an excellent substitute for corn. Soybeans are grown primarily in the same areas as corn, providing farmers with an excellent alternative during low relative prices or with a source of new corn land during relatively high priced periods.

Soybeans, like corn, are used primarily as a feed ingredient. Even moderate relative consumer price shifts can cause farmers to increase their use of one of these feed components in lieu of the other. However, soybeans do provide a somewhat different caloric and nutrient level than corn. As an easily palpable protein-rich crop, soybeans provide the best protein source in livestock and poultry production. Corn, on the other hand, provides a prime source of calories, with the lowest protein level of any major feed component (Smith).

While these differences expose a complementary feed role, soybeans and corn often function as feed substitutes in practice. This relationship occurs due to the overuse of soybeans and other oilseeds, especially in the European Union. This factor has resulted in excess protein levels by U.S. standards, and extensive use of low-protein alternatives to corn such as citrus pulp, millfeeds, mantioc, and other ingredients not extensively used in the United States. Since a significant reduction of this protein level would not hinder productivity, corn exists as an excellent substitute for soybeans in these areas (OECD, 1994, p. 37). Thus, although these two crops are not perfect substitutes, the dual soybean and corn commodity model will still increase the accuracy of this analysis.5

Trade Patterns and Government Policy The Corn Market: Trade and Production

The corn trade was characterized by four distinct periods over the past two decades. The first era, occurring from the late 1970s until 1984, was one of U.S. dominance. The major non-U.S. corn exporters, Argentina and the European Com- munity (EC), had relatively small export regimes, at 6% and 12% of the global total respectively. EC export capacity was limited by its vibrant internal demand for corn. Additionally, China, while easily the second largest corn producer in the world, used its production to meet vast internal demand, effectively excluding itself from this global trade until 1979 when it became a sizeable importer.

The global trade shifts of the next 10 years instigated an EC and Chinese corn resurgence. From 1985 to 1993, EC exports expanded to over 18% of the world total, while its imports dropped to 23% of the overall market. Similarly, with the exception of 1987, when China suffered through severe production and distribution difficulties, Chinese imports were virtually zero, while their exports held 6.3% of the global sum. From 1988 to the end of this period, China became the world's second highest net exporter of corn, capturing almost 12.5% of the global trade by 1993. Therefore, the United States and Argentina faced a dramatic demand reduction from their leading corn importer, the European Commission, at the same time that China emerged as a serious exporting threat.6

Domestic demand increases for corn, which began in 1993, marked the end of this boom for China and the European Union. Despite EU production increases of over 25% between 1992 and 1997, its net corn imports rose from virtually




0 to 2 MMT. A similar phenomenon occurred in China, where domestic production growth could not prevent a substantial return to net corn importing. This increased import demand caused U.S. exports to rise to nearly 75% of the world aggregate, while Argentina's reached an estimated 15% of this total by 1996 (USDA, 1997).

This rejuvenated U.S. export dominance was short-lived. After a return to net exporting in 1996, substantial production increases raised Chinese corn exports to almost 11% of world levels by 1997. With this Chinese and Argentine export expansion, the United States lost 18% of the global corn market in only a year (UN, 1999). While the United States has regained some of this lost market share in the past two years, this fierce Chinese and Argentine competition for global markets, and the EU concerns over genetically modified corn, have limited U.S. exports and led to global oversupply and severe price declines.

Government Policy and the Corn Market The Dillon Round

While crop harvests, consumer preferences and national incomes certainly play a large role in determining agricultural prices and trade patterns, it is impossible to ignore the significant impact of government actions on this sector. These vital policy decisions occurred primarily at a national level, though also through international organizations such as GATT, predecessor to the WTO. While GATT virtually ignored agriculture during its first half-century, its 1962 Dillon Round, which only covered oilseeds and feed substitutes, had pronounced ramifications on the corn sector. This agreement placed a zero duty limit on all soybean products and a very low tariff ceiling on other oilseeds and noncereal feed ingredients. There- fore, countries were able to place enormously high levels of protection on feed grains such as corn (420% in Japan and 150% in the European Community), while soybeans circled the globe duty free (Josling, Tangermann, and Warley, pp. 46-7).

This preferential trade regime illustrated that the price and available markets for soybeans have a sizeable impact on the corn market. EC imports of soybeans expanded by almost 1300% in the quarter-century following the Dillon Round, while its corn imports declined by approximately 30%. Globally, $6 billion more in oilseeds were imported than if its ratio to traded corn had remained at 1962 levels (USDA, 1997). This oilseed bias still holds today, despite some reduction during the Uruguay Round, and remains the most harmful aspect of protectionism for the corn sector.

China: Experiments in noncommunist agriculture In the decade and a half after the Dillon Round, little had changed in world

agriculture policy. In 1979, however, China shifted from collectivized farming to the private leasing of government land. This arrangement placed most production decisions in private control for the first time since the founding of the communist state. Sharp hikes in government procurement prices accompanied this change. While corn payments increased by 20% during this period, soybean prices grew initially by 24% and then by another 26% in 1981. This relative price increase caused Chinese soybean production to climb by a third between 1979 and 1983.




Consequently, net soybean exports moved from -$20 million to over $500 million by 1983, while net corn exports declined by 350% to -$350 million.

These trends ended in 1984 when the Chinese government reduced soybean prices by 13%. This action was followed in 1985 by a voluntary procurement system ending the production quota that farmers were required to fill for the government. This latter initiative allowed farmers to sell their products on the free market to private traders. With the poor internal infrastructure and the higher world corn price, these groups found it more profitable to export corn than to face the high costs and the lower returns offered domestically. Therefore, domestic shortages resulted, while net corn exports expanded to almost $600 million in 1985. These export levels remained high, though somewhat lower, after the reestablishment of mandatory government procurement in 1986. These shifts, along with rising Chinese incomes that first lowered demand for food corn and then heightened its feed use, have influenced Chinese domestic demand and, consequently, its net corn exports (Gamaut, Huang, and Smith).

The Chinese government, once again concerned with the impact of grain imports on domestic food security, restructured its cereal policy in 1994 through the governor's grain bag responsibility system. This program established artificially high support price levels for corn sales to the government, thus ensur- ing increased production and government commodity control. As was illustrated in the previous section, this program succeeded in attaining domestic corn self- sufficiency. However, this accomplishment came at a tremendous cost to the government. The stock-holding and price support expense of this cereal program cost the government over $11.5 billion in 1997-1998. The unsustainabil- ity of this vast expenditure has caused the government to implement reform measures bringing Chinese producer prices closer to world levels (USDA, 1998, p. 11).

Argentina: An improving climate for corn Government policy in Argentina also impacted international trade in corn and

soybeans. In an effort to encourage manufacturing growth, the government placed an 18% tax on agricultural exports. Additionally, it established a dual exchange rate system for exporters of manufacturing and agricultural goods, which effectively placed an additional 17% tax on corn exports. These policies, along with domestic price controls, low official export prices and export quotas, were used to depress Argentine corn exports until the early 1990s. The removal of these measures and its 6% export tax on unprocessed oilseeds help explain Argentine corn trade resurgence since 1992 (GATT, pp. 117-21).

Argentina, with its stable currency and a virtually protection-free agricultural regime, should benefit greatly from trade liberalization. The most substantial bar- rier to Argentine agricultural export growth is rapid price fluctuation, which has hampered investment in machinery, training, and infrastructure, causing subop- timal corn yields. This uncertainty, which is strongly encouraged by international market-distorting protectionism, should taper in the wake of a WTO agreement banning trade distorting agricultural policy. Consequently, Argentina was predicted to gain between $3.2 and $11.9 billion from full agricultural liberalization, a substantial sum for a nation with a GDP near $130 billion (GATT, p. 137).




United States: From production constraint to planting freedom The first major U.S. legislation to affect corn in this era came with the 1980 Farm

Bill and its efforts to regulate the production decisions of individual farmers. It influenced planting decisions through separate crop target prices and guaranteed producer prices for certain crops such as corn and wheat. Target price support was derived from the amount of land historically planted with eligible crops. The government would then pay deficiency payments, which equaled the difference between a commodity's target and market prices, to participating farmers.

The planting decision influence came from the exclusionary nature of this policy. If production were shifted from one of the eligible crops, it would lower subsequent base acreages, thus reducing eligibility for future deficiency payments. Likewise, land shifted from a noneligible crop to an eligible one would enter the base acreage and qualify for future deficiency payments, provided that said production was continued. This provision increased the risk of shifting production from corn to nonprogram crops such as soybeans by making any action impact future profitability (Roberts, p. 23). Even when conditions still dictated a move from corn to soybean production, a cross-compliance rule restricting the planting area allowed to nonprogram crops for farmers receiving deficiency payments, often limited this shift (OECD, 1994, pp. 38-9).

This distortion was further augmented by the 1985 Farm Bill, through its low- ering of the cereal loan rate, the price at which the U.S. government values a commodity when offering loans to farmers. Under this program, farmers can sell their crops and repay the government; or, if world prices are below the cereal loan rate, they can repay the loan in kind. Thus, this rate essentially acted as a floor on market prices. By reducing the loan rate in an era of low prices, the 1985 Farm Bill encouraged even lower market prices and higher deficiency payments. Consequently, U.S. soybean production declined during the 1980s despite substantial world relative price increases (OECD, 1994, p. 43).

The 1990 Farm Bill marked a major step towards free-market agriculture. Under the flexible acreage provision of this act, farmers could shift up to 25% of their production into non-base acreage crops without altering their base acreage. This increased flexibility illustrated the commodity distortion present in previous programs by aiding a 2 million acre soybean production expansion across typical corn growing regions of the northern United States, despite a relative soybean price decline (OECD, 1994, p. 44).

The 1996 Farm Bill marked a dramatic departure from its predecessors by insti- tuting a market-driven agricultural system within the United States. The main feature of this legislation was the shift from coupled deficiency payments to decoupled production flexibility control payments (PFCP). These payments are based on the land that a farmer had eligible for deficiency payments between 1991 and 1995 multiplied by a predetermined yield coefficient and a fixed price per unit of the historically grown commodity. With its basis in historical cropping decisions, the PFCPs allow total individual production flexibility by disassociat- ing prices and crop planting decisions from income support payments. In other words, these payments remain constant regardless of the type of crop grown, as long as the land stays in farming.

Given the impact of the 1990 partial acreage flexibility provision on soybean production, one would expect this full production freedom to cause a further shift




from corn to soybean production. However, this effect was mitigated by the removal of acreage planting restrictions in the 1996 Farm Bill. This program opened millions of acres of previously fallow farmland for corn cultivation. The offsetting impacts of these two initiatives led to a virtual stagnation of harvested corn acres for the first two years of the 1996 Farm Bill, though overall production rose due to increased yields.

The overall impact of this policy shift remains difficult to evaluate effectively. The world agricultural environment in the last year and a half of the decade posed considerable hazards for U.S. corn farmers independently of the domestic support regime. True, the 1996 Farm Bill indirectly contributed to the global corn oversupply by making it easier for farmers to respond to the erroneous predictions of short-term corn export growth with production increases.7 However, it also facilitated a more efficient response to price reductions by allowing them to substitute more profitable agricultural pursuits for corn planting without future deficiency payment punishment.

The 1996 Farm Bill has not provided fully decoupled income support as initially promised. While the PFCPs are fully decoupled, the releasing of significant U.S. corn reserves on to global markets and the abnormally low 1998 and 1999 prices have caused the United States to rely increasingly on production distorting subsidy mechanisms such as loan deficiency payments and emergency assistance grants. These mechanisms are designed to provide an income "safety net" estab- lishing a baseline for commodity prices and farm incomes. In theory, the ad hoc nature of this emergency Congressional funding and the setting of the loan rate below traditional world price levels ensures that these mechanisms will rarely be utilized. Because of the rare reliance on these programs, farmers were expected to discount their existence when making crop planting and management decisions. In other words, farmers would expect to get no assistance, except in case of natural disasters, thus making production decisions as if these programs never existed. However, their use has become commonplace in the volatile market following the passage of the 1996 Farm Bill. This has created certain expectations for income and price support, especially from emergency supplemental funding, among U.S. farmers. Consequently, these government initiatives have substantially impacted world markets, distorting production to the extent that they impact farmers' anticipated future returns (OECD, 1999, p. 36).

European Union: CAP Reform assists corn producers In sharp contrast to the recently liberalized U.S. agricultural policy, the

European Community has maintained steep domestic protection for agriculture under the CAP.8 In an attempt to sustain farmers' incomes through producer price controls, the CAP established high intervention prices, or amounts at which the European Community promised to buy any nonexportable surpluses. In practice, this mechanism was used less to buy surplus crop than to establish a domestic commodity price floor through variable import levies, export subsidies, and deficiency payments. These levies shifted with world prices in order to insu- late producers from world price shocks. They also established an artificially high intervention price for wholesalers, who received EC deficiency payments as compensation for this added expense. Export subsidies were used to dispose of any production that exceeded domestic demand. The European Community would




subsidize farmers at a sufficient level to allow them to profitably sell their product at or slightly below world prices. This product dumping led to world price deflation, causing bitter complaints from other agricultural exporters (Sturgess).

The 1962 Dillon Round agreements forced the European Community to use direct subsidies rather than price support to sustain the profitability of these crops.9 While this action might appear to prevent a domestic producer price distortion in favor of either oilseeds or corn, in practice it fostered highly favorable prices for oilseed production. Thus, soybeans and other oilseeds were produced in abnormally high numbers (though still minimal relative to other major producers) until the early 1990s. This increased output came at the expense of corn, whose production area declined by almost 13% during the 1980s (USDA, 1997).

The 1992 MacSherry reforms marked the first significant EU departure from this protectionist regime. The main impact of this reform came through a commodity support price reduction. Corn intervention prices fell over 40% to approximately $140 (Bailey et al., p. 14). To counter this price decline, the European Union insti- tuted cereal compensation payments similar to those already in place for oilseed processors. This reform was extended by Agenda 2000, which primarily reduced cereal and oilseed support prices by 15% with corresponding increases in compensation payments (Fischler, p. 2).

These two CAP reforms benefit EU corn farmers for three reasons. First, the oilseed support price bias has been eliminated. Second, the compensation payments are based on historic yields. As the highest yielding cereal crop during this period, this mechanism makes corn acreage payments substantially higher than those for other cereals.10 The current system is biased so extensively towards corn that, according to Jean-Francois Hulot, Assistant Deputy Director-General for Agriculture, a minimum of 35% of EU corn-producing land would switch to wheat or rapeseed if all EU agricultural supports were eliminated.11 This source claimed that an even greater decline would occur except for the corn-specific irri- gation used extensively in EU cultivation (Hulot, 1997).

More importantly to global exporters, the domestic corn price decline, com- pared to the stable consumer prices of soybeans and other oilseeds, has caused a substantial rise in corn feed demand. Aided by recently falling world corn prices, EU corn feed use increased by 55% in the first five years following the MacSherry reforms. Over this same period, domestic oilseed feed use declined by 4 MMT (UN, 1999).

The Uruguay Round: Agricultural achievements and prospects for the future The most significant agricultural policy developments during the Uruguay

Round occurred away from the negotiations with the 1992 Blair House accords. The main aspect of this agreement between the United States and the European Union was the creation of the "blue box" for agricultural support. It established a category of partially decoupled income support mechanisms that were granted fully decoupled status by both governments, and eventually by GATT. The blue box primarily covered acreage payments based on current cropping decisions such as EU compensation payments and set-aside. The other significant Blair House development concerning corn limited oilseed specific payments to 5.499 million hectares in 1994-1995 and 5.128 million hectares in subsequent years. If this limit is violated, these payments will be cut by 1% in both the current and




subsequent marketing year for every percent exceeded in planting. This support limitation lowered the effective price paid to EU oilseed producers by up to 40%, thus strongly encouraging a partial switch to cereal planting (OECD, 1994, p. 32). This regime was so effective that the EU relative producer price, biased towards soybeans for the past two decades, became significantly preferential to corn.

The Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture itself also made significant breakthroughs. However, only the export subsidy provisions of the accord had any specific influence on the corn market. The Agreement mandated that by 2000 all developed nations reduce the monetary value of their export subsidies by 36% and their quantity by 21% from the 1986-1988 average subsidy level. The 36% applies to overall subsidies, however, with only a 15% reduction mandated on specific commodities.

While most nations had little trouble meeting these requirements, satisfying the quantity restraint proved difficult for the European Union. It hoped to meet these constraints through substantial domestic demand and world price increases (Gardner, pp. 136-7). However, world prices dropped far below intervention levels, thus mandating export subsidies for EU grain exports. Fortunately for the European Union, domestic corn demand increased by 25% from 1993-1998, while production grew by only 15%. This occurrence, combined with decreased demand for exports worldwide, allowed the European Union to meet its corn export subsidy targets. However, European Agriculture Commissioner Fischler has admitted that changing market conditions could reverse this trend (Fischler, p. 3). Should this occur, the European Union would be forced to shift its internal trading patterns, eliminate exports subsidies, devise some nonsubsidy method of exporting domestic surpluses over WTO limits or establish costly grain stockpiles. Given that the European Union is a net corn importer, the initial scenario appears most likely.

Undoubtedly, the most important agricultural success of the Uruguay Round is that an agreement was reached at all on this topic. The inclusion of agriculture under the new WTO and the timetable for future negotiations included within the Agreement provides an unprecedented framework for agricultural trade liberalization. As a precursor to these talks, the following model examines the impacts of three potential proposals for further decreasing agricultural protection.

The Econometric Model The Modular Parameters

The preceding arguments have touched on many irregularities created in the corn market by protectionist government policies. The following model will attempt to construct a clearer picture of the costs associated with these government programs and provide some quantitative insight on the corn market implications of trade liberalization. This basic model uses corn production and demand variables for the four countries discussed previously, along with a separate set for the remaining countries (ROW). It also includes price and stock- holding information for both corn and soybeans, while tariff rates were acquired for the relevant corn and soybean importers.12 Due to the primacy of corn as a feed product, the global demand for livestock and poultry products, as well as a composite feed substitute price, are also incorporated into this model. These




Table 1. Corn model variables

Symbol Type of Variable Data Source

AA Argentine corn acreage (1,000 hectares) UN, 1999 CA Chinese corn acreage UN, 1999 EA European Union corn acreage UN, 1999 UA United States corn acreage UN, 1999 RA ROW corn acreage UN, 1999 AY Argentine corn yield (metric tons/hectare) UN, 1999 CY Chinese corn yield UN, 1999 EY European Union corn yield UN, 1999 UY United States corn yield UN, 1999 RY ROW corn yield UN, 1999 AD Argentine corn demand (1,000 metric tons) USDA, 2000 CD Chinese corn demand USDA, 2000 ED European Union corn demand USDA, 2000 UD United States corn demand USDA, 2000 RD ROW corn demand USDA, 2000 ACP Argentine corn price (US$/metric ton) Argentina ASP Argentine soybean price Argentina CCP Chinese corn price PRC CSP Chinese soybean price PRC ECP European Union corn intervention price EU, 1981-98 ESP European Union soybean target price EU, 1981-98 ECIP European Union corn import price EU, 1981-98 ESIP European Union soybean import price EU, 1981-98 UCP United States corn price USDA, 2000 USP United States soybean price USDA, 2000 RCIP ROW corn import price WTO RRIP ROW relative import price WTO WFSP World feed substitute price USDA, 2000 WCP World corn price IMF ECS European Union corn stocks (1,000 metric tons) UN, 1998 UCS United States corn stocks UN, 1998 CCS China corn stocks UN, 1998 USS United States soybean stocks USDA, 2000 WBMP World bovine meat production UN, 1999 WRMP World relative meat production (beef/poultry) UN, 1999 T Trend variable

variables were gathered from 1979-1998, due to the significant agricultural policy changes that occurred near 1979 and the scarcity and unreliability of earlier data (see table 1). The regression equations used for this modular analysis were deter- mined using ordinary least squares and were corrected for autocorrelation where it was significant (see table 2).

The differences in the production and demand equations in the various countries in the model result from the diverse support, pricing, and protectionist agricultural systems employed in each nation. For instance, the corn rationing and distribution system of the Chinese government makes consumer demand for




Table 2. Modular equations (t-values)

AA = 1114 + 13.5 ACP (1.78) (2.69)

CA = 12477 + 30.2 CCP + 436 T (5.34) (2.10) (6.28)

EA = 4300 + 5.46 ECP - 1.86 ESP - 0.109 ECS (8.67) (1.95) (-2.65) (-1.68)

UA = 30155 + 48.3 UCP - 14575 RRIP - 0.0569 UCS + 0.509 USS (8.45) (1.75) (-2.68) (-4.53) (4.28)

RA = 68328 + 75.0 WCP - 131 WFSP + 846 T (16.24) (2.03) (-2.19) (9.07)

AY = 2.67 + 0.0121 ACP - 0.00715 ASP + 0.122 T (3.09) (1.66) (-1.49) (5.11)

CY = 3.43 + 0.00590 CCP - 0.00364 CSP + 0.125 T* (5.52) (1.06) (-1.16) (7.47)

EY = 5.51 + 0.00235 ECP - 0.000173 ECS + 0.163 T (9.58) (1.09) (-2.35) (16.43)

UY = 5.93 + 0.0159 UCP + 0.0969 T* (5.59) (1.94) (4.38)

RY = 3.27 + 0.00129 WCP + 0.00650 T* (44.14) (2.90) (4.22)

AD = 4401 - 40.3 WCP + 4696 WBPP* (1.42) (-1.21) (2.84)

CD = -121860 + 0.00333 WBMP + 0.970 CCS + 214 WFSP (-3.20) (4.71) (3.56) (1.26)

ED = 15245 - 30.3 ECIP + 51.1 ESIP + 657 T (2.24) (-1.62) (2.64) (6.18)

UD = -103209 - 325 UCP + 0.00457 WBMP + 482 WFSP (-2.01) (-1.48) (4.91) (1.55)

RD = -59968 - 339 RCIP + 3085 WFSP* (-0.84) (-1.06) (4.41)

*Indicates an equation that was corrected for autocorrelation.

corn in that country highly dependent on the level of government corn stocks. Likewise, the government-set intervention prices in the European Union are far more representative of the corn costs facing European wholesalers, and thus consumers, than the producer prices. Therefore, Chinese corn stocks and the EU invervention prices are used rather than the normal national producer price for calculating domestic demand. Also, the lack of alternative feed use in Argentina and the high EU dependence on oilseed-based feeds merited the exclusion of the world feed substitute price index from their demand equations.

Similar factors also influenced the production equations. The Chinese government purchase of all domestically produced corn at a preestablished rate negates the normal impact of domestic stocks on corn production. The meagre level of corn and soybean stocks in Argentina and the lack of soybean stockpil-




ing in the European Union also warranted the exclusion of these statistics from their production equations. Furthermore, the high rate of U.S. corn exports makes their production especially susceptible to demand and price shifts in corn importing nations. To reflect this reality, the composite ROW relative import price was included in the U.S. acreage equation.

While this model focuses exclusively on the corn trade, the complex and inter- related nature of the global agricultural market must be acknowledged. These considerations are largely addressed through the use of corn substitute and world livestock data. This information enables the model to respond to external supply and demand shifts that directly impact the corn sector. It should be noted, however, that this model is only intended to give an indication of the likely impacts of trade reform on one isolated sector in the vast agricultural regime. For more com- prehensive predictions, the reader should refer to the FAPRI multi-commodity trade model.13

The Baseline Case Since this article focuses on the impacts of trade reform, not on predicting

future market conditions, this model will operate on historical parameters using data averages from 1995-1998. The first case tests the accuracy of this method by running the model without any policy change. To accomplish this action, a static equilibrium is created by setting accumulated stocks equal to zero. Then lagged prices are equated to current prices and are adjusted until the stock-free annual supply equals demand.

Apart from a 3% discrepancy in the EU soybean price and the inflated Chinese export figures, the modular price and trade flows are virtually identical to the actual results (table 3). The difference between the modular Chinese export figures (8.5 MMT) and the actual figures (3.5 MMT) result from a government stock- building effort that banned all corn exports from mid-1994 through mid-1996 (OECD, 1999, p. 162). Given its stock-free general equilibrium assumption, this model portrayed the surplus, which became increased stocks in reality, as exports.

Globalizing the 1996 U.S. Farm Bill This first Mini-Round possibility places the main trade liberalizing tenets of

the 1996 U.S. Farm Bill, decoupled government income support payments and a crop specific set-aside ban, into a WTO accord. By prohibiting commodity preferential subsidies, this proposal shifts national corn and soybean producer prices towards the world relative level. This change is most evident in the European Union, which sets artificially high producer prices through income support favorable to corn farmers. As expected, this decoupling would actually decrease EU corn production by over 0.5 MMT. However, the extensive land freed for use in EU corn producing areas by set-aside elimination would increase net EU corn production under this initiative by almost 2 MMT.

One corollary to this proposal, which is not included in the 1996 Farm Bill but should take a prominent role in Mini-Round negotiations, is the banning of export subsidies. According to this model, banning export subsidies will only raise the world corn price by $0.05 per metric ton or approximately 0.04%.14 The main




Table 3. 1995-1998 baseline scenario (corn data in hectares and metric tons)

Area Yield Quantity Price Net Receipts

Argentina Production 2,751 4.65 12,794 Domestic demand 5,407 $121.28 $655,760,960 Exports 7,387 $110.91 $819,292,170

China Production 23,641 5.05 119,358 Imports 1,500 $110.91 $166,365,000 Domestic demand 112,390 $102.58 $11,528,966,200 Exports 8,468 $110.91 $939,185,880

European Union Production 4,037 8.26 33,327 $203.81 $6,792,375,870 Imports 1,861 $216.26 Domestic demand 35,186 Government gaina ($2,900,022,000)

ROW government gain 48,865 (Imports) $201.26 $4,414,953,000 United States

Production 25,321 7.95 201,237 Domestic demand 171,418 $101.29 $17,362,929,220 Exports 29,819 $110.91 $3,307,225,290

Total producer value $41,572,100,000

aGovernment gain includes receipts acquired through corn tariff or other import duty collection minus costs levied through procurement prices, compensation payments, and export subsidies. PFCPs are not included in this figure due to their crop-neutral nature.

reasons for this meager shift are that U.S. agricultural export subsidies apply only to wheat and barley, and EU corn exports are virtually nonexistent.15 Even before the end of the Uruguay Round, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development estimated that the removal of all export subsidies would only lead to a 0.1% increase in the global corn price. Nonetheless, banning export subsidies would substantially increase world prices for commodities where subsidy use is more prevalent, making corn more competitive in dual use sectors (Runge, p. 197).

Swiss Formula for Agriculture This Mini-Round proposal is derived from a currently existing agreement in the

manufacturing sector. This arrangement, known as the "Swiss Formula," subjects virtually all commodities to identical ad valorem tariffs. Assuming a successful completion of the Uruguay Round tariffication, this proposal would allow consumers in importing countries to receive corn and its substitutes at world relative prices. For the sake of simplicity and to duplicate a potential compromise, the tariffs in this model were set at the ad valorem average between the original corn and soybean levels.

The most pronounced results from this scenario are, not surprisingly, found in the European Union (see table 5). With an almost 100% tariff on corn imports and




no levy on foreign soybeans, this market is highly biased towards soybean consumption. As expected from this relative consumer price drop, EU corn demand grows by nearly 7 MMT. Meanwhile, domestic corn production remains stagnant due to static producer prices. Similarly, ROW corn demand expands by 5 MMT, though this is partially offset by increased domestic production deriving from the relative world corn price increase. Given these global corn demands, the United States and, to a lesser extent, China experience significant export expansion. Given this export surge and the 10% domestic price increase, this proposal easily provides the most beneficial results for United States corn farmers.16

50% Cross-Commodity Tariff Reduction This proposal, a 50% universal reduction in agricultural tariffs, derives directly

from the Uruguay Round ideal that tariffication should be followed by absolute tariff declines. This initiative will likely face intense scrutiny from large exporters and low-tariff importers, since it fails to compensate for the "water" in many agricultural import fees. In this scenario, it is assumed that the high-tariff import-

Table 4. Globalizing the 1996 U.S. farm bill (corn data in hectares and metric tons)


Argentina Production 2,727 4.45 12,143 Domestic demand 5,209 $119.49 $803,165,220 Exports 6,934 $115.83

China Production 23,767 5.07 120,582 Imports 1,500 $115.83 $12,040,819,840 Domestic demand 112,784 $106.76 Exports 9,298 $115.83

European Union Production 4,259 8.26 35,201 $198.85a $6,999,718,850 Imports -15 $216.35 Domestic demand 35,186 Government gain ($2,923,895,000)

ROW government gain 53,708 $201.46 $4,599,016,000 United States

Production 25,321 8.08 204,678 Domestic demand 169,529 $109.84 $18,621,065,360 Exports 35, 149 $115.83 $4,071,308,670

World producer value $42,536,077,940

aSince these income support payments are now fully decoupled, they have no influence on production decisions and can be removed from the effective producer corn price. In essence, the new EU corn price of $195.41, which includes the compensation payment (at an average 1993-1996 level of $64.32/MT), is actually $131.09, only $15.83 higher than the new world price. However, this EU price does not include the 15% Agenda 2000 reduction, which would fully reduce domestic prices to the world level.




Table 5. Swiss formula for agriculture (corn data in hectares and metric tons)



China Production 23,886 5.10 121,743 Imports 1,500 $115.68 Domestic demand 111,999 $110.70 $12,398,289,300 Exports 11,244 $115.68 $1,300,705,920

European Union Production 4,253 8.26 35,139 $197.63 $6,944,520,570 Imports 6,923 $167.64 Domestic demand 42,062 Government gain ($2,519,922,000)




ing nations have sufficient negotiating leverage to ensure implementation of the equal percentage tariff reduction.

This scenario enhances corn demand, but at a lower level than the last proposal, due to the continuance of the soybean-biased tariff structure (table 6). The incen- tive for feed users to switch from soybeans to corn, although marginally greater than under current circumstances, is sharply reduced from the last proposal. The one significant exception to this trend occurs in ROW nations where domestically produced feed substitutes are prevalent. Since this 50% tariff reduces ROW consumer corn prices by a slightly greater level than under the previous proposal, domestic corn demand increases more in these areas using alternative feeds. Oth- erwise, however, this initiative appears to provide merely a second best option to the better targeted Swiss Formula proposal.

Conclusion The corn market has undergone a series of dramatic changes over the past

20 years. Until the 1998 Asian economic crisis, economic growth in developing states led to sharp increases in corn consumption and trade. This promising trend has been aided by agricultural policy liberalization. With isolated exceptions, the United States has made the most drastic governmental shift by granting complete production freedom to its farmers. This new policy is intended to allow farmers to maximize production and shift resources to those crops that are most profitable




Table 6. 50% cross-commodity tariff reduction (corn data in hectares and metric tons)



China Production 23,793 5.08 120,836 Imports 1,500 $116.77 Domestic demand 112,185 $107.62 $12,073,349,700 Exports 10,151 $116.77 $1,185,332,270

European Union Production 4,330 8.31 35,993 $195.41 $7,033,392,130 Imports 509 $172.18 Domestic demand 36,502 Government gain ($2,802,286,000)




on world markets. Short-term supply shocks and historically low prices, combined with the preferential soybean loan rate, have hindered attainment of this objective. Despite this setback, the elimination of the initial supply glut and the rising market prices provide hope for a complete realization of this enhanced production flexibility. With the projected growth in world demand, this production versatility should facilitate U.S. increases in long-term corn cultivation, giving American farmers an advantage in garnering new export markets.

China has also moved towards granting farmers greater production freedom. While Chinese policy shifts have been less pronounced than those in the United States, Chinese corn production has moved towards a system influenced by domestic supply and demand. However, this movement is tempered by firm government control over the domestic procurement prices, giving the government vast influence over final production figures. In Argentina, currency stability and the end of government discrimination against agriculture leave this nation in a prime position to exploit its vast fertile lands for increased corn cultivation should world market conditions dictate such action.

The European Union has reluctantly joined this trade liberalization trend. Even though the CAP still provides substantial support to domestic farmers, its cereal producer prices are approaching world levels. This reduced price and slightly lower corn tariffs have spurred EU corn consumption. Yet liberalized trade remains a distant goal, since its new support regime bolsters corn production




through a biased system of support payments, while its tariff scheme promotes domestic soybean consumption.

These revelations and the previous modular estimates suggest a number of issues for the upcoming Mini-Round. The most obvious recommendation is ending commodity preferential tariffs within agriculture. The Swiss Formula model illustrates how a commodity neutral tariff can greatly bolster corn import demand. When relative world prices reach consumers, feed compounds can reflect nutrient and price efficient requirements rather than the inefficient government formulae imposed by many current tariff structures. This efficient reallocation of feed components will benefit exporting farmers and importing feed users as a whole regardless of any resultant soybean tariffs.

Another obvious target of these WTO talks is the Blair House blue box. The first model illustrates that these partially decoupled payments are far from trade neutral. Blue box removal would reduce global supply and price volatility by subject- ing WTO agricultural production to world prices. Prospects for this proposal are also heightened by the U.S. elimination of this variety of income support and the fact that the total permitted EU support for its farmers would remain unchanged.

Although this issue will not be explicitly covered in the Mini-Round, these models illustrate the influence of Chinese agriculture, and hence the importance of Chinese entry into the WTO. China is currently the principal anomaly in global agriculture, especially in the corn market. Global price stability will improve through Chinese compliance with any WTO agricultural accord. With liberalized Chinese agriculture, corn demand should significantly increase, either through heightened direct imports or through increased use of corn by producers exporting livestock to China (Fuller, p. 11) This would reduce the potential for global corn oversupply, otherwise a distinct possibility under trade liberalization due to supply control removal and the predicted long-term price increase.

These findings present a bright picture for U.S. gains from agricultural trade liberalization, especially in the corn sector. Recent events, described earlier, have soured the U.S. outlook on its position in the world corn market. Despite these difficult circumstances, it is vital that the U.S. government remain committed to agricultural trade liberalization. This approach provides three significant long- term benefits for U.S. agriculture. First, this model and others like it illustrate that U.S. agriculture would gain substantially from global free trade through increased exports and higher world prices. Second, the initial section of this paper demon- strated that the liberalizing features of the 1996 Farm Bill brought considerable efficiency benefits to domestic agriculture. Third, this reform need have no impact whatsoever on government assistance to farmers. The key provisions of the trade reform, other than tariff reductions and the abolition of commodity-preferential pricing, involve the decoupling of government support from production decisions. Thus, farmers can receive unlimited government income support, provided that it is completely decoupled from production, as occurs with the PFCPs.

The collapse of the Seattle talks illustrated that many divisive issue remain to obstruct further agricultural trade liberalization. The European Union and nations with high rates of agricultural protection such as Japan and South Korea have publicly united behind their desire to keep agriculture separate from the more stringent WTO regime on other commodities (as in the Swiss Formula model)




and to maintain the Blair House blue box. However, hope does exist for further free-trade moves in these areas. The European Union recently broadened its efforts towards expansion while placing tight ceilings on future agricultural expenditure. This budget crunch will likely require significant reductions in EU subsidies, especially once the accession of new member states reaches its final stage (Fischler, p. 4). Meanwhile, progress on these two fronts, along with the abolition of export subsidies, will form the primary WTO objectives of the United States and the Cairns Group (Glickman, p. 1). With this new unison of exporting nations and the severe EU budgetary constraint, the modular trade reform scenarios could provide plausible future solutions to the current WTO stalemate.

One must bear in mind that these suggestions and the overall prospects for WTO trade liberalization depend upon a number of conditions. Primary among these is the assumption of renewed long-term corn demand increases in developing and newly industrialized countries. Elevated Chinese grain protectionism, health scares such as those with genetically modified corn, and consumer pref- erence shifts away from red meat could also lower corn demand. Finally, the predicted higher prices under liberalization could encourage current importing nations to increase their corn production beyond current expectations. To make this point succinctly, this analysis was conducted using historical conditions. When these modular scenarios are placed in tomorrow's uncertain world, even the most conclusive results merit careful scrutiny.

Acknowledgments Initial credit must go to Richard Gray, Gary Storey, and Brent Zacharias of the University of

Saskatchewan who designed the econometric model from which the one in this study was adopted. Special thanks are also merited for Joe Smith of the USDA Agricultural Extension Service and Yiping Huang of the Australian National University. Final acknowledgments must go to Ian Sturgess and Martin Dixon of the Department of Land Economy at the University of Cambridge, whose continual efforts made this article possible.

Endnotes 1Although many types of corn exist, exported corn is almost exclusively limited to yellow corn

#2. Consequently, this analysis will only examine this variety. 2 Japan is also a large player in the global corn trade, typically purchasing 15% of corn exports.

This study, however, focuses only on states that have sufficient production capacity to influence global markets. Since Japan lacks any significant corn production, it will be covered inclusively with other minimal producing importing nations.

3 When subsistence corn and other production not normally available on world markets is factored out, this amount approaches 75%.

4This logic assumes that farmers cannot opt out of farming for other employment, and that they value labor, including their own, at the market wage rate.

s For corn-importing countries without this protein surplus, the model will use a composite feed substitute price to analyze shifts in domestic corn demand.

6 A substantial dollar appreciation also reduced the global competitiveness of U.S. corn. 7As noted earlier, the 1996 Farm Bill also caused a one-time corn supply shock by ending

government-funded grain storage programs, thus encouraging the release of preexisting corn stocks onto the market.

8While this program was, and still is, highly complex, this discussion will focus on its highlights and corn-specific attributes.

9These subsidies were administered through the creation of dual intervention and guide prices, which were significantly above world levels. If supply exceeded demand, the producer price would rest near the intervention level, while it hovered around the guide price if the reverse was true, as was normally the case. To ensure this high payment by processors in light of the free access to global




oilseeds, the European Community then reimbursed processors for the difference between this rate and the EC calculated world price.

"1To counter this program bias, the European Union has limited corn planting to the 1989-1991 acreage.

11Given the primary importance of income support to the EU agricultural system and the likely reliance on these historical figures under a fully decoupled system, this bias is predicted to remain under all of the proposed WTO reforms.

12 The corn and soybean import prices represent the average effective rates of protection applied to corn and soybean imports in the four leading corn importing countries not enumerated in this study: Japan, Brazil, Mexico, and South Korea.

13 These modular scenarios exclude China from the final WTO agreement for three reasons. First, China is a non-WTO member with a tightly state controlled agricultural economy. Second, even if China obtains WTO membership in the near future, it will take considerable time for its socialist agriculture to meet WTO requirements. Third, since the state dictates the allowable corn imports, credible effective rate of protection figures for China are virtually impossible to acquire. However, Chinese demand and prices are responding to world shifts as modelled by the relevant regression equations.

14 Export subsidy elimination is calculated by finding the difference between the EU producer price (not including compensation payments) and the world price. This amount is multiplied by the percentage of global corn exports deriving from the European Union and then subtracted from the world price to give the new nonsubsidy enhanced level.

"1 This estimate could moderately underestimate the impact of an export subsidy ban on the corn market due to the fact that China, a traditional subsidizer of corn exports, was temporarily out of these export markets during the initial portion of the base period. However, the UNCTAD study, which avoids this Chinese bias, also estimates a similarly miniscule impact of a global export subsidy ban on corn prices.

16 This anticipated domestic price increase could vary somewhat depending upon the U.S. production response to decreased EU soybean demand. Any substantial planting shift from soybeans to corn would reduce the corn price increase deriving from this ad valorem tariff regime.

References Argentina, Republic of, Secretariat for Agriculture, Livestock, Fisheries and Food. Agriculture and

Fisheries Statistics. Buenos Aires, 1999. (http://siiap.sagyp.mecon.ar). Bailey, K., R. Henry, M. Herlihy, and S. Magiera. "European Agricultural Statistics." Mann Library

Database. Ithaca, NY: U.S. Department of Agriculture, 1997. (http:\\usda.mannlib.cornell.edu). European Union Agricultural Directorate-General. Agricultural Situation in the Community. Brussels:

European Commission Printing Office (price data used from each edition from 1981 through 1998). . "Prospects for Agricultural Markets: 1999-2006." Brussels, 1999. (http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/ dg06/publi/index_en.htm).

Fischler, F. "The Agenda 2000 Agreement: 'Der Himmel fiber Berlin' or 'Sleepless in Seattle'?" Agra Europe Special Conference. Brussels, June 29, 1999. (http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/dgO6/external/ wto/speeches/index_en.htm).

Fuller, F. "Agricultural Impacts of China's Accession to the WTO." Iowa Ag. Rev., August 1997, pp. 9-11.

Gardner, B. European Agriculture: Policies, Production and Trade. London: Routledge, 1996. Gamaut, R., Y. Huang, and G. Smith. The Chinese Grain and Oilseed Sectors: Major Changes Underway.

Canberra: Australian University Press, 1995. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Directorate. GATT Trade Report: Argentina-Part 1. Geneva:

GATT Publishing, 1992. Glickman, D. WTO Agriculture Day Welcoming Remarks. Seattle, December 1, 1999. Hulot, J. European Union Deputy Assistant Director-General for Agriculture. Interview with the

Author. Brussels, 1997. International Monetary Fund (IMF). International Financial Statistics. Washington, DC (exchange rate

data used from each March edition from 1981 through 1998). Josling, T., S. Tangermann, and T. Warley. Agriculture in the GATT: Past, Present and Future. London:

Macmillan Press, 1996. Olson, E. "WTO Plans To Resume Negotiations after Seattle; Smarting from Fallout, Group Will Con-

fine Talks to Agriculture." International Herald Tribune, February 7, 2000, p. A2. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. OECD Agricultural Outlook 1999-2004.

Paris: OECD Publications, 1999.




-. The World Oilseed Market: Policy Impacts and Market Outlook. Paris: OECD Publications, 1994. People's Republic of China (PRC), National Bureau of Statistics. China Statistical Yearbook: 1999. Beijing:

China Statistics Press, 1999. Roberts, I. US Grain Policies and the World Market. Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service,

1989. Runge, F. Beyond the Uruguay Round: Emerging Issues in Agricultural Trade Policy, World Agriculture and

the GATT. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994. Smith, J., Author's Interview, 2000. Sturgess, I. Land Economy Lecture Series. University of Cambridge, 1998 (unpublished lecture; notes

on file with author). United Nations, Food and Agriculture Organization. Statistical Database. Rome, 1998. (Internal Access

Only). -. "Export of Cereals by Source and Destination." In: FAO Statistical Database. Rome, 1999.

(http://apps.fao.org). U.S. Department of Agriculture. International Agriculture and Trade: China. Ithaca, NY: Mann Library

Database, 1998. (http://usda.mannlib.comell.edu). -. World Agricultural Supply and Demand Estimates. Ithaca, NY: Mann Library Database, 2000.

(http://usda.mannlib.cornell.edu). - . World Trade & Demand Indicators. Ithaca, NY: Mann Library Database, 1997. (http://usda.mannlib.

cornell.edu). World Trade Organization Directorate. WTO Trade Report: Japan (Brazil, Mexico, South Korea). Geneva

(data used from the 1995 through 1998 editions of these publications).



Date post:	31-Jan-2017
Category:	Documents
Upload:	jeff-king
View:	212 times
Download:	0 times

Trade Reform and the Corn Market: Prospects for the World Trade Organization Negotiations on...

Documents