ROAPE Publications Ltd.

The Evolution of British Trade Justice CampaigningAuthor(s): Tom SharmanSource: Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 34, No. 112, Trading Africa's Future (Jun.,2007), pp. 385-392Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20406405 .

Accessed: 28/06/2014 10:10

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

.

Taylor & Francis, Ltd. and ROAPE Publications Ltd. are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve andextend access to Review of African Political Economy.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 91.220.202.155 on Sat, 28 Jun 2014 10:10:06 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Briefings: The Evolution of British Trade Justice Campaigning 385

The Evolution of British Trade Justice Campaigning Tom Sharman

Trade justice campaigning has come a long way in just a few years. In the words of one NGO colleague, the ideas of trade justice have moved from the lunatic fringe to the mainstream faster than we thought possible. As NGO campaigning on trade has matured it has also evolved from an initial focus on agricultural subsidies and the World Trade Organi zation to include a much broader range of issues and institutional targets. It is not only the issues, the campaign terrain, that have changed but campaign tools have become more varied too. After dis cussing the different phases of trade justice campaigning I will give a few examples of how different campaign tools work to effect change.

'Trade Justice': An NGO Definition Trade justice is realised differently at different levels. For example, an African country realises trade justice when its government secures the right to choose the best policies to end poverty, protect the environment and empower women without impediment from international institutions, donors or other powerful global actors. An individual or commu nity in sub-Saharan Africa realises trade justice when they secure the right to participate in local or international mar kets and are able to make a decent living from this participation.

British NGOs (or, as in ActionAid's case, the UK offices of international NGOs) have focused on the international di mension of trade justice - what western governments must do in order that Af rica is able to benefit from the global trading system.' The rationale has been that while western NGOs influence west ern governments and institutions, Afri

can NGOs influence their own govern ments in order that gains in interna tional fora actually make a positive impact on the ground.

Trade Justice or 'Fairtrade'?

The ideas of trade justice are intimately associated with those of fairtrade. In deed the origins of trade justice cam paigning can be directly traced to the birth of the fairtrade movement. Some fairtrade producers, such as Traidcraft, have added trade justice campaigning to their list of activities. Fairtrade began as a response to the low wages that tea and coffee producers received, particularly stark given the high mark-up when the finished products were sold on British supermarket shelves. Given that many poor countries continued to depend on a handful of commodities for foreign ex change earnings and employment, it seemed logical to start by addressing the situation of commodity producers them selves.

Since the launch of the official fairtrade mark in the UK in 1994 sales have grown massively, albeit from very small begin nings, from ?16.7 million in 1998 to ?195 million in 2005.2 By 2005 there were 1,500 fairtrade retail and catering prod ucts available to British consumers.3 Yet despite its success, fairtrade remains largely confined to a small number of food commodity products such as coffee, tea and chocolate. Furthermore, it is estimated to benefit 1 million producers worldwide, or 5 million people if dependents are included.4 While this is impressive, it falls a long way short of the estimated 300 million people living on less than $1 a day in Africa. For deeper, structural changes to the global trading system it had become clear to develop

ment NGOs that additional measures were needed.

This content downloaded from 91.220.202.155 on Sat, 28 Jun 2014 10:10:06 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

386 Review of African Political Economy

A Brief History of NGO Mass Campaigning on Development

With the public visibility of 2005s 'Make Poverty History' coalition still fresh in many minds, it is easy to forget that large-scale NGO campaigning on devel opment is a relatively new, but welcome, phenomenon. For many NGOs, engag ing supporters' minds as well as their

wallets and purses only began in the late 1990s. Prior to this, while some NGOs might have engaged in some insider lobbying, the energy of the development sector was primarily directed towards funding and expanding their own projects and programmes in Africa and elsewhere.

The first big development coalition cam paign was Jubilee 2000, founded in October 1997 with strong roots in the churches and focused exclusively on the need for debt cancellation.5 The interna tional coalition fell apart when rich governments started to provide a partial response, which many of the Southern groups felt was inadequate. As 2000 was reached the sustained, mass-level cam paigning came to an end.

Into the vacuum NGOs began to turn their attention towards trade, specifi cally because of the campaigning oppor tunities presented by the launch of the new Doha Round negotiations of World Trade Organization in November 2001. Trade replaced debt as the major NGO issue of the day and the Trade Justice

Movement coalition was born.6

In the run up to 2005 and throughout the year, three issue coalitions were respon sible for 'Make Poverty History' policy demands: the Trade Justice Movement on 'trade justice'; the Jubilee Debt Cam paign on 'drop the debt', and the newly formed UK Aid Network on 'more and better aid'. After 'Make Poverty History' was formally wound up as a coalition campaign in early 2006, the develop ment sector was left with the three feeder

coalitions and the emergence of Stop Climate Chaos as a crossover develop ment-environment NGO coalition.7

The Changing Campaign Terrain: Four Overlapping Eras

Trade justice campaigning can arguably be divided into four overlapping eras: agricultural subsidies; no new issues at the WTO; stop forced liberalisation; and the emergence of corporate accountabil ity and regulation as a trade justice issue.

1) Agricultural Subsidies, 2002 The initial focus on agricultural subsi dies was down to the dual opportunities presented by the review of the Common Agricultural Policy in 2003 and the WTO Ministerial conference in Cancun in the same year. Campaigners demanded a complete end to export subsidies which enable Northern transnational corpora tions to export their food products at below cost of production. The main aim was for the British government to use its political clout to push for reform of the Common Agricultural Policy with other EU members. A secondary goal was for subsidies to be pushed up the agenda of the WTO negotiations with the specific intention of parallel reductions in US subsidies. NGOs anticipated reductions to Northern subsidies which would lead to reductions in dumping into African

markets.

On this plank of the trade justice agenda (freeing developing countries from the impact of western market distortions), the British government has been consist ently supportive, yet the limits of this kind of campaign soon became appar ent. Rather than the government seeing it as a spring-board to push for the wider trade justice agenda, it was sometimes even presented in opposition to it as part of a general agenda for global trade liberalisation. Furthermore, the campaign lacked power in other key EU member states, notably France and Germany,

This content downloaded from 91.220.202.155 on Sat, 28 Jun 2014 10:10:06 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Briefings: The Evolution of British Trade Justice Campaigning 387

which could have made a major differ ence to the EU's subsidy regime.

The limitations of a farm subsidies cam paign became apparent in some of the comments of its supporters, both from within NGOs and outside them. Some chose to present it as a free market agenda and appeared to suggest that they did not care if French farmers became unemployed as a result. This helped to wrongly frame the issues as Britain vs. France or urban vs. rural when the message that the majority of the campaigners wanted to convey was one of justice for poor farmers in Africa. It seems perfectly possible to design a subsidy regime in the EU and the US that supports small-scale farmers in those countries without having a negative impact on poor farmers in Africa and elsewhere.

2) 'No New Issues' at the WTO, 2003

With the reform of the Common Agricul tural Policy in 2003 failing to deliver the changes that campaigners had been call ing for, the next big opportunity was the

WTO ministerial in Cancun in 2003. The launch of the Doha Round in 2001 presented both poor countries and cam paigners with an opportunity and a threat, a recurring theme to the present day. Many African countries saw the purpose of the Doha Round as re balancing the global trade system after the previous Uruguay Round (concluded in 1994) which set up the WTO had largely left them with a set of obligations

which were having a negative impact on their home constituency rather than op portunities for economic development. In contrast the major rich countries, particularly the EU and US, saw the Doha Round as a means to greater multilateral trade liberalisation and an extension of the liberalisation agenda into new areas. The result was a broad list of issues covered by the label of 'Doha Development Agenda' in order to give it credibility with poor countries.

This tension, between rebalancing the multilateral trading system for the ben efit of poor countries and pushing for 'faster, further' trade liberalisation, first came to a head at the Cancun Ministe rial. By this time British trade justice campaigners had aligned with Southern governments with a demand to drop the 'new issues' - international agreements on the liberalisation of investment, com petition policy, government procurement, and trade facilitation. This annoyed the British government because for the first time, the NGOs were united in opposing a part of their liberalisation agenda. Eventually, if not belatedly, the then Trade Secretary, Patricia Hewitt, tried to persuade the then chief EU negotiator, Pascal Lamy, to drop the demand for agreements on these new issues or risk the collapse of the Ministerial. Lamy's response was that his negotiating man date came from all EU member states and that he could not bow to the demands of the UK alone. The result was that the

Ministerial collapsed.

It took a further year for the WTO negotiations to be put back together.

When WTO members agreed the 2004 July Framework the price was that three of the new issues - the liberalisation of investment, competition policy and gov ernment procurement - were dropped from the negotiations; only the fourth new issue - trade facilitation - remained.

3) 'Stop Forced Liberalisation', 2005

As the 2005 'year of Africa' came into focus - with the British Government using its Presidency of the G8 and the EU to 'do something for Africa', the UN

World Summit and the WTO Ministerial in Hong Kong - the profile of trade justice campaigning moved up several gears. It was agreed that the priority demand was that the British Govern ment should fight to stop forced liberali sation at the WTO and elsewhere.

This content downloaded from 91.220.202.155 on Sat, 28 Jun 2014 10:10:06 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

388 Review of African Political Economy

The initial government position was one of hostility. The starting point, as illus trated in the 2004 DTI White Paper, 'Making Globalisation a Force for Good',

was the ideology of 'same destination, different speeds' - 'the removal of trade barriers is just as important for develop ing countries as for developed'.8 Liberali sation is a sound objective and the only discussion should be how long a coun try should take to liberalise. The reason used to justify this is, 'The evidence shows that those countries which have achieved the biggest reductions in pov erty in recent years have been those which have been open to international trade'.9 The NGO response to this is that China, India, Vietnam, South Korea and Taiwan before them did not develop as a result of opening their own markets on an indiscriminate basis.

The idea that African countries should be able to choose their own paths to development gained currency in the Brit ish government in the run-up to the G8 summit. It was clear that in order for NGOs to be positive about Tony Blair's 'Commission for Africa' report it would have to signal a change from existing British policy. On trade, the 'stop forced liberalisation' position was articulated in two key statements:

Development must be the priority in all trade agreements, with liberalisation not forced on Africa.10

Attempts to dictate policies, as we have argued throughout, are not only unac ceptable as behaviour towards a partner and sovereign nation; they are also likely to be ineffective in generating real com

mitment and reform, let alone deliver the right solutions.11

'Make Poverty History' campaigning in other areas had helped to bring about mutually supportive changes. A parallel campaign to remove economic policy conditionality from the Department for International Development's (DFID) bi

lateral aid programmes had also re sulted in changes by March 2005. How ever, despite the repetition in a variety of formats throughout the year, the rhetoric struggled to be translated into practice.

One of the reasons was disagreement as to what exactly 'forced liberalisation' entailed. I have always been clear that 'unforced liberalisation' refers to na tional policy decisions taken without external pressure; 'forced liberalisation' meant market opening under pressure, either directly from donors and interna tional institutions or through trade nego tiations that would result in new obligations on developing countries. In contrast, the government's preferred in terpretation was to accept the arguments on aid conditionality but reject the trade position: 'forced liberalisation' meant only underhand coercion at WTO ministerials - for example, threats to withhold aid money or debt relief unless poor countries signed on the dotted line.

The era of 'stop forced liberalisation' campaigning coincided with the move to a broader agenda that looked beyond the

WTO. Many NGOs had begun to look to bilateral trade agreements and the Inter national Financial Institutions as sources of trade injustice. While the US had long pursued a strategy of negotiating Free Trade Agreements with strategic part ners, in parallel to the WTO negotiations, the EU had been more hesitant. But when negotiations on new Economic Partner ship Agreements (EPA) with the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group be gan in earnest, NGOs in Europe and Africa began to step up their campaign ing. In the UK, the opportunity of the EU Presidency in 2005 pushed EPAs up the trade justice agenda. NGO demands crystallised around two major areas: the reintroduction of the 'new issues', re jected by developing countries at the

WTO through the backdoor, and the EU push for rapid and deep trade liberalisa tion by the ACP countries.

This content downloaded from 91.220.202.155 on Sat, 28 Jun 2014 10:10:06 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Briefings: The Evolution of British Trade Justice Campaigning 389

Whilst the European Commission nego tiates trade agreements on behalf of the EU's member states, NGO discussions with Commission officials had come up against a brick wall. The standard re sponse was that a) the new EPAs had to include rapid and deep trade liberalisa tion to conform to WTO rules; b) that trade liberalisation was in any case 'good for development' and c) that the

EU's member states had already given the Commission a mandate to negotiate these deals which could not be undone.

As covered above, NGOs would dispute the idea that trade liberalisation is auto

matically good for development, espe cially if it is externally imposed to an arbitrary timescale, as the EU was pro posing. Second, if WTO rules were the problem, then the EU should be pushing to reform them to ensure developing countries' rights were protected. Third, if the largely uninterested EU member states had made a mistake in granting the

Commission powers to negotiate unfair deals, that was all the more reason to undo such powers.

The initial EPA campaign in the UK therefore focused on pushing the British government to work with other EU mem ber states to change the Commission's negotiating mandate and ensure that whatever deals were put to ACP coun tries did not require extensive liberalisa tion or include the 'new issues' against their will. After some argument, the British government moved in the NGO direction and issued a position paper a few days after the 'Commission for Af rica' report in March 2005: negotiations on new issues should be dropped unless

specifically requested by the ACP, and ACP countries should have up to 20

years to liberalise rather than the 10

years being promoted by the European Commission. At the time of writing (Feb ruary 2007), Brussels has made little progress on either of these points but ACP countries are being more vocal in their criticisms of the negotiating process

and anticipated outcome. It looks far from certain that agreements will be reached by the end of 2007.

4) 'Right Corporate Wrongs': Corporate Accountability, 2006 The corporate accountability dimension of trade justice began to gain momentum towards the end of 2005. A number of NGOs, notably ActionAid from the de velopment sector and Friends of the Earth from the environment camp, saw the Company Law Reform Bill as a major opportunity to improve the behaviour of British companies overseas.

The British Government had spent more than seven years preparing the ground for a major review of company law in order to both make it easier to set up and run businesses and to do so in a respon sible manner. While business lobby groups and NGOs had long been excited about the legislation, it was far from being at the forefront of the minds of the thinking public. This changed after

Gordon Brown's intervention at a speech to the Confederation of British Industry on 28 November 2005. The Chancellor appeared to have unilaterally decided to scrap the Operating and Financial Re view (OFR) which was due to come into effect from April 2006. Of interest to NGOs was the fact that the OFR would have required companies to report on their environmental and social impacts.

Given that an NGO coalition was being assembled to campaign to strengthen the OFR, this could have proved a major setback. But the decision proved seri ously embarrassing for the government over time. The Department for Trade and Industry had not been consulted and the decision ultimately proved to be unlaw ful, thanks to a court challenge by Friends of the Earth. The public row between the Government and NGOs put the issue of corporate accountability much higher up the political agenda than it would have been.

This content downloaded from 91.220.202.155 on Sat, 28 Jun 2014 10:10:06 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

390 Review of African Political Economy

Over 2006 as the Company Law Reform Bill moved through the parliamentary process, the Corporate Responsibility Coalition (CORE) and the Trade Justice Movement (TJM) pressed the Govern ment and MPs to amend the legislation. Three areas were identified: proper re porting of companies' social and envi ronmental impacts, a new duty on directors to minimise negative impacts, and the ability of affected communities overseas to gain 'access to justice' by being able to take action against a British company in a British courtroom.

Despite being a hugely technical area of law, the NGO coalition could point to real gains when the Bill finally gained royal assent and became the Companies Act. The Chancellor's OFR decision was effectively reversed, companies and their suppliers had to report on their social and environment impacts, directors had to take into account their companies' social and environmental impacts and ministers began to consider the concept of access to justice.

A major reason for the NGO successes was the party political nature of the debate on the Bill. Despite the new Conservative leader David Cameron's professed readiness to 'stand up to big

business',"2 his party acted as a mouth piece for the Confederation of British Industry in opposing all of the NGO demands. The partisan nature of the fight emboldened Labour and Liberal Democrat MPs to support the CORE/ TJM proposals and the Government to defend and improve its Bill. Boris Johnson MP gave NGO campaigners further cred ibility with his response to the CORE/ TJM campaign: 'I'm savagely hostile to this kind of bollocks'.13

NGO campaigning on corporate account ability is set to increase post-Companies Act. The new strategy is likely to be predicated on picking off particular busi ness sectors and using official processes to influence the outcome. The Competi

tion Commission's inquiry into the prac tices of UK supermarkets (especially Tesco), provides the impetus for Action Aid's campaign to strengthen the posi tion of supermarket suppliers and their employees.

With a move into supermarket cam paigning NGOs can rediscover their links to fairtrade. This brings NGO work on trade justice almost full circle - a return to micro and meso-level issues while the macro-level political changes needed remain unresolved.

Paradigm Change?

The ultimate goal of all trade justice campaigning is to break governments out of the predominant 'free trade' para digm and into the 'trade justice' one. The challenge is to organise campaigns which nibble at the edges of the former without undermining the case for moving to the latter. The British government, for all its rhetorical changes to its position on international trade negotiations and im provements to national legislation, re mains broadly stuck in a pro liberalisation stance. The near-mantra of 'more trade means less poverty' will continue to come under fire from NGOs, especially given that climate change has moved up the political agenda. It will become less sustainable to argue that trade in goods, which inevitably requires carbon emissions from transport, should be completely unfettered and free from any barrier. When the this becomes a majority view amongst policy-makers, the free-trade paradigm will be dead and buried.

The Changing Campaign Tools

Lobbying as a Necessary Evil: From an early stage in my NGO career I have been sceptical towards 'lobbying' as a useful instrument for changing policy-makers

minds. I think this is largely because I have predominantly worked on trade issues where the gap between policy

This content downloaded from 91.220.202.155 on Sat, 28 Jun 2014 10:10:06 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Briefings: The Evolution of British Trade Justice Campaigning 391

makers and NGOs is much wider com pared to, for example, aid. I also think my scepticism stems from my early meetings with civil servants from the Department for Trade and Industry, traditionally a voice for big business in Government and less interested in development is sues.

NGOs share some responsibility for un productive lobby meetings. The under standable desire for everyone to be at the table leads to set-piece affairs, with maybe ten NGO representatives on one side and ten civil servants on the other. If everyone is to say their piece it becomes a frag

mented exchange with little time to de velop a proper conversation. Such meetings rarely lead to anything useful: civil servants are there to defend the government's approach, NGOs to argue for change.

So why bother with such meetings at all? First, to show that you are still working on the issue in question; second, out of politeness. I also think that if you have just attacked government policy in the

media then you should give the govern ment's representatives a chance to re spond.

Media as the way to win change on trade: Much more productive for both gaining Government attention to an issue and in changing policy is judicious use of the media. It is a truism that the Blair administration is particularly 'media aware' and is sensitive to public criti cism. Journalists, as ever, are interested in a good story, particularly one that exposes government claims.

In 2005 the obvious pitch was to say that the government's trade policy was an odds with its proclamations that this was to be the 'year of Africa'. Three media successes on trade spring to mind. The first, in December 2004, put EPAs into the mainstream media for the first time. Covering the release of ActionAid's first report into EPAs, the UK's Financial

Times (FT) lined up a number of inde pendent critics including the Overseas Development Institute and the Mauritian trade minister behind ActionAid's argu

ments.14

By September 2005, it had become clear that the European Commission and its trade commissioner, Peter Mandelson, had become closed to further argument. For ActionAid's second report, into pos sible alternatives, the target had become policy-makers in the EU's member states and the African, Caribbean and Pacific countries. Because Mandelson himself had been dismissive of the possibility of alternative trading arrangements, de spite a clause in the EU-ACP treaty that certain ACP countries could ask for alternatives if they were not satisfied with an EPA, we investigated the possi bility that Mandelson was breaking in ternational law. A legal opinion from a lawyer at Matrix Chambers provided us

with the ammunition we needed and we made this the story.15

It is always frustrating when a good story is not given the coverage you think it deserves. For me, 'Mandelson in "ille gal" trade move' is much more interest ing than 'Bullied Africa in Mandelson poverty threat', which was the headline in the first ActionAid EPAs report press release.16 Whilst we did make it to the front page of the Morning Star and the top politics story on BBC news online,'7 it would have been great to have had a piece in the FT or the Guardian.

The final case is an example of one of those times when NGOs should expect the unexpected. With no obvious warn ing, Tony Blair had decided to make trade the focus of his annual foreign policy speech at Mansion House. The first I knew of it was when it was trailed in the papers, and even then I suspected that the Downing Street 'spin machine' had made trade the focus when the speech was actually more likely to focus on terrorism. The Prime Minister was

This content downloaded from 91.220.202.155 on Sat, 28 Jun 2014 10:10:06 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

392 Review of African Political Economy

trying to cajole other world leaders to agree to a new WTO deal at the ministe rial in Hong Kong in December 2005 but I felt his approach was totally wrong.18 It seemed clear from the outline deal emerg ing that an agreement would leave most African countries worse off and require poor people in Brazil, India and else where to pay the price for it. The day of Blair's speech remains my biggest media success personally. Not only did I write the quotes which the Guardian used19 but I also did a live interview on Channel 4

News with Jon Snow.

Conclusion

Trade justice campaigning in the Britain has evolved rapidly over a short period of time. From its origins in the fairtrade movement, NGO campaigning on trade has moved trade justice from a marginal to mainstream position in policy de bates. From an early concern with farm subsidies that cause dumping overseas, campaigners have broadened the trade justice agenda to encompass a range of challenges including policy space for developing countries and robust rules to hold transnational corporations to ac count. The challenges moving forward will be to maintain the link to the idea of fairtrade, which the public understands and supports, while establishing the relevance of regulating British business for the fulfilment of pro-poor goals in Africa.

Tom Sharman was a Trade Policy Officer at the intemational development NGO ActionAid UK. He is now their Policy Coordination Officer. He writes in a personal capacity; e-mail: sharman. tom@googlemail.com

Endnotes

1. By UK NGOs I mean members of the Trade

Justice Movement - a coalition of more than 70

organisations working on trade. See www.

tjm.org.uk for more. ActionAid is an international

NGO with its global headquarters in South Africa.

2. Fairtrade Foundation: http://www.fairtrade.

org.uk/about_sales .htm

3. Fairtrade Foundation: http://www.fairtrade.

org.uk/about_chronology.htm

4. Speech by Hilary Benn 14 October 2006: http: / /www.dfid.gov.uk/news/files/Speeches/

fairtrade.asp

5. The birth of Jubilee 2000: http: / / www.jubilee debtcampaign.org.uk/ ?lid=282

6. See www.tjm.org.uk for more.

7. For more information see Stop Climate Chaos:

http: / /www.stopclimatechaos.org.uk/, Jubilee Debt Campaign: http://www.jubileedebt campaign.org.uk/, UK Aid Network: http://

www.bond.org.uk/policy/ukan.htm, Trade

Justice Movement: http://www.tjm.org.uk/

8. DTI White paper 2004, p. 82.

9. Ibid.

10. Our Common Interest, p. 255.

11. Our Common Interest, p. 259.

12. David Cameron speech, 9 May 2006: http:/ /www.conservatives.com/tile.do?def=news.

story.page&obj_id=129669&speeches=l

13. As reported by one of his constituents, after a face-to-face meeting.

14. Poorer nations pressured by EU to open their

markets, Financial Times, 17 December 2004:

http://search.ft.com/ft Article?sortBy =gadat

earticle&queryText=Mandelson+Economic+

Partnership+ Agreements&=2&aje= true&x=

9&id=041217001079&page=3

15. Mandelson 'illegal' trade move, ActionAid

press release, 1 September 2005: http://

www.actionaid.org.uk/100112/press_release. html

16. Bullied Africa in Mandelson poverty threat, ActionAid press release, 17 December 2004:

http://www.actionaid.org.uk/1436/press_ release.html

17. Aid charity criticises Mandelson, BBC news

online, 1 September 2005: http://news. bbc.co.uk/l/hi/uk_politics/4203672.stm

18. Tony Blair 's Mansion House speech, full

text, The Guardian, 15 November 2005: http:// politics.guardian.co.uk/development/story/ 0?1643023,00.html

19. Aid agencies criticise Blair, The Guardian, 14

November 2005: http://politics.guardian.

co.uk/development/story/0?1642551,00.html

This content downloaded from 91.220.202.155 on Sat, 28 Jun 2014 10:10:06 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions