Tragic Moral Conflict and Endangered Species Recovery · 2. Two Utilitarian Senses of Wrongness 3....

Tragic Moral Conflict and Endangered Species Recovery

by

Rachel Lee Bryant

A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Department of Philosophy University of Toronto

© Copyright by Rachel Lee Bryant 2018

ii

TragicMoralConflictandEndangeredSpeciesRecoveryRachelLeeBryantDoctorofPhilosophy

DepartmentofPhilosophyUniversityofToronto

2018

Abstract

Giventhestateoftheartofconservation,andgiventherapiditywithwhichspeciesare

disappearingastheresultofhumaneconomicactivities,membersofthesocietiesthat

encourageandbenefitfromtheseactivities,andthatundertakethespeciesrecovery

process,oftenfaceaterriblechoice:either1)intensivelymanagespeciespopulationsand

ecologicalcommunitiesbykilling,harming,makingvulnerabletoharm,orcontrollingthe

mostimportantaspectsofthelivesofmanyindividualanimals;or2)allowentirespecies

togoextinct.Icallsituationsinwhichpeoplefacethiskindofchoicerecoverypredicaments.

Suchpredicamentsseemtobetragicmoralconflicts,orsituationsinwhichwhateverone

does—eventherightactthatisrightonthewhole—willbeseriouslywrong.

ThisdissertationexploreswhetherworkingfromwithinKant’sdeontology,Ross’s

deontology,orutilitarianismexcusesenvironmentalethicsforneglectingtheproblemof

tragicmoralconflict,orforfailingtorecognizerecoverypredicamentsastragicmoral

conflicts.Itasksthreequestionsofeachtheory.Doesithavewhatittakestoadmitthatthe

rightactcanbewronginsomeway?Ifso,doesithavewhatittakestoadmitthattheright

actcanbeseriouslywrong?Andifitdoes,canitinterpretrecoverypredicamentsas

situationsinwhichwhateveronedoeswillbetragicallywrong?

Thedissertationarguesthat,foreachtheory,theanswertothefirsttwoquestionsis

yes.Noneofthetheoriesexcusesusforignoringtheproblemoftragicmoralconflict.For

bothRoss’sandKant’sdeontologies,theanswertothethirdquestionisalsoyes,butfor

utilitarianism,theanswerisindeterminate.Thismeansthatfromwithinutilitarianism,we

cannotsaywhetherarecoverypredicamentisatragicmoralconflict,butfromwithinthe

othertwotheorieswecansaythatitis.

iii

AcknowledgementsIttookmealongtimetowritethisdissertation,andtheprocesswassometimesquite

painful.Ultimately,itwasafulfillingexperience,inlargepartbecauseofthecareand

supportothersgaveme.

Mycommitteemembers—advisorsWayneSumnerandDenisWalsh,andreader

PaulThompson—patientlystuckwithmethroughmajorchangesindirectionandlong

silencesonmypart.Deniswentoutofhiswaytofostermypreviousworkinthe

philosophyofecology,andgenerouslystayedwithmeevenaftermyinterestsveered

sharplyintotheterritoryofethics.Wayne,wholivesinthisterritory,kindlysupportedme

asIfoundmyownpaththroughit.ThankstohisandDenis’sguidanceandsuggestions,the

workisimmeasurablybetterthanitwouldhavebeenotherwise.Bothofthemexpressed

beliefinmeevenwhenIdidnotbelieveinmyself.Ithankthemmostofallforthis.

IwasthrilledtohaveLoriGruenastheexternalexaminer,becauseIadmireher

work—bothasaphilosopherandanactivist—somuch.Hercarefulreadingofthe

dissertation,andherinsightfulquestionsandadvice,willbeinvaluabletomeasI

transformmyworkinthefuture.TomHurkawastheinternalexaminer.Ashealwaysdid

withmycoursepapers,Tomreadthedissertationattentivelyandthoroughly,asked

essentialquestionsaboutcoreissues,andgavemanyveryhelpfulsuggestions.

MargaretOpoku-Paregavekindandskillfulassistanceinalladministrativematters.

TimeIspentwithFarshidBaghai,TawrinBaker,GailFraser,LetitiaGrenier,

LaurencePacker,SuzanPoyraz,HelgaVarden,andShelleyWeinbergremindedmeover

andoveragainaboutwhatmatters.Conversationswitheachofthesefriendsabout

philosophy,writing,reading,animals,orconservationscienceandpracticenourishedmy

thinkingandwork.

Stellahasbeenmydogcompanionfornearlythirteenyears.Shetookmeofteninto

thewoods,anddoesnotcareatallaboutphilosophy.Bothofthesethingshelpedmestay

saneasIworkedonthisproject.Mysister,CourtneyBryant,cametomyrescue,andkept

melaughingandfeelingloved.IwishIhadnotwaiteduntilthelastminutetolearnwhata

goodeditorsheis.IfitwerenotforFarshidBaghai,IdonotthinkIwouldhavehadthe

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imagination,thecourage,orthespacetotransformmyworkfromamereintellectual

exerciseintosomethingrootedinpersonalmeaning.

Finally,Iamdeeplygratefultomyparents,NancyWilliamsBryantandMichael

Bryant,whoabidinglysupportedmeinmorewaysthanIcannumber,andwhoseloveI

willneverfathom.

v

TableofContents

Acknowledgements

TableofContents

ChapterOne:TheRecoveryPredicamentandTragicMoralConflict

1.TheRecoveryPredicament

2.Remorse

3.MoralConflict

4.AskingtheTragicQuestion

5.TheChaptersAhead

iii

v

1

ChapterTwo:Ross’sDeontology

1.MoralConflict

2.TragicMoralConflict

3.RecoveryConflicts

4.Conclusion

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ChapterThree:Kant’sDeontology

1.Kant’sSystemofEthicalDuties

2.MoralConflictswithinKant’sEthics

3.IstheRecoveryPredicamentaTragicMoralConflict?

4.Conclusion

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ChapterFour:Utilitarianism

1.ThePrincipleofUtility

2.TwoUtilitarianSensesofWrongness

3.ThePossibilityofMoralConflictwithinUtilitarianism

4.TheRecoveryPredicamentisatLeastanEphemeralConflict

5.WhethertheRecoveryPredicamentisaPersistentConflictisIndeterminate

6.Conclusion

97

vi

Conclusion 133

Bibliography

147

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ChapterOne:TheRecoveryPredicamentandTragicMoralConflict

1. TheRecoveryPredicament

Thecaseoftheislandfox

Inthereports,sheisgivenanumberbutnotaname.Littleinformationisconveyedabout

SanMiguelIslandfox85619beforeshewasfirsttrappedin1998,butgoodguessesabout

keyelementsofhernarrativecanbecobbledtogetherfromthenaturalhistoryofUrocyon

littoralis,andfromtherecenthistoryoffoxesonSanMiguelandtheothernorthern

ChannelIslands.1

Shewouldhavebeenborninspring,inadenofhermother’schoosing.Ofallthe

sleepingandhidingplaceswithwhichshewasfamiliar,hermotherprobablywouldhave

pickedoutthesafestanddriestoneinwhichtodeliverandnurseherpups.Herfather

wouldhavebroughtfoodtothemthere,andhelpedhermothercarrytheyoungoutfrom

theden.Bothparentswouldhavechaperoned85619andhersiblingsaroundthepair’s

overlappinghomeranges,playedwiththem,protectedthemfromdanger,andshownthem

byexamplehowtohuntandforage.

Inherfirstautumnandwinter,85619mighteitherhaveremainedwithherfamily,

orhavewanderedawayfromtheirterritory,encounteringfoxesunknowntoher.Among

thesewouldhavebeenonessheoptedtoavoid,ortothreaten.Butperhapsonefox

appealedtoher,behavedcompatiblywithher.Thetwomighthavepairedup,initiatinga

partnershipthatwouldhavelasteduntiloneofthemdiedorelsewastrappedandtaken

away.

Whennottendingtoherownpups,85619probablypassedherdaysroamingher

territoryasshepleased.Sometimesshedefendeditsboundaryagainstfoxesinneighboring

territories,andsometimesshesurreptitiouslymatedwiththem.Sometimesshetook

1ThereportsaretheU.S.NationalParkService’sislandfoxcaptivebreedingandrecoveryreportsfor1999-2003:CoonanandRutz,IslandFoxCaptiveBreeding1999-2000;CoonanandRutz,IslandFoxCaptiveBreeding2001;CoonanandRutzCaptiveBreeding2002Report;CoonanandRutz,IslandFoxRecoveryProgram2003AnnualReport.Forthenaturalhistoryofislandfoxes,seeCoonanetal.,DeclineandRecoveryofIslandFox.TheChannelIslandsareanarchipelagointhePacificOcean,offthecoastofsouthernCalifornia.ThenorthernChannelIslandscompriseSanMiguel,SantaRosa,andSantaCruz.

2

nourishmentfromvariousandabundantfoodsources;shehunteddeermice,larks,and

crickets,shestoleeggsandchicksfrombirds’nests,andatethesweetfruitsofmany

differentplants.Sometimessheplayedwithhermateorkin,andsometimestheygroomed

eachother.Sometimessherestedaloneunderasagebush,ortogetherwithherfamilyin

theshelterofaden.

Whenshewasstillyoung,manyoftheotherfoxesonSanMiguelIslandfellpreyto

goldeneagles,whobeganhuntingontheislandaroundthetimeshewaslikelytohavebeen

born.85619’sneighbors,siblings,parents,pups,ormatewereprobablyamongthe

depredated.Shealmostwas,too.Aneagleonceswoopeddownuponher,sinkinghistalons

deeplyintohertorso.Hetriedtoflyoffwithher,butsheescapedhisgripandsurvivedthe

injuriesitinflicted.Beneaththickfur,theskinandmusclesaboveherribsborepermanent

scars.

In1998,shewastrapped,temptedbyfoodplacedatthebackofametalboxnot

muchlargerthanherbody.Beforebeingreleased,herthroatwasencircledbyachunky

collarthatemittedaradiofrequency,enablingpeopletotrackhermovementsremotely.

Outofeightradio-collaredSanMiguelfoxes,shewasoneofonlytwowhomanagedtostay

alivelongerthantwelveweeks.

Overthecourseofjustthreemonthsintheautumnofthefollowingyear,every

otherremainingfoxonSanMiguelIslanddisappeared—thelastofherkin,thelastofher

neighbors.Only85619evadedthebaitedtrapsthattrickedalltheothers,maybehaving

learnedalessonwhenshewascollared.

Forfouryears,therewasnoonetoplaywith,tofightwith,togroomorbegroomed

by,tomatewith,ortocurlupwithinsleep.Sheremainedfreeandcompletelyalone,

despitenumerousattemptsbyhumanbeings,andpresumablybygoldeneagles,tocapture

her.

Shegrewoldinsolitude,andshestartedgettingsick.Bythefallof2003,85619’s

kidneysandheartwerediseased,herthyroidhadtumors,andparasiteshadweakenedher

colon.Herwilysuspicionoftrapswasfinallyovercomewhenpeopleusedanewtechnique

tocatchher:aleghold.

Theytookherawayfromherplaceanddepositedherina200ft2pen.(Herhome

rangehadprobablybeenaslightlylessthan13millionft2beforetheotherfoxes

3

disappeared).2Twomonthslater,afterveterinariansdeterminedthattheillandagedfox

wasfittobreed,amalefoxwasbroughtintothesmallspacewithher.

85619wasnolongerinthehabitofinteractingwithotherfoxes.Thisonewasa

stranger.Hewasunacquaintedwiththewild,largerthanher,andmuchyounger.Unlike

matesinthewild,thetwohadnotchoseneachotherandcouldnotescapetheother’s

presence.Yetwinterwasapproachingandtherewasonlyoneenclosedshelterinthecage.

Thefoxeshadeithertoshareit,orfightoverit.And85619hadtocompeteforthefoodthat

appeareddaily.Shecouldnotacquireherownsustenance,sincetherewerenoanimalsto

hunt,noneststopilfer,nofruitstogather.

Perhapstheworstpartoflivinginthecagewasthattherewasnowheretogoto

avoidtheotherfox’saggression.Onemonthafterhearrivedinthepen,theotherfoxkilled

85619,breakingherlegandshakinghersoviolentlythatherbrainandkidneys

hemorrhaged.3

Whathappenedto85619isnotentirelyunusual.Like85619,everylastfoxonSan

MiguelIsland,everylastfoxonSantaRosaIsland,andatleastfifteenpercentofthefoxes

onSantaCruzIslandwerecapturedanddepositedincageslikehers—attheverylargest,

onehundredthofonepercentofthesizeoftheirhomeranges.Manyofthecaptivefoxes

(theonce-wildonesaswellastheircaptive-bornoffspring)wereinjuredrepeatedlyand

severelybytheirinescapablepenmates,andafewdiedastheresultofthoseinjuries.4

Notallcaptivepairingswereviolent,though.Somefoxesregularlyplayedwith,

groomed,andsleptwiththeirpenmates.However,thesefriendlypairingswereseveredif

theydidnotresultinlittersofpups.Thepup-lessfoxeswouldthenbeconfinedwith

2AccordingtoCoonanetal.,theaveragehomerangesizeofaSanMiguelIslandFoxis1.18km2,whichis12.7millionft2(DeclineandRecoveryofIslandFox,39-40).

3Forinformationon85619’sautopsy,captureandstintincaptivity,seethesourceslistedinnote1.4Recordsofpairings,breeding,injuriesanddeathsoffoxescanbefoundintheNationalParkService’sislandfoxcaptivebreedingandrecoveryprogramannualreports:inadditiontothereportslistedinnote1,theseare:Coonanetal.,IslandFoxRecovery2004,andIslandFoxRecovery2005;CoonanandDenis,IslandFoxRecovery2006,andIslandFoxRecovery2007;Coonan,IslandFoxRecovery2008andIslandFoxRecovery2009;andCoonanandGuglielmino,IslandFoxRecovery2011.

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strangers,chosenforthemsolelyaccordingtoestimatesofthecontributiontheireventual

offspringwouldmaketothegeneticdiversityoftheirsubspecies.

Thestrangenessandstressofconfinementhindersislandfoxesfromparentingas

oftenandaswellastheydointhewild.Incaptivity,theysufferedanunusuallyhighrateof

latetermabortions,stillbirthsandneonataldeaths.Someofthesecanbeattributedto

disease.Onerainyspringtwoyearsafter85619’sdeath,therewerenodryplacestogo

withinthefoxes’tinyenclosures.Sleepinginperpetuallydampwoodenboxes,many

pregnantfoxesdevelopedmastitis.Thispainfulbacterialinfectionofthemammaryglands

canpreventadequatenursing.Leftuntreated,itcandevelopintosepticemia,asystem-wide

infection.Asaresultofmastitisandsubsequentsepticemia,somemothersandyoungpups

diedintheircages.

Happily,mostpupsbornincaptivitysurvived.Yettheyhadanevenhardertime

reproducingthantheirwild-bornparentsdid.Asjuvenilesandadults,theyweremore

likelytoseriouslyinjuretheirmates,andtoabandonorharmtheirpups.Thoughwildfox

fatherscontributemuchtothecareoftheirpups,ononeislandcaptivefathersposedsuch

athreattotheiryoungthattheysystematicallywereremovedfromtheirpensonce

parturitionwasimminent.5

Whiletheislandfoxeswereconfinedincages,andaftertheirrelease,otherwild

animalsontheirislandswerebeingexterminated.Everylastoneofthe425muledeerand

740elkonSantaRosaIslandwasshot,andthe5,036pigsonSantaCruzIslandwereall

killed,too.

Theprocessofdestroyingthepigscouldnothavebeenmorethoroughand

systematic.6First,theentireislandwaspartitionedintoninesectionsbyfencesthatpigs

couldnotbreech.Foruptofifteenmonths,eachofthe5,036pigsontheislandwasstuckin

theirsection,regardlessofwhetherpartoftheirsocialgrouporhomerangelayonthe

othersideofafence.

5ButthiswasonSantaCatalina,anislandinthesouthernChannelIslands,whichforthesakeofsimplicityI’mnotincludinginthisnarrative.There,foxeswerebroughtintocaptivitynotbecauseofhyperpredation(asontheNorthernChannelIslands),butbecausetheyweredyingfromdistemperatveryhighrates.6Parksetal.,“RapidEradication”detailsthemethodsusedtokillthepigs.

5

Next,trapswerebaitedandset.Mostpigscaughtintrapswerekilled.Thefewthat

weretemporarilysparedwerefittedwithradiocollars,sterilizedandreleased.Thefemales

amongthemwerealsoinjectedwithachemicalthatinducessignsofestrous,sothatthey

wouldattractmalepigsforpurposesthatwillbecomeclearbelow.

Oncetrappingpigsbecameinefficient,peoplefoundandshotthemfromhelicopters.

Whennomorepigscouldbeseenreadilyfromtheair,peoplehuntedthemonfoot,using

dogstohelpfindandcornerthepigs.Afterthedogsceasedtofindthemeasily,peopleused

theradiosignalsfromthecollaredanimalstolocateandkillthelastgroupsofpigsonthe

island.

Alongwiththepigs,elk,anddeer,goldeneaglesalsowereremovedfromSantaRosa

andSantaCruzIslands.BecauseaU.S.federallawprohibitskillingeagles,theadultswere

trappedinnetsandtransportedtoAlaskaornorthernCalifornia.Chicksweretakenfrom

theirnestsontheChannelIslandsanddepositedinnestsonthemainland.Threeofthe31

adultsdiedafterbeingcapturedandbeforebeingreleased,andanothereaglediedalmost

immediatelyafterbeingreleased.7,8Itiscommonlyknownthattranslocatinganimals

substantiallyelevatestheirmortalityrates.

Asthegoldeneagleswerebeingtransportedfromtheislandstothemainland,bald

eagleswerebeingtransportedfromthemainlandtotheisland.Juvenilesborntocaptive

7Lattaetal.,CaptureandTranslocationofGoldenEagles,andCoonanandDenis,IslandFoxRecovery2006.SeealsoCoonanandRutz,IslandFoxCaptiveBreeding1999-2000,IslandFoxCaptiveBreeding2001,andIslandFoxCaptiveBreeding2002;Coonanetal.,IslandFoxRecovery2003,IslandFoxRecovery2004,andIslandFoxRecovery2005;Coonanetal.DeclineandRecoveryofIslandFox;andUSFWS,DraftRecoveryPlan.8Sometimesthetotalnumberofadultsornearadultsisgivenastwenty-two.SeeUSFWS,DraftRecoveryPlan.

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parents(wholikelylivedunderconditionssimilartothecaptiveislandfoxes’9)were

broughttoSantaCruz.10

Meanwhile,captiveislandfoxeswerebeingfittedwithradiocollarsandreleased

backtothewild.OnSantaCruzandSantaRosa,highproportions(e.g.50%)ofthefirst

groupsofreleasedfoxeswerekilledbygoldeneagleswithinweeksofhavingbeenfreed.

Thiswasnotsurprising,asthesefoxeswerereleased“experimentally”beforetheavian

causeoftheirconspecifics’highmortalityrateshadbeenremoved.Amongthelater

releases,somefoxesdiedofemaciationshortlyaftertheyencounteredthewild-bornin

captivity,theywerenotaccustomedtoalimentingthemselves.Oneolderfoxwhowasnot

inshapetodefendaterritorywaskilledbyotherrecentlyreleasedfoxes.Anotherwas

strangledwhenhisradiocollargotstuckonthebranchofashrub.Allinallthough,once

theeagleswereremoved,mostreleasedfoxesfaredverywell.Theychosematesandfound

territories,andtheyrearedpupsmuchmoresuccessfullythantheyhadincaptivity.

Insummary,fromthetimethat85619wasleftaloneinthewildin1999,untilthe

lastoftheelkwereshotonSantaRosaIslandin2011thefollowingoccurred:thousandsof

animalswerekilled;scoresofothersweretakenfromtheirhomesandputinunfamiliar

placeswheretheirchancesofsurvivalwereprobablygreatlydiminished;andhundredsof

9Thecaptiveeagles’conditionsmightevenhavebeenworsethanthefoxes’.Foronething,captivebirdscan’tlocomotethewaytheyprobablymostwantto(exception:flightlessones).Also,atleastthreeotheraviancaptive-breedingprograms(PeregrineFalcon,HawaiianCrow,CaliforniaCondor)force(orforced)birdstoconceiveattimesandintervalsoverwhichtheyhave(orhad)nocontrol,andwhichdon’tmatchtheonestheyexhibitinthewild.Forinstance,throughrepeatedartificialinsemination,andbyremovingtheireggsassoonastheyarelaid,condorsweremadetoproducemanymoreclutchesperyearthantheywouldinthewild.Also,captivebirdsareoftenpreventedfromrearingtheirownyoung.Forexample,captivecondorchickswereoftenfedbypeoplewearingcondorpuppetsontheirhands,ratherthanbytheirparents,withwhominthewildtheywouldstayforacoupleofyearslearninghowtobeacondor.Hawaiiancrowchicksarealsosometimesraisedbypuppets,sotheirparentscanusealltheirenergymakingmoreeggs.Whentheywereendangered,peregrinefalconshatchedatcaptivebreedingfacilitieswereoften“raised”inthewildbypeople—suchasmyfriendLetitiaandme—whoprovidedfoodforthemandprotectedthemfrompredatorsbutdidnotinteractwiththemastheirparentswouldhave.Theirparentsweredeniedchick-rearingactivities,becauseraisingtheirownbroodswouldhavegotteninthewayofproducingasmanyeggsaspossible.Forexcellentdiscussionsofmanyoftheethicalissuesraisedbykeepinghumansandotheranimalsincaptivity,seeGruen(ed.),TheEthicsofCaptivity.10USFWSDraftRecoveryPlan,Coonanetal.,IslandFoxRecovery2005,andCoonanetal.,DeclineandRecoveryofIslandFox.

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yetotherswereconfinedtostressfulsocialandphysicalconditionsthattheydidnot

choose,thatledto(sometimesfatal)diseaseandinjury,andwhichtheycouldnotoptto

leave.

Thisprogramiswidelyhailedasahugesuccessbecauseitpreventedtheextinction

ofthreecriticallyendangeredsubspeciesofUrocyonlittoralis(commonlycalledtheIsland

Fox),eachendemictooneofthethreenorthernChannelIslands:SanMiguel,SantaRosa,

andSantaCruz.11Everyelementoftheprogram—thekilling,thetranslocation,the

confinement—apparentlywasnecessaryforhinderinggoldeneaglesfromdepredatingthe

lastofthefoxes,andforgrowingtheshrunkenU.littoralispopulationstosizesthatwould

belikelytopersistagaininthewild.

Hereiswhy.Baldeaglesmostlyeatfoodfromtheocean,whilegoldeneagleseat

bothmarineandlandanimalsthesizeofislandfoxes.Therewasatimewhentheslightly

largerBaldEaglesnestingontheChannelIslandsrepelledprospectinggoldeneagles.But

afterMontroseChemicalCorporation,apesticidemanufacturer,begandumpingeffluent

intoMontroseBayin1940(theycontinueduntil1970),BaldEaglesingestedametabolite

ofDDTthroughtheirmarineprey,andaccumulateditintheirbodies.Asaresult,thebirds’

eggs’shellsgrewsothinthattheywouldbreaklongbeforethechicksdevelopinginside

werereadytohatch.Slowly,baldeaglesstoppedreproducingandeventuallydisappeared

fromtheChannelIslands.Goldeneaglesreplacedthem,andbeganbreedingtherebythe

endofthe1990s.Theyweresustainedbycopiouspigletsandfawns,theoffspringof

animalswhoseancestorshadbeenbroughttoSantaCruzandSantaRosabyfarmersand

huntersinthenineteenthandearlytwentiethcenturies,andbythecarcassesofelkleftto

rotbytrophyhunters.ThoughfoxesdidnotaccountforalargeportionofGoldeneagles’

diet,depredationnonethelesscausedthenumberoffoxestoplummet;between1994and

1999/2000,theestimatednumberonSanMiguelfellfrom450to15,onSantaRosait

droppedfrom1,780to15,andonSantaCruzfrom1,465to50or60.12Sofoxeswere

broughtintocaptivity,ungulatesweredestroyed,goldeneagleswereremoved,andbald

eagleswerere-introduced.

12Coonanetal.DeclineandRecoveryofIslandFox,47.

8

ThemethodsusedtopreventtheextinctionofUrocyonlittoralisarestandardinthe

appliedecologicalfieldsofconservationandecologicalrestoration.13Confiningwild

animalsinordertomanagetheirreproductionandtherebytheirsociallives(captive

breeding),movinganimalsfromplacestheyknowtoplaceswithwhichtheyhaveno

experienceornorecentexperience(re-introductionandtranslocation),andkillinganimals

perceivednottobelongwheretheylive(removalofso-calledinvasives)areconsidered

bestpracticesforstemmingextinctionsofendangeredanimalspecies.14,15Astherecovery

ofUrocyonlittoralisattests,whentheyareappliedmeticulously,themethodsworkwell.

Giventhestateoftheartofconservation,andgiventherapiditywithwhichspecies

andothertaxonomicgroupsaredisappearingastheresultofeconomicactivities,members

ofthesocietiesthatencourageandbenefitfromtheseactivities,andthatundertakethe

speciesrecoveryprocess,oftenfaceaterriblechoice.Wecaneither1)intensivelymanage

speciespopulationsandecologicalcommunitiesbykilling,harming,makingvulnerableto

harm,orcontrollingthemostimportantaspectsofthelivesofmanyindividualanimals,or

2)allowentirespeciesorothertaxonomicgroupstogoextinctbecauseofouractivities.

Iwillcallsituationsinwhichwefacethiskindofchoicerecoverypredicaments.In

them,thereissomethingdeeplytroublingabouteachofthecoursesofactionthatareopen

tous.Itseemsasthoughhoweverwerespondtothem,wewillhavecauseforprofound

regret,evenremorse.

13AfewexamplesotherNorthAmericanspeciesonwhichsomeorallofthesemethodshavebeenorarebeingusedincludeCaliforniacondor,Hawaiiancrow,Mexicanwolf,black-footedferret,VancouverIslandmarmot,whoopingcrane,andScripps’murrelet(formerlyknownasXantus’murrelet).Itwouldnotbeunreasonabletothinkthatpreventingtheextinctionofsomeofthesespeciessuchasthewhoopingcrane,theblackfootedferret,andtheHawaiiancrow,mightrequireperpetualmanagement.SeeRoman,Listed,Ch8.InNewZealand,thegovernment,conservationorganizations,andcitizenvolunteershaveundertakentokillhundredsofmillionsofmammals(whichdidnotexistontheislandsuntilhumansarrivedthereapproximately700yearsago)inordertopreventtheextinctionofmanyendemicbirdspecies.ForanintroductiontothisprojectseeKolbert,“TheBigKill.”14Habitatrestorationisalsooneofthebestpractices,butthiswasnotanissueintheU.littoraliscase,andIwillnotaddressithere.15Isometimesusetheterm“endangeredspecies”generically,toreferendangeredspecies,subspecies,populations,etc.

9

2. RemorseRegretcomesindifferentforms,someofwhichBernardWilliamselaboratesin“Moral

Luck.”Theyallhaveincommonanattitudethatcanbeexpressedas“howmuchbetterifit

hadbeenotherwise.”Afewexamplesaredisappointment,sorrow,andgrief,whichareall

neutraltowardtheroleplayedbytheregrettorindoingorbringingaboutthatwhichthey

regret.Inthisgeneralsense,Mrs.RamsaycanregretthatlittleJames’hopesweredashed

whenatriptothelighthousewasputoff,whetherornotshetakesherselfashavinghad

anythingtodowiththepostponement.16Or,apersoncanregretthatotherswerehurtina

carcrashregardlessofwhethertheperson’sownactionsmadeanydifferencetothe

occurrenceorseverityoftheaccident.

However,ifaperson’sownactionsareimplicatedinthatwhichtheyregret,in

additiontoanattitudeof“howmuchbetterifithadbeenotherwise,”itwillalsobefitting

forthemtohaveanattitudeof“howmuchbetterifIhaddoneotherwise.”Williams

introducesthetermagentregrettodistinguishthisspeciesofregretfromregretingeneral.

Thatagentregretisanappropriateresponseforsomeonedoesnotentailthattheyare

responsible,letaloneculpablefortheregrettedstateofaffairs.Takeforanexample

Williams’truckdriver,whowasdrivingsafelybutcouldnotstophisvehicleintimetosave

achildwhodartedinfrontofit.Thedriverisrelatedtotheaccidentinadifferentwaythan

spectator-regrettors,becauseunlikethem,ifhehadtakenanalternatecourseofaction,the

regrettablestateofaffairscouldhavebeenaverted;althoughhehadnogoodreasonatthe

timetodoso,thedrivercouldhavechosenadifferentroute,leftafewminutesearlieror

later,ortakenthedayoff,andsurelythishauntshiminawayunexperiencedbyawitness

orsomeonewholearnsoftheincidentsecondhandandwhofeelsonly,thoughperhaps

deeply,regretsimplicitoraboutit.

Althoughweexpectthetruckdrivertoexperienceandtoexpressadifferenttypeof

regretthanawitnesswould,wedonot,Ithink,expecthimtoexperienceandexpress

remorse.Williamssayslittleaboutthisemotion,buthesuggestsitisaspeciesofagent

regret.Iwanttofollowandexpandonhissuggestion,drawingfromcontemporary

accountsofremorsetoconceiveofitasprofoundagentregretforseriouswrongdoing.One

16Thisexample,whichrunsthroughthesection,isdrawnfromVirginiaWoolf’sTotheLighthouse.

10

elementthisconceptionofremorseshareswithmostothersisthattheagent’sregretted

actionisnotjustsomethingitwouldhavebeenbetternottohavedone.Itisawrong.

StevenTudorisamongthosewhoisconcernedtomarkoffagentregretforactions

whichinvolvewrongsfromthosewhichdonot.Hecharacterizesremorseas“thesuffering

acknowledgementofone’shavingwrongedtheOther,ofone’sresponsibilityfortheOther’s

suffering.”17OnTudor’saccount,anagentisresponsibleforanother’ssufferingifthereare

groundsforrequiringtheagenttoanswerforwhattheydid,groundsforboththemandus

tonotevadeitsmoralsignificance.Whatthesegroundsarewilldependonthemoral

theoryinplay,butonecandidateisthattheregrettedactwasdonewith“freewillplus

knowledgeofthenatureandlikelyresultsoftheaction,plusdesireorintentiontoachieve

suchresults,ortoperformtheactionregardlessofknownlikelyconsequencesetc.”18So

whilethetruckdriverintheexampleabovemightbeexpectedtoexpresshisregretina

differentwaythanaspectatordoes,heshouldbeneithercompellednorimpelledto

answerforwhathedid,whichisanotherwayofsayingthathedidnotdowrong.In

contrast,arecklessormurderousdriverwhocrashedintoapersonwouldhavetoanswer

forheractions—shewouldhavedonewrong.

Iftheonlythingthatmarksremorseasadistinctformofagentregretisthatwith

remorse,theregrettedactioniswrong,thenevenMr.Ramsaycouldappropriatelyfeel

remorseforhowharshlyhesquelchedhisson’shopeofsailingtothelighthouse,because

notonlydidthewayhepostponedthetriphurtJames,hewasresponsibleformakingsuch

apredictablyhurtfulpostponement;hewrongedJames.However,onmostphilosophical

conceptionsofremorseitwouldbeastretchtosaythatremorseiswarrantedbyMr.

Ramsayinthiscase.ThisisnotbecausehedidnotwrongfullyhurtJames,butbecausethe

wrongwasnotgraveenoughtomakesenseoftheprofoundkindofregretthatisremorse.

Letuscallagentregretforwrongdoingmoralregret.Thereisaspectrumofthiskind

ofemotion,ononeendofwhichliethelightestandmostephemeralpricksofconscious,

andontheotherliethedeeperandmoreenduringmoralregretstowhichremorserefers.

WhileremorsemaybeanintelligibleresponseonMr.Ramsay’sparttohisgeneralpattern

17Tudor,CompassionandRemorse,152.18Ibid.,141-2.

11

ofdistantandinsensitiveparenting,somethingclosertotheotherendofthemoralregret

spectrumwouldfithisuncaringpostponementofthelighthousetrip.

Invirtueofwhatisremorse,ratherthanalighterformofmoralregret,warranted

byanagent?Manyofthosewhotheorizeremorseconceiveitasmoralregretfor

wrongdoingwhichisbeyondrepair.AdamMorton,forinstance,describesremorseas

follows.“Inamodelcasesomeonehasbeenharmed,theharmisirreparable,andyoufeel

anappealfromtheharmedperson,whichwillnotleaveyoualone.Ifitisamodelcaseof

remorse,youhavedonewrongincausingtheharm.”19(emphasisadded)Similarly,Alan

Thomassaysthat“ithasbeenproposedasadistinctivemarkoftheemotionthatremorse

istypicallyfeltoverirremediableevil,adestructionofvaluethatcannotberemedied.”20

Thoughitdoesnotexactlytheorizeremorse,CharlesBaudelaire’spoem“L’Irréparable”

addressesitselftoRemorse,andlinksorevenidentifiesitwithTheIrreparable,which

“gnawswithhisaccurstteeth.”21

Awrongfulharmorlosscanbeirreparablewithoutbeingveryimportant,however.

ImaginethatyouthoughtlesslydiscardanobjecttowhichyouknowIattachsentimental

value,say,myfirstsubwaytransferaftermovingtothecitythatwouldbecomemyhome.

Thislosscannotberepaired—nothingintheworldcanreplacethatlittleslipofpaper.But

itisnotalossthatmattersverymuchtome.Thatyoucauseditnegligentlymightbewrong,

andmightwarrantsomekindofmoralregret,butsurelynottheterriblegnawingof

remorse.

Italsoseemsasthoughsomelosseswhicharebothreparableandrepairedare

nonethelessgraveenoughtowarrantremorseonthepartofthosewhowrongfullybring

themabout.Imaginethatbecauseyouaredrinkingcoffeeandconversingwhiledriving,

younoticetoolatethatyouhaveveeredtowardmeonmybicycle,andyouhitme,causing

bothofmyarmstobreak.Inresponsetothis,itwouldmakesenseforyoutofeelnotjust

anykindofmoralregret,butremorse.Importantly,itwouldmakesenseforyoutofeelthis

evenifinthelongrun,IamnotworseoffthanIwouldhavebeenhadtheaccidentnot

19Morton,EmotionandImagination,170.20Thomas,RemorseandReparation,130.21Baudelaire,FleursduMal.

12

occurred—saymyarmsbecamestrongerandmoreflexibleaftertheyheal,thatIam

neithertoofrightenednortoodistrustfultotakepleasureinroadridingagain,andthat

throughtherehabilitationprocessIdiscoverthejoyofswimming.Still,yournegligencewill

havesubstantiallydiminishedmanyimportantaspectsofmywell-beingforanappreciable

periodoftime,andthisisremorse-worthy.

Considerationssuchasthesesuggestthatwhenitcomestowrongdoing,seriousness

andirreparabilityarenotcoextensive,andthatthespectrumofmoralregretreflects

seriousnessratherthanirreparability.Thisisnottodenythatirreparabilitycan,and

probablyusuallydoes,addtotheseriousnessofawrong.

Iwanttosuggestthatremorseisappropriatewhenone’sactionhaswrongfully

broughtaboutorhasconstitutedalosstoafundamentalmoralvalue,andthelossis

significant.Whatcountsasafundamentalmoralvaluewilldependonthemoraltheoryone

holds.Amongthemanypossibilitiesarewelfare,dignity,relationsofcare,autonomy,and

sacredorotherwisecherishedobjectsorstates.

Whatcountsasasignificantlossofsuchvalues?Takingwell-beingtobethe

fundamentalvalue,Tudoridentifiessignificantharmsasthosewhichbringorkeep

someonebelowathresholdofmoderatewell-being,“whichismorethanmeresurvivalplus

minimumhealth,butlessthantheAristotelianidealofafullyflourishinglife.”22Remorse-

worthyactsarethereforeoneswhichwrongfullydepriveanotherofwhattheyneedto

meetthisthreshold.Inadiscussionofseriouswrongdoinginthepoliticalrealm,Martha

Nussbaumpositsthatthethresholdiscrossedbypoliciesthatmakesomeone“beara

burdenthatnocitizenshouldhavetobear.”23Shetakesthefundamentalvaluetobe

dignity,andholdsthattherearetencentralcapacitiesthatarebasictoit(amongtheseare

health,bodilyintegrity,sensesandimaginationandthought,emotions,practicalreason,

andaffiliation).Asocietycommitsseriousmoralwrongdoingwhenitallowsoneofits

memberstocarrytheburdenofanyoftheircentralcapacitiesfallingbelowacertainlimit.

Imentionthesestandardsforassessingwhetherawrongfullybroughtaboutlossis

significant,andthuswarrantsremorse,notinordertosettleonastandard,buttoillustrate

22Tudor,CompassionandRemorse,31.23Nussbaum“CostsofTragedy,”1019.

13

thatevenwhenweareequippedwithone,wewillsometimesbeunabletodetermine

whetheraparticularlossmeetsit.Whereisthelimitbelowwhichadeficitofemotional

capacityisaburdennooneshouldhavetobear?Atwhatpointbetweentheextremesof

meresurvivalplusminimumhealthandidealflourishingliesthe“moderatewell-being”

belowwhichonesufferssignificantharm?Thesevaguenessesdonotreflectaworrisome

lackofprecisioninthestandards.Instead,theyreflecttheactualvaguenessofthe

phenomenathestandardsaremeanttoidentify.TouseTudor’sphrase,thereisa“long

twilight”inwhichthesignificanceofaloss,andthustheseriousnessofwrongfullycausing

it,andthustheintelligibilityofremorseasaresponsetohavingwrongfullycausedit,will

beambiguous.24Yetattheextremesofthespectrum,significanceandinsignificance,

seriousnessandtriviality,intelligibleandexcessiveremorseshouldbeunambiguous.

Insummary,remorseisaspeciesofmoralregret,thatis,ofagentregretfor

wrongdoing;moralregretisaspeciesofagentregret,orregretthatone’sownactionwasa

causalfactorinbringingaboutsomethingregrettable;andagentregretisaspeciesof

regret,whichisabackward-lookingnegativeemotion,therootunpleasantnessofwhichis

theunchangeabilityofthepast,toparaphraseMorton.25

Thatanactoromissionwarrantsmoralregretimpliesthatitisinsomewaywrong.

Thatitwarrantsremorseimpliesthatitisinsomewayseriouslywrong.Ifrecovery

predicamentsaretroublingbecauseremorseiswarrantedbyallpossiblecoursesofaction

withinit,thentheyaresituationsoftragicmoralconflict.

3.MoralConflict

Amoralconflictoccurswhentwoormorejointlyimpossiblecoursesofactionareboth

morallycalledfor.Williamsisperhapsmoreresponsiblethananyoneforpullingthe

problemofconflictintotheambitofAnglo-Americanmoralphilosophy.“Bymoralconflict,”

24Tudor,CompassionandRemorse,31.25Ibid.,p.164.Iftheirreparabilitythatissupposedtomarkremorse-appropriatewrongsisunderstoodmerelyasunchangeability,ortheimpossibilityofundoingwhathasbeendone(ascontrastedwithrepairingit),thenallremorse-worthywrongswillbeirreparable.Butsowillallotherwrongs.Irreparabilitywillnotexplainremorse-worthiness.

14

Williamssays,“Imeanonlycasesinwhichthereisaconflictbetweentwomoral

judgementsthatamanisdisposedtomakerelevanttodecidingwhattodo.”26Hemakes

thismorespecificwhenhedescribestheoverlappingformsmoralconflictcantake.Inone

“itseemsthatIoughttodoeachoftwothings,butIcannotdoboth.”Intheother,

“somethingwhich(itseems)Ioughttodoinrespectofcertainofitsfeaturesalsohasother

featuresinrespectofwhich(itseems)Ioughtnottodoit.”27Soconflictsexhibitthis

structure:

XoughttodoA,andXoughttodoB,buts/hecannotdoboth.

Conflictsdonotnecessarilyposeinsolublepracticalpuzzles.Amongphilosophers

whotheorizeconflictandwhobelievethatitisnotalwaysillusory,mostthinkthatthereis

sometimes,orevenalways,arationalwaytodeterminewhichoftheclashingoughtstoact

against.28Whensuchadeterminationhasbeenmadeandactedupon,however,the

resolutionisnotalwayswithoutwhatWilliamscalls“aremainder.”Moralregretisa

responsetothisremainder,asareadesiretomakeamendsandamotivationtomanage

thingssothatsimilarpredicamentsdonotariseinthefuture.

Theremainder,oritsemotionalaccompaniment,indicatethattheoverridden

requirementhasnotbeeneliminateddespitebeingdecidedagainst.Thatis,itstillseems

wrongnottohavedoneA,evenwhenonehasdeterminedthattherequirementtodothe

incompossibleactBoverridesit.

LisaTessmancallsconflictsthatarenotresolvedwithoutaremaindermoral

dilemmas.Theyaresituations“inwhichthereisamoralrequirementtodoAandamoral

requirementtodoB,whereonecannotdobothAandB,andwhereneithermoral

requirementceasestobearequirementjustbecauseitconflictswithanotherrequirement,

26Williams,“EthicalConsistency,”170.27Ibid.,171.28Forexample,Brink,“MoralConflict”;Foot,“MoralRealism”;Nussbaum,“CostsofTragedy”;StockerPluralandConflictingValues;Tessman,MoralFailure;andperhapsWilliams,“EthicalConsistency.”

15

evenifforthepurposesofaction-guidanceitisoverridden.”29Tosimplify,dilemmatic

conflictsexhibitthisstructure:

XoughttodoA,XoughttodoB,XcannotdobothAandB,andneitherrequirementis

eliminateduponbeingoverridden.

ForWilliams,evenlightweightrequirementscansurvivebeingoverridden;what

Tessmancallsdilemmascanbemundaneaswellastragic.Tessman,incontrast,believes

thatonlycertainkindsofparticularlyweightyrequirementssurvivearesolutiontoact

countertotheirdemands.Forher,dilemmasarealwaystragic.Bothwouldagreethatat

leastsomeconflictsinvolverequirementswhichnotonlyresistelimination,butwhichit

wouldbeseriouslywrongtoactagainst,eveniftheyhavebeenoverridden.Callthesetragic

conflicts.Theyhavethisstructure:

XoughttodoA,XoughttodoB,XcannotdobothAandB,actingagainsteither

requirementwouldbeseriouslywrong,andneitherrequirementiseliminateduponbeing

overridden.

Suchconflictscanbeexcruciatingevenforthosewhofeelcertaintheyareactingforthe

best.

Thecaseofthenorthernspottedowl

WildlifebiologistLowellDillerhasvoluntarilytakenonthejobofkillinghealthy,wild

barredowlsintheCaliforniaforestswheretheyhaverecentlybeguntothrive.Hefindsthe

task,whichhehasundertakenovereightytimes,“traumatic”andsays“IhateiteverytimeI

gooutanddoit.”30YetDillercontinuestolurethebirdsinwithrecordedcallsandthen

riddlethemwithshot,becausehebelieves—notwithoutgoodreason—thatnorthern

spottedowlsmightgoextinctifexpandingbarredowlpopulationsarenotconstrained.

29Tessman,MoralFailure,15.30Diller,“ToShootorNottoShoot,”57;Shogren,ToSaveThreatenedOwl.

16

Recallingthemostharrowingofdilemmas,Dillersaysthatforhim,“theissueoflethal

removalboilsdowntoasortof‘Sophie’sChoice.’Shootingabeautifulraptorthatis

remarkablyadaptableandfitforitsnewenvironmentseemsunpalatableandethically

wrong,butthechoicetodonothingisalsounpalatable,andIbelievealsoethically

wrong.”31Byresolutelyadvocatingkillingbarredowlsforthesakeofthespottedowl,

Dillerexpressescertaintythathehaschosentherighthornofthedilemma.Yetthatdoes

notextinguishtheforceoftherejectedoption:“Intellectually,Ibelievethatsomebarred

owlsneedtobelethallyremovedinanexperimentalcontext,butwhenfacedwiththe

realityofshootingone,itremainsaninternalstruggle.Almostfiveyearsafterthatfirst

shot,Istillgetanxiouspreparingtofire...”32

Dillerkillsbarredowlsaspartofanexperimenttodeterminewhetherremoving

themfromnorthernspottedowl(Strixcaurinaoccidentalis,NSO)habitatcouldhaltor

reversedeclinesinNSOpopulations.TheU.S.FishandWildlifeService’s(USFWS,the

agencyresponsibleforpreventingextinctionsundertheEndangeredSpeciesAct)hastaken

thedecisiontoinvestigatetheefficacyofmasskillingofbarredowlsasasortoflastresort

initsattempttorecovernorthernspottedowls.Ithascometothisbecausepeoplehave

latelydestroyedmuchoftheforestonwhichNSOdepend,andbecausebarredowlsseem

tobecompetingwithdwindlingnumbersofNSOsforwhatisleftofit.

Membersofthenorthernsubspeciesofthespottedowldwellinstructurally

complexforestsofthePacificNorthwest,fromsouthernmostBritishColumbiathroughthe

CascadeandCoastalmountainrangesofOregon,WashingtonandCaliforniaasfarsouthas

SanFranciscoBay.Fornesting,roosting,andforaging,theyrelyonforestswithamostly

closed,multi-levelcanopy,theoverstoryofwhichiscreatedbyverylargetrees.Beneath

thisumbrellaoffoliage,NSOsrequireplentyofopenspace,littleundergrowth,and

abundantdeadanddecadenttrees(onesthatarealivebuthaverottingcavitiesorbroken

tops).Itnormallytakes150to200hundredyearsforaforesttoreachthisstate,sospotted

31Diller,“ToShootorNottoShoot,”57.32Ibid.

17

owlsdependonoldgrowthandmatureforests.Moreover,theydependupongreat

uninterruptedtractsofit;theirknownterritorysizesrangefromabout4km2to125km2

andtheywillnottraversevasttreelessareas,suchasbays,humansettlements,or

expansiveclearcuts.33

Between1800and1990,anestimated60–88percentofNSOhabitatwaslost,

mostlytotimberharvesting.Whatremainedofitwashighlyfragmented.Fragmentation

isolatessmallsub-populationsofowls,andthwartsyoungerbirds’attemptstofindtheir

ownterritories—ariskyundertakingeveningoodconditions.Andthereisevidencethat

whenNSOsmustmakedowithbroken-uppatchesofsuitablehabitat,theiradultmortality

raterisessharply.34

Uponlosingalawsuitfiledbyenvironmentalorganizations,theUSFWSlistedthe

subspeciesasthreatenedin1990.Thedecisioncitedhabitatlossand“lackofadequate

regulatorymeasures”astheprimarycausesofthebirds’precariouscondition.Atthattime,

therewere2,000knownpairsofspottedowls,thoughtheactualnumberofbirdsmayhave

beenmorethantwicethat.35AtsitesinCaliforniaandOregonpopulationsweredeclining

atfiveand15percentperyear.36

Sincetheowlswerelisted,therateofhabitatlosshasslowedsignificantly,mostly

becauseacontroversialforestmanagementplan—putinplacebytheU.S.governmentin

partasaresponsetotheplightofNSOsandtheperceivedneedtocontinueloggingolder

forests—placedmuchoftheirremaininghabitatoff-limitsfromharvesting.YetNSO

populationscontinuetodecline.Intenoutofthe11geographicalprovincesinwhichNSOs

live,theirnumbershaveshrunkbyanaverageofaboutthreepercentperyearsincethe

forestmanagementplanwasimplementedin1994–6.37Insomeprovinces,thecumulative

33USFWS,ThreatenedStatusforNSO,andRevisedRecoveryPlanforNSO.34USFWS,ThreatenedStatusforNSO.35Estimatingthetotalnumberofnocturnal,remotelylocatedNSOsismoredifficultthandeterminingratesofpopulationchange.36USFWS,ThreatenedStatusforNSO.37USFWS,RevisedRecoveryPlanforNSO.

18

lossovertheperiodsincethenamountstohalfofthepopulation,inothersitissomewhere

fromfiveto15percent.38Losseslikethesearenotsustainable.

Thoughongoinghabitatlossandthelingeringeffectsofpasthabitatdestruction

couldaccountforatleastpartofthecontinuingshrinkageofNSOpopulations,itisalso

thoughtthatescalatingcompetitionfrombarredowlsposesaseriousthreat.Barredowls

arerelativenewcomerstothePacificNorthwest.InWashington,forinstance,thefirst

sightingwasmadein1973.Sincethelate1980sorso,barredowlpopulationshavebeen

increasingsteadily.Now,notonlydoestheirrangecompletelyoverlapthatofthe

ecologicallysimilarbutmorefinickyNSO,barredowlsarealsousingtheolderforest

habitatonwhichNSOsdepend.TheyevenusetheverysamepartsoftheforestthatNSOs

do,andappeartobedoingsowithincreasedfrequency.AttheOregonandWashington

sitesElizabethKellyandhercolleaguesstudied,theproportionofNSOterritoriesinwhich

abarredowlhadbeendetectedwasrising.39

Bothowlspeciesareaggressivelyterritorial,andthereisreasontothinkthatbarred

owls,whoareslightlylargerthanNSOs,expelthelatterfromtheplacestheyhavesettled.It

mightoversimplifythesituationtoclaim,asWarrenCornwelldoes,that“Wherever[the

barredowl]turnsupinlargenumbers,spottedowlsstarttodisappear,”40buttheevidence

doespointinthatdirection.Forinstance,Kellyetal.foundthatoccupancyratesofNSO

territoriesdecreasedsignificantlyafterbarredowlsappearednearNSOactivitycenters

(placesNSOshaveusedfornesting,foragingetc.)41Similarly,ScottGremelobservedthatin

theNSOpairterritoriesinwhichnobarredowlsweredetected,NSOpairoccupancyrates

remainedstableovertime.Incontrast,oncebarredowlsweredetectedwithinterritories

theNSOpairsweremorelikelytoleave,nottobereplacedbyconspecifics.42Andaftera

38Ibid.39Kellyetal.,“AreBarredOwlsDisplacingSpottedOwls?”40Cornwall,“ThereWillBeBlood.”41Ibid.42Gremel,“DistributionandDemographyofNSOs.”ThisstudyalsofoundthatsomeofthedisplacedNSOsmovedtohigherelevations,wherehabitatwaslesssuitable.Forsmanetal.,PopulationDemographyofNSOsfoundthatdifferencesamonglargestudyareasintheproportionofNSOterritoriesinwhichbarredowlsweredetectednearNSOactivitycenterscouldpartiallyexplaindifferencesinNSOratesofdecline.Insimple

19

smallpilotexperimentinwhichthebarredowlsfoundinterritoriesvacatedbyNSOswere

killed,NSOsreturnedalmostimmediately.43

TheseandotherdataledtheUSFWStoconcludethat“Usinghabitatprotectionas

theonlyorprimarystrategyforrecoveringthenorthernspottedowlhasnotworkedinthe

pastandisnotlikelytoworkinthefuturebecause,withthebarredowlinvasion,reserves

arenotinandofthemselvescapableofconservingbreedingpopulationsofspottedowls..

.”44Ontopofprotectinghabitat,theServicereasoned,wemightneedtoremovebarred

owlsifwearetopreventtheextinctionofNSOs.Inits2011revisedrecoveryplanforthe

NSO,USFWSurgedthat“Giventherapidityandseverityoftheincreasingthreatfrom

barredowls,barredowlremovalshouldbeinitiatedassoonaspossibleintheformofwell-

designedremovalexperiments.”45

Theexperimentsbeganinthewinterof2014andwillconcludein2020.Overtheir

course,approximately3,600barredowlswillberemovedfromfourstudyareasinNSOs

habitat.Upto100ofthemwillbetakenintocaptivityorreleasedinunfamiliarplacesfar

fromNSOshabitat.Therestwillbeshotonsite.Iftheseexperimentsshowthatkilling

barredowlsincreasesNSOsiteoccupancyandimprovesNSOpopulationtrends,thenthe

USFWSwillconsideralarger-scale,longer-termpolicyofkillingbarredowlsaspartofits

efforttopreventtheextinctionofNSOs.46

Boththequestionofwhethertoperformthelethalexperiments,andthepossible

futurequestionofwhethertocontinuekillingbarredowlsindefinitelyandenmasse

exemplifytherecoveryconflict.EchoingDiller,BobSallinger,ConservationDirectorofThe

terms,areasinwhichNSOpopulationsweredecliningathigherratestendedtohaveagreaterproportionofNSOterritoriesinwhichbarredowlsweredetected.ThoughasfarasIcansee,Forsmanetal.’sdataisjustasconsistentwiththehypothesisthatbarredowlsreplacespottedowlsaftertheyleaveasitiswiththehypothesisthatbarredowlsdisplacethem.43USFWS,RevisedRecoveryPlanforNSO.ThispilotexperimentwasLowellDiller’s.44USFWS,ExperimentalRemovalofBarredOwls,341-342.45USFWS,RevisedRecoveryPlanforNSO,III-65.46USFWS,RevisedRecoveryPlanforNSOandFinalDecisionforBarredOwlRemoval.

20

AudubonSocietyofPortland,Oregonencapsulatestheproblemtheypresent:“Ontheone

hand,killingthousandsofowlsiscompletelyunacceptable.Ontheotherhand,the

extinctionofthespottedowliscompletelyunacceptable.”47Yetweinwhosenamethe

USFWSactsareboundtoberesponsibleforatleastoneoftheseunacceptableoutcomes.

4.AskingtheTragicQuestion

In“TheCostsofTragedy,”MarthaNussbaumdistinguishestwoquestionswemightask

ourselveswhenfacingdifficultchoices.The“obviousquestion”iswhatshallwedo?The

“tragicquestion”isisanyofthealternativesopentousfreefromseriousmoral

wrongdoing?48

Ihopetohavemadeitplausiblethattherecoverypredicamentpresentsuswitha

seriousmoralconflict.Itisatypeofsituationinwhichitatleastseemsasthoughthe

answertothetragicquestioncouldbeno.

Likeotherdomainsinappliedethics,environmentalethicsispronetoconcentrate

ontheobviousquestiontotheexclusionofthetragicquestion.49Toanextent,thisbiasis

understandable.Manyoftheproblemsaddressedbybiomedicalethics,agriculturalethics,

environmentalethics,etc.callurgentlyforpracticalsolutions.Facedwithnovel

circumstances,potentiallydireconsequences,andlimitsonthedurationofdeliberation,

arrivingefficientlyatawell-justifiedanswertothequestionof“whatshallwedo?”matters

immensely.

Itisnotallthatmatters,though.Itisalsoimportantforustoreachhonest

understandingsofourcircumstancesandactions.Ethically,thereismoretounderstand—

47Cornwall,“ThereWillbeBlood.”48Nussbaum,“CostsofTragedy,”1006-1007.49ThisisnottosaythatenvironmentalethicsignoresthekindsofsituationsIhavecalledrecoverypredicaments.Environmentalethicsoftenaddressessuchsituations,andhasdonesoforalongtime(forexamples,seeRolston,DutiesandValues,141–143;Singer,“NotforHumansOnly;”Jamieson,EthicsandtheEnvironment,172-175).Itevensometimescallsthem“conflicts.”But“conflict”canbeusedtomeannomorethanadifficultproblem,orthatdifferentpartieshavepracticallyincompatibleideasaboutwhatshouldbedone.Evenwhenitcallsthemconflicts,environmentalethicsrarelyframesrecoverypredicamentsexplicitlyassituationsinwhichwhateveronedoeswillinvolvemoralwrongdoing.Andwhileitoccasionallyimpliesthatrecoverypredicamentsareconflictsinthissense(forexamples,seeBeckoff,“Preface,”andVucetichandNelson,“InfirmEthicalFoundations”),itdoesnotthematizethis.Thatis,itdoesnottreattherealityofmoralconflicts—inthewaythatIunderstandthem—asaproblemthatneedsoursteady,carefulattention.

21

moretoknow,andmoretofeel—aboutasituationthanwhattodofromwithinit.And

thereismoretounderstandaboutanactionthanwhetheritwastobedoneunderthe

circumstances.Forinstance,thatanactinflictsgraveharm,destroyssomethingofgreat

value,orseverelydamagesanimportantrelationshipmattersmorally,eveniftheanswer

totheobviousquestionisdoit.

Whentheactoneshouldperforminvolvesthesekindsofharmsorlosses,toadmit

thatindoingrightonealsodoeswrong,revealsamoredetailedunderstandingofoneself

andone’srelationstootherpeople,animals,orthingsthanmerelyknowingthatonedid

whatoneshouldhavedone,allthingsconsidered.Suchanunderstandingwouldbeworth

aimingfor,evenifitwerepracticallyimpotent.

Yetacknowledgingthewrongsthatonehasdoneorisboundtodoinsituationsof

tragicconflictcanbepracticallyinfluentialinwaysthatasingle-mindedfocusonwhatto

doisnot.First,itcanmotivatereparation.Fromthepointofviewatwhichtheobvious

questionputsus,wehavedifficultyseeingtheneedforreparationincasesinwhich

someonehasdonewhattheyultimatelyshouldhavedone.Butfromthepointofviewmade

possiblebythetragicquestion,wecanappreciatethatsometimes,amendsarecalledfor

evenwhentheallthingsconsideredrightactionhasbeentaken.50

Second,asNussbaumobserves,“torecognizetheexistenceofatragicdilemma,in

thosecaseswheretheanswertothetragicquestionis‘‘no,’’reinforcescommitmentsto

importantmoralvaluesthatshouldingeneralbeobserved.”51Toaskonlytheobvious

questionleadsustooverlookthepossibleremorse-worthinessofsomeaspectsofanall-

things-consideredrightact.Thisoverlookingcoulderodethedispositiontoregretsimilar

actions,tojudgethemwrong,andtorecoilfromdoingthemeveninthethoseless

problematiccircumstancesinwhichtheyareunequivocallynottobedone.

50Williams,“EthicalConsistency”makesthelinkbetweentragicconflictandaneedtomakeamends,andthoughhedoesnotdwellonthetragedyofmoralconflict,Ross,RightandGoodalsopointsoutthatreparationscanbecalledforevenwhentheoverallrightacthasbeenperformed.51Nussbaum,“CostsofTragedy,”1017.

22

Finally,RuthMarcuspointsoutthatthepossibilityoftragicconflictsforces

reflectionontheconditionsthatbringthemabout,andmotivatesustochangethose

conditions.Shewrites:“Althoughdilemmasarenotsettledwithoutresidue,therecognition

oftheirrealityhasdynamicforce.Itmotivatesustoarrangeourlivesandinstitutionswith

aviewtoavoidingsuchconflicts.Itistheunderpinningofasecond-orderregulative

principle:thatasrationalagentswithsomecontrolofourlivesandinstitutions,weought

toconductourlivesandarrangeourinstitutionssoastominimizepredicamentsofmoral

conflict.”52Soevenifenvironmentalethicistscareonlyaboutwhatweshoulddo,thetragic

questionisimportantbecauseitcandisclosereasonsforactionthattheobviousquestion

obscures.Makingsenseoftherecoverypredicamentasatragicconflictgivesusallthe

morejustificationtostopdoingthethingsthatbringotherspeciestothebrinkof

extinction.Itrevealsasteepmoralcostofdoingtherightthingatthebrink.

Ithinkthesereasonsforaskingthetragicquestionareforceful.Thosewhowould

neglectthequestion,however,mightnotbemovedbythem.Theymightarguethatthe

reasonswouldhaveforceifitwerepossiblefortherightacttobewronginsomeway.But

itisnotpossible,becauseitviolatesdeonticlogic.Relyingontheagglomerationprinciple

(ifoneoughttodoonething,andoneoughttodoanother,thenoneoughttodoboth

things)andtheprinciplethatoughtimpliescan,deniersofconflictarguethatconflict

impliescontradiction,asfollows.

1. "X[O(X)àC(X)] Principlethatoughtimpliescan

2. "X&"Y{[O(X)&O(Y)]àO(X&Y)} Principleofagglomeration

3. O(A) 1stpremiseofconflict

4. O(B) 2ndpremiseofconflict

5. ~C(A&B) 3rdpremiseofconflict

6. O(A)&O(B) 3and4

7. O(A&B) 2and6

8. C(A&B) 1and7

52Marcus,“MoralDilemmas,”121.

23

5and8contradict.

Deniersofconflictwillclaimthattheabsurdity-makingflawliesinthepremisesofconflict;

atleastoneofthecompetingoughtsmustnotreallybeanoughtafterall.

Thisargumentissoundenough,whenalltheoughtswithininitindicatefinal

answerstotheobviousquestion.IfIaskmyselfwhatshallIdo?Imustanswerwithan

action,orasetofthem,whichitispossibleformetocomplete.Ifmyanswerincludes

somethingwhichIsimplycannotdo,thenitisnottherightkindofanswer,andIneedto

rethink.Whenoughtmeansthatwhichultimatelyistobedone—theactionwhichallthings

consideredisbest,orright,toperform—thenImustbemistakentothinkthatIoughttodo

A,andthatIoughttodoB,whenIcannotdoboth.Atleastoneoftheapparentoughtsisnot

agenuineought,inthissense.Thereisthusanimportantsenseinwhichitwouldnotbe

wrongtoviolateit.

Anethicaltheorydoesnotneedtodenythisinordertoacceptthepossibilityof

moralconflict.Butifitdoesnotdenyit,thenitneedstoacknowledgeadifferentsensein

whichanactcanbewrong,andsoanotherkindofoughtthanthatwhichattachestothe

answertotheobviousquestion.Unliketheobviousought,thisonewillresist

agglomeration,and/orwillnotimplycan.PhilosophersamongthoseDavidBrinkcalls

“friendsofdilemmas”havelongpointedouttheambiguousnessofought,anddistinguished

anoughtthatcannotconflictfromonethatcan.53Williamsdoesthisin“Ethical

Consistency”whenhewarnsagainst“...identifyingtheoughtthatoccursinstatementsof

moralprinciple,andthesortsofmoraljudgementsaboutparticularsituationsthatwehave

beenconsidering,withtheoughtthatoccursinthedeliberativequestion‘whatoughtIto

do?’andinanswerstothisquestion...”54TouseterminologyheintroducesinEthicsand

theLimitsofPhilosophy,thelatteroughtrepresentstheconclusionofapractical

53Brink,“MoralConflict,”222,237,246,247.Somefriendsofconflict,suchasMarcusinher“MoralDilemmas,”seemtoholdthatthereisonekindofought—theobviouskind—anditcanconflict.54Williams,“EthicalConsistency,”184.

24

deliberation.Theformerisaparticularlycompellingkindofmoralconsiderationwithin

thatdeliberation.55

PhilippaFootdrawsasimilardistinctiononebetweentype1andtype2ought

statements.Type2statements“tellustherightthingtodo,”whichis“thethingthatisbest

morallyspeaking,orspeakingfromwhateverotherpointofviewmaybeinquestion.Itis

impliedthatforoneforwhommoralconsiderationsarereasonstoacttherearebetter

moralreasonsfordoingthisactionthanfordoinganyother.”56Type1statementsidentify

acertainkindofmoralreasonfordoingsomething.Whileconflictsamongtype2oughtsdo

notmakesense,conflictsamongtype1oughts,andbetweentype1andtype2oughts,do.“I

canhavereasonnottodosomethingandyethavebetterreasontodoitthanIhavetodo

anythingelse.”57Thisdoesnotentailthattherightcourseofactioninvolvesbothdoingit

andnotdoingit(agglomeration),orthatitmustbepossibletobothdoitandnotdoit

(oughtimpliescan).

Inordertoremainopentothepossibilityofconflict,amoraltheorymustalsoallow

foratleastsomeoftheoughtsthatsignifyparticularlycompellingmoralconsiderationsto

remaininforcedespitepullingindifferentdirectionsfromtheconclusionaboutwhattodo,

allthingsconsidered.TouseTessman’slanguage,therequirementstheyexpressarenot

eliminateduponbeingoverriddenforthepurposeofactionguidance.Aconflict-friendly

theorycannotimplythatitisnecessarilyamistaketothinkthatanoughtpersistswhenit

cannotbeactedupon,orthatacourseofactionismorallyunacceptableeventhoughit

shouldbedone.Whenitisnotamistake,thentheactthatanswerstheobviousquestion

willbeinsomewaywrong,andthemoralregretfeltbythoseresponsibleforitwillbe

warranted.

Ifanethicaltheorylacksspaceforanoughtwhich1.doesnotgenerateavicious

contradictionwhenitclasheswithanotherought,and2.canremaininforceevenwhenitis

overridden,wecannotaskthetragicquestionfromwithinit.Wethereforecannotachieve

theinsightorthemotivationthatanswerstothequestioncanprovide.Suchatheory

55Williams,EthicsandLimitsofPhilosophy,174-196.56Foot,“MoralRealism,”385.57Ibid.ForFoot,obligationsareamongthemoralreasonsthataretype1oughts.

25

cannotaccountforthemoralexperienceofpeoplelikeLowellDiller,andtherestofuswho

aretornbytherecoverypredicament,withoutdismissingthatexperienceasimplying

confused,immature,orincompletemoralthinking.

5.TheChaptersAhead

BynowitshouldbeobviousthatIwantenvironmentalethicstobeabletoaskthetragic

question,andsotoremainopentotragicmoralconflict.ThisisnotastanceforwhichIcan

argueconclusively,thoughIhopetohaveshownitsappeal.Ialsohopetohaveidentified

theminimumthatatheoryneedsinordertoembraceseriousmoralconflict:itneedsto

accommodatethepossibilitythatthereisasenseinwhichrightacts—actsprescribedby

obviousoughts—canbewrong.Finally,Ihopetohaveshownthattherecovery

predicamentcanatleastappeartobesuchaconflict.

Thatenvironmentalethicsdoesnottendtoaskthetragicquestion—aboutthe

recoverypredicamentoraboutanythingelse—couldbebecausethekindsofnormative

theoriesitappliestohumaninteractionswiththerestofnaturecannotaccommodate

wrongsotherthanobviouswrongs.Thatis,ifanethicaltheorydoesnotadmitofawayfor

anactiontobewrongotherthanbynotbeingtheactionthatultimatelyistobedone,then

anenvironmentalethicbasedinthattheorywouldneverthinktoaskthetragicquestion.

Bothcriticsanddefendersofdominantdeontologicalandconsequentialistmoral

theorieshaveclaimedthatsuchtheoriesnegatethepossibilityofconflict.Amongthose

whomakesuchclaimsapprovingly,KantiansofteninterpretthedeclarationinThe

MetaphysicsofMoralsthat“acollisionofdutiesandobligationsisnotevenconceivable”

(6:224)asanegationofthepossibilityofmoralconflict.58W.D.Rossprofessesthathisnon-

Kantianformofdeontologyprovidesauniquesolutiontothe“casesofconscience”created

bymoralconflicts,andthatindoingsoitshowsconflicttobe“non-existent.”59Andsomeof

58E.g.Herman,“ObligationandPerformance;”Donagan,TheoryofMorality,ch.5,and“MoralDilemmas,”14-15,althoughDonagandoescarveoutanexceptiontothis(pleaseseetheconclusionofthisthesisfordetails).59Ross,RightandGood,18,andFoundationsofEthics,85.

26

themostprominenttextsofutilitarianismexplicitlypresentutilitarianismasofferingaway

toexplainandtoevadetheproblemofmoralconflict.60

Friendsofconflictmakesimilarclaims,butdosodisparagingly.Gathering

deontologicaltheoriessuchasImmanuelKant’sandW.D.Ross’sundertheumbrellaof

“morality,”Williamscomplainsthat“moralityresiststhenotionofamoralcost,inthesense

ofamoralwrongknowinglycommittedbyanagentwhoisdoingsomethingthatevenfrom

amoralpointofviewisbetter:inthatcase,theywillsay,thewrongcannotultimatelybe

wrong,thecostcannotreallybeacost.”61Healsofaultsutilitarianismforthis,asdoa

numberofthosewhohaveexpandeduponhisdefenseofconflict.62

ThechaptersaheadexplorewhetherworkingfromaKantian,Rossian,orutilitarian

normativetheoryprovidesenvironmentalethicswithanexcuseforavoidingtheproblem

oftragicmoralconflict,orforfailingtorecognizetherecoverypredicamentasatragic

moralconflict.Itdoesthisbyaskingthreequestionsofeachtheory.Doesithavewhatit

takestoadmitthateventherightactcanbewronginsomeway?Ifso,doesithavewhatit

takestoadmitthattherightactcanbetragicallywrong?Andifitdoes,canitinterpretthe

recoverypredicamentasasituationinwhichwhateveronedoeswillbetragicallywrong?

60SeeSidgwick,MethodsofEthics,esp.1-14and423-459;andHare,MoralThinking,esp.chs.2and3.61Williams,“MoralLuck:APostscript,”246.NussbaumalsofaultsKant’sethicsforthis.SeeherFragilityofGoodness,31-32.62Williams,“EthicalConsistency,”175-6.TessmanandNussbaumimplicitlyfaultutilitarianismforthis,byfaultingconsequentialismandcost-benefitanalysis.SeeTessmanMoralFailure,21-24,andNussbaum“CostsofTragedy.”

27

ChapterTwo:Ross’sDeontology

1.MoralConflict

Onlyifatheoryhasroomformoralconflictingeneralisitworthascertainingwhetherit

hasroomfortragicmoralconflict.Inthissection,IarguethatW.D.Ross’sdeontologyhas

roomformoralconflictingeneral.Inthenextsection,Iarguethatitalsohasroomfor

tragicmoralconflict.Inthethirdsection,Ishowhowitcanmakesenseoftheislandfoxand

spottedowlpredicamentsastragicmoralconflicts.

1.1Twokindsofwrongdoing

Ross’sdeontologyadmitsoftwokindsofwrongdoing.Whilethesecondliesburiedwithin

thedetailsofthetheory,thefirstisanalyzedmorefullyandopenly.Itisthewrongthat

shadowstherighttowhichTheRightandtheGoodrefers,thewrongassociatedwithacting

againstone’sallthingsconsideredduty,orwithdefyingtheoughtthatattachestoMartha

Nussbaum’sobviousquestion,whichiswhatshallIdo?whenaskedfromamoralpointof

view.63WecanunderstandthiskindofwrongthroughunderstandingRoss’saccountof

whatmakesrightactsright.Attheheartofhisaccountliesthedoctrineofprimafacie

duties,whichRossdevelopsinTheRightandTheGood,thenclarifies,refines,andamends

inFoundationsofEthics.

Thefirstkindofwrongdoing:violatinganallthingsconsideredduty

Anintuitionistaboutmoralknowledge,Rosstakesbasicmoralprinciplestobeself-evident

featuresofthe“moralorder”whichis“partofthefundamentalnatureoftheuniverse.”64

Thepartsofthemoralordertowhichwehaveaccessviareflectionareourmultipleprima

facieduties.Theyincludethefollowing.1)Dutiesoffidelity,whichRossdescribesasduties

tokeepone’spromises,bothimplicitandexplicit.2)Dutiesofgratitude,whichobligateus

todogoodforthosewhohavebenefitedus.3)Dutiesofnon-maleficence,whichareduties

63Nussbaum,“CostsofTragedy.”64Ross,RightandGood,29.

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of“notinjuringothers,”orofrefrainingfromharm.654)Dutiestomaximizethegood.

Althoughheusuallytreatsdifferentgood-promotingdutiesasdistinct,Rossrecognizesthat

theyall“fallunderthegeneralprinciplethatweshouldproduceasmuchgoodaspossible.

Therearethreesuchduties:dutiesofbeneficence,ordutiestoimprovetheconditionof

others;dutiesofself-improvement,ordutiestoimproveone’sowncondition;anddutiesof

justice,ordutiestodistributehappinessinproportiontovirtue.5)Finally,thereareduties

ofreparation.“Restingonapreviouswrongfulact,”thesearedutiestomakeupfor

“wrongswehavedone,”orforthe“inflictionofinjuriesonothers.”66Rossresiststhe

philosophicalurgetosubsumethesediversedeonticprinciplesunderasingleone,arguing

thateachisbasic.Andwhilehedeniesthatthelistofprimafaciedutiescanbeshortened,

heremainsopentothepossibilitythatitcouldbeexpanded,sayingthatitis“correctasfar

asitgoes,thoughnotnecessarilycomplete.”67

Theprimafaciedutiesgroundtherightnessandwrongnessofvariouscharacteristics

oftheactsonecouldperforminconcretecircumstances.Forinstance,thefactthata

particularactwouldreturnabenefitwouldmakeit,inthatrespect,primafacieright.That

thesameactwouldalsoharmsomeonewouldmakeit,inthatrespect,primafaciewrong.

Whethertheactisactuallyrightoractuallywrongdependsonhowmuchitsprimafacie

rightnessoutweighsitsprimafaciewrongness,comparedtoalternativepracticableacts.

“Everyact,therefore,viewedinsomeaspects,willbeprimafacieright,andviewedinothers,primafaciewrong,andrightactswillbedistinguishedfromwrongactsonlyasbeingthosewhich,ofallthosepossiblefortheagentinthecircumstances,havethegreatestbalanceofprimafacierightness,inthoserespectsinwhichtheyareprimafacieright,overtheirprimafaciewrongness,inthoserespectsinwhichtheyareprimafaciewrong...”68

ForRoss,sayingthatanactisrightisusuallyequivalenttosaying“thisistheact

thatoughttobedone”or“thisactismorallyobligatory,”orthatitistheagent’sactual

65Ibid.,21.66Ibid.,41,32.67Ibid.,23.68Ibid.,41.

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duty,dutyproper,dutysansphrase,or—touseatermthatpost-datesRoss—allthings

consideredduty.69TheoughtembeddedwithinitiswhatIhavecalledtheobvious

ought;theactitprescribesprovidesthefinalanswertoNussbaum’s‘obvious

question’.

ThoughRoss’srightisusuallyequivalenttoduty,itisnotalwaysso.Iftwo(or

more)possiblecoursesofactionwouldeachfulfillanagent’sprimafaciedutiestoa

greaterextentthananyothers—thatis,ifthereisatieforwhichcourseofactionhas

thegreatestbalanceofprimafacierightness—thenbothoftheactsareright,but

neitherisaduty,strictlyspeaking.Thedutyistodoeitherone.

ThisbringsustothefirstnotionofwrongnessatworkwithinRoss’sdeontology:

anactiswrongjustincaseitviolatestheagent’sallthingsconsideredduty,anditwilldo

soaslongasitfulfillstheirprimafaciedutiestoalesserextentthanatleastoneother

practicableact.

Itisnotpossibleforallofone’savailablecoursesofactiontoinvolve

wrongdoinginthissense.Inanysituationfacedbyanagent,therewillbeatleastone

courseofactionthatisnotworsethananother.Rosscanthusclaimthatonhistheory,

theproblemofconflictofdutiesismerely“apparent,”“non-existent,”and“unreal.”70

Primafaciedutiescancertainlyconflict,though.AccordingtoRoss,theynearlyalways

do.71Yetsuchconflictsare,inprinciple,completelyresolvableforthepurposeof

determiningone’sconflict-proofactualduty.

Isaythatconflictsamongprimafaciedutiesareresolvableinprinciplebecause

thereisnowaytoknowforsuretherelativestrengthsofthevariousprimafacieduties

atstakeinagivencircumstance.Theexplanationforthisisbothmetaphysical(asit

centersonthenatureofprimafacieduties),andepistemological(asitcentersonour

capacitytoknowthem).

69Ibid.,4,19,20.70Ross,Foundations,86.71Ross,RightandGood,41.

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Themetaphysicalpartoftheexplanationisthatthevariouskindsofprimafacie

dutieshavedifferentweightsindifferentcircumstances.Rossthinksthatsomekinds

aretypicallystrongerthanothers,butnokindinevitablyprevailsoveranyotherkind.

Forinstance,althoughfidelitytendstobearmoreweightthanbeneficence,ina

concretesituationthedutytokeepacertainpromisecanbeweakerthanthedutyto

improvetheconditionofsomeoneinneed.ThisfeatureofRoss’stheory,togetherwith

thefactthathismoralprinciplesincludebothdutiestopromotethegoodandduties

thatconstrainthat,makespossiblewhathasrecentlycometobecalledmoderate

deontology,accordingtowhichtherearemoralconstraintsonpromotingthegood,

buttheseconstraintscanbeoverriddenifenoughgoodisatstake.

WhileRossbelievesthatwecanknowthebasiccontentofourprimafacieduties

withquasi-Cartesiancertainty,hedeniesthatwecanhavesuchknowledgeoftherelative

stringencyofthoseduties.Becauseouractualdutyinagivensituationisdeterminedbythe

relativestringenciesoftheprimafaciedutiesatstakeinthatsituation,wecannotknowfor

surewhethertheactthatwethinkisouractualdutyisinfactouractualduty.This

epistemologicaldifficultydoesnotaffecttheconclusionthatactualdutiescannever

conflict,butitdoesdenyussmugcertaintyaboutwhatouractualdutyis.

ThatRoss’sdeontologypreventsconflictsofallthingsconsidereddutiesdoes

notentailthatitpreventsconflictsofthesortinwhichIaminterested.Ifthetheory

incorporatesasecondkindofwrongdoing,andifitispossiblethatthiskindof

wrongdoingcaninfectone’sallthingsconsideredduty,thepossibilityremainsthat

onecanfindoneselfinasituationinwhichwhateveronedoeswillinvolve

wrongdoing.

IbelievethatRoss’sdeontologydoesincorporateasecondkindofwrongdoing.

Thoughitperformsrealworkwithinthetheory,itisnotgivenmuchdirectattention.

Maybethisisbecausespotlightingitwouldrevealthatthetheorydoesnotsolveallof

whatRosscallsthe“casesofconscience”inwhichwecanfindourselvesenmeshed.72

72Ibid.,18.

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Thesecondkindofwrongdoing:violatingsomeone

Ross’saccountofprimafaciedutiesofreparationprovidesthechiefcluetothesecond

kindofwrongdoing.Rossdescribesthesedutiesas“restingonapreviouslywrongful

act”andsaysthatreparationsareowedfor“wrongsdone”(emphasesadded).73

Crucially,thewrongthattriggersreparationisnotthewrongthatdescribesactswhich

violateallthingsconsideredduties.

Multiplepiecesofevidencesupportthis.First,actsthatcallforreparationarenot

limitedtothosethatareallthingsconsideredwrong.Adutyofreparationcanbetriggered

bytheinfringementofaprimafaciedutyevenwhenfulfillingthatdutywouldconflictwith

doingone’sactualduty.Inacaseinwhichsomeone’sactualdutyrequiresthemtobreaka

promisetoonepersoninordertodeliveremergencyaidtoanother,Rosssaysthat

althoughitisallthingsconsideredright,breakingthepromisegivesrisetoadutytomake

uptothepromisee.74Healsosaysthatreparativedutiesemergefrom“theinflictionof

injuriesonothers,”whichispreciselywhattheprimafaciedutyofnon-maleficence

prohibits.75Soifyouharmsomeoneelseasaninescapablepartofperformingyouractual

duty,thiscangenerateanewprimafaciedutytomakeamends.Sinceitcandescribeacts

whichbreachdutieswhichareonlyprimafacie,the“wrong”thattriggersreparation

cannotbe“allthingsconsideredwrong.”

Itcannotbeshorthandfor“primafaciewrong,”either.Ifitwere,Icouldnotclaim

thatRossreliesontwodistinctsensesofwrong;the“wrong”modifiedbyprimafacieis

wronginthefirstsense—aviolationofanallthingsconsideredduty.Tosaythatanactis

primafaciewrongistosaythatitisconditionallyallthingsconsideredwrong—itwouldbe

allthingsconsideredwrongintheabsenceofothermoralconsiderations.76Thoughthe

73Ibid.,21,42.74Ibid.,18.75Ibid.,27,21.76“Isuggest‘primafacieduty’or‘conditionalduty’asabriefwayofreferringtothecharacteristic(quitedistinctfromthatofbeingadutyproper)whichanacthas,invirtueofbeingofacertainkind(e.g.thekeepingofapromise),ofbeinganactwhichwouldbeadutyproperifitwerenotatthesametimeofanotherkindwhichismorallysignificant.”Ross,RightandGood,19.

32

kindsofactsthatcallforreparationareindeedprimafaciewrong,theymustalsobewrong

inanothersense,becausereparationdoesnotappeartobecalledforbybreachesofevery

kindofprimafacieduty.Rossmentionsitasarequiredresponseonlytobreachesof

fidelityandnon-maleficence.77Thesedifferfromtheotherdutiesonhislistinanimportant

way.Whereastobreachadutyofgratitude,beneficence,orself-improvementistonot

improvesomeone’scondition,andtobreachadutyofjusticeistonotimprovetheworldin

oneway,tobreachadutyofnon-maleficenceorfidelityistomistreatorviolatesomeone—

tomakethemworseoff,todeceivethem,toundermineorexploittheirtrust.78Because

onlythelatterrequirereparation,itcannotbethecasethatthesecondkindofwrongisno

morethantheprimafacieversionofthefirst.Thefirstkindofwrongisaviolationofanall

thingsconsideredduty.Thesecond,reparation-generatingkind,isaviolationofsomeone.

FurtherevidencethatRossreliesontwoconceptionsofwrongdoingcanbefoundin

thenuancesofhislanguage.Heconsistentlyusesdifferentwordstorefertoreparation-

generatingwrongdoing,ononehand,andprimafacieorallthingsconsideredwrongdoing

ontheother.Whenheistalkingaboutactsquaprimafaciewrongorquaallthings

consideredwrong,Rossalwaysusestheadjective“wrong.”Incontrast,hereservesthe

adjective“wrongful”andthenoun“wrong”foractsthatgeneratereparativeduties.

Ifanydoubtremainsaboutwhetherthesecondnotionisagenuinekindof

wrongdoing,itshouldbedispelledbythefactthatonRoss’sview,moralregretisan

appropriateresponsetoit.InTheRightandtheGood,Rossrepeatedlyreferstoanexample

77ThomasHurkaalsonotesthatonRoss’stheory,thewrongthattriggersreparationneednotbeallthingsconsideredwrong,andthatnotallprimafaciewrongstriggerreparation.SeeHurka,BritishEthicalTheorists,187.78Rosshimselfsaysthattheprimafaciedutiesthatdonotgeneratereparativedutieswhenbreachedhaveincommonanameliorativepurposeasopposedtoaprotectiveone:“Andwhenweconsidertheothermaintypesofduty—thedutiesofreparation,ofgratitude,ofjustice,ofbeneficence,ofself-improvement—wefindthatinthethoughtofanyofthesethereisinvolvedthethoughtthatwhatthedutifulactistheoriginationofiseitheranobjectivegoodorapleasure(orsourceofpleasure)forsomeoneelse.”Ross,RightandGood,162.Thattherearenoprimafaciedutiesthatspecificallyprohibitinjustice,ingratitude,orself-deteriorationalsoindicatesthatthedutiesofjustice,gratitude,andself-improvementareeachatypeofdutytopromotethegood,andsothedutyofnon-maleficenceprohibitsactinginoppositiontothem.Finally,Rossstatesthatthedutyofjustice,along“withbeneficenceandself-improvementcomesunderthegeneralprinciplethatweshouldproduceasmuchgoodaspossible.”RightandGood,27.Thedutyofgratitudealsorequiresustopromotethegood,butthegoodisthatofabenefactor,not“asmuchgoodaspossible.”

33

inwhichsomeonemustbreakapromise—andthusbreachaprimafaciedutyoffidelity—

inordertofulfillastrongerprimafaciedutytoprovideaid.Althoughprovidingaidistheall

thingsconsidereddutyinthiscase,Rosssaysthatbreakingthepromiseleadstheagentto

feelnotmereregretbutcompunction,andheimpliesthatthisistheappropriateemotional

response.79Compunctionis,andhistoricallyhasbeen,definedasakindofagentregretfor

sin,fault,orwrongdoing.ForittomakesenseinRoss’sexample,theactwhichisitsobject

mustinvolveactualwrongnessofsomesort.

1.2HowmoralconflictispossiblewithinRoss’sdeontology

Conflictoccurswhenwhateveronedoeswillinvolvewrongdoing.Ihopetohaveshown

thatinRoss’sview,onecandowrongintwodifferentways.Thefirstwayistoviolateanall

thingsconsideredduty.Thesecondwayistoviolatesomeone,byeitherharmingthemor

bybreakingapromise.Rossrulesoutconflictsinwhichonlythefirstkindofwrongdoingis

atstake;itisnotpossiblethatalloftheactsopentoonewillviolateanallthings

consideredduty.Anothersortofconflictremainspossible,though.Situationscanoccurin

whichwhatevercourseofactiononetakes,onewilldowrongeitherbyviolatinganall

thingsconsidereddutyorbyviolatingsomeone.Thiswillhappenwhenonecannotfulfill

one’sdutyproperwithoutbreachingareparation-generatingprimafaciedutyofnon-

maleficenceorfidelity.Ross’sdeontologyclearlyhasroomsuchconflicts,asisshownbyhis

exampleinwhichadutytoaidoutweighsadutytokeepapromise.

Iwanttopointoutasubsetofconflictsbetweenthefirstandsecondkindof

wrongdoing.Itcomprisesthosepredicamentsinwhichbothfulfillingone’sdutyproperand

takingthealternativecourse(s)ofactionwouldinvolveviolatingsomeone.Insuchcases,

oneisboundtocommitawrongofthesecondsort.Thiswillhappenwhenwhateverone

doeswillharmsomeone(e.g.youdiscoverthatyourbabyOrlandoisallergictoThelonius,

yourcat,andtheonlywaytoeaseOrlando’ssymptomsistosendTheloniusaway),when

onecannotkeepbothoftwo(ormore)promises(e.g.yousayyestoafriends’requestthat

youserveasattendantathiswedding“tobeheldinAustraliathefirstweekendinJuly,”

79Ross,RightandGood,18.

34

andtoanotherfriend’srequesttoserveasattendantatherweddingwhich“willtakeplace

inCanadaonthelastweekendinJune.”Notlongbeforetheevents,yourealizethatthelast

weekendinJuneisalsothefirstweekendinJuly,andyoucannotbepresentatboth),or

whenonecannotavoidharmingsomeonewithoutbreakingapromise(e.g.youpromise

yourfriendsthatyou’lltakecareoftheirdogCosmoforthemwhiletheyaretravelling

incommunicado.OncethefriendsaregoneandCosmoisinyourcare,yourealizethat

Orlandoisallergictohim).Insuchcases,committingeitherwrong—eventheonecalledfor

byanallthingsconsideredduty—shouldleavearemainderintheformofmoralregretand

responsibility.

1.3Awrinkle

IhavearguedthatthereisacleardistinctioninRoss’stheorybetweentwokindsof

wrongdoing—violatinganallthingsconsideredduty,andviolatingsomeonebybreachinga

primafaciedutyofnon-maleficenceorfidelity.Thoughthedistinctionhasbeenmoreor

lessneglected,mostnotablybyRosshimself,muchinthetheorypointstowardit.Theonly

thingthatsitsintensionwithitisRoss’sclaimtohavesolvedtheproblemofconflict

(thoughifweinterpretitasaclaimonlytohavesolvedtheproblemofconflictsofallthings

consideredduties,asIbelieveweshould,eventhisclaimisnotatoddswiththe

distinction).

Ihavenottakenuptheideathatbreachesofprimafaciedutiesotherthanthe

reparation-generatingones—letuscalltheseameliorativeprimafacieduties—canalso

involvewrongdoing,andsocancontributetomoralconflicts.Perhapsanargumentcould

bemadethattheydo,andthattheycan.SomeofwhatRosssaysaboutsuchduties

indicatesthatbreachingthemisnotmerelyconditionally,orprimafaciewrong.80However,

thecaseisnowherenearasclearasitisforthereparation-generatingprimafacieduties.

TotakeupapointBernardWilliamsmakes,Rossseemsto“wantitbothways”for

80Forinstance,hesaysthatthemoralsignificanceofaprimafaciedutyisnotmerelyapparent,evenwhenitcallsforanactionthatisinconsistentwithone’sallthingsconsideredduty.Healsousestheanalogyofphysicalforcetodescribewhyaprimafaciedutyhasatendencytobeanallthingsconsideredduty.Andhesaysthatnotcomplyingwithanoverriddenprimafaciedutywillleadto“compunction.”whichisaformofmoralregret.SeeRightandGood,20,28-29.

35

ameliorativeprimafacieduties;hebothascribesanddeniesoughtnesstothem.81Arguing

foronethingortheotherwouldrequireinterpretingawaytoomuchofwhatRosssaysfor

mycomfort.SoIwilllimitmyanalysistothetwokindsofwrongIcanconfidentlyattribute

toRosswithoutdistortingwhathehaswritten.

2.TragicMoralConflict

DotheconflictsallowedbyRoss’sdeontologyincludetragicones?Thatis,dotheyinclude

predicamentsinwhichtheinevitablewrongsareserious,andremorseisawarrantedform

ofmoralregretforcommittingthem?

AsIunderstandthem,remorseandseriouswrongdoingimplyeachother.Recall

thatremorsehastwofeaturesthattogetherdistinguishitfromotherformsofmoralregret.

First,itsobjectistheagent’sownseriouswrongdoing.Second,itliesatthestrongeror

moreprofoundendofthespectrumofmoralregret.Toshowthatagiventheoryhasroom

fortragicconflict,itshouldsufficetoshowthatthetheoryallowsthatonecanfindoneself

inasituationinwhichseriouswrongdoingisunavoidable.However,amoraltheorymight

callintoquestionthemutualentailmentofseriouswrongdoingandwarrantedremorse.So

itwillalsobehelpfultoshowthatthetheorydoesnotdenythatincasesinwhichserious

wrongdoingisinevitable,soiswarrantedremorse.

Inthissection,I’llarguefirstthatRoss’sdeontologyallowsfortheinevitabilityof

seriouswrongs.Then,Iwillarguethatinsuchcasesitallowsfortheinevitabilityof

warrantedremorse.

2.1Seriouswrongs

GiventhesensesofwrongdoingatworkinRoss’stheory,therearetwowaysinwhicha

conflictcanbetragic.Inthefirstway,theallthingsconsideredrightactisseriouslywrong

invirtueofseriouslyviolatingsomeone,andsoisthealternative.Inthesecondway,theall

thingsconsideredrightactisseriouslywronginvirtueofseriouslyviolatingsomeone,but

81Williams,“EthicalConsistency,”176.Seeespeciallyn.5.WilliamsmakesasimilarclaiminEthicsandLimitsofPhilosophy,176.

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thealternativeisnotseriouslywronginvirtueofviolatingsomeone.Ratheritisseriously

wrongonlyinvirtueofseriouslyviolatingtheallthingsconsideredduty.82

Withoutagoodideaofwhichcourseofactionisallthingsconsideredright,we

cannothaveagoodideaofwhetheraconflictistragicinthesecondway.Butifboth(orall)

possiblecoursesofactionareseriouslywronginthesecondsense,thenevenwithout

havingagoodideaofwhichoneisallthingsconsideredright,theconflictistragic.83

BecausetheultimateaimofthischapteristodeterminewhetherRoss’sdeontologycan

accountforrecoverypredicamentsastragicconflicts,andbecauseitisbeyondthescopeof

thischaptertodecidewhichcourseofactioninarecoverypredicamentismorelikelytobe

allthingsconsideredright,Iwilllimitthefollowingdiscussionofseriouswrongdoingto

seriousbreachesofnon-maleficenceandfidelity.

Seriousbreachesofnon-maleficence

Thedutyofnon-maleficenceprohibitscausingharmtoanother.Toharmsomeone,on

Ross’sview,istobringbadthingsuponthem:“Iftherearethingsthatarebadin

themselves,”Rosssays,“weought,primafacie,nottobringthemuponothers;andonthis

factreststhedutyofnon-maleficence.”84

Rossdoesnotthoroughlyinvestigatewhatthingsarebad,soIwillcomeatthe

questionthroughhismoresystematicanalysisofwhatthingsaregood.“Good”forRoss

referstointrinsicvalue,whichisbornebysomethingiffitis“goodapartfromits

consequences,orwouldbegoodevenifitwerequitealone.”85Histestforthisisto

comparetwostatesoftheuniversewhichareidenticalineverywayexceptthatonehas

morethantheotherofthethingwhoseintrinsicvalueisinquestion.Ifweintuitthatthe

statewithmoreofthethingwouldbebetter,thenthismustbebecausethethingis“good

initself.”Applyinghistest,Rossconcludesthatfourthingsaregood:pleasure,virtue,

82E.g.theallthingsconsidereddutyseriouslybreachesanameliorativeduty,suchasthedutyofgratitude.83Wecanneverbecompletelysure,becauseRossdoesn’tthinkwecanbecertainabouttheofweights,andsooftheseriousness,ofduties.84Ross,RightandGood,26.85Ibid.,74.

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knowledge,andtheapportionmentofpleasureinaccordancewithvirtue.Onebenefits

anotherbyincreasingtheirlotofanyofthefirstthree,withonecaveat:onlyinnocent

pleasures,oronesthatarenotundeserved,aregood.Thepleasureofamorallybadperson

isundeserved,andthereforelackspositivevalue.Similarly,pleasuresthatexpressbad

character—forinstancethepleasureamoralbeingmighttakeinsomeone’sundeserved

pain,orinthebreachofaduty—arenotgood.86

Rossstatesclearlythatundeservedpainisbad,andsotobringituponsomeoneis

toharmthem.87Givenhisaccountofwhatthingsaregood,Itakeitthatignoranceand

viciousnessarebad,aswellaspain.Thus,oneharmsanotherbycausingthemundeserved

pain,bymakingthemignorant,orbymakingthemvicious.Onecanalsoharmsomeoneby

deprivingthemofgoodstheyotherwisewouldhavehad.Rossindicatesasmuchwhenhe

citestheprohibitiononkillingasaparadigmaticexampleofadutyofnon-maleficence.88

Killingsomeonedoesnotnecessarilybringpain,viceorignoranceuponthem.Butintaking

awaytheirlife,itdeprivesthemofaconditionfor,orameansto,thingswhicharegood.So,

wecaninferthatdeprivinganotherofasourceorconditionofhappiness,virtue,or

knowledgebreachesadutyofnon-maleficenceevenifitdoesnotbringaboutanything

positivelybad.

Ourjudgementsabouttherelativeweightsofvariousprimafaciedutiescannotbe

betterthan“probableopinions,”accordingtoRoss.89Accordingly,wecansurmisethatwe

cannotbecertainofourjudgementsabouttheseriousnessofaharmordeprivation,either.

Butattheveryextremesoftrivialityandsignificance,surelywecancomeveryclose.

Whenkillingsomeoneharmsthem,theharmisusuallyveryserious,and

unquestionablyso.90Butdeathisnottheonlyunambiguouslyseriousharmthatcanbe

86Rossdoesnotofferatheoryofwhatpleasureis.Thatheequatesitwith“pleasantconsciousness,”“well-being,”and“happiness”(RightandGood,21,136,152)indicatesthathemeansbyitsomethingmorethanphysicalorsensualpleasure.87Ross,RightandGood,136-7.88Ibid.,23.89Ibid.,31.90Ifyoucareaboutsomeone,youwantwhatisbestforthem,fortheirownsake.Itseemstobeadeepandnotculturally-relativefeatureofcare,thatamongthethingsthatwewantmostforourcared-forsis(usually)that

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donetosomeone.Unfortunately,onecansuffersignificantphysical,psychological,or

emotionalinjuries,andonecanbedeprivedofwhatoneneedsinorderforone’slifeto

containanadequateamountofpleasure,knowledge,orvirtue.

Seriousbreachesoffidelity

Totheextentthatbreakingapromiseharmsthepromisee,itbreachesaprimafaciedutyof

non-maleficence,notfidelity.Ifdutiesoffidelityprotectthosetowhomweowethemina

uniqueway(astheyshoulddoifRoss’sprimafaciedutiesareirreducible),theymust

protectagainstsomethingotherthanharmorlossofwelfare.Rossdoesnotdiscussthis

explicitly,butItakeitthattheyprotectagainstdamagestothepromisee’strust.91Such

damagesareoftenslight,butsometimesserious.Sometimesthereisnothingthatcanbe

donesuchthatthevictimofabrokenpromisecanlatersaytrulythat“mytrustwasnot

significantlydiminishedbecauseofthepromise-breaking.”

InRoss’sexample,breakingapromisetomeetfora“trivialpurpose”isnotserious.

Thepromiseemightatfirsttakethepromiser,andpossiblypeopleingeneral,tobeless

reliablethantheyoriginallythought.Yetifthepromiserexplains,and/orapologizes,

and/ormeetstoachievethepurposelater,thenthepromisee’strustshouldbecompletely

restored.Otherkindsofpromisebreakingsignificantlyimpairorevendestroytrust.While

theydonotdie(or,thattheydonotdietoosoon);mostofusliveandloveasthoughdeathisnormallyagraveharmtotheonewhodies.Epicureanargumentsthat“deathisnothingtous,”couldleadonetoquestionthis.EpicurusandLucretiusmadethecasethatbecauseonedoesnotexistwhenoneisdead,onecannotsufferinanyway(Epicurus,“LettertoMenoeceus,”andLucretius,OntheNatureofThings).Theirargumentsshowthatdeathisnotapositiveharm.Itmightyetbeaharmofdeprivation.Thatis,ifdeathdeprivesyouofgoodsthatyouwouldotherwisehavehadinyourlife(morespecifically,ifitcausesyoutomissoutonmoregoodthanevil)thendeathcanharmyouevenifitdoesnotcauseyoutosuffer.Deprivationaccountsinvitethequestion:whendoestheharmofdeathoccur?Thereislittleagreementontheanswer.Forinstance,ThomasNagelholdsthattheharmistimeless,accordingtoFredFeldmanitoccurseternally,andBenBradleyarguesthatitoccursduringthoseperiodsafteryourdeathinwhichcontinuedlifewouldhavebeengoodforyou(Nagel,“Death,”Feldman,“SomePuzzles”,Bradley,“WhenisDeathBad?”).Eachoftheseanswerscanbemetaphysicallypuzzling,becauseoftheassumptionstheymakeaboutyourexistenceandaboutharmability.However,Idonotthinkthatthedifficultyofthesepuzzlesshoulddissuadeusfromtheverynaturalidea,whichwedivinethroughcaring,thatdeathoftenharmstheonewhodies.91ForsomeevidencethatthismightbeRoss’sview,seeFoundations,105,whereRosssaysthattheproblemwithbreakingapromisecomesdownnottoitseffectonutility,buttoa“breachoftrust.”

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itisnotalwaysclearwhetherabreachoftrustisseriousornot,themostseriousonesare

hardtodeny.Thesearebetrayals.92

AsIwilldiscussinthenextsubsection(Remorse),Rossavoidsexamplesof

situationsinwhichwhateveronedoeswillcauseseriousharmorlossoftrust.Yetnothing

inhistheorysuggeststhatitwoulddeemsuchsituationsimpossible,andlittleimagination

isneededtoconjureexamplesofthem.Theliteratureonconflictbrimswithfictionalcases:

Aeschylus’sAgamemnonmusteitherkillandbetrayhisdaughter,orbetrayhistroopsand

exposethemtodeathandgraveinjury;WilliamStyron’sSophiemustbetrayandexposeto

seriousharmatleastoneofhertwochildren;intheBagavadGita,Agarjunamustkillsome

membersofhisfamily,orelsebetrayothers.93Non-fictionalreallifeoccasionallysupplies

examples,too.Whatcomesimmediatelytomindisthepredicamentofsoldierswhofind

themselvesincombatwitharmedchildren,andothercircumstancesinwhichkillingan

innocentthreatistheonlywaytosavethelifeofsomeoneforwhosewelfaretheagenthas

aspecialresponsibility.Whensituationssuchastheseoccur,fulfillingone’sallthings

considereddutywillinvolvecommittingatleastoneseriouswrong.AsRoss’stheorydoes

notdenythis,ithasroomfortragicmoralconflictaslongasitalsodoesnotdenythat

remorsecanbewarrantedbyeachofthepossiblecoursesofaction.

2.2Remorse

Ross’sdeontologyincludesdutiestorespondtoone’swrongfulbreachesofresponsibility

withreparatoryactions,butnodutiestorespondtoone’sactionsinemotionalways.

Despitedenyingthatpeoplecanbeobligatedtofeelonewayoranother,Rossdoesthink

thatmorallygoodpeoplewillhavecertainemotionalresponsestothemorallyrelevant

featuresoftheiractions.Someoftheseareprospective—forinstance,desirestoperform

theprimafacierightaspectsofanactandaversionstoperformingtheprimafaciewrong

ones.Othersareretrospective.Isremorseamongthem?

92Similarly,Stockersaysthatbetrayalsareamongthejustifiedviolationsthatmakeaconflictacaseofdirtyhands.PluralandConflictingValues,17-18.93TheseexamplesarebroughtintothephilosophicaldiscussionbyWilliamsin“EthicalConsistency;”NussbauminFragilityofGoodnessand“CostsofTragedy;”andStockerinPluralandConflictingValues.TheyaredrawnfromStyron,Sophie’sChoice;Aeschylus,Agamemnon;andVyasa,BagavadGita.

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Rosssayslittleaboutremorse.Histreatmentofitislimitedtoafewmentionsinthe

middleofadiscussionofdeterminisminFoundationsofEthics.Whathesaysthere

indicatesthathisconceptionofremorsediffersfromtheoneinwhichIaminterested.For

Ross,remorseisanappropriatereactionforanagenttohavetowardtheir“badaction.”94A

badaction,onRoss’sview,isonewhichhasbeenperformedoutofabadmotivation,anda

badmotivationisonethatisattractedtotheprimafaciewrongfeaturesoftheact,or

aversetotheprimafacierightones.Therightactcanbebad,andsowarrantremorse,ifthe

agentdoesitoutofadesiretocommitthebreachesitcontains,ratherthanadesireto

fulfilltheresponsibilitiesitfulfills.Withitsnegativeattentionfocusedonthequalityofthe

selfthatperformedtheaction,ratherthanonthewrongnessoftheact,Ross’sremorse

wouldbebettercalledshame.95

TheconceptionofremorseinwhichIaminterestedisdifferent,becauseittakes

remorsetobeanappropriatereactiontoone’sseriouswrongdoing,evenifthewrongdoing

wasnotdonefrombadmotivationsandwasnotexpressiveofabadcharacter.Rosscomes

closesttoaddressingmynotionofremorseinthepassageinwhichhediscussesbreakinga

promiseinordertofulfillastrongerdutytoprovideaid.There,hesaysthatbreakingthe

promise“leadsustofeelnotindeedshameorrepentance,butcertainlycompunctionfor

behavingaswedo...”96

AsImentionedabove,compunctiongenerallyreferstoaformofmoralregret,or

agentregretforwrongdoing.Manydictionarydefinitionsofcompunctionequateitwith

repentanceandremorse.YetRosscontrastscompunctionwithrepentance,sowemight

takehimtomeanbycompunctionsomethingweakerthanthat,andweakerthanremorse.

Itmightbea“prickofconscious,”oraslightmoraldiscomfortwhichdoesnotrisetothe

levelofanguish.

94Ross,Foundations,246.95Whileremorseandshamearebothretrospectivenegativeemotions,remorsefocusesontheone’sactionandontheplightofthevictim(s)ofthataction,whereasshame,“focusesonthemoralcharacterofthepersonfeelingtheemotion,”asAdamMortonputsit.SeeEmotionandImagination,160.96Ross,RightandGood,20.

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SomeprominentscholarsofRossseemtotakehisclaimaboutcompunctiontomean

thatthefailuretofulfillamerelyprimafacieduty—evenareparation-generatingone—can

neverwarrantmorethanaprickofconscious.97Remorsewouldbeanoverreactioninany

suchcircumstance.

Suchinterpretationsareopentoquestion.Toseewhy,letuslookattheparticular

exampletowhichRossreferswhenhemakesthecompunctionclaimonwhichtheyare

based.Inthepassageinwhichhemakestheclaim,Rossspeaksofbreakingapromiseto

onepersoninordertorelieveanother’sdistress,withoutgivingdetailsaboutthe

importanceofthepromiseorthedirenessofthedistress.Yetheisreferringtoanalready

runningexample,thedetailsofwhichhedescribedearlierinthechapterwhenheasked

readerstoimaginethat“Ihavepromisedtomeetafriendataparticulartimeforsome

trivialpurpose,”(emphasisadded)butcannotbothmakethemeetingandrelieveanother’s

distress.98

Itisnomistaketoconcludefromthecompunctionclaimthatitisappropriateforan

agenttofeelaprickofconscience,butnomore,uponbreakingatrivialpromiseasan

inevitablepartoffulfillingastrictduty.Areweentitledtomakethewiderinferencethatit

isnotappropriatetofeelanymorethanaprickofconsciencewhenfulfillingastrict

obligationinvolvesirreparablywrongingafriend,forinstancebybetrayingthem?

ThiswiderinferencewouldbeinconsistentwithRoss’spositiononthemoralvalue

ofmoralemotions.InFoundationsofEthics,hearguesthatamorallygoodpersonwillhave

negativeattitudestowardtheaspectsoftheiractionsthatgoagainsttheirresponsibilities

inproportiontotheweightsofthoseresponsibilities.Theseattitudescanbeprospective,or

retrospective.Rosscharacterizestheformerasaversionandthelatterasdissatisfaction.99

Ifcompunctionisthetypeofdissatisfactionwarrantedbyfailingtofulfillatrivialpromise

inthecourseofdoingtheoverallrightthing,thensomethingmuchstrongerthan

compunctionshouldbewarrantedbyfailingtofulfillamuchweightierresponsibility.This

97E.g.Stratton-Lake,“Introduction,”xxxvii.98Ross,RightandGood,18.99Ross,Foundations,291-310.

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suggeststhatremorse,whichisstrongerthancompunctionbutliesonthesamespectrum

(thatofmoralregret),mightbelegitimateinsomecases.ThatRossrulesitoutwhenit

comestobreakingatrivialpromisedoesnotprovethatherulesitoutwhenitcomesto

causingseriousdamagetothepromisee’strust.

Whetherpurposefullyornot,Rossavoidsanydiscussionofsituationsinwhich

performingone’sproperdutyinvolvesbreachingaveryweightyresponsibility,letalone

onethatprotectsagainstseriousviolation.Allofhisexampleseither1)stateoutrightthat

theoverriddenresponsibilitiesaretrivial(e.g.therunningexamplewehavebeen

discussing),2)steerthereadertowardthinkingofthemastrivial,ashedoeswhenhesays

that“theprobabilityisthatanyact,howeverrightitbe,willhaveadverseeffects(though

thesemaybeverytrivial)onsomeinnocentpeople,”100or3)obscuretheabsolute

seriousnessoftheresponsibilitiesatstakebyabstractingsofarfromthedetailsofthe

situationthatreaderscangleannomorethantherelativeweightsofthoseresponsibilities.

Forinstance,weknowthatfulfillingapromisetoAwouldproduce1,000unitsofgoodfor

him,whileanalternativecourseofactionwouldproduce1,001unitsofgoodforB,butwe

donotknowtheseriousnessofthepromise,includingwhetherbreakingitwouldresultin

asignificantlossoftrust.101Nordoweknowhowmuchwelfareoneunitofgood

represents.HisavoidanceoftheproblemofjustifiedbutseriouswrongsallowsRossto

remainsilentonwhetherornotremorse(asIconceiveit)iseveragoodmoralresponseto

thebreachofaresponsibilitythatconflictswithanallthingsconsideredduty.

Silenceisnotdenial.IhopetohaveshownthatitisperfectlyconsistentwithRoss’s

theorythatremorsecanbewarrantedonthepartofanagentwhohascommittedaserious

wrongasaninevitablepartofperformingtheirallthingsconsideredduty.Thisisbecause

1)accordingtoRoss’stheoryitclearlyisappropriateforanagenttofeelsomeformof

moralregretuponcommittingawrongfulact(evenajustifiedone);2)thedegreeof

appropriatemoralregretvarieswiththeseverityofthewrongcommitted;and3)although

Rossappearstodenythatprofoundmoralregretisawarrantedresponsefortrivialor

slightwrongs,hedoesnotdenythatthatisitwarrantedforseriousones.

100Ross,RightandGood,41.101Ibid.,34-35.

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Becauseitisconsistentwiththetheorythatallofanagent’spossiblecoursesof

actioncaninvolvecommittingseriouswrongs,andbecausethesewrongscanberemorse-

worthy,Ross’sdeontologyhasroomfortragicmoralconflict.Thenextquestionis:can

Ross’sdeontologymakesenseofrecoverypredicamentsastragicmoralconflicts?The

followingpartofthechaptertakesupthisquestion.

3.RecoveryConflicts

Atheorycanmakesenseofrecoverypredicamentsastragicconflictsaslongasitcan

characterizethemassituationsinwhichwhateveronedoeswillinvolveserious

wrongdoing.TherearetwowaystodowrongonRoss’sview:toviolateanallthings

consideredduty,ortoviolatesomeonebybreachingaprimafaciedutyofnon-maleficence

orfidelity.Evenifwedonotknowwhichcourseofactioninarecoverypredicament

violatesanallthingsconsideredduty,wecanknowthatitpresentsatragicmoralconflict

aslongasbothcoursesofactionseriouslyviolatesomeone.

TofindoutwhetherRoss’sdeontologycaninterpretrecoverypredicamentsas

tragicmoralconflicts,Iwilltakethefollowingtwosteps.First,insection3.1,Iwill

investigatewhether,fromtheperspectiveofRoss’stheory,seriousdutiesofnon-

maleficenceareatstakeinthetworecoverypredicamentsthatareourexemplars—the

islandfoxpredicamentandthenorthernspottedowlpredicament.Insection3.2,Iwill

investigatewhetherthepredicamentsinvolveseriousdutiesoffidelity.

3.1Dutiesofnon-maleficenceatstakeinrecoverypredicaments

ThemostobviousplacetolookforRossiandutiesofnon-maleficenceinourpredicaments

isintheirrecoverycoursesofaction,inwhichmanyanimalsarehurt,intimately

controlled,orkilled.OnRoss’sview,canpeoplebeardutiesofnon-maleficencetoother

animals?

Non-maleficenceandotheranimals

“Iftherearethingsthatarebadinthemselvesweought,primafacie,nottobringthem

uponothers;andonthisfactreststhedutyofnon-maleficence,”writesRoss.Painisamong

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thethingsthatarebadinthemselves,onhisview.Bypain,hemeansunhappiness,or

unpleasantstatesofmind.Suchstatesarebadonlywhentheyareundeserved(e.g.

unconnectedtowrongdoingbytheonewhoexperiencesthepain),andnotexpressiveof

badcharacter(aswouldbepaintakeninanother’smeritedgoodfortune).Theseconditions

onthebadnessofpainentailthattocauseitisnotnecessarilytodowrong.Makinganother

humansufferdoesnotalwaysbreachaprimafaciedutyofnon-maleficence;asmoral

beingswecanactinaccordancewithoragainstduty,andourmotivationscanbegoodor

bad.Yetbecausenon-moralbeingsdonothavethepossibilitiesofwrongactionandbad

character,theirpainisbadwithoutexception.Rossthinksthatanimalsotherthanhumans

arenon-moral,soanythingapersondoeswhichcausesthempainbreachesaprimafacie

dutyofnon-maleficence,andisthereforewronginthesecondsensearticulatedinsection

1.1(Twokindsofwrongdoing);evenifitdoesnotbreachanallthingsconsideredduty,it

violatessomeoneandsogeneratesadutyofreparationandwarrantsmoralregret.

Thislogiccanbeextendedtoharmsofdeprivation.AsIarguedinsection2.1

(Seriouswrongs),Rossseemstothinkthatoneharmsanothereitherbybringing

somethingbaduponthemorbydeprivingthemofsomethinggood.Justasthepainofother

animalsisalwaysbad,onRoss’sview,theirhappinessorpleasureisalwaysgood.Thus,

anyactionwhichdeprivesanotheranimalofhappinessharmsthem.Itthusbreachesa

primafaciedutyofnon-maleficence,asdoesanyactionwhichbringsthempain.

So,harmingotheranimals—byeithercausingthempainordeprivingthemof

happiness—constituteswrongdoing.Itwillconstituteseriouswrongdoingiftheharmis

significant.AlthoughonRoss’stheory,judgementsaboutthesignificanceofaharmcannot

bemorethanprobableopinions,andalthoughopinionsaboutthesignificanceofmany

harmswillnotbeveryprobableatall,Ithinkthatouropinionsabouttheworstoneswill

beasprobableasitispossibletobe.

Harmstootheranimalsintheislandfoxrecoverypredicament

Fordetailsontheislandfoxrecoverycase,seechapter1,section1.Muchofwhatoccurred

inthiscasecausedotheranimalspain.Forinstance,theprobablelonelinessof85619prior

tohercapture,thefearanddiscomfortshemighthavefeltduringherentrapment,andthe

intensephysicalpainassociatedwiththeattackthatkilledher;theanxietyexperiencedby

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themanyotherfoxeswhowereforcedtolivewithpen-matestheydidnotchooseandwith

whomtheydidnotgetalong;thephysicalpainoftheinjuriesinflictedbytheirmates;the

grieforconfusiontheymighthavefeltuponbeingseparatedfromtheirfriends,orupon

losingtheirpups;thefrustrationandboredomoflivinginaspaceonehundredthofone

percentofwhattheywereusedto;thediscomfortofsleepingincold,dampboxes;thepain

andsick-feelingofmastitis;thetraumaexperiencebyeaglesuponbeingcaptured;the

frustrationofbeingconfinedandunabletofly;theconfusionandanxietyassociatedwith

beingreleasedtoanentirelyunfamiliarplace,thesadnessoruneasinessofbeingseparated

fromtheirmateandyoung,andofneveragainholdingaterritory;forpigs,confusionand

perhapssadnessofbeingpennedintospaceswheretheywerehabituatedtoroamfreely;

thefearuponbeingcaughtintraps,anduponofbeingchasedbypeopleanddogs;andthe

terrorsomemighthavefeltduringtheepisodesinwhichtheywereshotenmassefrom

helicopters.

TheIslandfoxrecoverybroughtharmsofdeprivationuponanimals,aswell.102

Examplesoftheseincludetheprematuredeaths-by-killingof5,036pigs,740elk,and425

deer,aswellasthedeathsoffourgoldeneagleswhoexpiredafterbeingtrappedand

beforeorimmediatelyafterbeingtranslocated.

Clearly,recoveringtheislandfoxpopulationscausedmuchharm.Yetnotrecovering

them—takingtheextinctioncourseofaction—wouldalsohavecausedharm.Specifically,it

wouldhaveharmedmostofthe48capturedislandfoxes,whointheabsenceof

interventionwouldlikelyhavediedearlydeathsbyeagledepredation.

102Seenote90foradiscussionofdeathasaharmofdeprivation.Someclaimthatalthoughdeathcanbeaharmofdeprivationforhumanbeings,itcannotbeforotheranimals,becausetheylackthekindoffuture-orienteddesiresnecessaryfortheirwell-beingtobesetbackbydeath(e.g.Velleman,“Well-beingandTime”).Suchclaimsrelyonaconceptionofwelfareasdesire-satisfaction.Betterconceptionsofwelfarecharacterizeitassatisfactionwiththeconditionsofone’slife(seeSumner,Welfare,Happiness,andEthics),ofwhichevenabeingwhodoesnotanticipatetheirownfuture,andwhodoesnotconceiveofthemselvesashavingalife,canbedeprivedbydeath.Thisisnottosaythatotheranimalsdonotanticipatetheirownfutures.Perhapssome,suchascoral,donot.Butthereisgoodevidence(asifanyonewhohasspentanytimewithmammalsandbirdsneededit)thatmanyanimalsdoanticipatetheirownfutures(e.g.KabadayiandOsvath,“RavensFlexiblePanning”).ForstrongargumentsagainsttheclaimsofVellemanandothersthatdeathdoesnotdepriveanimalsofwelfare,seeBradley,“IsDeathBadforaCow?”

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Moralresponsibilityforharmstootheranimalsintheislandfoxrecoverypredicament

Thatanimalswouldbeharmedundereachscenariointherecoverypredicamentdoesnot

entailthatthepredicamentisamoralconflict.Inorderforthepredicamenttobeaconflict,

itmustbethecasethatatleastoneoftheagentswhobearsmoralresponsibilityforthe

harmsofrecoverywouldhavebeenresponsiblefortheharmsofextinction,hadrecovery

notbeenundertaken;thesamemoralagent(s)whowrongedanimalsinrecoverywould

alsohavewrongedanimalsifrecoveryhadnotoccurred.

Whoisresponsiblefortheharmsofrecovery?Mostobviously,thepeopleonits

frontlines:thosewhokilledthepigs,elk,anddeer;thosewhocapturedfoxesandmade

thembreedincaptivity;andthosewhotranslocatedeagles.Yetthepeoplewhocharged

themwithdoingthesethingswouldalsoberesponsible,aswouldtheorganizations(e.g.

theNationalParkService,theNatureConservancy)undertheauspicesofwhichtheydid

them.Atthehighestlevel,theU.S.governmentwouldberesponsible,becauseitmandates

recoveryofendangeredspeciesaswellasbeingthemaininstitutionthatmanages

recovery.

Whowouldhavebeenresponsiblefortheharmsthatwouldhaveoccurredif

recoveryhadnotbeenundertaken?Becauseeagleswouldhavebeentheproximatecauses

oftheseharms,onemightattempttoarguethatnomoralagentswouldhavebeen

responsibleforthem.However,theharmstofoxesthatwouldoccurintheextinction

courseofactioncanstillbeattributabletohumanmoralagents.Adulthumanbeings,anda

corporationofthem(Montrose)wasresponsibleforthepresenceofDDTneartheChannel

Islands,andthusfortheextirpationofbaldeaglesfromtheisland,andthusforthe

presenceofgoldeneaglesthere,andthusforthegoldeneagles’depredationoffoxes.Not

protectingthefoxesfromeagledepredationwouldthereforeamountnotjusttoabreachof

adutyofbeneficence,butalsotoabreachofadutyofnon-maleficenceontheirpart.

Theproblemisthatthesetofmoralagentswhowereultimatelyresponsibleforthe

eagles’depredationoffoxesdoesnotseemtooverlapwiththesetthatwasresponsiblefor

theharmsofrecoveringfoxes.Noneofthepeopleonthefrontlineofrecovery,andnoneof

theinstitutionsinvolvedinrecovery,wereinvolvedinMontrose’sdumpingofDDT.And

becauseMontrosedumpeditillegally,throughmunicipalsewagelines,itwouldbetrickyto

arguethattheU.S.governmentwasresponsible.

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Inwhatremainsofthissubsection,Iwillbrieflysketchanargumentfortheclaim

thattherearesomeagentswhocouldbemorallyresponsibleforbothsetsofharmatstake

intheislandfoxrecoverypredicament.Inthefollowingsubsection,Iwillindicatehow

thoseagentsmightbreachdutiesofnon-maleficenceinbringingabout,orinfailingto

protectanimalsfrom,theharmsforwhichtheyareresponsible.Bothdiscussionsdolittle

morethangrazeissuesthatmeritmuchmoreattentionthanIcanaffordthemhere.Myaim

issimplytoshowthatitisnotimplausibletoholdthatintheislandfoxrecovery

predicament,thereareagentsforwhomallavailablecoursesofactionwillinvolve

wrongdoing.

Toseehowsomeofthosewhoaremorallyresponsiblefortheharmsofrecovery

mightalsobemorallyresponsiblefortheharmsofnotundertakingrecovery,letusstart

withthedistinctionbetweenbackward-lookingandforward-lookingmoral

responsibility.103Anagentbearsbackward-lookingresponsibilityforsomethinginvirtueof

havingbeencausallyresponsible(intherightway(s))forbringingitabout.Theybear

forward-lookingresponsibilityforsomethinginvirtueofbeingcharged(intheright

ways(s))withbringingitabout.104Thetwokindsofresponsibilityrelatetoeachotherina

numberofways.Onewayisthatbearingbackward-lookingresponsibilityforaharmgives

rise,onRoss’sview,toaforward-lookingresponsibilitytomakeamendsforit.Another

wayisthathavingaforward-lookingresponsibilityfordoingsomethingcangiverisetoa

backward-lookingresponsibilityfornothavingdoneit.Forthepurposesofthisargument,I

willcallthefirstkindofbackward-lookingresponsibilitysimplebackward-looking

responsibility,andthesecondkindcompoundbackward-lookingresponsibility.

Aswesawabove,noneoftheagentswhowouldbearsimplebackward-looking

responsibilityfortheharmsassociatedwithnotrecoveringtheislandfoxarethesameas

thosewhobearsimplebackward-lookingresponsibilityfortheharmsinvolvedin

103InFoundations,(85)Rosssaysthattheword“responsibility”captureswhathemeansbyprimafaciedutybetterthan“primafacieduty”does.104Forward-lookingdutiestostopormitigateharmsfitwellinRoss’stheoreticalframework.Rossemphasizesthataperson’smultipleprimafaciedutiesarisefromthevariouskindsofmorallysignificantrelationsinwhichtheystandtoothers(e.g.,RightandGood,19,22).Itonlymakessensetoassumethatamongsuchrelationsarethoseinwhichonepersonisresponsibleforprotecting(certainaspectsof)thewell-beingofanother,orofothers.

48

recoveringthem.However,ifthereareagentswhobearforward-lookingresponsibilityfor

preventingtheharmsassociatedwithextinction,theniftheydonotpreventthoseharms,

theymightbearcompoundbackward-lookingresponsibilityforthat.Ifamongthoseagents

responsibleforrecoveryharms,somealsohadforward-lookingresponsibilityfor

preventingtheharmsassociatedwithextinction,thentherearesomeagentswhowouldbe

morallyresponsibleforbothsetsofharmatstakeintheislandfoxrecoverypredicament.

Itcouldbearguedthatthepeopleandinstitutionschargedwithpreventing

extinction,aswellastheU.S.governmentthatmandatesandmanagesrecovery,have

specialresponsibilitiestoprotectmembersofthosespeciesfromtheharmsassociated

withextinction.Thiscouldbethecaseevenifpreventingharmsisnotthemainreasonfor

preventingextinction.Inourcase,inordertopreventtheextinctionoftheislandfox,itwas

necessarytopreventthefoxesfromsufferingearlydeathsbyeagledepredation.Sincesuch

deathswouldharmthefoxes,itwasthereforenecessarytopreventthoseharms.

Therefore,preventingthemwaspartofwhatthosechargedwithpreventingextinction

wereresponsiblefordoing.105

Breachesofdutiesofnon-maleficencetootheranimalsintheislandfoxrecoverypredicament

Thenextquestionis,iftheanythosewhowerechargedwithpreventingextinctionhad

chosennottofulfilltheirforward-lookingresponsibilitytopreventharmstofoxes,would

thishavebreachedthedutyofnon-maleficence?Inotherwords,doesanyonewhobears

forwardlookingresponsibilitytoprotectfoxesfromtheharmsassociatedwithextinction

standinrelationtothemsuchthatnotprotectingthemwouldamounttoabreachofnon-

105Iwouldalsosaythatamongthosewhoaremorallyresponsibleforbothsetsofharmsarethoseofusinwhosenameagovernmentundertakesrecovery,andwhoarealsoinpositionstoadvocatefororagainstit,orwhoparticipate,evenpassively,asbeneficiariesofthepolitical-economicsysteminwhichtherecoverypredicamentisgenerated.IrisMarionYoung’ssocialconnectionmodelofmoralresponsibilityhelpstomakesenseofthis.AsYoungwritesinher“ResponsibilityandSocialJustice,”“Thesocialconnectionmodelofresponsibilitysaysthatallagentswhocontributebytheiractionstothestructuralprocessesthatproduceinjusticehaveresponsibilitiestoworktoremedytheseinjustices.”Shecontraststhismodelwiththeliabilitymodelofresponsibility,whichislikewhatIhavecalledsimplebackward-lookingresponsibility.OnYoung’ssocialconnectionmodel,moralresponsibilityismoreforward-looking,issharedamongmembersofacommunityorgroup,andcanonlybefulfilledthroughcollectiveaction.BecauseofthecommunalnatureofmoralresponsibilityonYoung’smodel,itwouldbedifficultorimpossibletofitwithinRoss’sveryindividualisticethicaltheory(thankstoTomHurkaforpointingthisouttome),andsoIwillnottakeituphere.

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maleficence?Itmightbetemptingtothinkthatfailurestoprotectareonlyeverfailuresof

beneficence,notnon-maleficence.Toseethatthistemptationshouldnotbefollowed,

considerthefollowingexample.

Ioncedoveintothedeependofapublicswimmingpooltopulloutayoungboywho

wasstrugglingtokeephisheadabovethewater.HadIchosennottodivein,andhadthe

boyinhaledmuchwater(asallindicationswerethathewould),onemightthinkthatinnot

protectinghim,Iwouldhavefailedtofulfilla(particularlyurgent)dutyofbeneficence,but

notoneofnon-maleficence;afterall,Ididnotputtheboyinthedeepend,ortrickhiminto

goingthere.Thatthoughtmightbesound,hadIbeenjustanotherpool-goer.ButIwasa

lifeguard,andIwasonduty.Furthermore,Iwasgivingtheboyatesttodeterminewhether

hewouldbeallowedtoswiminthedeepend.Itwasmyjobtoprotecthimfromdrowning,

andheandhisparentshadentrustedmewithlookingoutforhimwhilehetooktheswim

test.BecauseIhadaspecialresponsibilitytoprotecthimfromdrowning,afailuretohave

donesowouldhaveamountedtoharminghim.Itwouldhavebeennotjustabreachofthe

dutyofbeneficence,butabreachofthedutyofnon-maleficence.

Similarly,Ithink,thefailuretofulfillaresponsibilitytoprotectfoxesfromtheharms

associatedwithextinctionwouldhaveamountedtoabreachofnon-maleficence,notjusta

missedopportunityforbeneficence.Inboththeswimmingpoolcaseandthefoxcase,

moralagentsareexplicitlychargedwithprotectingparticularothersfromparticularkinds

ofharms.IwaschargedwithprotectingpeopleatSchenleyPoolfromtheharmof

drowning,whilethoseinvolvedinislandfoxrecoverywerechargedwithprotecting

northernChannelIslandfoxesfromearlydeaths.Thesedutiesdifferfromthemorevague

andgeneraldutytohelpothersinneed,whichisthedutyofbeneficence.Iwouldhave

breachedthatif,whilevacationing,IhadoptednottodiveintoLakeChamplaintosavea

child,andtherecoveryworkerswouldhavebreachedithadtheynothelpedoutaninjured

skunktheyencounteredduringtheirfoxwork.Intheswimmingpoolandfoxcases,in

contrast,wehadspecial,formallybestowedresponsibilitiestohelporprotectinclearly

definedways,andsonothelpingorprotectinginthosewayswouldhavegonebeyond

failingtofulfilldutiesofbeneficence.

Ihopetohaveshownthatitisatleastplausiblethatthespecialresponsibilitiesthat

thoseinvolvedinrecoveryhadtopreventextinctionincludedresponsibilitiestoprevent

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theharmsassociatedwithextinction,andthatnotpreventingthoseharmswouldhave

amountedtobreachesofdutiesofnon-maleficence.Becausetheissuesraisedinshowing

thisdefinitivelyarevast(who,ifanyone,hadaspecialresponsibilitytoprotectislandfoxes

fromharm?whendoesfailuretoprotectamounttoabreachofnon-maleficence?),Ihave

notdonesohere.Still,Iwilltakeitthatintheislandfoxrecoverypredicament,both

coursesofactioninvolvethesamemoralagentswrongingotheranimals.

Manyofthesewrongsareunquestionablyserious—theearlydeaths,thesuffering

associatedwithtranslocation,andsomeofthesufferingassociatedwithcaptivity.Thus,the

islandfoxrecoverypredicamentisatragicmoralconflictregardlessofwhetherdrivinga

populationtoextinctioncountsdirectlyasaseriousharm,orwhetherpeoplewouldbe

seriouslyharmedbyeithercourseofaction,orwhetherthereareseriousbreachesof

fidelityatstakeinthepredicament.

Intheislandfoxrecoverypredicament,bothcoursesofactioninvolvewronging

otheranimals.Manyofthesewrongsareunquestionablyserious—theearlydeaths,the

sufferingassociatedwithtranslocation,andsomeofthesufferingassociatedwithcaptivity.

Thus,theislandfoxrecoverypredicamentisatragicmoralconflictregardlessofwhether

drivingapopulationtoextinctioncountsdirectlyasaseriousharm,orwhetherpeople

wouldbeseriouslyharmedbyeithercourseofaction,orwhetherthereareserious

breachesoffidelityatstakeinthepredicament.

Breachesofnon-maleficencetootheranimalsinthenorthernspottedowlrecovery

predicament

Liketheislandfoxrecoverypredicament,thespottedowlrecoverypredicamentisonein

whichbothavailablecoursesofactioninvolveirreparablyharmingmanyindividual

animals.Fordetailsoftheowlrecoverypredicament,pleaserefertochapter1,section3.

Thispredicamentoccursaspeoplefacethechoiceofwhethertoattempttopreventthe

extinctionofnorthernspottedowlsbykillingbarredowls,whooutcompeteNSOsfor

habitat.Astherecoverycourseofactioninvolveskillingthousandsofhealthybarredowls,

itinvolvesthousandsofseriousbreachesofthedutyofnon-maleficence.

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Theextinctioncourseofactionwouldbringharmuponanimalsaswell.Ifbarred

owlsarenotremoved,thenpeoplewillresponsibleforsomenumberofnorthernspotted

owlslosingterritories.Theywillthuslosematesandwillnotraisechicks.Ithinkthatthese

losseswouldbeserious,althoughtheywouldnotbeasgreatasthelossesoflifeassociated

withthealternativecourseofaction.

Asinthefoxpredicament,therearesomeagentswhowouldbemorallyresponsible

forbothsetsofharms.Theagents(bothorganizationsandindividualpeople)chargedwith

killingbarredowlsareresponsiblefortheharmstheytherebybringupontheowls.

Becausetheseagentshavespecial,formallybestoweddutiestopreventNSOextinction,

whichnecessarilyinvolvespreventingNSOsfromlosingterritoriesandopportunitiesto

breed,theywouldalsoberesponsiblefortheharmsassociatedwiththoselossesifthe

extinctioncourseofactionweretaken.Asinthefoxcase,failingtofulfilleithersetof

responsibilitiescouldamounttoseriousbreachesofdutiesofnon-maleficence.Thus,

whatevertheydointhepredicament,theorganizationsandindividualschargedwith

recoveringNSOswillseriouslywrongowls.Unlikeinthefoxcasehowever,intheowlcase

theU.S.governmentwouldbeamongthoseagentswhofacethistragicmoralconflict.This

isbecauseinadditiontomandatingrecovery(andthustheharmsassociatedwithit),the

governmentwouldhavesimplebackward-lookingresponsibilityfortheharmsassociated

withextinction,sincetheclearcuttingofNSOhabitat(whichmadeNSOpopulationsso

vulnerabletocompetitionfrombarredowls)wasmadepossiblebyU.S.governmentpolicy.

Endofnewmaterial

Breachesofnon-maleficencetospeciesinrecoverypredicaments

TheconflictthatLowellDillerseemedtothinkhefacedwasnot,orwasnotprimarily,a

situationinwhichbothavailablecoursesofactionwouldwrongotheranimals(seechapter

1,section3).Dillerdescribedeachcourseofactionas“ethicallywrong,”butidentified

killingindividualanimalsasthesalientwrong-makingfeatureofonlyoneofthem:

recovery.Thesalientwrong-makingfeatureofthealternativewasthatitwouldentail

drivingasubspeciestoextinction.Similarly,onBobSallinger’scharacterizationofthe

conflict,killingthousandsofowlsiswhatmakesrecovery“completelyunacceptable,”but

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extinctioniswhatmakesrefrainingfromrecovery“completelyunacceptable.”106AndasI

characterizedthegeneralformofrecoveryconflictsintheintroductorychapter,theyare

situationsinwhichweeitherallowaspeciestogoextinctbecauseofhumanactivities,or

wekill,and/orharm,and/orintimatelycontrolindividualanimalsinordertoprevent

extinction.

MightdrivingspeciestoextinctioninitselfviolateaRossiandutyofnon-

maleficence?Thatis,doestheextinctioncourseofactionharmspecies?Rossdoesnot

addressdirectlythequestionofwhetherpeoplebeardutiesofnon-maleficencetospecies.

Buthispositiononwhatthingsaregoodandbad,andthereforehisviewofwhatcountsas

aharm,entailsthataspeciescanneitherbebenefitednorharmed.Tohaveaprimafacie

dutyofnon-maleficencetosomeoneorsomethingistobeararesponsibilitynottobring

uponthemthingswhicharebad,andasIarguedinsection2.1(Seriouswrongs),notto

deprivethemofthingswhicharegood.AccordingtoRoss’saxiology,noneofthethings

whicharegood(pleasure,virtue,knowledge,pleasuredistributedinaccordancewith

virtue)orbad(pain,ignorance,vice,pleasurenotdistributedinaccordancewithvirtue)

arethingswhichcanbebroughtuponanon-sentientthing.Suchathingthereforecannot

beharmed,andsomoralagentsbearnodutyofnon-maleficencetoit.

Inthecourseofarguingagainstthenotionthatwedonotbeardutiestoother

animals,Rosscomesascloseasheeverdoestoaddressingthequestionofwhetherwe

mightbeardutiestospecies.Heconsiders,andrejects,theideathatapersonmightbear

dutiesto“anhistorichouse”—whichlikeaspeciesisaprecious,butnotsentient,object.

Thoughwemightspeakasthoughapersonhasdutiestoahouse,Rosssays,suchdutiesare

“purelymetaphorical.Wemayinafancifulmoodthinkofanoblehouseasifitwerea

consciousbeinghavingfeelingswhichweareboundtorespect.Butwedonotreallythink

thatithasthem.”Incontrasttodutiesconcerningpeopleandotheranimals,duties

concerninghousesareneverdutiestothehousesthemselves:“Isupposethatthedutyof

theownerofanhistorichouseisessentiallyadutytohiscontemporariesandtoposterity..

106Cornwall,“ThereWillBeBlood.”

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.Ontheotherhand,ifwethinkweoughttobehaveinacertainwaytoanimals,itisoutof

considerationprimarilyfortheirfeelingsthatwethinkweoughttobehaveso.”107

Inrestinghisrejectionofthepossibilityofdutiestohousesontheirlackof

sentience,Rossincidentallyrejectsthepossibilityofdutiestospecies,aswell.Atthesame

time,heremindsusthatwemightowepeopledutiesofnon-maleficenceorfidelitywhich

wouldprimafacieprohibitusfromdrivingspeciestoextinction.Ifdrivingaspeciesto

extinctioncanseriouslyharmorbetrayhumanbeings,itwouldinvirtueofthisbewrong,

evenifitweretherightthingtodo,allthingsconsidered.

Breachesofnon-maleficencetopeopleinrecoverypredicaments

OnRoss’sview,therearetwowaystoharmsomeone.Oneistobringpain,ignorance,or

viciousnessuponthem.Theotheristodeprivethemofpleasure,knowledge,orvirtue.The

extinctionofaspeciessurelydeprivessomepeopleofpleasureandknowledgethatthey

otherwisewouldhavehad.Listsoftheinstrumentalvaluesofspecies,madeinattemptsto

justifyconservation,almostalwaysincludethepleasurepeopleexperienceupon

encounteringmembersofaspecies(theyusuallydonotpointouttheanxietythatalsocan

accompanysuchencounters),andtheknowledgeoftheirlifehistory,ecologicalrelations,

physiology,etc.thatwemightgainbystudyingthem.

Ifinditdifficulttoimaginethatwhenasinglespeciesgoesextinct,theconcomitant

lostopportunitiesforpleasureandknowledgeconstituteharmsthatareserious.Forthose

ofuswhoaresubjectedtotheselosses,Idonotthinkthatitwillultimatelybethecasethat

thingsturnedoutworseoverall,knowledge-orhappiness-wise.Wesurelywillhavehad

lesspleasurefromaparticularsource,andlessknowledgeaboutaparticularthing.But

neitherourlifetimewelfare,norourbodiesofknowledge,willbeappreciablylessthan

theyotherwisewouldhavebeen.

However,ifpeoplearedependentonaparticularspeciesfortheirlivesor

livelihoods,oriftheirsenseofmeaninginlifeistiedupwiththeirrelationstothatspecies

(e.g.perhapsreindeerforsomeSami,caribouforsomeInnu,northerncodforsome

Newfoundlandfishermenbeforethe1990s),theextinctionofthatspeciescouldseriously

107Ross,RightandGood,49.

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harmthem.Inourrecoverypredicaments,peopledidnotdependinthesewaysonisland

foxesornorthernspottedowls.

Tobesure,indecadespriortotheowlpredicament,itappearedtosomeasthough

protectingthehabitatnecessarytoconservetheowlwouldrequiredeprivingPacificnorth

westernloggersoftheirlivelihoods.Iftheywerecorrect(thatis,iftheloggerscouldnot

havebeencompensatedfortheirfinanciallosses),theninthatpredicament,therecovery

courseofactionwouldhaveirreparablyharmedtheloggers.Ourpredicamentisadifferent

one,though.Itoccursyearsafterthelogginghasbeencurtailed,atthepointatwhich

protectingthespottedowlrequireskillingbarredowls.Inthiscase,itdoesnotseemas

thoughanyseriousdutiesofnon-maleficencetopeopleareatstake.

3.2Dutiesoffidelityatstakeinrecoverypredicaments

Inthefoxandowlrecoverypredicaments,certainindividualsandgovernmentagencies

couldbearRossiandutiesoffidelitytotaketherecoverycourseofaction.Iftheywereto

taketheextinctioncourse,theywouldbreachthoseduties,andthusdomoralwrong.Itis

notclearwhethertheywoulddoseriousmoralwrong,however,becauseitisnotclear

whetherthosebreacheswouldbeserious.

Dutiesoffidelitybasedinlaw

Inourrecoverypredicaments,therearetwowaysthatagentscanacquireRossiandutiesof

fidelitytoundertakerecoverymeasures.Thefirstisbybeingbounddirectlybylawto

undertakethem.Thesecondisbybeingboundbycontractualorprofessionalobligationto

doso.

Ifanagentisboundbylawtotakethemeasuresessentialtorecovery,nottaking

thosemeasures—whichamountstotakingtheextinctioncourseofaction—would

constituteabreachoffidelity.ThisisbecauseonRoss’sview,violatingthelawcanentail

breakingapromise:“...thedutyofobeyingthelawsofone’scountryarises...partlyfrom

theimplicitpromisetoobeywhichseemstobeinvolvedinpermanentresidenceina

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countrywhoselawsweknowweareexpectedtoobey;andstillmoreclearlyinvolvedwhen

weourselvesinvoketheprotectionofitslaws...”108

Here,Rosswritesofthepromisetofollowthelawasapromisemadebyan

individualperson.Itappearsthathethinksthatstatescanalsohavesuchdutiesoffidelity

tofollowlaws.ThisissuggestedbyhisdiscussionoflegalpunishmentinTheRightandthe

Good,duringwhichheconceivesofthelawasapromisebythestatetoindividualsandto

societyingeneral.109

Law-baseddutiesoffidelityandendangeredspeciesrecovery

BothofourexamplesoftherecoverypredicamentoccurintheU.S.Ifthereisalawthat

requiresanyonetotakethemeasuresthatarenecessaryforpreventingtheextinctionofa

speciesintheU.S.,itwouldbetheEndangeredSpeciesAct(1973,hereafterESA).

Recognizingthat“economicgrowthanddevelopmentuntemperedbyadequateconcern

andconservation”hasalreadydrivensomespeciestoextinctionandhasimperiledothers,

U.S.CongresspassedtheESAwiththeaimofconservingendangeredandthreatened

speciesandtheecosystemsonwhichtheydepend.110

ThemeansthattheESAtakestoachievethisendincludevariousprohibitionson

individualsandfederalagencies,andvariousrequirementsoftheSecretaryoftheInterior.

Specifically,thelaw1)prohibitsanyonefromtradinginmembersofendangeredspecies2)

prohibitsanyonefromharassing,pursuing,shooting,harming,killing,hunting,wounding

ordestroyingthehabitatofamemberofanendangeredspecies(amongtheexceptionsto

thisarepermitstopursueandtrapanimalsinordertorecovertheirspecies),3)prohibits

federaldepartmentsfromfunding,authorizingorcarryingout”actionsthatwould

“jeopardize”endangeredorthreatenedspecies,oralterhabitatcriticaltotheirrecovery;111

4)requirestheSecretaryoftheInteriortodothreethings:drawupalistofspeciesthat

108Ibid.,27.109Ibid.,63-4.11016U.S.C.,§1531.11116U.S.C.§1536.

56

meetthecriteriaforbeingendangeredorthreatened;foreachlistedspecies,drawupa

recoveryplanwhichmustinclude“suchsite-specificmanagementactionsasmaybe

necessarytoachievetheplan'sgoalfortheconservationandsurvivalofthespecies”;112

and,mostimportantly,toimplementtheplan.

Toviolateanyoftheseprohibitionsorrequirementsistoviolatethelaw.Soitwould

seemasthoughtheSecretarywouldviolatethelawiftheyfailedtoincludeinalisted

species’recoveryplananymanagementactionthattheydeemedtobenecessaryto

conservethespecies,oriftheyfailedtoundertakesuchactionsoncetheplanwasinplace.

Thisconclusionisslightlytroubledbythefactthataccordingtocaselaw,recovery

plansdonotcarrytheforceoflaw.MichaelDeIulisobservesthatwhentheSecretaryhas

beensuedfornotundertakingamanagementactionthatispartofarecoveryplan,orfor

undertakingonethatisnot,thecourtshaveroutinelysidedwiththeSecretaryratherthan

theplaintiffs.113Forinstance,in1985,theU.S.FishandWildlifeService(FWS,theagencyof

theDept.oftheInteriorusuallychargedwithcarryingouttheSecretary’sresponsibilities

visavisspeciesatrisk)decidedtobringallfiveorsixoftheremainingwildCalifornia

condorsintocaptivity,despitethefactthataccordingtothecondor’srecoveryplan,

maintainingbothcaptiveandwildpopulationswasessentialtothespecies’persistence.In

thatcase,asinothersimilarcases,thecourtheldthattheSecretarywasnotinviolationof

theESA.

ThecourtexplainedthatthiswasbecausetheFWShadgivenreasons—relatedto

thegoalofpreventingthespecies’extinction—fornotmaintainingawildpopulationof

condors.Inbrief,FWSopinedthatinlightofunexpectedlossesofandriskstothewild

birds,itwouldbemoreeffectivetobringallofthebirdsintocaptivitythantoleavesomeof

theminthewild,perhapstoperishthere.Thedivergencefromtherecoveryplanthuswas

not“arbitraryorcapricious”withrespecttoconservingthespecies.

ThecaselawshowsthattheSecretary,viatheiragencies,hasdiscretionwhenit

comestowhichmanagementactionsarenecessaryforpreventingextinction,andthatthey

canchangetheirjudgementaboutwhetheraparticularactionisnecessary.Thecaselaw

11216U.S.C.§1533.113DeIulis,“WhenSquirrelsFly.”

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hasnotdeterminedthattheSecretaryhasdiscretionaboutwhethertoimplementa

managementactionwhichtheydojudgetobenecessary.Boththeletterofthelawandthe

waythecourtshavejustifieddivergencefromplansgivegoodreasontothinkthatfailure

toimplementanecessarymeasurewouldamounttoaviolationoftheESAandthereforea

breachofadutyoffidelitytothepublicwhoserepresentativeswrotethelaw.

Law-baseddutiesoffidelityinthenorthernspottedowlrecoverypredicament

AccordingtotheRevisedRecoveryPlanforthenorthernspottedowl,theFWSisconvinced

thatspottedowlswillnotrecoveraslongastheyarecompetingforhabitatwithbarred

owls,andthat“giventherapidityandseverityoftheincreasingthreatfrombarredowls,

barredowlremovalshouldbeinitiatedassoonaspossibleintheformofwell-designed

removalexperiments.”114ItisreasonabletothinkthataslongasthisremainsFWS’s

position,failingtodotheremovalexperimentswillconstituteaviolationoflaw.Itwill

thereforeamounttoabreachoffidelityonthepartoftheFWS,oftheDepartmentof

InteriorofwhichFWSisanagency,andoftheSecretaryoftheInteriorwhoisultimately

responsibleforthedepartment.Theseagentsareamongthosewhobreachdutiesof

maleficencetobarredowlsbymandatingtheexperiments.

Law-baseddutiesoffidelityintheislandfoxrecoverypredicament

ThethreepopulationsinourrecoverypredicamentwerelistedunderESAasendangered

in2004,whentheyfacedfiftypercentchancesofgoingextinctwithinadecade.Buta

recoveryplanforthemwasnotpublisheduntil2015,yearsaftertheclosureofthecaptive

breedingprogram,theremovalofgoldeneagles,andthekillingofpigs,elkanddeer.Well

before2015,however,theNationalParkService(NPS),anagencyoftheDepartmentof

Interior,ledarecoveryteamof“publicagencyrepresentatives,landowners,conservancies,

zoologicalinstitutions,non-profits,andacademicsconcernedaboutconservationefforts

fortheislandfox.”Thisteamdeterminedwhichmanagementactionswerenecessaryto

conservethepopulationsandimplementedthoseactions.Theyjudgedthatthefox

populationswouldnotsurviveunlesstheywerebroughtintocaptivityandbredthere,

114USFWS,RevisedRecoveryPlanforNSO,III-65.

58

unlessgoldeneagleswereremovedfromtheislands,andunlesstheferalpigsthat

attractedthoseeagleswerealsoremoved(thekillingofelkanddeer,thoughalsothought

essential,wasnotthegroup’sresponsibility).Thoughtheydeemedthesemeasurestobe

necessaryforrecovery,thiswasnotsetforthinanactualrecoveryplan,soitisnotclear

whethertheSecretaryoftheInteriorwouldhavebeeninviolationoftheESAhadtheNPS

anditspartnersnotstartedacaptivebreedingprogram,killedthepigs,orremovedthe

eagles.Therefore,itisnotclearwhethersuchomissionswouldcountasbreachesof

Rossiandutiesoffidelity.

Dutiesoffidelityatstakeinourowlrecoverypredicament,andpossiblyinthe

islandfoxpredicament,canexplainpartofwhatwouldmaketheextinctioncourseof

actionwrong,fromaRossianperspective.Itisanotherquestionwhethertheycanhelp

explainwhatmakesitseriously,ortragically,wrong.Forabreachofthedutyoffidelityto

beseriouslywrong,itmustbeserious.AsIstipulatedinsection2.1(Seriouswrongs),a

breachoffidelity,orpromise-breaking,isseriousifitsignificantlydiminishesthe

promisee’strust.SothebreachesoffidelitythattheSecretaryoftheInteriorwouldhave

committedhadtheFWSorNPSnotundertakenrecoverywouldhavebeenseriousifthey

wouldhavesignificantlydamagedthepublic’strustintheSecretary(orintheagencies

theyrepresent).

Itmightbethatatrendofsuchbreachescouldsignificantlydamagepublictrust.But

itishardertosaywhetheroneorafewsuchbreacheswoulddoso.

Dutiesoffidelitybasedincontract

Whilesomeagentsmightbebounddirectlybylawtoundertakethemanagementmeasures

inRecovery,othersmightbeboundbycontractualorprofessionalobligationtodoso.By

signingontoacertainjobdescription,orbyfulfillingacertaininstitutionalrole,some

employeesoftheFWSorNPS,forinstance,mightexplicitlyorimplicitlypromisetoleador

tohelpcarryoutthemanagementmeasuresnecessaryforRecovery.Whenthesemeasures

involvewrongingindividualanimals,theemployeeswouldfaceamoralconflictnotonly

becausewhatevertheydowillharmindividualanimals,butalsobecausetheywillbreacha

dutyoffidelitytotheiremployeriftheyrefusetotakethemeasures.

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Summary

Ross’sdeontologyhasroomtoacknowledgerecoverypredicamentsastragicmoral

conflicts,asbothofourcasesoftherecoverypredicamentshow.Inthem,eachcourseof

action—recoveryandextinction—involvesseriousmoralwrongdoingbecauseitbreaches

seriousdutiesofnon-maleficencebyirreparablyharmingindividualanimals.These

harms—andtheseriouswrongstheyconstitute—areattributabletothepeoplecharged

withcarryingoutrecovery,totheorganizationsandinstitutionsundertheauspicesof

whichtheydoit,andtothegovernmentthatmandatesit.

Acasecanalsobemadethattheextinctioncourseofactioninvolveswrongdoingof

adifferentsort.Hadtheextinctioncoursenotbeentaken,theFWS,perhapstheNPS,the

DepartmentoftheInteriorofwhichtheyareagencies,andthesecretarywhobears

responsibilityforthedepartmentwouldhavebreachedadutyoffidelitytothepublicby

violatingalawthatarguablyrequiresthemtotakethemanagementactionstheydeemto

benecessaryforpreventingtheextinctionofanimperiledspecies.Someemployeesofthe

department,orofotherorganizationsinvolvedinrecoveringspeciesatrisk,mightalso

havebreacheddutiesoffidelityhadtheyrefusedtoparticipateinthemanagement

measuresessentialtotherecoverycourseofaction.Itisnotclearwhetherthesebreaches

ofthedutyoffidelity,basedinlawsorcontractandlimitedtospecificpersonsorstate

agencies,wouldbeserious.Soitisnotclearwhethertheywouldconstituteseriousmoral

wrongdoing.However,theywouldsurelyaddweighttosomepeoples’primafaciedutiesto

takepartintherecoverycourseofaction.

4.Conclusion

Ross’sdeontologycanmakesenseofmoralconflictsbecauseithasroomforthenotions

thattoviolatesomeoneiswrongregardlessofwhetheritviolatesanallthingsconsidered

duty,thatseriousviolationsareseriouslywrong,andthattherearesituationsinwhich

whateveronedoesmightirreparablyviolatesomeone.Itcanmakesenseofrecovery

predicamentsastragicmoralconflictsbecauseinthem,itispossiblethateachofthe

possiblecoursesofactionmightseriouslyviolatesomeone.Inthefoxandowl

predicaments,forinstance,eachcourseofactionseriouslyviolatesmanysomeones.

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ChapterThree:Kant’sDeontology

Unlikesomelaterphilosophers,amongthemtheutilitarians,ImmanuelKantdoesnot

attendtoconflictinasustainedway.Soweneedtoexcavatetheaccountofconflictthatlies

buriedinKant’stexts.ThemostpromisingplacetobegindiggingisinTheMetaphysicsof

Morals,wheretheprincipleofpracticalreasonthatKanthadpreviouslyestablishedinthe

GroundworkandsecondCritiqueisworkedoutatalessabstractlevel,thatis,inawaythat

conceivesoftheprincipleasitisappliedtoitsobjects—humanbeings.Thisresultsina

systemofmorespecificethicaldutiesthatpeoplebeartothemselvesandtoothers.If

conflictcanbeaccommodatedanywhereinKant’smoraltheory,itwillbehere,where

multipledutiesaresupposedtonecessitateandconstrainthevariousendspeopleseekto

realizeinaction,inanempiricalworldinwhichthingsarenotnecessarilyasthey“ought”

tobe.

Friendsofconflictclaimthatthereisnopossibilityofmoralconflicttobefound

withinKant’sethicaltheory.AccordingtoBernardWilliams,forinstance,Kant’sethics

exemplifieswhathecalls“morality,”invirtueofconflatingpracticalnecessity,obligation,

andethicalconsiderations.Becausewithinmorality,allethicalconsiderationsboildownto

obligations,becauseobligationsexpresspracticalnecessity,andbecausewhatispractically

necessaryispracticable(oughtimpliescan),moralityhasnoroomforconflict:“morality

resiststhenotionofamoralcost,inthesenseofamoralwrongknowinglycommittedbyan

agentwhoisdoingsomethingthatevenfromamoralpointofviewisbetter:inthatcase,

theywillsay,thewrongcannotultimatelybewrong,thecostcannotreallybeacost.”115

Otherfriendsofconflict,suchasMarthaNussbaumandLisaTessman,similarlydiagnose

Kant’stheoryasincapableofacceptingthattherightactcanbesomehowwrong,andthus

asincapableofacceptingthepossibilityofconflict.TheyagreewithWilliamsthatthisisa

seriousflaw.116Inwhatfollows,IwillexplorewhetherandhowKant’sethicsmightactually

115Williams,“MoralLuck:APostscript,”246.SeealsoEthicsandtheLimitsofPhilosophy,ch.10.116Nussbaum,FragilityofGoodness,31-32;Tessman,MoralFailure,18-20.

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haveroomfortragicmoralconflict,andwhetheritcanregistertherecoverypredicament

asone.

1.Kant’sSystemofEthicalDuties

1.1Kant’sphilosophicalproject

IntheprefacetoTheMetaphysicsofMorals,Kantexplainsanddefendshisconceptionof

philosophy,whichconcernsreasoningeneral,notjustinitspracticaluse:“...since

consideredobjectively,therecanbeonlyonehumanreason,therecannotbemany

philosophies;inotherwords,therecanbeonlyonetruesystemofphilosophyfrom

principles...”Thesourceofthissystemis“theunityofthetrueprinciplewhichunifiesthe

wholeofphilosophyintoonesystem.”(MM6:207)117HowKantspellsoutthisprincipleisa

matterofdebate,butitspurpose,itwouldseem,istosecuretheintegrityoftheonehuman

reason—tokeepitunifiedandtoensureitsfreedomfromoutsideforces.

Kantseeshistaskasphilosopherashavingtwoparts.Thefirstistoworkoutthe

“trueprinciple”ineachofthedomainsorfieldsinwhichreasonoperates:nature,freedom,

andart.(CPJ5:198)Thisistheproject—undertakeninhisthreeCritiquesandinthe

GroundworkoftheMetaphysicsofMorals—ofdiscoveringtheprinciplesreasonderives

fromitselfindependentlyoftheobjectsaboutwhichwereason.Asoperationsofpure

theoreticalreason,purepracticalreason,andthereflectingpowerofjudgement,theydo

notdependonanythingempirical.

Afterthecriticalprojectcomesthemetaphysicaloneofapplyingthesepureapriori

principlestotheparticularkindsofobjectsorendsthatreasondealswithineachdomain

orfield.Theresultantsecondaryprincipleswillbenumerousandlessabstractthanthose

unearthedinthecriticalproject.Justastheaprioriprinciplesoftheoreticalreason,

practicalreason,andthereflectingpowerofjudgementhavetheirsourceinthe“true

principlewhichunifiesthewholeofreasonintoonesystem,”themultipleprinciplesspecial

toeachdomainorfieldofreasoncanbederivedfromthesupremeprincipleofthatdomain

117IrefertoKant’stextsusingthePrussianAcademypagination,precededbyabbreviationsofthetitlesinEnglish.Theabbreviationsare:GWGroundworkoftheMetaphysicsofMorals;LELecturesonEthics;MMTheMetaphysicsofMorals;CPJCritiqueofthePowerofJudgment;CPRCritiqueofPureReason;CPrRCritqueofPracticalReason;RReligionwithintheBoundariesofMereReason.

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orfield.Thespecialprinciplesarethusrelatedhierarchicallytothepureaprioriprinciple

ofreason,thoughtheircontentalsodependsontheempirical,aposterioricharacteristicsof

thekindsofobjectstowhichthatprincipleisapplied.

Inthepassageinwhichhedeclarestheonenessofreasoningeneral,Kantalso

affirmstheonenessofreasoninthemoralsphere“...themoralistrightlysaysthatthereis

onlyonevirtueandonedoctrineofvirtue,thatis,asinglesystemthatconnectsalldutiesof

virtuebyoneprinciple.”(MM6:207)Theprincipletowhichherefersistheoneworkedout

intheGroundworkandTheCritiqueofPracticalReason.Itistheprincipleofautonomy,in

thesenseofself-legislation;inthepracticalrealm,reason(orwill)maintainsitsintegrity

andfreedomfromoutsideforcesbysubmittingitselftolegislationthatitimposesonitself.

Thislegislationisthemorallaw.

Kantarticulatesthelawinatriadofformulations,eachofwhichexpressesthesingle

principleofmorality,orthecategoricalimperative,asviewedfromslightlydifferentangles.

Theformulationthatismostrelevantforthesubsequentmetaphysicalsystemofethical

dutiesisthefollowing:“Soactthatyouusehumanity,inyourownpersonaswellasinthe

personofanother,alwaysatthesametimeasanend,andnevermerelyasameans.”(GW

4:429)118By“humanity”Kantmeans“arationalnature,”orautonomyofwill.As“anendin

itself,”itisabletosetitsownend,ratherthanmerelytodeterminehowtorealizethisor

thatgivenend.Themorallawrequiresustomakethiscapacitytosetendsitselfan

unconditionalend.Aboveallelsewevalueandsetourselvestobringaboutthroughaction,

wemustvalueandsetourselvestobringaboutgood—orautonomous—willing.The

118Theformulaofhumanitycanbelinkedtotheuniversallawofnatureformulationintwoways.First,itisinvirtueoftheunconditionallyobligatoryendofhumanitythattheimperativetoactonlyonamaximyoucanwilltobeauniversallawofnatureiscategorical(ifhumanitywereadiscretionaryend,theimperativewouldbehypothetical).Second,humanityistheoneendthat,relyingonpracticalreasonalone,wecanwilleveryonetohaveasuniversallaw.Thus,inTheMetaphysicsofMorals,Kantidentifies“thesupremeprincipleofthedoctrineofvirtue,”asfollows:“actinaccordancewithamaximofendsthatitcanbeauniversallawforeveryonetohave.—Inaccordancewiththisprincipleahumanbeingisanendforhimselfaswellasforothers,anditisnotenoughthatheisnotauthorizedtouseeitherhimselforothersmerelyasmeans(sincehecouldthenstillbeindifferenttothem);itisinitselfhisdutytomakethehumanbeingassuchhisend”(MM6:395).Together,theformulaofhumanityandthelawofnatureformationcanbringustotheformulationofthekingdomofends.Whereasthelawofnatureformulahighlightstheformofthecategoricalimperative,andtheformulationofhumanityhighlightsitscontent,theformulationofthekingdomofendshighlightstheircombination.

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legitimacyofanyotherendwilldependonitsadoptionbeingconsistentwiththis

commitment.

Toputitinasomewhatdifferentway,thefundamentalprincipleofmorality

commandsustovaluehumanityashavingdignity,thatis“anunconditionaland

incomparableworth,”“aworththathasnoprice,noequivalentforwhich[thatwhichbears

it]couldbeexchanged.”(MM6:462)Respectingitsdignitymeansneversubordinatingitto

somethingthevalueofwhichisconditionalonsubjective(empirical)valuation.

Insum,the“oneprinciple”ofreasoninthepracticalrealmistheprincipleof

autonomy,whichamountstothewillfollowingalawofitsownmaking.Thelawin

questioncommandsthewilltoactoutofanoverridingcommitmenttothecapacityto

followsuchalaw.Itissupposedtobetheprincipleof“apuremoralphilosophy,completely

cleansedofeverythingthatmightbeinsomewayempiricalandbelongstoanthropology.”

(GW4:389)Asanoperationofpurereason,themorallawisvalidforanyrationalbeing—

whetherhumanorholy—justinvirtueoftheirrationality.

1.2Ethicaldutiesingeneral

InTheMetaphysicsofMoralsKantbeginstoapplyhisaprioriprincipleofpracticalreason

tothekindsofobjectsthisreasondealswithinpeople’slivedexperience,resultingina

numberofdutiesthataremorespecificthantheoriginalcategoricalimperative,butthat

inherititsobjectivenecessity.

TheMetaphysicsofMoralshastwoparts,whichdevelopdistinctbutoverlapping

systemsofduties.TheDoctrineofRightdealswithdutiesofexternalfreedom,orduties

whichonecanbecompelledtoobeybyapublicauthority.Thesedutiesamounttojuridical

laws,andtheirpointistoensurethateachpersonhasasmuchfreedomtopursuetheir

endsasisconsistentwitheveryoneelse’sequalfreedom.Fulfilmentofsuchdutiesconsists

merelyinperformingoromittingtherequiredorproscribedbehaviors,nomatterwhat

motivatesonetodoso.Thoughtheexistenceoftheseduties(whichdependsonwhether

oneiswithinthejurisdictionofalegitimatepublicauthority)givesrisetoethicaldutiesto

fulfillthemnotjustfromanymotivationbutfromthemotivationofduty,dutiesofrightare

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fundamentallypolitical,notethical.Imentionthemmainlyinordertosetthemasidesoas

tofocusonfundamentallyethicalduties,ordutiesofvirtue.

EthicaldutiesaresystematizedintheDoctrineofVirtue(DV),thepartofThe

MetaphysicsofMoralsthatpicksupdirectlyfromwherethemoralpartofKant’scritical

projectleavesoff.DVspellsoutdutiesofinternalfreedom,ordutiesthatcannotbe

imposedonapersonbyanyonebutthemselves.Atbase,thesearedutiestotakeupcertain

ends.Theyoriginateinthesupremedutytomakehumanityone’send,which,asaprinciple

ofpurepracticalreasonunmixedwithempiricalconsiderations,offerslittleguidancefor

ourspecificchoicesabouthowtoliveandwhattodo.Itleavesopenwhatitmeansto

respectthedignityofrationalnatureinthecontextofanactualhumanlife.

Whatitmeansisspelledoutinanumberofmoresubstantiveethicaldutiesthatresult

whenthesupremeprincipleisappliedto“theparticularnatureofhumanbeings,whichcan

becognizedonlybyexperience.”(MM6:217)Kantthinksexperienceteachesusthatweare

animalswhoaremoral,andwhohaveimperfectwills.Itakeitthatatleastpartofwhatthis

meansisthatweareembodied,sensible,andfinite.Soforus,themotiveofduty,orrespect

forthemorallaw,isonlyoneoftwotypesofmotiveforchoice.Theotherisnatural

inclination,whichKantalsocalls“sensibleimpulse.”Thisisa“forcethatstrivesonly

toward[thesubject’sown]happiness.”(MM6:481)AsKantunderstandsit,happiness

encompassesallsortsofendsandpurposeswhichvaryfromsubjecttosubjectandwithin

asubjectovertime;apersonishappytotheextentthattheendstheynaturallydesireare

realized.Ourtwotypesofmotivescanpullusinoppositedirections,andevenwhenwe

haveresolvedtoactmorally,wesometimeschoosetoallowcompetingmotivationsto

guideouractionsinstead.Inotherwords,wecansubordinatetheobligatoryendof

humanitytoarbitraryends(incontrast,holyormorallyperfectbeingsareincapableof

beingtemptedtosubordinatethenecessaryendofrationalnaturetootherends;their

“maximnecessarilyharmonizeswiththelawofautonomy,”andsoforthemthemorallaw

nevercomesacrossasaconstraint).(GW4:440)Achievingandmaintainingthestrengthof

willtochoosemorallyeveninthefaceofopposingmotivations—astrengthKantidentifies

asvirtue—isalifelongtaskforhumanpracticalreasoners.

Soistheprotectionandcultivationofourphysical,cognitive,andemotionalcapacities.

Withoutthese,andwithouthelpfromotherpeople,wecanrealizeneitherourmorally

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obligatorynorourmorallypermissibleends.AsOnoraO’Neillexpressesit,“becausehuman

agentshavefragileandundevelopedabilitiesandarealways,andoftenintensely,

physicallyandmentallyvulnerabletooneanother,theymust,iftheyaretoensurethat

moralactionhasareliableplaceintheirworld,sustainhumanabilitiesbydevelopingtheir

owncapacitiesforaction(talents)andsupportingoneanother’spursuitof(permissible)

ends.”119

Inlightofhumanbeings’originalcombinationofcapacities,limitations,andneeds,the

dutytorespectthedignityofhumanityofoneselfandothersimpliestwomorespecific

unconditionalends:otherpeople’shappinessandone’sownperfection.Theyarepartofa

nestedsystemofduties;adoptingthemispartofwhatitmeanstoadopthumanityasan

end,andtheyinturnimplyfurtherevenmorespecificduties.Itcannotbeoverstressedthat

asinternalduties,ethicaldutiesarenotdutiestoperformortorefrainfromperforming

thisorthatexternalaction.Theyaredutiesregardingthesubjectiveprinciplesaccordingto

whichwechoosetoperformorrefrainfromactions:“EthicsDoesNotGiveLawsforActions

...butOnlyforMaximsofActions.”(MM6:389).

1.3Maxims

Kantsaysthatamaximisa“subjectiveprincipleofvolition.”Toclarifythis,letuslookat

therelationbetweenobjectiveprinciplesandmaxims.Anobjectiveprincipleisonethat

appliestoallrationalbeings,invirtueofbeingrational.Thecategoricalimperativeisan

objectiveprinciple.Itstipulatestheconditionofreason’sautonomyinthepracticalrealm.

Theconditionisthatpracticalreasonitselfhaslexicalpriorityoverothermotivesfor

action.Thisisanotherwayofsayingthathumanity,orrationalnature,mustalwaysbean

endandneverjustameans.

Theobjectiveprincipleprovidesthestandardforthesubjectiveprinciples,or

maxims,accordingtowhichaparticularhumanbeinginfactdoesact,atleastwhenthey

are(orcanbeconsideredtobe)actingfreely.Whereasthefundamentalobjectiveprinciple

istheproductofwhatKantcallsWille,orpurepracticalreason(andotherobjective

principlesareproductsofWilleappliedtohumannatureingeneral),amaximisthe

119O’Neill,“InstitutingPrinciples,”219.

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productofWillkür,orthepowerofchoice;aslongasanagentactsvoluntarily,itisupto

themwhattheultimateendoftheiractionis,andthuswhetheritmeetsthestandardsetby

purepracticalreason.Soaperson’smaximsreflecttheirultimateendsandthewaythey

orderthem,whetherornottheydosointhewaythecategoricalimperativecommands.As

Timmermanputsit,“inKant'sphilosophyofaction,maximsarethefreelychosen

subjectiveprinciplesordeeperintentionsofallofourconsciousactions.Theyarethus

expressiveofthestancewetaketowardsourincentives.”120

AmongKantians,thereissomedisputeaboutwhichkindsofpracticalchoices

expressmaxims.IfollowTimmermanandothersintakingmaximstoworkatmultiple

levels,whichcorrespondtothehierarchyofethicalduties.121Atthelowestlevelthereare

whatLoudencalls“specificintentionsfordiscreteacts,”andatintermediatelevelsthere

aresecondordermaximsthatexpresshowweprioritizeourends,incentives,or

motives.122Theseprinciplescanconveytheresolutions,suchaspersonalpoliciesorlife

rules,towhichapersonconsciouslycommitsasguidesfortheirlowerlevelmaxims.The

intermediatemaximscanalsoidentifythewayapersonactuallyhasprioritizedtheirends

ormotives,whichmightdivergefromhowtheyhaveresolvedtoprioritizethem.Atthe

highestlevelshouldbeamaximthatmirrorsthecategoricalimperative:fromrespectfor

thedignityofrationalnature,Iwillgiveitprecedenceoverdiscretionaryends.Lowestlevel

maximsareinfluencedbyintermediatemaxims,whichareinfluencedbythehighestone.

Becausemaximsuniteactiontypeswithmotives,twooutwardlyidenticalactscan

bedonefromdifferentmaxims,andsooneoftheactsmighttransgressethicaldutywhile

theotherdoesnot.ItisnotuncommontothinkthatKant’sethicsstrictlyforbidsthe

externalactofkillingoneself.However,thedutynottocommitsuicideismostaptly

understoodasaprohibitionagainst“disposingofoneselfasameremeanstosome

discretionaryend.”(MM6:423,emphasisadded)Thisrulesoutchoosingtotakeone’slife

fromanincentiveofself-interest,butitleavesopenthepermissibilityoftakingone’slife

120Timmerman,“Kant’sPuzzlingEthicsofMaxims,”39.121Timmerman“Kant’sPuzzlingEthicsofMaxims.”SeealsoLouden,“Kant’sVirtueEthics”andCuretonandHill,“KantonVirtue.”122Louden,“Kant’sVirtueEthics,”481;Timmerman,“Kant’sPuzzlingEthicsofMaxims.”

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outofrespectforrationalnature,eitherinoneselforinotherpeople.Kantsignalsthis

opennessinthe“casuisticalquestions”heappendstohisexplanationofourdifferent

ethicalduties.Forinstance,heasksbutnotablydoesnotanswerwhetheritisever

permissibletosacrificeone’slifeforallofhumanity,orwhenonefeelstheonsetof

incurablemadnessandfearsthatonewillcauseharmtoothersoncetheillnessinevitably

escalates.(MM6:423–424)

1.4Thesystemofethicalduties

Ihavesaidthat“lawsforthemaximsofactions”containedinKant’ssystemofethical

dutiesarerelatedhierarchically.Withinthisstructuretherearenegativedutiesand

positiveduties.

Negativeduties

Negativedutiesforbidmaximsthatopposeanobligatoryend.Aprominentsetofnegative

dutiestoothersareunitedunderthedutyofrespect,which“iscontainedinthemaximnot

todegradeanyotherasameremeanstomyends...”(MM6:450)Thelowerlevelmaxims

ruledoutbythisdutyareonesthatexpressafailuretorecognizethedignity,or

unconditionalandincomparableworth,ofotherpeopleasrationalbeings.Maximsof

publiclymockingsomeone,orexposingtheirfaultsandwrongdoingina“wanton”way,or

“withnoparticularaim”(MM6:466–467)areamongthoseproscribedbyrespectfor

others.Itisimportanttoemphasizethatsuchdutiesdonotforbidmakingfunofsomeone

orpublicizingtheirmisconduct.Theyforbiddoingthesekindsofthingswithoutagood

moralreason.Negativedutiestoothersalsoincludedutiesnottoactfrommaximsthat

opposepositivedutiesoflove,whichwillbeexplainedbelow.

Negativedutiestooneselfproscribetreatingoneselfasameremeanstoanother’s

ends,oreventoone’sownnon-moralends.Theystrictlylimitmaximsofdiminishingor

destroyingthephysical,intellectual,emotional,andmoralcapacitiesthatmakeitpossible

foronetosetandpursueends,andthustobehumaninKant’ssenseoftheterm.The

previouslydiscussedprohibitionon“disposingoneselfasameremeanstoadiscretionary

end”exemplifiesthekindofmaximproscribedbythesedutiesto“preserveoneselfinthe

perfectionofone’snature.”(MM6:423,6:419)Mutilatingoneself,anddiminishingone’s

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moralcharacter—e.g.byhabituatingoneselftoprivilegenaturaldesireoverreasonorby

stuntingone’smorallysignificantemotionsinordertoachieveanon-moralend—provide

otherexamples.

Negativedutiesdoprohibitabsolutely,butwhattheyprohibitabsolutelyisdoing

certainkindsofthingsfornon-moralreasons.However,itisnotalwayseasy,oreven

possible,forapersontoknowwhattheirultimatemotivationis,especiallywhenmoraland

non-moralmotivespointinthesamedirection.Forinstance,apersoncouldbelievethat

theyaremovedtoendtheirlifebyrespectforthehumanityofthosetheywillsavebydoing

so,wheninfactaself-interesteddesiretohavethelegacyofaherodrivestheirchoice.The

opacityofourownmotivesandourpenchantforself-deceptionareprobablythefeatures

ofhumannaturethatlieatthebasisof“thefirstcommandofalldutiestooneself”whichis:

“know(scrutinize,fathom)yourself...Thatis,knowyourheart.”(MM6:441)Thatpeople

aresusceptibletonotknowingtheirhearts,especiallywhenitisintheirinterestnotto,

shouldmeanthatalthoughnegativeethicaldutiesdonotabsolutelyprohibitthetypesof

externalactionthatcannotbedonefornon-moralreasons,thereisaverystrong

presumptionagainstchoosingtodoanactionofthesetypes.123

Anotherreasonforthepresumptionagainsttakingsuchactionsisthatitdoesnot

seemasthoughKantthinksthatjustanymoralmotivationsufficestomakepermissiblethe

maximofaproblematictypeofaction.Yethistheorygivesnorulesforascertainingwhen

moralreasonsleaveuptoourjudgementwhether,say,beinggenuinelymovedbythe

dutiesofgratitudeandbeneficencemakesitpermissibletodonatepartofone’slivertoa

parentwhoseliverisfailing,oreventosellanon-vitalorganinordertopaythefees

requiredtogettheparentoutofademeaningcircumstance.Therearestrong

presumptionsagainstperformingtheseactions,butthetheorycannotspecifyhowstronga

moralreasonmustbeinordertotrumpit.

Positiveduties

Aftertheratherabstractpositivedutytomakethehumanityofotherpeopleanend,the

nexthighestpositivedutytoothersistoadoptamaximofbenevolence,thatis,“tomake

123Hill,“MoralDilemmas,”andDenis,“DutiesRegardingAnimals.”

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other’sendsmyown(providedonlythattheyarenotimmoral).”(MM6:450)Amongthe

intermediatemaximsthisdutyimpliesisamaximofbeneficence,whichisthe

determination“topromoteaccordingtoone’smeansthehappinessofothersinneed”(MM

6:453)Italsoimpliesmaximsofgratitudeandsympathy,whicharecommitmentstohonor

andbenefitone’sbenefactors,andtocultivateone’scapacityforcompassionatefeeling.

Kantcallsthesepositivedutiestoothersdutiesoflove.Theendofother’shappinessalso

impliesnegativeduties,whichforbidmaximsopposedtolove.Actingonaprincipleof

malice,envy,oringratitude,forinstance,wouldviolatethisduty.

Positivedutiestooneselfarebasedinthedictum“makeyourselfmoreperfectthan

merenaturehasmadeyou.”(MM6:420)Thus,peoplearetomakeenduringcommitments

tocultivate(asopposedtosimplypreserve)thecapacitiesthatenablethemtoact

accordingtoprinciples,tobepracticallyrational,tobemoral,andsotobefree.

Positivedutiesarelessdeterminatethannegativeduties.Thoughtheydorequire

certainkindsofintermediatemaxims—e.g.resolutionstoputhelpingothersand

developingyourowncapacitiesabovethepursuitofnon-obligatoryends—theydonot

specifyexactlywhatyourlowerlevelmaximsshouldcontain;thereareallsortsofwaysin

whichyoucandevelopyourcapacities,orcontributetoothers’well-being,andthewaysin

whichyoudothesethingsareuptoyou:“...forifthelawcanprescribeonlymaximsof

actions,notactionsthemselves,thisisasignthatitleavesaplayroom(latitudo)forfree

choiceinfollowing(complyingwith)thelaw,thatis,thatthelawcannotspecifyprecisely

inwhatwayoneistoactandhowmuchoneistodobytheactionforanendthatisalsoa

duty”(MM6:390)

ThelinchpinofKant’ssystemofduties

InTheMetaphysicsofMorals,Kantwritesthat“thehighestunconditionalendofpure

practicalreasonisthatvirtuebeitsownend.”(MM6:397)ThatKantseemstobeofferinga

re-statementofthecategoricalimperativeheremightindicatethatheequates“virtue”with

“rationalnature.”Buthedoesnot.Kantconceivesofvirtueas“themoralstrengthofa

humanbeing’swillinfulfillinghisduty”(MM6:405).Sovirtueisnotsomuchthebare

capacitytoactfromthemotiveofduty,asitistherobustnessofaperson’sdispositionto

actuallydoso,eveninthefaceofcountervailingnaturalinclinations.Ithinkthatthe

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commandthatvirtuebeitsownendisthereforeanapplicationofthecategorical

imperativetothepeculiarlyhumancondition.Ournegativeandpositivedutiestoourselves

tohavemaximsofprotectinganddevelopingourmoralcharactershouldthereforebeseen

totakesomeprecedenceoverotherduties,becausewithoutstrengthofwill,wewouldnot

beablereliablytodoanyduties.AsRobertLoudenwrites,“withoutdutiestooneself,no

dutieswhatsoever,”andso“thedutytodevelopone’smoralcharacteristhelinchpinof

Kant’sentiresystemofduties.”124

Thesystemofdutiesisnotadecisionprocedure

Inrequiringandproscribingmaxims,Kant’ssystemofethicaldutiesprovidesguidelines

forformulatingtheintermediateprinciplesbywhichwewanttolive,(whichinturn

influence—orshouldinfluence—ourmaximsforparticularactions).Butitdoesnotfurnish

adecisionprocedurewecanusetodeterminewhat,ethically,weoughttodoinanyand

everycircumstance.125AsO’Neillargues,thesystemofdutiesfurnishesinsteadasetof

desiderataordemands,whichapersonmustinventawayoffulfilling.Sheillustratesthis

byanalogyto“theequallypracticaljudgementofthedesigner,craftsperson,orpoet,who

hastodiscoverorfindsomewayofmakingthatsatisfiesmultipledemands.Imaginethat

youhavetodesignawheelbarrow.Ithastorollsmoothly,tobelightenoughevenfor

feeblegardeners,tobedurableenoughforroughuse,andtobemadeofavailableand

affordablematerials...themultiplicityofdemands...constrainsandtherebyshapesthe

activitiesofthosewhomakewheelbarrows.”126Likewise,theconstellationoffundamental

andspecialdutiesthatapersonhasincorporatedintotheirintermediatemaxims

constrainsandshapes,butdoesnotdetermine,howtheyshouldliveandwhattheyshould

do.

124Louden,“Kant’sVirtueEthics,”483.125SeeGuyer,“DutiesRegardingNature,”Louden“Kant’sVirtueEthics”,cf.Herman,“ObligationandPerformance.”126O’Neill,“InstitutingPrinciples,”343.

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2.MoralConflictswithinKant’sEthics

Ihavecharacterizedmoralconflictsinthreeways,whichIhavetakentobeequivalent:as

situationsinwhichallofaperson’savailablealternativesinvolvedoingsomethingthat

theyoughtnottodo(andnotdoingsomethingthatoneoughttodoisonewayofdoing

somethingthatoneoughtnottodo);assituationsinwhichwhateveronedoeswillwarrant

moralregretontheirpart;andassituationsinwhichwhateveronedoeswillbewrongin

someway.OnKant’stheoryasontheothersIamconsidering,atleastonewaytodowrong

istoviolateaduty.127

KantbrieflyaddressestheissueofconflictsofdutyintheintroductiontoThe

MetaphysicsofMorals.Itwillhelpourenquirytobreakthispassageintotwoparts.

FirstPart

Aconflictofduties(collisioofficiorum,s[ive]obligationum)wouldbethatrelationbetweenthembyvirtueofwhichoneofthemwouldinvalidatetheother(whollyorinpart).Butsincedutyandobligationareconceptsthatexpresstheobjectivepracticalnecessityofcertainactions,andtworulesopposedtoeachothercannotbothbenecessaryatthesametime—ratherifitisone’sdutytoactaccordingtooneofthem,toactaccordingtotheoppositeoneisnotonlynoduty,butevencontrarytoduty—acollisionofdutiesandobligationsisnotevenconceivable(obligationesnoncolliduntur).(MM6:224)

SecondPart

However,twogroundsofobligation(rationesobligandi),oneortheotherofwhichdoesnotsufficetoobligate(rationesobligandinonobligantes),canbecombinedinasubjectandtheruleheprescribestohimself,butinthatcaseoneofthemisnothisduty.Whentwosuchgroundsconflictwitheachother,practicalphilosophysays,notthatthestrongerobligationtakesprecedence(fortiorobligatiovincit),butthatthestrongergroundofobligationprevails(fortiorobligandiratiovincit).(MM6:224)

Asawhole,thepassageseemstobaronewayofaccountingforconflictwhilepossibly

leavinganotheropen.Inthefirstpartofthepassage,Kantclearlydeniesthatdutiescan

127InTheMetaphysicsofMorals,itisarguablethatKantdoesnotusewrongasasynonymofoughtnot,butasaspeciesofit.Whileoughtnotcoversallviolationsofduty,forthemostpartKantreserveswrongforviolationsofdutiesofright,orjuridicalduties.ItcouldbearguedthatforKanttherearenoethicalwrongs,onlylegal-politicalones.Ithinkthisisasemanticissue,notasubstantiveone.

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conflict.Hearguesfromtheconceptofadutytotheabsurdityofconflict:ifduties

conflicted,onewouldcanceltheotherout;butdutiesarenotthekindsofthingthatcanbe

cancelledout,becausetheyexpressobjectivenecessity;sodutiescannotconflict.

2.1Conflictsofduty

Inthefirstpartofthepassage,Kantseemsatleasttoruleoutinconsistenciesamonghigher

levelobjectiveprinciples.Thebestevidenceforthisisthatherejectsthepossibilityof

opposingrules.Aswehaveseen,Kant’sethicaltheorydoesnotfurnishprescriptionsfor

specificacts;objectiveprinciplescannotgodownthatfar,andiftheydiditwouldbe

strangetocallthemrules,becauserulesaregeneral,notparticular.Itthereforemakes

sensetointerpretthepassageasassertingthatgeneralethicalprinciplescannotcontradict

eachother.Forinstance,atheorycannotincludeaprincipleofmakingothers’happinessan

end,andaprincipleoftakingrevengeonone’senemies.Or,touseanexampleof

Timmerman’s,itcannotrequireusunconditionallytosupportthoseinneed,andalso

requireusnevertointerfereinother’slives.128

Unsurprisingly,theethicalsystemKantelaboratesinTheMetaphysicsofMoralsdoes

notincludeopposingduties.Noneoftheendsitrequiresustoadopt,orthekindsof

maximsitrulesoutasantitheticaltothoseends,contradictsanyoftheothers(e.g.a

commitmenttobeneficencedoesnotdirectlyopposeacommitmenttoself-perfection,and

neithercommitmentisintrinsicallyinconsistentwithprohibitionsonservility,contempt,

ordeceitfulness).Thisisnotaccidentaloradhoc.Ourethicaldutiesareallpartof,andare

organizedbyasingleself-consistentprincipleofrespectforrationalnature.

Ifnothingelse,thefirstpartofKant’sconflictpassageimposesaconsistency

constraintonduties,whichhissystemofethicaldutieseasilymeets.Aswesawinthe

introductorychapter,aconsistencyconstraintisuncontroversial,evenamongfriendsof

conflict.Forinstance,inarguingforthepossibilityofmoralconflict,Williamsdiscardsas

uninteresting“thepossibility(ifitexists)thatamanshouldholdmoralprinciplesor

generalmoralviewswhichareintrinsicallyinconsistentwithoneanother.”129Whatis

128Timmerman,“KantianDilemmas?”42.129Williams,“EthicalConsistency,”171.

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interestingiswhetherornotatheoryrulesoutaccidentalconflictsatthelevelofdiscrete

choices.Isiteverpossiblethat,say,onecannotfulfillthedutyofbeneficencewithout

transgressingthedutyofself-perfection,orwithoutviolatingtheprohibitionson

deceitfulnessorself-abasement?

WhileKant’spassageonconflictmightnotruletheseout,thenatureofhisethical

dutiesdoes.OnKant’sethicaltheory,thereisonewayinwhichanactcanviolateaduty—

itsmaximsubordinatesanobligatoryendtoanarbitraryone.So,incircumstancesinwhich

anobligatoryendisatstake,ifapersonchoosestoactfromanincentiveofself-interestas

opposedtomorality,theywillhavedonewrong.Anotherwaytoputthiswouldbetosay

thatactsarewronginvirtueofexpressingalackofrespectforrationalnature,andacts

expressrespectordisrespectinvirtueofthesubjectiveprinciplesthatunderliethem.

ForKant’stheorytoallowforconflictatthelevelofparticularchoices,itwouldhave

toallowforthepossibilitythatapersoncouldfindthemselvesinasituationinwhich,

althoughethicalendsareatstake,alloftheactionstheycouldproducewouldbedonefor

thesakeofanarbitraryend.Thetheorydoesnotallowforthispossibility.Aslongasa

humanbeing’srationalnatureisintact,theywillneverbeboundtoactfromaself-

interestedmotiveratherthanamoralone;wheneverrationalnatureisatstake,theycan

actforthesakeofit,andcandosojustbecauseitisobligatory.Indeed,itisapremiseofthe

theorythataperson,quaperson,canalwaysdothis.Theveryconditionofbeingsubjectto

ethicaldutiesisbeingcapableofactingfromamoralmotive,whetherornotone’snatural

desirescoincidewithmorality.Soifsomeonereallyhasnochoicebuttoactonnatural

inclination—iftheysimplycannotactfromaprinciplejustbecausereasonrequiresit—it

willbebecausetheirrationalnatureisnotintact.Inthatcase,theycannotpossibly

transgressaduty,becausedutiesdonotapplytothem.

Itiseasytomissthisifonefocusesmistakenlyontokenexternalactions,decoupled

fromtheirmaxims.Kant’stheorydoesnotruleoutthepossibilitythatapersonmightbe

facedwithachoiceamongoutwardactionsallofwhichtendtobethekindsofacts

expressiveofbadmaxims.Forinstance,theymightnotbeabletoavoidneglectingthe

urgentbutreadilysatisfiableneedsofonepersonandtoavoidneglectingthoseofanother

(e.g.afirstresponderoverwhelmedbymultiplecasualties).Evenmoreproblematically,

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theymightnotbeabletoavoidseriouslyharmingonepersonandtoavoidseriously

harminganother.

YetforKant,anactiondoesnotfulfillortransgressdutiesinvirtueofthekindsof

maximsonwhichactionslikeittendtobedone,butonthemaximsthatactuallyunderlie

thatparticularaction.Ineventhemostdifficultofsituations,apersonwillneverbebound

toactfromanon-moralincentive,orwithalackofrespecteitherforthemselvesorfor

others.Helpingonepersonindistressandnotanotherdoesnothavetomeanthatthe

choicewasmotivatedbyself-interest,orthattheagentdoesnotreallyseethehappinessof

bothpeopleasends.Evenactinginapredicamentinwhichridicule,harm,orlossoflifeare

unavoidableisnotincompatiblewithvaluingeveryhumanbeingasanendinthemselves.

Althoughrepeatedfailurestoactsoastopromoteanobligatoryendindicatethat

onedoesnotactuallyhavethatendorhasnotgivenitpriorityoverarbitraryends,passing

upachancetopromoteoneobligatoryendinordertopromoteanotherisentirely

consistentwithhavingandproperlyprioritizingbothofthem.Similarly,althoughthereisa

verystrongpresumptionagainstthepermissibilityofactionsthattendtobedonefrom

indifferencetoorhatredofobligatoryends,ifsuchanactionischosenoutofacommitment

tosuchends,itneednotviolateanethicalduty.

2.2Conflictsofgroundsofobligation

Whiletherecanbenosituationsinwhichwhateverapersondoeswillviolateanethical

duty,itcanbethecasethatwhatevertheydowillruncountertoagroundofobligation.

ThisisassertedinthesecondpartofKant’sconflictpassage:“twogroundsofobligation

(rationesobligandi),oneortheotherofwhichdoesnotsufficetoobligate(rationes

obligandinonobligantes),canbecombinedinasubjectandtheruleheprescribesto

himself,butinthatcaseoneofthemisnothisduty.”(MM6:224)Becausethepassagedoes

notmakeclearexactlywhatgroundsofobligationare,itraisesbutdoesnotanswerthe

questionofwhatkindofnormativeforceagroundofobligationhas,andwhetherthatforce

cancontinuetoexertitselfevenif,becauseofconflict,itdoesnotsufficetoobligate.

Whatdoesitmeanforasubjecttohavemultiplegroundsofobligationintherulehe

prescribeshimself?Interpretersofthispassageconcurthatthe“ruleheprescribeshimself”

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isthesubject’smaxim.130Theydonotagreeonwhatexactly“groundsofobligations”are.

Timmermanarguesthattheyare“obligatingreasonsthatresultfromcorrectif

inconclusivemoralarguments.”Thepremisesoftheseargumentsarei)ethicalprinciples

orduties,whichshouldbereflectedinaperson’sintermediatemaxims(e.g.helpothersin

needwhenyouhavethemeans)andii)thefactsofaperson’sconcretesituation(e.g.Hilda,

here,needshelpandIcanprovideit).131Thedutytohaveamaximofhelpingothersin

needwhenyoucan,andthefactsthatHildaneedshelpandthatyoucanhelpher,generate

areasontoprovidehelp,agroundofanobligationtohelp.

Therearetwoaspectsofgroundsofobligation,asTimmermanconceivesthem,that

shouldbenoted.First,groundsofobligationcommendmaximsofgeneraltypesofactions,

suchasprovidehelp.Likeobligationsproper,theydonotspecifyexactlywhatyouare

supposedtodoinordertofulfillthem.RecallthatKant’ssystemofdutiesistheresultof

purereasonappliedtohumannatureingeneral,soitcannotpossiblyfurnishempirically

detailedprescriptionsaboutwhattodo.Thus,themaximsofouractionsunitemotives

withactiontypes,notwithmeansforcarryingthemout.

Second,groundsofobligationsdonotnecessarilyobligate.Ifyoulackthemeansto

carryoutthetypeofactsuggestedbyagroundofobligation,youdonothaveanobligation

toperformit.Forinstance,ifprovidingassistanceisphysicallyimpossible(e.g.aswift

flowingriverseparatesyoufromthepersonwhoneedshelp)thenalthoughyoustillhavea

reasontohelpthepersoninneed,youwillnotbeobligedtodoso.

Moreimportantforourdiscussionistheimpossibilitythatresultswhentakingthe

stepsnecessaryforrealizingonegroundofobligationprecludestakingthosenecessaryfor

realizinganother.SayTariqneedsyourassistanceatthesametimeHildadoes.Thiswill

giveyouasecondgroundofobligationtohelp.Ifyouareabletohelpeitheroneofthem,

butlackthematerials,thetime,ortheskilltohelpboth,thenyourtwogroundswill

conflict—notintrinsically,butcontingently.AsTimmermansays“suchconflictsdonot

arisefromanytheoreticalorrationalinconsistencybutbecausetheagentisconsciousof

130O’Neill,“InstitutingPrinciples,”Timmerman,“KantianDilemmas?”andHerman,“ObligationandPerformance.”131SeeHerman,“ObligationandPerformance”foracontrastingview.

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theempiricalcomplexitiesthatarisewhenheenvisagesconcrete,positivestepstoadvance

amorallyrequiredend.”132ToreturntoO’Neill’smakermetaphor,conflictsamonggrounds

ofobligationsoccurwhenthereisnocourseofactionapersoncantakethatwillcoverall

oftheactiontypestheyhavemoralreasonstoperformandavoidallofthosetheyhave

moralreasonsnottoperform.

Insuchcases,Kantsaysoftheincompatiblegroundsofobligationthat“oneofthemis

nothisduty.”Isittherebyeliminated?Thatis,doesfailingtobecomeanactualobligation

necessarilyextinguishitsnormativeforce?Timmermanarguesthatitdoesnot.Essentially,

thisisbecauseoftherelationbetweengroundsofobligationsandobligatoryends.Ifa

personhasagroundofobligation,shehasitinvirtueofbeingunconditionallycommitted

toamorallynecessaryend.Havinganecessaryendentailsnotbeingabletodropitjust

becauseyoucannotactonit.Andhavinganendofanysortentailsbeingmovedtoactonit,

andbeingfrustrated(atleast)whenyoucannot.IfHilda’sandTariq’sdistressgiveyou

groundsofobligationstohelp,thisisbecausebothHildaandTariq,andthehappinessof

eachofthem,andhelpingeachthemachievetheirhappiness,areunqualifiedendsofyours.

NotbeingabletohelpTariqbecauseofanobligationtohelpHildacannotextinguishthe

reasonyouhavetohelphim,becauseitcannotextinguishthesourceofthatreason.As

Timmermanexplains,“groundsofobligationdependontheprecariousavailabilityof

meanstogenerateduties,butunlikethosedutiestheydonotdisappearwhentheycannot

beactedupon.”133

Conflictsamonggroundsofobligationcanbetragic.Havingtheattitudeofrespect

forrationalnaturerequiredbythefundamentalprinciplesmeansvaluingeachandevery

humanbeing,quarationalbeing,ashavingavaluethatisunconditionalandincomparable;

nothingcancompensateforitsloss.ThomasHillobservesthattragicconflictoccurswhen

apersonfacesasituationinwhichthereisnosolutiontotheproblemofproducingan

action—orevenawayoflife—thatwillnothumiliate,diminish,ordestroyahuman

132Timmerman,“KantianDilemmas?”50.133Ibid.,60.

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being.134Thisdescribesmanypredicamentsinthecontextofwar,unjustinstitutions,and

evenjustbadmoralluck.Wearealreadyfamiliarwithsomeofthese;trolleyproblems,

Sophie’schoice,andAgamemnon’sdilemma.HelgaVardenbringsupanotherexampleof

peoplelivingunderanoppressiveregimehavingtochooseamongpathsofviolent

resistance,passiveresistance,andcompliance.Inallthesecases,eachoptionposesgrave

moralrisks(e.g.killinganotherhumanbeing,beingkilled,degradingoneself).135

Insuchsituations,apersonisnotboundtoviolateaduty,becauseevenintheworst

predicamentsonecannotbeboundtoabandontheattitudeofrespectforhumanity.For

thisreason,Kantianstendtoclaimthatnon-dutyviolatingresponsestoconflictsofgrounds

ofobligationscanwarrantagentregret,butnotremorse.AccordingtoTimmerman,

althoughapersonwhohasactedinresponsetoaconflictofgroundsofobligationmightbe

expectedtofeelregretthat“goesbeyondbeingunhappywiththeunfortunatesituationor

theresultsofmybehavior,”therecanbeno“unavoidableremorseorinevitableself-

reproachwhenanagenthasdonehisduty.”Similarly,BarbaraHermanarguesthat“if

remorseisthecorrectorgoodresponsetosituationsofconflict,wecannotacceptthe

Kantianaccount”(thatdutiesneednotbeviolatedinconflictsituations),whereasagent

regretisnotunwarrantedinherview.136

Hill’stakeontheappropriatenessofemotionalresponsestoconflictismore

interesting,becauseitskirtsthequestionofremorse.Heacknowledgesthefittingnessof

agentregret,writing“theattitudeofpersonalregret,althoughnotinitselfmorally

required,ismorallysignificantinsofarasitisanaturalexpressionofconscientiousagents’

deepandself-identifyingcommitmenttopreserveandrespecthumanityineachperson...

lackingitisasymptomthatonedoesnottakeone’smoralresponsibilityseriously.”137He

alsoclaimsthataslongasaperson’sresponsetoconflictdoesnotviolateduty,guiltis

inappropriate.Hedoesnotmentionthespeciesofagentregretthatisremorse,though.By

134Hill,“MoralDilemmas,”180,and“MakingExceptions.”135Varden,“KantandLying,”417-418.Varden’sexemplarofthisisthepredicamentfacedbypeoplewholivedunderNazioccupationinEurope.136Herman,“ObligationandPerformance,”325.137Hill,“MoralDilemmas.”

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notexplicitlydenyingtheappropriatenessofremorse,Hill’saccountmightleaveroomfor

it.

Thosewhodenythefittingnessofremorseincasesinwhichnodutyhasbeen

violateddonotdosobecauseremorseisinappropriatelyintense.Intragicconflicts

somethingofincalculablevaluehasbeenlost,anditslosscannotbecompensated.Mildor

passingregretwouldindicateafailuretograsptheimmensityandincompensabilityofthe

loss.Remorseisruledoutbecauseitisinappropriatelymoral.Thisispuzzling,becauseon

theKantianview,thelossinquestionismorallysignificant.Itisdifficulttoseehowagent

regretforhavingvoluntarily(albeitreluctantly)destroyedordamagedsomethingofmoral

valueisnotbestunderstoodasakindofmoralregret.

Oneexplanationmightbeanassumptionthatchoicesthatwarrantmoralregretare

coextensivewiththosethatwarrantblame.Onsuchaview,remorsewouldbeanextreme

formofself-blame.Itwouldnotbewarrantedbythosewhohaveactedwithgoodwillin

tragicconflicts,becauseonlyviolationsofdutyareblameworthy.Thiscouldaccountfor

whysomeonemightdiscussguiltbutnotremorseasresponsestotragicconflict,asHill

does.Theymightconflateguilt—whichisoftenassociatedwithrule-breakingandsowith

blameworthiness—withremorse.

2.3Twomoralstandards:thecategoricalimperativeandthehighestgood

Anotherexplanationisanexcessivelynarrowfocusononeoftwomoralstandardsatwork

inKant’sethics.Thefirstmoralstandardisthatgivenbythecategoricalimperativeandis

moralinthestrictestsense.Itappliesatthelevelofthemaximsofouractions.Thesecond

standard,whichisoftenoverlookedindiscussionsofconflictinKant,istheidealofthe

highestgood.Thehighestgoodappliesatthelessrarifiedleveloftheoutcomesofactions

originatinginmaximsthatmeetthefirststandard.Itisbroaderthanthecategorical

imperative,butisnonethelessmoral:itproceedsfromthemorallaw;itisthetouchstone

foramoralworld;anditanswersanessentialinterestofpurepracticalreason,whichfor

Kantismorality.Inwhatfollows,IhewcloselytotheaccountofKant’sconceptionofthe

highestgoodthatPaulineKleingeldpresentsin“Kanton‘Good,’theGood,andtheDutyto

PromotetheHighestGood.”

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Callingthehighestgoodamoralstandardmightraisehackles,becauseultimately

thereisjustonesupremeprincipleofpracticalreason,andthatprincipleisthecategorical

imperative.GivenKant’sinsistenceonthecompletesystematicityofmorality,asecond

standardmightseemawkwardatbest.Thedisorganizationimpliedbytwostandardsis

onlyapparent,though.Thecategoricalimperativeandthehighestgoodarestandardsfor

differentmorallysignificantthings,andthehighestgooddoesnotchallengethecategorical

imperative’sstatusasthesupremeprinciple.138

Asexplainedinsection1.3(Maxims),thecategoricalimperative—andthusthe

ethicaldutiesthatderivefromit—ispracticalreason’sstandardforjudgingmaxims.As

such,itfulfillsreason’sneedforsystematicunity:itdelimitsthetotalityofgoodmaxims

(or,allofthepossiblegoodmaxims)fromthetotalityofbadones,anditensuresthatgood

maximsharmonizewitheachotherandneverconflict.139

Maximsthatmeetthestandardsetbythecategoricalimperativecanbeenactedin

allsortsofways,however,andthemorallawdoesnotgiveguidanceonhowtochoose

amongthenumerouswaysofactinginaccordancewithit.SaythatIhaveamaximof

helpingmyundergraduatestudentslearnphilosophy,whichisbasedinamaximofmaking

others’happinessmyend,whichisbasedinamaximofrespectforhumanity.Therearean

almostinfinitenumberofwaysIcouldtrytohelpmystudentslearnthatwouldconformto

themorallaw.Somewillworkwell,otherswillonlydemoralizethestudents,orpanderto

them.IfIchoseademoralizingorpanderingmethod,orifIchooseamorepromising

methodbutdonotpullitoffeffectively,somethingwillhavegonewrong.Butthemorallaw

138“Theconceptofthehighestalreadycontainsanambiguity,that,ifnotattendedto,canoccasionneedlessdisputes.Thehighestcanmeaneitherthesupreme(supremum),orthecomplete(consummatum).Thefirstisthatconditionwhichisitselfunconditioned,thatis,notsubordinatetoanyother(originarum).Thesecondisthatwholewhichisnotpartofastillgreaterwholeofthesamekind(perfectissimum),”writesKantintheCritiqueofPracticalReason.(CPrR5:110)Thecategoricalimperativeisthesupremeprincipleofmorality,butthehighestgoodistheprincipleofmoralityasacompletewhole.139AsKleingeldobserves,“IntheDialecticofthefirstCritique,Kantprovidesanaccountoftheideasofspeculativereasonasbasedonreason’s“need”forsystematicunityandcompleteness(KrVAvii,A796/B824).IntheDialecticofthesecondCritique,thesamerationaltendencyleadstotheideaofthehighestgood.Theconceptionofthehighestgooddoesnotspringfromasensibleneed,but,rather,fromatendencythatKantregardsascharacteristicforreasonassuch,whetherinitsspeculativeoritspracticalemployment.”Kleingeld,“Kanton‘Good,’”48.

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cannotsaywhat.Practicalreasonneedsadifferentstandardforjudginghowtoenactour

goodmaximsandforevaluatingtheoutcomesofthoseactions.Inotherwords,inaddition

tosystematizingthemaximsofouractions,practicalreasonalsoneedstosystematizethe

objectsorendsofouractionsintheworld.140Kleingeldsuggeststhatwecanthinkofthis

standardastheoverallplanforwhatwecollectivelyaimtorealizeintheworldasweactin

accordancewiththesupremeprincipleofmorality.

Thisplanorstandardisthehighestgood.ItisthetouchstoneofwhatKantcalls“a

moralworld.”(CPRA808/B837)141AsKleingeldexplains,onewaythatKantcharacterizes

thisis“theworldthatmoralagentswouldbringintoexistenceiftheiragencyfacedno

obstacles,thatis,ifallmoralagentswerefullyvirtuousandtheiractionswouldachieve

theirmoralends.”142Itisaworldinwhicheachpersonisvirtuous,andinwhichtheir

actionsperpetuatetheirvirtueandbringotherpeoplehappiness.Makingsuchaworldis

onewayoflookingatwhatwearedoingexternallywhenwefollowthemorallaw

internally.143

Kantsometimescallsthehighestgoodthe“finalend”ofreason.[e.g.R6:5–6:7]

Kleingeldemphasizesthatcallingitafinalenddoesnotindicatethatitgroundsmorality;

achievingthehighestgoodisnotwhywefollowthemorallaw.Rather,itistheendthatwe

aimforbecauseweseeourselvesboundbythemorallaw,andbecauseweneedtobeable

tojudgetheresultsofouractionsfromamoralpointofview.Andsothefinalendisnot

140InReligionwithintheBoundariesofMereReason,Kantwritesofthefinalendofpracticalreason,whichisthehighestgood,“Theideaisnot(practicallyconsidered)andemptyone;foritmeetsournaturalneed,whichwouldotherwisebeahindrancetomoralresolve,tothinkforallourdoingsandnondoingstakenasawholesomesortoffinalendwhichreasoncanjustify.”(R6:5)And“thehumanbeingevincestheneed,effectedinhimbymorality,ofaddingtothemthethoughtofafinalendaswell,astheirconsequence.”(R6:6).141IntheCanonofPureReasonintheDoctrineofMethodoftheCritiqueofPureReason,Kantwrites“Icalltheworldasitwouldbeifitwereinconformitywithallmorallaws(asincanbeinaccordancewiththefreedomofrationalbeingsandasitshouldbeinaccordancewiththenecessarylawsofmorality)amoralworld.”(CPRA808/B837)SeealsoKant’sReligionwithintheBoundariesofMereReason(R6:5).142Kleingeld,41.143AnotherwaythatKantcharacterizesthehighestgoodisasastateinwhichhappinessisdistributedaccordingtovirtue,e.g.CritiqueofPracticalReason(CPrR5:110-111).Thisformulationcanmisleadoneintothinkingthataworldinwhichallthevirtuousarehappyandalltheviciousaremiserablecouldmeetthestandard.Butthestandardismetonlywheneveryoneisvirtuousandtheirvirtuousactionsbringaboutcompletehappinessaswellastheperpetuationofvirtue.

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additionaltotheobligatoryendsofothers’happinessandourownperfection.Rather,it

encompassesthoseends,organizesourpursuitofthem,andgivesusawaytoassessour

efficacyatrealizingthem.Sothehighestgoodisgroundedin,yetgoesbeyond,the

categoricalimperative.144

Anactthatmeetsthestandardsetbythecategoricalimperativecanfailtomeetthe

standardsetbythehighestgood.Well-intentionedbutdemoralizingphilosophyinstruction

isoneexample.Andwhileapersoncannotfaceasituationinwhichtheyhavenochoicebut

todosomethingthatfailstomeetthestandardsetbythecategoricalimperative,theycan

faceasituationinwhichwhatevertheydowillfailtomeetthestandardsetbythehighest

good.Imaginethefirstpoliceofficerwhoarrivesatabuildinginwhichamassshootingis

inprogress.Theonlywaytostoptheshooteristotakemeasuresthatsheknowswillharm

orevenkillsomeoftheinnocentpeopletrappedinthebuilding.Ifshechoosestotakethe

measures,thentheworldwillfallfarshortofthehighestgoodinoneway(certainpeople

willsufferandperhapsdie);ifshechoosesnotto,itwillfallfarshortofitinanotherway

(otherpeoplewillsufferanddie).Whatevershedoeswilldetractsubstantiallyfroma

moralworld,eventhoughherchoiceneednotviolatethemorallaw.OrtakeVarden’s

exampleofmembersoftheWWIIresistancemovement,whoinasituationthatoffered“no

morallyunproblematicexits,”choseheroicyetviolentcoursesofaction;theychoseto

injureandkillotherpeopleinordertoremovethebarrierthosepeopleformedagainst

rightfulinteraction.145

144Seenote131,andKleingeld,“Kanton‘Good’,”42-8.145Varden,“KantandLying,”417-418.Vardeninterpretstheresistancefighters’predicamentthroughthelensoftheDoctrineofRight,arguingthattheirchoicewasbetweencommittingageneralwrong(injuringandkillingpeople)andfailingeffectivelytoputinplacethesocialconditionsforrightfulinteractionamongpeople.Withoutcontradictingthis,thepredicamentcanalsobeinterpretedthroughthelensofthestandardofthehighestgood;Evenifthesufferingoftheviciousdoesnotdetractfromthehighestgood,aswewillseeinsection3ofthischapter,causingharmtoanyonecanthreatenone’sownemotionalpreconditionstovirtue,thusthreateningone’sownmoralstrengthorvirtue.Sotheresistancefightersfacedasituationinwhichtheyhadtochoosebetweenthreateningtheirownvirtue(andsodetractingfromthehighestgood),andallowingastateofaffairsthatwasveryfarfromthehighestgoodtogetevenfartherfromit(tobeclear,Vardendoesnotquestionthevirtueoftheresistancefighters).Importantly,shearguesfortheintelligibilityof“themoralcostorstressthosewhouseviolenceagainstaggressorssooftenexperience.Forexample,itisaknownfactthatmembersofresistancemovementsduringWWIItypicallystruggledwithsadnessanddepression,nervousdisordersandvariousotherpsychologicalproblemslateroninlife.”

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Attheriskofrepetitiveness,Iwanttoemphasizeandrephrasethecoreideasofthis

subsection.TherearetwonotionsofmoralityatworkinKant’sethics.Thefirstconceives

moralityaspurepracticalreason.Itsstandardisthecategoricalimperative,which

abstractscompletelyfromthematerialconditionsofitsapplication.Ofcourse,theethical

dutiesoutlinedinthedoctrineofvirtuetakematerialityintoaccounttoanextent;they

applythecategoricalimperativetothenatureofhumanbeingsingeneral,forwhomvirtue

isanaturallyacquiredstrengthandforwhomhappiness,ortherealizationofdiscretionary

ends,isprecarious.Yetaswehaveseen,thereisnopossibilityofconflictamongsuch

duties,becausetheyaresystematizedbythecategoricalimperative.

Thesecondnotionconceivesmoralityasamoralworld,anditsstandardisthe

highestgood.Thehighestgoodisdeterminedbythecategoricalimperative,butitisalso

determinedbythematerialconditionsinwhichpeopleact.Inadditiontohumannaturein

general,thisincludesalltheempiricalvicissitudesthatmakeadifferencetothenatural

developmentandmaintenanceofeachperson’svirtueandtotheefficacyoftheirvirtuous

actionsinbringingaboutotherpeople’shappiness.Sowhiletheresultsofanactionare

morallyirrelevanttowhethertheactionmeetsthestandardofthecategoricalimperative,

suchresultsareextremelysignificanttowhetheritmeetsthestandardofthehighestgood.

Atthislevel,unlikethatofthemorallaw,conflictispossible.Apersoncanbesituatedsuch

thatwhatevertheydowilldetractfromthehighestgood—forinstance,bycompromising

thenaturaldevelopmentoftheirownmoralstrength(thatis,virtue)orbycompromising

thehappinessof(virtuous)otherpeople.Somesuchdetractionscanbetrivial,otherscan

betragic.

Thissectionstartedwithconflictsofgroundsofobligation.Groundsofobligation

arereasonstohelpothers,ortootherwiseexpressrespectforthem,andtoperfect

ourselves.Theyarebasedinourethicaldutiestoadopthumanity,other’shappinessand

ourownperfectionasends.Whenapersoncannotactoneachofthegroundsofobligation

atstakeintheircircumstance,therecanbenoconflictatthelevelofpurepracticalreason,

wherethecategoricalimperativeisthestandardformoralaction.Butactingagainsta

groundofobligation—especiallybutnotonlythosesuggestedbynegativeduties—can

detractfromamoralworld.Becausethestandardforthisworld(thehighestgood)isthe

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“finalend”ofreason,itencompassestheobligatoryendsthatgenerategroundsof

obligation.Actionsthatdiminishordestroyoneselforothers,thatunderminethe

happinessofothers,orthatthreatenordegradeone’sownperfection—especiallyone’s

moralperfectionorvirtue—goagainstgroundsofobligation,andalsofrustratethefinal

endofreason.Therecanbeconflictatthislevel,wherethehighestgoodprovidesthe

standardforaction.Ifonecanfaceasituationinwhichwhatevertheydowillinvolve

seriousmoralwrongdoing,itwillbeatthislevel.Thequestionis,isthereroomwithin

Kant’sethicsforactionstobeseriouslywronginvirtueofdetractingfromamoralworld?

Becauseseriouswrongnessandwarrantedremorseimplyeachother(seechapterone),we

canre-phrasethequestionas“isthereroomwithinKant’sethicsforanactiontowarrant

remorseinvirtueofdetractingfromamoralworld?”

2.4Tragicmoralconflicts

Kant’sstudentCollinsreportsKantsayingthatremorseistheoutcomeofaverdictof

conscience.146Conscienceis“aninstincttojudgewithlegalauthorityaccordingtomoral

laws.”[LE27:353]SoonKant’stheory,remorseiswarrantedforviolationsofthemoral

law.Thisiscompletelyunsurprising,becauseaswehavealreadyseen,atleastonewayan

actcanbewronginKant’sviewisbyviolatingthemorallaw,orthecategoricalimperative.

Thequestionis,canremorsealsobewarrantedforatleastsomefailurestomeetthe

secondmoralstandard,thehighestgood?Ifitcan,thenthepossibilityremainsthatKant’s

moraltheoryhasroomformoralconflict,orforsituationsinwhichwhateveronedoeswill

bewronginsomesense.

TheonlyemotionthatKantexplicitlyassociateswiththehighestgoodishope.Inthe

CanonofPureReasonintheCritiqueofPureReason,heliststhreequestionsthattogether

expresstheentiretyofreason’sinterests.Thefinalquestion,whichreflectsaninterestof

boththeoreticalandpracticalreason,is“whatcanIhope?”andtheanswertoitisthe

highestgood.[CPRA805/B833]

146Presumably,Kantmeantthatremorseisignitedbyanegativeverdict,butCollins’notesarenotentirelyclearonthis.

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Hopeisaforward-lookingemotion.Itsbackward-lookingcounterpartsare

satisfactionanddisappointment,orregret.Ifpeoplearewarrantedtohopeforamoral

world,onKant’stheory,thentheyarewarrantedtoregretstatesoftheworldthatfallshort

ofit.Forinstance,onecanappropriatelyregretthatanotherpersonalwaysputshisown

satisfactionabovemoralends,orthatmanyvirtuouspeoplegowithouttheirbasicneeds

beingmet,orthatthefirststateofaffairsisacauseofthesecond.Similarly,agentregret

canbewarrantedwhenone’sownactionsareimplicatedinastateofaffairsthatfalls

regretfullyshortofthehighestgood.ItisconsistentwithKant’stheorythatWilliams’truck

driver,forinstance,appropriatelyexperiencesprofoundagentregretforhisinvolvementin

achild’sdeath,andinthesufferingitbringstothosewholovedher.

Thequestioniswhethermoralregretcaneverbewarrantedinresponsetoone’s

owninvolvementinastateofaffairsthatfallsshortofwhatpracticalreason(morality)

hopesfor?Thatis,caniteverbeappropriatetomorallyregretone’sfailuretomeetthe

moralstandardofthehighestgood?Thatthefirstmoralstandard,thecategorical

imperative,doesnotwarrantmoralregretinsuchcasessaysnothingaboutwhetherthe

standardofthehighestgooddoes.

ThoughneitherKantnorthosewhoelaboratehisaccountofmoralconflictaddress

this,hisviewdoesnotprecludeit.Inotherwords,ithasroomtoaccommodatemoral

regretforfailurestomeetthemoralstandardofthehighestgood.Moreover,itmakesmore

sensethatmoralregretcouldbeanappropriateresponsetosomesuchfailuresthanitdoes

toruleitoutcompletely.Therolethatthehighestgoodplaysinpracticalreasoning

demandsthatweacknowledgethemoralsignificanceoftheoutcomesofouractions,

consideredseparatelyfromthemoralstatusofthemaximsofthoseactions.

Ifweacceptthatmoralregretcanbewarrantedinresponsetosomemorallaw-

abidingfailurestomeetthemoralstandardofthehighestgood,thenextquestionsare

“whichsuchfailureswarrantmoralregret?”“Andamongthose,whichoneswarrant

remorse?”AsneitherKantnorhisinterpretersaddressthesequestion,Iwillsuggest

adaptingaversionofTudor’sresponsibilityrequirementtomarkoffmoralregret-worthy

failurestomeetthestandardofthehighestgoodfromthosethataremerelyagentregret-

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worthy.147AccordingtoTudor,apersonisresponsibleforaharm(or,inthiscase,a

deviationfromthemoralworld)iftherearegroundsforrequiringthemtoanswerforwhat

theydid,groundsforboththemandustonotevadeitsmoralsignificance.Isaidthatwhat

thesegroundsarewilldependonthemoraltheoryinplay,butonecandidateTudor

mentionsisthattheregrettedactwasdonewith“freewillplusknowledgeofthenature

andlikelyresultsoftheaction,plusdesireorintentiontoachievesuchresults,orto

performtheactionregardlessofknownlikelyconsequencesetc.”148Kantdoesnotidentify

thegroundsforanagenttonotevadethemoralsignificanceofanactionoftheirsthat

bringsaboutalessmoralworld.SowecantakeupTudor’ssuggestion.

Ifwedo,thenthesufferingthatispartiallyattributabletothepoliceofficer’smoral-

law-abidingchoice(whicheveroneshetakes)canwarrantmoralregret,becausethechoice

wasmadefreely(whichaKantianhastoaccept),theofficerknewinadvancewhatthebad

sideeffectsofherchosenactionwouldbe,andshechosetoperformtheactionanyway.

ThisalsoholdsfortheWWIIresistancefighters.

Whatabouttheparticularlyintenseformofmoralregretthatisremorse?Isaidin

chapteronethatremorseisappropriatewhenone’sactionhaswrongfullybroughtabout

orhasconstitutedalosstoafundamentalmoralvalue,andthelossissignificant.That

moralregretiswarrantedforanactionimpliesthatitiswrongful,sothequestionis

whethertheactionconstitutesorbringsaboutasignificantlosstoafundamentalmoral

value.OnKant’stheory,thefundamentalmoralvalueishumanity.AsHillobserves,tragic

conflictcanoccurwhenapersonfacesasituationinwhichthereisnosolutiontothe

problemofproducinganactionthatwillnotthreaten,destroy,ordiminishthisvalue.

Althoughhedoesnotgosofarastosaythatinsuchcaseswhateverthepersondoeswill

warrantremorse(whichimpliesthatitwillbeseriouslywrong,insomesense),oncewe

recognizethatremorsecanbewarrantedbyactsthatfallfarshortofmeetingthestandard

147Tudor,CompassionandRemorse.148Ibid.,31.

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ofthehighestgoodeveniftheydonotviolatethemorallaw,wehavefoundroominKant’s

moraltheoryforthepossibilityoftragicmoralconflict.149

3.IstheRecoveryPredicamentaTragicMoralConflict?

Inthissection,Iwillarguethatrecoverypredicamentsposetragicmoralconflictsbecause

fromwithinthem,thereisnopracticalresponsethatdoesnotweaken,orthreatento

weaken,theagent’svirtue.Whileaperson’scapacitytoimpelthemselvestofollowthe

morallawisafeatureoftheirpurepracticalreason,andsocannotbeputatriskbyevents

inspaceandtime,theirvirtue(ormoralstrength)isacquired,maintained,andmanifested

inspaceandtime.Thisiswhywehaveethicaldutiestoprotectanddevelopourvirtue.As

wesawintheprevioussection,thesedutiescanyieldwhatKantcallsconflictinggroundsof

obligation.Fromthestandpointofthecategoricalimperative,suchconflictsarenotmoral

conflicts,becausetheydonotleaveapersonwithnochoicebuttoviolatethemorallaw.

Yetfromthestandpointofthehighestgood,conflictsamonggroundsofobligationcanbe

moral,becausefromwithinthemitcanbethecasethatwhateveronedoeswilldetract

fromamoralworld.150

3.1Dutiesregardingmorallysignificantfeelings

Therecoverypredicamentoccurswhenpreventingtheextinctionofaspecies,subspecies,

orpopulation,requiresharming,killing,orcontrollingthelivesofindividualanimals.Allof

Kant’sethicaldutiesarebasedinthedignityofrationalnature;wehavedutiestoother

peopleandtoourselvesbecauseourcapacitytomakechoicesdeterminedbyreason

149Itisinteresting,andperhapsrevealing,thatinthelectureinwhichKantlinksremorsetoviolationsofconscience(andsotoviolationsofthemorallaw),theGermanwordthathasbeentranslatedasremorseisGewissensbisse.Thisliterallymeans“biteofconscience,”andinanotherpartofthelectureistranslatedas“pangofconscience.”Gewissensbissecanalsomeanthefeelingofguilt.ItisnottheonlyGermansynonymforremorse,andwasnottheonlysynonymwhenKantwaslecturingattheendoftheeighteenthcentury.AmorecommonGermanwordforremorseisandwasReue,whichissimilartotheEnglishrue.WemightsaythatviolatingthemorallawwarrantsGewissensbisse-remorsewhilesignificantfailuretomeetthestandardofthehighestgoodwarrantsReue-remorse.Thatthelatterdoesnotinitselfwarrantguiltdoesnotimplythatitdoesnotinitselfwarrantruing.150Ofcourse,therearetwosensesofmoralhere.Conflictsofgroundsofobligationarenotmoralconflictswhenmoralisidentifiedcompletelywithpurepracticalreason.Theyaremoralconflictswhenmoralistaken,lessstrictly,toencompassthefinalendofthatreason.

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commandsrespect.Inanimatepartsofnature,suchasspecies,donothaverationalnatures,

andsotheydonotcommandrespect.Otheranimalsdonoteither.Althoughunlike

inanimatenaturetheyhavefeelingsandmakechoices,animals’choicesarenotfree,

becausetheyaredeterminedbynaturalinclinations.SoforKanttheworthofbothanimals

andinanimatenatureismerelyconditional.

Thisdoesnotentailthathisethicsleavesourtreatmentofanimalsandinanimate

naturetoourdiscretion,orthatitdoesnotprovidemoralreasonsagainstharmingor

destroyingthem.Itdoesprovidesuchreasons,butastheyarebasedinrespectforour

rationalnature,theyareultimatelydutiestoourselvesandtootherhumanbeings.More

specifically,theethicaldutiesthatgroundobligationsnottoharmordestroyanimalsand

otherpartsofnatureflowfromourdutiestoprotectandcultivatecertaindispositionsof

feeling.

Wehumanbeingshavedignityinvirtueofbeingabletoconformthemaximsofour

actionstothemorallaw,andtodosofromthemotiveofduty.ItseemsasthoughKant

thinksthatinordersubjectivelytobemovedbytheobjectivenecessityofthemorallaw,it

mustaffectusinsomeway.ThiscomesoutmostclearlyintheIntroductiontotheDV,

wherehediscusses“...naturalpredispositionsofthemind(praedispositio)forbeing

affectedbyconceptsofduty,antecedentpredispositionsonthesideoffeeling...”(MM

6:399)Thesedispositionstofeelcertainwaysinresponsetothewill’sself-generated

representationofthemorallawarenotpracticallysuperfluous.Tothecontrary,theyare

partofwhatmakesmoralchoice,ordutifulactionforitsownsake,possibleforhuman

beings.Kantsaysthatthey“lieatthebasisofmoralityassubjectivepreconditionsof

receptivenesstotheconceptofduty,”and“itisbyvirtueofthemthat[ahumanbeing]can

beputunderobligation.”(MM6:399)Furthermore,althoughmoralfeelingis“merely

subjective,”Kantclaimsthatisessentialforourpeculiarlyhuman(finite,embodied)sortof

morality:“were[ahumanbeing]completelylackinginreceptivitytoithewouldbemorally

dead.”(MM6:400)

Kantdiscussesfourofthesenaturalbutmorallyessential“predispositionsonthe

sideoffeeling”:moralfeeling,conscience,loveofhumanbeings,andrespect.His

descriptionsofthemleavemuchopentointerpretation,andhisaccountofhowtheyenable

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moralchoiceisvague.PaulGuyerproposesthattheyoperatetogetherinthefollowingway.

Moralfeeling,whichKantcalls“asusceptibilityonthepartoffreechoicetobemovedby

purereason(anditslaw)...”motivatesustoconformtothemorallawingeneral.(MM

6:400)Conformingtothislawrequiresstrengtheningourconscience,whichislessa

feelingthananawarenessofwhatthemorallawdemandsofusinparticularcases(recall

Kant’sclaiminhislecturesthatconscienceis“aninstincttojudgewithlegalauthority

accordingtomorallaws”).Italsorequiresstrengtheningourfeelingsofrespectandof

love—thelatterofwhichincludesfeelingsofsympathyandgratitude—becausetheyimpel

ustofollowthelawinparticularcases:theyarethe“finalimpulsespromptingustofulfill

ourspecificdutiestoourselvesandothers.”151

Becausetheyareessentialtoourcapacitytoactfromthemotiveofduty,wehave

ethicaldutiestocultivateourdispositionstomoralfeeling,love,andrespect.Recallthatthe

linchpinofaperson’sethicaldutiesisthedutytodeveloptheirownvirtue.152Virtueis

strengthofwillinfulfillingone’sduties.Thisisa“strengthtoovercomeallopposing

sensibleimpulses”ortoovercometheobstaclespresentedbynaturalinclination.(MM

6:397)“Strengthofanykindcanberecognizedonlybytheobstaclesitcanovercome,and

inthecaseofvirtuetheseobstaclesarenaturalinclinations,whichcancomeintoconflict

withahumanbeing’smoralresolution.”(MM6:394)Itmakessensethatthestrengthofour

moralfeelingsconstitutesatleastpartofthestrengthofvirtuebecausemoralfeelingsare

theproximatecausesofourdutifulchoices(theultimatecausemustbeautonomyof

practicalreason)andbecauseasinclinations,theyarejustthekindofthingsthatcould

counteracttheinclinationsthatvirtueisneededtooppose.153

151Guyer,“MoralFeelings,”151.152Louden,“Kant’sVirtueEthics,”483.153Thisisreflectedinthedutytomakeone’sownperfectionone’send.Byperfection,Kantsaysthathemeans“theharmonyofathing’spropertieswithanend.”(MM6:386)Theendinquestionherecanbenothingotherthanvirtue.Whatmustharmonizewithitareour“faculties(ornaturalpredispositions).”Forthesakeoftheupcomingdiscussionoftherecoverypredicament,itisimportanttoemphasizethatemotionsareamongthenaturalpredispositionsthattheethicaldutyofselfperfectionrequiresustoharmonizewithreason.AsGuyerexplains“...dutiestooneselfcanbedutiestohave—topreserveanddevelop—certainkindsoffeelings.Or,toputthepointanotherway,one’ssensiblebeingcanandevenmustbemadeharmoniouswithone’sduty...outoftheincentiveofdutyonecanmakeone’snaturegracefullyharmoniouswithduty.And,Kantnowargues,onefallsshortofthedemandsofvirtueifonedoesnottrytodojustthis”(“DutiesRegardingNature,”33).Loudenmakesasimilarpoint:“Thereareahostofphenomenalemotions

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3.2Dutiesregardinganimalsandinanimatenature

BetweenthesectionsofDVdedicatedtoperfectandimperfectdutiestooneself(positive

andnegativeduties),Kantinsertsanepisodicsection.Thissectionprovidessomeofthe

besttextualevidencefortheclaimthatKant’ssystemofdutiesincludesethicaldutiesto

ourselvestopreserveandtodevelopcapacitiesformorallysignificantfeelings.Italso

showsthatthesedutiesimplyfurtherdutiesregardingourtreatmentofotheranimalsand

inanimatenature.Kantwrites:

“Apropensitytowantondestructionofwhatisbeautifulininanimatenature(spiritusdestructionis)isopposedtoahumanbeing’sdutytohimself;foritweakensoruprootsthatfeelinginhimwhich,thoughnotitselfmoral,isstilladispositionofsensibilitythatgreatlypromotesmoralityoratleastpreparesthewayforit:thedisposition,namely,tolovesomething(e.g.beautifulcrystalformations,theindescribablybeautyofplants)evenapartfromanyintentiontouseit.”Withregardtotheanimatebutnonrationalpartofcreation,violentandcrueltreatmentofanimalsisfarmoreintimatelyopposedtoahumanbeing’sdutytohimself,andhehasadutytorefrainfromthis;foritdullshissharedfeelingoftheirsufferingandsoweakensandgraduallyuprootsanaturalpredispositionthatisveryserviceabletomoralityinone’srelationwithothermen.”(MM6:443)

Thatapropensitytowantondestructionofbeautifulnature,andviolentandcruel

treatmentofanimalsopposedutiestooneselfsuggestthatthesechoicesgobeyondfailing

toadoptanobligatoryend.Inreferringtoactsthatopposeduty,Kantuseslanguagehe

usuallyreservesforvices,orviolationsofwhatIhavecallednegativeduties.154Negative

dutiestooneselfprohibitmaximsthatdemeanorareincompatiblewithrespectforone’s

humanity.Inthispassage,Kantdeclaresthatmaximsofwantondestructionviolateaduty

(themostimportantofwhicharejoy,sympathy,andlove)which,whilenotthedirectBestimmungsgrundofthewill,...mustbepresentinavirtuousdisposition.”And“actingfromvirtue,onKant’sview,doesentaildiscipliningtheemotionsthroughreasonsothatonecomestowanttoperformthesameexternalactsthatreasoncommands”(“Kant’sVirtueEthics,”487-488).154TobySvobodamakesasimilarpointin“DutiesRegardingNature,”153.

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tooneselfbecausethey“weakenanduproot,”(ratherthanjustfailtostrengthenand

deepen)one’scapacitiesforloveandsympathy.Ourdutiesregardinganimalsandnature

arethusbasedinadutytomaintainourcapacitiesforthesefeelings,whichinturnisbased

inadutytopreserveourmoralperfection,orvirtue.

Thatthevalueoftheseemotionsliesintheirusefulnesstomoralactionissuggested

byKant’sdescriptionofthemas“serviceabletomorality,”andbythefactthathe

unquestionablydoestakethemtobeuseful.LaraDenisobservesthatonKant’sview,these

feelings“canmotivatepeopletoactrightlyevenwhentheylackthemoralstrengthtodo

so,orwhentheirmoralstrengthaloneisinsufficient,”andthatsympathyinparticular“can

directuswhenandhowtohelpothers.”155ButitcannotbeKant’sviewthatthevaluesof

loveandsympathyaremerelyinstrumental.

ThedutiesregardingloveandsympathythatKantdiscussesintheepisodicsection

arenegative,so,atbase,theyaredutiesnottodemeansomethingthathasdignity,or

unconditionalworth.Ifthevaluesofloveandsympathywereonlyinstrumental,their

worthwouldbeconditional.Wehavenegativedutiestoourselvesnottoweakenoruproot

thesefeelings,becausetheyarepartofourmoralstrength;theyarenotjustaidstohuman

virtue,theyareconstitutiveofit.AsPatrickKainexplains,“thesefeelingsofloveand

sympathyarenotsimplymorallyuseful,asmerelyonemeansamongothers,ormerely

becauseofsomehighlycontingentfactsabouthumanpsychology;theymaybe‘anessential

partofthefulfillmentofdutyitself,’atleastforbeingsanythingmuchlikeus.”156Thisline

ofthinkingissupportedbyKant’scontentionsthatthesefeelings“lieatthebasisof

morality”andthatwecannotbemovedbydutywithoutthem.(MM6:399)Italsomakes

moresensethandoesapurelyinstrumentalaccountofthevalueofmorallyimportant

emotionsofKant’sstatementthat“anyactionwherebywemaytormentanimals,orlet

themsufferdistress,orotherwisetreatthemwithoutlove,isdemeaningtoourselves”and

“inhuman,”“anindirectviolationofhumanityinourownperson”(asrecordedbyhis

studentVigilantus,LE27:710).Thisisbecausedisregardforpriceorinstrumentalvalueis

notdemeaning,butlackofrespectfordignityis.

155Denis,“DutiesRegardingAnimals,”406.156Kain,“DutiesRegardingAnimals,”223;Guyer,“DutiesRegardingNature,”390.

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Negativedutiesnottodestroynatureorharmotheranimals

Whatisthenatureoftheseduties?Thatis,whatpreciselydotheyprohibit?Negativeduties

absolutelyforbiddoingcertainkindsofactionfromnon-moralincentives.Thus,ourduty

regardingnatureisnevertodestroybeautifulpartsofitwantonly,orforarbitraryreasons.

AsDenisobserves,ournegativedutiesregardinganimalsshouldlikewisebeunderstoodas

dutiesnottoengagein“cruelorviolenttreatmentthatisnotpartofamaximthatshows

respectforrationalnature.”157Thus,whileKantsaysthatpainfulandunnecessaryphysical

experimentsonanimals,andexperiments“doneforsport”“aretobeabhorred,”(MM

6:443),somecasesofpainfulvivisectionare“acceptable.”

First,asIdiscussedinsection1.4(Thesystemofethicalduties),negativeduties

carryastrongpresumptionagainstthepermissibilityofanyactionofatypethatmustnot

bedonefornon-moralreasons.Justbecauseapersonthinksthattheyhaveamoralreason

forharmingananimalordestroyingabeautifulpartofnaturedoesnotmeanthatthey

actuallyaremotivatedbysaidreason.Andeveniftheyare,thereasonmightnotbestrong

enough.Thereshouldbeaparticularlyhighbarfordefeatingthepresumptionagainst

doingthingsthatthreatento“weakenoruproot”ourmorallysignificantcapacities.As

Guyersurmises,inKant’ssystem,dutiesregardingone’sownmoralperfection“mustbe

givenacertainpriority”overreasonsgroundedinotherobligatoryends,because

“fulfillmentofdutiestoourselvesisanecessaryconditionforactingoutoftheincentiveof

duty.”158

Thatwehavenegativedutiestoourselvesnottotreatotheranimalsandbeautiful

natureinwaysthatdiminishordemeanourmorallysignificantfeelingsimpliesthatwe

alsohavepositivedutiestotreattheminwaysthathonorandcultivatethesefeelings.

Negativeself-regardingdutiesaredutiestoconserveone’sperfection,whilepositiveself-

regardingdutiesaredutiestodevelopit.Refrainingfromtreatinganimalsandnaturein

certainwaysprotectsourmoralperfectionbyprotectingourmorallysignificantnatural

feelings.Sotreatingtheminotherways,e.g.withcompassion,orfromaloveofthemfor

157Denis,“DutiesRegardingAnimals,”417.158Guyer,“DutiesRegardingNature,”329.

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theirownsakes,wouldbewaysoffulfillingourpositivedutiestocultivatemorally

essentialfeelings.159

Inadditiontoself-regardingduties,weshouldalsohavepositivedutiestoother

peopletotreatanimalsandnatureinwaysthatcultivatemorallyessentialfeelings.Oneof

Kant’sheadingsinthesectionofDVondutiesoflovetootherhumanbeingsis

“SympatheticFeelingisGenerallyaDuty.”Inthissubsection,heexplainsthatamongour

positivedutiestoothersis“theindirectdutytocultivatethecompassionatenatural

(aesthetic)feelingsinus,”becausedoingsois“ameanstosympathybasedonmoral

principlesandthefeelingappropriatetothem.”(MM6:457)Itakethepointheretobethat

the“willtoshareinothers’feelings,”—whichisadirectdutytootherpeople—isenhanced

byournaturalreceptivitytotheirfeelings,andthatstrengtheningthelatterisawayto

strengthentheformer(MM6:456).Exercisingthisnaturalreceptivitythrough

compassionaterelationstootheranimalswouldbeonewaytofulfillthisduty.

AlthoughKantdoesnotmentionitexplicitly,preservingandincreasingourcapacity

to“lovethingsoutsideus”inawaythatisnot“self-serving”mightalsobeamongourduties

toothers,becauselovingthem(inapracticalway)fortheirownsakesismuchthesameas

adoptingtheirendsasourends.Ifwedohaveadutytootherstocultivatethecapacityfor

non-instrumentallove,thenappreciatingandprotectingbeautifulnaturewouldbeone

waytofulfillit.

3.4Therecoverypredicament

Therecoverypredicamentwillbeatragicconflictifbothpossiblecoursesofaction—

recoveryandextinction—willdiminishordestroytheagentsorotherpeople,will

underminethehappinessofothers,orwillthreatenordegradetheagents’own

perfection—especiallytheirmoralperfectionorvirtue.Insuchacase,bothcoursesof

actionwillgoagainststronggroundsofobligation,andalsodetractfromamoralworld.

Apersoncanalwaysactfromthemotiveofduty.Inthissense,theirhumanity

cannotbediminishedordestroyed.Yettheirvirtue,orthestrengthoftheirdisposition

159Denis,“DutiesRegardingAnimals,”makesanargumentlikethis.AndGuyer“DutiesRegardingNature,”arguesthatdutiesregardingnaturearealwayspositive,notnegative.

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actuallytochooseaccordingtothismotive,canbecompromised.Kantsuggestsasmuch

wheninthemidstofadiscussionoftheeffectsofhowpeopletreatanimalsontheir

morallysignificantemotions,henotesapprovinglythat“InEngland,nobutcher,surgeon,

ordoctorservesonatwelve-manjurybecausetheyarealreadyinuredtodeath.”(LE

27:460)Kantcouldnotpossiblymeanthataperson’schoicetopracticemedicineis

necessarilymorallyimpermissible.Rather,heseemstomeanthateventhemorally

permissiblepracticeofmedicinediminishesaperson’snaturalfeelingsaboutdeathenough

thattheycannotbetrustedtomakegoodchoicesaboutmurderorcapitalpunishment.

Kantmightbewronginthiscase,butthatdoesnotmarthepointthatthecaseillustrates:a

person’svirtue,oritsoperationincertainfieldsofchoice,canbecompromisedbyactsthat

diminishtheirmorallyessentialfeelingsevenifthoseactsdonotviolatethemorallaw.The

quotealsoshowsthatonKant’sview,muchexposuretothedeadbodiesofotheranimals

canalsocompromiseaperson’svirtue.

Soourquestionbecomeswhetheracasebemadethat1)peoplecompromisetheir

virtuebysupportingoractivelycarryingouttherecoveryactivitiesthatharm,killand

controlotheranimals,and2)theycompromiseitbyopposingrecoveryoractivelyrefusing

toparticipateinitregardlessofwhethereithercourseofactionviolatesethicalduty.

Aswesawinpreviouschapters,bothcoursesofactionintherecoverypredicament

involveharmtoanddeathsofotheranimals.Thisiswhatmakesthembothwrongful

accordingtomyinterpretationofRoss’sdeontology.Letusexaminewhethertheharmsin

eachcasemightthreatenvirtue,asKantunderstandsit.Wewilltakerecoveryfirst.

Doesislandfoxrecoverycompromisevirtue?

Ifpeopleinjurecapacitiesformorallyessentialfeelingswhen,toquoteVigilantus’noteson

Kant’slectures,they“tormentanimals,orletthemsufferdistress,orotherwisetreatthem

withoutlove,”thentheyinjurethesecapacitiesbyparticipatinginrecovery.(LE27:710)

Whileitcertainlycouldbearguedthatanimalsarenottormentedinrecovery,anditmight

bepossibletoarguethattheyarenottreatedwithoutlove,itcannotreasonablybeclaimed

thattheyarenotmadetosufferdistress.

OnKant’sview,itseemsclearthatbybeingadirectagentofthisdistress,aperson

willcompromisetheirvirtue,eveniftheydonotviolateadutyindoingso.Thiswillbe

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particularlytrueiftheyroutinelycauseorareexposedtoanimals’distressoveralong

periodoftime,asbutchersandsurgeonsareregularlyexposedtodeathanddying.Those

whoareinvolveddailyincaptivebreedingprogramswillthuscarryatragicmoralcost.

Whataboutthoseofuswhoactivelysupportbutdonotparticipatedirectlyinrecovery

programsliketheonethatpreventedtheextinctionofislandfoxsubspecies?Orthoseofus

whopassivelysupportthem?Denis’sconstructionofaKantiantakeoneatingmeatand

usingproductsmadefromanimalsforcedtosufferonindustrialfarmsishelpfulhere.She

arguesthatwhenpeople“knowthattheanimalswhosebodypartstheyarebuyingwere

killedpainfullyorweretreatedharshlywhilealive,theirpurchasesexpresssupportforthe

morallyobjectionablecrueltyofthosewhooperateslaughterhousesandfactoryfarms,”

andthatthereisastrongpresumptionagainstexpressingsupportforthoseviolations(in

otherwords,thereisanegativedutynottosupportothers’violationsofdutywithoutgood

moralreason),atleastinpartbecauseitdullsorshowsdisregardforone’sownmoral

feelings.160However,Denisnotesthatthelessapparentitistoapersonthatanimalswere

harmedinproducingagood,“thelesslikelytheuseistoweakenoropposemoral

sentiments.”161Shereasonsthatinthesecases,peoplehaveapositivedutytothemselves

toconsiderhowtheirproductsaremade.

ToborrowfortherecoverypredicamentDenis’lineofthinking,thoseofuswhoare

awarethataparticularspeciescannotberecoveredwithoutmakinganimalssufferwill

impairourownmoralfeelingsifwesupportrecovery,evenifrecoveryand/oroursupport

foritdoesnotviolateaduty.Animplicationofthisisthatclear-eyedsupportofislandfox

recovery,inadditiontoactiveparticipationinit,impairsaperson’smorallyessential

feelings,andsoimpairstheirvirtue.Thereisatragicmoralcosttosupportingrecovery,

whetherornotsupportingitviolatesanethicalduty.

Doesnorthernspottedowlrecoverycompromisevirtue?

Spottedowlrecoveryentailskilling,butnotnecessarilycausingsufferingordistressto

animals.OnKant’sview,doespainlesskilling,andclear-eyedsupportofit,threatenour

160Denis,“DutiesRegardingAnimals,”416.161Ibid.

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moralfeelings,andthusourmoralstrength?IntheepisodicsectionofDV,hedoessaythat

“thehumanbeingisauthorizedtokillanimalsquickly(andwithoutpain).”(MM6:443)

Thatpainlesskillingisauthorizeddoesnotmeanthatitismorallyunproblematic.Ifwe

takeseriouslyKant’sclaimthatbutchersandphysiciansproblematicallyinurethemselves

todeath,weshouldassumethatkillinganimals,whichlikebutcheryandmedicineexposes

onetodeath—andunlikethemexposesonetotheexperienceofcausingdeath—would

haveasimilareffect,evenifthekillingispainless.SoIthinkaKantiancasecanbemade

thatthekillingrequiredtorecovernorthernspottedowlsdiminishesnaturalsympathetic

feelingsaboutlossoflifeandsocomeswithatragicmoralcostregardlessofwhetheror

notitviolatesethicalduties.Thesamewouldhold,probablyinanattenuatedway,for

clear-eyedsupportofspottedowlrecovery.

Doesextinctioncompromisevirtue?

Inrecoverypredicaments,Iwanttoinvestigatetwopossiblewaysinwhichtheextinction

courseofactionmightimpairaperson’svirtue.Itmightdosobydiminishingtheir

dispositiontolovesomethingforitsownsake,anditmightdosobydiminishingtheir

capacityforsympathy.Iwillconsidersympathyfirst.AswesawinthechapteronRoss’s

deontology,boththeextinctionofislandfoxpopulationsandtheextinctionofnorthern

spottedowlswouldlikelyhaveharmedsignificantnumbersofindividualanimals(e.g.in

theabsenceofinterventionbytherecoveryteam,mostofthe48capturedislandfoxes

wouldlikelyhavediedearlydeathsbyeagledepredation).Thequestionis,dotheseharms

makeadifferencetoanyone’scapacityforsympathy?Onereasontothinkthattheydonot

isthatnoonedirectlycausestheharms.ButasDenis’Kantiananalysisofimplicitsupport

forthemeatindustrysuggests,oneneednotimmediatelycauseaharminorderforone’s

voluntaryinvolvementwithittoimpactthestrengthofone’smorallyessentialemotions.

Thiswouldholdfornon-instrumentallove,aswell.Kantthinksthatdestroying

inanimatenaturecanimpairone’scapacityforthismorallysignificantnatural

predisposition,andhistheoryimpliesthatprotectingnaturecanstrengthenthis

disposition.Eitheractivelydecidingnottorecoveraspeciesthatisthreatenedbyhuman

activities,orsupportingsuchadecisioncouldaffectone’scapacityforlove.

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Whetherthechoicetoallowextinctionbyrefrainingfromrecovery(andsothe

choicetosupportthis)affectaperson’scapacitiesforloveandsympathyintragicways

dependsonwhetherthechoiceisbestunderstoodasachoicetodestroyaspecies(orother

taxonomicgroup),orasachoicenottoprotectit.Ifitistheformer,thenitwillbeaformof

moralself-harm,andsobetragic.Ifitisthelatter,thenthosewhomakeitdonotbydoing

soimpairtheirmorallyessentialemotions,theyjustmissanopportunitytocultivatethem.

Thismightbedeeplyfrustratingandsad,butitwillnotbetragic.

4.Conclusion

Itcannotbethecasethatwhateveronedoeswillbewronginthesenseofviolatingthe

morallaw.Butbecauseitispossiblethatwhateveronedoeswillbewronginthesenseof

detractingfromamoralworld,Kant’sethicscanaccommodatemoralconflicts.Recovery

predicamentscanposeKantiantragicconflicts,becauseinthemitcanbethecasethat

whateverapersondoeswilldiminishtheirmoralperfection,andsodetractfromamoral

world,byinjuringtheirowncapacitiesforthemorallyessentialfeelingsofloveand

sympathy.

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ChapterFour:Utilitarianism

1.ThePrincipleofUtility

Someofthemostprominenttextsofutilitarianismexplicitlypresentitasasolutiontothe

problemofmoralconflict.InhisintroductiontotheclassictomeMethodsofEthics,Henry

Sidgwickframestheclashingprescriptionsgeneratedbycommonsensemoralityas

symptomsofanunacceptableirrationality.Thefatalflawhefindsinintuitionism,whichhe

takestobeutilitarianism’schiefrival,isthatithasnowaytoresolvesuchconflicts.Just

overacenturylater,R.M.Hare’sMoralThinkingclaimsthatitisirrationaltogroundmoral

thinkinginmoralintuitions,inlargepartbecauseitleadstoirresolvableconflict.Tellingly,

itisinachapterentitled“MoralConflict”thatheputsforwardthekernelofhisownversion

ofutilitarianism.LikeSidgwick’s,itisportrayedasbothexplainingandresolvingthe

problemofconflict.

Sidgwick’sutilitarianism

SidgwickandHareconvergeonutilitarianismfromwidelydivergentmetaethicalstarting

points.Sidgwickacceptstheintuitionistassumptionthatthecontentofanethicalprinciple,

ifitreallyisaprinciple,isself-evident.Thatis,peoplecanknowit“withreallyclearand

validfinalintuition,”muchaswearesupposedtoapprehendmathematicalaxiomsapriori.

Ifthemoralrulesreallyareknowableinthisway,thenpeoplecanhavetheutmost

confidenceinthem,andinthejudgementstowhichtheylead.ButSidgwick’sassiduous

investigationofcommonsensemoralityleadshimtoconcludethat,contraryto

appearances,noneofitsrulesarereallyself-evident.Thatis,noneofthemare

independentlyvalidaxiomsofpracticalreason.Heacceptsthattherearesuchaxioms,

albeitatamoreabstractlevelofmoralthinking.Specifically,therearethree,andonly

three,ofthem.Twoaremoralinthenarrowsense:1)theprincipleofjustice,accordingto

which“individualsinsimilarconditionsshouldbetreatedsimilarly;”162and2)the

162Sidgwick,MethodsofEthics,380.

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principleofrationalbenevolence,accordingtowhichoneismorallyboundtoaimatthe

generalgood,towardswhichthegoodofeachindividualcountsequally.163

Alone,neitheroftheseprinciplesdeterminewhatoneoughttodoinanyparticular

situation.Theprincipleofjusticeleavesopenthecontentoftherulesitinsiststhatwe

applyimpartially.Andtheprincipleofrationalbenevolencecannotguideactioninthe

absenceofatheoryofthegood.Sidgwickprovidessuchatheory,arguingthatan

individual’sgoodconsistsinherhappiness,whichhedefineshedonisticallyaspleasureor

“desirableconsciousness.”164

Sidgwickthinksthatonceitissupplementedbythistheoryofthegood,theprinciple

ofrationalbenevolencebringsusstraighttotheutilitarianprinciple,whichhasquite

enoughsubstancetoguideaction:

“...theconductwhich,underanygivencircumstance,isobjectivelyright,isthatwhichwillproducethegreatestamountofhappinessonthewhole;thatis,takingintoaccountallwhosehappinessisaffectedbytheconduct.”165

Hare’sutilitarianism

Haredoubtsthatwecanhaveconfidencethatanysubstantiveethicalintuitionisan

immediatedeliveranceofreason,ratherthananexpressionofdeeplyrootedbutultimately

contingentculturalnorms.SoherejectsSidgwick’smethodofjustifyingutilitarianismby

groundingitinsuchanintuition.Instead,Harejustifiesitbyshowingthattheformofmoral

thinkingentailsit.Thisformisgivenbythelogicalpropertiesofought:itisanoverriding

universalizableprescription.

Tomakeaprescriptionistoexpressapreference,andtodirectactiontowardits

satisfaction.ThisiswhyHaresaysthattoberational,aprescriptionmustbeissuedwith

“cognizanceoffacts,”orwithanunderstandingof“whatitsexecutioninthisconcrete

163Theotherprincipleistheprincipleofprudence,accordingtowhich“oneoughttoaimatone’sowngood...onthewhole.”(ME,381).Sidgwickarguesthatutilitarianismcansolvetheproblemofconflictwithinmoralityunderstoodnarrowlyashavingprimarilytodowithhowouractionsorattitudesshouldrespondtothelives,claims,andinterestsofothers.Yetheconsidersmoralityalsotoincludeself-interest,andfindsnosolutiontotheproblemofconflictgeneratedbynarrowlymoralprinciplesandtheprincipleofprudence.164Sidgwick,MethodsofEthics,391-407.165Ibid.,411.

99

situationwouldentail.”166Otherwise,theprescribermightguideactiontoward

establishingastateofaffairswhichtheydonotactuallywant.

Ofcourse,apersonneednotknowalloftheimplicationsofanactioninorder

rationallytoprescribeit.Theyonlyneedtoknowthosethatwouldmakeadifferenceto

whethertheycanwillthattheactionbeundertaken.Whenitcomestouniversal

prescriptions,theimplicationstowhichtheymustattendarethosehavingtodowiththe

preference-satisfactionsofallthesentientbeingswhomtheactionoritsalternativeswould

affect.

Thisisbecauseauniversalprescriptionappliesnotonlytothesituationinwhichit

ismade,buttoallsituationswiththesameuniversalproperties.Theseincludethelogically

possiblesituationsinwhichtheauthoroftheprescriptiontakestheplaceofanyoneofthe

otheraffectedbeings.Tobeassuredthatonecouldacceptthatone’sprescriptionforthis

situationbefollowedinalloftherest,onemustknowwhateachoftheotherswouldprefer.

Harethinksthatapersoncannotknowwhatanotherpreferswithoutknowingwhat

itwouldbelikefortheothertolivethroughallofthealternatives.Toensurethatone’s

oughtisrational,therefore,apersonmustimaginativelyinhabittheexperiencesofevery

beingforwhomthingswouldgodifferentlyiftheprescribedactionwerenotcarriedout.

Theymustundergowhatevereachofthem—intheirownbodies,andwiththeirown

memories,relationships,attitudes(includingmotivationalstates),etc.—wouldundergoif

theprescribedactionwereperformed,aswellwhatevertheywouldundergoifthe

alternativeswereperformedinstead.

Apersonwhosucceedsinempatheticallyidentifyingwithanotherwillknow

throughdirectexperiencewhattheotherprefers(orwhattheywouldprefer,iftheyknew

whatallthealternativeswouldbelike),andthusthepersonwillknowwhattheywould

prefer,iftheyweretobeintheother’ssituation:theywouldpreferexactlywhattheother

does(orwould).Knowingthis,Harethinks,entailsacurrentpreferenceaboutwhatshould

happenintheeventthattheytaketheother’splace.Thispost-reflectivepreferencewill

havethesamecontentandthesamestrengthastheother’soriginalpreference.

166Hare,MoralThinking,89,108.

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Thus,conflictsamongthepreferencesofdifferentbeingsmetamorphoseintoa

conflictamongthepreferencesofasingleperson—themakerofthemoraljudgement(or,

theywillsometamorphoseifthemakerofthejudgementistobesatisfiedthatthe

judgementisrational,i.e.genuinelyuniversallyprescribable).

Harethinksthattheonlyuniversalizablemethodofresolvingoriginally

interpersonalconflictsofpreferencesintoamoralprescriptionistomaximizeaggregated

preferencesatisfaction.Hepresumesthatthismethod,andonlythismethod,skirtsthe

trapsofprivilegingsomepreferencesoverothers,andofallowingunexaminedmoral

intuitionstospoilajudgementthatissupposedtofollowonlyfromfacts(whatwillhappen,

whowillbeaffected,andhowwilltheybeaffected)andlogic(giventhefacts,what

prescriptionwouldbeuniversalizable).

Harethusgeneratesautilitariannormativeethicfromhisquasi-Kantianmetaethics.

Strictlyspeaking,theuniversalprescriptivistcriterionforright,orrational,actionisnot

thattheactionmaximizeswelfare.Rather,itisthattheprescriptiontoperformtheactis

universalizable.Butaprescriptionisuniversalizableifandonlyiftakingitwouldmaximize

aggregatewelfare(understoodaspreferencesatisfaction).Sotheprincipleofutilitycan

functionastheuniversalprescriptivistcriterionforaction.

2.TwoUtilitarianSensesofWrongness

2.1Thefirstsenseofwrongness:violatingtheprincipleofutility

Accordingtothiscriterion,anactionisrightiffitbringsaboutmore(ornoless)welfare

thananyalternativepracticableaction.Corollarytothis,anactioniswrongiffitbrings

aboutlesswelfarethanatleastonepracticableaction.Whenrightandwrongaretakenin

thisway,thepossibilityofmoralconflictisnegated,becauseitisimpossiblethatwhatever

onedoeswillbringaboutlesswelfarethansomethingelsetheycouldhavedone.

Thisdoesnotsettlethequestionofwhethermoralconflictispossiblewithin

utilitarianism.Ifutilitarianismincorporates,oratleastleavesroomfor,anotherwayin

whichanactioncanbewrong,itmightstillbeabletoaccommodatemoralconflict.

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2.2Indirectutilitarianism

Aspaceformoralconflictemergesfromwithintheutilitarianresponsetooneofthe

strongestobjectionsagainstthetheory.Theobjectionisthatitistoodifficulttoconduct

ourmoraldeliberationsbytestingpossibleactsagainsttheprincipleofutility.Doingitwell

enoughtocomeclosetomeetingthestandardwouldrequireustoknowmanyfactswhich

weoftendonotknow:whatarethealternativecoursesofaction?Whatarepossible

outcomesofeachalternative?Whatarethelikelihoodsofeachoutcome?Whatdifference

willeachoutcomemaketothewelfareofeachpersonorotheranimalitaffects,including

thosewhohavenotyetbeenborn?Itwouldalsorequireustoresistthenaturalinclination

toallowthewelfareofthosewecareaboutmosttoinfluenceourdecisionsmorethanthe

welfareofunknown,distantothers.Andgiventhebriefamountoftimewehavetomake

moralchoicesbeforeourfailuretochooseimposesachoiceuponus,testingpossible

coursesofactionagainsttheutilitarianstandardcouldrequireustoperformenormously

complicatedfelicificcalculationsmorerapidlythanwepossiblycan.

Standardly,utilitariansrespondtothisobjectionbyadvocatinganindirectformof

utilitarianism.Therearevariousversionsofindirectutilitarianism,buttheiressenceisthe

same:thesurestroutetoutilitarianconductusuallyrunsthroughnon-utilitarianthinking.

Thispositionreliesonaconceptualdistinctionbetween1)thetestorcriterionof

rightaction,and2)eithertheprocedurebywhichoneidentifiestherightaction,orthe

motivefromwhichoneperformsit.AsSidgwicksays:

“ThedoctrinethatUniversalHappinessistheultimatestandardmustnotbeunderstoodtoimplythatUniversalBenevolenceistheonlyrightoralwaysbestmotiveofaction.For...itisnotnecessarythattheendwhichgivesthecriterionofrightnessshouldalwaysbetheendatwhichweconsciouslyaim:andifexperienceshowsthatthegeneralhappinesswillbemoresatisfactorilyattainedifmenfrequentlyactfromothermotivesthanpureuniversalphilanthropy,itisobviousthattheseothermotivesarereasonablytobepreferredonUtilitarianprinciples.”167

Indirectutilitariansholdthatexperienceshowsthatweareoftenmorelikelyto

meettheutilitarianstandardifweactfromothermotives,oruseothermethods;setting

167167Sidgwick,MethodsofEthics,413.

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oursightsonsomethingotherthanmaximizingaggregatehappinessworksbetterthan

aimingstraightforit.Indirectutilitariansthereforeadvocatethegeneraldisuseof

impartialfelicificcalculationsinmoralthinking.

Instead,mostindirectutilitariansrecommendfollowingwhatMill,Sidgwick,and

Harerespectivelycallthe“receivedcodeofethics,”therulesof“commonsensemorality,”

or“intuitivelevelprinciples,”whichtheysayweabsorbthroughsocializationandwhich

havewhatVarnerdescribesasa“deontologicalflavor.”168Byfollowingtheserules,they

argue,oneismorelikelyinthelongruntoconformtotheutilitarianstandardthanby

attemptingtotesteachandeveryactionagainstthatstandard.

Sidgwick’sindirectutilitarianism

Sidgwick’sindirectutilitarianismrunsthroughtheverysameunconditionalrulesthathe

rejectsasindependentmoralaxioms.Hethinksthatthemethodofutilitarianismistostart

fromthemoralcodealreadyinplaceandtoenforceoramenditdependingonthe

consequencesofdoingso.Thus,utilitarianisminpracticeusuallycomesdownto“...a

comparisonbetweenthetotalamountsofpleasureandpainthatmaybeexpectedtoresult

respectivelyfrommaintaininganygivenruleasatpresentestablished,andfrom

endeavoringtointroducethatwhichisproposedinitsstead.”169

Sidgwickbelievesthatthiscomparisonwillfavorconservatism.Itwilllicensesmall,

incrementalchangestoasociety’sreceivedmoralcode,butnotradicalones.Theattempt

tomakeradicalchanges,especiallyiftheyarenegative,willlikelyweakenpeople’sresolve

totaketherestofthecodeseriously.

Sidgwickalsobelievesthattheprincipleofutilitymightlicenseitsowneffacement

fromthemoralthinkingofordinarypeople.Inparticularcases,knowledgeofautilitarian

exceptiontoacommonsensemoralrulemightbestbelimitedtoanelitewhocanbe

trustedneithertolettheknowledgeerodetheircommitmenttotherulewhenthe

exceptiondoesnotapply,nortobetemptedtocraftself-servingexceptionstootherrules.

168Mill,Utilitarianism,24;Sidgwick,MethodsofEthics(throughout);Hare,MoralThinking(throughout);Varner,Personhood,Ethics,AnimalCognition,83.169Sidgwick,MethodsofEthics,477.

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Sidgwickevenentertainstheideathatmostpeoplearenotcapableofresponsiblyusingthe

utilitarianprincipleatall.Hesurmisesthatperhapsweshouldbeallowed—andmaybe

evenbeled—tobelievethatutilitydoesnotultimatelydeterminetherightnessofacts,and

doesnotjustifyouradherencetoostensiblydeontologicalmoralrules:

“...itmaybedesirablethatCommonSenseshouldrepudiatethedoctrineswhichitisexpedienttoconfinetoanenlightenedfew.AndthusaUtilitarianmayreasonablydesire,onUtilitarianprinciples,thatsomeofhisconclusionsshouldberejectedbymankindgenerally;oreventhatthevulgarshouldkeepalooffromhissystemasawhole,insofarastheinevitableindefinitenessandcomplexityofitscalculationsrenderitlikelytoleadtobadresultsintheirhands.”(ME,490)

TheunabashedelitismofSidgwick’searlyformofindirectutilitarianismisnow

rightlyconsideredunacceptable.Hare’stwo-levelutilitarianismprovidesabetter

alternative.

Hare’sindirectutilitarianism

Hare’stwo-levelutilitarianismoffersthemostfullydevelopedexplanationofindirect

utilitarianismthatIknowof.Itsdetailsmeritattention,becauseitpreparesthegroundfor

arichandnon-dismissiveaccountofmoralconflict,onewhichcanbeembracedby

utilitarianswhodonotaccepthisuniversalprescriptivistjustificationforutilitarianism.

ThetwolevelsofHare’sversionofindirectutilitarianismrefertohierarchically

relatedwaysofthinkingaboutmoralquestions.Atthecriticallevelofmoralthinking,one

usestheactutilitarianstandardofactiontodeterminewhetheranactionisuniversally

prescribable,orwhetheritwillmaximizeaggregateutility.Onlythismethodprovides

certaintyaboutwhetherawhetheraparticularactisrightorwronginthesense

elaboratedinsection2.1.SinceHarebelievesthatthejobofmoralphilosophyistohelp

peoplesolvetheirmoralproblemsanddisagreementsthroughthinkingrationally,his

theoryprivilegesthecriticallevel.

Asanexemplarofthisidealformofmoralthinking,Hareinvokesthearchangel.

Whenevertheinterestsofmorethanonepersonorotheranimalareatstake,thearchangel

immediatelyandunerringlyappropriatestheinterestsofeveryoneinvolved,determines

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whichofallpossibleactionswouldmaximizethesatisfactionofthoseinterestsand

performsthatactionwithouthesitation.

Wehumanbeingsrarelythinklikearchangels.Usually,wethinklikewhatHarecalls

proles.Withouttryingtogatheralltherelevantfacts,andwithouttryingtoextendour

empathybeyonditsnaturalterritory,wemakemoraljudgementsbasedsimplyonasense

ofrightandwrong.Thissenserevealsitselfthroughstabledispositionstoexperience

certainmoralsentimentsinrelationtoourownandother’sconduct.Forinstance,wetend

tofeelrepugnanceorqualmsattheprospectofcommittingcertainkindsofactions,andwe

tendtofeelmoralregretwhenwecommitthemanyway.Thoughwemaynotarticulate

themassuch,ourdispositionstoexperiencetheseemotionsamounttosimple,general

principlesofaction.Thelinkbetweenintuitivelevelprinciplesandmoralfeelingscouldnot

becloser.Harewrites:“Havingtheprinciples,intheusualsenseoftheword,ishavingthe

dispositiontoexperiencethefeelings.”170Ifwearewellbrought-up,welearnand

internalizetheseprinciplesinchildhood.Bythetimewereachadulthood,theyfeellike

intuitionsofmoralfacts.

Thinkingontheintuitivelevelhasalegitimaterolewithinutilitarianismprimarily

becauseconductingallofourmoraldeliberationatthecriticallevelisnotuniversalizably

prescribable,orconducivetothegreatestgood.Whilethecriticalmethodyieldsrational

moraljudgementswhenitisdonewell,wehumanbeingsdonotalwayshavewhatittakes

todoitwell.Indefendingthetwo-levelaccountofmoralthinking,RichardArnesonbluntly

explainsthatcriticalthinkingchallengesusbecause“humanshavecognitive,affectiveand

volitionaldisabilities.”171Itisnoaccidentthatonthisaccount,theidealmoralthinkerisnot

anexcellenthuman,butasupernaturalbeing.

ThoughweHomosapienscannotthinklikearchangelsmostofthetime,wearemore

orlesscapableoffollowinguncomplicated,broadlyapplicableprinciples—especiallywhen

thoseprinciplesimplicatemoralsentimentswithwhichweidentify.Ifoursimpleintuitive

principlesareonestheacceptanceofwhichwouldmaximizewelfareinthelongrun,then

theireverydayusewouldbesanctionedfromthecriticalstandpoint.Inotherwords,an

170Hare,MoralThinking,39.171Arneson,“WhatDoWeOwe?”289.

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archangelwhoknowsaboutourcognitive,emotional,andvolitional“disabilities”would

prescribethatwehumanbeingstendtoholdandtofollowsuchprinciplesratherthan

attemptcriticalthinkingeverytimewefindourselvesinsituationswhereouractionsmight

affectthewelfareofothers.172

Anarchangelwouldnotprescribethatwefollowourintuitiveprinciples

unwaveringly,however.Inextraordinarycases,wehumansmusthoistourselvesuptothe

criticalleveltoensurethatourintuitiveprinciplesreallydofunctiontomaximizewelfare,

eitheringeneralorinaparticularinstance(e.g.Isthewidespreaddisapprobationof

transsexualityuniversallyprescribable?ShouldIbreaktheruleagainstlyinginorderto

deceivethemurdereratmydoor?)Iftheydonot,wemustusecriticalthinkingtobanish

them,amendthem,orcarveoutexceptionstothem.Thiscanbeaprojectforeachofus,not

justforSidgwick’simaginedutilitarianelite.

Intuitiveprinciplesarenotfixed

Becausetheusefulnessofanintuitiveprincipledependsonhowsentientcreatureswillbe

affectedbyitsacceptance,andbecausethesefactsarenotimmutable,agood(thatis,

utility-maximizing)principleformembersofasocietyatonetimemightbebadatanother

time,orbadformembersofadifferentsociety.AsVarnersays“totheextentthatsocieties

facedifferentbackgroundecological,technologicalandeconomicconditions,thereshould

bevariationsacrosscultures”inintuitiveprinciples.173Two-levelutilitarianismthus

requiresanopennesstoabandoningorrevisingevenourdearestintuitiveprinciples,as

ourphysicalandsocialenvironmentschange.

172AutilitariancantakeupHare’stwo-levelswithoutcommittingtohistheoryofwelfareaspreferencesatisfaction.Inadditiontopreferenceordesiresatisfaction,someprominenttheoriesofwelfareincludehedonism,objectivelisttheories,hybridtheories,andeudaimonistictheories.Accordingtohedonism,welfareispleasureandtheabsenceofpain.Onobjectivelisttheories,onefareswelltotheextentthatone’slifecontainsorexemplifiesobjectivevalues(e.g.knowledge,achievement,alifethatisexemplaryofone’skind).Hybridtheoriesofwelfarecombineobjectivismaboutwhathaspotentialprudentialvaluewitharequirementthatasubjectmustfavorthosethingsinorderforthemtoenhancethesubject’swelfare.Eudaimonistsholdthatonefareswelltotheextentthatoneishappy,orasSumnerargues,authenticallysatisfiedorfulfilledbytheconditionsofone’slife.SeeSumner,Welfare,Happiness,andEthics,andHeathwood“Welfare”formoredetailedaccountsofvarioustheoriesofwelfare.173Varner,Personhood,Ethics,AnimalCognition,51.

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Evenwithinthesamesocietyatthesametime,differentpeoplewillhavedifferent

setsofgoodintuitiveprinciples.Inadditiontoprinciples“commontoall,”Harepointsout

thattherewillbespecialprinciples“commontoparticularroles,”aswellasonesthatare

“personaltoindividuals.”174Heobservesthatasapersonencountersnovelmoral

problems,theymightupdatetheirsetofintuitiveprinciplestodealwiththem.Since

differentpeopleencounterdifferentproblems,weshouldexpectthemtoreviseor

complexifytheirintuitiveprinciplesindifferentways.Also,regardlessofthekindsofmoral

questionstheyencounter,somepeoplewillsimplybebetteratcriticalmoralthinkingthan

others.Theintuitiveprinciplesofthosewhocantrustthemselvestothinklikearchangels

willtendtobedifferentfromandlikelymoresophisticatedthantheonesheldbypeople

whorarelydaretoquestionthesimplerulestheyhaveinherited.

Peoplewithincertainsectorsorcommunitieswillencountersimilarkindsof

problemsthatotherswillnot,andtheymighthavespecialresponsibilitiesforresponding

totheseoneveryoneelse’sbehalf.Forinstance,weshouldexpectpoliceofficerstohave

andtopropagateamongthemselvesprinciplesconcerningtheenforcementoflawwhich

arericherandmorecomplexthanthosewhoarenotpolice(inlightofwhathasbeen

revealedaboutsystematicallyunjustpolicingintheU.S.andCanada,Ishouldpointoutthat

theprinciplesspecialtomembersofaprofessionmightnotbeoptimific)or,healthcare

giverstohaveandtopropagatearicherandmorecomplexsetofprinciplesrelatedto

treatingpatients,etc.

Becausepeopledonotallhavethesameabilitytoperformcriticalmoralthinking,

andbecausewedonotallfacethesamekindsofmoralproblems,orfacethemwiththe

samefrequency,differentpeoplewillhavedifferentsetsofgoodintuitiveprinciples,

includingprinciplesregardingwhentothinkaboutmoralquestionsfromthecritical

standpointandwhentoremainattheintuitivelevel.Andnoone’ssetofgood,orutility

maximizing,principleswillalwayspointtowardthesameactionthattheprincipleofutility

does.

Tobringhomethesepoints,taketheexampleoftwodifferentagentswho

separatelyfindthemselvesinsimilarsituations:theybothwitnessanaggressorattackinga

174Hare,MoralThinking,203.

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thirdperson.Assumethatinbothcases,harmingtheaggressorindefenseofthevictim

wouldleadtomoreutilitythananyofthealternatives,suchasfleeing,callinglaw

enforcement,doingnothing,ortryingtotalktheaggressoroutoftheirviolentstate.

Imaginethatthefirstagenthasanintuitivelevel“donotharm”principlethatisqualifiedto

admitofanexceptionfordefendingothers,andthatitmaximizesutilityforthemtohold

exactlythisprinciple.Thismightbebecausetheagentislikelytofacesituationsinwhich

theonlywaytopreventonepersonfromattackinganotheristoharmthewould-be

attacker,theyarestrongandskillfulenoughtointervenewithoutsufferingseriousinjury,

areunlikelytobeconfusedaboutwhentheconditionsofthequalificationaremet,andwill

notbeencouragedbyajustifiedexceptionto“donotharm”tomakeunjustifiedexceptions

toit.Incontrast,theotheragentdoesnotqualifytheir“donotharm”principle,andit

maximizesutilityforthemnottodoso.Thiscouldbebecausetheyhaveneverandwill

neveragainfindthemselvesinasituationwhereinvokingthedefenseexceptioniscalled

for,becausetheytendtomakebadjudgementsaboutwhenaggressionisappropriate,

becausetheyarepronetouseexcessiveforce,orbecausetheyareusuallyunabletouse

forceeffectively.Whenfacedwiththesituationdescribedabove,thesecondagent’sutility-

maximizingprinciplewillruleoutthecourseofactionrequiredbytheprincipleofutility,

whilethefirstagent’swillnot.

2.3Thesecondsenseofwrongness:violatingagoodintuitiveprinciple

Aswehaveseen,onewayforanactiontobewrongfromtheutilitarianperspectiveisforit

toviolatetheprincipleofutility,ortobringaboutlesswelfarethananavailablealternative

would.Inthissense,itwouldbewrongforeitheroftheagentstorefrainfromharmingthe

attackerintheexampleabove.Yettwo-levelutilitarianismentailsanotherwayforan

actiontobewrong:itiswrongifitviolatesagoodintuitivelevelprinciple.Inthissense,it

wouldbewrongforthesecondagenttoharmtheattacker.

Toseehowthiscanbe,letusreturntotheconceptofmoralregret.Inchapterone,I

explainedthatmoralregretisagentregretforanactionthatisinsomewaywrong.Thatan

actiswrong,andthatmoralregretiswarrantedbythepersonwhodoesit,implyeach

other.Soifmoralregretiswarrantedbyanagentforanactionoftheirs,thenthataction

waswronginsomeway.Utilitariansacceptthatmoralregretsignalsajudgementthatone

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hasdonesomethingwrong.AsHaresays,“remorse...impliesthethoughtthatIoughtnot

tohavedonewhatIdid.”175Ofcourse,Icanbemistakenaboutwhethermyactionwas

wrong,andsomymoralregretaboutitcouldbeinappropriateorunwarranted.According

totwolevelutilitarianism,actionsthatviolatetheprincipleofutilityarenottheonlyones

thatwarrantmoralregret.Moralregretcanalsobewarrantedbyactionsthatviolate

intuitiveprincipleseveniftheydonotviolatetheprincipleofutility.

Recallthatbeingdisposedtofeelcertainmoralsentiments,includingmoralregret,

aboutatypeofactionispartofwhatitistoholdanintuitive-levelprinciplethatforbids

thattypeofaction.Tobewarrantedinholdingtheprincipleistobewarrantedinfeeling

moralregretforviolatingit.Anagentiswarranted—evenrequired—tohold(or,todevelop

andmaintainthedispositionsthatconstituteholding)aprincipleifftheirholdingitwould

leadthemtomaximizewelfareoverthelongterm.Theyarethereforewarrantedinfeeling

moralregretaboutviolatingit.Violatingitwouldbewrong.

Sotwolevelutilitarianismaccommodatestwowaysinwhichanactioncanbe

wrong:itcanbewronginvirtueofviolatingtheprincipleofutility,anditcanbewrongin

virtueofviolatinganintuitiveprinciplethattheprincipleofutilityjustifiestheagentto

hold.Thissecondsenseofwrongnessdoesnotcollapseintothefirst.Ifitdid,theclassof

actionsthatarewronginthesecondsensewouldinevitablyoverlapperfectlywiththe

classthatarewronginthefirstone.Butitdoesnot.Astheexampleaboveillustrates,

intuitiveprinciplesthatleadtowelfaremaximizationoverthelongtermdonotnecessarily

pickoutthewelfaremaximizingactineveryinstance.

Beforemovingaheadtoexaminewhetherthesecondkindofwrongnessgives

utilitarianismroomtoaccommodatemoralconflict,itisworthaddressingitssusceptibility

toarepeatedcriticismofindirectutilitarianism.Thecriticismproblematizesthegap

betweendispositionsattheintuitivelevel,andthejudgementsthatwouldbemadeatthe

criticallevel.AmongthosewholodgethiscriticismisBernardWilliams,whosaysthatby

construingintuitivelevelprinciplesessentiallyasstrategiesforfulfillingtheprincipleof

utility,two-levelutilitarianisminstrumentalizestheformer.Thus,afissureemerges

betweenthemeaningoftheintuitiveprinciplesatthecriticallevel,andthemeaningof


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themaslivedbythosewhoholdthem,forwhom“theyaredispositionsnotsimplyofaction

butoffeelingandjudgementandtheyareexpressedpreciselyinascribingintrinsicvalueto

suchthingsastruthtelling,loyalty,andsoon.”176Accordingtoutilitarianism,onlywelfare

hasintrinsicvalue.Butitcanbeoptimificforpeopletoholdintuitiveprinciplesrequiring

themtoprotectothervalues.Sobyencouragingpeopletofeelandtobelievethatveracity,

loyalty,andothervaluesprotectedbygoodintuitiveprincipleshaveintrinsicvalue,two

levelutilitarianism“demeansmostmoralagents.”177

Notallintuitivelevelprinciplesdemeaninthisway,however.Holdingprinciples

thatprescribebenefittingothers,andthatprohibitharmingothers,encouragethosewho

holdthemtovalueforitsownsakeexactlywhatthetheorydoes:welfare.Soatleastsome

intuitivelevelprinciplesarenotsusceptibletoWilliams’otherwisetrenchantcritique.

3.ThePossibilityofMoralConflictwithinUtilitarianism

Utilitarianscanandshouldacknowledgetwowaysinwhichanagent’sactcanbewrong:it

canbewronginvirtueofviolatingtheprincipleofutility,anditcanbewronginvirtueof

violatinganotherprinciplewhichtheprincipleofutilityjustifiestheagenttohold.

Conflictoccurswhenalloftheactionsavailabletoapersonareinsomewaywrong.

Ipointedoutinsection2(TwoUtilitarianSensesofWrongness)thatitisimpossiblefora

persontofaceasituationinwhichalltheactionsavailabletothemarewronginthefirst

sense.Yetitispossibleforapersontofaceasituationinwhichtheymusteitherdo

somethingthatiswronginthefirstsense,orsomethingthatiswronginthesecondsense.

Oneoftheagentsinthedefense-of-anotherexamplefindsthemselvesinthiskindof

conflict;notharmingtheattackerwouldbewrongin(atleast)thefirstsense,butharming

themwouldbewronginthesecondsense.Itisalsopossibleforapersontofaceasituation

inwhichwhatevertheydowillbewronginthesecondsense.Forinstance,imaginea

palliativecarephysicianwhohasamoralcommitmenttohelpingherpatientsliveoutthe

176Williams,EthicsandtheLimitsofPhilosophy,108.177ThisisaquotefromBarbaraHerman,in“ObligationandPerformance,”313.ItisworthnotingthatherversionoftheobjectiondiffersslightlyfromWilliams’s.Shefaults“indirectioninmorality”forencouragingpeopletobelieveandtofeelthatcertainactsarewrong,eventhoughtheactsnotwrong.ThisversionoftheobjectiondoesnotcutintoutilitarianismasIhaveinterpretedit.Onmyinterpretation,violationsofintuitiveprinciplesreallyarewrong,albeitnotinvirtueofviolatingtheprincipleofutility.

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endsoftheirlivesinwhateverwaysarebestforthem,andwhoalsobelievesandfeels

deeplythatitwouldbewrongforhertokillapatient.Ifoneofthephysician’spatientstells

herthattheywouldfarratherbeeuthanizedthanliveoutthelastfewweeksoftheirlifein

eithermiseryorsemi-consciousness,andifthephysicianhasnodoubtthatthepatient’s

desireisfirmandcohereswiththeirlifelongvalues,andifthepatientisphysicallyunable

toadministerlife-endingdrugstothemselves,thephysiciancouldfaceasituationinwhich

whatevershedoeswillbewronginthesecondsense(whichisnottodenythatoneofthe

coursesofactionthatiswronginthesecondsenseisalsowronginthefirstsense).

Istipulatedthatthestrictandsimple“donotharm”principleheldbytheagentin

thedefense-of-anotherexampleisagoodprinciple,thatis,itmaximizesutilityfortheagent

toholdit.Notalloftheintuitiveprinciplesheldbyeveryagentaregood,though.Thisis

whytwo-levelutilitarianismrequiresussometimestohoistourselvesuptothecritical

leveltoensurethatourintuitiveprinciplesreallydofunctiontomaximizewelfare.A

conflictinvolvingintuitiveprinciplescompelsatwo-levelutilitariantorevisitthose

principles.AsHaresays,“thoughingeneralitisbadpolicytoquestionone’sprimafacie

principles...conflicts...forceustodothis(hencetheanguish).”178Conflictsforceustodo

thispartlybecausetheycallintoquestiontheutilityofasetofprinciples;aconflictingsetis

notnecessarilynon-optimific,butallelsebeingequalconflictproduceslessutilitythan

harmonydoes.Also,whentwointuitiveprinciplesconflict,anagentcanfindthemselvesat

apracticalimpasse.Insuchcases,everydaymoralthinkingfailstoguideaction,andcritical

thinkingisrequired.

Harereferstotwodifferentoutcomesofsuchquestioning:thequalification,andthe

overridingofatleastoneoftheprinciples.Thoughhedoesnotdescribetheseoutcomesin

muchdetail,drawingouttheimplicationsofhisdistinctionhelpsmakesenseofhow

intuitivelevelconflictcanpersistevenafterresolutionatthecriticallevel.


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3.1Qualifyingandoverridingintuitiveprinciples

Qualifyingaprincipleinvolvesrevisingitsuchthatitnolongertriggersaconflict.For

example,onemightamendtheprinciple“Neverphi,”to“Neverphi,exceptincircumstances

likeC.”AsHaresays,“Thisqualificationofprincipleswillhavebroughtwithitaresolution

oftheconflict,becausetheprinciples,asqualified,arenolongerinconsistentevenper

accidens.”179

Becauseintuitiveprinciplesinvolveemotionaldispositions,whenanintuitive

principleisqualified,thedispositionsofthosewhoholditwillchange.Forexample,

someonewhowasoncedisposedtobalkattheprospectofadulteryinanyformmight

graduallyceasetofeelmoralregretorindignationaboutextramaritalsexcarriedoutwith

thewholeheartedconsentofbothspouses,orjustpriortothesettlementofamutually

soughtdivorce.Althoughhesaysthat“peoplewhohavebeenthroughsuchcrises[conflicts

thatleadtoqualifyingprinciples]oftenthinkdifferentlythereafteraboutsome

fundamentalmoralquestions,”Haredoesnotemphasizethefactthatqualifyingaprinciple

willleadtoashiftinprincipleholders’judgementsaboutandemotionalresponsesto

behaviorsthattheprinciplenolongercovers,orthatithasonlyjustbeguntocover.180

However,theinevitabilityofthisshiftfollowsfromhischaracterizationofthesentimental

dimensionofintuitiveprinciples,andmarksanimportantcontrastwithwhatoccurswhen

aprincipleisoverriddenratherthanqualified.

Haresaysthatinsteadofusingcriticalmoralthinkingtoqualifytheprinciplesthat

generateconflict,onecoulduseittodeterminewhichcourseofactiontotakeina

particularcaseofconflict.Takingonecourseratherthantheotheramountstooverriding

one(ormore)oftheconflict-generatingprinciples.AccordingtoHare,tooverridea

principleisnottoalterit,buttodecidenottofollowitinaparticularsituation.Becausea

personretainstheprinciplestheyoverride,andbecauseholdingaprincipleinvolvesbeing

disposedtothinkthatiswrongtoactagainstit,andtoexperiencemoralregretforhaving

doneso,usingcriticalthinkingtochoosewhichprincipletooverridedoesnotremovethe

179Ibid.,51.180Ibid.

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phenomenaofconflicteventhoughitsolvesthepracticalpuzzleofwhattodofromwithin

thatconflict.“Thegoodutilitarianwillreachsuchdecisions,butreachthemwithgreat

reluctancebecauseofhisingrainedgoodprinciples;andhemayagonize,andwillcertainly

reflect,aboutthem.”181

Harewritesasthoughusingcriticalthinkingtodecidewhichconflict-generating

principletooverrideisonlyatemporarysolutiontoconflict.Eventually,theprinciples

themselvesmustbeexaminedcriticallyand,heimplies,qualified.Hare’sgoodutilitarian

will“agonize,andwillcertainlyreflect,aboutthemtillhehassortedoutbycriticalthinking,

notonlywhatheoughttohavedoneintheparticularcase,butwhathisprimafacieprinciples

oughttobe.”(emphasesadded)182Thattheutilitarianwillagonizeuntilhehascritically

scrutinizedhisprinciplesimpliesthattheresultofsuchscrutinywillbeaconflict-skirting

qualificationofthoseprinciples.Afterqualification,theoriginalconflictwillbeseenas

havingbeenonlyapparent.Theutilitarian’soriginalsensethattheactrequiredbythe

principleofutilitywassomehowwrongwasnotwarrantedbecausetheintuitiveprinciple

thattheactviolatedwasnotonethattheywerewarrantedinholding.Thatis,itwasnot

optimificforthemtoholdit,whichiswhyitdidnotwithstandcriticalscrutiny.

Yetitwouldbeamistaketoassumethateverytimeintuitiveprinciplesconflict,the

resultofcriticalmoralthinkingwillbetoqualifyatleastoneoftheminawaythat

eliminatestheconflict.Criticalthinkingwillcallforqualifyinganintuitiveprincipleif,and

onlyif,theacceptanceutilityofthequalifiedversionisatleastashighasthatoftheoriginal

one.Frequentconflictswouldbeamongthethingsthatlessenaprinciple’sacceptance

utility.YetasHarehimselfpointsout,sowouldbeconfusingcomplexity,andatendencyto

weakenagents’resolvetofollowtheprincipleevenwhenqualificationsdonotaffectits

bearing.Thus,itcouldbethecasethatalthoughcertainpairs(orsets)ofprinciples

engenderconflict,criticalthinkingwouldconcludethatitisbettertokeepthembothintact

thantoqualifyeitheroneofthem.

Whenapair(orset)ofoptimificprinciplesyieldsincompossibleprescriptionsfor

action,howdoesapersondecidewhattodo?BecauseHaredoesnotdirectlyaddressthe

181Ibid.182Ibid.,51-2.

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possibilityofthistypeofconflict,hedoesnotdirectlyanswerthisquestion.Nonetheless,

theanswerisclear:overrideoneoftheprinciples.Sincetheprincipleshavealreadybeen

deemedoptimific,qualification—theonlyalternativetooverriding—makesnosense.

AsIexplainedabove,thequalificationofaprincipleshouldleadtoaneventual

changeinthedispositionsofthosewhoholdit.Theywillresistandeventuallyovercome

experiencingoffenseormoralregretinresponsetoactionsthatanamendedprincipleno

longerprohibits.Overriddenprinciples,ontheotherhand,willcontinuetoprohibitthe

actionswhichcriticalthoughtjustifiesinparticularcasesofconflict,sothosewhohold

themwilltendtofeelmoralregretforhavingviolatedthem.Hare’stwo-levelutilitarianism

impliesthatoneshouldnotresistordiscouragethisaslongascriticalthinkinghasshown

thattheoverriddenprincipleisagoodonetokeep.Inthatcase,themoralregretwillbe

warranted,andsoactingagainsttheoverriddenprinciplewillbewrong,despitenot

violatingtheprincipleofutility.

3.2Ephemeralandpersistentconflicts

Critical-levelscrutinybreaksthepracticalimpassethatconflictscancreate.Ifthescrutiny

resultsinthequalificationofatleastoneofthe(setsof)conflictingprinciples,thenthe

conflictwillhavebeenephemeral,ormerelyapparent.Whatseemedtobeagoodprinciple

wasnotinfactutility-maximizing.ThisisthekindofresolutionofwhichWilliamssays“it

explainstheoriginofmyconflictasnothavingcometothesituationsufficientlyprepared,

becauseIhadtoosimpleasetofmoralprinciples;anditpicturesmeasemergingfromthe

situationbetterpreparedsinceIhavenowmodifiedthem—Icanfacearecurrenceofthe

samesituationwithoutqualms,sincenexttimeitwillnotpresentmewithaconflict.”183

Moralregretwillnotbewarrantedbyalloftheactionsavailabletome—theywillnotallbe

wronginsomeway,despitehavinginitiallyappearedtohavebeenso.Yet,contraWilliams,

notallutilitarianresolutionsofconflictextinguishthem.Ifcriticalthinkingvalidatesthe

conflictingprinciplesandsocallsforoverridingthemcase-by-caseratherthanqualifying

themonceandforall,thepracticalimpassewillbebreached,buttheconflictwillpersist.I

willhavebeenandIwillcontinuetobejustifiedinholdingtheoverriddenprinciple(s)in

183Williams,EthicalConsistency,176.

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itsconflict-generatingform,Iwillrightlycontinuetoexperiencequalmsinsimilar

circumstances,andmoralregretwillbewarrantedonmypartnomatterwhatIdointhem.

Thatis,eachofmyavailableactionswillbewronginsomeway.

Iftherecoverypredicamentisatleastanephemeralconflict,bothrecoveryand

refrainingfromrecoverymustviolateoneormoreintuitivemoralprinciples.Ifitistobea

persistentconflict—arealmoralconflict—foreachcourseofactionitmustbeoptimificto

retainoneormoreoftheprinciplesitviolates,evenaftertheprinciplehasbeenimplicated

inthepredicament.

3.3Tragicconflictswithinutilitarianism

Aschapteroneexplains,aconflictistragicwhenthewrongsamongwhichapersonmust

choseareserious;whichmeansthatremorsewouldbeafittingresponsetohavingtaken

anyofthepossiblecoursesofactioninsuchsituations.Likemoralconflictsingeneral,

tragicconflictscanbeeitherephemeralorpersistentwithintheutilitarianframework.An

ephemeraltragicconflictoccurswhenthefollowingtwothingshold.First,eachofthe

actionsavailabletoapersonwouldseriouslyviolateatleastoneoftheirintuitivelevel

principles.Inotherwords,thepersonisdisposedtofeelremorseforhavingdoneanyof

theactions,andtojudgethatdoinganyofthemwouldwrongfullybringaboutorconstitute

asignificantlosstosomethingoffundamentalmoralvalue.Second,criticallevelscrutiny

willshowthatitisnotoptimificforthepersontohavesuchdispositionsregardingatleast

oneofthepossiblecoursesofaction;theremorsethattheyaredisposedtofeelisnot

warranted,thecourseofactionisnotseriouslywrong.Thepersonshouldthusqualifythe

intuitiveprinciplessuchthattheynolongergenerateatragicconflictinthissituationorin

oneslikeit.

Incontrast,atragicconflictispersistent,orreal,ifforeachpossiblecourseofaction,

atleastoneoftheperson’sintuitiveprinciplesforbiddingitmaximizesutilityinitstragic

conflict-generatingform.Itisoptimificforthepersontobedisposedtojudgeasthough

violatingitisnotjustwrongbutseriouslywrong,andtofeelremorseabouthavingviolated

it.

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Insection4,below,Iarguethattherecoverypredicamentcanbeatleastan

apparentorephemeralconflictformostormanyofthepeopleincontemporarysocieties

thatcreateit,andthatforsomeofthem,itcanalsoappearasatragicconflict.Insection5,I

arguethatwecannotknowwhetheritisarealorpersistentconflict.Giventhecomplexity

ofthebenefit-harmanalysis(BHA)thatwewouldhavetoconductinordertohaveasense

ofwhetherpreservingtheprincipleswillproducemorewelfarethanmakingconflict-

evadingchangestothem,andgiventheradicaluncertaintyofmanyoftheassumptionswe

wouldhavetomakeinordertorunthisBHA,wecannothaveanyconfidenceinitsresults.

4.TheRecoveryPredicamentisatLeastanEphemeralConflict

Ihopetohaveshowninchapteronethatintherecoverypredicament,itcertainlyseemsas

thoughwhateverwedowillwarrantremorse.Eitherwewillfailtopreventthehuman-

causedextinctionofaspecies,orwewillundertakecaptivebreeding,translocation,and

removalofpopulationsthatthreatenrecovery.Ontheutilitarianaccountofconflict,this

mustbebecauseeachpossiblecourseofactionviolatesatleastoneintuitive-levelmoral

principle.Whataretheprinciplestheyviolate?

Whataretheprinciplestheyviolate,andforwhom?Insection2.2(Indirect

utilitarianism),Iexplainedhowaccordingtotwolevelutilitarianism,differentpeoplewill

havedifferentsetsofintuitiveprinciples.Therecoveryconflictmightnotregisterasa

conflictforeveryone,becauseevenwithinasinglesociety,theprinciplesitinvolvesneed

notbeuniversallyheld.Inadditiontoaskingwhataretheprinciplesatriskofbeing

violatedintherecoveryconflict,wethereforeneedtoaskwhoseprinciplestheyare.

Intuitiveprinciplesinvolvedintherecoverypredicament

Ithinkthattherecoveryconflictwillregisterasaconflictformanypeoplewholiveinthe

societiesthatencourageandbenefitfromtheactivitiesthatdrivespeciestoextinction,and

thatundertakethespeciesrecoveryprocess.Inthenextsection,Iwillofferevidencethat

theprinciplesthatautilitarianmightclaimtounderlietheconflictareonesthatare

commonlyheldinCanadaandtheUnitedStates.Inthissection,Iendeavortoidentifywhat

thoseprinciplesare.

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Ifprinciplesareabstractionsfromimmediateemotionalreactionstoand

judgementsaboutparticularactions,thenagoodwaytoidentifyprincipleswouldbeto

workbackwardfromthosereactionsandjudgements.Onehasbetteraccesstotheirown

experiencesandjudgementsthantheydotoothers’.SoIwillbeginbytryingtoidentifythe

principlesthatmightunderlieorexplainmyownexperienceoftherecoveryconflictasa

situationinwhichbothpossiblecoursesofactionarelamentable,andevenwrong.

Preciselywhatisitaboutthecoursesofactionthatdisturbme,thatsetoffmy

moral-emotionalalarmbells,thatappeartowarrantremorse?184Ontheutilitarianaccount,

theanswerstothesequestionswillpointtowardprinciples.Iwillstartwiththerecovery

alternative,takingtheislandfoxcaseasanexampleandfocusingonwhatpeopledidtothe

foxknownas81659(pleaseseethefirstsectionofchapteronefordetails).

ThemainthingsatwhichIbalkinthiscasearethatpeoplesevered81659fromher

mostimportantsocialrelationships,thattheyremovedherfromtheplacesinwhichshe

knewhowtosustainherself,togetsafe,andtofindcomfort,thattheyconfinedher,that

theyforcedhertoassociatewithafoxshewouldhaveavoidedifshewerenottrapped,and

thattheyputherinasituationinwhichshewasunabletoprotectherownbodyandlife.I

believeIdonotunjustifiablyanthropomorphize81659inassumingthatbydoingthis,

peoplecausedhergreatsorrow,anxiety,confusion,frustration,pain,fear,andlikelyeven

terror.Becausecausingeachofthesethingsisawayofseriouslyharmingsomeone,ifthere

isagenericprincipleunderlyingmyrepugnanceformuchofwhatpeopledidto81659,it

mightbe:donotinflictseriousharmonothers.SinceIamdisposedtocondemnnotonly

thosewhodidthesethingto81659,butalsotherestofusinwhosenameitwasdone,I

mightaddtothistheprincipledonotbecomplicitintheinflictionofseriousharmon

others.

184Here,IfollowJoshuaGreeneinlikeningpeople’simmediateandforcefulmoralconvictionsto“alarmbells.”However,Iremainneutralon,orevenwaryof,Greene’sexplanationfortheanalogy.Inhisview,ourmoralalarmbellsare“designedtomakeacleardemandthatisextremelydifficulttoignore.”(emphasisadded).Adheringtoadualprocesstheoryofcognition,hethinksthattheyemergefromwhatDanielKahnemancallscognitivesystem1,whichisinstantaneous,automatic,andnon-conscious.Incontrast,cognitivesystem2ischaracterizedbytheslow,effortful,conscious,andrule-basedthinking,whichmanyiswhatpeopleengageinwhentheyconducttheirmoraldeliberationbytestingalternativesagainstthestandardofutility(seeGreene,“SecretJoke,”andKahneman,ThinkingFastandSlow).

117

Theseprinciplescouldalsoexplainmyinclinationtocondemnandtofeel

remorsefulaboutotherpartsoftherecoveryalternative.Forcinganimalstobreed,and

forcingthemtodosoatshorterintervalsthantheydointhewildimposesonthem

physiologicalandprobablypsychologicalstress.Italsomakessensetothinkthatdepriving

themoftheirownchoiceofmateorcompanions,andtakingthemfromafamiliarplacein

whichtheyarethrivingtoanunfamiliaronewheretheywillfacerisksforwhichtheyare

possiblyunprepared(translocation,re-introduction)cancauseanimalstosuffer,andso

wouldbeprimafacieviolationsoftheprincipledonotseriouslyharmorbecomplicitin

seriouslyharmingothers.

Myflinchingatrecoveryisnotlimitedtothesufferingitcauses.Recoveryalso

involveskillinghealthyanimals,andthisappearsasmorallyregrettablewhetherornotitis

accompaniedbysuffering.Killingbarredowlswhowerethrivingseemstobewhatcaused

Dillersuchanxiety,eventhoughasanexperiencedandcarefulhunterhedidhisutmostto

killtheminstantlyandpainlessly.Asecondsetofprinciplesmightbe:donotkillorbe

complicitinkilling.

Anotheraspectofrecoverythatdisturbsmeistheintensityofcontrolthatpeople

exertoverotheranimals.Incaptivity,andespeciallyincaptivebreedingprograms,what

wouldseemtobeamongthemostimportantaspectsofananimal’slifearealmost

completelymanagedbypeople.Suchthoroughcontrolappearswrong,evenasidefromthe

harmIimaginethatitmustinflict.Soathirdpairofprinciplesmightbe:donotcontrol

others,anddonotbecomplicitincontrollingothers.

Recoverycanalsoinvolveafailuretocareforthosewhomonehasmadedependent

ononeself.IdonothaveanimmediatesenseofwrongnesswhenIthinkaboutdeathor

sufferingthathasnothingtodowithhumanagency(thereisasenseofbadness,butnotthe

moralregretorcondemnationthatsignalswrongness).Yetwhenpeoplehaveputothersin

situationsinwhichthethingstheyneedtolive,andtolivewell,dependalmostentirely

uponourchoices,itimmediatelyseemswrongnottodowhatisnecessaryforthemnot

onlytosurvivebutalsotofarewell.Thus,afourthpairofprinciplesmightbe:whenyou

makeothersdependentonyourself,donotdeprivethemofthingstheyneedinorderto

livewell,anddonotbecomplicitinsuchdeprivation.

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Finally,Iamdisturbedbythefactthatinrecovery,otheranimalsarecontrolled,die,

enduresuffering,andarenottreatedwiththecarecalledforbytheirdependence,allinthe

serviceofanendthattheanimalsneitherknownorcareanythingabout.Manyofthe

regrettablethingsthathappentotheminrecoveryarenotinstrumentaltotheirown

welfareoragency.Thebenefitaccruesalmostentirelytoothers,notleasttothehumans

whocareaboutspeciesandecosystemsassuch.185Afifthsetofprinciplesviolatedbythe

recoveryalternativemightbe:donotexploitothers,anddonotbecomplicitintheir

exploitation.

Intherecoverypredicament,whatintuitiveprinciplesareviolatedbythe

alternativeinwhichaspeciesisallowedtogoextinct?Myoriginalnegativeemotional

responsetothisisarousedbythedestructionofanalmostunthinkablycomplexand

wonderfulwayofbeingalive,theresultofeonsofunrepeatableevents(suchasbirths,

pairings,deaths,foraysintonewterritories,trialsofnovelbehaviors,mutations).The

principlethisrevealsmightsimplybe:donotcause,orcontributetocausing,another

speciestogoextinct,anddonotbecomplicitincausingextinction.

Inaddition,someofmyintuitiveprinciplesthatareviolatedbyrecoveryarealso

violatedbyextinction.Likerecovery,extinctioncancausesufferinganddeath(the

proximatecauseoftheislandfox’sextinctionwouldhavebeenearlydeathsvia

eviscerationbyeagles,andiftheygoextinct,thelastnorthernspottedowlswillgowithout

matesandyoung,andprobablywithoutterritories),soanthropogenicextinctioncan

violatetheprinciplesagainstcausingorbeingcomplicitincausingsufferinganddeath.

Assumingforthesakeofargumentthatintuitive-levelprinciplesunderlieorare

constitutedbymyimmediate,concretereactionstorecoveryandextinction,Ithinkthat

thesearetheprinciples.Itwouldbetooeasytodismisstheconflictbypointingoutthatthe

principlesarenotabsolute.Onreflection,Icanseethatkillingisnotalwayswrong,that

185J.M.Coetzee’sfictionalElizabethCostelloexpressesakindredideamoreeloquently,whenshesays“Anecologicalphilosophythattellsustolivesidebysidewithothercreaturesjustifiesitselfbyappealtoanidea,anideaofahigherorderthananylivingcreature.Anidea,finally—andthisisthecrushingtwisttotheirony—whichnocreatureexceptmaniscapableofcomprehending.Everylivingcreaturefightsforitsown,individuallife,refuses,byfighting,toaccedetotheideathatthesalmonorthegnatisofalowerorderofimportancethantheideaofthesalmonorthegnat.”Coetzee,ElizabethCostello,99.

119

inflictingseriousharmcansometimesbejustified,andthatinsomecasesitmightbebest

toallowaspeciestogoextinct.Itisjustthatevenjustifiedviolationsoftheprinciples

triggeramoral-emotionalrecoil.Thatispartofwhatitmeanstosaythattheyare

principles.

Theprinciplescomeintwosets.Theprinciplesagainstharming,killing,controlling,

neglecting,andexploitingothersmakeupthesetaccordingtowhichrecoveryiswrong.I

willcallthistheNoMistreatmentset.Thesetaccordingtowhichitiswrongnotto

undertakerecoverycomprisestheNoExtinctionset.Itisimportanttonotethatholding

justoneprinciplefromeachsetcangiverisetotherecoveryconflict.

Someevidencethatmoralprinciplesagainstmistreatingotheranimalsarecommonlyheld

Idonotthinkmuchargumentneedstobemadefortheclaimthatmostpeople--whetherin

NorthAmericaoranywhereelse—tendtothinkthatprotanto,itiswrongtoinflictserious

harmonothers.AsShaunNicholsnotes,“normalhumanshavestronglyaversiveemotional

responsestosufferinginothers,”suchresponsesareprobablyinnate,and(consequently,

hethinks)normsthatprohibitharmexistandpersistacrosscultures.186

OnequestioniswhethermostofusintheU.S.andCanadalimitthisprinciplesoas

toforbidonlyharmstohumanbeings(or,whetherwehaveextendedittoforbidharming

otheranimals).Ithinkthatmostofusdonotsolimitit,buttheevidenceisadmittedly

mixed.Anotherquestioniswhethermostofusextendtoanimalstheotherprinciplesinthe

NoMistreatmentset.Whileitshouldbepossibleinprincipletodisentanglepeople’s

adherencetothevariousprinciplesinthisset,inpracticeitisnot.Theevidencefor

people’smoralapprobationordisapprobationofthedifferentformsofmistreatmentisnot

fine-grainedenoughtodistinguishbetweencausingsuffering,killing,controlling,

exploiting,andneglecting.

Muchofourcollectivebehaviorbeliesacommonprincipleforbiddingthesekindsof

mistreatmentofotheranimals.Foroneofmanyexamples,99%ofthe9.1billionfarm

186Nichols,“SentimentalismNaturalized,”271.

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animalskilledforfoodeachyearintheUS,and95%ofthe665millionkilledinCanada

livedtheirlivesinthedeplorableconditionsoffactoryfarms.

Ontheotherhand,pollssuggestthatintheU.S.,mostpeoplecareabouthowother

animalsaretreated,andbelievethattheyshouldbeprotected.Independentlyofeach

other,YouGovandGallupintervieweddifferentsamplesof1000randomlychosenadults

fromacrossthecountry.187ExactlythreequartersofthosepolledbyYouGovthoughtthat

animalsshouldbeaffordedsomelegalprotections,andabarelysmallerpercentage—

74%—saidtheybelievethatanimalshaverights.TheGalluppollproducedsimilarresults.

AmongthequestionsGallupaskedwasthefollowing.“Whichofthesestatementscomes

closesttoyourviewaboutthetreatmentofanimals:animalsdeservetheexactsamerights

aspeopletobefreefromharmandexploitation,animalsdeservesomeprotectionfrom

harmandexploitation,butitisstillappropriatetousethemforthebenefitofhumans,or

animalsdon'tneedmuchprotectionfromharmandexploitationsincetheyarejust

animals.”Only3%ofrespondentsthoughtthestatementdismissiveofprotectionbest

capturedtheirbelief,while94%believedthatanimalsdeserveatleastsomeprotection

againstharmandexploitation.Thisgroupincludedthe32%ofrespondentswhothought

thattheirviewwasbestrepresentedbytheclaimthatotheranimalsdeservethesame

rightsaspeople.

Inadditiontopublicopinionpolls,atrendinlegislationthatprotectsotheranimals

givessomesupporttotheclaimthatmostpeopleinCanadaandtheU.S.holdatleastoneof

theprinciplesintheNoMistreatmentset.Lawspassedbylegislaturesandbyreferenda

tendincreasinglytoprotectotheranimalsfromharminflictedbypeople,despiteacounter-

trendtowardpreventingprotectivemeasuresthatwouldlessenprofitsofanimal

agriculture.AccordingtotheAnimalLegalDefenseFund(ALDF),inboththeU.S.and

Canadatherearestrongtrendstowardincreasinglyprotectiveanimalwelfarelaws,passed

eitherbyreferendaorbylegislatures.188Between2012–2017,morethanhalfofthestates

andterritoriesintheU.S.made“significantimprovement[s]”totheiranimalwelfarelaws,

187SeeRiffkin,“MoreSayAnimalsShouldHaveRights”andMoore,“MajorityEndorseAnimalRights.”188AnimalLegalDefenseFund,2017U.S.AnimalProtectionLawsRankings;and2017CanadianAnimalProtectionLawsRankings.

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onALDF’sanalysis.CrueltytootheranimalsisnowafelonyineveryU.S.state,andthe

numberofstatesthatassignfelonypenaltiestoneglect,abandonmentandreckless

endangermentisrising.Similarly,inCanada“therehasbeenamarkedimprovementinthe

lawsofmanyprovincesandterritories”since2008,thoughinsomeprovincesandinthe

territories,legalprotectionremainsweakandpatchy.Someprovinceshavebegunpassing

lawsthatprotectotheranimalsnotonlyfromphysicalharm,butalsofrompsychological

harm.

Insummary,publicopinionpollsandatrendinpublicly-supportedlawsprotecting

otheranimalsgivessomesupporttotheclaimthatmostpeopleinCanadaandtheU.S.hold

atleastoneoftheprinciplesintheNoMistreatmentset.Sincethereismistreatmentof

otheranimalsonbothsidesoftherecoverypredicament,thepredicamentwillatleast

appearasaconflictformostpeople,eveniftheydonotalsoholdtheprincipleagainst

causingextinction.

Someevidencethatamoralprincipleagainstdrivingaspeciestoextinctioniscommonlyheld

LawsandpublicopinionstudiesalsoindicatethatthatpeopleinCanadaandtheUStendto

thinkthatitiswrongforpeopletodriveotherspeciestoextinction.Inonestudy,Leigh

RaymondandLauraSchneidersentmailsurveystoasampleoflandownersincentral

Indiana.189Thesurveyspresentedanumberofdifferentkindsofreasonspeoplehavegiven

forprotectingendangeredspecies,andaskedrespondentstoratehowimportanteach

reasonwastothem,onascaleof1(notatallimportant)to7(extremelyimportant).Of419

responses,theaverageimportancegivento“Speciesprotectionisimportantbecause

human-causedextinctionismorallywrong”was4.47.Thisindicatesthatthosesurveyed

tendtothinkthatthereisamoralreasontopreventanthropogenicextinction,although

admittedlynotanextremelystrongone.190Inasimilarstudy,AndreaOlivesurveyed

189RaymondandSchneider,“PersonalMoralNormsandAttitudes.”190TheenormouspopularityoftheEndangeredSpeciesAct(ESA)addssomesupporttotheclaimthatmanypeopleintheU.S.thinkthatcausingextinctioniswrong.InJuly2015,TulchinResearchreleasedtheresultsofapollof600registeredvotersintheU.S.NinetypercentofthemsaidthattheysupporttheESA.Supportwashighacrossregions,demographicgroups,andpoliticalaffiliations.ThoseleastlikelytosupporttheESAweremid-westerners,men,people50yearsoldormore,andconservatives.Eveninthesegroups,thepercentagesofpeoplewhoexpressedsupportfortheactwerequitehigh,at87%,88%,87%and82%respectively.SeeTulchin,“PollFindsBroad,OverwhelmingSupport.”

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registeredvotersinSaskatchewanbymail.191Shereportsthat82%ofasampleof369

peopleagreedthat“otherspecieshavearighttoexist,”andonly17%ofthemagreedthat

“itisokayforhumanbeingstoletotherspeciesgoextinctbecauseofhumanactivities.”

Therecoverypredicamentwillregisterasaconflictforanyonewhorespondswith

moralperturbationbothtoextinction(ortotheharmfuleffectsofit)andtowhatmust

sometimesbedonetopreventextinction.Onautilitarianinterpretation,thisconflictisthe

resultofintuitivelevelmoralprinciplesthatyieldclashingprescriptionsforaction.Ihave

suggestedwhattheseprinciplesmightbe,andhavegivensomeevidencethattheyare

widelyheldbyresidentsofCanadaandtheU.S.,twocountriesinwhichtherecovery

predicamentsoccur.Ihavenotproventhatalloftheprinciplesareuniversallyheld,orthat

uponbeingmadeawareoftherecoverypredicament,mostpeopleinthesesocietieswould

experienceitasaconflict.YetIhopethatIhavemadetenabletheideathatitwouldbeso

perceivedbyacommunitythatincludesmanymembersofthesocietiesthatcreatethe

conflict.

Insection2.2,underthesubheadingIntuitiveprinciplesarenotfixed,IsaidthatHare

distinguishesamongintuitiveprinciplesthatarecommontoall,onesthatarecommonto

particularroles,andonesthatarepersonaltoindividuals.Therewillthereforebeconflicts

thatarecommon,onesthatoccuronlyforpeopleinparticularroles,andonesthatare

uniquetoindividuals.Ifwetake“all”withagrainofsalt,Ithinkitisfairtosaythatthe

recoverypredicamentisaconflictthatiscommontoall,atleastephemerally.Isitalsoa

conflictforatleastsomeofthosewhoserolesplacethemattheheartofthepredicament?

Whilesomepeopleonthefrontlinesoftherecoverypredicamentmaynotregister

itasevenanephemeralconflict,otherswill.TakeLowellDiller,thelong-timewildlife

biologistwhokillsbarredowlsinthehopeofpreventingextinctionofspottedowls,and

whothinksasfeelsasthoughbothcoursesofactionavailabletohim—killingtheowlsand

doingnothing—are“ethicallywrong.”192AndrecallthatBobSallinger,anofficialatamajor

191Olive,Land,Stewardship,andLegitimacy,112-143.192Diller,“ToShootorNottoShoot,”57.

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birdconservationorganizationintheregionwheretheowlrecoverypredicamenttakes

place,expressesthesimilarnotionthatbothoptionsare“unacceptable.”193

Thesepeoplewhoworkonornearthefrontlinesofthespottedowlrecovery

predicamentcertainlyregisteritasamoralconflict.Morethanthat,theyseemtoregisterit

asatragicmoralconflict.Sallingerdoesnotcalltheoptionswithinitsimply“unacceptable,”

hecallsthem“completelyunacceptable.”AndDillerdoesnotsayonlythattheyare

“ethicallywrong,”hedescribeshavingtodecidebetweenthemas“asortof‘Sophie’s

Choice,’”whichisatragicconflictifthereeverwasone.

Thatpeopleholdintuitiveprinciplesinsuchawaythattheyregister(orare

disposedtoregister)recoverypredicamentsastragicmoralconflictsisallthatisneeded

forautilitariantoacceptthatforthosepeople,recoverypredicamentsareatleast

ephemeraltragicmoralconflicts.Butcanrecoverypredicamentspersistastragicmoral

conflictsevenaftercriticalutilitarianscrutiny?Theycan,aslongasforeachpossible

courseofaction,atleastoneoftheperson’sintuitiveprinciplesforbiddingitmaximizes

utilityinitstragedy-generatingform.Thetragicconflictwillnotpersist,thatis,unlessitis

optimificforthepersontobedisposedtojudgethatviolatingitisnotjustwrongbut

seriouslywrong,andtofeelremorseabouthavingviolatedit.

5.WhethertheRecoveryPredicamentisaPersistentConflictisIndeterminate

Inthissection,Iwillarguethatitisnotpossibleforautilitariantodeterminewithany

degreeofcertaintywhethertherecoverypredicamentisapersistentmoralconflict

becausethereliabilityoftheirmethodfordeterminingthisdependsontheaccuracyof

empiricalfactstowhichtheydonothaveaccess.Thisentailsthatthepredicament’sstatus

asatragicmoralconflictisalsoindeterminate;iftheutilitarianmethodcannotshow

whetherthepredicamentisapersistentmoralconflict,thenitwillnotbeabletoshow

whetheritisapersistenttragicconflict,either.

193Cornwall,“ThereWillBeBlood.”

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AsHarewrites,conflict“force(s)ustoquestiontheprinciplesthatgiverisetoit.”194It

compelsautilitariantoscrutinizeprincipleswhich,previously,theymayhavehadno

reasontodoubt.Thequestionautilitarianmustaskaboutconflict-generatingprinciplesis

aretheprinciplesoptimificintheirconflict-generatingform,orwouldthosewhoholdthe

principlesbringaboutmorewelfare,onthewhole,iftheyweretoqualifytheminawaythat

eliminatesconflict?

Inresponsetotherecoverypredicamentthereareaminimumofthreealternative

treatmentsofprinciples,theutilityofwhichautilitarianmustcompare.

1. Keepbothsetsofprinciplesintheirconflict-generatingforms.Ifthisalternative

maximizesutility,therecoveryconflictwillpersist.Eachtimeitarises,oneofthe

setsofprinciplesmustbeoverridden,andsoactedagainst.Butthedispositionsto

thinkthatitiswrongtoactagainstitandtofeelmoralregretforhavingdoneso,

willendure.

2. QualifytheNoExtinctionsetbybuildingintoitanexceptionsuchthatitdoesnot

applyinthecircumstancesoftherecoverypredicament.Eventually,tothosewho

amendorinheritamendedprinciples,therecoverypredicamentwillnolongerpose

evenaprimafacieconflict.Soifthisistheutility-maximizingresolution,the

recoveryconflictwillnotpersist.

3. QualifytheNoMistreatmentsetbybuildingintoitanexceptionsuchthatitdoesnot

applyinthecircumstancesoftherecoverypredicament.Ifthisistheutility-

maximizingresolution,therecoveryconflictwillnotpersist.

Thesearetheminimumnumberofalternativesamongwhichautilitarianwillhaveto

choosewhentheycriticallyassesstheprinciplesimplicatedintherecoverypredicament.

Thethreebasictreatmentscanalsobecombinedtoyieldhybrids.Forinstance,autilitarian

couldconsideramendingtheNoExtinctionsetforasubsetofrecoverypredicaments(say,


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onlythoseinvolvingdecadesofcaptivebreedingandlarge-scaleculls),whileamendingthe

NoMistreatmentsetfortherest.Or,theymightconsideramendingtheNoMistreatment

principlesinonesubset,andotherwisemaintainbothsetsofprinciples.Thehybrid

possibilitiesarenumerous.Undersomeofthemconflictwillsometimespersist,under

othersitwillnot.

Two-levelutilitarianswillmovetothecriticalleveltochooseamongthesetreatments

ofrecoveryconflict-generatingprinciples.Becausenooneisactuallycapableof

imaginativelyinhabitingthepreferencesofeverysentientbeingwhowouldbeaffectedby

thechoiceamongalternatives,choosinginvolvesconductingabenefit-harmanalysis(BHA)

tocomparetheutilityofthevariouspossibleresolutions.IftheBHAshowsthatthewelfare

maximizingresolutionisonethatneitherqualifiesthecontentoftheconflict-generating

principlesnoreradicatestheprinciples,thenrecoverypredicamentswillbepersistent

conflicts.Yetifwelfarewouldbemaximizedbyamendingtheprinciplessuchthattheyno

longergenerateconflict,thentheconflictwillbeonlyephemeral.

However,itisnotpossibleforautilitariantodeterminewithanydegreeofcertainty

whethertherecoverypredicamentisapersistentconflict.Toseewhythisisso,letustake

alookatthefivestepsofarecoverypredicamentBHA(RPBHA),thatis,aBHAcomparing

theaggregatewelfarethatwouldresultfromeachofthewaysthatwemightreformulateor

re-ordertheprinciplesthatgeneratetherecoveryconflict.Thefirststepistodetermine

whateffectthevariousresolutionswillhaveonthebehaviorofthosewhooriginallyheld

theconflictingsetofprinciples.Thesecondstepistodeterminewhichwelfaresubjectswill

beaffectedbythedecisiontoretainorchangetheprinciplesinvolvedintherecovery

conflict.Next,theutilitarianmustfigureouthowthingswillgodifferentlyundereach

alternativeforeachofthosewhowillbeaffected.Afterthat,theymusttranslatethese

differencesintoamountsofwelfare—howmuchmoreorlesswelfarewillaccruetothe

affectedundereachalternative?Finally,theymustaggregatetheseamounts,andcompare

thetotalsforeachalternative.

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Howwilldifferentresolutionsaffectpeople’sbehavior?

Letusallowtheutilitariantoassumethatpeople’sbehaviorwillreflecttheirprinciples.So

qualifyingoroverridingtheNoMistreatmentsetofprinciplesinrecoverypredicaments

willleadpeopletoundertakeortosupportrecoveryinthosesituations,andqualifyingor

overridingtheNoExtinctionsetwouldresultinrecoverynotbeingundertakenor

supportedinsuchsituations.Thismightbeasafeassumptionabouttheeffectofprinciple

changesonpeople’sbehavior,buttheutilitarianwillbefacedwithothersthataremore

opentoquestion.Forinstance,howwillmodifyingoroverridingaprincipleinone

situationaffectpeople’sbehaviorinothersituations?WouldoverridingtheNoExtinction

principlesincasesoftherecoverypredicamentstrengthenorweakenpeople’stendencies

toundertakeandtosupportrecoveriesthatdonotinvolveconflicts?Woulditleadthemto

bemoreorlesscarefulnottodothethingsthatcriticallyendangerspecies?Itisdifficultfor

metoseehowtheutilitariancanmakegoodguessesabouttheanswerstothesequestions.

Whowillbeaffected?

ThesecondquestiontheutilitarianmustanswerinordertoperformtheirBHAis:Whowill

beaffectedbythedecision?Thatis,whoseliveswouldgodifferentlyfortheminimportant

waysifpeopleregularlyresolverecoveryconflictsinonewayratherthananother?Ifthis

wereacost-benefitanalysis,thequestionwouldbephrased“whoarethestakeholders”?It

isimportantnottoignore,substantiallyoverestimate,orsubstantiallyunderestimateany

groupofstakeholders,asthiscouldskewtheanalysistowardanoutcomewhichwouldnot

infactmaximizewelfare.WhenitcomestoperformingBHAsforpoliciesthatwould

primarilyaffectcurrentlyexistinghumanbeings(e.g.shouldthepostalservicediscontinue

door-to-doormailcarrierserviceinurbanareas),therisksofthesemistakescanbe

minimizedbygivingpeopleampleopportunitiestoclaimandtoargueforstakeholder

status.Yetwhenmostofthosewhowillbeaffectedareotheranimals,whocannotadvocate

fortheirinclusion,therisksremainhigh.Thisisespeciallysowhenthedecisionhasthe

potentialtomakeadifferencetogreatnumbersofindividualsfrommanydifferent

populationsoverlongperiodsoftime,becauseslightlymistakenassumptionsaboutthe

initialnumbersaffected,orabouthowdifferentpopulationswillgroworshrinkovertime,

canleadtoenormouserrors.IntheRPBHA,ignoring,overestimating,andunderestimating

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the“stakeholders”ofthisdecisionisalmostinevitable,andsotheutilitarianshoulddoubt

thatthattheresolutionitrecommendswillactuallymaximizeutility.Tomakethismore

concrete,letustakealookatthebroadgroupsintowhichtheaffectedwillfall.

1.Sentientmembersofcriticallyendangeredpopulations,therecoveryofwhicha)requires

captivebreedingand/ortranslocationand/orremoval/eradicationofotherpopulations

thatimpederecovery,andb)wouldbeattempteddependingontheoutcomeoftheRPBHA.

2.Sentientmembersofnon-threatenedpopulationsthatwouldbetranslocatedor

eradicatedifpeopleattempttorecoverthepopulationsingroup1.

3.Sentientmembersofpopulationsthatdepredate,parasitize,competewith,are

depredatedby,orotherwiseimpactedbythepresence/absenceandsizeofthepopulations

in1and2(humanswillbeamongthosewhofallintothisgroup).

4.Potentialmembersofgroups1,2,and3whoseexistence/non-existenceand/orlife

conditionsinfuturegenerationswillvaryaccordingtowhetherpopulationsingroup1are

recovered.

Neitheridentifyingthespeciesmembershipofindividualsingroups1and2,nor

estimatingthenumberofindividualsperspeciesinthesegroupsshouldbethesourceof

greatuncertainty.Populationsingrouponewouldbeformallylistedasendangered,and

wouldhaverecoveryplanscallingforcaptivebreeding,translocation,oreradication.

Estimatesoftheirsizearelikelytobefairlyaccurate,becausewhenananimalpopulationis

knowntobeatthebrinkofextinction,thosewhoworktorecoverthemoftenkeeptabson

everysinglemember.Populationsingroup2wouldbeidentifiedintherecoveryplansfor

speciesingroupone.Thenumbersthatwouldbecapturedandtranslocated,orkilledare

usuallyspecifiedprecisely,inpartbecausedoinganyofthesethingstoawildanimal

normallyrequiresapermit.

Groups3and4willbemuchlargerthangroups1and2,butneithertheirspecies

compositionnorthenumberofindividualsperspeciescanbeknownwithanydegreeof

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certainty.Letustakegroup3first.Evenexpertsoncriticallyendangeredspeciesdonot

alwaysknowallofthespeciestheypreyupon,letalonethesizeofthosepreypopulations

ortheextenttowhichtheywouldbeaffectedbytheextinctionorrecoveryofthe

endangeredpopulations.Neitherdotheyknowhowtheextinctionorrecoverywouldmake

adifferencetothepredatorsofgroups1and2,orwhosedietsorhabitatuseoverlapswith

thoseofgroups1and2.Thespeciesandnumbersofindividualswhowouldnotbe

impactedbyasingleextinctionorrecoverybutwhowouldexperiencecumulativeeffectsof

multipleextinctionsorrecoveriesareevenlesscertain.Amongthisgroupmightbesome

humanpopulations,althoughmostofthehumansaffectedbythisdecisionwillbeingroup

4,futuresentientbeings.

WhiletheutilitarianmightbefairlycertainthatamendingoroverridingtheNo

Extinctionprincipleswouldresultintherebeingzerofuturemembersofpopulationsin

group1,andthatamendingoroverridingtheNoMistreatmentprincipleswillresultinzero

futuremembersofpopulationsthatrecoverywoulderadicate,theycannotpredictwith

muchaccuracythefuturesizesofpopulationsinthesegroupsunderotheralternatives.

Neithercantheyaccuratelypredictfuturesizesofpopulationsingroup3.Todothis,they

wouldneedaccurateestimatesofthecurrentpopulationsizes,andtheywouldalsohaveto

knowtheirdensity,theirdensity-dependentratesofgrowth,andhowtheseparameters

wouldbeaffectedbychangesinthesizesofotherpopulationstowhichtheyrelate

ecologicallyinbothdirectandindirectways.

Howwilltheybeaffected?

Fortheirbenefit-harmanalysis,theutilitarianalsoneedstohaveasolidunderstandingof

howthelivesoftheaffectedwouldgodifferentlyundereachresolutiontorecovery

predicaments.Underwhatconditionswilltheyliveineachscenario?Forhowlongwill

theyliveunderthem?Eveniftheutilitarianmanagestohavegoodestimatesofwhowillbe

affected,theywillnothaveaccesstomuchdetailaboutwhatconditionswillbelikefor

manyofthem.Attheverybest,theutilitariancanroughlyestimatehowmanyofwhich

kindsofanimalsintheaffectedgroupswillreachtheirlifeexpectancyandhowmanywill

liveshorterorlongerlives,howmanywillspendtimeinthewild,howmanyincaptivity,

howmanyinunfamiliarplaces,andhowmanyinplacestheyknowwell,howmanywithin

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theirownterritoriesandhowmanywithoutterritories,howmanywithcompanionsthey

havechosen,andhowmanywithoutthem.Yettheutilitarianisnotinapositiontomake

evenroughguessesoftheseunlesstheyhavegoodestimatesofthenumbersandspecies

membershipofindividualsineachoftheaffectedgroups.

Howmuchwelfarewilleachalternativecontain?

Iftheutilitarianisableroughlytodescribetheconditionsunderwhichthousandsof

sentientbeingswillliveifweundertakerecoveryinrecoverypredicaments,andthose

underwhichtheywillliveifwedonot,theymusttranslatethisinformationintoaranking

oftheoutcomesofthesechoicesaccordingtowhichcontainsthemostnetlifesatisfaction.

ThisisthewholepointoftheBHAandisarguablythemostdemandingstep.Itisdifficult

enoughforautilitariantoknowwhichamongalternatecoursesofactionwillmostenhance

welfarewithinjusttheirownlife,asSidgwickobserves.195Thisdifficultyismagnifiedwhen

theyaredealingwiththelivesofmanydifferentkindsofbeingswhosebodies,sociallives,

andformsofcognitiondiffervastlyfromours,andwhocannotcommunicatetheirattitudes

touswithmuchdetail.Yettocometoaconclusionaboutwhichchoicewillleadtothemost

welfare,theutilitarianmustmakesomebigassumptionsabouttherelativeamountsoflife

satisfactionexperiencedbybeingstowhoseinnerlivesshehaslittleornoaccess.

Theutilitarianmightassume,contraDavidBenatar,thatsomelifeisbetterthanno

life.196Theymightalsoassumethat,atleastuntilsenescence,morelifeisbetterthanless,

thattimespentincaptivityisworsethantimespentinthewild,andthatitisbettertolive

withinone’shomerangethantobetranslocatedelsewhere.IftheresultsoftheBHAare

close,though,theutilitarianmighthavetomakeadditionalassumptionsabouthowmuch

betteronekindoflifeisthananother.Thiscouldinvolvemakingevenfurtherassumptions

aboutwhether,say,captivelifehasnegativeorpositiveutility(whetheritisbetteror

worsethannothing).Suchassumptionswillbeshakierthantheassumptionthatcaptive

lives,etc.arenotasgoodaswildones.

195Sidgwick,MethodsofEthics,140-150.196Benatar,BetterNevertoHaveBeen.

130

Becausethealternativeresolutionswouldleadtodifferentsuitesofspecies,and

differentnumbersofindividualsperspecies,theutilitarianfacesafurtherdifficultyin

tryingtocomparetheamountofwelfareassociatedwitheachone:thewildlivesof

membersofsomespeciesmighttypicallycontaineithermorelifesatisfaction,ormore

dissatisfaction,thanthelivesofmembersofothers.Icanthinkoftworeasonstoentertain

thispossibility.First,membersofsomespeciesleadmuchlongerlivesthanmembersof

others.Forinstance,wildelephantsliveforabout42years,whilehousemiceliveforabout

two.Imagineahappymouseandahappyelephant,eachofwhichlivestotheaveragelife

expectancyofherspecies.Forthesakeofargument,saythatlifesatisfactioncanbe

quantifiedonascaleof1to10,andthatthroughouttheirlives,bothanimalsmaintainalife

satisfactionof8.Dotheirlivescontainanequalamountofwelfare?Thattheelephantwill

spend40moreyearsenjoyingherlifethanthemousesuggeststhattheirlivesdonot

containequalamountsofwelfare.Ontheotherhand,theelephants’lifemightnotseem

longertotheelephantthanthemouse’sdoestothemouse;therecouldbeasmanymouse-

eventsinthemouse’slifeasthereareelephant-eventsintheelephants’.

Ifthelivesofmembersoflonger-livedspecieshavegreaterpotentialforwelfareand

suffering,thentheassumptionthat“themorewildlivesanalternativecontains,themore

welfareitcontains”biasesaBHAtowardmembersofshorter-livedspecies.Onesolutionto

thiswouldbetochangeourcoreassumptionto“themorewildyearsanalternative

contains,themorewelfareitcontains.”Butthisassumptionmightnotgiveenoughweight

tothewelfareofmembersoflong-livedspecies.Wedonot—andprobablycannot—know

whichassumptionisclosertothetruth.

Anotherreasontothinkthatthelivesofmembersofsomespeciesmightcontain

morewelfarethanthoseofothersisthatevenfortwospecieswithsimilarlifespans—such

asislandfoxesandferalpigs,bothofwhichtendtoliveforaboutsevenyears—membersof

onemightbedisposedtogreaterlifesatisfactionthanmembersoftheother.Justassome

individualswithinthesamespecieshavehigherbase-linelevelsofcontentmentthan

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others,somespeciesmight,too.Species-specificemotionalandcognitivetendenciesmight

makeitsothatsomekindsofanimalsaregenerallyhappierthanothers.197

Insum,theutilitariancannottrustthattheirRPBHAwilldowhatitissupposedto

do:pickouttheutility-maximizingreformulationorre-orderingoftheintuitivelevel

principlesthatgeneraterecoverypredicaments.Thisisbecauseinordertoperformthe

RPBHA,theutilitarianwillhavetomakepoorlygroundedassumptionsabouthow

reformulatingprincipleswillchangepeoples’behavior,aboutwhoseliveswillbeaffected

bythosechanges,abouthowtheirliveswillbeaffected,andabouthowtheseeffects

translateintotheamountofwelfaretheirliveswillcontain.Asaresult,theutilitarian

cannotdeterminewhethertherecoverypredicamentisapersistentconflict—tragicor

not—ormerelyanephemeralorapparentone.

Onemightconcludefromthisthatrecoverypredicamentsleaveutilitariansata

practicalimpasse.Thisisnotnecessarilyso.Whenitisnotfeasibleadequatelytoevaluate

conflict-generatingintuitiveprinciples,theutilitarianhasasolution:conductBHAsonthe

availablecoursesofactioninparticularsituationsofconflict,astheyarise.TheseBHAswill

beslimmerthanthemega-BHArequiredtodeterminewhethertheprinciplesimplicatedin

therecoverypredicamentareoptimific.

Whetherthismovesusawayfromthepracticalimpassedependsonwhetherthe

smallerBHAssufferthesameweaknessesasthelargeronedoes.Iamafraidthattheydo.

Likethelargerone,theyrequireinformationaboutthesizeandspeciescompositionof

currentandfuturegenerationsofotheranimals,oftheconditionsunderwhichthose

animalswilllive,andhowthoseconditionswillmakeadifferencetotheamountsof

welfaretheirliveswillcontain.

197Somestudieshaveshownthatdomesticatedmammalstendtohavemoreserotoninintheirbrains(silverfoxes),andlesscortisolintheirblood(silverfoxes,Norwayrats,Guineapigs),thantheirwildcounterparts.SeeHareetal.,“Self-DomesticationHypothesis,”2-3,6;KünzlandSachser,“BehavioralEndocrinologyofDomestication;”Popovaetal.,“SerotoninMetabolismandSerotonergicReceptorsinNorwayRats;”andTrutetal.“AnimalEvolutionDuringDomestication.”Inhumans,serotoninisassociatedwithfeelingsofwell-beingwhilecortisolisassociatedwithfeelingsofstress.Sowemighthypothesizethatmembersofdomesticatedspecies(includingH.sapiens)tendtobehappierthanmembersofwildones.

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6.Conclusion

Utilitarianismaccommodatestwowaysinwhichanactioncanbewrong:itcanbewrongin

virtueofviolatingtheprincipleofutility,anditcanbewronginvirtueofviolatingan

intuitiveprinciplethattheprincipleofutilityjustifiestheagenttohold.Admittedly,it

cannotbethecasethatwhateverapersondoeswillbewronginthesenseofviolatingthe

principleofutility.However,apersoncanfaceasituationinwhichwhatevertheydowill

bewronginthesenseofviolatingagoodintuitiveprinciple.Andtheycanfaceasituationin

whichwhatevertheydowilleitherviolateagoodintuitiveprincipleorviolatetheprinciple

ofutility.Toknowwhetheramoralconflictispersistent,orreal,wemustassesswhetherit

maximizesutilitytoretaintheimplicatedintuitiveprinciplesintheirconflict-generating

form.Yetwedonotandperhapscannotknowenoughtodeterminewhetherwithany

degreeofcertaintywhetheritmaximizesutilitytoretaintheprinciplesimplicatedinthe

recoverypredicamentintheirconflict-generatingform.

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Conclusion

TheprecedingchaptersexploredwhetherworkingfromwithinKant’sdeontology,Ross’s

deontology,orutilitarianismprovidesenvironmentalethicswithanexcuseforavoidingthe

problemoftragicmoralconflict,orforfailingtorecognizerecoverypredicamentsastragic

moralconflicts.Thechaptersaskedthreequestionsofeachtheory.Doesithavewhatit

takestoadmitthattherightactcanbewronginsomeway?Ifso,doesithavewhatittakes

toadmitthattherightactcanbetragicallywrong?Andifitdoes,canitinterpretrecovery

predicamentsassituationsinwhichwhateveronedoeswillbetragicallywrong?

Foreachtheory,theanswertothefirsttwoquestionswasyes;noneofthetheories

excusesenvironmentalethicsforneglectingthequestionoftragicmoralconflict.198For

bothRoss’sandKant’sdeontologies,theanswertothethirdquestionwasalsoyes,butfor

utilitarianism,theanswerwasindeterminate.Thismeansthatfromwithinutilitarianism,

wecannotsaywhetherarecoverypredicamentisatragicmoralconflict,butfromwithin

theothertwotheorieswecansaythatitis.Thefollowingthreesectionssummarizethe

argumentsthatledtotheseconclusions,andhighlightsomeoftheimplicationsofeach

theory’saccountofconflict.Thefourthsectioncriticallyyetbrieflycomparesthetheories’

accountsofrecoveryconflicts.Thefinalsectionshowsthattherecoverypredicamentisnot

theonlykindoftragicmoralconflictcreatedwhenhumanactivitiesvastlyandrapidly

transformenvironments.Itsuggeststhatlikewagingwar,causingextremeecological

changesprolificallygeneratestragicmoralconflict.Thisgivesusyetanotherreasonnotto

causethem.

198Asmentionedinnote49,whenIsaythatenvironmentalethicsneglectstheproblemofconflict,IdonotmeanthatitneglectsthekindsofsituationsIhavecalledrecoverypredicaments.Environmentalethicsoftenaddressessuchsituations,andhasdonesoforalongtime(forexamples,seeRolston,DutiesandValues,141–143;Singer,“NotforHumansOnly;”Jamieson,EthicsandtheEnvironment,172-175).Itevensometimescallsthem“conflicts.”But“conflict”canbeusedtomeannomorethanadifficultproblem,orthatdifferentpartieshavepracticallyincompatibleideasaboutwhatshouldbedone.Evenwhenitcallsthemconflicts,environmentalethicsrarelyframesrecoverypredicamentsexplicitlyassituationsinwhichwhateveronedoeswillinvolvemoralwrongdoing.Andwhileitoccasionallyimpliesthatrecoverypredicamentsareconflictsinthissense(forexamples,seeBeckoff,“Preface,”andVucetichandNelson,“InfirmEthicalFoundations”),itdoesnotthematizethis.Thatis,itdoesnottreattherealityofmoralconflicts—inthewaythatIunderstandthem—asaproblemthatneedsoursteady,carefulattention.ThatiswhatImeanwhenIsaythatenvironmentalethicsneglectstheproblemofmoralconflict.

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1.Ross’sDeontology

Rossproclaimsthathisformofdeontologyprovidesauniquesolutiontothe“casesof

conscience”createdbymoralconflicts,andthatindoingsoitshowsconflicttobe“non-

existent.”Tobesure,thetheorydoesruleoutconflictsinwhichwhateveronedoeswillbe

wronginthesenseofviolatinganallthingsconsideredduty.However,Ihavearguedthat

thisisnottheonlynotionofwrongnessatworkinthetheory.Fulfillingone’sallthings

considereddutycanbewronginthesensethatitwrongssomeone,eitherbyharmingthem

orbreachingtheirtrust.OnRoss’sview,suchwrongswarrantmoralregretandreparation,

evenwhentheyareinevitablepartsoffulfillingone’sallthingsconsideredduty.Whensuch

wrongsareserious,itisconsistentwithRoss’stheorythatremorseisanappropriateform

ofmoralregret.Becauseitdoesnotdenysituationsinwhichwhateveronedoeswill

involvewrongdoingthatisbothseriousandremorse-worthy,Ross’sdeontologyhasroom

fortragicmoralconflict.

Ihavealsoarguedthatrecoverypredicamentsareamongthesituationsthatcanbe

interpretedastragicmoralconflictsfromwithinRoss’sframework.Thesepredicaments

occurwhenonefacestwoincompossiblecoursesofaction:recoveryandextinction.The

extinctioncourseofactioninvolvesfailingtopreventthehuman-causedextinctionofa

species,sub-species,orpopulation.Therecoverycourseofactioninvolvestaking

managementmeasuresthatharm,kill,orintimatelycontrolindividualanimals.Inconcrete

casesoftherecoverypredicament,itispossiblethateachofthesecoursesofaction

seriouslybreachesdutiesofnon-maleficenceorfidelity.Intheislandfoxandnorthern

spottedowlpredicaments,forinstance,eachcourseofactionwouldseriouslybreachduties

ofnon-maleficencetootheranimals.Andtheextinctioncourseofactionwouldbreach

dutiesoffidelitytohumans,althoughwhetherthesebreacheswouldbeseriousisunclear.

BernardWilliams,MichaelStocker,andothershavearguedthatatheorycannot

handlemoralconflictunlessitadmitsapluralityofmoralvalues.199AsStockerexplainsthe

argument,valuemonismprecludesconflictbecauseifthereisonlyonekindofvalue,thena

worsecourseofactioncannotcontainorbringaboutanygoodthatthebetteronedoesnot

199Stocker,PluralandConflictingValues,chapter8;Williams,“ConflictsofValues.”SeealsoTessman,MoralFailure.

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alsocontainorbringabout.Thebetterlacksnothingofvalueincomparisonwiththelesser.

Sowhileitcouldberationaltobeupsetthatonecannottakebothcoursesofaction,it

cannotnotberationaltofeelregret—includingmoralregret—abouthavingtakenthe

betterone.Ifthereismorethanonekindofvalue,however,alessercourseofactioncould

containagoodthatthebetterlacks.Whenitdoes,takingthebetteronecanwarrantmoral

regret.

OnecanconcludefromStocker’sargumentthatmoralconflictrequirespluralism

aboutthegoodand/orpluralismaboutfundamentalmoralprinciplesorduties.Ross’s

theoryispluralisticinbothoftheseways.Butneitherofthemexplainswhythetheory

allowsforthepossibilityofmoralconflict.WecouldstripawayfromRoss’stheoryevery

primafaciedutyexceptthedutyofnon-maleficence,andwecouldstripawayevery

intrinsicevilexceptpain,andmoralconflictwouldstillbepossible.Apersoncouldfacea

situationinwhichtheactthatleastviolatestheprimafaciedutyofnon-maleficence

nonethelessseriouslyharmsatleastonesentientbeing.Performingtheactwouldbe

wronginthesecondsenseIdrewoutofRoss’stheory(itwouldwrongsomeone)while

abstainingfromitwouldbewronginboththesecondsenseandthefirstone(itwouldbe

allthingsconsideredwrong).

MyinterpretationofRoss’sdeontologydoesnotsupporttheclaimthatconflict

requirespluralvalues,becauseneithermultiplegoodsnormultipledeonticprinciplesare

necessaryforthekindofconflictthetheorymakespossible.Conflictisenabledbytwo

featuresofthestructureofthetheory.Thefirstfeatureisthedistinctionbetweenprima

facieduties,whicharticulatefundamentalmoralprinciples,andallthingsconsidered

duties,whicharetheparticularactsthatfulfillanagent’sprimafaciedutiesasmuchasor

morethananyotherpracticableact.Thesecondfeatureisthatwrongdoingisnotlimitedto

violationsofallthingsconsideredduties.Violatingsomeprimafaciedutiescanalsoamount

towrongdoing,evenwhenitisnotallthingsconsideredwrong.Thus,Ross’sdeontology

leavesroomforthepossibilityofmoralconflictbecauseithasapluralityofwaysinwhich

anactcanbewrong,notbecauseithasapluralityofgoodsorapluralityoffundamental

duties.Onmyinterpretationsofthem,thisisalsotrueofutilitarianismandKant’s

deontology,althoughthestructuralfeaturesthataccommodateconflictonthesetheories

differfromthosethataccommodateconflictinRoss’s.

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2.Kant’sDeontology

ThosewhodenythatKant’sethicsleavesroomforthepossibilityofmoralconflictinsist

thatitisimpossibleforapersonevertobeboundtoviolatethemorallaw.Thatis,itcan

neverbethecasethatwhateveronechosestodo,themaximoftheiractionwillviolatethe

categoricalimperative.Theyarecorrecttoinsistonthis.However,thecategorical

imperativeisnottheonlymoralstandardatworkwithinKant’sethics.Thehighestgoodis

alsoamoralstandard,notforthemaximsofactionsbutfortheiroutcomesintheworld;it

iswhatKantcallsa“moralworld,”inwhichallagentsarefullyvirtuousandtheirvirtuous

actionsareeffectiveinhelpingotherpeoplerealizetheirends.Iarguedthatmoralregret

canbewarrantedbysomefailurestomeetthisstandard,andthusthatsuchfailuresare

wrong.Becauseitispossiblethatwhateveronedoeswillbewronginthisway,Kant’s

theorycanaccommodatemoralconflict.Itisalsopossiblethatwhateveronedoeswillbe

seriouslywronginthisway—asThomasHillhasobserved,apersoncanfindthemselvesin

asituationinwhichwhatevertheydowilldestroy,diminishordegradeaperson.200Kant’s

theorythereforehasroomfortragicconflicts.Ithenarguedthatrecoverypredicaments

canposeKantiantragicconflicts,becauseinthemitcanbethecasethatwhateveraperson

doeswilldiminishtheirmoralperfection,andsodetractfromamoralworld,byinjuring

theirowncapacitiesforthemorallyessentialfeelingsofloveandsympathy.

Theaccountoftherecoverypredicamentasatragicconflictthatcanbeunearthed

fromKant’sethicsbringstotheforethemoralinjurythatissufferedbypeoplewho

encountersuchconflicts.Kant’sframeworkallowsustoseerecoveryconflictsassituations

inwhichwhateveronedoeswillweakenanaturalpreconditionofone’svirtue.Itthus

allowsusclearlytoseehowtragicconflicts,suchastherecoverypredicament,harmthe

peoplewhoareentangledinthem.Kant’saccountofconflictoffersanexplanationfor

compassionforLowellDiller,whichsomeonemightfeelwhetherornottheyagreewiththe

choicehemadeinhisconflict.

ThespotlightthatKant’saccountofconflictfocusesontheagentasbotha

perpetratorandavictimofmoralinjurytothemselvesalsoprovidesawaytounderstand

200Hill,“MoralDilemmas,”180,and“MakingExceptions.”

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RuthMarcus’sobservationofthe“dynamicforce”ofmoralconflict,which“motivatesusto

arrangeourlivesandinstitutionswithaviewtoavoidingsuchconflicts.”Becausehavingto

actfromwithinatragicconflictinvolveshavingtochoosetomorallyinjureoneselfinone

wayoranother,itcouldbearguedthatwehavenegativeethicaldutiesnottocreatesuch

situations,eitherforourselvesorforotherpeople.Andaccordingtomyinterpretationof

theaccountofconflictinKant’sethics,thatanactcreatesasituationofconflictmight

sufficetomaketheactwrong,inthesensethatitdetractsfromthehighestgood.

ItisimportanttocontrastthispossibilitywithAlanDonagan’scontentionthatprior

wrongdoingisanecessaryconditionformoralconflict.201LikemostinterpretersofKant,

Donaganholdsthatthereisjustonewayinwhichapersoncandowrong,andthatisby

violatingthemorallaw.202Unlikemostinterpreters,though,Donaganthinksthatitis

possibleforapersontofindthemselvesinasituationfromwhichwhatevertheydowill

violatethemorallaw—butonlyiftheyhavealreadydonesomethingwrong.203

Donagan’sclaimthatapersoncanbeboundtoviolateanethicaldutycontradicts

Kant’snotionofsuchdutiesasapplyingtomaxims,notexternalactions.Ethicalduties

obligateustoprioritizeobligatoryendsoverdiscretionaryones,theydonotrequireor

forbidparticularkindsofoutwardbehavior.Aslongasone’srationalnatureisintact,one

willneverbeboundtoactfromaself-interestedmotiveratherthanamoralone;whenever

rationalnatureisatstake,onecanactforthesakeofit,andcandosojustbecauseitis

obligatory.Indeed,itisapremiseofthetheorythataperson,quaperson,canalwaysdo

this.Thisiswhytheonlykindofwrongdoingapersoncanbeboundtocommit,onmy

interpretationofKant’stheory,isthekindinvolvedindetractingfromthehighestgood.

201DonaganTheoryofMorality,chapter5;and“MoralDilemmas.”202E.g.Timmerman,“KantianDilemmas?”;Herman,“ObligationandPerformance.”203Forexamples,DonaganturnstoSt.GregorytheGreat.Allinvolve“injudiciousvows”whichlaterobligatethevowmakertodosomethingcontrarytoduty.Inatypicalexample,amanpromisesareprobatefriendtokeepallofhissecrets.(TheoryofMorality,144)Thefriendlaterdivulgesthatheisgoingtokillsomeone.Ostensibly,theman’sinitialwrongdoingistomakeapromisedespitenothaving“acceptablereasontobelievethathecanandmaydoashepromises.”(“MoralDilemmas,”283)Subsequently,hefacesaconflictbetweennotpreventinganeasilypreventablemurder,andbreakingapromise.Donaganthinksthatpracticalreasonprovidesarulefordecidingwhattodoinresponsetosuchconflicts:takethelessevilcourseofaction.Yetthisruledoesnotcanceloutthewrongnessofthelessevilact,whichremainsinviolationofthemorallaw.

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3.Utilitarianism

Utilitariansoftenchampiontheirmoraltheoryasresistanttoconflict,andfriendsof

conflictcriticizethetheoryonthesamegrounds.Againstthechampionsandthecritics,I

havearguedthatwithinutilitarianism,itispossibleforanagenttofaceasituationinwhich

whatevertheydowillbewronginsomeway.Admittedly,itcannotbethatwhatevera

persondoeswillbewronginthemostconspicuoussenseofviolatingtheprincipleof

utility.Thatis,itcanneverbethecasethateverycourseofactionpersoncouldtakewould

bringaboutlesswelfarethananotheravailableaction.However,utilitarianismimplies

anothersenseinwhichanactioncanbewrong:itcanbewronginvirtueofviolatingan

intuitivemoralprinciplethattheprincipleofutilityjustifiestheagenttohold.AsHare

explains,violatingautility-maximizingintuitiveprinciplewarrantsmoralregret,whichis

anotherwayofsayingthatitiswrong.Utility-maximizingintuitiveprinciplesdonotalways

prescribeutility-maximizingactions.Soanagentcanfindthemselvesinasituationin

whichwhatevertheydowilleitherbewronginthesenseofviolatingtheprincipleof

utility,orwronginthesenseofviolatinganotherprinciplethattheprincipleofutility

vindicatestheminholding.

Ihavealsoarguedthattherecoverypredicamentwillbeautilitarianmoralconflict

if1)bothrecoveryandrefrainingfromrecoveryviolateatleastoneintuitivemoral

principle,and2)themoralprinciplestheyviolateareoptimific,eventhoughthey

sometimesclashwitheachother.Iarguethat1)istrue,butthat2)isindeterminate

becausethereliabilityoftheutilitarianmethodforfiguringoutwhethertheimplicated

principlesareoptimificdependsonempiricalfactstowhichwedonothaveaccess.

NoneofthetheoriesIhavecanvassedmakeiteasytofigureoutwhattodointhe

faceoftherecoverypredicament.Utilitarianismhasthefurtherproblemthatwecannot

applyitsmethodtothequestionofwhetherthepredicamentisaconflictandexpectan

answerinwhichwecanhaveanyconfidence.Utilitarianismcanexplaintheappearanceof

moralconflictastheresultofclashingintuitiveprinciples,butitcannotsaywhetherthe

principlesaregoodones,andsoitcannotsaywhethertheconflictisrealornot.

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4.CriticalComparisonofThreeAccountsofRecoveryConflicts

Onesummeryearsago,IworkedfortheUSFishandWildlifeService,censusing

seabirdsandmonitoringtheirproductivityonasmallislandinDownEastMaine.Among

mycrew’sresponsibilitieswaspayingattentiontothefeedingbehavioroflargegulls,and

“eliminating”anygullwhospecializedindepredatingterns.Thiswaspartlybecausethe

islandharboredasmallcolonyofendangeredroseateternsandasinglesavvygullcould

wrecktheirentirebreedingseason.Duringtheterns’chick-rearingperiod,werecognized

thatagreatblack-backedgullwecalledGoldmundwasanexpertandvoracioustern

hunter.Asthecrewsupervisor,Idecidedwithmuchreluctancethatwewouldfollowour

office-boundbosses’commandtoshootGoldmund.WhenIexaminedGoldmund’sbody

afterward,Ifoundabroodpatchbeneaththeouterlayeroffeathersonhisbelly.

Ifelt(andstillfeel)thatIhaddonesomethingevil.Kant’saccountofconflict

elegantlyaccommodatesoneofthethoughtsrelatedtothisfeeling:“whathaveIdoneto

myself?”Butthiswasnotthemainthought.Themainthoughtwas“Ihavewronged

Goldmundandhischicksinoneoftheworstpossibleways.”Kant’sethicaltheorycannot

accommodatethisthought,becauseitcannotregisterrespectforanimalslikeGoldmundas

intelligible.RecallthatforKant,practicalreasonmustbeunderstoodasfreefromoutside

forces.Theonlywayitcansecurethisfreedomistoabsolutelyprioritizefollowingthelaw

itgeneratesfromitself.Thislawrequirespracticalreasontomakethecapacitytofollow

suchalawanendaboveallothers,inotherwords,torespectthecapacitytofollowsucha

law.Respectforanythingelsewouldamounttoreasonsubmittingitselftosomething

outsideitself,whichwouldunderminereason’sautonomy.Absentanargumentthatother

animalsaremoralinthesensethattheirpracticalreasondisciplinesitselfbysubmittingtoits

ownlaw,anyKantianattempttoexpandthemoralcircleofrespecttoincludebeingsother

thanhumanswillfail.204,205

204Therearemanygoodargumentsfortheclaimthatotheranimalsaremoral,ifmoralityisunderstoodintermsofemotionsandbehaviorratherthanintermsofthecapacityofthewilltosubmititselftoitsownlaw.Forexamples,seeBekoff,WildJustice;Rowlands,CanAnimalsBeMoral?;andProctoretal.“ChimpanzeesPlaytheUltimateGame.”205SomeKantians,mostnotablyAllenWoodandChristineKorsgaard,havetriedtoshowthatdespitethefactthatKanthimselfstatesthathumanbeingscannotbeardutiestootheranimals(6:442),onthebestinterpretationofhistheory,theydeserverespectandhavetheconcomitantcapacitytoobligateus.Woodarguesthatotheranimalsdeserverespectbecausetheysharemanyofhumanbeings’preconditionsfor

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Byidentifyingwelfareasthethingthatmattersforitsownsake,utilitarianismdoes

notlimitmoralconsiderationtohumanbeings.Anactionthatharmsotheranimalscanbe

wrongjustbecauseitharmsthem,andarecoverypredicamentcanbetragicjustbecause

everycourseofactionitpresentswouldseriouslyharmotheranimals.Aslongasitviolates

agoodutility-maximizing“donotharm”principle,anactthatcausesseriousharmcanbe

seriouslywrong,regardlessofwhetheritviolatestheprincipleofutility.However,the

wrongnessofsuchaharmmightbelessrobustthanonemighthopefor.

Thatconflictispossiblewithinutilitarianismisafunctionofthefeatureofthe

theorythathasbeenadded,mostconvincinglybyHare,inordertoaccommodatewhat

RichardArnesonreferstoasthe“cognitive,emotional,andvolitionaldisabilities”that

preventhumanbeingsfromthinking,feeling,andbehavingastheyideallywould.206These

“disabilities”oftenhamperusfromapprehending,andfromimmediatelybeingmovedto

performactsthatmaximizeaggregateutility.Theroleofintuitivemoralprinciplesisto

guideustowardmaximizingnetutilitywithoutrequiringustodothechallengingworkof

aimingtodoso.Theidealmoralthinker—Hare’sarchangel,orabeingwhotakes

Sidgwick’s“pointofviewoftheuniverse”—doesnotneedandpresumablydoesnothave

thedispositionsthatconstituteintuitiveprinciples.“Suchanarchangelwouldnotneed

intuitivethinking,”saysHare,“everythingwouldbedonebyreasoninamomentoftime.

Nor,therefore,wouldheneedthesoundgeneralprinciples,thegooddispositions,the

intuitionswhichguidetherestofus.”207Anarchangelwouldneverfindthemselvesina

conflict,becausetheycandirectlyapplytheprincipleofutilitytoeverychoiceamong

morality.OnWood’sview,wecan(ethically)wrongthemdirectlybynotcaringaboutthemfortheirownsakes.SeeWood,“KantonDuties,”189–210.AccordingtoKorsgaard,Kantwasmistakentodenythatotheranimalsareendsinthemselves,andsohisargumentthattheycannotobligateus(whichentailsthatwecannot(ethically)wrongthem)isunsound.Shethinksthatotheranimalsareendsinthemselves,because“ananimalisanorganicsystemtowhomitsowngoodmatters,anorganicsystemthatwelcomes,desires,enjoys,andpursuesitsgood.Wecouldevensaythatananimalisanorganicsystemthatmatterstoitself,foritpursuesitsowngoodforitsownsake.”Animalsarethusthe“sourceoflegitimatenormativeclaims”andsocanobligateusdirectlyeventhoughthey“cannotgivetheforceoflawto[their]claims.”SeeKorsgaard“FellowCreatures.”Inordercogentlytoholdsuchaview,aKantianmustgiveupKant’scorecommitmenttoprioritizingreason’sfreedomfromexternaldemands.ForargumentsagainsttheattempttoexpandKantianrespecttootheranimals,seeKain“DutiesRegardingAnimals,”andVarden“KantandMoralResponsibility.”206Arneson,“WhatDoWeOwe?”289.207Hare,MoralThinking,44-45.

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actions,andcanfollowthroughontheresultingprescriptionwithouthindranceor

misgivings.Thewrongnessofviolationsofintuitiveprinciplesdependsonhumanbeings’

imperfection,andwillcorrelatenegativelywithindividualhuman’scapacitiesforthinking

likeanarchangel.

Themorecloselyahumanbeingapproximatesthearchangel’saptitudeforwielding

theprincipleofutilityuncomplicatedbyintuitiveprinciples,thefewermoralconflictsthey

willface.Theintuitiveprinciplesofsuchapersoncanbehighlyqualified—permittingharm

inmanyinstancesinwhichmore“disabled”peoplewouldconsiderharmingtobewrong—

andsuchapersoncanmoreoftenappealdirectlytotheprincipleofutility,withoutthe

resultchafingagainstintuitiveprinciples.InDiller’sposition,someonewhosemorallife

approachesthatoftheidealutilitarianwouldnotthinkandfeelasthoughwhatevertheydo

willinvolvewrongdoing.Rather,theywoulddeterminewhichcourseofaction—shooting

barredowlsorallowingnorthernspottedowlstobedriventoextinction—wouldbring

aboutthemostnetwelfare,andtheywouldtakethatcourse,unburdenedbymoralanxiety

orregret.

If,likeme,youregardDilleraswiserandmorefinelyattunedtothewrongsatstake

inhispredicamentthananarchangelwouldbe,youmaybecalledtoquestiontheelement

ofutilitarianismthatblindstheidealutilitarianthinkertothewrongnessofutility-

maximizingharm:aggregationism.Bytakingthepositionthatthepracticallyrational

responsetotheintrinsicvalueofwelfareistomaximizeitinaggregate,utilitarianism

allowsthewrongnessofindividualharmstofluctuateininverseproportiontoagents’

abilitiestocalculatewhichcourseofactionmaximizesnetwelfare,andnottobe

emotionallydeterredfromactingontheresultofthatcalculation.

OnmyinterpretationofRoss’stheory,thewrongnessofharmingindividual

others—whethertheybehumansorotheranimals—ismorerobustthanitisaccordingto

utilitarianism.Itdoesnotfunctionprimarilyasahelpfuldeviceforsteeringpeopletoward

theperformanceoftheactionwhich,inthefinalanalysis,isrequired.Whenweharm

someone,accordingtoRoss,wewrongthemwhetherornotisitoptimificforustobe

disposedtojudgethatwehavewrongedthem.IfRoss’stheoryhadanidealmoralagent,

thatagentwouldthinkthatharminganotheriswrong,andmoralregret-worthy,even

whenitisaninescapablepartoffulfillinganallthingsconsideredduty.

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ThewayRoss’stheoryhandlesrecoveryconflictsisopentoanothercriticism,

however.FromwithinRoss’stheory,takingorsupportingtheextinctioncourseofaction

wouldbewrongbecauseitwouldharmsentientbeings,andinsomecasesbecauseit

wouldbreakpromises.Itwouldnot,andcouldnot,bewrongjustbecauseitallowsor

bringsaboutthedestructionofaspecies(orothertaxonomicgroup).Inmanypeople’s

view,apparentlyincludingDiller’s,thedestructionofaspeciesisthemainwrong-making

featureoftheextinctioncourseofaction.Itwaspartlyinresponsetoaperceptionthat

mainstreamethicaltheoriesdenythiskindofwrongthatthefieldofenvironmentalethics

emerged.208ThatRoss’stheoryneglectsitcouldbeseenasadefectofthetheory.209

AlthoughRoss’sargumentagainsttheideathathousescanbeharmedstrongly

impliesthatthedutyofnon-maleficencedoesnotcoverspecies,histheorydoesnotrule

outthepossibilityofaprimafaciedutynottodestroyspecies.210Rosssaysthathislistof

primafaciedutiesisexpandable.Itis“correctasfarasitgoes,thoughnotnecessarily

complete.”211Asanintuitionist,Rossbelievesthatfundamentalmoralprinciples—prima

facieduties—areknownapriori.Inorderforanotherdutytobeaddedtothelist,itmust

bea“self-evident”moralprinciple.Thisepistemologicalintuitionismisperhapsthemost

questionableaspectofRoss’sethics.Ifoneacceptsit,however,onecanattemptthetaskof

showingthatitisintuitivelytruethatitisprimafaciewrongtoallowortoundertakeeither

speciesdestruction,orsomemoregeneraltypeofdestructionofwhichspeciesdestruction

isatoken.Ifoneissuccessful,thenonecouldarguethattherecanbecasesinwhichthe

relativestrengthofaparticulardutynottodestroyaspeciesrenderstheextinctioncourse

ofactionallthingsconsideredwrong.

208E.g.Routley,“IsThereaNeedforaNew,anEnvironmentalEthic?”209TobefairtoRoss,ifthisisdefect,itisnotonethattheothertwotheorieslack.210Ross,RightandGood,49.Forafullerexplanation,seechapter3,“Ross’sDeontology,”section3.1(Dutiesofnon-maleficence).211Ibid.,23.

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5.MoralConflictintheAnthropocene

Insection2(Kant’sDeontology)IdismissedDonagan’sclaimthatapersoncanonly

becomeentangledinamoralconflictasaresultofpriorwrongdoingontheirpart.Yeta

looserversionofDonagan’spointiswelltaken:peopleoftenfindthemselvesinmoral

conflictsbecauseofpriorwrongdoing,whetherithasbeencommittedbythemselvesorby

others.ManyoftheexamplesofconflictthatIhaveusedariseinpartbecauseofcoursesof

actionthatarguablywerewrongindependentlyofthefactthattheygeneratedconflict.

Sophie’sconflictwasadirectresultofanevildonetoherbyanSSofficer,andanindirect

resultofpoliciesandindividualactsthatputherinasituationtobesoabused.

Warsarecauldronsofmoralconflict.LikeSophie’schoice,anumberofmyexamples

ofconflictoccurinthecontextofwar:Agamemnon’sconflict,Agarjuna’sconflict,the

conflictofWWIIresistancefighters,andtheconflictofthosewhofacechildsoldiersin

combat.Warscannotgetstartedwithoutwrongdoingbyatleastoneoftheinvolved

parties.Eitheroneparty’smilitaryengagementwithanotherisunjust,oritisjust.Ifitis

unjust,thepartyhasdonewrong.Ifitisjust,anotherpartymusthavedonesomething

unjustenough—andthereforewrongenough—tosanctiontheintervention.

Likewartimeconflicts,recoveryconflictsoftenresultfrompriorwrongdoing.For

instance,theislandfoxandthespottedowlrecoveryconflictsbothresultedfromcourses

ofactionthatarguablywouldberemorse-worthyeveniftheyhadn’tengenderedconflicts.

Intheislandfoxcase,thearguablywrongfulprioractwaslargescaledumpingofpesticides

intoMontroseBay.Inthespottedowlcase,itwasclearcuttingvasttractsofmature

forest.212

Itisuncontroversialthathumanactivitiesarecausingvastandrapidchangesto

climate,tohabitats,aswellastothenumbersanddistributionsofdifferentkindsof

organismsontheplanet.Peopleworkinginenvironmentalethicshaveelaborateda

numberofreasonstoavoidcausingtheseextremeecologicaltransformations.Theseare

212Otherrecoverypredicamentsmightsimilarlybelinkedtopriorwrongdoing:partofthereasonthatCaliforniacondorswereatthebrinkofextinctionwasthatpeoplewereshootingthemforsport.Whoopingcraneswereindirestraitsbecausesomanywerekilledfortrophies,museumcollections,andhats,andbecauseofvastandrapiddestructionofwetlands.Androseateternswereendangeredbecausesomanyofthemwerekilledinorderforsomepeopletoprofitfromsellinghatsdecoratedwiththebirds’palest-of-pinkfeathers.

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someofthemostcompelling:suchtransformationsharmpeopleandotheranimals;they

exacerbateanalreadyunjustdistributionoftheburdensandbenefitsoftheactivitiesthat

causethem;andtheydestroyobjectsandrelationshipsthathavesignificantand

irreplaceablevalue.Ihopetohavedrawnattentiontoanadditionalreason:causing

extremeecologicaltransformationscanforcepeopleintosituationsoftragicmoralconflict.

ThetragediesonwhichIhavefocusedarerecoverypredicaments.Theyarenotrare,and

theyarenottheonlykindofmoralconflictcreatedbyextremeecologicaltransformations.

Foranotherexample,takeapotentialfutureconflictthatwearenowinapositionto

prevent.

Thelikelihoodiseverincreasingthatfortyorfiftyyearsfromnow,somepeoplewill

facethefollowingchoice:allowglobalsurfacetemperaturestoincreaseby2–6degrees

abovethoseofthelate19thcentury,orengageinsolargeoengineering—sprayingsulfate

aerosolsintothestratosphereinordertodeflectsolarradiationawayfromtheinner

atmosphere,counteractingtheeffectofrisinglevelsofanthropogenicgreenhousegases

(muchliketheashfromavolcaniceruptiondoesonsmallerspatialandtemporalscales).213

AsStephenGardinerpointsout,eventheadvocatesoframpingupresearchintosolar

geoengineeringcallthechoicetheyfavor“thelesseroftwoevils,”andsoholdthatboth

coursesofactionwouldinvolveseriouswrongdoing.214

Toallowglobaltemperaturestorisemorethan2degreeswouldbetoallow

catastropheformanyhumansandotheranimals.AccordingtotheIntergovernmental

PanelonClimateChange(IPCC),ifglobalsurfacetemperaturesinthelate21stcenturyhave

risen2–4degreesthefollowingareverylikelytohappen:extinctionrateswillincrease

sharplyforspecieswithlowdispersalrates(e.g.plants,smallmammals,freshwater

mollusks),especiallyinflatorisolatedhabitats;foodinsecuritywillincreasebecauseof

lowerfisheriesyieldsinlowlatitudes,andbecauseoflowerandmorevariablecropyields;

morbidityandmortalitywillincreaseamongchildren,olderpeople,peoplewhowork

outdoors,homelesspeople,andanimalswhocannotmovetoclimatestheyare

213WhenMountPinatuboeruptedin1991,itinjectedmillionsoftonnesofsulfatesintotheupperatmosphere,andglobalsurfacetemperaturesdroppedbyalmosthalfadegreeinoneyear.214Gardiner,PerfectMoralStorm,341-3.

145

physiologicallyabletohandle;waterwillbemorescarce,especiallyforpeoplewhoare

poorandforanimals;sectorsofhumansocietieswillcompetewitheachotherforwater

resources;therewillbelargescaledisplacementofpeoplefromplacesinwhichtheycan

nolongerlivebecausecoastalandlow-lyingareashavebeeninundated,andbecauseof

urbanflooding,foodscarcity,andwaterscarcity;theriskofpoliticalandmilitaryconflicts

willincreaseaspoverty,competitionforresources,anddisplacementdoes.215

Undertakingsolargeoengineeringcouldmitigatemanyoftheseevils,butwould

leadtoothers:Itwouldincreaseairpollution;itwouldmaketheplanetdrier—monsoons

mightbeweakened,andtherecouldbetropicaldroughts,substantiallydiminishing

agriculturalproductivityinsomeoftheworld’spoorestandmostpopulousregions;216

solargeoengineeringwouldextendandentrenchthehumandominationoftherestof

nature;217itwouldturntheblueskyadullwhite;218oncesolargeoengineeringis

underway,haltingitsuddenlywouldcauseglobaltemperaturestoshootup.Itispredicted

thatthiswouldcauseevenhigherratesofextinctionthanclimatechangealone.219

AsGardinersays,eitherdecisionwillmorallymarthosewhomakeit.220Thecurrent

generation,atleastthoseofuswhoarerelativelyaffluentandaremembersofthesocieties

thatdrivetheproductionofgreenhousegases,willimposethismarringchoiceonothersif

wedonotdotwothings.Thefirstistotakeeffectivemeasurestosignificantlydecreaseour

owngreenhousegasemissions.Thesecondistoinvestmoreintheprogramsand

institutionsthatcanreducepeople’svulnerabilityandexposuretoclimatechange,and

215IPCC,ClimateChange2014,seeesp.64-73.216Jones,“SolarGeoengineering.”217SeeJamieson,“IntentionalClimateChange,”andGardiner,PerfectMoralStorm,349.218Morello,“GeoengineeringCouldTurnSkiesWhite,”andHecht,“GeoengineeringWouldTurnBlueSkiesWhiter.”219Trisosetal.“PotentiallyDangerousConsequences.”220Gardiner,PerfectMoralStorm,385-9.GardinerisapplyingtothegeoengineeringconflictRosalindHursthouse’sideathatevenwhentheyareresolvedforthepurposeofaction,tragicmoralconflicts(whatshecallsdilemmas)maragents’lives.SeeOnVirtueEthics,chapters2and3.

146

increasetheirabilitytoadapttoit.Wealreadyhavemanygoodreasonstodobothofthese

things.Theprospectofforcingothersintoatragicconflictgivesusanother.

Thegeoengineeringconflictandtherecoveryconflictsuggestthattoevadethe

problemoftragicmoralconflictistoignoreanethicalsignalofthecurrentepoch,inwhich

humanactivitiesareadominantinfluenceonclimatesandecologies.221BecauseRoss’s

deontology,Kant’sdeontology,andutilitarianismallhavetheresourcestoacknowledge

thepossibilityoftragicmoralconflict,wecannotuseallegiancetoanyofthemasanexcuse

forignoringthissignal.

221TheInternationalUnionofGeologicalSciences,whichistheprofessionalorganizationthatdefinesEarth’sepochs,continuestomaintainthatweareintheHoloceneepoch.However,thereisagrowingpushtodefinethecurrentepochastheAnthropocene,becauseofthescaleoftheecological,geomorphological,andclimatologicalimpactshumansnowmake,andbecauseofthemarkstheseimpactswillleaveinthegeologicalrecord.

147

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