Training MillennialsImproving Quality in an Environment of Austerity

LCDR Gordon Judy FaulknerVFA-106 Training Officer

Contents

Disclaimer: 1Introduction: 1The Genesis: 2The Aviator: 5

RECENT CHANGES .........................................................................................................................................................: 7

CULTURAL CONCERNS ....................................................................................................................................................: 8

The Officer: 10INTERNAL POSSIBILITIES ................................................................................................................................................: 11

GENERATIONAL INFLUENCES ..........................................................................................................................................: 13

........................................................................................................................Narcissism and Self Assessment: 13

..............................................................................................................................................Causal Demeanor: 15

.....................................................................................................................................................Disobedience: 15

..........................................................................................................................................Sense of En

Disclaimer:What follows is a TOPGUN (one word, all caps) debrief. Please check your egos and rank at the door and recognize that there are many goods in addition to the others presented herein.

Introduction:The mission of VFA-106 is to provide the fleet with combat ready Replacement Aircrew (RAC). This requires conversion of newly winged Category One Replacement Pilots (RP) or Weapons System Officers (RWSO) into a steely eyed warrior, fully prepared to employ the F/A-18 in combat, rapidly assimilate into a fleet Ready Room and assume the duties of a squadron Junior Officer. In an environment of lengthening cruises, shrinking budgets and reduced fleet training opportunities, the role of the Fleet Replacement Squadron (FRS) and Training Command in producing quality warriors is more important than ever.

Over the past two years the VFA-106 Training Department observed an alarming two-fold trend: overhead costs soared as SODs increased 132 percent from fiscal year 2011 to fiscal year 20131, and several incidents involving poor officer-like qualities arose, where before there were few documented issues involving professional conduct. In the past 18 months VFA-106 conducted 11 Field Naval Aviator Evaluation Boards (FNAEB), issued four Non-Punitive Letters of Caution (NPLOC) and eight Letters of Instruction (LOI) addressing issues with officer-like qualities. In the preceding 18 months, the squadron conducted only two FNAEBs and Field Flight Performance Boards (FFPB). Surprisingly, less than 40 percent of unsatisfactory events have been related to increasingly complex tactical skills, but have instead been for deficiencies in core skills. This degradation in core skills from Category One aviators has occurred over time, insidiously, as the number of Training Command platforms (at least for pilots) was reduced from three to two and the number of Training Command flight hours declined over a decade from nominally 290 at winging compared with 240 today. The principal result is Fleet Replacement Squadrons (FRS) that focus on remediating basic air work (BAW), formation, and admin, rather than converting winged aviators into fleet warriors. Not surprisingly, VFA-106 is also devoting an increased amount of time to mentoring officers who have demonstrated significant character deficiencies and integrity problems.

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1 Normalized SOD rate adjusted for students in training

In addition to these trends, the Naval Aviation Enterprise (NAE) has been pursuing several efforts to optimize training by downloading flights to less expensive cost per hour (CPH) platforms. The Chief of Naval Air Training (CNATRA) has made several requests for suggested FRS flights to download to less costly platforms. The FRS syllabus already operates at the minimum required number of flights, introducing most concepts only once during the course of training. Any flight time reduction in the FRS syllabus would likely result in additional remediation, thus negating the savings from that reduction. At the very least decreasing flight time could tangibly reduce the quality of the aviator going to the fleet.

A viable alternate solution is to optimize training by reducing FRS overhead in the form of remedial flights. Each remedial flight offered by VFA-106 is, on average, 1.3 flight hours and $15,600 in direct costs (of note, this measure of cost per hour does not include the expense of valuable and limited life-cycle time and fatigue). From fiscal year 2012 to date, VFA-106 flew 510 flights to remediate 250 failed events (not including Carrier Qualification (CQ)). When CQ is included VFA-106 has flown 730 remedial flights. That is $14 million dollars spent on remediation. While it is impossible to entirely eliminate remediation at the FRS, it is viable to target a reduction of 60 percent based on an examination of the current breakdown of remediation. Those hours, if reallocated to the T-45, equate to 2,940 T-45 flight hours (direct cost). As the author assumes that VFA-122 and VMFAT-101 experience similar SOD rates, the actual effects are even greater. Properly focused additional flights in the training command could significantly reduce the number of failed flights in the FRS and hence the costs of remediation. In an increasingly austere operating environment, the true gain from reducing remediation in the FRS is a savings in service life on our valuable but aging fleet of F/A-18s.

The Genesis:The amount of information presented to aircrew in an F/A-18 cockpit has grown in complexity. Increasing amounts of information available from onboard systems provide a deluge of Situational Awareness (SA) for the competent aviator that can completely overwhelm more junior aircrew. The amount of information displayed in the cockpit and our updated tactics provide an incredible challenge to even experienced aviators, let alone recent training command graduates. Additionally, a lack of these systems at the FRS leaves a graduate with a significant amount to digest when they arrive at their first

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fleet squadron. The radar warning receiver (RWR), electronic attack (EA), defensive countermeasures (DECM), the joint helmet mounted cuing system (JHMCS) and advanced tactics, techniques and procedures (ATTP) are but a few of the advanced systems and concepts required for fleet proficiency.

Over time, this creep towards more capable weapons and increasingly complex tactics created an increasing gap between the FRS graduate and the trained fleet nugget. Since VFA-106 does not have the systems or resources to completely train FRS students to fleet tactics, we must instead rely on ensuring that the basics of book knowledge, formation, sensor and communications are so engrained as to enable them to focus appropriately on new and advanced tactics presented in the fleet. A 2011 letter from Commander Naval Air Force Atlantic indicated that VFA-106 was not achieving this goal.1 To the end of improving quality, VFA-106 implemented the following critical actions:

- Created a skill based proficiency matrix for each phase of training.

- Validated the entire syllabus to ensure that it efficiently contributed to achieving the proficiency matrix goals.

- Engaged with fleet Training Officers to uncover specific weaknesses in our graduates, syllabus and instructor cadre.

- Worked in concert with VMFAT-101 and VFA-122 to conduct a survey of FRS instructors on the preparedness of incoming RAC.

- Made several revisions to the Category One syllabus and completely re-authored the Category Three syllabus. Developed a survey for Carrier Air Wing Commanders to track the results of changes to the Category Three syllabus and make improvements.

- Completely revised performance review procedures, emphasizing a TOPGUN mindset of remediating individual events until RAC achieved the appropriate level of proficiency, setting them up for future success in the syllabus.

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1 Source: Commander Naval Air Force Atlantic ltr. dtd. 18 Jan 2011

- Fostered an environment of ownership by encouraging every instructor to view VFA-106 as a brand and to ensure that only the highest quality product matriculated to the Fleet.

The results have been tangible:

- Graduating Department Heads, Prospective Executive Officers and Prospective Deputy Commodores achieved unprecedented levels of proficiency.

- A marked increase in positive feedback from fleet Commanding Officers on the performance of nuggets. While it is too early to draw conclusions based on hard data, recent Commanding Officer survey results and substantial positive feedback from Fleet Training and Commanding Officers indicate that VFA-106 is producing high quality aviators.1

An outgrowth of this concerted emphasis on quality was an increase in remediation in the weakest students. Eventually this resulted in the FNAEBs of four VFA-106 RAC with ultimate classifications of B1. Simultaneously VFA-106 instructors were generally dissatisfied with the bottom 25 percent of Training Command graduates. As a result the VFA-106 Training Department, in conjunction with VFA-122 and VMFAT-101, conducted an in depth analysis of signal of difficulty (SOD) data as well as a survey of all FRS instructors.

The results of those surveys spawned this project and uncovered three distinct trends:

- The majority of instructors felt that the bottom 25 percent of RAC were only marginally prepared for FRS training and the bottom 10 percent were not adequately trained at all.

- Eighty-eight percent of respondents reported that arriving RAC possessed a sense of entitlement. There was disagreement on the overall professionalism of RAC with VMFAT-101 feeling that RAC were adequately prepared on a professional level, while the data from VFA-106 and VFA-122 showed variability with a mean of RAC being only somewhat prepared.

- The results for RWSO preparedness showed significant variability; however, across the board, FRS instructors

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1 Source: Commanding Officers survey of F/A-18 FRS aircrew training

felt that RWSOs were less prepared than their pilot counterparts.

Throughout 2012, the VFA-106 Training Department participated in several training optimization conferences. Based on information gained at those conferences, VFA-106 recommends a twofold approach of increased flight time and a fundamental shift away from the X production mindset towards a culture of ownership, quality and mentorship. The cost of quality is not cheap, but with focus and hard work, it can be cheaper.

The Aviator:Several changes have occurred in pilot training in the past 15 years. The overall pipeline is shorter, and the number of flight hours and platforms have been reduced. The resulting pool of aviators ranges from competent and prepared to marginal at best. Additionally, the NAE has seen the sundown of the S-3 and the F-14 as well as the impending retirement of the EA-6B. In todays Navy, 85 percent of tailhook aviators will end up in some variant of the F/A-18. Diminishing resources and a focus on efficiency have resulted in a production system (and Navy) that is strained to the ragged edge. Over time, this lack of resources and focus on efficiency created a pervasive mindset of production vice quality. While the NAE has a responsibility to efficiently achieve production goals, VFA-106 questions whether the pendulum has swung too far towards cheap and fast and away from quality. As in business, it follows that when faced with the production goals of inexpensive, fast, and good, history dictates that only two of the three are realistically attainable.

Changes in Training:Comparing the authors background to todays average Category One pilot illustrates the point. The author graduated flight school after flying 291 hours in T-34, T-2 and T-45.1 Todays average Category One pilot receives 240 hours in a primary flight trainer and the T-45.2 The loss of the third platform materially detracts from the adaptability and flexibility inherent in having to learn three platforms vice two. Coupled with the loss of 50 hours of flight time, the effect is significant. Fifty additional flight hours represents an

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1 The author completed advanced flight training in October of 2001, tracking through the Training Command at a representative pace, with no failed events or remedial events.2 IFS data not available.

increase of 20 percent in total SNA experience. That equates to 50 more hours of formation flying, 50 more hours of air sense and situational awareness, at least 50 more rendezvous and at least 50 more landings. Sixty percent of FRS remediation comes from deficiencies related to formation and the administrative portion of flight, not advanced tactics. If the Training Command utilized increased flight time to focus on the development of fundamentals in a task saturated environment, the FRS would see a significant reduction in remedial flight time.

Not all aircrew develop at the same pace. The loss of the F-14, the S-3 and eventually the EA-6B significantly reduced the number of platforms available to TACAIR Student Naval Aviators (SNA) and Flight Officers (SNFO). Fifteen years ago, a full 70 percent of Navy TACAIR SNAs were assigned to the EA-6B, S-3, F-14 or E-2/C-2s. Today roughly 85 percent end up flying some variant of the F/A-18. Where at one point the system could play to aircrews strengths, now platform selection is relatively homogenous. The only way to achieve a relatively homogenous result in both the Training Command and the FRS is through the amount of remediation offered. In order to standardize output, the Training Command and FRS must tailor its training to the individual. There is no one size fits all solution.

The results of VFA-106s FRS instructor aircrew survey captured this concept:

- The average FRS instructor feels that the top 25 percent of RAC are prepared for the FRS syllabus.

- The middle 50 percent of RAC are partially prepared.- The bottom 25 percent of RAC are marginally prepared.- The bottom five to ten percent of RAC are unsatisfactory.

This correlates to studies of SOD data, which show that 70 percent of SODs are concentrated on 33 percent of RAC. As the number of SODs per student increases, the remediation required increases as well. Approximately 20 percent of RAC account for 70 percent of remedial flights.1 Additionally, a fiscal year 2012 study showed 66 percent of SODs occur in students who were below average in the Training Command. While this is not surprising, a better prepared and more homogenous Training Command product will result in a reduction in remediation at the FRS. Put simply, top Training Command graduates fare well in the FRS. There is no requirement to raise the quality of top

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1 CQ SODs not included due to the unique nature of the phase.

graduates; instead the bar needs to be raised for below average Training Command students.

VFA-106 SOD data shows that 60 percent of all SODs are attributable to administrative or formation related items. In later phases, the percentage of SODs for formation increases as aircrew are tasked with additional cockpit workload. This indicates that the bandwidth of those students who struggle is perhaps sufficient during low intensity operations, but when faced with more demanding environments requiring multi-tasking they are not up to the challenge. The Training Command should use this data to focus the efforts of additional training. With the eventual advent of the Virtual Mission Training System (VMTS), it will be possible for the Training Command to more adequately train to formation flying in task saturated environments. This should identify problem aviators earlier in the system and allow for remediation in less expensive platforms.Recent Changes:Data from VFA-106 shows a disturbing uptick in early stage SODs. Out of the last nine classes to start VFA-106, the first six classes experienced a SOD rate of 3.5 SODs per class in the Transition phase of training. The most recent three classes to start training have experienced a SOD rate of 6.3 SODs per class, an 81 percent increase.1 In an effort to rule out an artificial bias or shift in standards, VFA-106 conducted an in depth review of a sample of failed and completed events and saw no significant shifts in standards in either the grades or the instructors comments. The standard for a SOD has not shifted, but the performance of the below average Category One pilot has, for the worse.

There are potential external and internal causes for the noted shift in Transition Phase performance. Internally, VFA-106 continues to experience continuity of training problems created by a lack of sufficient resources. Too few ready for production (RFP) aircraft2 and various strains on simulator resources create an environment where training aid supply fails to meet syllabus demand. In this scenario, scheduling becomes overly restrictive and only the highest priority classes get scheduled. These constraints result in a hurry up and wait effect. This

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1 Data normalized for class size.2 Source: VFA-106 fiscal year 2013 NAPP data

materially affects SOD rates; however, due to the recent nature of the shift, there is insufficient data to prove this. Trying to achieve more with less has consequences. What may be saved in the short term, is lost in additional remediation or quality; what is gained by utilizing fewer Sailors, is lost in maintenance programs, safety and the morale of those Sailors who work harder to turn fewer aircraft more quickly and more frequently than planned.1 The bottom line is that production squadrons must be properly resourced in order to achieve the results that are expected of them.

Externally a recent shift to the MPTS grading system in the Training Command created difficulty in properly evaluating student naval aviators (SNAs), resulting in lower quality students matriculating from the Training Command. Anecdotally there appears to be significant confusion and frustration among Training Command instructors about the grading system and attrition process. Effective evaluation systems should prioritize an instructors experience and expert opinion of an SNAs performance vice a complicated attempt at objectivity which results in confusion and inconsistency in grading. The grading system is so convoluted that it has been the butt of jokes on Junior Officer Facebook blogs. While there are attempts to objectively quantify each graded item on a flight, it is nearly impossible for an instructor to achieve the fidelity of memory required by MPTS; however, all instructors should be capable of determining whether or not a student meets the level of proficiency required to advance to the next flight or stage of training. The author recommends significant further study of the accuracy of the MPTS grading system and its effects on the overall evaluation of Training Command students.Cultural Concerns:An overarching and continuing concern is a Training Command culture that prioritizes event completion (X generation) over quality. Recently VFA-106 requested that the Training Command explore refreshing select SNAs instrument qualifications prior to leaving for the FRS to ensure currency through the initial phases of F/A-18 training. A Training Command Standardization Officer responded that this had been explored before, and the reason it was not supported was because everything we do with SNA's (sic) is/should be X generating oriented. Ignoring the validity of the request itself, this comment captures an important aspect of Training Command culture. Everything we do

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1 Source: VFA-106 fiscal year 2014 PPF submission

with SNAs is/should be X generating oriented. The Training Command and FRS should be focused on producing high quality officers and aviators who are geared for success in the fleet, while maintaining a keen focus on efficiency.

Upper level leadership encourages this production first mindset through awards which focus on achieving production goals, not capturing the quality of matriculating aviators. The criteria for the Ellyson award is as follows: A CNO-appointed awards committee will select five squadrons which demonstrate the greatest efficiency in meeting the fleet requirement for pilots and naval flight officers within the CNO-approved syllabus. There is no mention of quality in this award, only efficiency.The effect of this is best illustrated in a comparison of attrition rates. In fiscal year 2012, VFA-106 attrited five percent of our Category One RAC for performance. In the past three years, only two VFA-106 graduates received fleet FNAEBs for performance. Both finished in the bottom ten percent of their training command classes. Today both would have been better identified by VFA-106s performance review system and remediated or attrited. Anecdotally, the Training Wing One Commodore indicated in 2012 that total Training Wing One Intermediate and Advanced Strike Fighter attrites for all reasons numbered three. Comparing expected production rates, Training Wing One rates of attrition are significantly lower than current FRS levels. The Commodore also indicated there were zero attrites for Training Wing One CQ during the same time period.

The bottom line is that production squadrons have to achieve production goals but also have a responsibility to ensure quality. In order to achieve that goal, production squadrons need to be properly resourced and rewarded for the quality of the warrior they produce as well as the efficiency with which they produce that warrior. While the current system emphasizes that Commanding Officers have the ability to attrite subpar aviators, the system is also set up to incentivize those same Commanding Officers to achieve production over quality. The result is an FRS which conducts FNAEBs at a higher rate than the Training Command attrites poor performers. Attrition rates should be lower in every phase of training and almost zero in the FRS. If Fleet Replacement Squadrons hold the bar where it should be, attrition for performance based problems should be zero in the fleet. Not only does this make sense from a standpoint of pride in mission, it makes sense financially. The

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sooner substandard performers are identified, the sooner they can be remediated or attrited at significantly lower cost.

The Officer:Four careers almost ruined in their infancy. Four young aviators, two pilots and two WSOs, briefed, conducted a preflight on two BLU-111 500 pound bombs hanging from their airplanes and manned up their $60 million dollar F/A-18Fs for a seminal moment in their budding careers. Like so many before them, they transited to the range, made a cold pass and then rolled in hot for the first time. So far, so good. What follows is a transcript of the inter-cockpit comm on that day:

18:07.59 RP: So the second one is all you.RWSO: Im too chickenshit.RP: Say what?RWSO: Im too chickenshit to do it. RP: Youre not going to do it?!RWSO: Ok, Ill do it. RP: Might not get another shot at it.RWSO: I know. RP: I think its the left hand controller.RWSO: Yep (pause) are your tapes on right now? RP: Uh yeah, but whatever.RWSO: (giggling)18:15.20RP: Alright, you got it18:15.32RWSO: Ugh, I dont know.18:15.45RP: Did you get on the pickle, er?RWSO: I dont know (unintelligible) I didnt want to.RP: Ok, Ill take the next one then. 18:15.57RP: No biggy. 18:16.04RP: It will be our little secret.18:16.11RWSO: (unintelligible) [do you think theyll look] at the tapes?

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RP: Probably not.

During tape review (with the volume turned down), an instructor notices that one of the pilots seems nervous; then, an off comment from the WSO; now, suspicion on the instructors part.

Following this event, the instructors carefully reviewed the tapes a second time and discovered the pilots attempts to convince his RWSO to release live ordinance from the aft cockpit. This action is not trained to and in fact is expressly forbidden in VFA-106 instructions. When confronted, the RP fabricated a story to cover up the no drop. When pressed further, the RP stood behind his intentional efforts to cover up attempts to release from the back seat. Only when confronted with direct evidence of the attempt did he finally yield and admit to the attempts.

This is not the only example of a demonstrated lack of professionalism by RAC. Here is another example:

- Another RP (someone with noted attitude issues prior to this event) flies one of the last events of the syllabus. During an extremely dynamic Air to Air flight, this RP drives himself below BINGO fuel state. After landing, when queried about on deck fuel, he responds that he landed with SOP minimum fuel. When pressed, he holds to his tale. After being confronted with data from his flight recorder, he breaks down crying and admits to landing well below SOP minimum fuel.

These are only a few examples of several issues with officer-like qualities. There are several potential internal and external reasons for these noted deficiencies. Internal possibilities:VFA-106s most recent four FNAEBs suggested that Command Climate may have contributed to the violation of standards because our RAC might not be comfortable approaching instructors. In a recent survey of RAC, very few expressed concern that VFA-106 instructors were not approachable. Additionally RAC consistently rate VFA-106 instructors as more professional than their Training Command counterparts. However, the command takes the concerns of even a small portion of RAC seriously and is making adjustments to the instructor cadre via ongoing instructor training, standardization checks and a continuous feedback loop.

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In the case of the aircrew who attempted to release from the aft cockpit, the RAC were well aware that their actions were not above board, as evidenced by the transcripts of their cockpit communications. Why worry if youre tapes will be reviewed unless you already understand that your actions are inappropriate? Why lie to cover your trail unless you were aware of your own wrongdoing? These RAC violated standards knowingly and lied to cover it up because they knew they were in the wrong.

A more likely explanation of the issue that applies to both the Training Command and FRS is a lack of ownership on the part of our instructors, Department Heads and perhaps even Commanding Officers. In both the Training Command and FRS, most officer development takes a backseat to aviation training. Interviewed RAC frequently commented that their only instructor interaction throughout the Training Command was during their briefs, flights and debriefs. This flies in the face of the most basic officer training. Naval Aviators are officers first. While VFA-106 encourages off-duty interaction during regular detachments, the days of telling sea stories in the Officers Club are few and far between. Those off-duty interactions were vital opportunities for RAC, Junior Officers and NAE leadership to rub shoulders and further personal relationships. Now those personal relationships are delayed until RAC arrive in the fleet. It is not that there is a need to get more intrusive, which smacks of micromanagement; there is a need to get to know each other better. Healthy class advisor programs focused on mentorship are a viable solution to this critical area of concern. Too often these programs take a back seat to production, again driven by the X generation mindset and not a quality driven model.

With that being said, other reasons instructors do not spend substantial off-duty time with RAC include heavy tasking at work, a high percentage who are married with children and many who have recently been deployed. The solution is a concerted effort to properly resource production squadrons so that shore duty is actually shore duty and for squadron leadership to encourage healthy class advisor programs from the top down. Additionally, when on detachment the FRS and Training Command should encourage appropriate off-duty interaction.

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Generational Influences:The current generation of Training Command students and F/A-18 aircrew grew up in a very different environment than even their instructors, potentially contributing to noted shifts in professionalism. There is substantial academic research suggesting shifts in personality traits which are fundamental to success as a military officer. Here are a few examples of those shifts.Narcissism and Self Assessment:

American culture has shifted to emphasize the rights of the self as more important than duty...the social rules for behavior so prized in Milgrams early 1960s have declined (Twenge and Im, 2007) replaced by an assertiveness (Twenge, 2001) and self-focus so strong it has veered into narcissism (Twenge, Konrath, Foster, Campbell, & Bushman, 2008). (Twenge J. M., 2009)

A recent RP represents an excellent example of this. The RP struggled early in his FRS training. In order to address these concerns the VFA-106 Training Department conducted a HFB and identified preflight preparation as a deficiency. The board offered several suggestions and provided a mentor. During his HFB, the RP admitted to throttling back the amount of effort he put into preparationbecause he erroneously felt comfortable that he was doing okay. Subsequent to the HFB the RPs performance improved dramatically, highlighted by his strike performance as one of the top five in the last 100 in training at VFA-106. As he entered the next phase of training feeling confident, he dropped his pack again. Upon arriving in Key West for a fighter weapons detachment he initiated a relationship with a local female. This resulted in a loss of valuable preparation time. Not only did this marginalize the RP, it left his classmates in the lurch, picking up the slack for the weakest link. An end of phase review of training trends by his class advisor revealed average flight performance but noted a trend of poor preflight preparation. Fourteen grade sheets mentioned deficient preflight preparation, and the RP failed two flights for preflight preparation. The RP is now repeating a portion of the Fighter Weapons phase as remedial training to ensure that he can demonstrate the level of preparation and dedication required of a fleet nugget.

This is not the only example of a RACs perception of their performance being out of sync with reality. Several HFBs have

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demonstrated that RAC have an over inflated sense of their performance, indicating an inability to accurately self assess and a potential rise in narcissistic traits. One RP, after being medically disqualified from flying F/A-18s posted a picture of himself in front of the jet to Facebook with the comment, my other ride is an F-18.

The following research addresses self assessment specifically:

Compared to previous generations, more American college students now rate themselves as above average on attributes such as academic ability, drive to achieve, leadership ability, public speaking ability, self-confidence, and writing ability (based on a nationally representative sample collected 19662009; N=6.5 million)Trends in positive self-views are correlated with grade inflation (which increased d=0.81), but are not explained by changes in objective performance (e.g., SAT scores have declined, d=70.22) or effort (time spent studying is down, d=70.31). Broad cultural trends toward greater individualism and positive self-views (such as parents, teachers, and media encouraging higher self-esteem among young people) could result in younger generations embracing increasingly positive self-viewsEventually, these cultural messages encouraged people to not just think positively of themselves, but to consider themselves better than they actually were (e.g., Everyone is special). (Twenge & Campbell, 2011)

The best example of this personality trait negatively affecting an RP follows below:

- VFA-106 recently received a Category One RP who came from the Training Command with several emails offering apologies and trying to explain that after many attempts to attrite said aviator, he ultimately remained in the system and matriculated due to perceived pressure from the squadrons Commanding Officer. This was confirmed in conversations between the author and the units Executive Officer. This RP continually argued with his instructors and even took a confrontational tone on several occasions. His lackluster performance as an officer continued at VFA-106. Eventually his attitude landed him at a Human Factors Board (HFB) and with a LOI for officer-like qualities. In light of our mission to train not only sound aviators but also good officers, VFA-106

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elected to remediate this young man rather than send him to a FNAEB. His remediation was the pilot of a new VFA-106 mentorship program aimed at remediating the worst of the worst. His mentor uncovered a systemic inability to accurately self assess and self esteem bordering on narcissism. While he was eventually successfully remediated and matriculated to the fleet as a well prepared officer and aviator, the costs of remediation were substantial. Whether or not they were worth it remains to be seen.

Self assessment is critical to success as a Naval Officer. Imagine a new Department Head or Commanding Office unable to accurately assess the condition of their department, squadron or ship. Accurate self reporting is critical to building a picture of readiness. There is little worse to imagine than a Navy whose leaders over inflate a picture of their own performance or readiness, especially in an environment of financial austerity. The path to a hollow force is paved with financial austerity and inaccurate self assessment.

Causal Demeanor:

Technology has enabled relationships to be easy, and according to recent research, Millennials see this as defining their generation (Pew Research Center, 2010). The ease with which Millennials establish relationships and the open and casual nature of many of those relationships, is likely to carry over to the work-place. This may be true even with managers and supervisors, who in previous generations commanded respect simply by the virtue of their position. (Thompson & Gregory, 2012)

Eighty-eight percent of instructors noted that they believed RAC lacked professionalism in the brief and debrief, with one instructor commenting, I am shocked at the lack of professionalism in the Brief and Debrief My impression is 95% of the students think it is a privilege for Naval Aviation to have them, not a privilege for them to be a part of Naval Aviation. Disobedience:While the jury is still out, substantial academic research suggests that disobedience is on the rise in the Millennial generation [generally defined as people born between 1980 and

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the late 1990s] (Twenge, 2009). 90 percent more men disobeyed the experimenter in 2006 than did in 1962 (Twenge J. M., 2009). When viewed in concert with the conduct of RAC who flagrantly violated flight standards and subsequently lied about it, we must ask ourselves: are we in for more of the same? How can we effectively train this disobedience out of our young officers? Sense of Entitlement:Among the instructors surveyed, 88 percent feel there is a perception of a sense of entitlement in RAC.

Millennials grew up with unprecedented levels of positive reinforcement and positive attention. Parents, and in some cases society at large, have moved toward rewarding children for participation, rather than performance leading some to refer to this generation as trophy kids. (Thompson & Gregory, 2012)

Interviews with several RAC revealed that they perceived a substantial difference between themselves and their training command instructors. After winging, they expected to be welcomed to the club, unaware that the really hard work of being a professional officer and aviator was just beginning. The results vary from a casual attitude with instructors to a distinct air of entitlement and a disregard for established norms. Interestingly, the data from VMFAT-101 suggests fewer issues with professionalism among Marines, perhaps due to service culture and training pipeline differences.

The effects of these shifts are potentially devastating to character development. Because participation was rewarded vice performance, character developing failures were likely few and far between. Although the author does not have data on current Training Command flights, training should be structured to expose aviators to stress and failure in a controlled environment in order to prepare them to deal with stress when it matters most: in combat. Meridian simulator instructors Jack Douglas, Burt Zoeller and others were famous for subjecting SNAs to famously painful simulators rife with yelling and artificial stress. Anecdotes from recent Training Command graduates suggest that has changed substantially in recent years. Where before the system utilized artificial stress, distraction and failure to test character early on, now perhaps there is too much concern for peoples feelings. How well are we preparing young officers if the first real stress they experience is behind the boat, or worse, in combat?

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Developing Millennial officers requires a concerted leadership approach. Officers cannot lead in the ways that they believed worked for their generation. They must study, adapt and lead in the way that their Sailors require them to. Leaders must adjust their approach to their Sailors, not the other way around.1

The Solution:1) Ownership. Raise the bar fleet wide. Always prepare people for the next level, not the current one. Remind students that their wings are just the beginning! Emphasize being humble, approachable and credible while instilling confidence, aggressiveness and calculated risk. Think of each squadron as a brand. High quality leadership and instruction does not require sending #1s to the training command. It requires the fleet to raise the bar for their mid-grade performers. Better #1 Must Promotes are better instructors than we have now.

2) Ensure that mentorship is emphasized during all phases of training. Getting to know Sailors and Officers is the most fundamental aspect of success as leaders.

3) Do not cut the FRS syllabus. Increase resources to Production Planning Factor (PPF) recommended levels or cut production accordingly. Give squadrons the flexibility to adequately schedule with continuity of training. Supply must exceed peak demand at almost all times. Otherwise, demand is shifted left and right, creating a push-pull effect throughout the syllabus. The result is poor continuity of training and increased remediation costs.

4) Increase flight time in the Training Command through re-flys. Adopt the TOPGUN mindset. Test students ability to compartmentalize. Introduce advanced TACFORM, necessitating mission cross check with high cockpit task loading. The top 25 percent are prepared. Apply flight time where it is required through targeted re-flys. Trust the opinion of instructors. Do not allow aircrew to move on to the next phase until they have mastered the current one. The current evaluation system is setup for that, but the standard is too low! Proper application

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1 A conversation with Jean Twenge, a PHD from San Diego State University and the author of the majority of the research contained herein, corroborates the information presented in this section of the paper.

should result in less remediation at the FRS. This will save valuable service life where it is needed most: in the fleet.

5) Train, remediate, mentor and attrite when necessary. Create an environment of spirited competition to excel, not a lackluster environment of survival. Ensure a syllabus that challenges people enough to develop character. Failure should be a part of the game. Michael Jordan said it best, I've failed over and over and over again in my life and that is why I succeed. Test character in a controlled environment before sending aircrew into combat. Empower those who thrive in stressful situations. Remediate or find other lines of work for those who do not.

6) Consider specific approaches for the current generation. Millenials, who may be more defiant could require more character development to encourage integrity and obedience. Provide consistent feedback that emphasizes goods as much as it does others. Put the focus back where it needs to be: officer first, then aviator.

7) At the earliest stages of training, ask if the Navy is recruiting and retaining the right people for Naval Aviation and setting them up for success. Examine the effects that allowing pilots with eye surgery has on the quality of SNFOs. Explore radical changes in Primary flight training to encourage competition. All eligible candidates could start as Replacement Aircrew and select pilot or flight officer after a period of initial training. This would allow for competition and quality spread between designators. Offer opportunities to convert from NFO to pilot without damaging a career. Reexamine changes to the Aviation Selection Test Battery and the personality type that Naval Aviation seeks to acquire.

Conclusion:Right now, Naval Aviation is expending valuable money to remediate performance at the most expensive level. Additionally, fleet tactics continue to grow more complex, widening the gap between the FRS graduate and the fleet nugget. Without a fundamental change in the way we do business, this gap will continue to increase FRS remediation, straining the system further. Targeted additional flight time is needed in the Training Command along with a renewed focus on quality. While this may require more Training Command flight hours, the overall effect will be a savings in FRS overhead and valuable fatigue

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life on our most valuable airframes. The NAE can no longer attempt to do more with less. It is time we focused on doing it better.

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Works CitedThompson, T., & Gregory, J. B. (2012). Managing Millennials: A Framework for Improving AUracWon, MoWvaWon and RetenWon. The Psychologist-Manager Journal, 15 , 237-246.

Twenge, J. M. (2009). Change Over Time in Obedience: The Jury's SWll Out, But It Might Be Decreasing. American Psychologist , 28-31.

Twenge, J. M., & Campbell, W. K. (2011). GeneraWonal increases in agenWc self-evaluaWons among American college students 1966-2009. Self and Iden