Transatlantic Trends 2003

8/8/2019 Transatlantic Trends 2003

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A PROJECT OF THE GERMAN MARSHALL FUND OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE COMPAGNIA DI SAN PAOLO.

SUPPORT FOR THE PORTUGUESE SECTION OF THE SURVEY COMES FROM THE LUSO-AMERICAN FOUNDATION.


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GMF Transatlantic Trends 2003 Partners

Methodology: Taylor Nelson Sofres (TNS Sofres) was commissioned to conduct the survey by telephone interviews

(CATI: Computer Assisted Telephone Interviews) in all countries except Poland, where lower telephone penetration

necessitates face-to-face interviews (CAPI: Computer Assisted Personal Interviews). In all countries, 1,000 women andmen, 18 years of age and older, were interviewed using a random digit-dialing technique. For the results based on the

total sample in each of the eight countries, one can say with 95% confidence that the margin of error attributable to sam-

pling and other random effects is either plus or minus 3 percentage points. For results based on the total European sam-

ple, the margin of error is less than plus or minus 1.4 percentage points. All Europe-wide figures are weighted by the size

of the countrys population. Comparative data listed in brackets comes from Worldviews 2002, undertaken by the

German Marshall Fund of the United States and the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations (Portugal was not included

in the Worldviews survey).


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T R A N S A T L A N T I C T R E N D S 2 0 0 3 |

KEY FINDINGS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3

I. FRIENDSHIP UNDER STRAIN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4

II. PARTNERSHIPS RECONSIDERED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7

III. WORKING TOGETHER OR GOING IT ALONE? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12

IV. THE TRANSATLANTIC CHALLENGE OF MIDDLE EAST PEACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16

V. CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19


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2 | T R A N S A T L A N T I C T R E N D S 2 0 0 3


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The transatlantic split over war in Iraq has under-mined Americas standing with Europeans. In con-trast, Americans voice a growing commitment to coop-

eration with a strong Europe. These findings are part of

Transatlantic Trends, a new comprehensive survey of

European and American public opinion. This study

explores how both sides of the Atlantic view the world

and their relationship to each other in the wake of the

Iraq war.1 The survey is a project of the German

Marshall Fund of the United States and the Compagnia

di San Paolo. Support for the Portuguese section of the

survey comes from the Luso-American Foundation.

Key findings of the survey include:

Europeans have grown more critical of U.S. global

leadership, while American support for a strong

European partner has increased.

Americans and Europeans have similar views of

threats, but different impulses on how to respond

to them.

If North Korea and Iran acquire weapons of mass

destruction, Americans are more likely thanEuropeans to support the use of force to disarm

these countries.

Despite different attitudes toward Israel, Europeans

and Americans are equally willing to apply pres-

sure to encourage a withdrawal from the West

Bank and Gaza. However, Americans are much

more willing than Europeans to pressure the

Palestinians and Arab states to stop suicide bomb-

ings and terrorism.

Both Americans and Europeans see U.S. unilateral-

ism as a problem.

Both view the United Nations favorably and want

to strengthen it, but Americans are willing to

bypass the U.N. if required by national interest.

Americans and Europeans are more likely to sup-

port military intervention if done under NATO orU.N. Security Council auspices the former con-

veys almost as much legitimacy as the latter.

The largest percentage of Americans since 1947

wants the United States to play an active role in

world affairs.

Germany, the long-time American ally, now

expresses an unambiguous preference for Europe

over the United States.

Europeans want to see the European Union

become a superpower like the United States in

order for the EU to cooperate better, rather than

compete, with the U.S. However, the EU resists

increased military spending.

Key Findings

1 Fieldwork was conducted between June 10-25, 2003 in eight countries (France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, and the

United States).

IN THE THE WAKE OF THE IRAQ WAR, AMERICANS INCREASINGLY DESIRE

A STRONG EUROPEAN PARTNER, WHILE EUROPEANS WANT

TO RELY LESS ON THE UNITED STATES.


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The transatlantic rift over the Iraq war was bitter

and public. While European governments were

divided over the war, many public opinion surveys

showed that European publics were strongly united in

their opposition to war.2 One of the fundamental issues

this survey seeks to illuminate is the extent to which the

disagreement over the Iraq war has soured transatlantic

relations generally and affected public views of one

another.3

EACH SIDE PERCEIVES A GAP IN VALUES.

In recent years, an intense debate has developed over

whether and to what extent a gap in world views has

developed that divides the two sides of the Atlantic.

The gap thesis seems to be shared by the public at

large. When asked whether Europeans and Americans

have different social and cultural values, majorities on

both sides of the Atlantic overwhelmingly agreed (83%

of U.S. and 79% of European respondents). Each side

perceives a values gap, although it is not clear what this

perception is rooted in.

INCREASED EUROPEAN DISAPPROVAL

FOR BUSH ADMINISTRATION FOREIGN POLICY.

One topic on which disagreement has grown since 2002

is the Bush Administrations foreign policy; support in

the United States increased, whereas European disap-

proval grew over last year.4 The one exception was

Great Britain, where there was a slight upturn in

approval (although those registering approval remain a

minority). The similarity of critical responses in France

and Germany was striking, as were the 20-point increas-

es in Italian and German disapproval. (see Figure 1-1)

MAJORITY OF EUROPEANS THINK

IRAQ WAR WAS NOT WORTH THE LOSS OF LIFE.

Transatlantic disagreement also surfaced over the ques-

tion of whether the war in Iraq was worth the loss of

life and other associated costs. While majorities in all

European countries answered no, (from 51% in Great

Britain to 81% in Germany and 84% in France), a major-

ity of American respondents (55%) answered yes.

I. Friendship Under Strain

2 See, for instance, the polls by Gallup International, Jan. 14-29, 2003, in 37 (including 19 European) countries, and by EOS Gallup in all EU countries, Jan.21-27, 2003, for data before the war, and the poll by Gallup International/TNS Sofres, April 16-May 8, 2003, for post-war data for 45 (including 23European) countries.

3 A word of caution: When evaluating the data, it is important to remember how sensitive these survey questions are to recent international events.

4 In the accompanying chart, scores for approve and approve very much, and for disapprove and disapprove very much were combined. If onelooks at the full breakout, one sees that polarization within the United States on this question has grown, because the number of those approving very

much and disapproving very much has grown relative to those approving and disapproving.


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These results are in line with other surveys conducted

at roughly the same time on both sides of the Atlantic.

EUROPEANS LIKE THE U.S. LESS,

WHILE AMERICANS LIKE THE EU SLIGHTLY MORE.

Given the disconnect between American and European

publics on foreign policy and the Iraq war, one critical

question is whether that discord has spilled over into

other aspects of the transatlantic relationship. One indi-

cator is the so-called thermometer question, in which

survey participants rate their feelings toward various

countries on a scale of 0 to 100, with 100 meaning very

warm, 50 neutral, and 0 very cold. A considerable

Iraq effect i.e., fallout from the war in Iraq is

indeed apparent.

Of the six European countries surveyed last year,

public opinion in all of them is less favorable to the

United States this year. The largest drop in warmth was

recorded among French respondents (from 60 degrees

in 2002 to 50 degrees in 2003); it is reciprocated by

Americans similar cool feelings toward France (from 55

5 In Worldviews 2002, the question was: How do you rate the G.W. Bush administration handling of the following problems? Would you say the

American administration handling of overall foreign policy has been excellent, good, fair or poor?

60%

41%

51%

37%

61%

15%

82%

35%

57%

70%

60%

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

GreatBritain

France Germany Netherlands Italy Poland Portugal Europe U.S.

Nocom

parativedataavailableforPortugalA

pprove

Disapprove

30%

66%

21%

74%

16%

81%

36%

62 %

28%

70%

40%

57%

57%

37%

58%

30%

62%

26%

64%

56%

34%

53%

44%

30%

38%

60%

2003Transatlantic Trends

Approve

Disapprove

2002Worldviews

Approve

Disapprove

DO YOU APPROVE OR DISAPPROVE OF THE WAYU.S. PRESIDENT GEORGE BUSH IS HANDLING INTERNATIONAL POLICY?5

Figure 1-1


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degrees in 2002 to 45 degrees in 2003). Warmth of feel-

ing toward the European Union (EU), in comparison,

increased somewhat among Americans (from 53 to 60

degrees) and remained relatively constant in Europe,

except for a gain in the case of Germany (where the rat-

ing went from 67 degrees up to 75 degrees). AmongEuropeans, Americans feel warmest toward Britons

(with a thermometer rating of 79 degrees), while

Britons, along with Italians and Poles, give the United

States a reading of 61 degrees.6

MANY EUROPEANS SEE STRONG

U.S. GLOBAL LEADERSHIP AS UNDESIRABLE.

Another possible consequence of the Iraq war is the

drop in support for strong U.S. leadership in world

affairs among European publics (see Figure 2-1, page 8).

Less than a majority (45%) of European respondents see

it as desirable for the United States to exert strong lead-

ership in world affairs, down from 64% in 2002. In con-

trast, 80% of Americans, consistent with last years 79%,

continue to see strong EU leadership as desirable.While Europeans have grown more critical of U.S. lead-

ership, Americans continue to show support for strong

EU leadership.

To sum up, Americans and Europeans are still

friends, but Europeans are more likely to be critical

both of Bush Administration foreign policy in general,

and of the Iraq war in particular. The Iraq war appears

to have unleashed a stronger backlash effect on

European views of the United States than the other

way around.

2003 2002

80 Italy (84)

75 Germany (67)

74 Portugal73 France (75)

71 EUROPE (70)

66 Netherlands (70)

63 Poland (60)

60 U.S. (53)

57 Great Britain (59)

Feelings towards EU

neutral

100

90

80

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

Feelings towards U.S.

2003 2002

92 U.S.61 Great Britain (68)

61 Italy (68)

61 Poland (65)

57 EUROPE (64)

56 Germany (63)

55 Netherlands (59)

54 Portugal

50 France (60)

neutral

100

90

80

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

THERMOMETER READINGS NATIONS FEELINGS TOWARDS THE U.S. AND THE EUROPEAN UNION

6 Other public opinion research, notably the Pew Global Attitudes Project, suggests that the low point of European opinion toward the United States wasthe Spring of 2003. For instance, according to Pew, in March 2003, 48% of Britons and 31% of French had a favorable view of the United States; by June

2003, when the fieldwork for this survey was conducted, those numbers had risen to 70% and 45% respectively. Another poll (Gallup International/TNSSofres, Dec. 2001, Jan. 15-16, 2003, and April 16-May 8, 2003) conducted in many European countries and the U.S. showed similar results. In all coun-tries surveyed, including the U.S., a strong increase, roughly a doubling between Dec. 2001 and Jan. 2003, took place in the numbers of those who

thought that U.S. foreign policy had negative consequences. By Jan. 2003, this had become the view of majorities in France, Denmark, Germany,Macedonia, the Netherlands, Russia, Serbia, Spain, and Switzerland, as well as pluralities in Finland and Great Britain. Striking, however, was that thisnegative assessment declined in most countries when the question was asked again in April 2003; nonetheless, it still remained the view of at least aplurality in all European countries surveyed.

Figure 1-2


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The question of whether Americans and Europeans

are friends is distinct from that of whether both

publics still see each other as partners. Can both sides

acknowledge their differences and still work together?

Or has the current disaffection noticeably weakened

prospects for transatlantic partnership and cooperation?

To answer these questions, it is helpful to tell the U.S.

story and the European story of partnership separately,

before arriving at a transatlantic assessment.

AMERICANS SUPPORT BOTH ACTIVE U.S. GLOBAL

ENGAGEMENT AND STRONG

EULEADERSHIP

.

For Americans, there are several notable findings.

Among the most important is that U.S. public willing-

ness to be engaged in the world is at a 50-year high.

When asked whether it is best for the future of the

United States to take an active part in world affairs or

stay out, 77% chose to take an active part. This is the

highest level of support since Americans were first

asked the question in 1947; the 15% saying stay out

represents the lowest level ever.7 This support for an

active U.S. role in the world is matched by equally

strong support among Americans for the European

Union to exert strong leadership in world affairs, with

an increasing percentage viewing such EU leadership as

very, rather than somewhat, desirable (43% saw this as

very desirable up from 31% in 2002 and 37% as

somewhat desirable down from 48%. Thus the total

is stable, but the intensity of U.S. feeling has grown).

AMERICANS INCREASINGLY

SEE A STRONGER EU AS DESIRABLE.

When asked whether the United States should remain

the only superpower, 42% said yes (down from 52% in

2002), with only a slightly smaller percentage (37%, up

from 33% in 2002) opting for the European Union to

become a superpower like the U.S. When those respon-dents, who answered the U.S. should remain the only

superpower, were asked if they would still oppose the

EU as superpower if it meant the EU would share the

costs and risks of global problems, notably, 50% said

no. Thus, a majority of Americans wants to see the

European Union become a superpower capable of shar-

ing global responsibilities with the U.S. When the 37%

who favored the EU as superpower were asked if this

would still be the case if the EU sometimes opposed US

policies, 83% of them said yes, suggesting the view is

strongly held and unconditional. Therefore, Americans

increasingly see a stronger EU as desirable. By these

measures, Americans, on the whole, are neither isola-

tionists nor unilateralists.

II. Partnership Reconsidered

7 Trend data from 1947 through 1973 come from the following national surveys conducted by the National Opinion Research Center at the University ofChicago: Study T-49, 151, 156, 169, 295, 332, 348, 355, 370, 399 and the 1973 General Social Survey. The 1974 survey was conducted by Louis Harris and

Associates, Inc.


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ONLY 45% OF EUROPEANS

DESIRE STRONG U.S. LEADERSHIP.

On the European side, one also sees general public sup-

port for strengthening Europe as a partner of the

United States, as opposed to relying on the U.S. While

the British, Dutch, and Polish still see strong U.S. lead-

ership as desirable (if less so than last year), the French,

Germans, Italians, and Portuguese do not. Majorities in

France (70%), Germany (50%), and Italy (50%) believe

strong U.S. leadership is undesirable. Overall, only 45%

of Europeans, a large drop-off compared to 64% in 2002,

see strong U.S. leadership as desirable. The sharp

change in opinion is striking and, if it persists and is

reflected in government policy, may have important

implications for transatlantic cooperation. This decline

in the European view that U.S. leadership is desirable is

one of the starkest results of the survey.8

8 Put in historical perspective, however, such changes are not a new phenomenon. Earlier crises also led to fluctuations in how U.S. leadership was eval-

uated.

43%

44%

57%

41%

27%

70%

55%

38%

90%

80%

70%

60%

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

GreatBritain

France Germany Netherlands Italy Poland Portugal Europe

NocomparativedataavailableforPortugal

Desirable

Undesirable

72%

25%

48%

48%

45%

50%

68%

27%

75%

23%

46%

50%

63%

33%

53%

34%

22%

64%64%

45%

31%

49%


ApproveDisapprove

2002Worldviews

ApproveDisapprove

HOWDESIRABLE IS IT THAT THE UNITED STATESEXERT STRONG LEADERSHIP IN WORLD AFFAIRS?

Figure 2-1


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EUROPEANS CONTINUE TO SEE THE EU AS

MORE IMPORTANT TO THEIR VITAL INTERESTS

THAN THE U.S.

When European respondents were asked whether the

European Union or the United States was more impor-

tant to the vital interests of their country, majorities in

all countries chose the EU (as was true last year). The

one eye-catching change was in the German numbers,

with 81% (as compared to 55% in 2002) now opting for

the EU and 9% (as compared to 20% in 2002) for the

U.S.

LARGE MAJORITY OF EUROPEANS WANT THE EU

TO BECOME A SUPERPOWER LIKE THE U.S., BUT

SUPPORT DROPS DRAMATICALLY IF GREATER

MILITARY SPENDING IS REQUIRED.

The European desire to build a stronger EU was clearly

expressed in responses to a question about whether the

EU should become a superpower.

It is important to probe what respondents had in

mind when asked about their preferences concerning a

superpower role for Europe. Despite the general sup-

port shown by Europeans for a superpower role for the

EU, follow-on questions indicated that that support

7%9%

5%

22%

60%

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

GreatBritain

France Germany Netherlands Italy Poland Portugal Europe U.S.

U.S.remainonlysuperpower

EU

becomesuperpower

20%

56%

3%

91%

8%

22%

48 %

11%

59%

5%7%

76%

10%12%

63%

10%

14%

42%

37%

52%

65%

52%

89%

70%

65%

80%

63%

80%

71%

Nocomparativedataavaila

bleforPortugal

33%


2002Worldviews

IN THINKING ABOUT INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, WHICH STATEMENT COMES CLOSERTO YOUR POSITION ABOUT THE UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN UNION

Figure 2-2


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may be soft or conditional. For those Europeans who

wanted the U.S. to remain the only superpower, 52%

said that they opposed superpower status for the EU

because they thought it would require increased mili-

tary expenditure. The large majority favoring an EU

superpower role were asked if they would be willingfor the EU to be a superpower even if this implied

greater military expenditure; only 51% answered yes,

meaning that support for the EU superpower role

would drop to roughly 36% if greater military spending

were required.

BOTH SIDES OF THE ATLANTIC WANT AN EU

SUPERPOWER TO SERVE AS A PARTNER TO THE U.S.

Those Europeans and Americans who expressed sup-

port for the EU as a superpower were asked a follow-

on question which gauged whether they thought the

EU should become a superpower in order to better

compete with the U.S. or, rather, to cooperate effectively

with the U.S. in dealing with international problems.9

The results were almost exactly the same as last year,

with 85% of Europeans choosing cooperation over com-

petition (10%). Thus, one could conclude that the major-

ity of Europeans who want the EU to be a superpower

envision an Atlanticist EU, serving as a partner to the

U.S., rather than a Gaullist EU, seeking to serve as acounterweight to U.S. power.

EUS NON-MILITARY POWER IS INFLUENTIAL,

SAY AMERICANS AND EUROPEANS.

Both Americans and Europeans were asked whether

they agreed with the statement that the EU may not be

as powerful militarily as the United States, but can still

have influence to solve world problems through diplo-

macy, trade, or development aid. Large majorities of

88% on both sides of the Atlantic expressed agreement,

underscoring a similarity of view in assessing the EUs

soft power.

MAJORITIES ON BOTH SIDES SEE

U.S. UNILATERALISM AS POSSIBLE THREAT.

More surprising was the finding that not only

Europeans, but also Americans, share apprehension of

the way in which the U.S. is exercising its power. Whenasked whether U.S. unilateralism is a possible interna-

tional threat in the next 10 years, 78% of Europeans and

67% of Americans listed it as an extremely important or

important threat.

GERMANY CHOOSES EUROPE

OVER THE UNITED STATES.

Within Europe, each country has an interesting national

story. Germany provides the most striking example.

Whereas in the 2002 Worldviews survey, Germany

seemed uncertain about its global role, and about

whether Europe or the United States was its natural

partner, that ambiguity has now disappeared, with

Germany choosing Europe.

When asked whether it would be best for the

future of Germany to take an active part in world

affairs or stay out, 82% of Germans chose an active

part (as compared to 65% in 2002) and 13%, rather

than 23%, opted for staying out.

Whereas a majority of Germans last year (68%)

thought a strong leadership role for the U.S. in

world affairs was desirable, this year only 45%

gave this response. In 2003, 50% of Germans (as

compared to 27% in 2002) felt strong U.S. leader-

ship was undesirable.

In 2003, 70% of Germans, as compared to 48% in

2002, said that the EU should become a superpow-

er, like the United States, with only 8% (as com-

pared to 22% last year) opting for the U.S. toremain the only superpower.

When asked whether the EU or the U.S. was more

9 This question was formulated as an experimental question and the wording read either to better compete with the U.S. or to counterbalance the U.S.The other choice was either to cooperate effectively with the U.S. or to cooperate effectively with the U.S. in dealing with international problems.While the wording changes did alter the results somewhat (for instance, counterbalance garnered more support than compete), strong majorities

across all questions opted for cooperation, regardless of the exact wording.


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T R A N S A T L A N T I C T R E N D S 2 0 0 3 | 1

important to Germanys vital interests, 81% of

German respondents (up from 55% in 2002) said

the EU; 9%, down from 20%, said the U.S.; and 8%

(down from 22%) volunteered the answer that both

are equally important.

To see such clear swings in public opinion from one

year to the next is unusual. The German publics shift

of support from the United States toward the European

Union is a key factor in explaining the overall shift of

opinion among the European countries surveyed in

favor of the EU. In the wake of the U.S. military victory

in Iraq, the press reported that the Bush Administration

planned to ignore Germany due to its opposition to

the war. The data here suggests that ignoring Germany

could have a long-term cost.

The survey documents important changes in the

transatlantic relationship. Americans are more support-

ive than last year of having a strong European partner,

while Europeans are less willing to rely on the United

States on the foreign policy front. The experience of the

past year, with the war in Iraq most likely the dominant

event, appears to have had a generally negative impacton European views of the United States. In contrast, and

unexpectedly, Americans seem more positively disposed

to the European Union. This lack of symmetry, with

Europeans feeling worse about the U.S. and Americans

feeling better about the EU, is surprising and potentially

significant for policymakers on both sides of the

Atlantic. On the one hand, Europeans starkly question

U.S. global leadership and endorse the EUs aspiration

to a global role. On the other hand, Europeans clearly

envision a collaboration with the United States in global

affairs, rather than a competition.


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Whether Americans and Europeans can, in fact,

work together will depend on a number of fac-

tors. Among them are both their perceptions of threats

and the extent to which they share the same approaches

to meeting those threats. To explore these issues, a

series of questions was asked to gauge threat percep-

tions on both sides of the Atlantic, as well as views on

how governments should respond to such threats.

AMERICANS AND EUROPEANS SEE

INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AS TOP THREAT.

In spite of the deep differences across the Atlantic over

Iraq, Americans and Europeans have remarkably simi-

III. Working Together or Going it Alone?

0 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

InternationalTerrorism

North KoreaWMD

IranWMD

IslamicFundamentalism

Arab-IsraeliConflict

U.S.

EUROPE

U.S.

EUROPE

U.S.

EUROPE41%

43% 39%

46%

39%

38%

44%

47%

28%

36%

57%

46%

U.S.

EUROPE

33%

35%

60%

49%

U.S.

EUROPE

26%

26%

70%

70%

Important Extremely Important

THE FIVE MOST IMPORTANT INTERNATIONAL THREATSACCORDING TO RESPONDENTS FROM EUROPE AND THE U.S.

Figure 3-1


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lar assessments of the threats they face.10 When asked

about possible international threats to Europe (to the

U.S., in the United States) in the next 10 years, respon-

dents ranked the five threats illustrated in Figure 3-1 as

the most important.

While there is some difference in the intensity withwhich Americans and Europeans perceive these threats,

the similarity of their assessments is more striking than

the divergence. Further, if one looks at the feelings ther-

mometer (a scale of 0-100 from cold to warm),

Americans and Europeans feel roughly the same level

of coolness toward unfriendly countries, such as Iran

(US/31; EU/34), North Korea (US/27; EU/33), and

Syria (US/34; EU/38).

NATO SEEN AS PROVIDING ALMOST AS

MUCH LEGITIMACY AS THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL.

To attempt to gauge how these assessments and feel-

ings translate into policy in specific cases, sur-

vey respondents were given an experimental

question, in which 1/8th of the sample size was

asked about a different scenario involving either

a North Korea or an Iran armed with weapons

of mass destruction (WMD). They were then

asked if they would support military action if it

were proposed by the United States, the U.S.and its allies, NATO, or the United Nations

Security Council (UNSC). The combined results

(i.e., the weighted averages for all of Europe

and the average for both cases) follow:

On the issue of the legitimacy of using mili-

tary force, there appears to be a clear hierarchy

on both sides of the Atlantic, with support for

military action growing in all countries as the

support of allies, then NATO, and finally the

UNSC are invoked. It is notable that NATO sup-

port for military action provides almost the

same bump in support as does the U.N.

Security Council.

AMERICANS MORE WILLING TO USE FORCE

AGAINST A NORTH KOREA OR IRAN WITH WMD.

If one looks at overall support for military action

against Iran versus North Korea, 44% of Europeans

support military action in the case of Iran, as opposedto 37% in the case of North Korea. For Americans, 73%

support military action in the case of Iran and 63% in

the case of North Korea. Thus, in these cases,

Americans are more willing to use force than

Europeans and both are more willing to engage in mili-

tary action against Iran (as compared to North Korea).11

GIVEN THE CHOICE, BOTH SIDES PREFER ECONOMIC

SANCTIONS TO THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE.

When presented with eight different scenarios about a

country either harboring dangerous international ter-

rorists or threatening a neighboring country with

74%

64%63%

90%

80%

70%

60%

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0

U.S.Alone

34%

39%

73%

43%46%

68%

41%

U.S. andAllies

NATO UNSC Total

Europe U.S.

SUPPORT FOR TAKING PART INMILITARY ACTION IN KOREA AND IRAN

10 Worldviews 2002 included questions about threat perceptions, but the wording of the question on the U.S. side differed from that used this year inTransatlantic Trends. Thus, while the comparative numbers are listed in the topline data for your information, it is problematic to compare directly

responses, as it is unclear whether the wording change or other factors affected U.S. responses in 2003.

11 Survey research experts caution that general conclusions about the proclivity to use force should not be drawn from single questions, because question

wording has a particularly strong impact on outcomes in this area of inquiry.

Figure 3-2


16/21


nuclear weapons, solid majorities of both Americans

and Europeans opt for imposing economic sanctions,

rather than using military force. The percentage of

Americans willing to use force in these cases, while a

clear minority, is larger than that for Europeans (rang-

ing from 19% to 35% on the U.S. side and from 14% to26% on the European side). The large gap that emerged

across the Atlantic on support for military action in the

cases of a North Korea or Iran armed with WMD

appears to be much narrower when a more general

question is asked offering alternatives other than the

use of force.

STRONG SUPPORT ON BOTH SIDES

OF THE ATLANTIC FOR THE UNITED NATIONS.

To explore further transatlantic views of the United

Nations, one question stated: Some say, because of the

increasing interaction between countries, we need to

strengthen international institutions to deal with shared

problems, while others say this would only create big-

ger, unwieldy bureaucracies; for the United Nations,

please tell me it if needs to be strengthened or not.

European opinion proved stable with 74% saying the

UN needs to be strengthened, as compared to 75% in

2002. On the American side, 70%, as compared to 77%in 2002, opted for strengthening. One might have

expected a much steeper decline on the U.S. side, given

the controversial role of the UN in the run-up to the

Iraq war.

LARGE MAJORITY OF AMERICANS BELIEVE

IN JUST WAR, CREATING GULF WITH EUROPE.

Two additional questions round out the picture of how

both sides of the Atlantic view the role of the United

Nations as provider of international legitimacy. First,

the survey asked whether war can be just.

The gap across the Atlantic on this question is huge.

While Great Britain rests somewhere mid-Atlantic on

0 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

Great Britain

Germany

Italy

Portugal

Europe

38%

39%

28% 18%

29%

France

Netherlands

Poland

U.S.

Agree StronglyAgree Somewhat

29% 16%

30% 18%

22%

35%

12%27%

12%27%

28% 15%

55%

UNDER SOME CONDITIONS, WAR IS NECESSARY TO OBTAIN JUSTICE

Figure 3-3


17/21


18/21


The challenge both sides of the Atlantic face in

devising a common strategy to foster Middle East

peace is not new. Traditionally, there have been deep

differences across the Atlantic on this issue. However,

with the seeming renewed commitment of the Bush

Administration, following the Iraq war, to tackle a chal-

lenge many view as central to stability in the region, the

survey sought to explore the potential for transatlantic

cooperation.

AMERICANS FEEL WARMER TOWARD

ISRAEL THAN DO EUROPEANS.

To gauge the similarity or divergence of public views

on both sides of the Atlantic toward Israel and the

Palestinians, the thermometer rating of warmth is

helpful.

Clearly, the degree of warmth felt toward Israel is

greater in the U.S. than in Europe. On the European

side, the one significant change was the

growth of warm feelings in Germany

with regard to Israel. Relatively coolfeelings toward the Palestinians do not

appear to differ in any substantial way

across the Atlantic. Unlike Americans,

Europeans do not feel differently toward

Israel and the Palestinians, with both

rating 43. Transatlantic views of Saudi

Arabia, Syria, and Iran are broadly

similar.

U.S. SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL LINKED TO

ITS STATUS AS THE ONLY DEMOCRACY

IN THE ARAB WORLD.

To probe views of Israel more deeply, a

question was asked as to whether Israel

deserves support because it is the only

democracy in the Arab world. In the

IV. The Transatlantic Challenge of Middle East Peace

Feelings towards Israel

2003 200260 U.S.

48 Netherlands (48)

46 Great Britain (43)

43 EUROPE (38)

43 France (43)

43 Germany (32)

43 Italy (42)

40 Portugal

33 Poland (29)

neutral

100

90

80

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

2003

47 Great Britain

46 Italy

45 France

43 EUROPE

43 Portugal

41 Netherlands

40

Germany39 U.S.

35 Poland

Feelings towards the Palestinians

neutral

100

90

80

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

THERMOMETER READINGS NATIONS FEELINGS TOWARDS ISRAEL AND THE PALESTINIANS

Figure 4-1


19/21


U.S., 28% of respondents agreed strongly with this

argument and 35% agreed somewhat (totaling 63%); in

Europe, 12% agreed strongly and 33% agreed some-

what (totaling 45%). The resonance of this issue look-

ing both at the number who agree strongly and the

overall number who agree is far greater in the

United States than in Europe.

AMERICANS MUCH MORE WILLING TO EXERT PRES-

SURE ON THE PALESTINIANS AND THE ARAB STATES.

While Americans feel greater warmth toward Israel, as

well as support its status as a democracy, American and

European publics have surprisingly similar views when

it comes to their willingness to put pressure on Israel to

resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. Survey participants

were given a list of proposals aimed at helping to end

0 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

U.S.

EUROPE

27%

34%

40%

41%

The U.S. and Europeans should increase political pressure on Israel to withdraw from Palestinian territory.

0 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

U.S.

EUROPE

30%

36%

22%

29%

The U.S. and Europeans should impose economic sanctions on Israel in order for it to withdraw from Palestinian territory.

0 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

U.S.

EUROPE

22%

26%

50%

26%

The U.S. and Europeans should stop economic aid to the Palestinians to end their suicide attacks against Israeli civilians.

0 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

U.S.

EUROPE

19%

34%

70%

45%

The U.S. and Europeans should increase pressure on the Arab states to stop their support of Palestinian terrorism.

0 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

U.S.

EUROPE

29%

34%

26%

33%

The U.S. and Europeans should send a peace-keeping force to separate the parties.

Agree Somewhat Agree Strongly

13 Half of the sample was asked about the U.S. and Europeans and half about the U.S. The wording change resulted in no statistically significant

difference and thus the answers to the two questions were combined

Figure 4-2

ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT: POLICY OPTIONS

13


20/21


the conflict.14 The five policy options are listed on the

prior page. While there was majority support on both

sides of the Atlantic to pursue these options, important

differences were also apparent.

Based on responses to these questions, Americans

and Europeans appear almost equally willing to exertpressure on Israel, while Americans are much more

willing to exert pressure on the Palestinians and the

Arab states. On the questions regarding increasing

political pressure or imposing economic sanctions on

Israel to withdraw from Palestinian territory, Europeans

are slightly more willing to increase political pressure

(75% for Europe versus 67% for Americans) and clearly

more willing to impose economic sanctions (65% versus

52%). When asked about stopping economic aid to the

Palestinians to end their suicide attacks against Israeli

civilians, Americans are unequivocal in their strong

support for such a policy (50% in strong agreement, as

compared to 26% in Europe), whereas in Europe there

is, overall, only a small majority in favor (72% for the

US and 52% for Europe). In the case of increasing pres-sure on Arab states to stop their support of Palestinian

terrorism, overall support is high in the United States

(89%) and Europe (79%), but the intensity of feeling

among Americans, with 70% agreeing strongly with the

proposal, is far greater than the 45% offering strong

agreement in Europe. One area of unexpected consen-

sus was majority support on both sides of the Atlantic

for sending a peace-keeping force to separate the

parties.15

14 Half of the sample was asked about the Arab-Israeli conflict and the other half about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The wording change resultedin no statistically significant difference and thus the two sub-samples were combined.

15 On the question of a peacekeeping force, previous surveys have shown a deeply divided or negative U.S. public. In April 2002, a CBS News Poll showed49% in favor and 43% in opposition to the United States sending in troops as part of a peacekeeping force in order to try and end the fighting betweenIsrael and the Palestinians. In March 2002, a Princeton Survey Research Associates/Newsweek Poll recorded 32% of American respondents favoring

and 62% opposing sending U.S. troops to Israel as part of an international force with monitoring and peace-keeping responsibilities.


21/21

Akey message of the survey seems to be that allies

can simultaneously feel estranged and share for-

eign policy interests that lead them to work together.

Compared to 2002, Europeans like the United States

less and are less willing to rely on U.S. global leader-

ship. Increased European support for a stronger

European Union results, in no small measure, from

clear majorities in Germany opting in this survey for

Europe over the United States. The Germany that

sought never to choose between Europe and the United

States has now expressed an unambiguous preference

for Europe. It remains to be seen whether this trend willendure.

For the United States, the largest percentage of

Americans since 1947 acknowledges the need for the

United States to take an active part in world affairs.

Americans are both supportive of the Bush

Administrations foreign policy and of a stronger role

for the European Union. Europeans and Americans,

who want to see the EU become a superpower like the

United States, supported this development in order for

the EU to cooperate effectively with the U.S., rather

than to compete better. A majority of Europeans appear

to want an Atlanticist EU, serving as a partner to the

U.S. Americans remain multilateralists and fear the con-

sequences of unilateralist policies. Furthermore, there is

an overwhelming consensus across the Atlantic that the

EUs soft (non-military) power has a role to play.

Americans and Europeans have roughly similar

views of threats, but different impulses on how to

respond. On questions regarding North Korea and Iran

acquiring weapons of mass destruction, as well as sce-

narios involving a country harboring dangerous terror-

ists or threatening a neighbor with nuclear weapons,

Americans are more likely than Europeans to support

the use of military force. When given the choice, how-

ever, both sides of the Atlantic express a preference for

imposing economic sanctions, rather than turning to the

military.

On questions regarding international organizations,both Americans and Europeans opt for strengthening

the United Nations, but a majority of Americans sup-

port bypassing the world body if vital interests are at

stake. On both sides of the Atlantic, NATO offers

almost the same amount of legitimacy for military inter-

vention as does the U.N. Security Council.

On the Middle East peace process, Americans are

much more willing to exert pressure on the Palestinians

and the Arab states than are Europeans. Despite these

differences, transatlantic majorities exist for applying

political and economic pressure on all sides, as well as

for sending a peace-keeping force.

V. Conclusions

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Transatlantic Trends 2003

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