Transatlantic Trends 2006

8/8/2019 Transatlantic Trends 2006

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KEY FINDINGS 2006TRANSATLANTIC TRENDS


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Transatlantic Trends 2006 Partners


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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Key Findings 2006 ............................................................................................................................................................... 3

Section One: rends in ransatlantic Relations ................................................................................................................ 5

Section wo: Challenges and Treats on the Global Agenda .................. ................... .................. ................... ................. 7

Section Tree: Democracy Promotion ............................................................................................................................. 14

Section Four: A Period o Re ection in Europe ............................................................................................................ 17

Section Five: Conclusion .................................................................................................................................................. 22

Notes ................................................................................................................................................................................. 23

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Key Findings 2006

Five years a er September , 200 , the image o theUnited States in the eyes o the world has not recoveredrom its steep decline a er the war in Iraq. Yet at the o cial

level there have been e orts at rapprochement, shi ing thetransatlantic policy agenda toward the challenges o emerg-ing global threats and concerns. U.S. Assistant Secretary o State or Europe Daniel Fried declared last all, Te relation-

ship between the United States and Europe is ocused lesson itsel and more on putting that relationship to work. Similarly, European Commission President Jos ManuelBarroso recently observed, EU-U.S. relations have strength-ened considerably over the last year, and we are workingtogether systematically to address common economic,political, and environmental challenges.2 In this years

ransatlantic rends , our h annual survey, we analyzewhether and how this spirit o working together at the o ciallevel is refected in American and European public opinionon a range o global threats and policy issues.

Cooperation between the United States and the EuropeanUnion (led by France, Germany, and the United Kingdom)to prevent Iran rom developing nuclear weapons is perhapsthe most prominent example o greater consultation andpolicy coordination. Te United States and the EuropeanUnion have also been working closely in the past year in theBalkans, Belarus, and Sudan. At the same time, public debateon both sides o the Atlantic has wrestled with allegations o secret CIA prisons in Europe, continued violence in Iraq, andconcerns about human rights in the U.S. detention center

in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Te recently thwarted attack on transatlantic fights rom London raises the ollowingquestion: Is there a gap in the threat perception o Americansand Europeans concerning international terrorism and Islamic

undamentalism? Do they draw the line on civil libertiesdi erently when asked about granting greater governmentalauthority in the e ort to prevent terrorism? What do they think their governments should do about the threat o anuclear Iran, especially i diplomacy ails? How do they viewthe growing power o China or increased immigration withintheir own borders? Do they still support NA O in light o

this alls summit addressing its uture? Given instability in the Middle East, how do Americans and Europeans eelabout democracy promotion and its chances in the region?

Te prospects or transatlantic cooperation will be shaped inpart by domestic developments within the United States andEurope. We explored di erences in the United States betweenDemocrats and Republicans on Iran, democracy promotion,and civil liberties in light o the upcoming midterm elections.Despite the rejections o the proposed constitutional treaty in France and the Netherlands in 2005, we ound continued

strong support across Europe or EU global leadership andre orms such as a new EU oreign minister. Contrary to publicconcerns about enlargement atigue, our results suggestthat Europeans see positive bene ts rom enlargement o theEUs borders. At the same time, Europeans remain dividedover strengthening their military orces and ambivalent about

urkey joining the EU. In addition, this years survey includestwo new countries, Romania and Bulgaria, that could jointhe EU as early as 2007. We also devote close attention to

urkey, which appears to be turning away rom the UnitedStates and Europe in the ace o increasing instability and

violence on its borders in the Middle East.

ransatlantic rends is a comprehensive annual survey o American and European public opinion. Polling was

Foreign Press Center Brie ng, New York, September 9, 2005. http:// pc.state.gov/ pc/5 5 0.htm2 EU-U.S. Summit, Vienna 2006. http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/us/sum06_06/index.htm


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conducted in the United States and 2 European countries:Bulgaria, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland,Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, urkey, and the UnitedKingdom. Te survey is a project o the German MarshallFund o the United States and the Compagnia di San Paolo,with additional support rom the Fundao Luso-Americana,Fundacin BBVA, and the ipping Point Foundation.

KEY FINDINGS OF THIS SURVEY INCLUDE: 3

n Large majorities o Americans and Europeans agree on theimportance o global threats, with the largest increase overthe past year in those who see Islamic undamentalismas an extremely important threat, led by the UnitedKingdom, where the increase was 22 percentage-points.

n While support or EU leadership in world a airs hasremained strong since 2002, Europeans are divided overhow it should play a larger role, with 6% who agreethat the EU should strengthen its military power and5 % who disagree.

n Sixty- ve percent o Europeans agree that the EUshould have its own oreign minister, one o the key re orms put orth in the proposed constitutional treaty.

n Seventy-nine percent o Americans and 8 % o Europeans agree that e orts to prevent Iran romacquiring nuclear weapons should continue, with only

5% o Americans and 5% o Europeans seeing military action as the best option.

n I non-military options toward Iran should ail, 5 % o Americans who support e orts to prevent Iran romacquiring nuclear weapons would support military action, compared with 5% o Europeans. Fi y- ourpercent o French respondents, though, would supportmilitary action i non-military options ail.

n Americans and Europeans show broad agreementon where to compromise on civil liberties, opposinggreater governmental authority to monitor citizens

telephone calls as part o the e ort to preventterrorism but supporting greater authority to monitorcommunications on the Internet and install surveillancecameras in public places. Tey disagree about whetherto grant greater governmental authority to monitorbanking transactions, with more Americans opposedthan Europeans.

n Tere is a partisan divide within the United States oncivil liberties, with a majority o Democrats opposinggreater government authority to monitor telephonecalls, communications on the Internet, and bankingtransactions as part o the e ort to prevent terrorism, allo which a majority o Republicans support. Te partiesagree, however, on greater government authority toinstall surveillance cameras in public places.

n Fi y-six percent o Americans and Europeans do noteel that the values o Islam are compatible with the

values o democracy. However, majorities also agreethat the problem is with particular Islamic groups, notwith Islam in general. Sixty-six percent o Democratsand 59% o Republicans agree.

n European support or NA O has declined rom 69%in 2002 to 55% in 2006, with large declines in countriestraditionally perceived as strong supporters o NA OGermany, Italy, Poland, and urkey.

n Sixty-three percent o Europeans agree that urtherenlargement o the European Union will help it toplay a more important role in world a airs, and 62%agree that urther enlargement will promote peace anddemocracy along its borders.

n urkey has cooled toward the United States andEurope but warmed toward Iran. On a 00-pointthermometer scale, urkish warmth toward theUnited States declined rom 28 degrees in 200 to 20 in2006, and toward the European Union rom 52 degreesto 5. Over the same period, urkish warmth towardIran rose rom degrees to .

Unless otherwise noted, Europe-wide percentages re er to E 2, except in sections one, three, and our where we discuss long-term trends, andquestions where we examine the opinions o current EU members.


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EUROPEANS CONTINUE TO DISTINGUISH VIEWS OF

PRESIDENT BUSH FROM THE U.S.

Europeans continue to distinguish between their views o President Bush and their views o the United Statesmore generally. While European attitudes toward PresidentBushs handling o international a airs have allen rom

8% positive in 2002 to 8% in 2006, there is a 9-point gapbetween this gure and their evaluation o U.S. leadership inworld a airs. Tis gap has generally persisted over ve years.Negative attitudes toward President Bush also have risenin the United States, where, or the rst time since 2002,more Americans disapprove (58%) than approve ( 0%) o President Bushs handling o international a airs. As onewould expect, a ar greater number o Democrats (8 %)disapprove than Republicans ( 9%), with greater negativesin both parties since last year. (See chart #2 on page 5)

EUROPEAN SUPPORT FOR NATO DECLINES

Te percentage o Europeans who agree that NA O isessential or their countrys security has declined eachyear since 2002, rom 69% that year to 55% in 2006. Telargest declines have come in countries traditionally

perceived as strong supporters o NA O; in Germany,support ell rom 7 % in 2002 to 56% in 2006, and in Italy,support dropped rom 68% in 2002 to 52% in 2006. InPoland support ell rom 6 % in 2002 to 8% in 2006, andin urkey, support dropped rom 5 % in 200 to % in2006.5 In the United States, support or NA O rose rom56% in 2002 to 6 % in 2006. (See chart # )

EUROPEANS WANT TO BE MORE INDEPENDENT,

AMERICANS BEGINNING TO AGREE

A majority o Europeans (55%) support a more independentapproach to security and diplomatic a airs between theUnited States and the European Union (compared to 50%in 200 ). While the largest percentage o Americans wantcloser relations, this has dropped rom 60% in 200 to 5%in 2006, and those who wish to take a more independentapproach have increased rom 20% in 200 to 0% in 2006.Romania (5 %) and Poland ( %) have the highest support

or closer relations in Europe. Only in France and Italy werethere increases in support or closer relations since last year,with France seeing a nine percentage-point increase (to 0%)and Italy seeing a six percentage-point increase (to 5%).


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Javier Solana, EU High Representative or CommonForeign and Security Policy and Secretary-General o the Council o the European Union, recently describedthe transatlantic agenda, saying what [we] have begunto think [about] is how to resolve together the many problems, which are an international agenda.6 Yet, doAmericans and Europeans see todays world in the same

way? A er years o di erent approaches toward Irans

nuclear program, the United States and the EuropeanUnion (led by France, Germany, and United Kingdom)agreed upon a common transatlantic position last year,trans orming the situation. Concerns about internationalterrorism and Islamic undamentalism were heightenedagain a er the subway bombings in London last July,attacks on European embassies and consulates in the

Middle East ollowing a Danish newspaper publishing

6 Speech at Brussels Forum 2006, April 28, 2006. http://www.gm us.org/brussels orum/template/transcript_detail.c m?id=2

Section wo: Challenges and Treats on the Global Agenda


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cartoons satirizing the prophet Mohammed, and therecently thwarted plot to bomb transatlantic airliners.In this section, we devote attention to support or policy options on dealing with Iran. We also explore Americanand European attitudes toward immigration, globalwarming, economic downturn, and Chinas rising power.Treat perceptions raise questions about what to do, espe-cially concerning civil liberties, a complex issue involvingdi erent traditions, institutions, and policies. Te pros-pects or transatlantic cooperation will depend in part ondevelopments within the United States and Europe, sowe highlight variations within Europe as well as partisandi erences in the United States.

AMERICANS AND EUROPEANS AGREE ON

GLOBAL THREATS

Large majoritiestopping 70% o Americans andEuropeanscontinue to agree on the importance o a wide

range o international threats in the next 0 years,including international terrorism, Islamic undamentalism,immigration, the global spread o disease such as avian fu,global warming, the growing power o China, and violenceand instability in Iraq. Te intensity o threat perceptionis higher among Americans than Europeans on all threatsbut global warming. (See chart # on page 7)

INCREASED CONCERN ABOUT ISLAMIC

FUNDAMENTALISM

Te largest shi s in threat perceptions since last year wereincreases on both sides o the Atlantic in those who seeIslamic undamentalism as an extremely important threat(+ percentage-points o Americans, + percentage-pointso Europeans). Te largest increases among Europeans werein the United Kingdom (+22 percentage-points), Italy (+ 9percentage-points), and Spain (+ 2 percentage-points).


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IRAN GREATER THREAT THAN IRAQ

Larger percentages o Americans and Europeans see Iranacquiring nuclear weapons as an extremely importantthreat (75% and 58%, respectively) than continued violenceand instability in Iraq (56% and 5%, respectively). AmongEuropeans, the highest percentages o respondents who seeIran acquiring nuclear weapons as an extremely importantthreat are in Portugal (69%), Spain (68%), Germany (67%),and Poland (6 %). On Iraq, the highest intensities o threatperception in Europe are in Spain (5 %) and the UnitedKingdom (52%). For more in ormation on American andEuropean attitudes toward Iran, see the accompanyingsection on page 0.

BROAD AGREEMENT ON WHERE TO COMPROMISE

ON CIVIL LIBERTIES

Although public debate might lead one to expect thatAmericans and Europeans have di erent views o how

to respond to terrorism, we ound broad agreement onboth sides o the Atlantic on where to draw the line oncivil liberties. Fi y-nine percent o both Americans andEuropeans oppose greater governmental authority tomonitor citizens telephone calls as part o the e ort toprevent terrorism. Americans and Europeans also agreethat governments should have greater authority to monitorcommunications on the Internet (5 % o both Americansand Europeans in avor) and to install surveillance camerasin public places (7 % o Americans and 78% o Europeansin avor). Tey disagree about greater authority to monitorbanking transactions, with 58% o Americans opposedand 50% o Europeans in avor. (See chart #5)

SPLIT BETWEEN DEMOCRATS AND REPUBLICANS

ON CIVIL LIBERTIES

Within the United States, there is a partisan divide ongranting the government greater authority as part o

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AMERICAN AND EUROPEAN VIEWS ON IRAN

How willing are Americans and Europeans to support

the ull range o policy options surrounding Iran,

especially should negotiations and a possible UN

resolution ail to halt its nuclear program? We asked

questions about support or the current initiatives

to prevent Iran rom acquiring nuclear weapons, as

well as potential uture options, including economic

incentives, economic and political sanctions, and,

ultimately, military orce i diplomatic options should

ail. By considering support or current and uture

options, we can assess the overall potential support

among American and European publics or the use o

orce, as well as or accepting a nuclear Iran.

MAJORITIES SUPPORT CURRENT EFFORTS TO

PREVENT NUCLEAR IRAN

Seventy-nine percent o Americans and 84%

Europeans agree that e orts by the United States

and the European Union to prevent Iran rom

acquiring nuclear weapons should continue. When

asked about the best option or doing so, the largest

percentage o Americans (36%) presently pre ers

economic sanctions while the largest percentage o

Europeans (46%) pre ers economic incentives. Only

very small percentages o both Americans (15%) and

Europeans (5%) eel that military action is cur rently

the best option. (See chart #7)

IF NON-MILITARY OPTIONS FAIL, AMERICANS AND

FRENCH SUPPORT MILITARY FORCE IN IRAN

I non-military options ail, 53% o Americans whosupport e or ts to prevent Iran rom acquiring nuclear

weapons would support military action, compared

with 45% o Europeans. In France, Germany, and The

United Kingdom, the countries leading negotiations

with Iran or the EU, 54% o French respondents

would also support military action i non-military

options ail, ollowed by 46% o British and 40% o

German respondents. The largest percentages in

the United States (36%) and Europe (47%) agree

that the United Nations can best handle the issue

o Iranian nuclear weapons. This is true both or

respondents who are willing to accept a nuclear

Iran and or those who support military orce against

Iran. Only 9% o Europeans believe that the


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United States can best handle the issue, compared

with 22% o Americans. (See chart #8)

FACED WITH POLICY OPTIONS, MORE AMERICANS

WILLING TO CONSIDER FORCE IN IRAN

An aggregate portrait o American and European

support or current and uture policy options on Iran

reveals that 45% o Americans would support the

use o orce either now or i non-military options

should ail, while 35% o Americans would accept

a nuclear Iran, and 20% are uncertain about what

to do. Europeans (E11) are nearly evenly divided

between 37% who would support the use o orce


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e orts to prevent terrorism. Majorities o Democratsoppose greater government authority to monitortelephone calls (78%), monitor communications onthe Internet (55%), and monitor citizens bankingtransactions (7 %), whereas majorities o Republicanssupport greater government authority on each issue (6 %in avor o monitoring telephone calls, 72% o monitoring

communications on the Internet, and 56% o monitoringbanking transactions). Majorities o both parties (65%o Democrats and 80% o Republicans) support greatergovernment authority to install surveillance cameras inpublic places. (See chart #6 on page 9)

AMERICANS AND EUROPEANS SEE RISE OF

CHINA DIFFERENTLY

When asked to evaluate their eelings o warmth towardChina on a 00-point thermometer scale, American andEuropean ratings were virtually identical ( 6 degreesto 5, respectively). But 8% o Americans, comparedwith 27% o Europeans, eel that the rise o China is an

extremely important threat in the next 0 years. In theUnited States, the largest percentage o respondentsare more concerned by the threat posed by growingChinese military power ( 5%), while in Europe, thelargest percentage o respondents is more concerned by

either now or should non-military options ail and 38%

who would accept a nuclear Iran, with 25% who are

uncertain what to do. Among Turkish respondents,

only 10% would support the use o orce either nowor i non-military options should ail, while 56% would

accept a nuclear Iran, and 34% are uncertain about

what to do. (See chart #9 on page 11)

AMERICANS AGREE ON PREVENTING NUCLEAR IRAN

BUT DIVIDED OVER MILITARY OPTION

In the United States, Democrats and Republicans over-

whelmingly agree (73% and 88%, respectively) that

e orts to prevent Iran rom acquiring nuclear weapons

should continue, with only small minorities o both

parties who eel that military action is the best option

(15% o Democrats and 19% o Republicans). The

parties diverge over what to do i non-military options

should ail; 70% o Republicans but only 41% o

Democrats would support military action under those

circumstances. The parties also di er regarding who

can best handle the issue, with largest percentage o

Democrats (46%) supporting the United Nations, and

the largest percentage o Republicans (34%) avoring

the United States. (See chart #10)

continued from page


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the threat posed by the growing Chinese economy ( 7%).Among Europeans, the highest perception o threat romthe Chinese economy is in France (5 %), Portugal (52%),and Italy (5 %). Within the United States, Democrats aremore concerned about the economic ( 7%) than military threat (28%), and Republicans are more concernedabout the military ( 2%) than economic threat (2 %).(See chart # )

IMMIGRATION SEEN AS A THREAT ON BOTH SIDES

OF THE ATLANTIC

Seventy-nine percent o Americans and 76% o Europeans agree that large numbers o immigrantscoming into their country is an important threat. Onboth sides o the Atlantic, the percentages o those whosee immigration as an extremely important threat hasincreased since 2005, rom 5% to 2% in the UnitedStates, and rom 27% to 2% in Europe. Many moreRepublicans (5 %) than Democrats (29%) agree, andamong Europeans, the highest percentages that seeimmigration as an extremely important threat are inSpain ( 9%, an increase rom 28% in 2005), the UnitedKingdom ( 2%), and Portugal ( %).


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he United States and the European Union declaredat their 2006 annual summit, we recognize that the

advance o democracy is a strategic priority o our age.7 Te two partners have cooperated closely in the WesternBalkans on the nal status o Kosovo, the contestedpresidential election in Belarus, and e orts to relievesu ering in Sudan. Yet the elections o a Hamas-led

government in Palestine and a government in Lebanonincluding Hezbollah have raised di cult questions aboutdemocracy promotion in the Middle East and aboutthe compatibility o Islam and democracy, a complexissue relating to views o religion and state. Last years

ransatlantic rends ound that more Europeans thanAmericans supported democracy promotion while bothsides strongly pre erred so power options. Tis year,

we probed urther, to see whether these ndings werestable and how deep public support is, given the contin-ued challenges in the Middle East.

AMERICAN SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY

PROMOTION SOFTENS

When asked whether it should be the role o the European

Union to help establish democracy in other countries,7 % o Europeans agreed, a gure nearly unchanged

rom 2005. Forty- ve percent o Americans agreed whenasked i it should be the role o the United States, adecline o seven percentage-points rom last year. As in2005, breakdown by U.S. party a liation shows a strongpartisan divide, with only 5% o Democrats agreeingcompared to 6 % o Republicans. Tese percentages

7 Vienna Summit Declaration, EU-U.S. Summit, June 2 , 2006. http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/us/sum06_06/docs/decl_ nal_2 0606.pd

Section Tree: Democracy Promotion


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refect declines in support in both parties (minus-eightpercentage-points among Democrats and minus- 2percentage-points among Republicans). (See charts # 2and # )

DECLINE IN SUPPORT FOR MILITARY FORCE TO

PROMOTE DEMOCRACY

Asked whether they would support one or morepolicy options to promote democracy, Americans andEuropeans show strong support or less intrusive optionssuch as monitoring elections (79% o Europeans, 67% o Americans) and supporting independent groups such astrade unions, human rights associations, and religiousgroups (77% o Europeans, 7 % o Americans). Supportdeclined when asked about more intrusive or severeoptions, such as economic sanctions, supporting politicaldissidents, political sanctions, and use o military orce.Tese percentages remain largely unchanged rom

last year, with the exception o support or military orce, which declined eight percentage-points among

Europeans to 2 %. In the United States, support ormilitary orce continued to show a strong partisandivide, with the support o 28% o Democrats and 5 % o Republicans. (See charts # , and # 5 on page 6)

SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY PROMOTION UNLESS

ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISTS ELECTED

Fi y-nine percent o Americans and 60% o Europeanswould continue to support democracy promotion even i the countries in question would be more likely to opposeU.S. or EU policies. When asked i they would continue tohold these views even i it was likely that these countrieswould elect Islamic undamentalist leaders, 5 % o Americans agree, while European support drops to %.Notably, 5 % o urkish respondents agree, a percentagealmost identical to Americans.


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INCOMPATIBILITY BETWEEN ISLAM

AND DEMOCRACY DUE TO PARTICULAR

ISLAMIC GROUPS

Fi y-six percent o Americans and Europeans (E 2) eelthe values o Islam are not compatible with the valueso their countrys democracy. Te highest percentagesamong Europeans were in Germany (67%), Slovakia(6 %), and Spain and Italy (62%). Forty- ve percento urkish respondents eel the values o Islam are notcompatible with democracy, which may refect their

countrys long debate on secularism. Sixty percent o both Americans and Europeans (E 2) who hold these views eel that the problem is with particular Islamicgroups, not with Islam in general. While the largestpercentages o both Democrats and Republicans eel thatthe values o Islam are not compatible with democracy,many more Republicans (67%) than Democrats ( 7%)hold this view. Sixty-six percent o Democrats and 59%o Republicans agree that the problem is with particularIslamic groups.


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Since the rejection o the proposed constitutionaltreaty in France and the Netherlands in 2005, theEuropean Union has been in a period o refectionabout its uture. Riots by second-generation immigrantyouth in France last all raised questions about multicul-turalism and Europes economic prospects. Policymakersdebated enlargement atigue, wondering whether the

EU could continue to admit new members on its bordersand remain a coherent international actor. Romania andBulgaria moved closer to joining the EU, and urkey andCroatia were invited to begin accession negotiations, butquestions were raised about when urkey would be ready to join. urkish politicians, in turn, warned that rustra-tions over accession could turn urkey away rom theEU and the West. How have these widespread concerns

and debates shaped attitudes toward the EUs role ininternational a airs? Given strong support or EU globalleadership, how willing are Europeans to play a military role in international a airs? Are Europeans as skepticaltoward urther enlargement as their politicians?

STRONG SUPPORT BUT DECLINING INTENSITY

FOR EU LEADERSHIP AMONG CORE MEMBERSOverall support or the European Union to exertstrong leadership in world a airs has remained very strong since 2002, with 8 % o respondents seeing EUleadership as desirable in 2002 and 76% eeling the samein 2006. Te intensity o this support, however, hasdropped considerably in some o the ounding memberso the European Union, with the percentage o French

Section Four: A Period o Re ection in Europe

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Turkish oreign minister Abdullah Gl warned recently

that Turkey is at risk o turning away rom its traditional

alliances in the West, that moderate liberal people

[in Turkey] are becoming anti-American and anti-

EU, especially young, dynamic, educated, and

economically active people. 8 Although the European

Union invited Turkey to begin accession negotiations in

October 2005, the initial steps have been characterized

by rustration over the unresolved situation in Cyprus

and public skepticism about Turkeys candidacy voiced

by some European politicians. The sense that Turkey

was not welcome was rein orced by the change in the

French constitution last year to require a re erendum

or uture enlargements a ter Romania and Bulgaria.

U.S.-Turkish o fcial relations have been strained,

and Turkey has repeatedly expressed concerns with

the instability on its borders with Iraq and with U.S.

policies in the Middle East. In this time o uncertainty

about Turkeys uture in the EU and its border relations,

can we observe trends in public opinion?

TURKEY COOLING TOWARD U.S. AND EU, WARMING

TOWARD IRAN

Turkish eelings toward the United States and Europe

have cooled since 2004, with a warmth reading toward

the United States declining rom 28 degrees in 2004

to 20 in 2006 on a 100-point thermometer scale, and

rom 52 degrees to 45 toward the European Union.

Over the same period, the warmth reading o Turkish

eelings toward Iran has risen rom 34 degrees to

43, and their eelings toward the Palestinians have

declined rom 52 degrees to 47. (See chart #17)

YOUNGER TURKS WARMER TOWARD BOTH

U.S. AND EU

Younger Turks, however, have warmer eelings toward

both the United States and the European Union than

the national averages, with a thermometer reading

among 18 to 24-year-olds o 27 degrees toward the

8 Anti-west backlash is gaining pace, warns urkish minister,Financial imes, July 20, 2006, page .

IS TURKEY TURNING AWAY FROM THE WEST?


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United States and 48 degrees toward the European

Union. Overall, warmth toward both the United States

and the European Union was negatively correlated

with age, suggesting that the younger Turks are not

more anti-American or anti-EU than older generations.

DECLINING SUPPORT FOR EU MEMBERSHIP

IN TURKEY

While a majority o Turkish respondents continue to

see membership as a good thing, the percentage o

Turks who see Turkeys membership as a good thing

has allen each year rom 73% in 2004 to 54% in

2006, while the percentage o Turkish respondents

who see Turkeys membership as a bad thing has

increased rom 9% to 22% over that same time.

(See chart #18)

TURKEY MOST CRITICAL OF BUSH AND NEGATIVE

TOWARD EU LEADERSHIP

Among Europeans, Turkey has the lowest approval

rating or President Bushs handling o international

policies, with only seven percent approving and 81%

disapproving. The strongest negative eelings toward

U.S. leadership in world a airs were also ound

in Turkey, where 56% o respondents viewed U.S.

leadership as very undesirable. At the same t ime,

Turkish support or strong EU leadership in worlda airs also dropped, rom 50% in 2005 to 35%

in 2006.

DOWNWARD TREND IN TURKISH SUPPORT

FOR NATO

While 53% agreed with the statement that NATO

is still essential or Turkeys security in 2004 and

52% in 2005, only 44% o Turkish respondents

agreed in 2006. This percentage, while no longer a

majority, remains the largest percentage o Turkish

respondents.


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respondents who see EU leadership as very desirabledropping rom 0% in 2002 to 2 % in 2006. Similarly,this percentage has dropped in Italy rom 5 % in 2002to % in 2006 and in the Netherlands rom 2% to 6%in 2006. Only Germany, among the ounding memberssurveyed, has remained constant, with 27% in 2002 and

% in 2006.

WIDESPREAD SUPPORT FOR EU FOREIGN

MINISTER

Sixty- ve percent o Europeans agree that the EU shouldhave its own oreign ministerone o the key re ormsput orth in the proposed constitutional treatyeven i their country might not always agree with the positionstaken. Support is highest in Spain (7 %) and Italy (7 %)and lowest in Slovakia ( 8%) and the United Kingdom(52%). (See chart # 6 on page 7)

COMPETING VIEWS ABOUT DEALING WITH

INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS

When asked whether the EU should strengthen its military power in order to play a larger role in the world, 6% o Europeans agree and 5 % disagree. As past ransatlantic

rends surveys have suggested, this disagreementrefects competing views o the EU as an internationalactor between those who eel the EU should increaseits military power and those who eel the EU shouldconcentrate on economic power. Te highest support orstrengthening military power is ound in Portugal (68%),France (56%), and Poland (5 %), with the lowest supportin Germany ( 5%).

EUROPEANS FEEL FURTHER ENLARGEMENT WILL

HELP EU IN WORLD AFFAIRS

Majorities o Europeans agree that urther enlargemento the European Union will help it play a more important

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role in world a airs (6 %). Te largest percentages areound in countries about to join the EU, Romania (85%)

and Bulgaria (82%), ollowed by Spain (78%), Poland(77%), Portugal (7 %), and Slovakia (7 %). Similarly, amajority o Europeans agree that urther enlargement willpromote peace and democracy along its borders (62%).At the same time, a majority o Europeans eel that urtherenlargement will make it even more di cult to develop acommon European identity (58%). (See chart # 9)

NEW EU MEMBERS NOT A COHERENT BLOC

New and prospective EU members surveyedBulgaria,Poland, Slovakia, Romania,do not appear as a group tohold signi cantly di erent views on the EU or the UnitedStates rom the European averages. Te percentages o Poles and Romanians who support strong EU leadershipin world a airs (70% and 66%, respectively) is close to theEuropean average o 76%, while the percentages are lowerin Bulgaria and Slovakia (56% and 50%, respectively). YetPoland and Romania also show the highest support orPresident Bushs policies ( 0% and 2%, respectively),where Bulgaria and Slovakia (20% and 2 %, respectively)are closer to the European average o 8%.

NEGATIVE TRENDS IN EUROPEAN VIEWS ABOUT

TURKEY JOINING THE EU

When asked whether urkeys membership in theEuropean Union would be a good thing, a bad thing, orneither good nor bad, the largest percentage o Europeanscontinue to eel it would be neither good nor bad ( 0%,a gure unchanged since 200 ). Among those who havean opinion, however, there has been a reversal in thepercentages who see urkeys membership as a good or badthingthose who see urkeys membership as a good thinghave allen each year rom 0% in 200 to 2 % in 2006,and those who see urkeys membership as a bad thinghave grown rom 20% in 200 to 2% in 2006. Te largestincreases in negative views since 200 have been in Slovakia(+2 percentage-points), the Netherlands (+ 8 percentage-points), and Germany and Spain (+ percentage-pointseach). (See chart #20)

AMERICANS CONTINUE TO SUPPORT STRONG

EU LEADERSHIP

Americans continue to eel positively about the EuropeanUnion and to support strong EU leadership in the world.Americans registered an increase in their eelings o warmth toward the EU rom 5 degrees to 60 on a 00-point thermometer scale between 2002 and 2006. Seventy-six percent o Americans also support strong leadership

or the EU in world a airs in 2006 (nearly unchanged rom79% in 2002). Tere is no partisan di erence on this issue,with 75% o both Republicans and Democrats agreeing.


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2 2 | R A N S A L A N I C R E N D S 2 0 0 6

Although the image o the United States has not recov-ered among Europeans, this years ransatlantic rends suggests that American and European views o internationalthreats and challenges may not be so ar apart. Concernsabout Islamic undamentalism and terrorism have risen onboth sides o the Atlantic in the past year. Tere is strongsupport or continuing e orts to prevent Iran rom acquiring

nuclear weapons, although there are likely to be di erencesshould military orce become a serious option. Iran may o era good case or the development o a common European

oreign policy since public opinion is relatively united, yetEuropeans remain divided about how the EU should play alarger role in the world. Americans and Europeans seem toagree on where to compromise on civil liberties in the e ortto prevent terrorism, although a closer look at the UnitedStates shows signi cant di erences between Republicans andDemocrats. While Chinas rising power is viewed di erently,with more Americans than Europeans concerned about a

potential military threat, both are concerned about the com-patibility o Islam and democracy and agree that the problemis with particular Islamic groups.

Te United States and its European allies will debateNA Os uture this all at the Riga summit at a time whenwe nd declining support or the alliance in Europe. Tis isperhaps most worrisome when this trend is led by notabledeclines in public support among traditionally strongsupporters o NA O, including Germany, Italy, Poland,and urkey. Public support or NA O, other surveys

show, has rebounded a er comparable low periods in thepast (around the Pershing missile crisis in 98 , the endo the cold war in 989, and the war in the Balkans in themid- 990s) and may do so again.

rends in urkey o er a sobering picture. urkishrespondents appear to be cooling toward both the U.S.and the EU, while warming toward Iran. Support orNA O has declined each year since 200 , as has support

or joining the EU. Yet, these trends are not refected inmore critical attitudes in urkeys younger generation,which has the most positive attitude toward both.

American and European relations with urkey, at a timewhen rustrations are growing about EU membership andinstability on its borders, may prove vital to the prospects

or transatlantic cooperation surrounding progress in theMiddle East.

Looking ahead, the gap between the reported improvementin transatlantic relations at the o cial level and persistentnegative views among European publics may simply refecta time lag in the perception o change, especially i politicalleaders continue to declare their desire to leave behind the

bitterness around Iraq. On the other hand, the persistenceo negative views o President Bush among Europeansmay indicate that their minds are made up, that changewill only be possible with a new president a er 2008. Wehave explored di erences among European countries toshow the contours o public opinion on a range o issues.Tere are also di erences across the political spectrum andamong European policymakers, themes which are exploredin another, related survey project.9 Public opinion is only one o many actors shaping oreign policy, a actor that isinfuential under some conditions, such as elections. We

should look closely to this alls midterm elections in theUnited States and to next years presidential elections inFrance as politicians seek to gauge the public mood andtheir support or uture policies.

Section Five: Conclusion

9 European Elite Survey, a project o the Compagnia di San Paolo. Please see www.a arinternazionali.it or the ull data and analysis.


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Notes


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Notes


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METHODOLOGY:

NS Opinion was commissioned to conduct the survey using Computer Assisted elephone Interviews in all countriesexcept Bulgaria, Poland, Slovakia, Romania, and urkey, where lower telephone penetration necessitated the use o ace-to-

ace interviews. In all countries a random sample o approximately 1,000 men and women, 18 years o age and older, wereinterviewed. Interviews were conducted between June 6, 2006, and June 24, 2006.

For results based on the national samples in each o the 13 countries surveyed, one can say with 95% con dence that themargin o error attributable to sampling and other random efects is plus or minus 3 percentage points. For results based onthe total European sample (n=12044), the margin o margin o error is plus or minus 1 percentage point. Te average responserate or all 13 countries surveyed was 23.4%.

Europe-wide gures are weighted on the basis o the size o the adult population in each country. Unless otherwise speci ed,comparative data are reproduced rom Transatlantic Trends 2003-2005 and/or rom Worldviews 2002(www.transatlantictrends.org).

When processing is complete, data rom the survey are deposited with the Inter-University Consortium or Political and SocialResearch at the University o Michigan (ICPSR) and are available to scholars and other interested parties. At the time o printing, data or years 2002 through 2004 are available through ICPSR. For more in ormation please consult the ICPSRcatalog at www.icpsr.umich.edu.

NOTE ON EUROPEAN AVERAGES:

Over time, additional European countries have been added to the survey. While the addition o new countries has afectedthe Europe-wide average, the impact has usually not been statistically signi cant. Tere ore, or ease o presentation, we havetreated several diferent averages as i they were part o one average: the EU6 and EU7 averages are listed as part o the EU9,and the E10 average is listed as part o the E12. For additional in ormation on the composition o the European averages, pleaseconsult the table below.

YEAR AVERAGE COUNTRIES

2002 EU6 France, Germany, Italy, Te Netherlands, Poland, and Te United Kingdom

2003 EU7 Same as the EU6 with the addition o Portugal

2004-2006 EU9 Same as the EU7 with the addition o Slovakia and Spain

2004-2005 E10 Same the EU9 with the addition o urkey

2006 E11 Same as EU9 with the addition o Bulgaria and Romania

2006 E12 Same as E10 with the addition o Bulgaria and Romania

TABLE OF EUROPEAN AVERAGES:


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