- 1. TranscendingZombies Pete Mandik Associate Professor and
Chair of Philosophy Coordinator, Cognitive Science Laboratory
William Paterson University, New Jersey USA
2. Primary Goal
- To articulate a transcendental argument for the conclusion that
my physical doppelganger cannot be a zombie.
3. Reductive Physicalism and Zombies
- Reductive Physicalism = A being maximally physically similar to
me while numerically distinct must be phenomenally similar to
me.
- Reductive Physicalism = A being maximally physically similar to
me while numerically distinct must not be a zombie.
4. The Transcending Zombies Argument in Brief
- I know that Im not a zombie.
- If its possible to know that Im not a zombie, then its
necessary that qualia are such-and-such.
- Fixing my physical properties fixes my such-and-such.
5. Whats SUCH-AND-SUCH?
- (A certain kind of) conceptualized egocentric content
6. What are concepts?
- Two working characterizations:
- 1. The knowledge we bring to bear in judgment
- (George judges dogs to be mammalsGeorge has the concepts /dog/
and /mammal/George knows stuff about dogs and mammals)
- 2. Mental particulars satisfying the re-identifiability
criterion
- (possessing concept Cthe possessor is able to re-identify
objects falling under C as such)
- (George has /dog/George is able to identify a dog as such on
multiple occasions)
7. The Transcending Zombies Argument
- P1.If it is possible for me to know that I am not a zombie,
then phenomenal character is (a certain kind of) conceptualized
egocentric content.
- P2.I know that I am not a zombie.
- P3.Phenomenal character is (a certain kind of) conceptualized
egocentric content.
- P4.Fixing my physical properties fixes my conceptualized
egocentric contents.
- C.Fixing my physical properties fixes my phenomenal
properties.
8. Remarks on premises 1, 3, & 4
- P1.If it is possible for me to know that I am not a zombie,
then phenomenal character has to be exhausted by (a certain kind
of) conceptualized egocentric content.
- P2.I know that I am not a zombie.
- P3.Phenomenal character is exhausted by (a certain kind of)
conceptualized egocentric content.
- P4.Fixing my physical properties fixes my conceptualized
egocentric contents.
- C.Fixing my physical properties fixes my phenomenal
properties.
- P1: This is the biggie. Much will be said very soon on its
behalf, including clarifications of the notions of conceptualized
and egocentric contents used in P1, P3, and P4
- P3: Follows straightforwardly from P1 & P2.
- P4: Further discussion must await the unpacking of
conceptualized and egocentric
9. P2: I know that I am not a zombie
- I know that Iam not a zombie
- I know thatIam not a zombie
- Following Lynch (2004), I stipulate the equivalence of P2
to:
- I am certain that I have some qualitatively conscious mental
states now
10. P2: I know that I am not a zombie (contd)
- Also following Lynch (2004), three reasons for P2:
- Attempts to doubt P2 hurts your head, and head hurting is
phenomenal
- The falsity of P2 cannot be imagined
- The problem of consciousness makes sense only if P2
11. P1, Part One: Phenomenal Knowledge requires Conceptual
Content
- The story of George and the rock:
If George has the concepts /hard/ and /lumpy/ but not the
concept /igneous/, then all George can know about the rock is that
it is hard and lumpy and not that it is igneous. hard & lumpy!
hard, lumpy, & igneous 12. P1, Part One: Phenomenal Knowledge
requires Conceptual Content (contd)
- The story of George and the rock:
Relative to Georges current conceptual repertoire, that the rock
is igneous is unknowable. It is un-conceptualized residue. For all
George knows, that rock is not igneous. hard & lumpy! hard,
lumpy, & igneous 13. P1, Part One: Phenomenal Knowledge
requires Conceptual Content (contd)
- The story of Pete and his qualia:
If I know that Im not a zombie, then my current mental states
have a set of qualia, Q, such that I know that I have them and no
member of which is un-conceptualized residue. Relative to my
current qualia, my conceptual repertoire isfully adequate . Mmm,
coffee-y! Self-known non-zombie 14. P1, Part One: Phenomenal
Knowledge requires Conceptual Content (contd)
- The story of Pete and his qualia:
If my current qualia are un-conceptualized residue, then for all
I know I dont have them. For all I know, Im a zombie. Mmm,
coffee-y! Self-known non-zombie 15. P1, Part Two: Phenomenal
Knowledge requires Egocentricity
- Egocentric content= the content of mental states concerning the
creature of which they are states
- My perceptual content of my coffee cup as being off to my
left
- Neural activations in ones LGN code for luminance events in
retinocentric space
16. P1, Part Two: Phenomenal Knowledge requires Egocentricity
(contd)
- The story of Pete and his qualia (contd):
If Im incapable of representing my qualia as mine, then I can
know that someone has qualia without knowing that its me. Whose
coffee qualia are these? WTF!? Ignorant coffee fiend 17. P1, Part
Three: Conceptualized Egocentric Content is Phenomenal
Character
- The previous arguments showed
- (where PK=Phenomenal Knowledge, P=Phenomenal Character, and CE
= Conceptualized Egocentric Content)
- If [PK & (CE & ~P)], then I could have phenomenal
knowledge even though all my judgments of the form I have qualia Q
are false.
- However, knowledge entails truth.
18. P1, Part Three: Conceptualized Egocentric Content is
Phenomenal Character (contd)
- If my current qualia are knowable by me, then my current
conceptual repertoire must contain a structure isomorphic to my
current qualia
19. P1, Part Three: Conceptualized Egocentric Content is
Phenomenal Character (contd)
- Beyond Isomorphism: Identity
- I want to argue that phenomenal character is not just
isomorphic to, but identical to, a certain kind of conceptual
content.
- However, reflections on knowability alone will not establish
this, otherwise George would have rocks in his head.
20. P1, Part Three: Conceptualized Egocentric Content is
Phenomenal Character (contd)
- Preliminary reasons why, unlike rocks, qualia are made of
concepts
- Plausibly, at leastsomecharacter is conceptual, e.g. the
experience of experts
- The concept-independence of rocks bears an explanatory burden
unmatched by the concept-independence of qualia. (More later.)
- Part of our rock concept is that they have a reality that
outstrips their appearance, whereas /quale/ is an appearance
concept (explicable in terms ofepistemicappearances. More
later.)
21. P4: My Physical Properties Fix My Conceptualized and
Egocentric Contents
- Conceptual contents alone do not suffice for phenomenality
- Egocentric contents alone do not suffice for phenomenality
- visual agnosics card posting
- LGN retinocentric neural codes
22. P4: My Physical Properties Fix My Conceptualized and
Egocentric Contents (contd)
- Arguments to the contrary presuppose direct phenomenal
concepts, which are the target of my The Neurophilosophy of
Subjectivity
- Brief remark: alleged concepts that can be had only while
currently having a quale violate the re-identifiability
criterion
23. Conceptualism, Part One: Explaining Appearances
- What needs to be explained: How can the dog seem blue to Jones
even though he believes its white?
24. Conceptualism, Part One: Explaining Appearances
- Compare: The Monty Hall Problem: How can keeping his door seem
correct to Jones even though he believes its incorrect?
25. Conceptualism, Part One: Explaining Appearances
- In both cases, Jones has a disposition to make a judgment that
he overrides due to collateral information.
- We still need, however, an explanation of the difference
between Joness belief that the dog is white and his experience of
it as if blue.
26. Conceptualism, Part One: Explaining Appearances
- Joness as if blue dog experience = a reciprocally interacting
pairing of a sensation carrying egocentric blue dog information and
a conceptualization of that information
- Joness white dog belief = a conceptualization concerning a
white dog
011001 Blue dog White dog 27. Conceptualism, Part Two:
Explaining Diachronic-Discrimination Failures
- Kelly Cases: colors discriminable in simultaneous but not
serial presentationsprima facieconstitute violations of the
re-identifiability criterion
28. Conceptualism, Part Two: Explaining
Diachronic-Discrimination Failures
- Kelly Cases: colors discriminable in simultaneous but not
serial presentations
MASK! 29. Conceptualism, Part Two: Explaining
Diachronic-Discrimination Failures
- Kelly Cases: colors discriminable in simultaneous but not
serial presentations
30. Conceptualism, Part Two: Explaining
Diachronic-Discrimination Failures
- Kelly Cases: colors discriminable in simultaneous but not
serial presentations
31. Conceptualism, Part Two: Explaining
Diachronic-Discrimination Failures
- Kelly Cases: colors discriminable in simultaneous but not
serial presentations
32. Conceptualism, Part Two: Explaining
Diachronic-Discrimination Failures
- My conceptualist explanatory strategy:
- Argue that the simultaneous and serial presentations differ in
their perceptual contents.
33. Conceptualism, Part Two: Explaining
Diachronic-Discrimination Failures
- Judgment-based models of Kelly cases:
- (where F is predicative and A and B are names, demonstatives,
or descriptions)
- In the simultaneous presentation, judgments 1, 2, and 3 are
roughly simultaneous. In the serial presentation, 1 and 2 are
temporally more spread out and 3 is withheld.
34. Conceptualism, Part Two: Explaining
Diachronic-Discrimination Failures
- Why would someone fail to judge that, (3) AB?
- The Information Deficiency option:The subject fails to believe
either (1) or (2) or both.
- The Inferential-Failure option:The subject believes both (1)
and (2) but nonetheless fails to infer (3)
35. Conceptualism, Part Two: Explaining
Diachronic-Discrimination Failures
- Problems withthe Inferential-Failure option.
- Plausible explanations of inferential failure would appeal to
either
- The complexity of the premises,
- The premises being believed but non-occurrently, or
- The premises being believed but non-consciously
- none of which are particularly applicable to Kelly cases which
involve non-complex, occurrent, conscious states.
36. Conceptualism, Part Two: Explaining
Diachronic-Discrimination Failures
- Cashing out Information Deficiency
- Memory Failure (E.g., it is forgotten that A is F )
- Problem: if /A/ is atomic and the first and fleeting
representation of A, then it fails re-identifability. (And some may
find implausible that its non-atomic.)
37. Conceptualism, Part Two: Explaining
Diachronic-Discrimination Failures
- Cashing out Information Deficiency
- Perceptual Failure (E.g., it was never consciously perceived in
the first place that A is F )
- So, the simultaneous and serial presentations of stimuli are
different contexts that give rise to differences in how stimuli are
perceived.
38. Concluding summary
- If I know that Im not a zombie, then phenomenal character is a
certain kind of physicalistically reducible conceptual
content.
39.