Transitional Politics of Korea, 1987-1992- Activation of Civil Society

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Transitional

olitics

ofKorea,

1987

1992:

Activationf CivilSociety

Su-Hoon Lee*

INTRODUCTION

IVAD

MICDISCOURSEn the Korean social science community uring

e

early

1980s

and

up

to

the

mid-1980s tended to

focus

upon

the

state;

for nstance, the role

of the state

n

industrialization,

ts

relations

with

big

capital,

its relations

with

labor,

and its

general

character

in

Korean society.'However,

n the wake of a democratic

ransition

n South

Korea during

the period

1987-1992, one of the major

scholarly

ebates

in

Korea

has centered on changing relations

between

state

nd

civil

oci-

ety.2

he main elements

in transitionalpolitics

from an authoritarian

regime to a would-be democratizing governmentduring the

Roh

Tae

Woo

presidency

nvolved iberalization

of the

regime,

activationof the

civil ociety,

nd the relativeweakeningof

the state.

The

main purpose

of this

paper

is to analyze

contemporaryKorean

politics highlighting

ctivities

f

the civil society.

Lately,many

Korean

social

scientists

have instigated timulating

nd

often controversial

e-

bates concerning

civil ociety

n

Korea.3Some put

a

great

deal of empha-

sis

on

the

significance

f an

emerging

civil society

nd its potential role

*An earlier versionof this paper was presentedto the annual meeting

of

the

American

SociologicalAssociation, ittsburgh,ugust 0-24,

992. would ike to thank hree

nonymous

reviewersor heir elpful ommentsn revisinghis aper.

I

Literaturen these ssues bounds.Here is only

very rief eference

ist.

angJip hoi,ed.,

Korean apitalismnd the tate Seoul: Hanul, 1985) (in

Korean); Korean Society or

ndustrial

Sociology, d., Contemporaryorean apitalismnd the tate

Seoul: Hangilsa,1988) (in Korean);

SangsupPark,

The

Capitalist

tate

Seoul: Hanul, 1985) (in

Korean);

Manhee

Lee,

'The

Role of

the EconomicPlanning oard

n

Korean ndustrial olicies

Ph.D.

diss.,

onseiUniversity,992)

(in Korean); Fred Deyo, State and Labor: Modes

of Political Exclusion

in East

Asian

Development, n Fred Deyo,ed., The olitical conomyf heNew Asian ndustrialismIthaca,N.Y:

CornellUniversityress, 987); and SukJoonKim, TheCrisis f heKorean apitalisttate Seoul:

Pulbit, 990) (in Korean).

2

For a representativework as a result of this

debate

in

part, see

Korean

Sociological

Association nd KoreanPolitical cienceAssociation,ds.,

State nd Civil ociety

n

Korea proceed-

ingsof theJointConference etweenKSA and KPSA,

April23-24, 1992, Seoul) (Seoul: Hanul,

1992) (in Korean).

3

In addition o the aforementionedonference

roceedings,ee

articles ncluded

n

a

special

issue of Kyongjewaahoe Winter 991) (in Korean); Se

KyunKim, A Critiqueof Ideological

Implications f Civil ociety ebates, 'YironFall 1992)

(in Korean),pp. 104-35.

351

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Pacific

Affairs

in

bringing bout social reform4while

others are

skeptical about

what

civil

societymight mply nd what

social movementswithin

ivil society

could ultimately

chieve.

I

argue that objective and properassessments

of

civil ocietymovements t this ime

are

neither

possible nor fair.All we

can

do now is to consider some

evidence that indeed

civil society is

emerging nd being

activated, nd that, s a result, elations

between the

state

nd civil ociety re being

transformed

n

Korea.

My previous

analyses6

of

democratization

in

South

Korea empha-

sized

the

opportunities

rovided and constraintsmposed

by such forces

as the global trend

towards

democratization. Also in those analyses,

focused

on

collective actors, in

particular, classes in

democratization

movementsduring the 1980s. In doing this have not ignored external

events, s they

constitute significant ariable which

should not be ex-

cluded in a discussion

of

economic

development

or

political change in

the case of South

Korea.

I

also believe that

such collectivegroups as the

urban

working class,

white-collarworkers, ntellectuals, and

students

have played a critical ole in bringing

bout a

democratizing egime, nd

that class dynamics

operated

in

important

ways

to influence

the socio-

political

configuration

f

the

Roh

regime.

However,

fter

observing

the

democratization

processes

of the Roh

Tae Woo regime (Koreans call this regime the SixthRepublic) for the

lastfive

years

or

so,

I

thought

hat different

rameworkhould

be

devel-

oped and utilized

in

order to

adequately grasp

the essential nature

of

political

changes

that

have taken

place

during

this

period.

I

do not wish

to

lose

the

elegance

and

parsimony

f

myprevious pproach.

But at

the

same

time,

do not wish to lose

sight

of

emerging

elements and new

dimensions that have come into the

political picture

of

contemporary

Korea.

Before analyzethe mainproblem(i.e., emergenceand activation f

the civil

ociety),

t

is

important

o

have

a

background

understanding

f

the

democratization movement which took

place

in

the

1980s.

The

4

SangJinHan,

WhoAre heMain

Agentsor ocialReform?Seoul: Dong-A lbosa, 1988); Sung

Kook Kim, Capitalist evelopment n Korea and the Character f Civil Society, n KSA and

KPSA, State nd Civil ociety,p. 149-72; Si Jae Lee, Social Change

in

the 90s, and Tasks and

Orientations

f

Social Movements, n KSA

and

KPSA, State nd Civil Society,p. 441-66;

and

Keun Bae Kim, CurrentActivities nd FutureTasks of Korean Environmental

Movements,

Kyongjewaahoe Winter 991), pp. 84-101.All referencesn this ootnotere n Korean.

5Se

KyunKim, Ideological mplications, p. 131-34;

Wook

n

Baek,

A

Critique

n

Civilian

Movementsn Korean

Society,

yong/ewaahoe Spring 991), pp. 58-83 (in

Korean).

6

David A. Smith and Su-Hoon Lee, Limitson a Semiperipheral

Success Story? tate

DependentDevelopment nd Prospects orSouth Korean Democratization,

n William

Martin,

ed., Semiperipheral

tates

n

the

World-EconomyNew

York:

Greenwood

ress,

990), pp. 79-96;

David

A.

Smith nd Su-Hoon Lee, Moving oward emocracy? outh Korean

PoliticalChange n the

1980s, n Michael P. Smith, d., Breaking hains:SocialMovementsnd

Collectivection New

Brunswick, J:

ransaction

ublishers, 991), pp.

164-87.

352








ActivationfCivil ocietyn

SouthKorea

democratizationmovement

n

South

Korea has by

no

means a

short

his-

tory.However,

in this

paper

I

focus only

on the movement

that

pro-

ceeded during the

FifthRepublic up

to

the

timewhen the ruling

Demo-

craticJusticeParty nnounced

the

June 29

Declaration

in

1987,

which n

turngave birth o

the Roh Tae

Woo presidency.

DEMOCRATIZATION MOVEMENT

IN THE EIGHTIES:

ADVENT OF THE

ROH

REGIME

The early 1980s

and indeed the entiretenure

of Chun Doo Hwan as

the president

of

the FifthRepublic

was one of the

most turbulent imes

in

Korean political

history. nti-government

orces tenaciously

nd

per-

sistently

ttacked the highly

uthoritarianChun

regime

on the

grounds

that it lacked legitimacy.This period mayalso be recorded as one in

which there

emerged

the most successfulexample

of

democratization

and

politicalchange

among developing countries.

A

variety f social

forces have played

a role in political change

in

South

Korea

in

the 1980s. Some

of

these

are

(1)

militant ndustrialwork-

ers, (2)

reform-minded hitecollar workers, 3)

intellectuals

including

students),

nd

(4)

traditional onservative pposition politicians.

First, he industrialworking lass represented

major threat

o the

coercive regime.Deyo7 dentifies disciplined ow-costabor as the basic

element

of

export-oriented

ndustrialization nd

points

to

increasing

ev-

els

of

labor

repression

under Park

Chung

Hee.

Still,

abor

repression

c-

tually ntensified

n

the early 1980s

as

Chun

Doo Hwan suspended

all

collectivebargaining

and banned

organized

labor protests nd the

for-

mation of

ndependent

abor

unions.

8

In

the face of this repression and political

exclusion, the

latent

power

of the South Korean

working

lass was

graduallygrowing

s

the

success

of

export

oriented

ndustrialization

ad

the effect f dramatically

transforming he occupational structure.The result of this economic

transformations a proletarianized and urbanized

South Korea.

When

political racks began to appear in the mid-1980s

(signaled by the

out-

come of the

general

election that had

taken

place

in

February

1985 to

form the

12th National Assembly reated by

a legitimation risis

n the

Chun

dictatorship),

he

pent-updemands

of the

working lass rapidly

o-

alesced. Workers nleashed a wave

of

strikes, hich climaxed during

the

summer

of

1987, demanding wage

increases, ollectivebargaining

rights

and guarantees, nd betterworking onditions. Beyond actingfor their

own

narrow

self-interest

n

work

stoppages,

workers also joined

in

7

Fred Deyo,

State nd

Labor: Modes of Political xclusion n

East

Asian

Development,

n

Deyo,

PoliticalEconomy,. 182.

8

Ibid.,p.

189.

353












PacificAffairs

The

sociopolitical cene reached some sortof social crisis.Manywor-

ried about

the

possibility f yet another military ntervention.Washing-

tonexpressed deep concern about the politicalcrisis.

On

June 29, 1987,

at the

height

of the

crisis,Roh

Tae

Woo, then the

chairman of

the DJP and its presidential nominee, issued a Special

Declaration. The essential element in the declaration was a promise to

hold a directpresidential lection within he year. t greatly ubdued the

nationwideuprising.And this declaration served as a springboardfrom

which Roh later mobilized the

narrowlywinning upport (35.9 percent

of the

vote) fromthe populace during the 1987 December presidential

election. Thus the Roh regime the SixthRepublic) came into existence.

LIBERALIZATIONFTHEROH REGIME

It

is

commonly rgued

thatdemocratizationmeans

pluralization nd

liberalization

f

the social structures.'2

t

is also argued thatdemocratiza-

tion concerns the political society,whereas liberalization s fundamen-

tally

elated to the civil

ociety.'3

I

take a different iew from these two

positions. argue, first,

hat

democratization

an not

be

reduced

to

liberalization,

nd

second,

that

any demarcation between democratization and liberalization through

the

political

and civil

ociety oncepts

s

unnecessary

nd can

complicate

political analysis. nstead, argue

that

iberalization s a

necessary

ondi-

tion for

democratization,

and that those

liberalization mattersrelate

more to the state

than

to

the

civil

society.

iberalization

s

close

to

the

concept

of

opening (abertura)

nd

loosening

of

the

coercive

state.'4

In

essence,

it means the

loosening

of direct state control

over the

civil

society.

If one

compares

the Roh

regime

with

previousregimes

in

particu-

lar the Chun regime in terms of liberalization, t should get a high

score

for t

sincerely

ook numerous iberalization

measures.'5

First f

all,

the new

regime

was tolerantof

political opposition.

One

mightkeep

in

mind the factthat

after he

1987

presidential

lection the

II

SukJoon Kim,The CrisisoftheKorean CapitalistState

(Seoul: Pulbit, 990), pp. 216-17 (in

Korean); Hak Joon Kim, Democratization

n South Korea: PresentSituation

nd Prospects

(1991,Mimeographed), .

4.

12

JuanLinz, AnAuthoritarianegime:Spain, n E. Allardt nd Stein Rokkan, ds., Mass

PoliticsNewYork: ree Press, 970),pp. 251-83,374-81.

13

Kim, Democratization, . 1.

14

See JamesCotton,

The Limits o Liberalization

n

Industrializing

sia: Three Views f the

State, acific ffairs,ol. 64, no. 3 (1992), pp. 311-327

for

n attempt

o compare heAsianNIC

state rom he tandpoint

f

iberalization.

15

See Tun-Jen heng

and LawrenceKrause, Democracy

nd

Development:

With

Special

Attentiono Korea, Journal fNortheast

sianStudies,ol. 10, no. 2, pp. 3-25

for discussion f

economic osts f

the

transitiono

democracy uring

his

eriod.

356








ActivationfCivil

ociety

n SouthKorea

opposition was deeply split.

As

far as the opposition played

the

game ac-

cording

to rules of the

institutional

olitics,

herewas no

politicalreason,

on the part

of

President

Roh

Tae

Woo,

to

repress political opponents.

Tolerance of political opponentswas inkeeping with he promisesof the

June 29 Declaration,

which served as the moral

cradle for the Sixth

Republic.

Second,

indicationsof liberalization

howed up

in

the arena

of the

press. Freedom of the press

became

a

norm.

New

legal

measures were

established

to

ensure

independence

and

self-regulation

f

the mass

media.

Subsequently, here

was an

explosion

of mass

media,

in

particu-

lar,daily newspapers

n

local areas.

One

statistic

hat ndicates iberaliza-

tion of the press is that 1,492 periodicals (including newspapers)were

newly egistered etweenJune29, 1987 and April 30, 1989.16

Third, liberalizationalso included local

political autonomy

for the

first ime since it had been eradicated

by the militaryunta

in

1961.

This

can

be recorded as

a

gigantic tep forward

n

the

history

f

Korean

polit-

ical

development.

n

the early 1990s, two elections took place

to form

local councils.

Finally,

he

autonomy

and

self-regulation

f various social sectors

were

implemented.

Educational

autonomy, campus self-government,

freedom of expression, deregulation of overseas travel, tc.,were put

into

practice.

Positions n the

Education

Board at

various levels,

which

were

previously

ttained

throughpolitical appointment,

became

subject

to election. Control

by the government ver

policies

and activities

f

uni-

versities essened

notably.

Simultaneously and/or

perhaps inevitably), owever,

iberalization

of

the Roh

regime

had to

pay

a

huge price

in

terms

f

state

apacity

n

two senses:

first,

he

ability

o

get

its

specificpolicies implemented'7 nd

second,theability o mobilize a national consensus around itsgoals.

Loss of

efficient

nd

effective

tatecapacities began to appear imme-

diately

fterRoh

took office. or

example,

a

lack

of

coordinationamong

different

overnment agencies drew the attention

of

the

press from

1988.18

Absence of

a

national consensus about where the nation was

heading and where it should head began to appear not long afterRoh

took

office n 1988. The president,

who obviouslyhad no vision or phi-

losophy

bout

national goals, was indecisive nd inactive.'9 residentRoh

16

Hankyere

hinmun, ay19,1989,p. 7 (in

Korean).

17

Theda

Skocpol, Bringinghe StateBack

n: Strategies f

Analysis

n

Current

esearch,

n

Peter

Evans,D.

Rueschemeyernd T. Skocpol,

ds., Bringing

he tate ack n (Cambridge:

am-

bridgeUniversity

ress, 985), pp.

3-37.

18

Refer oeditorials fmajor

daily

ewspapers uring he pring f 1988.

19

Ho

JinKim,

Qualificationsnd

Leadershipof Political

Leaders n the 1990s,

Korea nd

World

olitics,ol. 8, no.

1, p. 294 (in Korean).

357








Pacific

Affairs

demonstrated persistent ersonality

rait f naction or procrastination;

more often han not,

his decisions on

important ssueswere post hoc.

The workethic of a labor forcededicated to qualitydisappeared, the

inflation ate was unprecedented

n

recent times, nd the price of hous-

ing skyrocketed.Manufacturing

entureswent bankrupt,while the non-

productive ervice sector grewwith

great speed. Speculation over urban

housing and other real estate tems appeared to be the most profitable

business

activity.20

he frustrations

f

ordinary eople rose above the

tol-

erance

level.2'But

the

government

ould do little, nd to many, he Roh

regime

did not seem

capable

of intervening n private ectors

n

an

ef-

fort o

remedy

hese lls.

Consequently,the kind of omnipresent dynamism of the Korean

people

in

previous decades, despite its being under authoritarian

regimes, now lost its core. The

can do attitude that had been wide-

spread among

the

population

turned nto

despair and cynicism.

Advocates of

the Roh

regime

say thatthese are inevitable yndromes

during transitions

rom authoritarianism o democracy22 nd that they

will

go away

as

the

nation

develops

a

more

mature

democracy.

But

al-

though democracyprogresses

n

Korea,

there s

no

sign

of

improvement

or return o the

dynamic

ra.

The discussion presentedin this section is not intended to convey

the

impression

hat the

Roh

regime

fully

iberalized

Korean

society

nd

that

there have not

been

ups

and

downs

during

the

processes

of

liberal-

ization. This

was

by

no means a smooth

process.

For

instance,

eventsof

early

1989 and

another crisis

n

that

spring

were

reactionary

n

light

of

the fact

hatthe

single

most

mportant

oal

of the

regime

was democrati-

zation.23

Nevertheless,reactionary

measures and

responses

could

not

stop

the

tide of the

times.

ACTIVATION F THE CIVL SOCIETy24

The

year

1987 was

a climactic

point

in

the

history

f

political

devel-

opment

in

South

Korea.

It

was

the

year

n

which

the

long-fought

emoc-

ratization movement

recorded

a

victory.

t

was

the

year

when the

20

See

Tae

Dong

Kim

and Lee Keun Sik, Land: Objectof Speculation

or

Basis of Human

Life?

(Seoul:

Bibong, 989), pp.

14-17

(in Korean).

21

Suicides

committed y manyhouseless

families

ue

to unbearablehousingrenthikes

n

major cities

were reported lmostdailyduring

he spring f 1989. (See The

Dong-A lbofrom

March oMayof 1989.)

22

Hak Joon Kim, ed.,

Policies of

the

Sixth

Republic: Toward Unification and

Welfare Seoul:

Dongwha,

993), pp. 2-4 (inKorean).

23

Bruce

Cumings,The

Abortive bertura: outh Korea

n the Light f the

LatinAmerican

Experience,

ew

eft

eview,

o. 173 (1989),pp. 5-32.

24

The discussion n this

ectionprimarily

eliedon pamphlets, lyers,

ini compendia, nd

othermaterials

hat ivil

ociety

movement rganizations ut

out.

t

was very ifficult

orme to

provide eferences

n thosematerials. lthough

tried o read the materials

objectively,

cau-

tionreaders

o

nterpret

he

present

iscussion

ith

are.

358










Pacific

Affairs

CSMs are

reformist n the sense

that they are not fundamentally

against the

capitalist ystem ut rather

highlight istorted nd unjust as-

pects of thatsystem. hey struggle o reform he system y eliminating

such

aspects.

Although they re keenly ware of basic

contradictions n-

herent in a capitalist system, hey

equally emphasize

contradictions n

the arena of

consumption.They realize

that

contradictions re

born

in

the

fieldsof production,but thatthey

manifest hemselves n the

fieldsof

consumption.

They ntend to focus on

the atter. he politicalvision they

aspire

to

is

a

social

democracy

model

with an emphasis on the welfare

state.

The

premise of CSMs' strategys

nonviolence and peaceful

action.27

Nonviolenceand peacefulaction are nothingnew but ifwe castthem n

the

context of the Korean

social

movement

n

the eighties, heyrepre-

sent an alternative

method,

for

tudent nd labor

movementswere more

oftenthan not

militant nd

confrontational, hich

n

part s

attributable

to the authoritarian

egimes'

hyper-repression. SMs put

a

priority n

creating a mass base, acquiring

expertise (on the issues that

theyhave

taken

up), and seeking goal attainment.28 ote

that this

strategy

s dis-

tinct rom hat

of the abor movement.

Here the relationshipbetween the labor movementand CSMs in

South Korea

deserves

a

fewremarks to

say

the

least,

t has

been com-

plex. Many

feel there has been tension or even

conflict etween

the

two.

On

the part of CSMs, the labor movement s

regarded

as

important

nd

necessary s

long

as we

live

n

a

capitalist

ystem.

ut

CSMs

argue

that t

the

very

moment workers eave their

workplace they

become

members

of the civil

society e.g., consumers,

victims f

pollution, etc.).

As

such,

they

uffer

rom

ontradictions

n

the

fieldsof

consumption.

The

latter,

theyclaim,

cannot be handled

by

the labor movement.

Therefore, hey

argue, CSMs are complementaryto the labor movement.Proponents

of CSMs

recognize

their

significance

to the

degree

that

it

is

argued

that

proletarian

revolution s

not

a realistic

option

under

present

social

circumstances.29

But criticsof CSMs abound

and

the

tone of

attack

s

shrill.30

hey

attack

CSMs

because those movements

re

reformist nd are

limited

n

theirultimate

goal

and vision. CSMs turn their

eyes away

from

the basic

contradictions f

the

capitalist ocietyby ignoring

the

production

rela-

tions,

and do not see the cause

of

social

problems

but

the

outcomes.

27

Citizens' Coalition

for EconomicJustice

CCEJ),

A

Compendium

n Commemoration

f

the

Second nniversaryfCCEJSeoul: CCEJ, 991),p. 291 (in Korean).

28

Korea Anti-PollutionMovementAssociation, resolution adopted during the Third

GeneralAssemblyf KAPMA, 991 in Korean).

29

Wan Sang Han, Civil ociety, he State

nd Class n Korea, Sahoebipyong,o. 7, p. 247 (in

Korean).

30

Baek, CivilianMovements,p. 73, 76, 82.

360








ActivationfCivil ocietyn SouthKorea

Without

fixing

he

cause, they

waste

their

energy

n

treating

he

symp-

toms. More importantly, SMs, albeit unintentionally,

end to under-

mine the labor movementfor they pread rather

than

concentrate

the

energy f the socialmovement y absorbing tsmore moderatesegments.

Given the scope of the presentpaper, cannot analyze

all the CSMs

that emerged

in

the late 1980s and early 1990s. Environmental

move-

ment

organizations lone

number more than

twenty.imilarly,

number

of

consumer

protection

movement

organizations

and

feminist

groups

came into existence

during

the same

period.

Here

I

present

two

repre-

sentative ases of CSM

organizations,namely

the

Korea

Anti-Pollution

Movement Association

(KAPMA)

and Citizens' Coalition

for Economic

Justice CCEJ).

KOREA

ANTI-POLLUTION MOVEMENT ASSOCIATION

In 1986 and 1987, two mass-basedanti-pollutionmovementgroups

were formed

n

the

midstof intensifyingopular pressures

or democra-

tization. n 1986, the Korean Anti-Pollution ivilian Movement Council

was

established,

and in the

followingyear,

the Korean Anti-Pollution

Movement

Youth

Council was formed.

It

may

be noted that these two

organizationswere not entirely ew but were transformationsf earlier

loose groups.3'

The

year 1988 was a criticalpoint

in

the history f the Korean envi-

ronmentalmovementfor n thatyear the currentlymost active KAPMA

was

formedby merging

he earlier KAPCMC

and

KAPYMC.

The

KAPMA

now represents he mass-basedKorean green movement,with he largest

organization

nd most diverse

ntipollution

nd

antinuclear ctivities.

ts

membership

tands

at over two thousand as of February1993.32 It puts

out

a

monthly

ewsletter

alled, Survival

nd

Peace.

In February1991, it held its fourth eneral assembly hroughwhich

it reconstituted tself o accommodate young professionals uch as pro-

fessors,

medical

doctors, awyers,ournalists, nd so forth. hus, the lead-

ership positions of

KAPMA

were filledwiththe new urban middle class.

The

cadres or activists ho carry ut everyday uties of the organization

are

also

highly ducated

and

reform-oriented.hey possess a certainde-

gree

of

expertise

on

environmental ssues. For instance, theywritefor

magazines and,

in

isolated cases, for cademic ournals. They also appear

31

See

Su-Hoon Lee and David A. Smith,

Antisystemicovements

n

South Korea: The Rise

of

Environmental ctivism, ection

III

(Paper presented

at

the

Fifteenth nnual Meeting

of

PEWS,

University f Hawaii, March28-30, 1991) for a chronology f

the Korean green

movement.

32

Materials repared or heSixth

GeneralAssemblyf KAPMAheld on February 7, 1993

n

Seoul.

361








Paczfic

ffairs

on

TV and radio

talk shows. Although I lack data on

the social back-

ground of its members, KAPMA can

be categorized a

CSM because its

leaders areprofessionals uch as professors,awyers,ournalists, tc.

In the springof

1989,

twenty-one

nvironmental nd

other

pharma-

cists,medical

doctors, etc.) social

movement organizationsformed the

National Headquarters for the Nuclear

Power Eradication

Movement.33

This

was originally n

ad hoc organization.Nascent forms

f antinuclear

movementshave existed before this

organization, r,

more correctly,his

organization s

perhaps

a

reflection f

these earlierscattered

movements.

In

particular, ntinuclear power plants

movements

provided a major

impetus to the formationof the

national headquarters.

In this regard,

theyear 1988 can be recorded as the beginningyear not onlyof the

nuclear energydebate but also of

issues such as nuclear

weapons, arms

reduction (nuclear weapon related),

and peace.34

Existing ocal move-

ments

focused

on

the issue of illegal

nuclear waste disposal.

They waged

protests

nd

demonstrations o invoke

awareness among

the public of

the

potential dangers

nuclear

plants pose.

In

addition, there was an

ex-

ternal

hock thatcame from he disastrous

Chernobyl

ncident

n

1986.

Among

the

populace, the dangers of nuclear plantswere taken

to

be

no longer a remote or

peripheral issue.

A

mishap

similar to

that of

Chernobyl ould takeplace any timeon the Korean peninsula, for, s of

1988, nine

nuclear

plantswere

in

operation,providing

nearly

half

of the

nation's total

generated power.

n

addition to pending plant numbers

11

and

12

which are

to

be constructed

n

Youngkwang

the site

of

plant

numbers

7

and

8

-

the

government

nnounced

very

disturbing

uclear

energy plans: (1) by

the

year 2001,

five

more

nuclear

plants

are

to

be

built

and

(2) by

the

year 2030,

55

additional

nuclear

plants

will

be

constructed.35

In 1988, the NationalAssembly ook ssue with hependingconstruc-

tion

of

Korea Nuclear Number

11

and Number

12

and a

heated debate

between

the

government

nd

antinuclear

forces nsued

both

inside and

outside

the

National

Assembly.

The

major

issue

at

stake

was the

safety

issue, perhaps

reflecting

the

impact

of the

Chernobyl

incident. Ob-

viously,

he

environmental movement

leaders

joined

the

debate

and

launched a

major

campaign against

the construction f those

two

plants.

They organized

mass

rallies,

and

received

signatures

rom citizens on a

petition

with a

target

of one million

signatures.They

also

published

a

newsletter,alled Anti-Nuclear lants. The objectiveof thiscampaign

was to create

a national

consensus

against

nuclear

power plants

and

to

33

Hong-SupCho, A Debate on Nuclear

Energy: echnologicalOrientation

r Ecological

Orientation? ahoewa

asang March1990), p. 190 (in Korean).

34

Ibid.,p. 183.

35

Ibid.,p. 184.

362








Activation

fCivil ocietyn

SouthKorea

consolidate

the

existing

ocal movements, nd a national headquarters

was established

n

order to carry ut

the

movements' ims

in

more

orga-

nized and more effectiveways. Even though the Korean government

eventuallyproceeded

and completed

Korea

Nuclear Number 11 and

Number

12, the campaign

against the power

stations,which was carried

out under

the

guidance

of the

headquarters,

became a critical

urning

point

n

the

history

f

antinuclear

movement

n

Korea.

It

should be noted that

n the ate 1980s the

mportant hange was to

incorporateantinuclear

ssues as a criticalpart

of

the green

movement.

Also, those organizations which came into being

in the

late

1980s fo-

cused their

energy

on obtaining technical

knowledge and especially

on

environmentalssues.36

Even though all these

environmental organizations which were

formed

n

the 1980s are nominally

nationwide

organizations,

n

reality

theyare all Seoul based

and their activities

re

limited

n

that

regard.

However,

he Korean

green

movement

n

the 1980s also saw activization

of environmental movements

in local

areas,

in

particular

in

the late

1980s. Also earlier

local

struggles provided

an

important

stimulus to

national

green

movement

rganizations

uch

as

KAPMA.37

In

1992, the Rio UNCED

Meetingsprovided

KAPMA withthe exter-

nal stimulation nd

momentumthroughwhich so far exclusively

omes-

tic Korean

green

movementsbecame aware

of

the

transnationalnature

of

pollution

and the importance

of

international

ties with overseas

organizations.38 epresentatives

f KAPMA in

the

form of the Special

Committee

for

UNCED joined the Korean NGOs

Forum

for

UNCED

which consisted of

academics, ournalists,

nd

business

eaders as well as

environmentalmovement activists.

After

participation

at the

Rio Con-

ference, nternational

ties became greatly

nhanced. KAPMA not only

sent itsrepresentativeso international onferences,but it also hosted

foreign

nvironmentalists

n

Korea.39

CITIZENS' COALITIONFOR ECONOMICJUSTICE

CCEJ

was

a

unique

civilian

response

to

a

unique social situation. t

was a

creation

n

the midstof destructive conomic injustices hathit the

middle and

working

lass

hardest,

nd

that began to show up immedi-

ately

fter

he

1988 Seoul

Olympic

Games.

The

main cause of economic

36

Deuk-Yeon ee,

Evolution f the KoreanEnvironmental

ovementn the 1980s unpub-

lished paper presented

t the Annual

Meeting f

the

Korean

SociologicalAssociation,

ecem-

ber

13, 1990),pp. 7-8 (in

Korean).

37

See Lee and

Smith, Antisystemicovements, p. 4-5

for

discussion.

38

KAPMA,

A

Report

on

Activities

f

the

KAPMA

Special Committee or UNCED Seoul:

KAPMA

1992) (in

Korean).

39

See Materials

reparedfor the SixthGeneralAssembly f KAPMAheld on February 7,

1993

n

Seoul.

363








Pacific

Affairs

injustices, ccording to the view of foundingmembers

of CCEJ,was easy

money making,particularly nearned income from and (and housing)

speculation.

In July 1989, about five hundred people (primarily

professionals

such as

professors,awyers,

hurch

eaders) founded

CCEJ. They under-

stood that the most important ocioeconomic issues

of Korea were un-

earned

income, speculation,maldistribution

f income, and the tax sys-

tem. These

economic

injustices ould not be changed

by government r

politicians lone, but ultimatelymustbe solvedby the

organized power

of

the civil ociety. 40

The strategy f CCEJ to achieve its goal can be

summarized as fol-

lows: (1) organize the ordinary itizens, 2) demonstrate ts demands in

peaceful, nonviolent nd legitimateways, 3) seek workable alternatives,

and (4) mobilize the

civil

ociety

n

a non-class-strugglerinciple.4'

The membership

as of

July1991 numbered 5,791.42

There are ten

local chapters.But nearly80 percent of the members re residents f the

Seoul

Metropolitan

area. The educational

status

of the

membership

s

veryhigh. Sixty-threeercent

of

the

total

membership

re

college gradu-

ate

or

post-graduates, nd, interestingly,wenty-one-and-a-half

ercent

have

graduate training.High

levels

of education are reflected

n

the

oc-

cupational distribution, ith27 percent being employed n white collar

occupations, 26 percent

in

professionaloccupations,

nearly

10

percent

in small and medium business

or

self-employment,nd

15.5

percent

are

college

students.

Blue collar workers constitute

only

1.7

percent.

In

termsof

age

the

membership

s

strikingly oung

with 73

percent being

under

forty earsold,

and

41

percent

under

thirty.43

Activities hat

CCEJ

have carried out for the

past

three

years

ince

its

establishment

ave been remarkable.

Some of

the

major programs

uch

as the Economic Injustice Complaint Center,ParliamentWatch,Chung-

Nong (Right Farming)

Consumers'

Cooperative,

Research Institute or

Economic

Justice,

Publication of Research

Outcomes, Raising

Public

Awareness,

nternational

Solidarity,

tc. have received

a

good

deal

of

public

attention

nd recorded a certain

degree

of

success.

In

June

1990,

they began

to

publish

a

bimonthly magazine,

called

KyeongjeJeongyi

[Economic Justice]

n which semi-academic

writings

n issues related

to

economic

injustices

were

published.

The mass media have been

very

friendly

nd

responsive

o

CCEJ's

activities o the extentthatotherscriti-

cized the plethora of coverage given to CCEJ's activitiesby the mass

40

CCEJ, 991, Compendium,

p. 299-301.

41

CCEJ, 1990)

A

Compendium

n Commemoration

f

the irst

nniversaryf

CCEJ

in Korean),

pp.

12-14.

42CCEJ, 991,Compendium,. 289.

43

bid.,pp. 289-90.

364








ActivationfCivilSocietyn SouthKorea

media.44 CEJ frequently entbeyond the project

that

t

nitially et,and

in

some instances, stepped

into

the territory f

other movements.

A

good example

is

their

ntervention

n the

phenol

incident

(dumping

of tons of

phenol by

Doosan Electronics

nto

the

Nakdong River,

he

tap

waterreservoir orPusan-Kyungnam egion) that

had taken

place

in

the

springof 1991.

This is

the area

of

KAPMA,

which

duly responded

to the

incident.But in the end, CCEJ received the media

spotlight.45

CONCLUDING

REMARKS

The

discussion

and

analysis

of the transitional

politics during

the

1987-1992 period presented

n

this paper highlighted

hree characteris-

tics,namely, iberalizationof the regime, activationof civilsociety, nd

weakening

of the state's

capacity

to deal with certain situations.Given

the scope of the paper, approached the topic with focus on the emer-

gence

and activation

f

civil society,

ecause

I

thought

hat

perhaps

one

of

the most distinguishing lements

in

contemporarypolitics

n

Korea

under

the

Roh

Tae

Woo

regime

has been

the

formation

f civil

society

and

the

ensuing changes

in the

relationships

etween the

state and civil

society.

I assumed thatpressuresoriginating rom he worldsystemweresig-

nificant xternal factors nd

that

class dynamics

remained

a

potentially

crucial

factor n

determining political configurations

n Korea. But

I

argued

that

emerging elements,

most

notably

the formation

of

civil

society, nd other new dimensionswere growing n

importance,making

a

balanced analysis f contemporary orean politics

more complicated.

In

summary, examined,

in

some detail, democratization

move-

ments that took place during the FifthRepublic in

order to come to a

better

understanding

f

the advent of the Roh Tae Woo regime and its

character. Secondly, I discussed liberalization processes of the Roh

regime

and

examined some of the evidence. In

that ection, presented

an

abbreviateddiscussion of weakened state capacities in the sense that

the Roh

government ost not only the ability o

implement ts policies

but also

the

conventional ability to mobilize

the Korean populace

around national

goals. Finally, tried to substantiate

my

main

argument

concerningthe activation f civil ocietywith n

analysis

f

twocases. But

44This was heatedly

nd repeatedly ired

by some members f

the

executive ommittee f

KAPMA

during ts

monthlymeetings

n

1991. Referto

KAPMA,

Minutesof

the

Executive

Committee

Meetings, 991,pp. 4-5 (in

Korean).

45

Besides this

particular ase, the

favorablemediacoverage n

generalgiven o

activities f

CCEJ

s in

partevidenced

by

ts

newspaper

craps bout tsfirst ear

ctivities, hichwere com-

pactly eprinted nd

which

took

up

nearly orty ages ofits

Compendium. See CCEJ,

1990,

pp. 186-224.)

365








Pacyfic

ffairs

I feel that each of those arguments hould

be dealt withthrough n in-

depth analysis n the future, nd I certainly

welcome other scholars to

join in that effort. t this point, would like to make some concluding

remarks bout the future rospects f Korean

politicaldevelopment.

The political reformmovement n South

Korea in the 1990s faces a

number of

potential obstacles,both international

nd domestic. n spite

of a determined

leadership toward reform,

bstacles are largely truc-

tural

n

natureand thus oftenresisthuman efforts.

Internationally, he countryfaces a number

of pressures that com-

bine

to

threaten ts nternational conomic competitiveness. he contin-

uously changing, global

industrial

division

of labor has created a situa-

tion in which Korea can no longer provide labor as cheaply as the

so-called new NICs. From

the

advanced economies (primarily the

United

States),

which are the main markets or Korean export-oriented

industrialization, come

the

threat of protectionism

and pressures to

open

our

markets.While

the

move toward

nnovative apital-intensive

productionseems

to

provide a path to restore

world competitiveness,he

difficulty

f

overcoming echnologicaldependency

and

developing state-

of-the rt

research

and

development

facilities

and

personnel

is

enor-

mous.46 ears

of

declining global

competitiveness

cho

throughout

he

politicalarena as established apitalists onnect democraticreformswith

increases

in

wages

and

rises

in the

general

cost

of

doing

business

in

South Korea.

On the other

hand, internally,

ntrenched bureaucrats nd military

men,

who

are accustomed to

wielding

tremendous

power,may

feel

per-

sonally and/or collectively

hreatened

by

the direction of reform.

His-

torical or

contemporary atterns

of

uneven

development

and

regional

disparity,

hich are

likely

o be

particularly revalent

n

middle-income

countries,may nhibit hedegree towhichvariouspopular forcesofstu-

dents,workers,

he middle

class,

the

political opposition,etc.,

are able to

unite nto a

movement

or

progressive olitical change.

These issues

are not

idiosyncratic

o the Korean case.

Rather, hey

are characteristic of

contradictory

forces often

operating

in middle-

income countries

in

general.

What

appears

to

be

unique

in the class

equation

in

Korea is that

the new

middle

class

has

become

increasingly

important.

his

is

not to

say

that both

the

national

bourgeoisie

and

the

industrial

working

lass

are not

important.

hese

changes provide grow-

ing constituencies or ncipientmovements o further emocratizepre-

viouslybureaucratic,

authoritarian

regimes.

New

and

demographically

larger segments

of

the civil

ociety

re

present.

Right

now there exists

some distance between

the new

middle

class and

the industrial

working

46

Smith

and Lee,

Semiperipheral

Success

Story?

366








ActivationfCivilSocietyn SouthKorea

class. But myprojection s thatboth classes will come under the umbrella

of the civil ociety nd so providetwo

pillarsthatwillbuttress t.

Again,

I

realize

that the economic and political constraints

n the

pace and extentofprogressive oliticalreform xternallynd internally

are formidable n Korea. Pressures hat

the civil societymovementsput

upon

the

state, as

far as

tangible

effects nd policy outcomes

are con-

cerned, have been limited. But as we

stated earlier,we should

wait and

see how CSMs

progress

n

the future. have tended to

emphasize

their

potential.

The extentto which CSMs are successful

has

great bearing

on

the futurerealization of a

regime

based on welfare state. This will

be

all the more so as the ground for institutionalpolitics becomes ever

narrower.

What seems most unlikely s

the

blossoming

of

Western-style

emoc-

racy

n

South Korea

in

the near future.

f, ndeed, civil ocietygets more

activated and organized,

if

diverse

movements within civil society be-

come successful o the extent that theycurtail

the

arbitrary

xercise of

power by

the

state,

nd if the

progressive

oalition 47 by removing xist-

ing cleavages between abor and civil

society ctually merges,then civil

democracy

with certain

degree

of social welfarewill be

a

viable

model

in

Korea. However,prospects for the

currentreformdrive nitiatedby

the new civiliangovernment ed byPresidentKimYoung Sam are not

verybright.

f it

fails,

or achieves

only

symbolic uccess, the ROK might

end

up with

a

Japanese-style controlled parliamentary ystem

ased

upon a conservative oalition and characterized by restricted lectoral

competitionwith

minimum f

repression.

Kyungnam niversity,

outh

Korea,

March1993

47

HyunJinLimand Kim ByungKook,

Frustration

f

Labor and Betrayed emocratization,

Sasang Winter

991), p.

165

(in Korean).

367

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Transitional Politics of Korea, 1987-1992- Activation of Civil Society

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