Trust in the Knowledge Society*
Eric M. Uslaner
Department of Government and Politics
University of Maryland–College Park
College Park, MD 20742
Prepared for the Conference on Social Capital, Cabinet of the Government of Japan, March 24-
25, Tokyo, Japan.
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A bond of trust lets us put greater confidence in other people’s promises that they mean
what they say when they promise to cooperate. The “standard” account of trust presumes that
trust depends on information and experience. Offe (1999) states: “Trust in persons results from
past experience with concrete persons.”
If two people do not know each other, they would have no basis for trusting each other.
Moreover, a single encounter will not suffice to develop trust. Even when they get to know each
other better, their mutual trust will be limited to what they know about each other.
The decision to trust another person is essentially strategic. Strategic (or knowledge-
based) trust presupposes risk (Misztal, 1996, 18; A. Seligman, 1997, 63). Trust helps us solve
collective action problems by reducing transaction costs–the price of gaining the requisite
information that people need to place confidence in each other (Putnam, 1993, 172; Offe, 1996,
27). It is a recipe for telling us when we can tell whether other people are trustworthy (Luhmann,
1979, 43).1
Beyond the strategic view of trust is another perspective. Moralistic trust is a moral
commandment to treat people as if they were trustworthy. The central idea behind moralistic
trust is the belief that most people share your fundamental moral values (cf. Fukayama, 1995,
153). Moralistic trust is based upon “some sort of belief in the goodwill of the other” (A.
Seligman, 1997, 43; cf. Mansbridge, 1999; Yamigishi and Yamigishi, 1994, 131).
Strategic trust cannot answer why people get involved in their communities. The linkage
with moralistic trust is much more straightforward. Strategic trust can only lead to cooperation
among people you have gotten to know, so it can only resolve problems of trust among small
numbers of people. We need moralistic trust to get to civic engagement and to other benefits of
faith in others. Moralistic trust is important for the knowledge-based society: It leads to greater
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tolerance for groups that have historically faced discrimination. It leads to more tolerant
attitudes toward immigrants–and to greater support for open markets. And beyond people’s
attitudes, moralistic trust has consequences for public policy: Nations that rank higher on trust
have more open economies, higher rates of economic growth, better functioning governments,
less corruption, and are more likely to have activist governments. Trusting nations prosper
because they are the forefront of globalization. They are the pioneers in the knowledge-based
economy.
Trust is generally considered to be part of a larger concept of “social capital.” Social
capital has been defined to include trust, norms of reciprocity, and networks of civic engagement
(Putnam, 1993, 180). Each of the components of social capital is said to produce cooperation
within society. I have argued that trust does indeed lead to greater cooperation. However,
membership in voluntary associations (the most widely used measure of networks of civic
engagement) do not promote cooperation and economic growth in the same way as trust. All
sorts of people join civic groups and there is little evidence that group membership leads to
greater trust. There may be other benefits from joining civic groups. But the key to better
government, more tolerance, and greater economic growth is through trust, not civic engagement.
The Varieties of Trust
Moralistic trust is a value that rests on an optimistic view of the world and one’s ability to
control it. Moralistic trust is not a relationship between specific persons for a particular context.
Strategic trust reflects our expectations about how people will behave. Moralistic trus t is
a statement about how people should behave. People ought to trust each other. The Golden
Rule (which is the foundation of moralistic trust) does not demand that you do unto others as
they do unto you. Instead, you do unto others as you would have them do unto you. Moral
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dictates are absolutes (usually with some exceptions in extreme circumstances). Moralistic
trusters believe that the world is a benign place, that other people are generally well motivated,
and that they are part of the same moral community, even if (or especially if) they are of
different backgrounds and beliefs. Such beliefs ease the way toward getting people to work
together to make their communities (and the larger society) a better place. Mistrusters view
dealing with strangers as taking big risks. Trusters see expanding their horizons as great
opportunities.
Strategic trust is not predicated upon a negative view of the world, but rather upon
uncertainty. Levi (1997, 3) argues: “The opposite of trust is not distrust; it is the lack of trust”
(cf. Hardin, 1992, 154). But moralistic trust must have positive feelings at one pole and
negative ones at the other. It would be strange to have a moral code with good juxtaposed
against undecided.
Beyond the distinction between moralistic and strategic trust is the continuum from
particularized to generalized trust. Generalized trust is the perception that most people are part
of your moral community. The difference between generalized and particularized trust is similar
to the distinction Putnam (2000, 22) drew between “bonding” and “bridging” social capital.
Yamigishi and Yamigishi (1994) formulated this distinction: Generalized trust is trust in people
who are different from yourself. Particularized trust is faith in people who are like yourself.
Yamigishi and Yamigishi conducted surveys of Americans and Japanese and found that Japanese
rank higher on particularized trust and Americans on generalized trust.
While I have pictured particularized and generalized trusts as parts of a continuum,
reality is a bit more complex. Generalized trusters don’t dislike their own kind. Generalized
trusters don’t abjure contacts with people like themselves. Indeed, much of civic life revolves
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around contact with people like ourselves. Consider two of the civic associations that have
played such a key role in Putnam’s (1993, 2000) discussion of social capital: bowling leagues
and choral societies. Bowling leagues are composed of people who like to bowl and choral
societies are made up of people who like classical music.2 We are simply unlikely to meet
people who are different from ourselves in our civic life. Now, choral societies and bird-
watching groups (among others that Putnam discusses) will hardly destroy trust. And there is
nothing wrong with such narrow groups. They bring lots of joy to their members and don’t harm
anybody. But they are poor candidates for creating social trust (Rosenblum, 1998).
And you are not likely to get trust in people you don’t know from most of civic life.
Stolle (1998, 500) argues that the extension of trust from your own group to the larger society
occurs through “mechanisms not yet clearly understood.” An even more skeptical Rosenblum
(1998, 45, 48) calls the purported link “an airy ‘liberal expectancy’” that remains “unexplained.”
Stolle and Rosenblum challenge the idea that we learn to trust people we don’t know by
observing people we do know. Stolle (1998) finds that the longer membership in voluntary
associations is associated with more particularized trust (faith in other group members), not
with more generalized trust (faith in strangers).
Trust is a modern concept, of key importance to the knowledge-based society. Putnam
(1993, 88, 174) argues that trust will not develop in a highly stratified society. And Seligman
(1997, 36-37, 41) goes further. Trust can not take root in a hierarchal culture. Such societies
have rigid social orders marked by strong class divisions that persist across generations. Feudal
systems and societies based on castes dictate what people can and can not do based upon the
circumstances of their birth. Social relations are based on expectations of what people must do,
not on their talents or personalities. Trust is not the lubricant of cooperation in such traditional
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societies. The assumption that others share your beliefs is counterintuitive, since strict class
divisions make it unlikely that others actually have the same values as people in other classes.
In earlier days, when generalized trust was scarce, particularized trust (in people of your
own background) helped cement business deals in a world where any sort of trust seemed highly
risky (Greif, 1993). In the modern knowledge-based society, trust helps us make deals with
people we do not know. Macauley (1963), writing at a time of high trust in American society,
argued that in modern society, people make business deals based upon handshakes rather than
contracts. We do not build trust by relying on the law to enforce contracts or to put wrongdoers
in jail. Yes, we do punish people who violate the law and we do enforce contracts. But resorting
too often to the strong arm of the law may undermine trust, rather than build it up. Coercion,
Gambetta (1988, 220) argues, “falls short of being an adequate alternative to trust....It introduce
an asymmetry which disposes of mutual trust and promotes instead power and resentment.”
Strategic and moralistic trust have very different foundations. We don’t form moralistic
trust on experiences–so no amount of social interaction is likely to reshape our values. This is
not to say that trust is immutable and that we can’t learn to have faith in others even as adults.
But our civic life is not likely to be the place where we change our fundamental values: Most
people spend minuscule amounts of time in voluntary organizations and even the most
committed activists rarely devote more than a few hours a week to group life–hardly enough
time to shape, or reshape, an adult’s values (Newton, 1997, 579).
The roots of moralistic trust are a sense of optimism and control: The world is a good
place, it is going to get better, and you can help make it a better place. We “learn” moralistic
trust early in life, mostly from our parents–though also from our schools. Our early experiences
have the greatest impact on our sense of moralistic trust, and once we become a truster (or
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mistruster), we are not likely to change as an adult. Most personal experiences such as joining
civic clubs doesn’t matter for trust. But some experiences do matter mightily: More highly
educated people are far more trusting and college education is especially important.
The belief in personal control is very much part of the modern knowledge society. In the
past when societies were more hierarchical, there was little chance for people to shape their own
fates. Instead, their lives were ruled by forces beyond their control. In contemporary surveys,
we see that people who believe that their fates are controlled from outside are far less likely to
trust other people. At least in the United States, a fascinating indicator of control of our
environment is confidence in science. The more confidence people have in science, the more
trusting they are.
Big events in a society also matter very much: In the United States, the Vietnam War of
the 1960s and 1970s was associated with a decline in trust as young people chanted, “Don’t trust
anyone over 30.” Opponents of the war were far more likely to become mistrusters than
supporters. But the civ il rights movement in the United States was associated with greater trust
in people unlike yourself (Uslaner, 2002, ch. 6). In Sweden, labor peace after years of strife
seems to have led to a societal increase in moralistic trust (Rothstein, 2000).
The most important collective experience shaping trust is the level of economic equality
in a society. Both in the United States over time and across countries without a legacy of
Communism, the most important factor shaping trust in people is the level of economic equality
(see Figure 1).
_________________
Figure 1 about here
Equality promotes trust in two ways. First, a more equitable distribution of income
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makes
people with less more optimistic that they too can share in society’s bounty. And optimism is the
basis of trust. Second, a more equitable distribution of income creates stronger bonds between
different groups in society. When some people have far more than others, neither those at the
top nor those at the bottom are likely to consider the other as part of their “moral community.”
They do not perceive a shared fate with others in society. Hence, they are less likely to trust
people who may be different from themselves.
Why and How Trust Matters
We measure trust by the “standard” survey question: “Generally speaking, do you believe
that most people can be trusted, or can’t you be too careful in dealing with people?” This
question has been asked in surveys for more than four decades, most notably in the World
Values Survey (cross-nationally) and in the General Social Survey and American National
Election Studies in the United States, where we have the longest time series on trust. While the
question is controversial, elsewhere I provide strong support for its use–and for the claims that it
represents both generalized trust (rather than strategic trust or particularized trust) and
moralistic trust (Uslaner, 2002, ch. 3).
There is a presumption that trust and civic engagement are intrically connected. Putnam
(2000, 137) wrote:
...people who trust others are all-around good citizens, and those more engaged in
community life are both more trusting and more trustworthy....the critically
disengaged believe themselves to be surrounded by miscreants and feel less
constrained to be honest themselves. The causal arrows among civic involvement,
reciprocity, honesty, and social trust are as tangled as well-tossed spaghetti.
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The evidence for any link, much less a reciprocal link (trust 6civic engagement 6 trust), is
weak. Most forms of civic engagement neither produce nor consume trust. But the more
demanding forms, those that really tie us to people unlike ourselves, both depend upon
generalized trust and reinforce it. In Uslaner (2002, ch. 5), I use data from a variety of surveys
in the United States to investigate the reciprocal linkages between trust and civic engagement.3
These estimations show that Putnam’s “virtuous circle” is at most a “virtuous arrow.” Where
there are significant relationships between trust and civic engagement, almost all of the time, the
causal direction goes from trust to civic engagement rather than the other way around. Even
these results are based upon a presumption that the causal arrow usually goes somewhere. Some
social connections might even reinforce particularized rather than generalized trust. Much of the
time social networks, both informal and formal, are moral dead ends. They neither consume nor
produce trust. They just happen.
This is certainly true of all forms of informal social ties, ranging from playing cards to
joining choral societies to going to bars, restaurants, or bingo parlors. Our social ties are with
people like ourselves and do not (dare I say “cannot”) lead to trust in strangers. People who play
cards have more faith in their neighbors–the people they play with–but not in strangers. There is
some evidence that trusters are more likely to talk to more neighbors–but they are less likely to
see their best friends often and less likely to spend a lot of time with parents and relatives. They
are no more likely to go to parades, sports events, or art shows often; spend a lot of time with
friends from work or simply to hang out with friends in a public place; visit chat rooms on the
World Wide Web a lot, or even to play lots of team sports. People who trust folks they know–
their neighbors–are more likely to go to parades and join sports teams frequently. But overall,
the major reason why people socialize a lot is that they have many friends, not that they trust
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strangers. Misanthropes have friends too. Nor is there any evidence that these activities produce
generalized trust.
Joining civic groups, for the most part, is not linked to trust either. Of 20 types of civic
groups included in the 1996 American National Election Study, my analysis showed that: (1) no
group membership led to trust; and (2) trust only had significant effects on four types of group
membership. Generalized trusters are more likely to join business and cultural organizations, but
less likely to belong to ethnic and church groups. And this makes sense: Ethnic associations
reinforce in-group ties, as do some religious ties.
There are also very weak (and insignificant) ties between trust and political engagement.
And this is not surprising either. Politics is often confrontational. It thrives on mistrust (Warren,
1996). Trust in strangers brings forth a very different disposition, a desire to cooperate and work
with others.
Generalized trust matters because it helps connect us to people who are different from
ourselves. Generalized trusters are tolerant of immigrants and minorities and support equal
rights for women and gays. They believe in a common core of values and hold that ethnic
politicians should not represent only their own kind.
Trust matters for the type of civic activities that tap this sentiment of reaching out to
people who are different from ourselves–and to helping them. Where faith in others matters
most is in volunteering and giving to charity. And not just for any type of volunteering or giving
to charity. If I volunteer at my son’s school or give to my house of worship (or other religious
cause), I am strengthening in-group ties. Christian fundamentalists are a far more important
group in the United States than outside it.4 When Christian fundamentalists join voluntary
organizations or give time to others, they almost exclusively associate with those who share their
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faith. They do not reach out to people who think differently. Indeed, religious volunteering and
giving to charity is the mark of particularized trust. Giving time or money to secular causes,
where we are more likely to help people who are different from ourselves, is the hallmark of
generalized trusters (Uslaner, 2001, 2002, ch. 7. Wuthnow, 1999). Giving to charity and
volunteering time depend upon trust, but they also create it. Doing good deeds produces a
“warm glow” in the people who help others (Andreoni, 1989). So trusting people have even
more faith in strangers when they do good works.
These findings are not unique to the United States. In work with Gabriel Badescu and
Paul Sum (Badescu, Sum, and Uslaner, 2003), we have found that volunteers in Romania and the
Republic of Molodova are more trusting and tolerant than the mass public or group members.
Generalized trust, then, leads to taking risks. When we interact with strangers, we don’t
have information about them, especially when their backgrounds are different from ours. The
optimistic world view underlying trust minimizes our concern for risk. We look at strangers as
opportunities to develop new horizons.
Not all trust is the same and not all civic activity is the same. Some forms of civic
engagement may lead to more in-group trust and less trust in people who are different from
ourselves (cf. Berman, 1997; and Roßteutscher, 2002 ). Trusting your own kind may be part of
a more general positive syndrome of faith in others or it may inhibit generalized faith in others.
Trusting people you know does not lead to trust in strangers. Loving my wife and son will not
make me better disposed toward the men who haul away my garbage.5 We need strategic trust to
make do in our daily lives: Should I trust the contractor who proposes to rewire my house? How
do I find an honest mechanic? The type of trust that matters for policy-makers is moralistic trust,
and no amount of particularized trust will make you a moralistic truster.
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The Benefits of Trust Across Nations
I have shown that generalized trust makes people more likely to be tolerant and to
support open markets. Is there evidence that these values, as expressed in surveys mostly
conducted in the United States, have policy implications?
Yes! I have computed the shares of publics who believe that “most people can be
trusted” largely from the World Values Surveys (but also from the International Social Survey
Program) and show that countries with higher levels of trust have more open markets, more
globalization overall, higher growth rates, and less corruption. They also spend more on social
programs. And then I show that this is not just because democracies are more trusting or because
people belong to a wide range of civic groups.
In more than one way, trust makes democracies rich. The first link is indirect. Because
trust reflects sentiments toward people who are different from ourselves, it makes it easier for
societies to reach out and deal with other countries. Trusters favor free trade. And trusting
societies are more willing to reach out to outsiders: High trust goes hand-in-hand with open
economies and fewer restrictions on trade, which in turn leads to greater prosperity (cf.
Woolcock, 1998, 158).
There is a clear relationship between the level of trust in a society and how open its
markets are. The most trusting countries (the Nordic nations and the Netherlands) have the most
open economies. The least trusting countries (Brazil, the Phillipines, Peru, Colombia, and
Turkey) are most likely to close their markets (see Figure 2). The statistical relationship is
moderate (as we can see by the fit of the points to the line in the graph).
Much stronger is the overall connection between trust and globalization. Here I use a
composite index of globalization computed by the A.T. Kearney research firm for Foreign Policy
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magazine in 2001. The index includes goods and services imported and exported, foreign direct
investment, embassies, international organization memberships, United Nations security
memberships, the internationalization of stock portfolios, internet users, telephone calls in and
out of the country, and tourists both in and out of the country. The connection between
globalization and trust is strong. Since several of the components of the index tap a country’s
wealth (tourists, stock portfolios, internet usage, telephone calls), we might wonder if the
connection between trust and globalization might be illusory.
Maybe trusting societies are more globalized because both globalized and trusting
countries are well off. Or maybe both trusting and globalized countries have “cleaner”
governments, where businesses don’t have to make pay-offs so often. Or maybe it is simply that
free governments are more likely to be both globalized and trusting. Yet the connection between
trust and globalization remains powerful even when I add statistical controls for the income
(adjusted for per capita purchasing power), the extent of corruption in a country, and the level of
political freedom. Trusting societies invest more in globalization (see Figure 3). When people
trust strangers, they reach out to them in a wide variety of ways: They trade with other nations,
visit other countries, and communicate with them by telephone and the Internet. The connection
between Internet usage and trust in people across nations is very powerful.
Most economists believe that globalized economies, and especially open markets, bring
economic growth. So we would expect that trusting societies would have higher levels of
economic growth (see LaPorta et al., 1997, 1998). And this is what I find in Figure 5. Again,
the relationship is moderate, but the overall pattern is clear.6 Even beyond the level of prosperity
(wealthier countries have higher growth rates), trust leads to greater prosperity.
______________________
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Figures 2, 3, 4, 5 about here
Putnam (1993, 176) is correct when he argues that trust in people leads to better
government performance. Trusting countries are less corrupt than countries with many
mistrusters. Trust is the cornerstone of a cooperative spirit. It is the moral sentiment that points
to what we have in common with each other. Corruption is an expression of selfishness. Trust
leads us to give of ourselves, in both time (volunteering) and money (giving to charity).
Corruption involves expropriating what rightfully belongs to others. Trust rests on a foundation
of openness–accepting others for what they are, rather than for what you would like them to be.
Transparency is the enemy of corruption. Kleptocracy, government by thieves, rests on hiding
stolen assets and maintaining monopolistic control of the polity to ensure that no do-gooder can
trace where the money went. Trust and corruption rest upon fundamentally different views of
human nature. Trust is based upon an optimistic view of the world. Corruption rests on a
diametrically opposed view of human nature: We rob because we value creature comforts.
So it is hardly surprising that the relationship between trust and corruption is powerful:
Where trust is high, corruption is low (see Figure 6). I use the Transparency International 2001
estimates of corruption, where higher scores indicate less corruption. Trusting societies are less
corrupt and have better government performance. Trust has powerful effects on corruption (cf.
LaPorta et al., 1997). Theoretically, if you could make Chile as trusting as Denmark, it would
also be as clean as this least corrupt country in the world. The effect of trust on corruption is
almost one and half times as large as the next most important predictor, the average number of
school years completed. We might suspect that corruption has a greater impact on trust than
faith in others has on robbing the public purse. But it doesn’t. Kleptocracies thrive in low-trust
societies. They can’t get off the ground when most people trust each other.
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_________________
Figure 6 about here
Countries with high levels of trust also have better performing bureaucracies (less “red
tape”) and more “efficient” judicial systems, as well as more people who trust the legal system
(cf. LaPorta et al., 1997, 335-336; Uslaner, 2002, ch. 8). An efficient judicial system (Rothstein,
2000) depends upon an underlying foundation of social trust. And, once again, good judges
don’t make good citizens.
In each case, statistical analyses reported in Uslaner (2002, ch. 8) indicate that the
relationships go from t to good government, not the other way around. Countries with efficient
judicial systems don’t become more trusting. The link from trust to judicial efficacy is strong
and powerful, whereas the link in the opposite direction is insignificant with an incorrect sign.
Trust depends upon economic equality–and it leads to even more equality. Trusting
societies have bigger governments that redistribute wealth from the rich to the poor, spend more
on education, and pursue policies that will stimulate economic growth (see Uslaner, 2002, ch. 8
for the technical details). In Figures 7 and 8, I show moderately strong relationships between
the level of t rust, on the one hand, and per capita spending on education and transfer payments
from the rich to the poor, on the other hand.
____________________
Figures 7 and 8 about here
While there is no direct connection from trust to economic equality, trusting societies in
democratic regimes pursue programs that indirectly will boost faith in others. Trusting nations
spend a more of their total income on governmental programs in general and on education in
particular. They also have a larger share of their total population employed by the government
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(Uslaner, 2002, ch. 8). In particular, trusting societies are more likely to devote a higher share of
their national wealth to transfer programs that assist the least advantaged.
Governments that redistribute income, spend money on education, transfer wealth from
rich to poor, have large public sectors, and maintain open economies do not generate trust. Trust
seems to come first. Well, almost. Economic equality is a strong determinant of trust. And trust
leads to policies that create wealth and reduce inequalities.
Here we find what Putnam would call a “virtuous circle.” The equal become more equal.
Yet, there is also a vicious circle: Misanthropy and inequality feed on themselves. Yes, you can
increase trust indirectly by pursuing policies that reduce economic inequality: Each of the public
policies I have considered leads to more economic equality, though the correlations are moderate
except for one, for the openness of the economy. 7 And, yes, you can adopt these policies without
a trusting citizenry. But a public that is public spirited gives some countries advantages over
others in reducing inequality and boosting trust.
Is trust really the key to a better government or is trust simply a surrogate for democracy
or participatory societies? Muller and Seligman (1994) and Inglehart (1999) both see democracy
and trust as closely intertwined. Muller and Seligman see democratic regimes as the source of
trust (see also Levi, 1998), while Inglehart argues that trust is the foundation of the modern
democratic state. Yet, trust is not a prequisite, much less a consequence, of democracy.
Democracies may be trusting or mistrusting. In countries with no legacy of Communist
rule, the mean proportion of trusters in highly democratic regimes is .411, compared to .217 in
the formerly Communist regimes. Democracies are all over the place in trust, ranging from .03
(Brazil) to .65 (Norway). Formerly Communist regimes also vary in trust, but only from .06
to .34. Half of all democracies have more than 34 percent trusters. The standard deviation for
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democracies is .151. It is less than half that value (.062) for authoritarian states. Democracies
make trust possible. They don’t necessarily produce it. Totalitarian governments make trust
implausible, though not impossible.
Democracies have higher levels of trust because authoritarian states have lower levels of
trust. Democratic constitutions provide little guarantee–or even likelihood–of enhancing trust.
Yes, they can maintain order better because people believe that law enforcement is fair. And,
yes, democratic governments are almost assuredly more popular (and thus more trusted) than
dictatorships. But trust in the legal system or in government more generally is not the same as
faith in other people. Even in high trusting countries such as Sweden, there is only modest
support for the claim that people who have faith in the legal system also trust others (Rothstein,
2000).
There is certainly little evidence that democratization increases trust. The correlation
between change in trust in 22 nations from 1981 to the early 1990s (according to the World
Values Survey) and variations in Freedom House scores from 1978 to 1988 is effectively zero.
The democratic march to trust is a long and winding road. It takes 46 years of continuous
democracy to move a country from well below the mean on trust to above it. Countries with less
than 46 years of continuous democracy are no more likely to have trusting citizens than
authoritarian states. Of the eight Eastern bloc countries for which we have measurements on trust
in 1990 and 1995-96, only one nation had an increase in faith in others (Latvia, six percent),
while seven had decreases, four of which were substantial. The constitutions of Eastern and
Central European nations have become increasingly democratic over time. As democratization
proceeded apace, trust lagged behind and the correlation between trust and democratization
became increasingly (and significantly) negative.
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So it should hardly be surprising to find at best a weak relationship between trust and the
level of democracy (using the Polity III measure of democracy) in Figure 9. I could easily
substitute another measure of democracy–and the results would be very much the same. There is,
then, a difference between “making democracy” and (in Putnam’s apt terminology) “making
democracy work.” Anyone can design a democratic constitution, as we have seen in Central and
Eastern Europe since 1989. It takes trust to make democracy function well. An Indian journalist
commented on the sharp cleavages that led to a cycle of unstable coalitions, none of which could
form a government: “We have the hardware of democracy, but not the software, and that can’t be
borrowed or mimicked” (Constable, 1999, A19).
Nor is there much evidence that trust is simply another name for postmaterialist values.
Across a wide range of societies, both traditionally democratic and former Communist nations,
there is little relationship between the average position on the postmaterialism scale in the World
Values Surveys and the level of trust in people. The most trusting societies range from
materialist Norway to postmaterialist Netherlands. Among the lowest trust countries, Brazil is
very materialist, but Turkey is even more postmaterialist than Denmark and not much different
from Sweden (see Figure 10).
While this may seem counterintuitive initially, we must realize that postmaterialists are in
many ways different from trusters. Trust promotes cooperation. Postmaterialists may favor a
peaceable world, but their politics are often confrontational. In the combined World Values
Surveys samples, 34 percent of postmaterialists (compared to 13 percent of materialists) say that
they have attended a demonstration and 75 percent said they either had gone to a protest or might
do so (compared to 46 percent of materialists). Thirty one percent of postmaterialists said that
they either had occupied a building or might do so, compared to 10 percent of materialists.
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People who trust others are slightly more likely to have attended demonstrations (23 percent to
14 percent for mistrusters) and barely different from mistrusters to say that they might occupy
buildings (by 18 percent to 14 percent). Postmaterialists are less cooperative than trus ters.
. ____________________
Figures 9 and 10 about here
Finally, I return to globalization and economic growth and consider the other key
component of social capital, group membership. Earlier I showed that trusting countries are
more global (strong relationship) and have higher growth rates (moderate relationship). In
Figures 11 and 12, there is no clear relationship between total secular organization membership
across nations and either globalization or growth. It is trust that matters, not group membership.
And this should not be surprising: When we join groups, we encounter people very much like
ourselves. There is little reason to believe that membership in civic groups will make us more
open to trading with people who are different from ourselves. Generalized trust, on the other
hand, is all about interacting with people who are different from yourself.
________________________
Figures 11 and 12 about here
Policy Implications
Decision-makers in many countries and international agencies, including the United
States and the World Bank, believe that social capital can lead to better communities. They are
trying to get people involved in their communities in the hope and expectation that daily life and
public life will become better. There is a widespread belief that increasing social capital will
lead to more prosperous communities, as well as happier ones. Much of this effort seems to me
to be misplaced. There is much we can do, but I am not sure that we are clear in what we are
19
doing.
Local communities are trying to stimulate public participation. The World Bank has been
very active in promoting civic participation in poor countries. And American communities have
been promoting civic engagement as well.
Yet, as we have known since Verba and Nie (1972), not all civic engagement is of one
piece. Verba and Nie distinguish between political and communal activity. There is plenty of
evidence over more than one century that political engagement can make government more
responsive. This is, after all, what democracy is all about. Much of the literature on
representative institutions, elections, and interest groups focuses on how we can measure the
influence that ordinary citizens have on their governments. We know that not all political
activity is effective, but we also know that citizen action can make government more responsive
to the public. Yet, this is not what most of the discussion of social capital is all about. Political
activity is largely confrontational. Even if our tactics are gentle, politics is about winners and
losers. Social capital is about cooperation, where everyone supposedly wins. Someone has to
lose an election. And if democratic politics is all about a competition of ideas, there is nothing
wrong (or even bad) about having winners and losers–as long as we do not get too
confrontational about it.
Social capital as public policy goes awry in three ways. First, it presumes that all sorts of
group activity can lead to social cooperation. This is simply false. Most communal activity–
joining bowling leagues or choral societies or model airplane clubs, or having dinner parties or
going to the neighborhood pub–are what I have called “moral dead ends.” They may be fine
ways to connect with friends, but they have no larger social purpose. We expect too much of a
good thing (social ties). There is little reason to believe that getting together with people very
20
much like yourself will have broader consequences than a pleasant evening (and, if it doesn’t,
that’s quite all right).
Second, we may confuse the cause with the effect. The American national government is
trying to stimulate volunteering through the USA Freedom Corps (see
http://www.freedomcorps.gov/about_usafc/whats_new/announcements/20021218-1.asp ).
Get people involved in our communities and they will be a better place. Yes, that makes sense.
Volunteering has two fundamental roots: (1) a sense of moral obligation that stems from
generalized trust; and (2) religious values and ties. Much of the volunteering efforts stem from
the (correct) belief that good works will make us more trusting. However, to get a boost in trust
from volunteering, you generally need trusting people to begin with. Most programs to get
people involved in their communities have not paid sufficient attention to how we can motivate
people to do good works. Many school programs mandate volunteering. Yet, there is little
evidence to support the claim that mandatory volunteering will make young people any more
trusting or tolerant (Niemi, Hepburn, and Chapman, 1999) or even more likely to volunteer as
adults (John et al., 2001, 23). Religious volunteering does have deeper roots and they are most
profound among fundamentalists. Yet, fundamentalists will volunteer, as noted above, only
within their own communities. So the larger social benefits of this altruistic behavior will not be
achieved.
Third, our concern with civic engagement rat her than trust has taken our focus away from
the steps we need to build trust. We need to consider policies that will reduce economic
inequality. This is not simply an ideological agenda. Politicians on both the left and the right in
the United States have recognized that increasing inequality has torn away at America’s social
fabric. How to remedy this situation is a difficult question and different leaders have different
21
solutions. But it is important to bring the question of inequality to the forefront of the debate on
social capital.
We must also recognize the importance of values taught early in life and the opportunities
young people have to interact with different backgrounds. Young people who have friends of a
different race in the United States are much more likely to become trusters as adults. Yet adults
who have friends of a different race are no more likely to be trusters (Uslaner, 2002, ch. 6). Early
experiences are far more important than those later in life. We also know that education makes
people more tolerant and trusting. So policies that ensure that many young people are able to
gain entrance to universities can help build trust.
The Promise of Social Capital for the Japanese Society and Economy
In most of the graphs I have presented, Japan ranks above average, sometimes
considerably above average. So Japan has many advantages that other countries do not. But
every country wants to do better and the data suggest that there is room for improvement in
Japan’s social capital, that would promote economic growth and globalization.
On trust, Japan ranks 18th out of 82 countries for which I have data. It ranks higher than
the United States, Italy, Switzerland, Austria, and Belgium, though considerably below the
Nordic nations. On membership in voluntary associations, Japan ranks lower: 38th out of 53
nations (about the same level as India). Its economy is among the most open in the world, but its
overall globalization score is more modest (25th out of 39 countries).
In today’s knowledge society, Japan is well situated to face the challenge of technology:
It ranks 11th of 62 countries for users of the Internet and 12th out of 59 for average number of
school years, and 4th out of 68 countries in university students.
There are some challenges that Japan faces. While its economy is formally very open,
22
the share of its economy devoted to trade in goods and services (according to World Bank data)
ranks 61st out of 62 countries (according to A.T. Kearney data). Japan’s external trade is far
closer to those of low-trusting societies such as Argentina and Brazil (and the moderately low
trusting society of the United States) than to the higher trusting societies such as the Netherlands
and Ireland. One challenge to Japan is to open its markets further, to take advantage of its
moderately high level of trust.
A second challenge that Japan might consider is to strive for greater economic equality.
Japan ranks 40th of 64 countries in the level of economic equality. Among countries without a
legacy of Communism, it ranks 25th out of 41. If the path to greater trust (and greater prosperity)
is through economic equality, Japan should put greater emphasis on equalizing resources
between the rich and the poor. Reducing inequality does not require a massive redistribution
from the rich to the poor. It does entail directing resources more equally. Japan ranks 27th of 39
countries in transfer payments from the rich to the poor , 24th out of 44 countries in education
spending as a share of gross domestic product, and 36th of 43 countries in overall spending on
government as a share of gross domestic product. In each case except for education spending,
Japan spends less than other countries with similar levels of trust. If trust were higher, Japan
would spend more on these programs that directly reduce economic inequality.
A third challenge Japan might consider is to increase its level of generalized trust. One
way to do this is to reduce economic inequality. Yet, if Yamigishi and Yamigishi (1994) are
correct, it is also important to increase out-group trust much more than in-group trust. The social
ties among business associates that are so important to making deals in Japan (and elsewhere) are
very useful. They may be even more important than formal contracts, which require the strong
arm of the law. Yet, business transactions among people in the same society and of the same
23
background is not sufficient to produce long-term prosperity, Woolcock (1998) argues. Trust in
people of different backgrounds leads to greater tolerance and to taking the risks involved in
trading with strangers. In Japan, according to the World Values Study data, trusters are twice as
likely as mistrusters to accept people of different races and immigrants as neighbors. Schools
might encourage children to interact with other youngsters of different backgrounds, since we
know that young people who have friends of different backgrounds are more likely to become
trusters. A more trusting society will promote economic equality through governmental
programs and open markets, which in turn will lead to greater economic growth.
Japan has quite a bit of social capital. The low rate of participation in voluntary
associations should not concern her, since this form of social capital is less important for risk
taking than is trust. But it can use more—and seeking greater economic equality and
interaction among young people of different backgrounds might be the best way to increase
generalized trust.
24
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28
Figure 1
ARG
AUS
ASTBEL
BRZ
UK
CAN
CHL
COL
CYP
DEN
DOM
FIN
FRA
GHA
GRE
IND
IRE
ISR
ITA
JPN
LUXMEX
HOL
NZ
NIG
NOR
PRU
PHL
POR
SAF
SKRSPN
SWE
SWZ
TAI
TUR
USA
URU
VNZ
WGR
0.2
.4.6
Mos
t Peo
ple
Can
Be
Tru
sted
.2 .3 .4 .5 .6Gini index economic inequality
r2 = .391
Former and Current Communist Nations ExcludedTrust in People and Economic Inequality
As economic inequality increases, a country’s level of trust declines.
29
Figure 2
ARG
AST
BNG
BEL
BRZ
UK
CAN
CHLCOL
DEN
FINFRA
GHA
GRE
IND
IRE
ITA
JPNMEX
HOL
NIG
NOR
PRU
PHL
POR
SKRSPN
SWE
SWZ
TAI
TUR
USA
URU
WGR
.1.2
.3.4
Bar
ro In
dex
of O
pen
Eco
nom
y
0 .2 .4 .6Most People Can Be Trusted, World Values Surveys and Intl Social Survey Program
Source: Barro and Lee, 'Data Set for a Panel of 138 Countries,' Harvard University, r2 =.315
Former and Current Communist Nations ExcludedOpen Markets and Trust in People
As a country’s level of trust increases, it is more likely to have open markets.
30
Figure 3
ARG
AUS
AST
BRZ
UKCAN
CHL
COL
DEN
FIN
FRA
GRE
IND
IRE
ITA
JPNMEX
HOL
NIG
NOR
PRU
PHL
POR
SAFSKR
SPN
SWE
SWZ
TUR
USA
VNZ
WGR
02
46
For
eign
Pol
icy
Glo
baliz
atio
n In
dex
0 .2 .4 .6Most People Can Be Trusted, World Values Surveys and Intl Social Survey Program
Source: Foreign Policy index of globalization r2 =.531
Former and Current Communist Nations ExcludedGlobalization and Trust in People
Countries with higher levels of trust are more likely to rank highly on globalization.
31
Figure 4
RUSBRZ
COL UKRARG
SAF
CZK
HUNROM
SLV
POLPOR
PHL
ITA
CRO
SPN
IND
JPN
SLO
HOL
FIN
AST
WGR
SWE
FRA
UK
SWZ
USA
NOR
DEN
CAN
TUR
PRU BNG
TAI
GRE
SKRIRE
MEX
ARM
NIG
CHLVNZ
0.1
.2.3
.4.5
Inte
rnet
Use
rs a
s S
hare
of P
opul
atio
n, A
.T. K
earn
y
0 .2 .4 .6Most People Can Be Trusted
A.T. Kearney, Foreign Policy, r2 =.599
Internet Users as Share of Population and Trust in People
Countries with higher levels of trust have more people who use the Internet.
32
Figure 5
ARG
AUS
AST BEL
BRZ
UKCAN
CHL
COLDEN
DOM
FIN
FRA
GHA
GRE
ICE
IND
IRE
ITA
JPN
LUX
MEX
HOL
NIG
NOR
PRUPHL
POR
SAF
SKR
SPN SWESWZ
TUR USA
URUVNZ
WGR
010
020
030
0R
eal G
row
th R
ate
0 .2 .4 .6Most People Can Be Trusted, World Values Surveys and Intl Social Survey Program
Source: Penn World Tables, r2 =.300
Former and Current Communist Nations ExcludedReal Growth Rate 1980s and Trust in People
Countries with higher levels of trust have greater economic growth.
33
Figure 6
ARG
AUS
AST
BLR
BEL
BRZ
UK
BUL
CAN
CHL
CHN
COL
CZK
DEN
EST
FIN
FRA
GHA
GREHUN
ICE
IND
IRE
ITA
JPN
LAT
LUX
MEX
HOL
NIG
NOR
PRU
PHL
POL
POR
ROM
RUS
SAF
SKRSLV
SPN
SWESWZ
TAI
TUR
USA
UKR
URU
VNZ
WGR
02
46
8TI
Cor
rupt
ion
Inde
x 19
98
0 .2 .4 .6Most People Can Be Trusted, World Values Surveys and Intl Social Survey Program
Source: Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, 1998, r2 =.469
Level of Corruption and Trust in People
Countries with higher levels of trust have lower levels of corruption.
34
Figure 7
AUS
AST
BNG
BEL
BRZ
UK
CAN
CHL
COL
DEN
FINFRA
GHAGRE
ICE
IND
IRE
ITA
JPN
LUX
MEX
HOL
NOR
PHL
POR
SKR
SPN
SWE
SWZ
USA
URU
VNZ
WGR
24
68
Edu
catio
n S
pend
ing
Per
Cap
ita
0 .2 .4 .6Most People Can Be Trusted, World Values Surveys and Intl Social Survey Program
Source: Rafael LaPorta, Harvard University, r2 =.419
Former and Current Communist Nations ExcludedEducation Spending and Trust in People
Countries with higher levels of trust spend more per capita on education.
35
Figure 8
ARGAUS
AST
BEL
BRZ
UK
CAN
CHL
COL
DEN
DOM
FIN
FRA
GHA
ICE
IND
IRE
ITA
JPN
MEX
HOL
NIG
NOR
PRU
PHL
POR
SAF
SKR
SPN
SWE
SWZ
TAI
USAURU
VNZ
010
2030
Tra
nsfe
r Spe
ndin
g P
er C
apita
0 .2 .4 .6Most People Can Be Trusted, World Values Surveys and Intl Social Survey Program
Source: Rafael LaPorta, Harvard University, r2 =.357
Former and Current Communist Nations ExcludedTransfer Spending from Rich to Poor and Trust in People
Countries with higher levels of trust spend more per capita on transfers
from the rich to the poor.
36
Figure 9
ARG
ARM
AUS
AST
AZR
BNG
BLR
BEL
BRZ
UK
BUL
CAN
CHL
COL
CRO
CZK
DEN
DOM
EGR
EST
FIN
FRA
GEO
GHA
HUN
ICE
IND
IRE
ITA JPN
LAT
LITLUX
MEX
MOL
HOL
NIG
NOR
PRU
PHL
POL
POR
ROMRUS
SAF
SKR
SLV
SLO
SPN
SWE
SWZ
TAI
USA
UKR
URU
VNZ
05
10P
olity
III D
emoc
racy
Sco
re
0 .2 .4 .6Most People Can Be Trusted, World Values Surveys and Intl Social Survey Program
Source: Polity III Database, Ted Gurr, University of Maryland, r2 =.177
Democracy and Trust in People
There is only a weak relationship between a country’s level of democracy and its level of trust.
37
Figure 10
RUS
BRZ
LITEST
ARG
SAF
LAT
CZK
BLR
HUN
BUL
ROMPOL
POR
ITASPN
IND
JPN
SLO
HOL
BEL
FIN
AST
WGRNIR
SWE
FRA
UK
SWZ
USA
NOR
DEN
CAN
TUR
SKR
IRE
MEX
NIG
ICE
EGR
CHL
0.2
.4.6
Mos
t Peo
ple
Can
Be
Tru
sted
0 10 20 30 40Postmaterialism World Values Survey
r2 = .164
Trust in People and Postmaterial Values
There is only a weak relationship between the levels of trust and postmateralist values across countries.
38
Figure 11
ARG
AUS
AST
BRZ
UK CAN
CHL
COL
DEN
FIN
FRA
IND
IRE
ITA
JPNMEX
HOL
NIG
NOR
PHL
POR
SAFSKR
SPN
SWE
SWZ
TUR
USA
VNZ
WGR
02
46
For
eign
Pol
icy
Glo
baliz
atio
n In
dex
0 .5 1 1.5 2Total Memberships in Voluntary Associations, World Values Surveys
Source: Foreign Policy index of globalization r2 =.038
Former and Current Communist Nations ExcludedGlobalization and Voluntary Association Membership
There is no clear relationship between the level of membership in voluntary associations in a country and its level of globalization.
39
Figure 12
ARG
AUS
ASTBEL
BRZ
UKCAN
CHL
COLDEN
FIN
FRA
ICE
IND
IRE
ITA
JPN
MEX
HOL
NIG
NOR
PHL
POR
SAF
SKR
SPN SWESWZ
TURUSA
URUVNZ
WGR
010
020
030
0R
eal G
row
th R
ate
1980
s
0 .5 1 1.5 2Total Memberships in Voluntary Associations, World Values Surveys
Source: Penn World Tables, r2 =.027
Former and Current Communist Nations ExcludedReal Growth Rate 1980s & Voluntary Association Membership
There is no clear relationship between the level of membership in voluntary associations in a country and its rate of economic growth.
40
NOTES * This article summarizes arguments in Uslaner (2002). I gratefully acknowledge the
support of the General Research Board of the University of Maryland--College Park and
the Everett McKinley Dirksen Center for the Study of Congressional Leadership. Most
of the data discussed here were obtained from the Inter-University Consortium for
Political and Social Research, which is absolved from any responsibility for my claims.
See Uslaner (2002) for a list of my other obligations, but here I single out Dietlind Stolle
and Bo Rothstein.
1. The term “strategic trust” is mine. Most of the people I cite would like find the
terminology congenial. Hardin (1992, 163) emphatically holds that “there is little sense in the
claim of some that trust is a more or less consciously chosen policy...” Trust based on
experience can be strategic even if we do not make a deliberate choice to trust on specific
occasions.
2. This result comes from an analysis of the 1993 General Social Survey in the United
States, where performing music is best predicted by liking classical music–as well as looking for
opportunities to meet others with similar preferences–other predictors are age (young) and
income (high).
3. I use either two- or three-stage least squares estimation to investigate reciprocal linkages.
4. In the 2000 American National Election Study, 40.7 percent of all Americans called
themselves “born-again Christians,” rising to 57.9 percent in the South.
41
5. In Uslaner (2002, ch. 5), I show that there is no statistical linkage between trust in people
you know and trust in strangers.
6. In this and several of the other graphs, including Figure 1, I exclude former and current
Communist nations. First, some of the economic data for these countries may not be reliable.
Second, the economic data in these tables do not reflect market forces as they do in capitalist
countries, so the comparisons may not be appropriate.
7. The correlations are in the range of .4 to .5, except for the openness of the economy
(where the correlation approaches .7).