Turkey and Christendom

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TURKEY AND CHRISTENDOM :

AN HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE

RELATIONS BETWEEN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

THE STATES OF EUROPE.

REPRINTED, WITH ADDITIONS, FROM No. CLXXXIII. OF

THE EDINBURGH REVIEW.

LONDON:

LONGMAN, BROWN, GREEN, AND LONGMANS.

1854.


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oiittt


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TURKEY.

Three centuries ago^ the first vow of Christian states-en

was the expulsion of the Turks from the city of

Constantine, and the deliverance of Europe from the

scourge and terror of the infidel. In the present age,

the absorbing desire of the same cabinets is to maintain

the misbelievers in their settlements ; and to postpone,

by all known expedients of diplomacy and menace, the

hour at which the Crescent must again give place to the

Cross. The causes and progress of this curious revolu-ion

of sentiment we purpose to trace ; and to ascertain,

if possible, by what sequence of events, and changes of

opinion, such conditions of public policy have at length

been accredited among us.

It will naturally be presumed, that the clouds now

gathering on the Eastern heavens* have suggested both

our disquisition and its moral ; nor should we, indeed,

be without reasonable warrant for such an introduc-

* This was -written in the autumn of 1849, hut the Turkish crisis has

long heen chronic.


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4 TURKEY.

tion of the subject. But we feel it would be perilous

to prophesy the dissolution of a State which has now

been, for five generations, n its nominal agony. We

believe we might venture to assert, that no Christian

writer has treated of Ottoman history, ho did not seek,

in the sinking ortunes or impending fallof the Empire,

thepoint

and commendation of his tale. Knollea

thankfully ecounted the signs of its decline two hun-red

and fifty ears ago. Cantemir discoursed of the

Growth and Decay of the Ottoman Empire, while

Poland was still powerful kingdom. As the eighteenth

century wore on, such reflections became both more

justifiable nd more frequent; nd as the artificial xist-nce

of Turkey was hardly yet anticipated, he close of

its natural term seemed within the limits of easy calcu-ation.

Even the end of the last war, which left so

many crumbling monarchies repaired nd strengthened,

brought no similar relief to the House of Othman. Ex- luded,

on the contrary, from the arrangements of the

great Europeansettlement at the Congress of Vienna,

Turkey remained exposed to worse perils han any which

had yet beset her. In the great peace of Europe there

was no peace for Constantinople.hirty years since,

the historian of the Middle Ages expected, with an

assurance that none can deem extravagant, he approach-ng

subversion of the Ottoman power; and the progres-


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DAWNINGS OF TURKISH TOWER. 5

Bive current of events has certainly n no degreechanged

since this conviction was avowed. Yet, though the

only symptom of imminent dissolution that then seemed

wanting has now appeared, and though territorial dis-emberm

has partially upervened upon internal

disorganisation, he imperial fabric still stands the

Turkish Crescent stillglitters

n theBosphorus

and

still u the tottering rch of conquest spans the ample

regions rom Bagdad to Belgrade.

Without repeating, herefore, the ominous note of

prophecy, e shall direct our remarks to the historical

elucidation of the questions nvolved in it. Our purpose

is to illustrate the origin nd establishment of the Otto- an

Empire, as one of the substantive Powers of Europe;

to exhibit the causes which conduced to its political

recognition to trace the subsequent action of so ano-alous

a State upon the affairs of Christendom; to

mark the fluctuations of fortune by which its external

relations were determined ; and to distinguish he stages

of estimation and influencethrough

which it succes-ively

passed, ntil the dreaded Empire of the Ottomans

dwindled virtually, hough with dominions not mate-ially

diminished, nto the position f a Protected State,

subsisting, pparently,y the interested patronage of

those very Powers which had been so scared and scan-alised

at its growth.


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DAWNINGS OF TURKISn POWER. 7

tives or pensioners, ad ceased to exist. Nor was the

rise of the Turkish power an event calculated, t its first

announcement, to create any extraordinary onsterna-ion.

As regards sia Minor, the entire peninsula, ith

the exception f its western seaboard, ad long been in

the possession f kindred tribes ; and the mere substitu-ion

of Ottomans forSeljukians

ouldhardly

bethought

to menace the interests of Europe. Even the actual

passage of the Straits, hich was the first critical point

of Turkish progress, presented no unparalleled he-omeno

; for a Moorish kingdom still flourished on the

Guadalquivir and a Tartar horde had just established

its sovereignty ver the dismembered duchies of Russia.

It is certainly rue that the exigencies f Mogul in-asion

and the remnants of crusading zeal, id origin-lly

suggest that concert of nations which became after- ards

systematised y the standing requirements f a

politicalquilibrium and, perhaps, he dread of Otto-an

aggression nduced the first faint foreshadowings

of those State-combinations which characterise the

modern history f Europe. But it was not so at the

beginning. Adrianople had been made a Mahometan

capital, nd the metropolis f the Eastern Cassars had

become a mere enclave in Turkish territory, efore the

aid of European princes as forthcoming against the

new invaders ; and when at length the Christian allies


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8 TURKEY.

and the infidel forces joined battle in the field of Nico-

polis, he Ottoman power had been impregnablytrength-ned

by the impunity and successes of a century.

In elucidation of the subject before us, it may be

desirable to explain more particularly he events to

which these allusionsrefer.

When thedominion of Imperial

Romewas

divided

into two, the moiety constituting he Empire of the

East, or, as it was more commonly termed, the Byzan-ine

Empire, included the Thracian and Grecian provinces,

the Archipelago, sia Minor, Syria, nd Egypt. The

capital f this Empire was at Byzantium or Constanti-ople,

and itclaimed precedence f the Western Empire,

as the elder and superior ranch of the two. Its territo-ies,

however, were very soon dismembered. The Sara-ens

issuing, nder the impulse of Mahometanism, from

the deserts of Arabia, stripped he Byzantine monarchy

of its Egyptian and Syrian provinces and though the

power of the original aliphs oon declined, hey were

succeededby

invaders asdangerous

s themselves. In

the middle of the eleventh century, about the time of

the Norman conquest of England, a swarm of Turks or

Turkmans, from the eastern shores of the Caspian Sea,

made an irruption nto the territories of Byzantine Asia,

and ultimately stablished themselves in Asia Minor,

under the chieftainship f the house of Seljuk. rom that


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DAWNING S OF TURKISH TOWER. 9

time forward, although lie Eastern emperors frequently

effected partial econquests of their territories, sia Minor

was never entirely leared of these invaders. The Selju-

kians formed a large and substantial kingdom, and even

fixed their capital t Nice, within a short distance of

Constantinople tself. It was against the Turks of this

dynastythat the first crusades were

directed,nd the

result was, that the infidels were dislodged rom their

position t Nice, and driven back as far as Iconium, which

city they made the metropolis f their dominions for

nearly wo centuries more. It will thus be seen, that

the Asiatic provinces f the Eastern Empire had long

been more or less completely in the occupation f

Turkish invaders. These invaders,however, rarely en-ured

to cross the straits, nd never effected a lodgment

in Europe ; partly, in all probability, ecause Asia

provided sufficient scope for their conquests, and partly,

no doubt, because the superiority f the Greeks in naval

science insured them the command of the sea.

Towards theclose,owever,

of the thirteenthcentury

that is to say, al the very moment when the election

of a Swiss knight to the Germanic throne was laying he

foundations of the imperial ouse of Austria events

of equal singularity ere preparing the seat of the

rival Caesars for the progeny of a Turkish freebooter.

The Asiatic continent, rom its central highlands o the


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10 TURKEY.

shores of the Mediterranean, ad been utterly onvulsed

by the tremendous Irruptions f the Mogul conquero^

Zingis Khan, and the Seljukian monarchy was

destroyed y the shock. In the course of the commo-ions

which ensued, certain Turcoman chief, named

Ortogrul, rom the banks of the Oxus, found himself

wanderingin the hills of

Anatolia,t the head

of fourhundred families. A service which he accidentally en-ered

to a prince of the country, was acknowledged by

a grant of land ; and the estate was soon expanded into

a respectableerritory, y the talents which had origin-lly

acquired t. The inheritance of Ortogrul devolved,

in 1289, upon his son Osman or Othman, who at the

death, ten years later, f the impoverished ultan of

Iconium, o longer esitated to proclaim is independent

sovereignty. uch was the origin f the House of Oth- an.

The name itself, hich is a vernacular epithet f

the royal vulture, and signifies tl bone-breaker, has

been recognisedy the Turks as not disagreeably ym-olical

of the national character and mission;

and so

completely o they identify heir State with the race of

its founder, hat they have foregone ll other denomina-ions

for the dignity,tyle, nd title of the Ottoman

Porte.*

* The word Porte is derived from a version given by Italian

interpreters o an Oriental phrase. It was an ancient custom of Eas-


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THE HOUSE OF OTIIMAN. 11

At first, f course, the independence ssumed by these

Ottoman chiefs was not accompanied by any extensive

authority. They were still only the leaders of an in-onside

clan ; but the circumstances of the period

were peculiarly avourable to dynastic ambition. A

large population, f Turkish extraction, and Mahometan

religion, ad been left without a head; for the Mogulswithdrew from the scene of their conquests, and the

Seljukian overnment had been disorganised. n fact,

many provincial mirs or princes sserted their indepen-ence

exactlys Othman had done

;and it was evident

that a contest for supremacy would arrive between them.

Into the circumstances by which this contest was

eventually ecided, we need not particularly nter. It

is said that the clan of which we are speaking, as con-picuous

for its observance of the laws and ritual of

Mahomet ; and it is known with greater certainty, hat

its chiefs were eminentlydistinguished or military nd

political bilities. The event was, that the Turks of

tern sovereigns, n administering justice, r exercising other functions

of their office, o sit, s the Scriptural expression runs, at the Gate

of their palaces. Gate became thus synonymous with Court, or

Office, and the Sultan's Court was called by excellence, the Ex-lted,

or Lofty Gate. This phrase, in the literal translations of the

Dragomans, who were mostly Italians, became

La Porta Sublime,whence the title of The Sublime Porte. To the same source we owe

the term Grand Seignior, s applied to the Emperor of the Ottomans.


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12 TURKEY.

Asia Minor acknowledged the sovereignty f the House

of Othman instead of that of the House of Seljuk, nd

the city of Prusa or Brusa became the seat of the new

dynasty.It was now to be seen whether Ottomans would be

more aggressive r formidable than Seljukians nor was

the question eft long undecided. The opportunities, nfact, f aggrandisement ow presenting hemselves, ere

so peculiar, hat far weaker hands than those of Oth-

man's successors might have turned them to account.

On one side of them lay the Byzantine empire, shrunk

to the dimensions of Constantinople nd its environs

on the other, he fragmentary r effete principalities f

their Turkish predecessors. The House of Othman

struck right and left, nd, before the sixty years of its

two first reigns ad terminated, sia Minor had become

generally bedient to the lords of Prusa.

It happened that at this period the Byzantine mo-archy

was distracted by civil war, and the competitors

for theImperial throne,

who hadexperienced

hepower

of the Ottoman arms in the vain attempt to defend their

Asiatic possessions, ere solicitous to secure the aid of

such useful allies in their own contests. This took the

Turks into Europe. In the service sometimes of one pre-ender,

and sometimes of another, they repeatedly rossed

the straits ; and at length the opportunity as found of


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THE HOUSE OF OTHMAK. 13

establishing permanent lodgment on European ground.

So rapid as the course of events, that by the middle of

the fourteenth century, the northern shore of the straits

was studded with Turkish garrisons; nd Amurath, the

third Ottoman sovereign, ound little difficulty n con-uering

the Thracian territories as far as the Balkan,

anderecting

secondmetropolis

tAdrianople.

A few

years more, and we find these Ottomans of the third

generation t the very limits of their present empire,

and on the very scene of their present fortunes. By

1390 they had occupied Widdin ; and before five years

more had elapsed, he Moslem and Christian hosts were

delivering, s we have said, the first of their countless

battles on the banks of the Danube. Thus Byzantine

Europe, as well as Byzantine Asia, was passing nto the

hands of the Turks, and nothing remained of the old

empire of the East, except its capital. It will naturally

be concluded that considerations, ither of political ore-ight

or religious eal, ad combined the forces of Europe

againsthese fierce and

unbelievingnemies. The state

of opinion, owever, at that time, was very remarkable,

and it can only be explainedby reference to events of

much earlier date.

There had existed always national distinctions, nd

even antipathies, etween the Greeks and the Romans;

and these were confirmed and developed y the transfer of


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ANTAGONISM OF G KEEKS AND LATINS. 15

the West had been so scandalised at the excesses of the

Turks in the Holy Land, that they marched in arms to

the deliverance of Jerusalem, and incidentally f course

to the relief of the ByzantineEmpire ; but such was

the ill feeling revailing etween Greeks and Latins,

that they soon treated each other with greater hostility

than the common enemy, andin the

end the Latins

actually acked the Greek capital, nd seated a dynasty

of their owm on the throne of Constantinople. lti-

timately they wrere expelled, nd the Empire reverted

anew to the Greeks; but they long retained possessions

in the Holy Land, the Morea, and the Archipelago, nd

thus introduced a certain element of Latin Christianit

into the territories of the Greeks. Especially as this

the case in Palestine, where the Holy Places, having

been conquered by Latin arms, were naturally eld to

pertain peculiarly o the Latin Church.

It resulted from all these events, that though the re-ative

positions f Turks and Christians were now wholly

and alarmingly hanged,and

thoughthe attitude of the

new invaders on the borders of Germany did really

portend ore serious results than the transient irruptions

of Tartar savages, yet the deportment of the European

States underwent no corresponding lteration. So small

indeed was the sympathy felt for the Greeks themselves,

and so confirmed the antagonism between them and the


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16 TURKEY.

Latins, hat if none but Byzantine territories h d been

endangered by the new dynasty, t is possible he Turks

might have been left to work their way at discretion.

But the Ottoman princes ad overstepped he old frontier

of the Eastern Empire, had crossed the Danube, and by

attacking he kingdom of Hungary, had alarmed the

states within the pale of the Latin Church. The conse-uencewas the battle of Nicopolis, n which the chivalry

of Western Europe was completely verthrown by the

Turkish levies.

Still, owever, the progress of the Ottoman arms

exercised no proportionate nfluence on the councils

of Europe, nor did the impending fate of an imperial

and Christian city provoke any serviceable aid. After

the Thracian and Bulgarian conquests, to which we

have alluded, Constantinople, or the first time in its

existence, as completely nvironed by enemies ; and it

became clear to the Greek emperors, that the invaders

with whom they had now to deal, were of a very differ-nt

mould from theswarming

hordes, which had so often

swept past them and retired. Yet, though four empe-ors

in succession visited Western Europe in search of

aid, and though one of them brought his petition ven to

the king of this island, and Kentish yeomen saw a

Greek Caesar entertained in St. Austin's monastery,

and received on Blackheath by a Lancastrian sovereign.


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18 TURKEY.

dispositions f Norman barons ; but it must be remem-ered,

that on these occasions the moderator and

exponent of European opinion was no other than

the Roman Pontiff, without whose co-operation t

would have been scarcelyossible o organise n effectual

crusade. The application, herefore, f the Eastern

emperorsto the Powers of

Europe,took the form of con-iliatory

overtures to the Romish See ; and, excepting n

the case of the Emperor Manuel, the negotiations f the

imperial isiters were confined to the limits of the Papal

Court. Neither could the Greek State be exactly e-resented

to European sympathies s a Christian city

brought finally o bay, and desperatelyattling gainst

the overwhelming orces of the infidel. The terms on

which Turks and Greeks had for some time been living,

precluded ny such description f their mutual relation-hip.The presumptive antagonism of the two States

had been openly compromisedby concessions, y tri-utes,

and, what was worse, by the ordinary assages of

amity and good-will. Ottoman princes ere educated

at the Christian court, and Christian princes onourably

lodged in the camp of the Ottomans ; a mosque was to-erated

in Constantinople; nd a daughter f the EmperorJohn Cantacuzene was given in marriage o the second of

the Turkish sovereigns. hat these arrangements were

not wholly voluntary n the side of the weaker party we


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RELATIONS BE1 Wl.l A TURKS AM) GREEKS. 19

may safely elieve ; but it will still be evident how ma-erially

such a combination of circumstances must have

operated to the disadvantage f the emperors, in their

appeal o the sympathy of Christian Europe.

Meantime the Turkish power had been growing with

a certainty nd steadiness unexampled in the history f

an Orientalpeople.

Two or three of the causes which

principally onduced to this remarkable result, t may

here be right o specify. The passage of the Ottomans

into Europe might have been long retarded by the simple

expedient of guarding the Straits. While the power of

the Greek Empire consisted almost solely n the relics

of its fleet, till respectably ppointed, nd furnished with

the most formidable appliances f naval warfare known

to the age, the Turks were comparatively estitute both

of ships and of the science which concerned them. A

few galleys ight have effectually rotected he channel

against all the forces of Orchan and Amurath; and yet

not only were the Ottomans permitted to pass undis-urbed,

with such means asthey

could

extemporise,ut

even the intelligence f their having secured a lodg-ent,

and fortified themselves on the European side,

produced nothing but careless scoffs in the Imperial

court. The next point inviting otice is, that the con-uests

of the Turks were mainly effected by the agency

of European troops. The Ottomans will be found to


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20 TURKEY.

have conquered the Byzantineprovinces s we conquered

India, by enlisting nd disciplining he natives 6f the

country. Only 400 families had originally beyed the

voice ofOrtogrul; nd it is clear, therefore, hat the sub-ects

of his successors must have been swelled in numbers

by accessions from other tribes : in fact, the progress of

the Ottomans wasmerely

the onward flow of thepopu-ation

of Asia Minor. Even this,however, would have

been deficient in impulsive force, but for the singular

institution which we are now to mention.

The Janizaries were originally ormed and recruited

from the impressed hildren of Christian captives; fter-ards

from those of any Christian subjects f the Porte,

and at length from the sons of the soldiers themselves;

so that a pure military aste, with habits and interests

totally istinct from the rest of the people, as gra-ually

established in the very heart of the nation. The

number of the Janizaries in the middle of the fourteenth

century was only one thousand; but this muster-roll

was repeatedlyultipliedy successiveemperors,

till at

length, nder the Great Solyman, it reached to twenty

thousand, nd in the German wars, under Mahomed IV.,

to double that strength. It is not a little singular hat

a body so constituted shoidd not only have been the

main instrument of Turkish aggrandisement, ut should

have been so inveterately dentified with Ottoman tra-


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BAJAZET AXD MAHOMET I. 21

ditions, s at all times to have funned the chief obstacle

to any social or constitutional reforms. Xor should it

be overlooked, that the creation and maintenance of this

Standing rmy, isolated from all popular sympathiesbydescent and character, ontributed most powerfully o

consolidate the authority f the new dynasty, and to

furnish the Turkishsovereigns

iththose permanent re-ources,

in virtue of which they escaped the ordi-ary

vicissitudes of Oriental dynasties and encountered

the tumultuous levies of Hungary and Germany with all

the advantages of despotic ower. The pretensions f

the House of Othman kept pace with its achievements.

Originally ts chief had been content with the title of

Emir ; but Bajazet I., by means to which we shall im-ediat

refer, procured for himself, owards the end

of the century, the more dignified enomination of Sul-an.

Already, in justification f his new assumptions,

had he invested Constantinople, hen events occurred

by which the very course of Fate itself appeared to be

threatened with a change. We can do no more than

specify n a few words the occurrences which abruptly

subverted, the whole superstructure of Turkish power;

which scattered all its acquisitions o the winds, and

which render its restoration one of the most extraordi-ary

incidents of history.

In the height of his power and presumption, ajazet


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22 TURKEY.

was conquered and carried into captivityy Timour

By this defeat the inheritance of his house became to all

appearance entirely issolved. Its Asiatic possessions,

though contemptuously bandoned by the conqueror,

were seized upon by the representatives f the old Sel-

jukian house, who regained the positions rom which

theyhad been

dislodgedwhile in Europe the opportu-ity

was turned to similar account by the reviving

spirit f the Greeks. To complete the ruin, civil war

between the sons- of Bajazet presently nsued ; and the

heirs of the Ottoman House, instead of repairing heir

fortunes by concord and patience, ere fighting espe-ately

among themselves, or a heritage hich hardly

existed save in name. The perfect restoi'ation of a

State, dismembered and dismantled, at such a stage of

its existence, y so destructive and shattering shock,

may be described as without parallel n history and

yet within ten years it was completely ffected. Maho-et,

the mosc sagacious f the sons of Bajazet, waited

his time;

and atlength, by

the extinction of other

claims, succeeded in recovering oth the Asiatic and

European conquests of his family, nd in reuniting he

thrones of Adrianople nd Prusa. A peaceful nd pru-ent

feign of eight years enabled him to consolidate his

dominicvi anew; and when in 1421, Amurath II. suc-eeded

to the crown of his father, the Ottoman Power


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CAPTURE OF CONSTANTINOPLE. 23

was as vigorous, s sound, and as aggressive s if the

battle of Angora had never been fought.

We are now arrived at a period when the destinies of

the Ottoman House were to be finally etermined. Up

to this time the progress and renown of the Turkish

arms had stimulated Europe to nothing but a few insin-ere

leagues and a single precipitaterusade

; nor can

we be wrong in presuming that the recent temporary

suspension nd apparent annihilation of the Ottoman

Power must have operated materially n stillfurther in-isposi

European statesmen to exertion or alarm.

But in the year 1453, Mahomet II. at length aid siege o

Constantinople captured it ; subverted by this act

the ancient Empire of the East, and substituted a

Turkish Empire in its place. It has been usual to de-cribe

this memorable event as one of those which mark

a new epoch ; and as serving o introduce that period of

history hich we now emphatically erm Modern. Un- oubted

the definite and final extinction of the Roman

Empire,and the diffusion of Greek

literature, hroughthe agency of the Byzantinerefugees, ere incidents of

no ordinary ote ; but by far the most important onse-uences

of Mahomet's success were those which affected

the Ottomans themselves. As regards Europe, it can-ot

be said that the destruction of the Greek Empire

left any perceptible oid in the community of States.


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24 TURKEY.

As no system of mutual relationship ad yet been estab-ished

among Christian Powers, no special isturbance,

such as would in the present day follow on the extinction

of a particular ember, could then be expected to

ensue ; and, even in the partial nd transient examples

of concert which had occasionally ccurred, the Byzantine

monarchyhad

longbeen without

appreciablenfluence

or consideration. Since, therefore, o European func-ions

had been dischargedby the Greek Empire, no

positive oss could be felt from its destruction ; nor was

the capture of Constantinople f much greater signifi-ance,

in this respect, than the capture of Delhi. But

as affecting he rising ower of the Ottomans, the event

was of most material importance. It created, s it were,

a vacancy in the list of recognised onarchies, nd deli-ered

over to a State, which already anted littlebut a

seat of central power, one of the oldest and most famous

capitals f Europe. It gave to the House of Othman,

in a single ay, exactly he status which it needed ; and

whichyears

of successful invasions andforays

would

have failed to secure. It precluded all .future antago-ism

between Adrianople nd Prusa ; and established a

permanent cohesion between the European and Asiatio

dominions of the Turkish crown. More than this it

conveyed to the Sultans and their successors certain

traditional pretensions, f which they soon discovered


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26 TURKEY.

had been sacked by an unbelieving ace, whose deeds

for generations ast had been the horror of Europe.

Tet abruptly s the blow was at last felt to descend, it

had long been visibly suspended and, although no

human power could have permanentlyprotected the

Greek Caesars in their capital, hile the Turks were

established inunquestioned sovereignty etween the

Danube and the Euphrates, he actual circumstances of

the siege ere such, nevertheless, s to cast heavy im-utatio

and responsibility pon the Powers of Europe.

The Imperial city had been allowed to sustain the full

shock of the Ottoman forces, ith a weak and inadequate

garrison f eight thousand men, three-fourths of whom

were supplied rom the population ithin the walls ; so

that the chivalry f Christendom was represented, t

this critical period, y two thousand auxiliaries. Yet,

that there Avas both room and opportunity or effectual

succour was evident, not only from the manner in which

the defence, even under such circumstances, as pro-racted,

butfrom the

diversionwhich had been accom-lished,

during the previous nvestment of Constantinople

by Bajazet, ith a force of only six hundred men-at-

arms, and twice as many archers, nder Marshal Bouci-

cault.

But the truth was, that, although the actual cata-trophe

created a momentary consternation, nd even


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ESTABLISHMENT OF OTTOMAN EMriRE. 27

ioned the revival in certain quarters of crusad-ng

vows, there existed, as we have already said, no

fellow-feeling ith the Greeks sufficiently trong to

suggest an effective expedition nor any facilitiesin

fact for such an enterprise n the social or political on-ition

of Europe. The Turks were no new enemies ;

nor were

theynow seen for the first time on the northern

shore of the straits. The resources of Christendom

might admit of combination and exertion in the event

of an actual irruption f barbarians or infidels, s when

Frederick II. repulsed he Moguls, or Charles V. after-ards

scared the Ottomans under the great Solyman ;

but for aggressive nterprise n distant regions they

were no longer available. The writings of JEneas

Sylvius one of the earliest statesmen who surveyed the

several Powers of Europe in connexion with each other

give an intelligible icture f the condition of affairs

at this period. The fallof Constantinople ad excited

some sympathies, ut more selfishness. A certain com-iseration,

quickened by therefugees dispersed

ver

the countries of the West, was felt for the exiled Greeks,

but a far more lively entiment was excited by the de-onstr

of the triumphant Ottoman against the

Italian peninsula. o reasonable were the apprehensions

on this head made to appear, that within twelvemonths

of the capture of Constantinople, ar was actually de-


34/245

28 TURKEY.

clared against he new Empire of the East in the Frank-ort

Diet ; and, five years later, t was formally esolved

at the Congress of Mantua, that 50,000 confederate

soldiers should be equipped for the expulsion f the in-idel,

and the conclusive deliverance of Christendom.

Neither of these designs, owever, proceeded beyond

the original enace ; and the Turks were left in undis-utedpossession f their noble spoil.

Between this turning-point f Turkish destinies and

the new epoch to which we must now direct our atten-ion,

there intervened a period of great general interest,

and of remarkable importance o the Ottoman Empire

but not inducing ny material changes in the rela-ions

of this Power writh Western Europe. The avowed

designs of Mahomet II. upon the capital f Christen-om,

illustrated as they were by his attitude on the

Danube and his actual lodgment at Otranto, ere not

indeed without their influence, s was shown by the

multitude of volunteers who flocked to the standard of

theintrepid

unniades. But when the idea of Otto- an

invincibility ad been corrected by the victories

of the Allies at Belgrade,by the successful defiance of

Scanderbeg, nd by the triumphant resistance of the

Knights of Rhodes, this restlessness gradually ubsided,

and in a few years the course of events became such as

to substitute new objects f concern in European coun-


35/245

TURKISH SUPERIORITY. 29

cils for the power and progress of the Turks. Perhaps

the wild and indefinite projects f Charles VIII., in that

gigantic ational foray upon Italy which disorganised

the mediaeval constitution of Europe, may be taken as a

fair representation f the ideas prevailing especting

Constantinople, hirty years after the fall of the city.

If the forces of France andSpain,

instead of then con-ending

in deadly struggles or the possession f Italy,

had been combined against common enemy upon the

Hellespont, t is certainly ossible hat somethingmight

have been accomplished. he great Gonzalvo did, indeed,

once appear upon the scene as an ally of the Venetians,

and with ah effect proportionate o his reputation. ut

in computing the chances of any such expedition gainst

the new Empire, it must be remembered that the Turks

had hitherto achieved their conquests, not by mere force

of numbers, like the Tartar hordes, but by superiority

of discipline, actics, equipments, nd science. In this

respect, at least, they were no barbarians. Their army

was

incomparablyhe

strongestin Europe and

espe-iallyin those departments which indicate the highest

military xcellence. For many years afterwards, heir

artillery nd engineers surpassed hose of the best ap-ointed

European troops. These advantages would

have told with tenfold effect from such ramparts as those

of Constantinople; hile nothing, n the other hand,


36/245

30 TURKEY .

short of a recapture of the city, nd a complete dlslodge-

ment of the intruders, could have effected the objects f

the Christian Powers. Above all, t should be recol-ected,

what was so deary proved in the sequel, hat

these Powers could not then be relied on for any steadi-ess

of concert, or any integrity f purpose ; and that

thereligious

eal of formerdays

no

longersurvived in

sufficient force to furnish an extraordinary ond of

union. The Turks soon ceased indeed to be politicall

regarded s the common foes, either of the human race

or the Christian name. Already had the ordinary

transactions of bargains and contracts become familiar

between them and the Venetians ; dealings f a more

degrading kind had compromised the Papal See, and

the Ottoman arms had in various expeditions een re-eatedly

aided by small Christian succours. It is*

related, indeed, that high pay and liberal encourage-ent

attracted recruits from all countries to the Turkish

ranks ; nor is there, e believe, much reason to doubt

thatmany

an

European Dalgettyas

servingnder the

standard of the Prophet. The number of renegade

vizirs and pashas who have figured n the Turkish ser-ice

is something extraordinary.

To these considerations must be added the fact, hat

during the seventy years thus interposed etween the

capture of Constantinople nd the accession of the


37/245

CAMPAIGNS IN FEB8IA AND KGYrT. 31

Great Solyman, the designs of Ottoman ambition had

been diverted from the North and West to the East

and South from the shores of the Adriatic and the

Danube to the defiles of Armenia and the plains of

Cairo. Though the supremacy of the Turks was, it is

true, steadily supported on the scene of its recent

triumphs,nd

even unusually signalisedya naval

victory n the waters of the Archipelago, et the chief

efforts of the two immediate successors of Mahomet

were concentrated upon the territories of Persia and

Egypt. It does not enter into our present plan to

discuss the results with which these expeditions ere

attended. We need only remark, that while the over-hrow

of the Mameluke dynasty and the conquest (in

151(i) of the kingdom of Egypt, compensated for the

less productive nvasions of the Persian provinces, he

two objects together combined to divert the attention

of the Sultans from Europe, and to suspend, or an in-erval,

the apprehensions f Christendom.

On areview,

therefore, f theseevents,

it will be

observed, hat the first rise of the Ottoman power

occurred at such a period and under such circumstances

as to deprive he phenomenon of any great singularity

or terror ; that even the passage of the Turks into

Europe, their appearance on the Danube, and the per-anent

investment of Constantinople hich virtually


38/245

32 TURKEY.

ensued, exercised no corresponding nfluence on the

opinions f Western Europe, wearied as it was with

crusades, and detached as it had long practically een

from any civil or religious ntercourse with the Greeks

of the Lower Empire ; and that the Ottoman invaders

thus finally tepped without material opposition nto an

imperial inheritance, upplyingthem with what

theymost needed for the consolidation of their conquests

a local habitation and a recognised name among the

Powers of Europe. Lastly, e may remark, that the

power of resistance to further aggressioneveloped at

Belgrade, nd exemplified n the evacuation of Otranto,

contributed, n connexion with the diversion of Turkish

conquests to other quarters of the globe, to reassure

the kingdoms of the West, and to prepare the way for

the eventual admission of a Mahometan Power into the

political ommunity of Christian States. Some of the

earlier causes conducive to this remarkable consumma-ion

we have alreadypointed out ; but others, of no

inferior interest, emainyet

to be noticed.

In the month of February, 1536, the nations of

Europe were scandalised we may still employ the

expression with the intelligence hat a treaty of amity

and concord had been struck between the Grand

Seignior f the Turks and the first king of the Christian

world At an earlier period, rancis I. of France had


39/245



40/245

34 TURKEY.

in the rivalry, t the commencement of the 16th cen-ury,

between France and Spain. The aggrandisement

and consolidation which each of these kingdoms,though

in an unequaldegree, ad recently ttained, onstituted

them the two crowns of Christendom. The antago-ism

naturally nsuing between Powers thus situated,

soon drew the other States ofEurope

into itssphere

of

action. This rivalry ad been first exemplified n the

Italian wars which followed upon the expedition f

Charles VIIL, and it was continued entirely n the spirit

which that extraordinary nterprise ad generated. The

contested supremacy was for many years conceived tc

be represented y the possession f Italy and the in- umera

permutations f alliances which had been

witnessed in the wars referred to, suggested ll the re-uisite

ideas of State-combinations. Whether it can be

said that, in these early transactions, egard was really

had to that equitable djustment of power which after-ards

became the avowed object of similar struggles,

maybe

reasonablyoubted ;

but,at all

events, EuropeanStates now first began to group themselves about two

centres ; and both parties nxiously ast about for means

of circumscribing he resources of their adversary, r en-arging

their own. It wa3 no more than a natural result

of such a condition of things, hat the causes which had

hitherto operated in promoting hostilities or friendship


41/245

THE BALANCE OF POWEB. 35

between States, should be superseded by more absorbing

considerations of present policy and it will be seen,

accordingly, hat though religious ifferences were still

capable of originating ars, no material obstacle was

found in diversity f creeds to the establishment of cor-ial

and permanent alliances. In the Thirty Years'

War, for instance, though the dispute lay ostensibly e-weenthe Roman Catholic and the Protestant consti-uencies

of the Empire, yet the paramount object of the

aggressive elligerents as the depression f the House

of Austria ; and in this good cause, the Popish troops

of France, at the instigation f a cardinal minister,

fought shoulder to shoulder with the parti-coloure

Protestants of Germany and Sweden.

It was in such a state of affairs and opinion, hat

Francis I. turned his eyes towards the Porte. Solyman

the Great, who in 1520 had ascended the Turkish throne,

had again directed the Ottoman arms to European con-uests

and Avith a success surpassing he boldest

achievements of his victorious predecessors. his re-oubtableSultan not only expelled the Christian

knights from then' seat in the Isle of Rhodes, but

repeatedly nvaded the territory f Hungary, and at

last annexed a considerable portion f the kingdom, in-ludin

Buda, its capital, o the Turkish dominions.

He succeeded also in subjugating he provinces f Wal-


42/245

30 TURKEY.

lachia and Moldavia, now constituting hat are termed the Danubian principalities, nd in making their

princes ributary o his crown. But these events, which

a century before might have struck all Christian capitals

with indignation nd alarm, were now only looked upon

as so many inducements to a political lliance. Francis

saw in

Solyman,not the

conquerorof Rhodes and the

would-be subjugator f Christendom, but the monarch

of a mighty State, availably ituated for active diversion,

and already t war with his deadly enemy. That the

Ottoman Sultan should have invested Vienna, and

openly advanced pretensions o the supremacy claimed

fcy Charles, were circumstances onlyadditionally ug-estiveof the projected reaty. His resolution was

taken accordingly. here had long been certain rela-ions

of trade and amity between French merchants and

the Mameluke Soldans of Egypt; and when this country

fell, s we have stated, under the dominion of the Turks,

the privilegesnjoyed by the Christian traffickers had

beenjudiciously

onfirmed and augmented. These ante-edents

were turned to account by Francis ; who based

upon them a proposal or a general commercial treaty

between France and the Porte. The instrument, itis

true, did not stipulate ny alliance for offence or defence;

but the assurances of amity now ostentatiously nter-hanged,

were sufficiently ndicative of the point to


43/245

FIRST CHRISTIAN ALLIANCES. 37

which matters were tending; and within a few months,

the corsair subjects f the Porte were actually et loose

upon the Neapolitan possessions f the Catholic king

Such was the first formal recognition f the Ottoman

dynasty of Constantinople. ruces and treaties had, of

course, been previously oncluded between the Porte

and its enemies ; but this was the earliest instance of an

amicable and gratuitous alliance ; and it is worth observ-

ing, that so early did it occur, as to make the admission

of a Mahometan Power into the community of Christian

States contemporaneous with the very first and rudimen-ary

combinations of these States among each other. That

it was considered a step out of the common course of

politics, nd that it created, ven in impartial uarters,

some scandal, we can easilyperceive but not more,

perhaps, han had been occasioned by the previous ver-ures

of the same unscrupulous onarch to the Protest-nts

of Smalcald. It is a significant ndication, oo, of

the temper of the times, that the treaty was negotiated

at

Constantinopleya

knightof St. John

and that itcontained a special rovision or the admission oi the

Pope to the league

Still there was really, s we have said, some scandal;and it needed in fact a concurrence of conditions to

bring about so strange an innovation as the politicalnaturalisation of the Turk among the States of Chris-


44/245

38 TURKEY .

tendora. Some of these conditions are in the highest

degree curious and interesting. n the first place, ince

the period when we left the Ottomans on their way to-ards

Egypt and Persia, the Reformation of religion n

Europe had been successfully arried out. This mighty

event exercised a twofold influence upon the relation-hip

betweenthe Christian Powers and the Papal See.

On the one hand, by subtracting o many States from

the supremacy of the Pope, and weakening, in direct

proportion, is authoritative power, it dislocated and

neutralised the influence of that particular ourt, from

which all combinations against he misbelievers had pre-iouslyreceived their warrant and organisation. o

crusade could be maintained without the auspices f a

Pope ; and upon the good-will nd services of this po-entate

more urgent and impressive laims were now

preferred. But a few years before, indeed, the Pontiff

had been besieged nd imprisoned n his own city, not

by the fierce Mahometans, who once threatened such an

attack, and at the echo of whose arms on Italian terri-ory

a former Pope had actuallyprepared to retreat

beyond the Alps, but by the sworn foes of these intru-ers

the troops, on whose protectiongainst uch con-ingencies

the powerless Romans had been heretofore

taught to rely. The time had past when the most

deadly antagonist f the Pope was necessarily he Turk,


45/245

FIRST CHRISTIAN ALLIANCES. 39

and with it had gone all opportunity or the moral or

material organisation f an actual crusade. On the

other hand, the support derivable for such purposes

from popular opinion as diminished in a corresponding

degree by the operation f the same events. A new

object ad been found for the combative propensities f

fanaticismor

zeal. In thereligious ars

of thesetimes,

heretic was substituted for infidel, nd the enthu-iasm

or animosity hich in former days might have

been directed against the encroachments of the Turk,

were now furnished with sufficient occupationby the

fatal divisions of Christendom itself. In the year 1581

a proposition as actually ade by the Pope and

Jesuits, o divert the arms of the Maltese knights, hose

sworn champions of Christianity, rom the still formida-le

Ottomans against Queen Elizabeth of England;and a few years later at the very moment, indeed, hen

the Spanish Armada was directed against ur shores,

Henry III. of France despatched confidential envoy to

thePorte,

or thepurpose

of

impressingmurath III. with

the expediency f declaringaragainsthilip I.of Spain.

These causes, co-operating ith a visible and settled

repugnance to distant crusades, ith the distractions

arising rom domestic vicissitudes, nd with the indif-erence

to alarmingphenomena which familiarity lti-ately

brings on, may be taken as explanatory f that


46/245

40 TURKEY.

course of events which at length not only established

the house of Othman upon the throne of the Eastern

Ccesars, ut gave it a species f place in the courts and

councils of Europe.

It was not, however, under any ordinary spect that

this diplomatic ebut was solemnised. The Ottoman

Porte made itsentry

into theEuropean system

with all

the appliances f glory,grandeur, nd triumph. Not

only was it a first-rate Power, but, excepting he yet

scarcelyanageable resources of ImperialGermany, it

was the strongest Power which could take the field.

This consciousness of strength, ombined with that or-hodox

insolence and heritage f pretensions o which

we have alluded, gave to its deportment the genuine

impress of barbaric pride. The Emperor of the Otto-ans

carried himself as a sovereign mmeasurably xalted

above all the monarchs of the West especially bove

those with whom he was brought into immediate con-act.

The view taken by Solyman of the overtures of

Francis I.may

be collected from hishaughty

boast, that

in his shadow the kings of France, Poland, Venice, and

Transylvania ad been fain to seek refuge. The first

Austrian ambassador despatched o the Sublime Porte

was sternly ebuked for applying majestic epithet o

his own master, and was thrown contemptuously nto

prison. Indeed, for a long subsequent period, the


47/245



48/245

42 TURKEY.

which in mercantile compacts had been already n the

field, promptly followed ; and England's firstambassa-or

departed from the court of Elizabeth. His recep-ion,

curiously nough, as not unopposed. Previously,

our few negotiations ith the Porte had been transacted

through the representatives f the States already ccre-ited

there; and neither Venice nor France was dis-osedto forego the prerogative f mediation, or to

welcome a new competitor n the scene. Their objec-ions,

however, were overruled, nd the Ottoman Porte

was declared open to all. In 1606 the United States

of Holland despatched lso their envoy to Constantino-

pie ; and thus, either the suggestions f policy, r the

temptations f trade, ad collected the representative

of Christendom about the Turkish Sultan, at as early

a period as could be reasonably anticipated rom the

temper of the government, and the distance of the scene.

The influence directly xerted at this periodby Tur-ey

upon Western Europe was not very remarkable; but

thereare two points

onnected with it which deserve to

be recorded. The incessant attacks of the Ottomans

along the Danube and the Theiss, created in Germany

such a sense of insecurity s had not been felt since the

irruptions f the Moguls ; and it became indeed evident

that the protection f the Empire, under such new fron-ier

relations, ould not be intrusted to a distant or non-


49/245

CBARLE8 V. AND SOLY.MAN. 43

resident sovereign. It was true that the front recently

shown by Charles V. to Solyman proved that the

armies of the East could be still over-matched, n emer-encies,

by the forces of the West ; but these forces

could be mustered only by such desperate appeals, nd

after such difficulties, hat they supplied but an uncer-ain

resource againstthe

perilsonstantly impendingfrom the ambition or ferocity f the Sultan. Even on

the occasion alluded to, the Mahometans were in the

very heart of Styria, efore the strength f the Empire

could be collected for the deliverance of Germany,These obvious considerations, hough they had less

weight than might have been anticipated ith the Im-erial

States, ho apprehended more danger to their

libertiesfrom the House of Hapeburgh than from the

House of Othman, did induce Charles so far to modifyhis own schemes as to partition he reversion of his

possessions, nd to bespeak the Imperial rown for his

brother Ferdinand, instead of his son Philip. His ex-rtions

promoteda settlement which he afterwards

vainlv tried to cancel. Ferdinand was elected kino- of

the Romans ; and thus the substitution of the formid-ble

Ottoman for the degenerate Greek in the halls of

Constantinople, roved the means of settling he crown

of the Empire in a German instead of a Spanish House

and of laying the broad foundation of the great mon-


50/245

44g

TURKEY.

archy of Austria. The event, too, produced its reaction

on the fortunes of Turkey; for Ferdinand, thus

strengthened, ucceeded in incorporating he elective

crown of Hungary with the already aggrandised nheri-ance

of his family. From this consolidation of domi-ion

flowed two results of signalmportance o the sub-ect

we are now

considering.ot

onlywas a State

created of sufficient magnitude to resist the aggressions

of the Turk, but this rival empire became actually on-erminous

with the Ottoman dominions. Prague, Buda,

and Vienna were now capitals f the same kingdom ; a

blow struck at Zeuta was felt at Frankfort ; and thus,

instead of the uncertain resistance dictated by the fitful

and erratic impulses of Hungarian cavaliers, steady

force was organised nd arrayed against he Turk, and

the majesty and strength of Imperial Christendom

brought bodily n his borders.

It is with no wish to disparage he national character

of Hungary that we here avow our doubts whether this

kingdom of itselfeither served or could have served as

that bulwark of Christendom which it has been often

denominated. We think,indeed, that after an impartial

review of the annals of this period, t Avill be difficult to

escape the conclusion that, but for its practical dentifi-ation

with the Germanic Empire, it would probably

have become, and perhaps have remained, a dependency


51/245

TIIE BARBARY ST ATI S. 45

of the misbelievers. Even as it was, it must be remem-ered

that Buda was Turkish for almost as long a period

as Gibraltar has been English ; while, as regards any-

active or inveterate antagonism on the score of religion,

we find little ground for concluding that the inhabitants

of Hungary would have shown more tenacity han the

population f Wallachia or Moldavia. The personalprowess and brilliant successes of Hunniades and Mat- hias

Corvinus, ere mainly instrumental, o doubt, in

stemming the first torrent of Ottoman conquest; but

though the flower of the armies which encountered the

Moslem on the Danube was usually supplied rom the

chivalry f Hungary, it is impossible ot to trace the

ultimate ascendancy of the Christian over the Turk to

those events which established a mutual assurance among

all the kingdoms between the Vistula and the Rhine.

The second of the points to which we alluded as no-ably

exemplifying he influence of Turkey upon Christ-ndom

was the establishment, n the coast of Barbary,

of those anomalouspiratical

tates which haveonly

with-n

our own generation become extinct. From the earliest

development of their national strength, he Turks have

always experienced nd confessed their inferiority n the

seas; and though their unexpectedvictory ver the Vene-ians

at Sapienza might for a moment appear to announce

a change, the improvement was not maintained; and


52/245

46 TURKEY.

the famous battle of Lepanto decided the fortunes of

the Turkish marine. Exasperated, however, at the

insults to which he was exposed, and desirous of

creating by any methods some counterpoise o the

supremacy of the European Powers in the Mediterra-ean,

Solyman the Great invested the celebrated Bar-

barossa with a titlebeyond

that ofconquest

to the

possessions he had already acquired on the African

coast. Algiers and its kindred strongholds ecame

feudatories of the Porte ; and in this capacityupplied,

as will be remembered, the materials for some of the

most curious historical episodes f the times in question.

To say that these predatory governments ever seriously

influenced the affairs of Europe, would be attributing

to them too great an importance. But before the rise

and growth of the proper Powers Maritime, they often

successfully ontested the command of the adjacent

waters ; and though they should have been outlawed

by the very fact of their profession, o many States

were fain to treat with them, that the Porte had little

difficulty n maintaining hem b}r its favour for three

centuries in their anomalous existence. Something,

perhaps, they owed to the reciprocal ealousies f

Christian States ; and it deserves at least to be men-ioned,

that our own good understanding ith these

piratical ommunities preceded even our definite alii-


53/245

OTTOMAN POLICY. 47

ance with Holland, and was disturbed by only a singleserious rupture through a century and a half.

Our review has now reached a point at which theaction of the Ottoman Empire upon the affairs of

Christendom can no longer be described as peculiarly

that of a Mahometan Power. The holy war against

Christians no longer supplied ny guiding principle f

Turkish policy, or was any combination likely o be

suggested by analogous considerations on the other

side. Since the union of the Germanic and Hungarian

crowns in the House of Hapsburg, and the establish-ent

of this power on the borders of Turkey, the

Ottomans had become the natural antagonists of the

Austrians, nd all the enemies therefore of the Imperial

House were the friends of the Porte. When Mahomet

TIL departed from Constantinople n his campaignagainst the Emperor Rodolf II., his martial pomp was

swelled by the ambassadors of France and England.

And in truth, at the opening of the seventeenth cen-ury,

the principal estern States were either at peace

with the Porte, or had contracted positive lliances

with it. The idea of attaching o this Power any

political isabilities on the score of religion, ad in

reality ecome extinct, hough it still survived in popu-ar

conceptions, nd received occasional illustrations in

examples of individual chivalry. In fact, the existence


54/245

48 TURKEY.

of the still powerful order of St. John, holding its pos-essionsand privileges n the recorded condition of war

with the infidel, as sufficient to perpetuate the tradi-ions

of an earlier period and instances of volunteers

in the same cause were of constant recurrence. The

spirit f which we are speaking as conspicuously x-mplified

at the famoussiege

ofCandia, when, in

addition to other succours, the garrison as reinforced

by a select band of Christian knights under the Due

de Beaufort, although the alliance between France

and the Porte remained nominally ndisturbed. The

French, said the vizier Kiuperli, n this occasion,

are our friends; but we usually find them with our

enemies. No serious notice, however, was taken

of these incidents : nor was there wanting at Con-tantino

an accurate appreciation f the policy

subsisting n the principal abinets of Europe. In the

reign of our Charles L, a Venetian envoy ventured to

threaten the Porte with a Christian league. The

Pope,returned the Turkish

minister, would

stingif he could, but he has lost the power ; Spain and

Germany have their own work upon their hands ; the

interests of France are ours ; while, as to England and

Holland, they would only be too glad to supersede ou

in the commercial privileges ou enjoy. Declare your

war, then and see how you will fare for allies. This


55/245



56/245

50 TURKEY.

of German destinies, ere again turned with irre-istible

force upon Persia. It was not until that

terrible struggle ad been terminated, hat the Ottomans

were allured, by the seductive representations f Tekeli,

to make their last gratuitous emonstration against

the capital of the rival Empire. But the result of

this famous invasion wasvery

different from whatthey

had anticipated. ot only were the ramparts of Vienna

maintained against lack Mustapha's janizaries, nd his

spahis cattered by the first chai'ge f Sobieski's cava-iers,

but many circumstances of the campaign disclosed

the fact, that the preeminence in arms had passed at

length from the Ottomans to the Christians. The stories

of this celebrated siege, and the apparent peril of a

second Christian capital, ended to revive in no small

degree the popular orror of the Turk ; but, in point of

fact, he growing ascendancy of Christendom bad been

indisputably hown. Already had the defence of Can-

dia, protracted o more than twice the length of the

defence ofTroy,

demonstrated the resources of even unor-anised

Europe against he whole forces of the Ottoman

Empire, directed by the ablest minister it had ever

known ; the recollections of Lepanto were reanimated

and heightened by a new series of naval victories ; and

now, for the first time, the superior xcellence of Euro-ean

tactics was displayed n the banks of the Danube.


57/245

TFIE PANARIOT GREEKS. 51

Even had Vienna yielded to the first assaults, here is

scarcely ny room fur doubting that the tide of conquest

must soon have been both stayed and turned.

Still, lthough the seventeenth century was to close

upon the Porto with humiliation and discomfiture, either

its attitude nor its position mong the States of Europe

hadyet experienced ny material change. It no longer

indeed maintained a mastery in the field ; but it still

preserved its traditional carriage n the cabinet. It was

still beyond obvious reach of insult or attack, nd still

affected the haughtylanguage of unapproachable upre-acy.

It had not yet come to need countenance or

protection nor had that Power been yet developed

before whose deadly antagonism its fortunes were at

length to fail. A step, however, had about this time

been taken towards the impendingchange, which de-erves

to be recorded. The Turks were disqualified o

less by individual character than by national pretensions

for the subtle functions of diplomacy; and the rude

violence of theirdeportment

in their

foreignelations

may be ascribed in no inconsiderable degree o the fierce

and obstinate bearing of a true believer. Towards the

end of the century, accidental events suggested he em-loyment,

in this peculiar apacity, f the Greek subjects

of the Porte ; who turned to such account the opportu-ities

thus afforded them, that they presently onopo-


58/245

52 TURKEY.

lised the chief offices of external intercourse. In some

sense, the Ottoman Empire was of course a gainer by

the substitution of these suppleintriguers or its own

intractable sons ; but the change contributed materially

to affect its position n the eyes of other nations, and

served incidentally o mark the period at which its

characteristicarrogance began

to recede.

With the eighteenth century a new scene opened

upon Europe, in which the part hitherto playedby

Turkey was to be strangely eversed. Though we have

brought our sketch of the Ottoman fortunes to a com-aratively

modern period, e have as yet had no oc-asion

to name that remarkable nation by whose action

they were to be finally regulated. The reader may,

perhaps, e amused with the first dim foreshadowing f

the mightyfigures hich were to come. In times long

past, before the singular uccession of bold and sagacious

monarchs on the throne of Constantinople ad been

broken by the elevation of idiots or debauchees from the

recesses of theseraglio,

ome of thesepowerfulprinces,

with an enlightenment or which they have hardly e-eived

sufficient credit, ast about for the means of

restoring hose commercial advantages hich their domi-ions

had lost by the discoveries of Vasco di Gam a, and

by the consequent diversion of Eastern trade from the

overland route to an entirely ew channel. Among


59/245

ORIGIN OF THE BU88I \N EMPIRE. 1)3

other projects or this purpose, Sclim II. conceived or

revived the idea of connecting by an artificial canal, at

the most convenient points, he two great streams of the

Don and the Volga, thus opening a navigable assage

from the Black Sea to the Caspian, and establishing n

easy communication between Central Asia and Western

Europe.It

wasseldom that the Ottoman

Sultans didtheir work neirliojentlv. n this occasion the zeal of

Sclim was quickenedby his desire to invade Persia

through the new route, and he commenced his canal as

it might have been commenced by a king of Egypt.

He may be pardoned, in the fulness of his power, for

not taking into account the destined opposition o his

schemes. As the work, however, was proceeding,body

of men, with uncouth figures, trange features, nd bar-arous

language, allied out from a neighbom-ing own,

surprised he expedition, nd cut soldiers and workmen

to pieces. These savages were the Muscovite subjects

of Ivan the Terrible, and such was the first encounter

of the Turks and the Russiatis.

About the middle of the ninth century, a short time

before the accession of our Alfred the Great, Kurik,

one of the Varangian rovers of the Baltic, sailed into

the Gulf of Finland, and with the audacity nd for-une

characteristic of his race, established a Xorman

dynasty at Xovogorod. He presentlyespatched step-


60/245

54 TURKEY.

son to secure the city of Kiev, on the Dnieper, hich had

formed the southern settlement of the old Slavish popula-ion,

as Novogorod had formed the northern; and the in-aders

thus became the recognised ords of a country which

was even then called Russia. To the instinctsof the

new settlers, he wealthy and unwarlike empire of the

East was a point of irresistible attraction, nd fivetimeswithin a century were the Russians

conducted by

their new rulers to the siege of Constantinople. he

bulwarks,however, of the Imperiality ere proofagainst

the canoes and spears of the barbarians; and the last of

these expeditions, n 955, terminated in an event which

precluded ny repetition f the trial. Through the instru-entality

of a princess, he House of Rurik and itssub-ects

received the doctrines of Christianity; nd from

this time the marauding ambition of the Russians was

exchanged for a deep respect towards that State from

which they had obtained their religion, heir written

characters, nd many of the usages of civilisation. Un-ortunat

oneof

the consequences resultingrom

thedisorders of an irregular nd disputed succession Avas

the transfer, bout the year 1170, of the seat of govern-ent

from Kiev to Vladimir. The former city had

been early preferred o Novogorod, on account of its

vicinity o the scene of anticipated onquest ; and,

when the relation between its rulers and the Greek


61/245

ORIGIN OF THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE. 55

emperors had experienced he change to which we have

referred, the proximity aa still desirable, ur the sake

of an intercourse which was exercising highly beneficial

though partial nfluence upon the rising kingdom. But

this removal of the grand '-'princes r dukes from so

convenient a capital s Kiev, to what is nearly he centre

of the present monarchy, completelyut off the Russians

from Constantinople nd Christendom; and was the

first of those occurrences which so singularly etarded

the political evelopment of this mighty State. The

second was the invasion of the Moguls.

When in the middle of the thirteenth century, the

Tartars of the Asiatic Highlands burst, for the third

time, upon the plains of Europe, they found an easy

prey in the disorganised rincipalities f Russia. Vla-imir,

as we have remarked, was the capital f a grand

duchy, to which a score of princes, ll of the blood of

Rurik, owed a nominal allegiance; ut, so destructive

had been the consequences of unsettled successions and

repeatedpartitions,

hat there wasnothing

tooppose

the inroad or settlement of the Mogul; and the result

was the establishment, pon the banks of the Don, of a

Tartar khannat,or monarchy, with undisputed upremacy

over the ancient princes f the land. The sovereignty

of the Horde, however, althoughomplete, as not very

actively xerted; and, in the two centuries of dependence


62/245

56 TURKEY.

which followed, he grand dukes were left at liberty o

work out, in the interior of the country, the problem of

Russian libei-ation. Kiev having now been definitel

abandoned, the seats of the three leadingprinces ere

at Vladimir, Twer, and Moscow; the first of which lines

enjoyed the supremacy, until it devolved, in the begin-ing

of the fourteenthcentury, upon Twer, and,

in the

course of about fifty ears more, upon Moscow. At

this point the succession was finally ettled in the per-on

of Ivan of Moscow, surnamed Kalita; whose

resources were strengthenedy the gradual conflux of

the population pon his territory, s they retired from

the encroachments of the Lithuanians and Poles. His

descendants were soon enabled to hold their own not

onlyagainst hese nations, ut even against heir Tartar

lords: and the frame of a kingdom of Muscovy was

already formed,when, in 1462, Ivan the Great suc-eeded

to the heritage f his ancestors. So completely

by this time had the collateral lines of the royal stock

been subordinated to itshead,

that little more was

required or the consolidation of a powerfulmonarchy

than the reduction of some municipal epublics, nd the

subjugation f the now enfeebled horde on the Don.

These conditions were soon realised. In 1481, Ivan,

assuming the title of Czar, announced himself as an

independent sovereign o the states of Christendom;


63/245



64/245

58 TURKEY.

pathies, o have acquired ome of the rights f the emper-rsof the Greeks. By this destruction of the old Byzan-ine

Empire, the Russian monarchy became detached

from its original onnection with the East a circum-tance

which contributed to give it from this time forward

a European rather than an Asiatic aspect. This exchange

was undoubtedly conducive to political dvancement,but the penance was not yet done. At this critical con-uncture,

when every thing appeared to promise the

speedy growth of the new Power, the old stock of Rurik,

after seven centuries and a half of existence, ailed in

the third generation rom the great Ivan; and a suc-ession

of usurpers, invaders, nd pretenders through a

series of fifteen years, during which interregnum the

country narrowly escaped annexation to Poland, threw

back the risingonarchy into a condition scarcely etter

than that from which ithad before emerged. At length,

in 1613, the election of Michael Romanoff to the vacant

throne provided Russia anew with a royal stock; and

the fatedantagonist

f the House of Othman wasfinally

established in policy nd power.

But for the retarding: ircumstances to which we have

referred, t is probable hat the relationsbetween Turkey

and Christendom would have been changed at a much

earlier periodby the menacing attitude of the Russian

court. Alexis, the second of the Romanoffs, suggested,


65/245

THE HOUSE OF BOMANOFF. 59

even in the middle of the seventeenth century, the for-ation

of a holyleague against he infidels of Constan-inople.

His country, however, was as yet in no condi-ion

to play the part desired ; nor was it, indeed, until

the days of Peter the G reat, that Russian vessels, fter

a lapse of nearly eight centuries, again swam the sea of

Azov.Still,

he future waspreparing.

Thepeace

of

Carlowitz, n 1699, terminated the last of those Turkish

wars by which European freedom was conceived to be

threatened. Its provisions ncluded Russia, which, for

the first time, had been brought into hostile contact with

the Porte. It may be even added, that the terms of

the treaty were honourable to Peter; but, although

the ascendancy of the Imperialist ver the Ottoman

arms had now been conclusively ecided, some time

was to elapse before this superiority ould be claimed

by Russia also.

The Turkish Empire entered upon the eighteenth

century, considerably amaged by the last campaigns.

Its forces had beenrelatively, hough

notperhaps

ac-ually

weakened ; but its reputation as most seriously

diminished. Nevertheless, his very circumstance pro-ably

contributed, by finallyemoving all dread of its

aggressions, o promote that, peculiar nterest which the

cabinets of Europe now began to take in its politicalfortunes. The consideration, owever, which modified


66/245

60 TURKEY.

the estimation of Turkey among the Western States,

was the progress of Russia alone ; and we shall best un-erstand

the gradual revolution of opinion ow ensuing,

by observing he respective ositions f the Porte and

its new rival, t the close of the several wars by which

this century was distinguished.

It should berecollected,

hat the direct influence of

Turkey, at this period, upon the European system,

was chiefly onfined to the Northern States. The secret

inspiration f France was, indeed, perceptible n the

decisions of the Divan; but it was only on the

banks of the Vistula and the shores of the Baltic that

the vibrations of Ottoman struggles ere practically elt.

Acting on Russia and Poland through the medium of

Cossack and Tartar hordes, which carried their allegiance

and their disorder to all these countries in turn, on

Prussia and Sweden through Poland, and on Denmark

through Russia, the Turkish Empire found itself con-ected

with the less important oiety of Christendom

its relations with the Great Powers of the West bein j

mainly suggested by its capacities or annoying Austria.

In the wars, therefore, f the Spanish succession, s in

the other great European contests, the Ottoman Empire

was not involved. Though its councils, s we shall pre-ently

see, became more and more exposed to the in- rigues

of diplomatists; et so lordly as the indifference


67/245

PETER THE GREAT, AND HIS SUCCESSORS. 61

of the Porte to political pportunities, nd so capricious

and uncertain was its disposition, hat no extensive

combination could he safely based on its probable

demeanour.

When the Northern division of Europe had been

convulsed by the enterprises f Charles X.11. of .Sweden,

the Porte took nooi'iginal art

in thequarrel

but

when, after the defeat of Pultawa, the vanquished hero

soughtrefuge at Bender, the peace of Carlowitz was

summarily broken in behalf of a sovereign hose infe-iority

to his adversary had been exposed before all the

world. Turkey declared war against ussia. It would

be a work of some interest to ascertain how far the

Divan was actually influenced by any considerations

respecting ussian aggrandisement, nd whether, upon

this early occasion, ts deliberations were swayed by the

maxims of more modem policy. That it was not so in-luenc

to any very great extent, we may perhapsinfer from its promptitude in engaging the Czar, and

from thejustification

hich such confidence received on

the Pruth. Peter was there completely iscomfited ;

and although the Swedish king gained nothing in the

end, the advantages obtained by the Turks over the

Russians appeared in 1711 to be quite decisive as to the

comparativetrength of the two parties. By the year

1724, however, the Divan had evidently egun to look


68/245

62 TURKEY.

with jealousy, f not apprehension, pon the growth of

Russia ; and a fresh war was only averted by the good

offices of the French court. Its ambassador, n this occa-ion,

represented o the Porte, remarkably enough, hat

the aggrandisement f Russia could be in no wise injurious

to the Ottoman interests ; but that, n the contrary, it

wouldsupply

a

counterpoise gainstAustria, the natu-al

enemy of Mahometan power. It is said that Peter

the Great bequeathed certain cabinet traditions for

effacing hat he considered to be the humiliating ea-ures

of the treaty of the Pruth ; and it is at any rate

clear, hat when the accession of the Empress Anne in-roduc

fresh spirit nto the Russian councils, an

opportunity as promptly found for renewing hostilities

with the Ottomans. Indeed, the cabinet of St. Peters-

burgh appears to have now almost succeeded to the

imperious carriage f the Porte itself. Although such

was the condition of the country, even twenty years

later, hat one of the most intelligent f French diplo-atists

described it as liable, tany

moment, torelapse

into barbarism, and on that ground disqualified or any

permanent alliances ; yet it already ssumed the airs of

imperial upremacy, even to the length of contesting he

ancient precedence f France. The war from 1735 to

1739, which now ensued, proved the hinging point in

the military ortunes of Turkey. It cannot certainly e


69/245

PETER THE GREAT, AND HIS SUCCESSORS. 63

termed discreditable to the Turks. The Porte, notwith-tanding

that it was actively ngaged in Persia with the

formidable Nadir Shah, still succeeded in showing a

resolute front to Munich in the Crimea, and to the

Count de Wallis on the Danube, and at length drove

the Austrians to a precipitate eace under the walls of

Belgrade.But

thoughthe honour of the Ottoman

arms

was thus far unexpectedly maintained, and though no

advantage was ever gained against them without

a desperate truggle, t was nevertheless demonstrated,

by the results of the campaign, that the rising ower of

Russia had at length reached an equality ith the re-eding

power of Turkey ; nor could it be doubtful with

which the superiority ould rest for the future. The

point had now been reached after which, even if Tur-ey

did not retrograde, et Eussia must continue to

advance, and the distance between them must yearlyincrease. Even the terms of the particular reaty which

followed immediately upon the peace of Belgrade,shoAved the change of relationship etween them. The

territorial arrangements were not greatly o the disad-antage

of the Porte ; but the haughty Ottoman con-escended

to acknowledge n Empress in the Czarina;

and an explicittipulation as introduced for the annul-ent

of all previous conventions, agreements, and con-essions,

and the'recognitionof his treaty as exclusively


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64 TURKEY.

regulating he relations to subsist thereafter between

the contracting owers.

After this,all, excepting he actual conquest of the

Ottoman Empire, might be said to be virtually ver.

In fact, ven the last war had been commenced with

the avowed expectation. f despoiling he Porte of some,

at least,f its

Europeanpossessions, so precipitate adbeen its decline. Turkey was now fairly n the de-cendin

limb of her orbit ; and it seemed easy to calcu-ate

the speed w

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Turkey and Christendom

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