Turkey Watch EU Member States' Perceptions on Turkey's Accession to the EU

7/31/2019 Turkey Watch EU Member States' Perceptions on Turkey's Accession to the EU

1/236


2/236


3/236


4/236


5/236


6/236

1

Turkey Watch: EU Member States Perceptions on Turkeys Accession tothe EU

ISBN:978-605-89751-2-5A publication of the Center for European Studies, Middle East TechnicalUniversity

Any part of this publication may be fully reproduced in any form foreducational or non-profit uses with appropriate acknowledgement. No use ofthis publication may be made for resale or other commercial purposes withoutprior written permission of the Center for European Studies, Middle EastTechnical University, Ankara, Turkey.

SInAN logosu ve Strengthening and Integrating Academic Networks(SInAN)

Publication funded by the Strengthening and Integrating AcademicNetworks(SInAN) project (Grant Contract Nr. TR0604.01-03/092) which isimplemented by the Center for European Studies, Middle East TechnicalUniversity under the Programme Promotion of Civil Society Dialogue betweenthe EU and Turkey: Universities Grant Scheme in coordination with theSecretariat General for EU Affairs. The contracting authority for this project isthe Central Finance and Contracts Unit

The contents and publications of the SInAN project are the sole responsibility ofthe Center for European Studies, Middle East Technical University and can inno way be taken to reflect the views of the European Union.

The opinions expressed herein are only those of the authors and do not reflectany institutional views.

Page and Cover design byYlmaz Alaahan

First Published: November 2009

Printed in Turkey byZeplin letiim Hizmetleri Ltd. ti.6. Cadde 45/2, Birlik Mahallesi, ankaya 06610 Ankara-Turkey

Center for European Studies,FEAS B-Building, Middle East Technical University, 06531, Ankara, Turkey


7/236

2

Acknowledgments

First of all, we are grateful to all our authors of this volume for

putting a lot of effort and time in preparing their contributions. We

would like to thank, Aime Lindenmayer Ay, who worked very

hard to edit and proof read all the chapters in this volume on EU

Member States Perceptions on Turkeys Accession to the EU.

And also, we are thankful to Berat Tapnar, who helped us in

preparing the volume for publication, at the Center for European

Studies, METU.

Last but not least, we are all obliged to our families and friends

who have been there for us in all desperate and stressful times

throughout the project. Thank you all for your patience and

understanding...


8/236

3


9/236

4

ContentsSait Akit, idem stn

Introduction: In Search of an EU-wide Debate on Turkey..........6

Nicolas Monceau

French Perceptions.....................................................................16

Katrin Bttger, Eva-Maria MaggiGerman Perceptions...................................................................32

Yvonne Nasshoven

Belgian Perceptions ................................................................... 46

Emiliano Alessandri with Sebastiano Sali

Italian Perceptions......................................................................58

Eduard Soler i Lecha & Irene Garca

Spanish Perceptions ................................................................... 74

Athanasios C. Kotsiaros

Greek Perceptions......................................................................90

Gunilla Herolf

Swedish Perceptions ................................................................ 104

Cengiz Gnay

Austrian Perceptions................................................................118


10/236

5

Costas Melakopides

Greek Cypriot Perceptions.......................................................132

Petr Kratochvl, David Krl, Dominika Drailov

Czech Perceptions....................................................................150

Adam Szymaski

Polish Perceptions....................................................................166

Iulia Serafimescu, Mihai SebeRomanian Perceptions .............................................................186

Marin Lessenski

Bulgarian Perceptions..............................................................204

zgehan enyuva, Sait Akit

Turkey Seen from the EU: Conclusions ..................................218


11/236

6

Sait Akit, idem stn1

Introduction: In Search of an EU-wide Debateon Turkey

Turkey was accepted as an eligible candidate for EU

membership at the Helsinki Summit in December 1999, and began

her negotiations process for membership in October 2005. This

was a period with very positive developments in the relations

between Turkey and the EU, leading to a series of reform packages

in Turkey with an aim to fulfil the needs and requirements of

Turkeys aspiration of membership. The same period corresponded

to an important era of developments and attempts, first by the

Ecevit government and then by the Gl and Erdoan governments,

to transform Turkeys internal and external policies. At times,these attempts provided serious challenges on very sensitive issues.

Some of the important developments of the period are the

reconsideration of Turkeys foreign policy priorities and attempts

at solving long-standing disputes, such as the problematic relations

with Greece and the question of Cyprus.

Things have changed since the start of the negotiations

process, and the period between 2006 and 2009 has had its ups anddowns; in fact, more downs than ups. This has various reasons.

One of the most expressed criticisms of this period has been the

1 Research Fellows, Center for European Studies, Middle East TechnicalUniversity.The opinions expressed herein are only those of the authors and do not reflect

any institutional views.


12/236

7

assessment that Turkey has not accomplished much since 2006. In

fact, the reform process was argued to have slowed down, and at

times to have come to a halt. On the European Union side, the lackof progress in Turkeys reform process is cited as an important

reason for lack of progress in the negotiations process.

Shortly after the start of the negotiations process, these

claims were coupled with calls, on the EU side, for alternatives to

Turkeys full membership. This corresponded with the change of

leadership, first in Germany and then in France. German

Chancellor Angela Merkel, who came to power in November

2005, strongly advocated a privileged membership of Turkey

rather than full membership. This position was also asserted by

French President Nicolas Sarkozy, who was elected to the French

presidency in May 2007, first during his election campaign and

later during his presidency. The election of the adamantly-opposed

Sarkozy to the presidency meant a turning point in Frances

official position on Turkeys membership to the EU2, and was

followed up by what was perceived in Turkey as an alternative for

full membership: the proposal of the Union for the Mediterranean.

Thus, in Turkey, the picture seems more mixed. First, it is

believed that there is an increasing ambiguity in the messages

given to Turkey by the institutions of the European Union as well

as by the leaders of some EU member states, including Merkel andSarkozy. The proposals for an alternative to membership, plus

political statements and comments on Turkeys sensitive internal

and external policy issues, have reinforced the feeling of

ambiguity; this has led to a commonly held belief that some of the

2

As also put forward by Nicolas Monceau in his chapter for this book.


13/236

8

leaders of EU member states are creating new conditions and

obstacles which are not officially part of the accession negotiations

process, with an aim to keep Turkey out. Indeed, in Turkey it wasexpected that the accession process would not be easy after the EU

membership of the Republic of Cyprus3, whose citizens largely

perceive Turkey as the main party responsible for a lack of

resolution to the Cyprus problem. These concerns proved to be

true, with the unofficial Greek Cypriot blockage of certain chapters

of the negotiations process, and the fears of a train crash in

December 2006. Indeed, Turkeys process of negotiations provedto be more difficult, and the road to membership thornier, than

envisaged. The calls for a privileged partnership, the proposal of

the Union for the Mediterranean, the pressure on the extension of

the protocol of the Ankara agreement to include Cyprus, and the

calls for the opening of air and sea ports to Cyprus are all

strongly perceived in Turkey as trials intended to create new

obstacles or promote an alternative relationship with Turkey.Furthermore, the EUs ongoing debate on Turkeys

Europeanness and repeated questioning of the nature of Turkeys

candidacy only reinforce the myths and prejudices regarding the

EU, in Turkey.

We believe that there are serious, damaging myths and

prejudices in Turkey about the EU, on the one hand, and in the EUmember states about Turkey, on the other. One of the starting

points of the project on Strengthening and Integrating Academic

3 As officially named, the Republic of Cyprus, although accepted by the EU torepresent the whole island in the EU, is not representative of the Turkish CypriotCommunity on the island. The Republic of Cyprus in this volume thereforerefers to the Greek Cypriot administered part of the island, and perceptions in

Cyprus refers to Greek Cypriot perceptions.


14/236

9

Networks (SInAN) was to question the myths and prejudices

embedded in this ambiguous relationship. This edited volume is an

attempt to outline how Turkeys candidacy is perceived bydifferent actors in a number of EU member states. While Turkish

membership to the European Union, its opportunities and

challenges for all parties are widely discussed, it is rather difficult

to find comprehensive analysis that brings together the positions

and arguments of different actors in different countries. In fact, at a

very general level, it is argued that Turkeys accession into the

European Union is one of the most controversial and divisivetopics deeply dividing both the EU governments and their citizens.

Indeed, there is very limited literature on the European perceptions

on Turkeys membership into the EU, and almost none that tries to

tackle all relevant stakeholders, such as the government, the

opposition, the public and the elites, by exploring their views and

examining the media coverage of those views within different

countries.4

This volume is an output of the project on Strengthening

and Integrating Academic Networks (SInAN), funded by the

European Union under the Promotion of Civil Society Dialogue

between the EU and Turkey: Universities Grant Scheme. Turkey

Watch has its origins in the early stages of the SInAN proposal

aiming to follow the example of EU-27 Watch5

, prepared under the

4 One exception to this is the TEPAV-IAI Talking Turkey series; Natalie Tocci(ed.), Talking Turkey in Europe: Towards a Differentiated CommunicationStrategy, Quaderni IAI, December 2008. Also, for some detailed analysis onEuropean public opinion, see Antonia R. Jimnez and Ignacio T. Pay,European Public Opinion and Turkeys Accession: Making Sense of Argument

For or Against, EPIN, European Policy Institutes Network Working Paper no.16, 2007.5

http://www.eu-consent.net/content.asp?contentid=522


15/236

10

EU-CONSENT project which was coordinated by our partner, Jean

Monnet Centre, University of Cologne. With this publication, the

Center for European Studies, Middle East Technical University, asthe main coordinator ofSInAN, intends to question the myths that

characterise the terms of the current debate on Turkeys EU

integration process and to facilitate better knowledge and

understanding of Turkey within the EU and of the EU within

Turkey. Although the envisaged content of the volume has

changed over time, resulting in views from different EU member

states on Turkish candidacy to the EU, the main objectivesremained the same. Turkey Watch addresses one general question,

which is the following: How has Turkeys candidacy been

perceived in EU member states between the years 2006 and 2009?

We asked different experts from the member states to take up the

question, and to give qualitative insights by considering the

perceptions of some of the main actors in their respective

countries: the governments, the opposition parties, the civil societyorganisations and the media.

Different experts provided us with insights on France,

Germany, Belgium, Italy, Spain, Greece, Sweden, Austria,

Republic of Cyprus6, Czech Republic, Poland, Romania, and

Bulgaria. This particular group of EU member states reflects a

number of concerns. First, it represents a wide geographicaldistribution, including member states from southern, northern,

central and eastern Europe. Second, the group includes member

states from each successive enlargement process of the European

Union. Third, it includes core, old, new, small and large member

states. Fourth, it includes EU neighbours of Turkey, and states

6

See footnote 3.


16/236

11

which have good economic relations with Turkey. Fifth, it includes

states which officially have a supportive position for Turkeys bid

for membership, although some show only conditional support,and states which have a negative position on Turkeys

membership. These scholarly attempts to tackle all relevant

stakeholders collectively support our assumption: Although

perceived and long accepted as an elite-driven process, the EU

integration process must take into consideration the perceptions of

different actors for a better understanding of the various

dimensions of Turkeys bid for membership.7

With the various country studies, we have tried to find

answers to the following questions, through a consideration of the

period between 2006 and 2009:

How strong is the debate on Turkey? How informed is the debate on Turkey? What forms the basis of the perceptions of the

different actors?

Are there certain myths and prejudices thatdominate the debate on Turkey in these countries?

What are the reasons and motives in support for oropposition to Turkeys membership?

What are some of the perceived opportunities andchallenges presented by Turkeys membership?

Is there convergence of arguments in favour of oragainst Turkey on a cross-country basis?

Should perceptions on Turkeys membership be7 See zgehan enyuva, Turkey European Union Relations: A Quest for Mass

and Elite Opinion SInAN Newsletter 2, 2009.


17/236

12

considered within a broader context such as that of

future of Europe?

Indeed, comprehensive answers to these questions needfurther exploration. This volume is an endeavour to contribute to

such studies.

Overview of the Book

In his analysis of the French perceptions on Turkeys

accession to the EU, Nicolas Monceau points out that France is

one of the EU members where the public debate on Turkey is the

most intense and controversial. Monceau presents the main factors

that explain the opposition in France, at the elite and the public

level, and looks at whether there are any dividing lines across the

parties and the leaders.

Katrin Bttger and Eva-Maria Maggi argue that there arediverging positions on the question of Turkeys accession in

Germany, and point to different lines of argumentation which raise

a comprehensive list of questions. Yvonne Nasshoven, on the other

hand, spotlights a limited debate on Turkeys candidacy in

Belgium, due largely to its internal difficulties. However, the

Belgian stance deserves exploration due to the countrys large

Turkish population, and the fact that Belgian Prime MinisterHermann von Rompuy is to take the office of the President of the

European Council for two and a half years, between 2009 and

2012.

Emiliano Alessandris contribution, with Sebastiano Sali,

on Italian perceptions is particularly interesting, as Italy is one of

Turkeys strongest supporters when it comes to integration into the


18/236

13

EU. As such, the perceptions of different actors and the inter-

linkages between them remain interesting issues to be explored.

Similar to Italy, Spain is one of the most supportive states ofTurkeys entry into the EU. Eduard Soler i Lecha and Irene Garca

evaluate the Spanish position, and question whether this official

support is reflected at different levels. Athanasios C. Kotsiaros, on

the other hand, points to a supportive but reluctant position in

Greece, in his evaluation of the elements of support and opposition

to Turkeys accession. Swedish contributor Gunilla Herolf draws a

picture of conditional support for Turkeys membership, revealingthat her countrys interest largely lies in Turkeys reform process.

Alongside Germany and France, Austria and the

Republic of Cyprus can be counted among the most ardent

opponents of Turkeys accession to the European Union. Cengiz

Gnay discusses various elements and concerns with respect to the

Austrian opposition, and links these to concerns in Austria which

go beyond the simple debate on Turkey. Costas Melakopides

evaluation of the Greek Cypriot perceptions raises very

controversial points and issues for Turkey, and shows how

prejudicial a community, the Greek Cypriot community, can be in

this particular issue

The debate on Turkeys candidacy is more limited in

some of the new members of the EU, as expressed by differentexperts. The Czech contribution by Petr Kratochvl, David Krl

and Dominika Drailov, and the Polish contribution by Adam

Szymaski both point to the limited nature of debate, while

questioning the determinants of support and opposition for

Turkeys membership. Iulia Serafimescu and Mihai Sebe, on the

other hand, take up the question for Romania by largely


19/236

14

concentrating on regional factors. Bulgaria is a most interesting

case, given the large Turkish minority in the country and the

political role it has played since the early 1990s. In this finalcontribution, Marin Lessenski looks at the factors that inform and

influence the Bulgarian perception, by concentrating on the images

created by the Turkish minority, the bilateral relations, and the

historical and cultural context that has shaped the relations

between the two neighbouring countries.


20/236

15


21/236

16

Nicolas Monceau*

French Perceptions

Abstract

France is one of the European countries in which the

issue of Turkeys accession to the EU has sparked off the most

intense public debate, often controversial in tone, during recentyears. This may initially seem surprising, insofar as for centuries

Turkey and France have shared close ties in many historical,

political and economic areas. This report first draws the evolution

of the French public opinion dealing with Turkeys accession to

the EU in the past years. It presents the main factors political,

economic, cultural and social explaining French majority

opposition, both in the elites and the public. Then the reportfocuses on the political field in France, underlining the strong

divide between French political parties and leaders facing Turkeys

accession to the EU. It shows how French political perceptions of

Turkeys accession to the EU are linked to different conceptions of

Europe and presents the evolution of Frances official position on

Turkeys membership to the EU since the election of Nicolas

Sarkozy as French President in 2007. The report concludes with

the role of the French media in launching a public debate in France

on Turkeys accession to the EU.

* The opinions expressed herein are only those of the author and do not reflect



22/236

17

Introduction

France is one of the European countries in which the

issue of Turkeys accession to the EU has sparked off the most

intense public debate, often controversial in tone, during recent

years. This may initially seem surprising, insofar as for centuries

Turkey and France have shared close ties in many historical,

political and economic areas.

Three main steps can be identified in the development of

French perceptions about Turkeys accession to the EU. First ofall, the year 2002 marks a milestone in the media coverage of the

Turkish issue in France. In November 2002, Valry Giscard

d'Estaing, then chairman of the Convention on the future of

Europe, launched the debate in France on the subject of Turkeys

Europeanness, asserting that as Turkey is not located in Europe,

its accession would mark the end of the EU. In the same month,

the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi, or

AKP)'s victory in Turkeys general elections led to the formation

of a new government described by the French media as moderate

Islamist. In 2004 and 2005, Turkeys application came under

debate as a political issue during the French campaign for the

European elections, followed in May 2005 by the referendum on

the European Constitution and the membership negotiationsbetween Turkey and the EU begun in October. Finally, in 2007,

the election of Nicolas Sarkozy as French President marks a


23/236

18

turning point in Frances official stance towards Turkeys

accession to the EU1.

A Majority of French Citizens Against Turkeys Accession to

the EU

Most of the opinion polls tend to show the same findings:

at the European level, France, along with Germany, Austria and

Greece, demonstrates the strongest popular opposition to Turkeysaccession to the EU. According to the Eurobarometer2, a majority

of French citizens expressed reservations about the prospect of

Turkey joining the EU. In autumn 2006, 69% of French citizens

interviewed were opposed to Turkey becoming a member of the

EU in the future, while 22% expressed the opposite view3. Other

international public opinion surveys, such as the Transatlantic

Trends, confirm the same tendencies.

French opposition appears stable over time, even tending

to increase in recent years: varying from 64% to 69% between

spring 2002 and autumn 2006, and reaching 71% in spring 2008.

During the same period, the proportion of positive opinion also

increases, but only slightly (from 19% to 22%). The decrease of

No opinion since 2002 is also an indicator of the impact of the

1 Bruno Cautrs et Nicolas Monceau, La Tentation du refus ? Europens,Franais et Turcs face ladhsion de la Turquie lUnion europenne, Paris,Presses de Sciences Po, 2010.2 When another source is not mentioned, all the percentages quoted in the reportare from the Eurobarometers.3Eurobaromtre 66. Lopinion publique dans lUnion europenne. Automne

2006. Rapport national France, Brussels, january 2007.


24/236

19

public debate about the Turkish issue on the shaping of public

opinion.

French opposition to Turkeys full accession to the EU

can be viewed within the more general opposition to EU

enlargement expressed in recent years. In spring 2007, 60% of

French respondents are opposed to the EU enlargement while 32%

expressed the opposite view4. In national opinion polls carried out

by IFOP in December 2002, June 2003, and in June and September

2004, between 56% and 61% of French respondents expressed

negative opinions concerning Turkeys accession to the EU5.

What are the main factors explaining French majority

opposition to Turkey's accession to the EU? The political,

economic, cultural and migratory dimensions of Turkish-European

relations play an important role in French perceptions of Turkish

membership to the EU. In autumn 2006, economic and political

conditionality is supported by a large majority of French

respondents, particularly in the issue of human rights. Fears of

encouraging immigration from Turkey are also widely shared by

the French. Last but not least, cultural non-compatibility, an

argument often raised in the debates about Turkeys

Europeanness, features among the main concerns of the French.

In June 2008, Turkey's accession to the EU appeared notto represent a priority in the opinions of French citizens or leaders.

4Eurobaromtre 67. Lopinion publique dans lUnion europenne. Printemps2007. Rapport national France, Brussels, july 2007.5 The main resultats of these surveys are available on the Website of IFOP(www.ifop.com), in particular the following : Les Europens et la Turquie,survey carried out by IFOP in December 2004 in five European countries

(France, Germany, England, Italy and Spain).


25/236

20

Indeed, Turkeys potential accession to the EU was ranked in

thirteenth position among the three topics of most concern to the

French (with 6% of respondents), while no leader interviewedexpressed concern about this issue. Similarly, as a matter of

foreign policy, Turkish membership was ranked respectively at

sixth and fourth place among the concerns of the population (14%

of respondents) and of the elite (13%). Finally, Turkeys potential

accession to the EU was not regarded by the French as one of the

two priority topics to be handled by President Sarkozy during the

French Presidency of the EU in 20086.

Both the French population and the elite adopt similar

positions, which translate as a majority opposition to Turkey

joining the EU. In June 2008, 62% and 63% of respondents from

the general public and among the "Top Leaders" do not support

Turkeys accession to the EU, of which 36% not at all among the

general public. In contrast, 35% and 37% were in favour, of which6% very favourable, among the citizens and leaders interviewed.

An analysis based on social categories reveals significant

variations. Older generations are more reluctant to accept Turkey's

membership than the new ones. Indeed, opposition to Turkey's

accession appears higher, the older the population. Similarly,

political orientations seem to play a significant role in the French

perception of Turkey's application. The supporters of SgolneRoyal in the 1st round of the 2007 presidential election are more

likely to favour Turkeys accession (54%) than those who voted

for Franois Bayrou (36%) or Nicolas Sarkozy (21%). However,

6 Survey on the image of Turkey in France, commissioned by the TurkishEmbassy in Paris and carried out in June 2008 by OpinionWay, to a

representative sample of the population and a panel of French leaders.


26/236

21

these results merit explanation, insofar as nearly half of all French

citizens surveyed (42%), who in June 2008 declared themselves

opposed to Turkeys accession (that is, 62% of the sample), wouldnevertheless be in favour of Turkeys membership to the EU in the

future if it meets all the criteria (legal, economic and political) as

defined by the European Council. The same goes for 25% of

leaders surveyed who expressed their opposition in 2008. We

observe here again that time plays an important role in the

perception of Turkey's application. Among the reasons for

opposition to Turkeys accession to the EU: Turkey is notconsidered to be a European country either geographically or

culturally for 48% of citizens and 74% of the leaders interviewed.

Political and legal arguments prevail for the general public -

Turkey will never be a truly secular country (19%) or a true

democracy (14%) while the elite place emphasis on Turkeys

over-preponderance in the EU owing to its population (13%).

French popular perception of Turkey also throws light on

the respective places of these arguments in the national

imagination. For the majority of respondents, Turkey is a country

with a rich history (84% of citizens and 100% of leaders). It is also

perceived as a young country, culturally vibrant, turned towards

the future and economically dynamic. Nearly half of the people

and one third of the elite polled believe ultimately that Turkey canmake an important contribution to Europe. But Turkey is

considered by only a minority of respondents to be democratic

(38% of residents and 32% of leaders), secular (37% and 55%) and

respectful of human rights (27% and 10% of positive opinions). In

conclusion, other findings show that the French public has limited

knowledge of Turkey as a country, its history, culture, political


27/236

22

system and economic and social realities. A Turkish Season

launched in France between July 2009 and March 2010 should

encourage citizens to gain more insight into this country.

In 2009, French perceptions of Turkeys EU candidacy

seem to be evolving more positively. After President Obamas

statement in favour of Turkey's accession to the EU at the EU-

United States summit in Prague in April 2009, 50% of French

citizens interviewed said that they were against and 35% in favour.

Supporters of the Centre-Right Democratic Movement expressed a

majority of negative opinions to Turkish accession (71%),

followed by right-wing (67%) and left-wing supporters (41%).

Among the French respondents in favour of Turkeys accession,

49% are left-wing supporters, 21% are MoDem sympathizers and

19% from the right. These results reflect an increase in the French

support of Turkeys accession to the EU in comparison to previous

opinion polls. In June 2005, a survey on the same topic obtainedresults of 66% against, 28% in favour and 6% no opinion.

Finally, the French viewpoint on Turkeys accession to

the EU can also be explained by additional factors not regularly

gauged by opinion surveys. The role of secularism in French

society is certainly a factor to take into consideration and in

particular the impact of public debates raised in the past about thewearing of Islamic headscarves in public. In 2004, a law adopted

according to the recommendations of the Stasi commission

banned religious symbols in French state schools. Such debates are

likely to have an influence on French public opinion towards

Turkeys application, which is seen as a Muslim country where

issues of secularism and religion in the public domain are regularly


28/236

23

discussed. Frances perception of the Islamic religion, due to its

colonial past (especially in North Africa), plus the importance

given to the devoir de mmoire (duty of remembrance), whichled France to officially recognize the Armenian genocide in 2001,

are also significant factors which may explain French views on

Turkeys accession to the EU.

A (Strong) Divide Between Political Parties and Leaders

In the political field, French perceptions of Turkeys

accession to the EU have created a split within French political

parties and leaders since the early 2000s. Turkeys application for

full membership to the EU has gone beyond national political

divisions, resulting in opposition from both right and left. The

table below shows the - positive or negative - stances of the main

French political parties, and of their leaders, towards Turkey'saccession to the EU.

In favour Against

Nationalist parties

National Front Jean-Marie Le Pen

Conservative parties

Union for a PopularMovement (UMP)

Jacques Chirac, PierreLellouche

Nicolas Sarkozy, AlainJupp, Jean-PierreRaffarin, Jean-FranoisCop

Movement for France(MPF)

Philippe de Villiers

Hunt, Fish, Nature,Traditions (CPNT)

Frdric Nihous


29/236

24

Arise the Republic Nicolas Dupont-Aignan

Centrist parties

Democratic Movement(MoDem - formerlyUnion for FrenchDemocracy)

Franois Bayrou,Valry GiscarddEstaing, Jean-LouisBourlanges

New Center (NC) Herv Morin

Green parties

The Greens Dominique Voynet,Daniel Cohn-Bendit

Parliamentary leftparties

Socialist Party (PS) Michel Rocard, PierreMoscovici, DominiqueStrauss-Kahn,Sgolne Royal,Martine Aubry

Laurent Fabius, HubertVdrine, RobertBadinter, Max Gallo

French Communist Party Marie-Georges Buffet

Far-left parties

RevolutionaryCommunist League, NewAnticapitalist Party(NPA)

Olivier Besancenot

Workers Struggle (LO) Arlette Laguiller

Nationalist, right-wing and centrist parties are mostly

against Turkey's accession to the EU, while the far-left and left-

wing parties seem to be more divided. The Greens and the French

Communist Party support Turkeys accession to the EU within the

framework of the conditions set up by the Copenhagen criteria.

The geographical, cultural and religious arguments are more

favoured by the right-wing parties while the political conditionality


30/236

25

(respect for human rights and minorities) - and the Armenian issue

for the Socialist Party - are underlined by the left-wing parties.

Valry Giscard d'Estaing was one of the first French politicalleaders to reject Turkey's accession to the EU on geographical

grounds. In November 2002, in an interview published by Le

Monde that provoked a vigorous public debate in France about

Turkey, he stated : Turkey is a country with close ties to Europe,

an important country with a real elite, but it is not a European

country. (...) Its capital is not within Europe, 95% of its population

is outside of Europe: this is not a European country. The culturaland religious arguments, which focus on the threat of a conflict of

civilizations between Islamic and Western cultures and values,

were also often cited by many right-wing and centrist political

leaders, such as Franois Bayrou, chairman of the Democratic

Movement, or Jean-Pierre Raffarin, former Prime Minister in

2002-2005.

Beyond the divide between left and right sides, the issue

of Turkey's accession to the EU has also created divisions within

French leading political parties and the government. Within the

Gaullist movement, former President Jacques Chirac has supported

Turkeys "European vocation" for years. He played an important

role in supporting Turkeys application on the European scene, in

particular in the decision of the Helsinki European Council inDecember 1999 to grant the status of candidate country to Turkey.

However, in October 2004, President Chirac stated that he wished

to submit any further EU enlargement to a compulsory

referendum, so hoping to dissociate the Turkish issue and the

debate on the European Constitution. In this way, the French

would be consulted by referendum on Turkey's accession to the


31/236

26

EU. The issue of a compulsory referendum about Turkeys

accession to the EU was raised again in summer 2008 on the

occasion of the debate about the revision of the FrenchConstitution. While the abolition of a compulsory referendum for

the ratification of any new accession to the EU was considered,

MPs voted for a provision rendering a referendum compulsory for

EU accession of countries whose population represents more than

5% of the total EU population, which is true in Turkeys case. In

the end, the French Senate decided to cancel the provision.

In the years 2002-2007, President Chiracs support for

Turkeys application to the EU appears to have been at odds with

the presidential party stand (UMP) and the parliamentary majority.

During the campaign for European Parliament elections, Turkeys

application was used as a major campaign argument by some

political parties. In April 2004, the UMP and its then chairman

Alain Jupp distanced itself from Jacques Chirac and stated itsopposition to Turkey's accession to the EU. The presidential party

formulated a "privileged partnership" with Turkey as an alternative

to full membership. This kind of partnership has been promoted in

Europe, especially in French and German public debates in recent

years. It aims to maintain the cohesion of the EU while ensuring

the stability of its borders.

The election of Nicolas Sarkozy as French President on 6

May 2007, inaugurated a turning point in France's official position

on Turkeys membership to the EU. Throughout the presidential

campaign, particularly during the debate between the two

candidates Sgolne Royal and Nicolas Sarkozy, the latter

reasserted his opposition to Turkeys accession in the event of his


32/236

27

election. Quoting geographical arguments - "Turkey is Asia

Minor" - he proposed an alternative in the form of a Union for the

Mediterranean, which was officially launched in Paris in July 2008with the participation of Turkish Prime Minister Recep T.

Erdogan. In reaction to the support given by U.S. President Barack

Obama to Turkeys accession to the EU at the EU-United States

Summit in Prague in April 2009, President Sarkozy reiterated his

opposition to this prospect.

Beyond the left-right division, positions on Turkey differ

along with the visions of the future of the EU. Indeed, Turkey's

candidacy goes beyond the partisan opposition to bring together,

on both sides, those who defend the idea of a European power. The

latter, Laurent Fabius and Franois Bayrou among them, oppose

the entry of Turkey into the EU on the pretext that it would

severely threaten the political construction of Europe. On the other

hand, Turkey's application is championed by both the right and theleft for geopolitical reasons. In this way, Pierre Lellouche, one of

the few representatives of the UMP to support Turkey's accession

to the EU who was appointed as Secretary of State for European

Affairs in June 2009, and Dominique Strauss-Kahn for the PS

concur in their analysis of the geopolitical significance of Turkey

in Europe. Turkey's candidacy also raises objections within the

current French government. President Sarkozys opinions are notshared by a number of ministers, such as the minister of Foreign

Affairs, the socialist Bernard Kouchner, and the Secretary of State

for European Affairs from 2007 to December 2008, Jean-Pierre

Jouyet, who have both reiterated their support for Turkey's

accession to the EU.


33/236

28

If nowadays right-wing and centrist parties are mostly

opposed to Turkeys membership of the EU, the Socialist Party

seems to be more divided on the issue. In recent years, the PS hasprovided a measured support to Turkeys accession in the long run,

and its status of candidate country was recognised by the European

Council in 1999 when Lionel Jospin was Prime Minister.

However, the Turkish issue raises significant opposition within the

party. Some of its members, such as Laurent Fabius, Hubert

Vdrine or Robert Badinter, are openly opposed to Turkeys

accession for a variety of reasons. Others are more supportive ofthe prospect, such as Dominique Strauss-Kahn, currently director

of the IMF, or Pierre Moscovici, former minister of European

affairs and PS national secretary for international relations, who is

in favour of a "reasoned yes" to Turkey's accession if it meets the

Copenhagen criteria. Out of all the French Socialist leaders,

Michel Rocard, former Prime Minister, has shown the most

support for the Turkish candidacy in recent years. He participatedin an Independent Commission on Turkey, which in September

2004 issued a report supporting the opening of accession

negotiations with the EU if Turkey fulfilled the Copenhagen

political criteria. Similarly, Rocard has engaged in public debate

on numerous occasions for Turkeys accession to the EU,

defending his views in the book Yes to Turkey, published in

September 2008. Sgolne Royal has long declared that the issue

of Turkeys membership should be left to the French people to

decide. During the 2007 presidential campaign, she then claimed

that she was in favour of Turkeys accession on principle but that

the EU needed to put the procedure on hold. Finally, several

leading politicians from both left and right who previously

supported Turkeys membership, have also changed their minds


34/236

29

about Turkeys accession to the UE, including Alain Jupp, former

Prime Minister, Michel Barnier, former Minister of Foreign

Affairs and more recently Bernard Kouchner.

In Spring 2009, the Turkish issue came back strongly into

the French political arena on the occasion of the campaign for the

European elections. President Sarkozy played a major role in

making Turkeys accession to the EU a major issue in the

European elections. He stated his opposition to Turkeys accession

to the EU, both in a speech at a UMP meeting in Nmes in May

and during a joint declaration with the chancellor of Germany,

Angela Merkel, in Berlin on 10 May 2009. Sarkozys stance

provoked a number of reactions within the EU, in particular from

European countries whose governments support Turkeys

membership to the EU, such as Poland, Portugal or Sweden.

As regards the French media, in particular radio and

television, one may say that they do not have a specific stand

concerning Turkeys accession to the EU. In recent years, the

national press has mostly broadcasted the positions held by the

opinion leaders, such as the academics or the politicians, especially

in specific sections such as Opinions (inLe Monde orLe Figaro)

or Rebonds (Libration). For instance, Le Monde played an

important role in launching a public debate in France when itheadlined on the front page the interview with Giscard dEstaing in

November 2002, which was then followed with many reactions in

the same sections.


35/236

30

Conclusion

In conclusion, French perceptions of Turkeys accession

to the EU have shown a stable and majority opposition, both in the

public and the elites, for the last years. However, some recent

opinion polls may give a more optimistic view of French

perceptions, when more citizens answer that they agree with

Turkeys membership to the EU in the future if it fulfills the

required criteria. In parallel, French perceptions have revealed the

great divide among EU countries in the face of Turkeys accession

to the EU. Sarkozys stance during the campaign for the European

elections in 2009 has not been followed by many national

governments within the EU. In this prospect, the evolution of

French perceptions in the coming years will also be linked to the

place and influence of France within Europe.


36/236

31


37/236

32

Katrin Bttger, Eva-Maria Maggi*

German Perceptions

Introduction

When analyzing the German perception of Turkish

candidacy for EU-membership, diverging positions can be

observed in the media, in the government and opposition parties as

well as in civil society. These diverging arguments mostly follow

the lines of three subjects with opposing positions that are

advanced to different degrees by the actors. The first subject is the

question of identity. Here, the two extremes are the following: On

the one side stands the argument that the relationship between a

Christian European Union and a Muslim Turkey is that of a Clashof Civilizations, while on the other side, humanitarian thinking is

the reference point and being advocated at the same time. The

second subject by which the perception of Turkish EU-

membership is pervaded concerns institutional (in)stability. Here,

arguments concern either the EUs outdated internal structure or

the Turkish political system. While some argue that Turkey is not

ready for accession, other actors stress the fact that Turkey will notenter the EU before it is ready and fulfils the necessary criteria

* Dr. des. Katrin Bttger is Research Associate at the Institut fr EuropischePolitik, Berlin; Eva-Maria Maggi is Ph.D candidate at the Helmut-SchmidtUniversity Hamburg. The article results form the IEP-Programme DialogueEurope of the Otto Wolff-Foundation.*The opinions expressed herein are only those of the author and do not reflect



38/236

33

anyway. A third line of argumentation deals with strategic

geopolitics and security. Here, one side argues that a Turkish EU-

membership would bring the conflicts of Iraq, Iran andAfghanistan closer too close to the EU, while the other side

sees Turkey as a buffer or even a bridge between Europe and the

Arab world.

It has to be noted however, that not all actors promoting

or opposing Turkish EU membership make use of all the

arguments systematized above.

By the Media

Some parts of the German media have been constantly

engaged with the Turkish EU accession process during the last

years. The nature of this engagement has changed recently,

whereas the main attitude towards Turkeys accession stays

divided. Other print media, TV and radio stations remain notably

quiet. Instead, the integration of Turkish immigrants in Germany is

a steady topic.

Along the lines of their political (party) orientation,

German newspapers are divided into a group of accession

supporters on the one side and critics on the other. The mostly

conservative newspapers Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ)

and Die Welt have analyzed the accession process quite sceptically

and would rather prefer an alternative affiliation of Turkey, such as

the privileged partnership proposed by the Christian Democratic

Party (CDU) in 2004. Their arguments emphasize the differences

between Turkey and the European Union drawing upon cultural


39/236

34

heritages, identities and history.1 In contrast to this, the more

liberal/left-leaning newspapers like the Sddeutsche Zeitung (SZ)

and the Frankfurter Rundschau have generally assessed Turkeysambitions to join the EU positively, dependent on the speed of the

reform-process initiated by the Turkish government to fulfil the

accession criteria. Other newspapers, like the left-leaning

Tageszeitung or the tabloid Bild do not present the issue as a

central topic.

Rather, domestic questions like the integration of Turkish

immigrants in Germany are emphasized.

Interestingly, the argumentative nature of the main

newspapers has moved away from a concentration on the domestic

political situation in Turkey towards a closer look at the future and

identity of the EU project itself. Especially during the last year,

Turkish EU membership aspirations and EU internal processes like

the establishing of the new Lisbon Treaty were combined in

commentaries.2 Using the accession negotiations with Turkey as an

example, commentators argue pro and con over an effective EU

enlargement policy that has to be linked to the debate on European

identity. Even though the main protagonists, the FAZ and the SZ,

keep their basic opinions to the EU membership of Turkey, their

1 Wimmel, A. (2006) Beyond the Bosphorus? Comparing German, French andBritish Discourses on Turkeys Application to Join the European Union, ReihePolitikwissenschaft/Political Science Series, No. 111,http://www.ihs.ac.at/publications/pol/pw_111.pdf, see also Welt am Sonntag(2008) EU-Beitritt der Trkei: Entspannt euch!, 25 May 2008, p. 31; PeterGraf Kielmansegg (2009) Europa braucht Grenzen, in: FAZ, 27 May 2009, p.7.2 Peter Graf Kielmansegg (2009) Europa braucht Grenzen, in: FAZ, 27 May2009, p. 7.; SZ (2009) Insel gegen Kontinent 30 July 2009, p. 4; Welt am

Sonntag (2008) EU-Beitritt der Trkei: Entspannt euch!, 25 May 2008, p. 31.


40/236

35

argumentations are linked to internal affairs of the EU rather than

treating both issues separately. The FAZ, for example, commented

on Turkeys disagreement with Anders Fogh Rasmussen as NATOgeneral secretary, as an example of a conflict of civilizations

which could be enhanced with Turkey as a member of the EU

system, where blackmailing often works and identity plays an

important role in daily political life.3 Also, the SZ claims that the

problematic signing procedure of the Lisbon Treaty shows the

need to combine the future of enlargement policy with the debate

on European identity. The will of the accession candidates tocontribute to the European Integration process should be an

accession criterion for future enlargements and for Turkeys

accession.4

Taking into consideration all types of media, the debate

mainly remained an issue within the print media. In general,

reports of other media, like TV stations, concentrate on negativeconnotations of Islam.5 The picture drawn emphasizes cultural

differences and the reports concentrated on rather negative

examples of social integration.6

German media perceive Turkeys ambitions to join the

EU differentiated. While the conservative press advocates a

sceptical approach, the liberal orientated newspapers are rathersupportive. Accompanied by the mostly negative reporting on

Islam within the broader media, it can be said that in general the

3 FAZ (2009) Schne Partner, 5 April 2009, p. 14.4 SZ (2009) Insel gegen Kontinent 30 July 2009, p. 4.5 Kai Hafez/Carola Richter (2007) Das Islambild von ARD und ZDF, in: ApuZ26-27/2007, pp. 40-46.6 Grsel Gr (2005) Das Trkeibild der deutschen Presse, in: Brger im Staat

3/2005, pp. 122-129.


41/236

36

German media shows little optimism concerning a successful EU

accession of Turkey.

By the Government and the Opposition

Since there has been a general election in Germany on 27

September 2009 and it is foreseeable that a new government will

be formed shortly, the following section will firstly deal with the

positions of the government of 2005-2009 and the opinions of thetwo parties therein. Secondly, the individual positions of the three

smaller parties in parliament (Bundestag) in opposition between

2005 and 2009 will be outlined. In a third step, the opinions

voiced during the coalition negotiations in the Fall of 2009 will be

mentioned.

The government of chancellor Angela Merkel comprises

the two largest parties in Germany, namely the conservative

Christian Democratic Party (CDU) and the Social Democratic

Party (SPD).

These two governing parties hold diverging positions in

the grand coalition concerning Turkish candidacy for EU-

membership. While the CDU wants a privileged partnership, the

SPD advocates EU-membership. The CDU argues along the linesof EU-internal and identity reasons, whereas the SPD is of the

opinion that membership can stabilize Turkish democracy and thus

refute the argument that we are heading for a Clash of

Civilizations.


42/236

37

The Coalition contract7 of 2005 foresees that if the EU is

not able to absorb another member or if Turkey is not able to fulfil

all criteria related to membership, then Turkey has to be bound toEurope as closely as possible and in a way that allows for its

privileged relations to develop. The contract thus comprises both

of the institutional arguments, namely the question of the EUs

internal structures as well as that of the Turkish political system. It

does not give an opinion, however on what should happen if both

prerequisites are met, but only maps out further steps for a

situation in which one or the other or both conditions are notfulfilled.

Concerning the election campaign for the European

Parliament, further enlargements of the EU were not an important

subject. There was, however, a mentioning of the subject in the

manifestoes.

In their manifesto8 for the elections of the European

Parliament, the conservatives (CDU) based their advocating a

privileged partnership on a more general support of a consolidation

phase and a slowing down of all enlargement processes, since they

give priority to the stabilizing of the European identity and the

EUs institutions. Already in 2000, in its updated programme,9 the

CDU stressed the fact that the question of where the borders ofEurope lie should be answered before it reaches the borders of Iraq

and Iran. It is thus using an argument of fear of the conflicts of the

7 CDU/CSU/SPD (2005) Gemeinsam fr Deutschland. Mit Mut undMenschlichkeit, 11 November 2005, Berlin.8 CDU (2009) Starkes Europa Sichere Zukunft, 16 March 2009, Berlin.9 CDU-Bundesvorstand (2000) Programmatische Offensive fr Deutschland.

Norderstedter Erklrung, 7/8 January 2000, Norderstedt.


43/236

38

Arab world rather than seeing future membership as a bridge or a

buffer between Europe and countries like Iraq or Iran. In its

electoral programme for post-2009,10

the CDU stresses the factthat Turkey does not fulfil the prerequisites for EU-membership,

such as equal rights, the protection of minorities or freedom of

religion. For that reason they support a privileged partnership

instead of EU-membership for Turkey.

In addition, the CDUs Bavarian partner CSU supports

referenda to decide on new EU-members.11 The same opinion has

been voiced by Chancellor Merkel. At a meeting of young

conservatives in May 2009, she stressed the fact that there is no

sense in repeated enlargements if these make it impossible to

handle the EU.12 She thus pointed once more to the inadequate

EU-internal structure for further enlargements. Her statements are

backed by another large member of the EU, namely France, which

also opposes a Turkish EU-membership. The German-TurkishForum, a small organisation within the CDU with 400 members

that aims at bringing People of Turkish descent and the CDU

closer together, advocates Turkish EU-membership.13 It especially

opposes arguments aiming for differing and incompatible values.

They see only a minority of CDU members following this

argument, while a majority refers to the countrys size and the

EUs limited absorption capacity. The German-Turkish Forum

10 CDU/CSU (2009) Wir haben die Kraft. Gemeinsam fr unser Land.Regierungsprogramm 2009-2013, 28. June 2009, Berlin.11 CSU (2009) Wahlaufruf der Christlich-Sozialen Union zur Bundestagswahl2009. Was unser Land jetzt braucht: Eine starke CSU in Berlin, 17/18 June2009, Nuremberg.12 Cf. Turkey shocked by Franco-German Rhetoric, in: EurActiv.com, 11 May2009.13

Cf. Deutsch-Trkisches Forum der CDU, http://www.dtf-online.de.


44/236

39

argues in particular that if these two cultures were incompatible

that an integration of people of Turkish descent into German

society would make any efforts for integrating these into Germansociety useless. Its goals are being counter-acted by discussions

such as the one following a controversial speech by the Turkish

Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Cologne in February

2008 to the Turkish community in Germany, dealing with their

assimilation. In the wake of this speech, the CSU called for

suspending accession negotiations with Turkey.14 What would a

so-called privileged partnership actually look like? A policy paperof the CSU affiliated Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung that was authored by

the now Minister of Economics, Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg maps

out possible alternatives to a full-fledged membership.15 The

policy paper is based on the assumption that Turkish membership

would overwhelm the European Union and that alternatives have

to be found. It especially stresses the point that not all four

freedoms can be opened to Turkey. While it sees no problems in adeep economic cooperation, restrictions to free movement of

persons and free movement of services, as well as a monetary

union and large-scale financial support in the form of direct

payments to the agricultural sector or in Structural and Cohesion

Policy are foreseen.

14 FAZ (2008) Sder fordert einfrieren der Beitrittsverhandlungen, 15 February2008; see also Barbara Lippert (2008) Wait-and-See. Attitudes of GermanStakeholders Towards EU-Turkey, in: Nathalie Tocci (ed.) Talking Turkey inEurope: Towards a Differentiated Communication Strategy, Rome, pp. 135-160, here p. 145.15 Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg (2004) Die Beziehungen zwischen der Trkeiund der EU eine Privilegierte Partnerschaft, Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung:

Aktuelle Analysen 33.


45/236

40

The Social Democrats, on the other hand, support Turkish

EU-membership if Turkey fulfils all the necessary criteria. They

stress the fact that a Turkey which is committed to Europeanvalues can build a bridge to other Muslim countries, an asset which

lies in the interest of Germany and Europe. In March 2009, the

German foreign minister, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, stressed the

fact that it is enlargement that is being negotiated with Turkey and

nothing else.16 Concerning referenda, he underlined that those do

not exist in Germany on a national level. He thinks it is thus not

politically correct to hold a referendum on this subject or anyother. He said that it is a question of credibility to fulfil existing

obligations concerning Turkish and Balkan membership

perspectives. He does not deny the fact, however, that internal

reforms are necessary to proceed.

Between the two largest parties, a different approach on

causes and effects in these fields can be observed. While the CDUstresses the causes and assumes that the lack of internal and

external reforms is the cause for alternative measures other than

enlargement, the SPD stresses the effect, namely membership as

being able to result in stability and peace in the region.

Of the opposition by the three smaller parties, the Green

Party supports serious accession negotiations with Turkey tosupport the countries democratic and economic transformation. It

assumes that Turkish EU-Membership is in the EUs own interest,

since it can be a stabilizing anchor in the region.17

16 Frank-Walter Steinmeier, interview with Hrriyet, 21 March 2009.17 Bndnis 90/Die Grnen (2009) Volles Programm mit WUMS! Fr ein

besseres Europa, 23-25 January 2009, Dortmund, p. 150.


46/236

41

The liberal Federal Democrats (FDP) see the Lisbon

treaty, or an equivalent, as a prerequisite for further enlargement.

Cautiously, they stress the point that Turkish accession is not onthe agenda in the next five years anyway.18 They see the key for

accession in the implementation of reforms and the absorption

capacity of the EU. Party leader Guido Westerwelle said in an

interview in May 2009 that Turkey has a right to expect Europe

not to deny EU-membership categorically. As has been agreed, a

possible accession has to be considered unprejudiced. He considers

calling off the process as demanded by the CSU would be the endof a prudent foreign policy19. However, he does not think an

accession is possible on a short timescale. His main focus is on

reforms in Turkey: The country has to show that it is on the right

path in terms of rule of law, society, democracy and economy.

In its party documents, The Left (Die Linke) does not

deal with enlargement in general or Turkey in particular.20

Yet, inFebruary 2008, their deputy party leader Katina Schubert stressed

the fact that Turkey belongs in the EU if it fulfils the Copenhagen

criteria.21

For the coalition consultations between the CDU, CSU

and FDP following the elections on 27 September 2009, the

18 FDP (2009) Ein Europa der Freiheit in der Welt des 21. Jahrhunderts.Programm der Freien Demokratischen Partei fr die Wahl zum VII.Europischen Parlament 2009, 17 January 2009, Berlin, p. 4.19 Guido Westerwelle, interview with Der Spiegel, 4 May 2009.20 Die Linke (2009) Solidaritt, Demokratie, Frieden Gemeinsam fr denWechsel in Europa! Europawahlprogramm 2009 der Partei DIE LINKE, 28February 2009, Essen; idem (2009) Konsequent sozial. Fr Demokratie undFrieden. Bundestagswahlprogramm 2009, 20/21 June 2009, Berlin.21 Katina Schubert (2008) Europisierung ist Perspektive gegen Nationalismus,

press release, 13 February 2008.


47/236

42

question of Turkish EU accession is a conflictive, albeit not a

central, subject. While the spirit within the FDP leans towards

agreeing with Turkish EU-membership, the CDU continues toadvocate a privileged partnership.22 It will be interesting to see

whether the FDP will change its opinion, converging towards the

CDUs and CSUs point of view. The subject led to a conflict

between CSUs Horst Seehofer, who wants to include a No

concerning Turkish EU-membership in the coalition contract, and

FDP party leader Guido Westerwelle who opposes this idea on the

basis that the subject will not become relevant during the newgovernments four-year term in office.23 Since the foreign ministry

combined with the position of deputy chancellor traditionally goes

to the coalition partner and this is expected to be filled by party

leader Guido Westerwelle, this conflict of opinions might continue

to be relevant in the future.

Civil society Christian churches and Turkish communities

Speaking about the perception of Turkeys accession

aspirations by German civil society, two groups, the Christian

churches and the Turkish communities in Germany, are of special

interest. Both groups are notably sensitive to the topic, their

positions controversial and their perspectives different.

Two thirds of the German population is affiliated to a

Christian church, even though their membership rates have been

22 Oliver Grimm (2009) Rckkehr der liberalen Pro-Europer, in: Die Presse,28 September 2009.23 Spiegel Online: Seehofer und Westerwelle verkrachen sich wegen Trkei,

13 October 2009.


48/236

43

constantly declining during the last years. The Catholic and the

Protestant churches are skeptical about EUs enlargement towards

Turkey wherein they concentrate on the domestic situation inTurkey. Their main concerns are the freedom of religion, the non-

discrimination against minorities and the respect of human rights

within the country. During the last years, the Protestant Church

declared the accession negotiations between the EU and Turkey an

open process with the accession as one possible outcome.24

Referring to the unacceptable situation of the Christian minority in

Turkey, this position changed recently.25 Alternatives to EUmembership, restricted to an intensified economic cooperation, are

now favored and a full-membership is not supported anymore.

Also, the Catholic Church pledges against full membership.

Emphasizing the cultural differences between Europe and Turkey,

the Catholic Church in Germany prefers the privileged partnership

proposed by the CDU.26

Within the Turkish community, the broader perception of

Turkeys membership aspirations is difficult to access. In Germany

there are several organizations which claim to represent the interest

of the 2.6 million German Turks, who are also divided along

political party lines. Comments on Turkish EU-membership from

these organizations are rare. Nevertheless, Cem zdemir, the

24 Speech of Bishop Wolfgang Huber Religionsfreiheit und Toleranz - Wieaktuell ist derAugsburger Religionsfriede?, 22 September 2005,http://www.ekd.de/vortraege/050923_huber_religionsfriede .html.25 Wolfgang Huber, interview with Hamburger Abendblatt Online, 31 May2009, http://www.abendblatt.de/politik/article1034762/Bischof-Huber-Die-Tuerkei-gehoert-nicht-in-die-EU.html26 Central Committee of German Catholics, presse release, 17. April 2005,

http://www.zdk.de/pressemeldungen/meldung.php?id=229.


49/236

44

German-Turk politician and chairman of the Green Party, sees a

generally positive attitude of the German-Turk population towards

Turkeys ambitions to join the EU.27

The Turkish Community inGermany (Trkische Gemeinde Deutschlands TGD) for

example, which represents more than 200 communities in

Germany, pledges for membership and emphasizes the practical

facilitation for the Turks living in Germany and Europe; for

example their right to vote locally.28 Furthermore, Turkeys

membership could converge the Muslim and Christian

communities within Europe and thus become a geo-political andcultural bridge between Europe and the Middle East.

Summing up, within the German Christian churches, a

critical attitude towards Turkish membership is dominant. While

concentrating on the domestic situation in Turkey, they estimate

the cultural differences between Turkey and Europe as too

significant for a successful cooperation within the EU. The Turkishcommunity in Germany emphasizes Turkeys capacity to bridge

cultural differences between the Christian and Muslim community

within and outside Europe. Looking at these two groups, German

civil society seems to be divided over the question of EU

membership of Turkey.

27 Cem zdemir (2005) Demokratie und Islam sind vereinbar, in: Cafe Babel,25 February 2005, http://www.cafebabel.com/fre/article/1103/demokratie-und-islam-sind-vereinbar.html.28 Turkish community in Germany, activity report 2006-2008,http://www.tgd.de/index.php?name=News&file=article&sid=842&theme=Printe

r.


50/236

45

Conclusion: A Mixed Picture

It can thus be concluded that German public opinion

towards Turkish candidacy for EU-membership is comprised of

diverging positions and arguments. The virulence of proponents

and/or opponents of Turkish EU-membership will depend on the

further development of the accession process but also of the

internal institutional development of the European Union.


51/236

46

Yvonne Nasshoven*

Belgian Perceptions

Abstract

Belgium has in the debate on the accession of Turkey to

the European Union always taken a positive stance. Still, debate

has remained limited as internal problems, mostly due to thedifficult situation between Flemish and Wallonians in the country,

have forced the state to put its emphasis on domestic politics. This

passivity has especially been reflected by the near absence of

debate in the media, which has only for short timeframes gained

importance.

However, throughout 2010 the Kingdom of Belgium isgoing to become one of the key players of European politics, as the

country will hold the Presidency of the EU. Also its Prime

Minister, Hermann von Rompuy is at the moment one of the

frontrunners for the office of the first President of the European

Council. Under these circumstances, European and foreign policies

are going to figure more prominently in the political landscape,

including Turkeys accession to the EU.

* The opinions expressed herein are only those of the author and do not reflect



52/236

47

Introduction

Belgium has been a founding member of the European

Communities and actively been involved in shaping European

politics since the beginning. Especially for the countrys position

as a small member country of the EU, European integration has

always meant an enhancement of its role in the world. Therefore

the country has taken a strong prointegrative view, calling for a

deepening of the European Union.

However, throughout the last years Belgium internalfederalism has suffered from separatist and regionalist movements,

mostly in the prosperous Dutch-speaking Flanders, but also in

French-speaking Wallonia. Those forces, with regard to Turkish

EU enlargement opposed to the general line of Belgium politics,

have taken a position against the possibility of a Turkish

membership in the European Union. Although the two main

separatist parties Vlaams Belang in Flanders, and Front National

in Wallonia are not involved in government and still provide

only for a small part of the Belgium Assembly, the underlying

problems between the two major regions have paralyzed the

country during the last two years to a large extent.

By the Media

Debate about Turkish membership is largely absent in the

Belgium press. Mostly, discussions are caused by incidents

happening within the country that have an effect on the perception

of Turkey by Belgians. Here, especially, two discussions deserve

to be mentioned: The election of a grey wolf at the municipal


53/236

48

elections in Brussels in October 2006, and the debate following a

statement of the Turkish ambassador to Belgium, Fuat Tanlay, in

2009.

The debate on the election of Murat Denizli, a grey wolf

who has been elected in the Brussels district of Schaarbeek, in this

sense is exemplary as it shows that the discussion on Turkish

membership in Belgium is largely stimulated by events happening

on the ground with regard to the Belgian Turkish community.

Here, especially, the fear of a possible communitarization of

Turkish problems in Belgium has been discussed, linked with a

debate on the overall problem of Turkish ultranationalist parties.

A second incident has been caused lately by the statement

of the Turkish ambassador to Belgium, Fuat Tanlay. In the context

of a court case concerning the Revolutionary Peoples Liberation

Front (Devrimci Sol) in summer 2009, the ambassador was quoted

in Hrriyet saying that terrorism one day was going to haunt

Belgium and that then would be understood what the word

terrorism means.1 This, by many, has been understood as a

threat and has been heavily criticized.

In general, debates on Turkish EU membership have

rather been reproduced than stimulated by the Belgian media. This

is especially true for the regular perception of progress reportspublished by the European Commission, and the debate on a

privileged partnership , launched by Nicolas Sarkozy and

Angela Merkel in 2009. Belgian media thus can be characterized

as reactive, not proactive on the topic of Turkish accession. This

1

RTBF, Lambassadeur turc souhaite du terrorisme en Belgique, 20 July 2009.


54/236

49

certainly is also due to the fact that Belgium, as seat of many key

European institutions and capital of the European Union, is

closely watching to keep its own national identity distinct from themomentum of the European institutions, and to separate those

areas of life distinctively. Still, surprisingly public discussion on

enlargement is less positive on Turkish enlargement than the

governments view. This is also confirmed by the figures of

Eurobarometer, where only a close majority of 53% are in favour

of a further enlargement.2

By the Government

Belgian foreign policy in the past years cannot be

discussed without referring to Belgiums own political situation.

The overall fragmentation of the party system3, discontinuity in the

government and increased tensions between the Flemish andWallonian population have led to only limited discussion on

foreign policy matters in the government and beyond. Looking into

the situation more closely, since 2006, the Kingdom of Belgium

has seen four governments: Verhofstadt II, composed of a coalition

between four parties from 11 July 2003 to 21 December 2007,

2 Eurobarometer 71, Lopnion publique dans lUnion Europenne, Spring 2009,p. 50.3 Political parties in Belgium are organised along the lines of the Flemish andWallonian community, so that no overarching Belgian party exists. The mainparties involve the Christian democratic parties (Christian Democratic andFlemish party and Centre Dmocrate Humaniste), the socialist parties(Socialistische Partij Anders and Parti Socialiste), the liberal parties (FlemishLiberal Democrats and Mouvement Rformateur) and the green parties (Groen!and Ecolo). Very important players are the Flemish and Wallonian nationalistparties Vlaams Belang and Front National, Vlaams Belang gaining around 11%

in the general elections 2007.


55/236

50

Verhofstadt III, in place as an interim government from 21

December 2007 to 20 March 2008, the government Leterme from

20 March 2008 until 30 December 2008, and, starting from 30December 2008 the government with Herman van Rompuy as

Prime Minister. The government formation which followed the

general elections on 10 June 2007 thereby has been the longest

period of establishing a new government in Belgian history. In

addition, in the past governments five parties have been sharing

power in order to form a majority, so that consensus has been

found only at the lowest common denominator. As a consequence,domestic politics have dominated the governments agenda.

Nevertheless, the Belgium government has during the

past years shown a favorable attitude towards the accession of

Turkey to the European Union. Especially Guy Verhofstadt,

Belgium Prime Minister from 1999 to 2008 has taken a positive

stance on the prospect of Turkish EU membership, a position he isnow also continuing to pronounce in the European Parliament as

leader of the group of the Liberals (ALDE), though voicing his

opinion more moderately.

The roots of this positive position are twofold: Internal

policies, especially Turkish population living in Belgium and

domestically informed objectives, especially security, on the onehand; and the external policies of Belgium and its agenda as

member state of the European Union, on the other hand. Being a

small country, Belgium plays a specific role here; , as one diplomat


56/236

51

put it: Inevitably, as a small country being against Turkish

membership will not change much.4

Furthermore, the reasons brought forward for Belgiums

position diverge depending on the context in which the discussion

takes place, but in general three areas can be identified:

(1) Geopolitical reasons and the role of Europe in the

world: Here the possible function of Turkey as a bridge between

Europe and the Near East, even Central Asia, is emphasized.

Turkey is expected to be a factor of stability in a troubled region,also given its membership in NATO since 1951 which was not put

into question by the Cold War, and a potential reorientation

towards Russia.5 Turkey therefore proved to be a reliable partner in

the context of cooperation in international organizations, so that an

atmosphere of trust emerged which can be built upon.

(2) Security from a European perspective: The integrationof Turkey in the institutions and policies of the European Union is

seen by the Belgian government as the best way to achieve security

both with regard to militarist and fundamentalist forces in Turkey

on the one hand, and energy security for the European Union on

the other hand. Thus, a mixture of internal security and economic

matters is informing this realist position, founded on

instrumentalist and rational choice beliefs.

4 Pourqoi les Belges soutiennent la candidature de la Turquie, in Le Soir, 08December 2004.5 Chambre des Reprsentants de Belgique, Proposition de Rsolution relative ladhsion de la Turquie lUnion europenne, texte adopt par la Commission

des relations extrieures, DOC 502121/004, 10 dcembre 2002.


57/236

52

(3) Providing a tool for reform in Turkey: The Belgian

government also puts forward the need for reform in Turkey, for

which it sees enlargement as the main incentive.6

Thereby,especially the values of human rights, democracy and minority

rights are put forward. Still, the discourse on minorities features

less prominently than in other countries, given the Belgian

problmatique of Flemish-Wallonian relations.

The offspring of the favorable position of the government

consequently results from a mixture of self-interested security

reasons, but also from the strong belief that cooperation and the

existence of joint values is essential for the well-being of the

respective Belgian and Turkish societies. As many people of

Turkish origin already live in the member countries of the

European Union, membership is seen as a natural next step. This

position has been more or less intensively pronounced during the

last governments; however, the Belgian government at the sametime has always been clear that there are clear conditions for

membership which have to be met: First, the Copenhagen criteria,

which have also guided the European Unions enlargement to the

East, need to be strictly applied. This for Belgium means

especially the political criteria of the respect of the rule of law, of

human rights and of healthy civil-military relations. Comprised is

also the full transposition of the acquis communautaire, whereasthe need for reform on the economic system is only discussed at

the margins by the Belgian government. Secondly, Turkey needs to

6 Coalition agreement concluded between negotiators of the ChristenDemokraatisch und Vlaams CD&V, Movement Reformateur (MR), PartiSocialiste PS, Vlaamse Liberalen and Democraten Open Vld und centre

democratie humaniste, 23/12/2007.


58/236

53

solve its difficulties with Cyprus and Greece. This, as Guy

Verhofstadt stated already in 2005, is crucial to the negotiations.7

Belgium will, from 01 July 2010 onwards, take on the

Council Presidency of the European Union. Preparation is still in

its early stages, but some exchanges of opinion have already taken

place. In this context, the preparatory documents point in the same

direction: In line with the progress made in the accession criteria,

the negotiations with Turkey and FYROM shall proceed. Still,

with regard to Cyprus and the situation on human rights it is

remarked in the document that the steps forward have been rather

little.8

Summing up, although Belgium has not been at the

forefront of lobbying for a Turkish membership among the

member countries of the European Union, it has continuously

supported the Turkish membership, but also demanded clear

standards. Belgium has, in addition, acknowledged the need for a

partnership approach with regard to Turkey, as stated by the then

Belgian Foreign Minister Karel de Gucht on 20 January 2009:

[] Turkey has not been well - or even equally - treated by the

EU. [] The time has come for the partnership between Turkey

and Europe to mature. It needs to become a permanent and

unbreakable bond. []Turkey is Europes ally. As an integral partof the European family, sharing the same values, it is Europes

bridge to the emerging powers in Asia and - let no one forget - the

7 Riccardi, Fernando, Les divergences sur ladhsion de la Turquie seradicalisent, dans bulletin Quotidien Europe n 8861, 07.01.2005, p.3.8 Snat et Chambre des reprsentants de Belgique, Prparation de la prsidencebelge de l'Union europenne en 2010 (1), Rapport fait au nom du comit davisfederal charg des questions europennes par Mme Delvaux et M. De Croo,

Document lgislatif n 4-986/1, 9 December 2008.


59/236

54

Middle East. Even more than that, Turkey is a bridge to the

Muslim world and it is the prime example that modernisation,

secularisation and democracy are not anathema to Islam. Turkey is,in short, an essential ally in the most important struggles that the

world will face for years to come. So let Europe rise above its fears

and be as great and as generous as this great game demands.9

By the Opposition

Belgian opposition parties for the most part share the

governments approach of a clear enlargement perspective for

Turkey, given that the criteria for membership are met by the

country. One example can here be given by the electoral

programme of the Green Flemish party Groen!, which in its

manifesto for the 2007 general ele

Date post:	05-Apr-2018
Category:	Documents
Upload:	serhat-ertan
View:	215 times
Download:	0 times

Turkey Watch EU Member States' Perceptions on Turkey's Accession to the EU

Documents