8/9/2019 Turkey's New Foreign Policy Direction and Implications for U.S. Policy

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/turkeys-new-foreign-policy-direction-and-implications-for-us-policy 1/4

Summary: On July 28, 2010, Dr.

Ian Lesser testifed before the

House Committee on Foreign

Affairs regarding Turkey’s evolving 

foreign policy and the implica-

 tions for American interests and

strategy. His testimony explains

 that the changes in Turkish

foreign policy are the product of long simmering forces in Turkish

society, the particular afni-

 ties and concerns of Turkey’s

political leadership, and the rise

of public opinion as a factor in

Turkish policymaking. In a new

move away from the arms-length

policy toward its eastern and

southern neighborhood, Turkey’s

current leadership is much more

comfortable than its predeces-

sors in conducting an active

diplomacy across the Arab andMuslim worlds. This shift will be

consequential for U.S. interests

across a wide area, from Euro-

pean security to relations with

Russia, from energy geopolitics to

missile defense. It will also affect

Turkey’s future role in relation to

core regional concerns, above all

 the containment of Iran’s nuclear

ambitions and the Middle East

peace process.

Analysis

 Turkey’s New Foreign Policy Direction and

Implications for U.S. Policy 

 Testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs

by Dr. Ian Lesser 

July 28, 2010

Washington, DC• Berlin • Bratislava • Paris 

Brussels • BelgraDe • ankara • BuCharest 

O f f i c e s

Analysis

Mr. Chairman, distinguished members

o the committee, thank you orinviting me to share my views onTurkey’s evolving oreign policy andthe implications or American interestsand strategy. With your permission,I will oer a brie summary o my remarks. Let me also note that theseare my personal views and not thoseo the German Marshall Fund o theUnited States.

Signicant and Durable Policy Shifts

First, I believe that the changes inTurkish oreign policy are the producto long simmering orces in Turkishsociety, the particular anities andconcerns o Turkey’s political leader-ship, and the rise o public opinion asa actor in Turkish policymaking. Allo these elements have been at play in Ankara’s recent and controversialactions, including the Gaza “fotillacrisis” and Turkey’s “no” vote on Iransanctions in the UN Security Council.Today, Turkey’s international policy is more active and diverse, and mucho this new activity is ocused on theMiddle East and Eurasia. There is animportant commercial dimension tothis activism, ueled by impressiveeconomic growth (around 7 percent)even in the midst o a global crisis. All

o this has contributed to the sel-

condence o the AKP leadership. Ithas also produced a relative declinein Turkish interest in and attentionto the EU, NATO, and the strategicpartnership with the United States. Inmy judgment, these are durable ratherthan transient developments.

Second, there is no doubt that Turkey’scurrent leadership is much morecomortable than its predecessors inconducting an active diplomacy across

the Arab and Muslim worlds. Thisis new, and represents a move away rom the arms-length policy towardits eastern and southern neighbor-hood that characterized Turkish policysince the end o the Ottoman Empire.Turkish public opinion increasingly refects this new interest in the MiddleEast. Based on a preliminary analysiso this year’s GMF TransatlanticTrends survey data, we ound that thepercentage o those in Turkey who say that, on international matters, Turkey should act in closest cooperation withthe countries o the Middle East hasroughly doubled since last year.1 

1 GMF’s Transatlantic Trends is an annual survey of public

opinion conducted in the U.S. and 12 European countries

including Turkey. Transatlantic Trends 2010 ndings will

be released on September 15, 2010. www.transatlantic-

 trends.org  

8/9/2019 Turkey's New Foreign Policy Direction and Implications for U.S. Policy

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/turkeys-new-foreign-policy-direction-and-implications-for-us-policy 2/4

Analysis

2

AnalysisThe Balkan Trust for Democracy

But attention to the Middle East is not the only element in

a changing Turkish oreign policy. Increasingly, AKP leadersand their oreign policy advisors talk in terms strongly reminiscent o other emerging economic and politicalactors, including India, South Arica, Indonesia, and Brazil.In this context, Turkish-Brazilian diplomatic cooperationon Iran has not been so surprising. This new tendency, notso much neo-Ottoman as non-aligned, refects a strongsense o skepticism in many Turkish quarters about oreignand deense policies “made in the West.” On balance, Turkey remains a cautious and status quo actor in internationalaairs — this is most evident in Ankara’s conservativeapproach to change in NATO — but the trend is clearly 

toward a more assertive policy across Turkey’s neighbor-hood.

The New Turkey and American Interests

Third, these shits will be consequential or U.S. interestsacross a wide area, rom European security to relations withRussia, rom energy geopolitics to missile deense. They willalso aect Turkey’s uture role in relation to core regionalconcerns, above all the containment o Iran’s nuclear ambi-tions and the Middle East peace process. But it is importantto recognize that the new look in Turkish policy has hadsome positive dimensions rom the point o view o Amer-ican interests alongside some more troubling aspects. Onthe positive side, Turkey appears committed to the consoli-dation o détente with Greece and stability in the Aegean.Disputes in the Aegean and over Cyprus have not beenresolved, yet today, they are largely political rather thansecurity challenges or the United States and our Europeanallies. In the Balkans, Turkey has pursued a constructiveand multilateral policy. Turkey has been an important part

o coalition operations in Aghanistan, and led the ISAF

mission in its early days. On Iraq, Ankara might not havebeen willing to allow a second ront to be opened throughits territory in 2003. But Turkey has quietly allowed theUnited States to use Incirlik airbase or airlit to Iraq andAghanistan. In northern Iraq, Ankara has been playing apositive role, and cooperation in this sphere will be evenmore important as Turkey seeks to contain a resurgence o violence by the PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party).

To be sure, there has been a steady decline in the weight o traditional Atlantic ties in Turkish policy, and the fywheelo transatlantic partnership as a source o predictability in

Turkish-U.S. relations. At the same time, there has been arise in Turkish nationalism across the political spectrum,and this has reinorced a sovereignty-conscious approach inkey areas, including security in the Black Sea, where Ankarais wary o an enhanced U.S. and NATO role. In the MiddleEast, the United States and Turkey share a basic interest instability, but we are clearly not on the same page when itcomes to the key questions o Iran policy and the Israeli-Palestinian confict.

Turkey has a strong interest in preventing the emergence o a nuclear-armed Iran and the rise o new nuclear arsenalsin its neighborhood. Even a “nuclearizing” or near-nuclearIran would have negative consequences or Turkish securityTurkish policymakers may have strong energy security andcommercial interests in cooperation with Tehran, but they remain wary o Iran’s potential as a regional competitor.

There is no doubt that Turkey’s

current leadership is much more

comfortable than its predecessors

in conducting an active diplomacy

across the Arab and Muslim

worlds.

Today, Turkey’s international

policy is more active and diverse,

and much of this new activity is

focused on the Middle East and

Eurasia.

8/9/2019 Turkey's New Foreign Policy Direction and Implications for U.S. Policy

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/turkeys-new-foreign-policy-direction-and-implications-for-us-policy 3/4

Analysis

3

Analysis

That said, the AKP leadership does not seem to share the

prevailing U.S. and European assessment o Iran’s inten-tions, and Turks across the spectrum are opposed toeconomic sanctions, which they are convinced will harmTurkey’s economic interests. Despite Turkey’s own directexposure to Iranian (and Syrian) weapons o mass destruc-tion and the means or their delivery at longer ranges, theTurkish debate on these questions tends to be politicalrather than strategic in nature. Turkey’s leaders argue or anuclear-ree Middle East, and point to Israel’s undeclarednuclear capability as part o the problem. These perspec-tives are clearly out o step with the views o transatlanticpartners. Short o an overt Iranian threat to Turkish secu-

rity, U.S. and Turkish views on the Iran nuclear issue areunlikely to converge. Against this background, Turkey’s “no”vote on Iran sanctions in the UN Security Council was notsurprising.

The Gaza fotilla incident underscored another importantshit in Turkish perceptions and policy. A crisis o this kindwould have been unthinkable ten years ago, when Turkish-Israeli relations were ar closer and the Turkish military heldsway over the country’s oreign and security policy. In my 

 judgment, the erosion o Turkish-Israeli strategic coop-eration was inevitable. The “strategic partnership” was a

product o distinctive circumstances in the 1990s, includinga shared interest in the containment o Syria and Iran, anda setting in which Turkish public opinion — never very positive about relations with Israel — did not really count.Today, all o these conditions have changed, and the basisor Turkish-Israeli cooperation is much narrower. Aboveall, the Palestinian issue is a highly emotive one or Turkey’scurrent political leadership, and especially or PrimeMinister Erdogan. His strong views on the subject are essen-tially in tune with Turkish public opinion. AKP leaders reeropenly to Hamas as a legitimate interlocutor. The Turkishposition on Hamas and other aspects o the Middle Eastpeace process is unlikely to change anytime soon. In this, asin some other key areas, the United States and Turkey aresimply unlikely to agree.

Policy Implications

Taken together, these developments will pose continuedchallenges or American policy. We are used to viewingTurkey rom a NATO-centric, European security perspec-

tive, and while these aspects remain relevant, they are only 

part o the Turkish policy picture. What Turkey does ordoes not do in the Middle East and Eurasia will be just asimportant or U.S. interests in the years ahead.

It is important to remember that U.S.-Turkish relationshave never been easy to manage, and have experiencedrepeated periods o stress, alongside periods o close coop-eration. U.S.-Turkish relations have always suered romtheir geopolitical, security-heavy content, in which theeconomic, scientic, cultural, and other dimensions havebeen relatively weak. This is a structural problem, dicultto correct, and a particular liability as Turkey’s interna-

tional activism is increasingly driven by commercial actors.Almost certainly, we are moving into a period o decliningpredictability in relations with Ankara, with a la carte ratherthan automatic cooperation as the norm.

Let me conclude by noting some critical priorities orU.S. policy. First, with Ankara, we need to shit the debateon Iran (and the Middle East generally) rom politics todeense, where Turkey has its own exposure and concerns.Looking toward the NATO summit in Lisbon in November,it will be important to secure Turkish cooperation or thenext steps in a ballistic missile deense architecture covering

southern Europe and the eastern Mediterranean.

Second, we need to rethink and possibly reinorce ourcooperation with Turkey against the PKK and its baseso operation across the border in Iraq. In the absence o close coordination, there is a real possibility o larger-scale

Almost certainly, we are moving 

into a period of declining 

predictability in relations with

Ankara, with a la carte rather than

automatic cooperation as the

norm.

8/9/2019 Turkey's New Foreign Policy Direction and Implications for U.S. Policy

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/turkeys-new-foreign-policy-direction-and-implications-for-us-policy 4/4

Analysis

4

Analysis

Dr. Ian O. Lesser, Senior Transatlantic Fellow, GMF

As a senior transatlantic ellow at the German Marshall Fund o the

United States in Washington, DC, Ian Lesser leads GMF’s work on the

Mediterranean, Turkish, and wider-Atlantic security issues. Prior to join-

ing GMF, Dr. Lesser was a public policy scholar at the Woodrow Wilson

International Center or Scholars, and vice president and director o 

Studies at the Pacic Council on International Policy (the western part-

ner o the Council on Foreign Relations). He came to the Pacic Council

rom RAND, where he spent over a decade as a senior analyst and re-

search manager specializing in strategic studies. From 1994-1995, he was

a member o the Secretary’s Policy Planning Sta at the U.S. Department

o State, responsible or Turkey, Southern Europe, North Arica, and the

multilateral track o the Middle East peace process. He is also currently a

senior advisor to the Luso-American Foundation in Lisbon, a member o 

the Council on Foreign Relations, the International Institute or Strategic

Studies, the Atlantic Council, and the Pacic Council on International

Policy. He serves on the advisory boards o the International Spectator,

Turkish Policy Quarterly, and Insight Turkey, and has been a senior el-

low o the Onassis Foundation in Athens.

About GMF

The German Marshall Fund o the United States (GMF) is a non-par-

tisan American public policy and grantmaking institution dedicated to

promoting better understanding and cooperation between North Amer-

ica and Europe on transatlantic and global issues. GMF does this by sup-

porting individuals and institutions working in the transatlantic sphere,

by convening leaders and members o the policy and business communi-

ties, by contributing research and analysis on transatlantic topics, and by 

providing exchange opportunities to oster renewed commitment to the

transatlantic relationship. In addition, GMF supports a number o initia-

tives to strengthen democracies. Founded in 1972 through a git rom

Germany as a permanent memorial to Marshall Plan assistance, GMF

maintains a strong presence on both sides o the Atlantic. In addition to

its headquarters in Washington, DC, GMF has seven oces in Europe:

Berlin, Bratislava, Paris, Brussels, Belgrade, Ankara, and Bucharest.

About the On Turkey Series

GMF’s On Turkey is an ongoing series o analysis bries about Turkey’s

current political situation and its uture. GMF provides regular analysis

bries by leading Turkish, European, and American writers and intellec-

tuals, with a ocus on dispatches rom on-the-ground Turkish observers.

To access the latest bries, please visit our web site at www.gmus.org/tur-

key or subscribe to our mailing list at http://database.gmus.org/reaction.

independent Turkish operations in northern Iraq, a devel-

opment which could derail Turkish-Iraqi relations andcomplicate the outlook or stability in Iraq as a whole. Moresignicantly, our policy may need to respond to a potentialexpansion o PKK-inspired urban terrorism inside Turkey.This could imply very dierent kinds o intelligence sharingand other orms o cooperation with Turkish agencies. TheKurdish issue is the leading policy challenge acing Turkey today, and U.S. and European policies in this sphere will bekey tests or Turkey in its relations with Western partners.

Finally, the United States remains a key stakeholder inTurkey’s European Union candidacy. This process is increas-

ingly troubled, with growing ambivalence and oppositionon all sides. It is too simple to blame the lack o progress inTurkey’s European project or Ankara’s growing ocus onthe Middle East. But i Turkey’s candidacy proves hollow,this could well interrupt or reverse Turkey’s longstandingconvergence with the West, urther complicating an already strained relationship with the United States. Full member-ship in Europe has been the leading “big project” in Turkishpolicy. Without this goal, there will be a heightened risko Turkey’s strategic decoupling rom the transatlanticcommunity. Our support or Turkey’s European trajectory — critical to the resolution o the Cyprus dispute, closer

NATO-EU cooperation, and Turkish-Armenian rapproche-ment, among other issues — should not be diminished by recent U.S.-Turkish dierences over Iran and Israel.