Turkish DiasporaThe initial institutional groundwork for Turkish migration was laid by a 1961 (official gastarbeiter policy continued until 74) bilateral agreement between the German and Turkish governments. According to the terms of the recruitment provisions, Turkish applicants would be screened by German bureaucrats and allocated to specific job openings in Germany with specific firms. These workers would only remain in Germany so long as they were needed to "plug" labor shortages in particular sectors.Turkish DiasporaThis position was entirely consistent with migrants' own plans and priorities. Many of them hoped for a permanent return after earning a sufficient sum.Hundreds of thousands of migrants did, in fact, return to Turkey. Return migration peaked at 148,000 in 1974 following the end of the official Gastarbeiter policy.Turkish DiasporaTurkish diasporic trans-nationalism in economic, socio-cultural and political realmsIn economic terms, remittances, investments and Turkish-owned companies and banks, based in both Turkey and GermanyIn the political context migrants are able to maintain their legal status in both states that offer access to health care, property, welfare and even formal voting rights.In the cultural realm print capitalism, music sales, and satellite television play a decisive role for migrants in knitting together a sense of multilocal belonging and identification.
Turkish DiasporaTurkish Diasporas socio-economic positionFirst generation migrants usually performed unskilled factory jobs.Second generation attend German schools up to the tenth grade and, under pressure from their parents to learn a practical trade, complete a two-year apprenticeship program. Based upon their occupational training, they enter the labor market as qualified car mechanics, dental assistants, hair stylists, etc. Turkish DiasporaThird generation are encouraged to have higher goals and to attend a university and begin a more prestigious career as professional.However, although the exceptions remain, many second-generation migrants remain, like their first-generation parents, in relatively insecure factory and service-sector employment. In addition, members of the second and third generations are dramatically underrepresented in university-track high schools and in multi-year occupational training programs. Turkish DiasporaThis leaves a self-owned business as a highly attractive and sought-after path to upward mobility for younger migrants. Even those who manage to accumulate starting capital, however, are frequently unsuccessful in establishing themselves as entrepreneurs.Competition, both within the ethnic enclave economy and the broader market, is high. Would-be entrepreneurs lack relevant business knowledge, contacts, and practical experience. The rate of Turkish-owned small-business failure is high.Most continue to find themselves in the lower reaches of the German occupational structure, though a smaller proportion of Turks have moved into the ranks of educated professional managers, and small-scale entrepreneurs.
Turkish DiasporaDiasporic IdentityTheir emotional ties with Turkey and Turkishness, the usually denigrating connotation of the word Turk" continues to be imposed on them in myriad ways in their everyday lives. Consuming Turkish cultural products -reading the European editions of Turkish newspapers like Hurriyet, watching televised soccer matches and TV shows beamed via satellite; and listening to Turkish singers etc. helped them to sustain their attachment to the homeland.
Turkish Diaspora"Integration" in Germany is not only a process of ethnic assimilation, but also a process of acquiring the habits and attitudes considered appropriate for a normatively middle-class lifestyle.Academic or occupational credentials constitute a publicly recognized acknowledgement that migrants have successfully internalized "German" habits and attitudes. Those individuals with factory and service jobs; on the other hand, usually lack the recognition to become integrated.Turkish DiasporaAn educated, upwardly mobile group of migrants are more likely to draw on an intellectualized discourse of culture and to express multiethnic (that is, both German and Turkish) or hybrid forms of identity .Migrants in less secure and less prestigious positions, meanwhile, tend to be more strongly bound to Turkey, and they often seem to more clearly draw the moral lines that separate them from Germanness. Turkish DiasporaTurkish Diaspora Organizations in Germany underlines the persistence of homeland politics among Germany's Turks and contributes to divisions in Germany's Turkish community .Turkish guest workers arriving in the early and mid-1960s typically avoided organized political activity. But, as temporary guest-worker programs have given way to settlement, Turkish immigrants and their progeny have started expressing diverse political identities and engaging in related group activities.The general trend in the organizational landscape is toward an increase in ethno-cultural orientations at the expense of class ideology.Turkish DiasporaDITIB (The Directorate for Religious Affairs-Turkish Islamic Union), a sending country leverage organization promoting a moderate Islam acceptable to the Turkish regime, enjoys considerable success.IGMG/AMGT (The Islamic Community of National Perspective), an exile organization established in the late 1970s that promotes a brand of Islam considered irreconcilable with the modern Turkish regime. In 1995, KOMKAR (The Federation of Workers Organizations from Kurdistan), an exile organization established in 1979 around Kurdish identity.
Turkish DiasporaGermany's Turkish organizational landscape is that it remains fragmented primarily due to the persistent role of homeland political identities. Internal divisions over goals, strategies, and tactics weaken the Turkish community's potential to launch a successful incorporation movement. Leaders of these organizations contribute to divisions within the Turkish community. Because leaders, as opposed to their constituents, set the agenda in such organizations, a small set of immigrant activists is capable of fundamentally shaping how Germany's Turkish community will interpret homeland political conflicts.
Turkish DiasporaThere are two major factors affecting the increasing popularity of organizations that are more representative of the fragmentation in homeland domestic politics than support for traditional, class-based organizations. One factor is the host society's ability to absorb various ethno-cultural minorities. Host democracies unable to absorb ethno-cultural minorities relatively quickly provide such homeland oriented organizations with a distinct advantage over local collective action organizations.
Turkish DiasporaThe other factor is whether the sending state generates ideologically contentious political migrants. As sending states attempt to manage their domestic social conflicts, they often generate politically dissatisfied emigrants and refugees. These exiles may be united or fragmented by their grievances against the sending state. Additionally, the sending state may deploy its own political emissaries to the receiving country to compete for the loyalty of its expatriates and to gain favorable foreign policy outcomes by infiltrating the domestic politics of a sovereign stateTurkish DiasporaGermany has experienced considerable difficulties in absorbing Turks into its associations and broader society. Organizations, such as labor unions and most political parties, lack a government mandate to represent immigrants' interests, but welcome their participation all the same.Unions were among the earliest indigenous associations to make Germany's class-based institutional channels accessible to immigrants
Turkish DiasporaGerman political parties constitute another organizational medium through which Turks and other immigrants can negotiate terms of their incorporation. Those who naturalize, or dual citizens inheriting host country citizenship from one of their parents or through recent changes in the citizenship laws, can participate in any capacity in German parties. Cem Ozdemir, the Green Party Member of the Bundestag elected in 1994 and 1998 through the party list, and Ekin Deligoz, another Green MP elected in the same manner in 1998, are cases in point. However immigrant membership in political parties still remains low.Turkish DiasporaIf they are going to become members of any organization, most immigrants, including Turks, prefer to join their own national associations.Such organizations promising a support network and security in exchange for membership are likely to achieve greater success if immigrants feel the host society is fundamentally and intensely hostile to their presence. Turkish DiasporaContentious political migrants preoccupied with diverse views on Turkey's domestic politics remain the dominant players in Germany's Turkish associations. Evidence suggests political migrants continue to control Germany's Turkish associations.These political migrants take their mobilizing cues from developments in Turkish politics, fueling the division of Germany's Turks along the political fault-lines of their homeland.
Turkish DiasporaThe class-based associations political migrants established in Germany in the late 1960s and early 1970s reflected their ideological attachment to conflicts, dominating Turkish politics in the 1950s and 1960s. Since the 1970s, however, Turkish associations in Germany increasingly reflect the dominance of political migrants embroiled in struggles between Turkey's Kemalist tenets and competing ethno-cultural forces.
Turkish DiasporaImmigrant communities that are more prone to consume homeland media are also more likely to act on homeland issues while living in the host country. Turks are Germany's premier cons
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