TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY Summer School, 2008-2009

TURKISH FOREIGN POLICYSummer School, 2008-2009

HACETTEPE UNIVERSITYFEAS

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS DEPARTMENTLECTURER: Assistant Prof. Dr. Özlen Çelebi

BASIC DETERMINANTS OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY

• There are different approaches in classification.• There are plenty of factors which shape a country’s

foreign policy behaviours/objectives.• According to Mustafa Aydın:• There are structural variables and conjunctural

variables. “ One kind, which may be called structural variables, are continuous, and rather static. The other, which may be termed conjunctural variables, are dynamic and subject to change under the influence of domestic and foreign developments.”


• “The structural factors are not directly related to the international political medium and the daily happenings of foreign politics. They can exert a long-term influence over the determination of foreign policy goals. Geographical position, historical experiences and cultural background, together with national stereotypes and images of other nations, and long-term economic necessities would fall into” this category.


• “Conjucntural variables …are made up of a web of interrelated developments in domestic politics and international relations.”

• The structural determinants of Turkish foreign policy, according to M. Aydın are:

• 1. The historical experiences, specifically the Ottoman Empire heritage.

• 2. Geographic location of Turkey and geopolitical conditions.


• 3. Culture, especially the political culture of country and the decission-making.

• The basic determinants of Turkish foreign policy according to Ülman and Sander are:

• 1. Security concerns and alliances.• 2. Geographic location (neighbours, neighbouring

regions, the straits).• 3. Administrative structure, understanding of

politics and perceptions of the decision makers.


• 4. Economic needs/requirements.

BASIC PRINCIPLES OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY

• 1. Westernization in the sense of modernization and adoptin western values such as democratic rule, respect to rule of law and being an independent/sovereign nation sate within the international system;

• 2. Preserving staus quo: Protecting international peace and stability; no room for non-pacific solutions (esp. condemning wars);

• 3. Respect to international law, working in cooperation with international organizations;

• 4. Balanced and rational foreign policy decision-making.

1919-1923 PERIOD

• I. The Lausanne Conference:• The Lausanne Conference opened on 21

November 1922, but only after encountering serious problems as to who was to attend.

• A. Soviet participation: An invitation was issued to the Soviets on 27 November 1922 on condition that they could only participate in those discussions which had to do with the future of the Straits.

1919-1923 PERIOD

• B. Seperate invitations were issued to the Ankara government and to that of the Sultan in Istanbul. Mustafa Kemal Paşa and his colleagues were anxious to prevent a divided Turkish representation at Lausanne. The Assembly abolished the Sultanate on 1 November.

• C. Representatives: Britain, France, Italy, Japan, Greece, Roumania and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, on the one part and Turkey of the other part.

1919-1923 PERIOD

• D. Parts (4), sections, clauses and articles (143) of the Treaty.

• II. Negotiations:• The Lausanne Treaty was signed on 24 July

1923 at Lausanne.• British diplomatic strategy: Aiding the estb. Of

an independent Turkey as an anti-Soviet barrier, while protecting British interests.

1919-1923 PERIOD• The Straits: Britain’s main interests, as Lord Curzon saw them, were

to secure freedom of passage for British warships through the Straits, and the attachment of disputed province of Mousul to British-ruled Iraq, rather than to Turkey.

• The British sought to have the Straits opened to warships, while the Soviets aimed to keep them closed. Meanwhile, the British wished to prevent the Turks from closing the Straits to Western navies. The Turks were prepared to allow limited access to the Black Sea for the navies of non-Black Sea states, so as to maintain a balance of power against Russia. The result was a compromise under which non-Black Sea powers gained limited access to that sea, and both sides of the straits were demilitarised. These arrangemets were going to be supervised by an international commission.

1919-1923 PERIOD

• The Mousul issue: The Turks based their claim to the province of Mousul on the grounds that it was part of the non-Arabic territories which were included within the putative Turkish State under the National Pact, and had not been under British occupation at the time of Mudros armistice. The British were anxious to attach the Mousul Province to Iraq as a defensive barrier against Turkey. Moreover, parties were keen to gain control of rich oil resources of the Province. The question was left unsettled when the Lausaane Treaty was signed.

1919-1923 PERIOD

1919-1923 PERIOD

• The exchange of populations between Turkey and Greece: More than 1 million; homogenization of the populations and security concerns.

II. Settlement and Challenges:A. The domestic politicsB. The settlement of Mousul problem:1923-1926: Ankara Treaty

1923-1939 PERIOD• C. Turkey and the settlement of basic foreign policy principles:• A delicately balanced and multiplied foreign policy based on a larger

historical perspective and political evaluations; rational decisions and decison makers.

• D. Turkey and relations with the USSR:• Dec. 1925: Treaty of Neutrality and Friendship and it was renewed in

1929 with a protocol. Turkish policy makers attributed high importance to balanced relations with the USSR.

• E. Turkey and relations with Greece:• Exchange of populations-problems –Patriarchy; problems continued over

properties issue until 1929. In 1930, Prime Minister Venizelos visited Turkey Oct. 1930). Previously, in June 1930 an agreement was signed between the two countries which settled the dispute over properties.

1923-1939 PERIOD• F. Turkey and the West: • Relations with France and the UK.• G. Hatay issue: 1938 Hatay Republic; 1939 Hatay acceeded to Turkey following a

plebicit.• H. Turkey, international security and alliances:• Turkey signed bilateral agreements with her neighbours and the other international actors

such as the USA and the League of Nations. These treaties were reflecting Turkey’s security concerns, in general, and also the aim of solving international problems by peaceful methods.

• Alliance in the Balkans:• Major objective of Turkish policy was to form an entente with at least one, or preferably

two of her balkan neighbours. • 1933: Entente Cordiale under which Turkey and Greece mutually guaranteed their

common frontier in Thrace and agreed to consult with one another on all questions of common interests.

• Balkan Pact; 1934 between Turkey, Greece, Romania, and Yugoslavia.

1923-1939 PERIOD

• 1937 saadabad Pact: Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan

• Turkey obtained an armaments credit from the British in May 1938 and another one in Oct. 1939. Anglo-Turkish decleration was issued on 12 May 1939. Draft treaty betwn Turkey, France and Britain was signed on 1 Sept. 1939.

1939-1945: WWII and TFP

• “Although the (Turkish gvt.) had signed a tripartite alliance with Britain and France in October 1939, Turkey remained “a de facto neutral power” throughout the war, resisting strong pressure from both the Allies and Germany to join the war on their side. The careful balancing act is held up as an example of how a relatively small and militarily backward country could follow an independent path at a time of global struggle, and ‘a striking example of a small state which was no helpless pawn in international politics.’” (Hale, W.)


• “This policy could be seen as a natural outcome of Turkey’s experiences since 1914, and the country’s relative power and international position.” (Hale, W.)

• -Decision-making: lessons from history+ rationality: “…Turkey had practically nothing to gain and everything to lose by joining the war.” (Hale, W.)

• “Turkey’s wartime diplomasy can be seen as subject to significant shifts, adapted to the circumstances of a series of fairly distinct phases, and to changes within these phases.” (Hale, W.)

1939-1945: WWII and TFP• Turkish army’s limits: outdated equipment and lack of modern

training.• Baku Plan:• In March 1940 France proposed a plan for bombing the Soviet

oil fields at Baku, to weaken the Soviet support to Germany. The attacking aircraft would need to overfly Turkey. However the plan was dropped because of the British perception and evaluations about probabale results of such an operation regarding Turkey’s involvement in it: “Aggression by the Allies against the Soviet Union might give the Turks an excuse to stay out of the war, and Turkey’s role as the bastion of the British position in the Middle East made it essential to retain Turkish support.” (Hale, W.)


• Fall of Paris:• The collapse of France in June 1940 dramatically

reversed the expectations about the likely course of the war and Turkey’s role in it. Turkey’s possible participation in the war had depended on the assumption that the French fleet would be available to oppose Italy in the Mediterranean, if need be, and that the German army would be fully occupied in fighting a long war on the western front.


• Italy entered the war on 10 June 1940; on 7 October 1940, German troops began to enter Romania. The Turkish response to the Italian decleration of war was a decleration of non-belligerence issued by the government on 26 June 1940 which also cited the protocol to the Tripartite Treaty which absolved Turkey from joining the war if this would involve it in armed conflict with the SU. Turkey also claimed that the treaty has been done with both Britain and France, however, France was now out of the war/invaded, and unable to assume its obligations.

1939-1945: WWII and TFP• “Although the events of 1940 forced the Turks to reconsider their position this

did not lead to a rapid rapproachement with Germany. Initially Germany’s aim was to secure the neutrality of Turkey…After the dramatic German victories in the summer of 1940, von Papen urged Berlin that Germany should go further, by trying to convert Turkey into a pro-German neutral so as to facilitate a German attack on the British in the Middle East. Hints were meanwhile dropped to the Turks that Germany would oppose such concessions if Turkey made some concrete demonstrations of sympathy for Germany, including the dismissal of Saracoğlu…this demand was categorically dismissed by İnönü. Meanwhile trade relations formed the main business of Turkish-German diplomacy…In 1940, disagreements over trade agreements with Britain led Turkey to secure a new commercial agreement with Germany. However, its duration was limited to only one year, the volume of trade was still limited, and did not include chromite.” (Hale, W.)

1939-1945: WWII and TFP• Soviet factor:• Throughout the war a crucial concern for Turkey was the policy of SU. “In July

1940 Stalin accepted British mediation for an improvement in relations with Turkey, but insisted that this should be based on the participation of the Black Sea powers…in the defence of the Straits. This was unacceptable” for Turkey and the proposal came to nothing. “Moreover, Turkey’s relations with the Soviet Union were inevitably overshadowed by those of Stalin with Hitler.” (Hale, W.) Stalin added the Soviet ambissions on the Straits onto the agenda between SU and Germany. Germans responded Stalin by “presenting him with a draft agreement on 26 November (1940) which …proposed a joint committment to detach Turkey from its alliance with Britain…and to secure a revision of the Montreaux Convention giving the Soviet Union free naval access through the straits. However, Molotov regarded this as insufficient, and demanded the establishment of Soviet military and naval bases at the straits.


• If Turkey agreed to join a projected four-power pact …then the other powers would guarantee its independence and territory. If not, then ‘the required military and diplomatic measures’ would be taken.” (Hale, W.)

• “These demands were too much for Hitler. Evidently, he did not want to hand over control over the straits and Bulgaria to Stalin.”(Hale, W.)


• Britsh proposal to Turkey : Following the fall of France, a pro-Vich administration was established in Syria. Britain, during the summer of 1940 considered plans to intervene into Syria to prevent it coming under a direct German or Italian control. Turkey, accordingly, could be offered territory in Syria (Aleppo)“…as an inducement for cooperating in this.”However, Turkey showed no ineterest and the idea was dropped.

1939-1945: WWII and TFP• German proposal to Turkey: In 1941, Germany planned to send warplanes

to Iraq to play some role in fighting against the British forces there and in the larger area of Middle East. “The quickest way …was to draw on the Vichy stocks in Syria.” The only railway from Syria to Iraq passed through Turkish territory, and the operation thus depended on Turkey’s permission. In negotiations (June) Turkey insisted on a defined/limited number of German troops accross Turkish territory. However, it was late to negotiate since the British had moved forces into Iraq and overthrown Rashid Ali government. Britain also was preparing to invade Syria. They once more offered Turkey the plan about Aleppo.The proposal was again turned down by Turkey. “With the idea of collaboration with Turkey now dropped, a mixed force of British, Indian, Australian, Arab and Free French Forces invaded Syria...Turkey had thus been able to get out of the crisis without any serious involvement on either side.” (Hale, W.)

1939-1945: WWII and TFP• German advances in the Balkans: In the Spring of 1941, German

advances in the Balkans were Turkey’s main focus of concern.Hitler conquered Yugoslavia and Greece and German forces were now in full occupation of Romania and Bulgaria. “…on 4 March 1941, Hitler wrote a personal letter to İnönü assuring him that the German occupation of Bulgaria was in no way directed against Turkey, but purely against the British in Greece,…(Hale, W.) On 18 June 1941, the Turkish-German Treaty of Friendship and Non-Aggression was signed in which the two governments agreed to respect each other’s territorial integrity and to ‘abstain from all action aimed directly or indirectly against one another.’” (Hale, W.) Only 4 days later German forces invaded the SU. (Operation Barbarossa)

1939-1945: WWII and TFP• Trade was a significant factor in Turkish-German relations “Here, a

vital issue for both the Germans and British was the supply of chromite, which is an essential ingredient in steel-making. Germany had no domestic supplies, but Turkey had accounted for about 16 per cent of world production in 1939…In October 1939 the Turks had proposed to the British that they should sell them 200,000 tons of chromite per year for the next two years…However, in negotiations with the British, Numan Menemencioğlu also insisted that Britain should buy agreed quantities of Turkey’s other exports, on the grounds that Germany…would refuse to take these products if chromite were not also on offer. The British turned this deal down, and only promised to buy 50,000 tons of chromite per year in 1941 and 1942…”(Hale, W.)

1939-1945: WWII and TFP• “In their 1940 trade agreement with Germany,the Turks had withheld

chromite, but the failure to reach an exclusive long-term agreement with the British left them free to reverse this later. In October 1941 a new arrangement was reached with Germany, known as the ‘Clodius agreement’…Under this, Germany was to receive a maximum of 90,000 tons of chromite in 1943 (that is, after the contract with the British expired) and 45,000 tons in 1944. The Clodius agreement also provided for the sale by Germany of substantial amounts of military and other essential equipment to Turkey. In the summer of 1942 Turkey received a loan of 100 million Reichsmarks for the purchase of arms from Germany-supplies which Britain could not match at the time…The signature of the Clodius agreement partly derived from the British failure to accept the proposed exclusive deal with Turkey, but it is likely that it also reflected İnönü’s desire not to provoke Germany by witholding supplies of chromite…” (Hale, W.)

1939-1945: WWII and TFP• “Obviously, the beginning of ‘Barbarossa’ also effected Turkey’s relations with

both Moscow and London, since Britain and the Soviet Union were now fighting on the same side. Their first concern was to try to allay Turkish suspicions about Soviet ambitions at the straits. Accordingly, on 28 July 1941, Stalin held told İnönü that he had no interest in revising the Montreaux Convention.” (Hale, W.) On 10 August, Britain and the SU issued a joint decleration “stating their fidelity to Montreuax rules…”. “However, it does not appear that the Turks were reassured by these statements. Their suspicions were naturally strengthened by the Anglo-Soviet invasion and occupation of neighbouring Iran in August 1941.” (Hale, W.)

• “…both the British and Soviet governments realised that the best they could do would be to try to keep Turkey as a neutral buffer at this stage...However, behind the scenes, and by August 1942, Churchill was trying to persuade his two allies (which now included the United States) that their next priority must be try to knock Italy out of the war, and bring Turkey in.” (Hale, W.)

1939-1945: WWII and TFP• “Clearly, the full entry of the United States into the war following the Japanese

attack on Pearl Harbour in December 1941 was probably the decisive event which determined that, in the long run, the Axis would lose the war. However,…Turkey’s position was not effectively changed until the winter of 1942-43-first by the German defeat at el-Alamein in October-November 1942 and the consequent allied landings in Algeria and Morocco, which ended the Axis threat to the Middle East, …”(Hale, W.) Turkey had to deal with a political environment in which the Allies’ campaign was to bring Turkey into the war, esp. Following the developments with the Casablanca Conference (Jan. 1943) where there remained no possibility of a negotiated peace between Germany and the Allies…Turkish policy was determined, first by the fear that if Turkey joined the war on the Allied side with inadequate preparation or support it would still be very vulnerable to a retaliatory attack by Germany. Equally, Stalin might use Turkish entry into the war as an excuse for Soviet entry into Turkey. On the other hand, if Turkey bluntly rejected the Allies’ proposals then it would be left dangerously isolated, and in a very weak position to resist Soviet ambitions at the straits and elsewhere in the post-war world.” (Hale, W.)

1939-1945: WWII and TFP• İnönü and his cabinet decide to play for time, to avoid

committing country to war unless it’s an offensive one and to keep the balance in their relations with the Allies.

• “The initiative for bringing Turkey into the war came principally from Winston Churchill…It depended on bringing military supplies into Turkey via Syria and elsewhere, and originally assumed that Turkey would invade the Balkans in the spring of 1943, so as to strike Germany’s southern flank. The main obstacles to this project was the reluctance of the Turks to get dragged into the war, objections from the British Foreign Office,…, and from military commanders…

1939-1945: WWII and TFP• The Adana Meeting: İnönü decided to talk directly with Churchill at

a meeting in a train parked near Adana on 30-31 July 1943. “İnönü’s main objective was to avoid committing Turkey to war against the Axis, and in turn to obtain the maximum amount of military supplies for Turkey and to warn Churchill about Stalin’s likely post-war intentions…When Churchill suggested that air bases should be prepared in Turkey for the Royal Air Force (RAF), the Turks responded that even if German was now not what it had been, Germany was still capable of reacting by overrunning the straits, and reducing İstanbul and Turkey’s few industrial installations to rubble.Hence, it was eventually agreed that Britain would not ask for any immediate committments from Turkey, …If it became belligerent,

1939-1945: WWII and TFP• Turkey’s territory would be fully guaranteed by Britain after

the war…The only clear and immediate committment on both sides was that Turkey should receive an increased flow of arms and infrastructural support.”(Hale, W.)

• Following the Adana meeting Turkish policy was to postpone the date at which they might be required to enter the war indefinitely.

• 1943: Italy collapsed. Britain began to invade Dodacanese. However, Germany was still a strong power in the eastern Mediterranean and Dodacanese operation turned into a disaster for the British.

1939-1945: WWII and TFP• The Moscow meetings: The meetings at Moscow were held

between Eden, Molotow and the US Secretary of State, Hull between 19 October and 1 November 1943. Molotov, at the meetings proposed that Turkey should be told to join the Allies. The USA had its own proposal that Turkey should be asked to allow the establishment of Allied air bases in Turkey and to enter the war by the end of 1943.

• The 1st Cairo meeting: Eden put these proposals to Menemencioğlu at a meeting in Cairo (5-8 November 1943). Menemencioğlu, on behalf of Turkey did not accept these proposals.

1939-1945: WWII and TFP• Turkey stated in a message of 22 November that Turkey was prepared to enter

the war “in principle” if only it received adequate protection against a German attack.

• The Tehran Conference: The question about Turkey’s entrance to war was also discussed at the Tehran Conference between Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin ( 28 November-1 December 1943). The conference concluded that it was “most desirable” for Turkey to enter the war by the end of the year, and fixed 14 February 1944 as the date by which it should become an active participant.

• The 2nd Cairo meeting: These proposals were put to İnönü at a second Cairo meeting with Roosevelt and Churchill on 4-6 December 1943. İnönü continued to stress Turkey’s military inadequacy, and the shortfall in supplies from the British. “Turkey’s participation in the war, İnönü argued, would depend on nthe organization of a joint Allied offensive in the Balkans…İnönü realised that Roosevelt was sceptical about the idea of bringing Turkey in, and exploited this difference between Britain and the United States to delay action.” (Hale, W.)

1939-1945: WWII and TFP• Finally, it was understood that Turkey would committ itself to accept a military

mission to discuss the preparation of the proposed air bases and to reserve the right to decide by 15 Feb. 1944 whether Turkey would allow the Allies to use them.

• Von Papen was very well informed about the Cairo conference. A German agent called Cicero, “…made it clear to the Turks that accepting Allied aircraft on Turkish soil would mean immediate war with Germany and, was assured by Menemencioğlu 0n 18 December that Turkey would remain neutral…on 12 December, the Turkish government duly informed the Allies that Turkey would exercise its option not to receive Allied air detachments by the target date of 15 February.A military mission arrived in Ankara, but left on 4 February 1944 after making no progress, and the British decided to stop their programme of re-equpping Turkey.By the middle of the year, the Soviet government had indicated that it had lost interest in bringing Turkey into war, and opposed the use of British or US forces in the area…”(Hale, W.)

1939-1945: WWII and TFP• The Moscow meeting of October 1944: Churchill and Stalin met and delineated the

spheres of influence in eastern Europe and the Balkans. In this meeting/conference the Turkish Straits issue was once more put on the table. “…Stalin claimed thatthe Montreaux Convention was ‘unsuitable’ and a ‘spearhead’ aimed at Russia: he could not accept a situation in which Turkey might ‘grip Russian trade by the throat’, he maintained. Against the advice of Eden and the Foreign Office, Churchill responded that Britain would have no objection to allowing free passage for Soviet warships through the straits, and that the Convention was now ‘inadmissable’ and ‘obsolete’.” (Hale, W.) The question came back onto the agenda at Yalta, (Big Three meeting) ( 4-11 February 1945)

• “The most contentious issues in relations between Turkey and the Allies during the spring and summer of 1944 was caused by Allied pressure on Turkey to break commercial and diplomatic relations with Germany…On 20 April, Menemencioğlu announced that chromite shipments to Germany would cease immediately…The process was rounded off on 2 August when Turkey formally broke off diplomatic relations with Germany…”(Hale, W.)

•


• One of the decisons taken at Yalta was that to the effect that membership of the proposed UNO would be restricted to those states which had joined the war on the Allied side before the end of Feb. 1945. This decison led Turkey to declare war on Germany and Japan on 23 February.

TFP During 1945-1960 Period

• I. Post-War Settlements and the New World System: A bi-polar world system; Conflictual relations between the two major

blocks;Rapid escalation of tensions;Establishment of military and economic

cooperation organizations within the each block and/or non-block members.

TFP During 1945-1960 Period• II. Turkey and Foreign Relations:• According to W. Hale: “For the Turks, the most important feature of the post-

war world, was its bipolarity, and the fact that the United States and Soviet Union were the only two players who really mattered…the range of Turkey’s options was far more limited than it had been during the early period. It could not opt out of the Cold War, relying on a balance of power between the two Cold War blocks to maintain its security, like most of its Arab neighbours and and other Asian and African states, without running the serious risk of Soviet agression or political domination.”

• Was there a well-founded basis for such an argument to develop during the late 1940 and early 1950s in Turkey? It worths to question and to think about it.

• “Nor did it have sufficient economic, technical and military resources to protect itself, if it choese neutrality. On this account, it was virtually bound to seek place in the Western alliance.” (Hale, W.)

TFP During 1945-1960 Period• “In March 1945 the Soviet government officially denounced the Treaty of

Friendship which it had signed in 1925. Three months later, on 7 June 1945, Molotov told Selim Sarper, …thet in return for renewing the treaty the Soviet Union would demand a new straits convention, negotiated solely between Turkey and the Soviet Union. This would provide for the free passage of Soviet warships through the straits and their closure to non-Black Sea states, the establishment of Soviet bases at the straits, and the retrocession to Russia of the eastern provinces of Kars and Ardahan which had been returned to Turkey in 1921.” (Hale, W.)

• The same issue was brought on to the meeting table of Big Three at Potsdam. Stalin failed to gain British or the Us support for these demand on the Straits. However, Turkish policy makers had some serious doubts about the British position. “Hence, Turkey had to try to secure US assistance.” (Hale, W.)

TFP During 1945-1960 Period• A. Relations with the USA and the EEC countries:• “On 2 November 1945, the United States presented a note to the Turkish

government proposing an international conference to discuss the revision of the Montreaux Convention, at which the United States would support the principle of free passage for the warships of Black Sea powers, and limited access for the fleets of non-Black Sea states…The fact that this response excluded the proposal for the establishment of Soviet bases was the most important point from the Turkish viewpoint…by the beginning of 1946 President Truman had been converted by Soviet actions in Iran and elsewhere where to adopt a much tougher approach than it had demonstrated at Potsdam.

• Truman’s forecast of likely Soviet actions appeared to be born out in March 1946 as the Soviet Union reinforced its substantial military presence in Iranian Azerbaijan, thus threatening both Iran and eastern Turkey, as well as strengthening its forces in Bulgaria which could have been used against either Turkey or Greece. An important boost to Turkish morale came on 6 April 1946, when the battleship USS Missouri paid a visit to İstanbul, to wide public acclaim.” (Hale, W.)

TFP During 1945-1960 Period• Meanwhile, the diplomatic tussle over the straits continued. (From 7 August

1946 to 26 October 1946) Finally, the Soviet government informed the British that a conference to consider a new straits regime would be “premature”. “Meanwhile, Britain was in dire economic straits. On 21 1947 Clement Attlee’s government announced that it would no longer be able to carry the burden of economic support to Greece and Turkey…British and US leaders had been convinced for over a year that the defence of Greece and Turkey was essential for the protection of Western interests in the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle east.” (Hale, W.)

• 1. 1947 Truman Doctrine:• The Truman Doctrine took the form of a speech to both houses of Congrees

delivered on 12 March 1947, in which president asked for approval of a USD 400 million aid programme to Greece and Turkey, to last until the end of June 1948. The programme was passed by large majorities in both houses. (USD 300 million to Greece and USD 100 million to Turkey)

TFP During 1945-1960 Period• 2. 1948 Marshall Plan and OEEC:• Turkey began to receive Marshall Aid in 1948 following the economic

cooperation agreement in 4 July 1948. • Marshall Plan (5 June 1947) • Turkey also became a member of OEEC (12 July 1947) (later OECD) in 1948.• B. International Organizations:• 1. NATO: • Turkey’s first application and refusal (1948) (“…in November 1948, Turkey

formally submitted an unsuccessful application for inclusion in any future Atlantic Pact” (Hale, W.) ) ; (Turkey applied bec. Of the security concerns, bot there were other reasons as well such as Turkey’s acceptance as a member of Western community. Turkey also applied for admission to the Council of Europe, which was accepted in August 1949.)

TFP During 1945-1960 PeriodTurkey’s second application in 1950;Turkey and the Korean War: 1950-1953 Middle East Command Project: Turkey had to overcome some obstacles before her

NATO membership: Truman administration, initially tended to see Turkey as part of the Middle East rather than Europe, and assumed that US interests in the region were minimalcompared with those of Britain.

1951: US support to Turkey’s membership in NATO1952: Membership

• 2. Balkan Defence Pact: 1954, Turkey, Greece and former FR of Yugoslavia• 3. The Baghdad Pact (then CENTO, then RCD) : 1957• C. Middle Eastern Developments and the Eisenhower Doctrine (1957)• D. Turkey and the missile Crisis (“Cuba for Turkey trade”) (1963)• E. Turkey, Greece and the Cyprus issue

Turkish Foreign Policy during the 1970s

• 1. Relations with the USA and NATO:• A. 1969 Joint Defense Cooperation Agreement (JDCA): Rights and authorities

related to the USA and NATO military bases in Turkey were arranged. It was an umbrella agreement which merged all the previous bilateral agreements of the same kind between Turkey and the USA.

• 2. Opium Issue: The USA administration were demanding from the Turkish administrations to cancel the opium raising and to declare it outlaw since 1969 (the Nixon administration). Pressures were increased during 1970. In 1970 Turkey limited the opium cultivated fields. However, it was not enough for the US. Prime Minister Nihat Erim, who established the interim government following the 12 March 1971, military decleration, has declared that Turkey could negotiate for the abolishment of opium raising. The USA adm. Offered 30.000 USD to Turkey to be distributed to the farmers as compensation and Erim governmt. Accepted this ofer: Banned the opium cultivation.


• The USA adm. Sent only 1/3 of the promised compensation. Bülent Ecevit established the government in 1973 and lifted the abolishment decision in 1974. The USA decisiomaking bodies reacted in a strong way. They applied the deceion of embargo on Turkey after the Cyprus intervention!

• The USA lifted up the economic (trade) embargo on Turkey in 1975 (6 October). However, in order to lift the arms embargo the USA had a precondition: To revise the status of military bases in Turkey and sign a DECA.

• DECA was signed in 26 Marc 1976 at Washington between Turkey and the USA. However, the US Congress refused to approve it mainly because there was not a major change since then 1969 JDCA. Thus, 1976 DECA cpould not enter into force. The USA started to negotiate with the Greek administration for a DECA. When the Greeks learnt that Turkey was offered a 1 billion USD loan while Greece was offered only 200.000.000 they wthdrew from the negotiations. The USA administration then recommended to the Congress to approve a ratio between Turkey and Greece: 70% of the loan offered to Turkey had to be spared to Greece.


• This cretaed the famous and problematic 7/10 ratio between Turkey and Greece. The US Congress approved a law in August 1977 by which it was permitted a Foreign Military Sale to Turkey amounted 175.000.000 USD in 1978.

• 2. Relations with the USSR:• The two countries’ top level administrators paved the reciprocal visits

throughout the 1960s. It can be claimed that Turkey was following a relatively balanced and autonomous policy (than block politics) towards the USSR. The two countries have accepted a Good Neighbourhood Decleration in April 1972. Top level visits continued during the 1970s and have led to the decleration of a document on cordial relations and good neighbourhood. These had reflections on economic relations, as well. In 1975, the Economic and Technical Cooperation Agreement was signed. In 1978 a protocol was signed which was covered economic/trade relations for three years, including petroleum sales to Turkey from the USSR (3 billion tons/year).


• 3. Relations with the EC:• A. The Second Stage of the Ankara Agreement:

Additional Protocol and the Financial Protocol• B. 1974: The Cyprus impact• C. 1975: Greek application for full membership

at EC• D. 1977-78: Deterriorated relations end the

frozen relations.• 4. Relations with the Middle Eastern countries

TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY DURING 1980s

• According to W. Hale:• “During the first half of the 1980s, Turkish

foreign policy-particularly in relation to the superpowers- entered a phase of re-engagement in the western alliance, in the sense that the previous tension in Turkish-US relations abated markedly, talk of altering Turkey’s position within NATO subsided, and some of the old suspicion and hostility returned to Turkish-Soviet relations.


• As in the case of the previous phase, this realignment had both international and domestic political causes.”

• International: The second stage of Cold War (Iran, Afghanistan…)

• Internal: 12 September 1980, coup.; November 1982, new cons.; the elections in November 1983)


• Özal era (as PM and then, President)• Relations with the West:• 1. The USA• A. DECA: 1980; 1985 to 1987/88• B. Lobbies (Armenian and Greek)• C. Middle East: Iran; Iran-Iraq war; Rapid Deployement Force Task• D. US loans and credits; foreign military sales: Conditions on the

Cyprus issue and later on, human rights and the PKK issue• 2. The USSR:• A. Military concerns (+)• B. Financial support (-): After 1989 (+)• 3. Europe: Turkey’s relations with the EC?


• 4. Cyprus issue: 1983, TRNC– Özal and TRNC: economic considerations

• 5. The Middle East:• A. Iran-Iraq War: 1980-1988• B. PLO and Turkey (1981 events, 1982 Lebanon events; Sabra and Shatilla

massacres; Arafat’s second visit to Turkey, 1986; Palestinian Intifada (1987); recognition of the Palestinian State, 1988.)

• C. Relations with Israel: decreasing diplomatic relations (1980, Jerusalem case)

• D. Relations with Syria: PKK issue; water problem• E. Relations with Iraq: PKK ; Peshmerges and their escape to Turkey,

1988-89: deterriorating relations with Iraq and Iraq’s violence on Turkmen’s in Iraq.

TFP DURING and AFTER 1990s• I. The End of the Cold War ?• The end of the Cold War, the dissolution of the SU and the Eastern

Block, altered Turkey’s international environment as profoundly as either of the two previous transformations, of 1918-23 and 1945.

• * The security threat from the SU had effectively ended. A series of small successor states had emerged in the Black Sea region, Central Asia and Transcucasia.Turkey now was surrounded by smaller neighbours which were weaker than itself both militarily and economically.

• * Turkey’s foreign policy agenda expanded into new areas. However, Turkey remained a committed member of NATO and an aspirant for full EU membership.

TFP DURING and AFTER 1990s• TFP during the 1990s was profoundly affected by the global

transformation. However, the domestic political environment also had a strong influence over the direction of foreign policy. Turgut Özal’s hold on power was severely reduced by his party’s defeat in the general elections of 1991, and ended with his death in 1993. This opened a phase of serious governmental instability, which severely limited government abilities to formulate or implement effective policies. More radical political currents-primarily those of politicised Islam- also tried to challenge previously accepted positions. The rise of Kurdish seperatism had profound effects on TFP. Finally, economic demands and ambitions came to have an increased role in foreign policy making.

TFP DURING and AFTER 1990s• II. Turkey and the West After the Cold War:• A. Turkey and the United States:• 1. In 1992, when TurkeySDECA with the USA came up for renewal, it was

extended for only one year. Turkey then asked for a renegotition of its terms, but in practice the agreement was renewed on an annual basis. Meanwhile, the US military presence in Turkey was drastically reduced. This was part of the US’ global policy of reducing its military commitments worldwide. By the mid-1994 8 of the 12 US military bases previously established in Turkey had been closed orhanded over to the Turkish forces. The vital NATO airbase at İncirlik continued in operation and it was to be of crucial importance during the Gulf war of 1991 and its aftermath. US military aid to Turkey was also scaled down substantially- partly because of congressional opposition over human rights and other issues, but partly also because there seemed to be less need for it.

TFP DURING and AFTER 1990s• 2. Common interests and common approaches:• a. Both countries supported the admission of new Eastern

European members to NATO, and that of the states of the former SU to the OSCE, NATO’s PfP, and the North Atlantic Cooperation Council.

• b. In the early 1990s, the US helped to sponsor the idea that Turkey could be projected as a model of democracy and the liberal economic system in the newly independent states of Central Asia.

• c. The US gvt. Strongly supported the plan to built an “East-West energy corridor” linking the states of the Caspian basin to the world markets via Turkey, and avoiding Russian territory.

TFP DURING and AFTER 1990s

• d. Turkey also played an active role in supporting actions by the UN and then by the USA and the rest of NATO, in BiH.

• e. For both sides, the Gulf crisis of 1990-1991 was a critical turning point, since it gave Turkey an important actual and potential role in US policy in the Middle East:

• -2 Aug. 1990: Iraq invade Kuwait;• -6 Aug. 1990: The UN Resn. No. 661 (economic

embargo to Iraq);

TFP DURING and AFTER 1990s• -8 Aug. 1990: It was announced that Turkey would suspend all commercial

dealings with Iraq and close the oil pipeline from Kirkuk to Yumurtalık.• The Turkish gvt. had also have to face with crucial questions of sending troops to

join the war in the gulf; or to open a second front against Iraq; or to allow the coalition powers to use İncirlik for attacks on targets in N. Iraq. This has led to a political crises in Turkey which caused to the resignation of two ministers and the Chief of General Staff. Opposition was supported by M. Yılmaz, who was one of the most important figures within ANAP. Finally, Turkey gave permission to the coaltion forces to use İncirlik for regular aircraft sorties. The second wave of the crisis came with the flood of Kurdish refugees from Iraq to Iran and Turkey, mainly. (April 1991)

• 7 April 1991: Özal’ proposal to establis a “safe heaven” in N. Iraq. The idea was adopted by the British and US gvts. Under the UN Sec. Coun. Resn No. 688 an intl. Force was stationed at Silopi. Virtually most of the refugees returned to Iraq by the end of May as part of “Operation Provide Comfort.”

TFP DURING and AFTER 1990s• *No fly zones in Iraq north of the 36th paralell and south of the 32nd

paralell were established.• For T. Özal the primary reason for supporting the coalition in the Gulf

war was that it would re-establish Turkey’s strategic importance in the eyes of the western powers, esp. The USA. He also hoped that the war would result in the fall of S. Hussein and his replacement with a democratic regime in Iraq which could work out a settlement with the Kurds, restore Baghdad’s control in the north of the country and thus prevent the PKK from using it as a base for its attacks in Turkey. However, S. Hussein stood in power and Turkey’s economic losts grew stemming from the trade embargo against Iraq. Turkey did not receive a major support from her Western allies and thus had to maintain and actually develop eceonomic ties wit ME countries.


• More critically, the question of continuing the mandate for “the Operation Provide Comfort” turned out to be a problematic one in Turkey. It was feared that it might be used by the USA for other operations in the ME, over which Turkey had no control or that it was a part of a Western project to promote the establishment of an independent Kurdish state. The name of the operation was changed to “Northern watch” as from the beginning of 1997.

TFP DURING and AFTER 1990s• According to K. Kirişçi, “…a key point of convergence between the

United States and Turkey was thier common interest in the emergence of democratic, secular, pro-Western regimes in the area and their desire to prevent the rebuilding of a Soviet/Russian empire.”

• “In the early 1990s…many US decision-makers even promoted Turkey’s market oriented economy, democracy, and secularism as a model for Central Asian republics of the former Soviet Union. Many also talked about Turkey becoming a bridge between the West and those nations…both governments also saw those countries’ admissions to OSCE, NATO’s Partnership for Peace Program, and North Atlantic Cooperation Council as critical to consolidating a new geopolitics in the ex-Soviet sphere of influence.”


• “By the end of 1990s,…,there seemed to be growing convergence between Turkey and the United States toward a more common geostrategic stance to enhance the region’s independence from Russia and economic integration with the world. A key instrument in this effort was to support the opening of an ‘east-west energy corridor,’ oil and gas pipelines that went through Turkey instead of Russia. (the so-called New Great Game)”


• “Regarding regional economic development …the two countries appear to have similar approaches. Two good examples are the US support given to the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization and Turkey’s membership in the European Union.”

• “All these developments coincided with a period when Turkey had begun to develop relations with Israel, especially after the September 1993 Israel-Palestine Libertaion Organization Agreement.”


• Another important issue of cooperation between Turkey and the USA involved UN and NATO peace-keeping and humanitarian assistance operations.

• At the same time there were/are still important areas of diagreement, based on differing interests, over the status of N. Iraq and the Kurdish issue, sanctions agains Iraq, the Armenian issue, Cyprus and Turkish-Greek relations, and relations with Iran and Syria. The Kurdish issue was exaceerbated because of US annual human right case reports.

TFP DURING and AFTER 1990s• B. Turkey and EU:• 1. Impacts of EU’s deeper and enlarged relations with the CEECs

on relations with Turkey: post-Cold war politics; 1991, Mastricht Treaty; 1992, Lisbon Summit; 1993 Copenhagen criteria.

• 2. Customs Union: 1994/1995• 3. Impact of the Cyprus issue and the relations with Greece:• 1996, Kardak crisis, • 4. Human rights issue• 5. 1997, Luxembourg meeting, 1997 Amsterdam Summit and

the new treaty and Agenda 2000• 6. 1998, Cardiff Summit and the “Strategy for Turkey”


• 7. 1999 Helsinki Summit and forthcoming developments: 1999 Progress Report and Turkey’s official candidacy for EU membership; Association Membership Document (for Turkey, 4 December 2000)

• 8. 2001 NAP( 24 March); 2001, Gotteburg Summitt and approval of Turkey’s NAP; 2001 Laeken Summit (perspective on membership negotiations are the next); 2003 and 2005 revions; December 2004, negotiations to be started at October 2005.

• The latest progress report (2008)

TFP DURING and AFTER 1990s• C. Turkey and the Balkans• 1. General: There are some basic factors which determine

Turkey’s foreign policy towards the region. One of them is historical links between Turkey and the regional countries. These historical links have been established during the time of the Ottoman Empire. Physical and human entities which are still living in the region make Turkey to stay in tune with the regional developments. Besides the very existency of Turkish origin people living in the Balkans there lies another factor at the heart of Turkey’s policy towards the region: Greece or to balance Greece in the Balkans. Furthermore, the geopolitical and strategic concerns in Turkey consist a strong basis for Turkish policy makers to attribute high importance to the Balkans area.

TFP DURING and AFTER 1990s• The stability in the region has an utmost importance from the Turkish point of view.

As Uzgel has stated “Maintaining stability in the Balkans became essential for Turkey’s security.” (Uzgel, İ.; 2001:49) Above all, “…Turkey’s relations with the United States significantly affected the former’s diplomatic and political activity, military engagement, and growing influence in the Balkans.” (Uzgel, İ.; 2001:49) It seems so that ineterests Turkey and the USA were accepted as in conformity with each other if it is the case of cooperation in the Balkans. This proximity of policies of Turkey and the USA, besides the geographic approximaty of Turkey to the Balkans region provoked reactions from Greece and Moscow. These countries were doubtful about Turkey’s increasing attention and influence over the region. “Athens, Moscow, and Belgrade objected to Turkey’s involvement in the Balkans and even tried to prevent its involvement in multilateral peace-keeping operations. Nevertheless, Turkey found allies in Albania, Romania, Bosnia, Macedonia and Bulgaria. It also enjoyed US backing for its policies.” (Uzgel, İ.; 2001:49) One of the main concerns of Turkish policy makers during the 1990s was about Turkey as being encircled and / or contained in the Balkans by an “Orthodox axis.”


• Turkey, tried to balance her relations with the USA on this basis as well. Furthermore, unlike other issues, Turkish-US cooperation in the Balkans did not create any public reaction or significant criticism in Turkey and was received warmly im many of the Balkan countries (except Greece and Yugoslavia)

TFP DURING and AFTER 1990s• 2. Relations with the regional countries:• a. Albania: • Following the end of Cold war period Albania had to face the challenges raised by the

issues such as the Kosovo issue, the status of the Albanian minority in Macedonia, the issue of northern Epirus with Greece and illegal migration of Albanians into Greece. “The 1990s witnessed many high level visits, military agreements between ‘Turkey and Albania’ and even the dispatching of Turkish troops to Albania.”(Uzgel, İ.) Turkish army officers took part in training the Albanian army. Turkey financially supported that country during the caotic days of the collapse of the finacial firms/bankers in the “pyramid”. Turkey supported Albanian membership both in NATO and the Organization of Islamic Countries(OIC). In July 2008, Albania (together with Croatia) signed the Accession protocols and (they) became official NATO members on 1 April 2009. Albania became member of OIC in August 1992. b. BiH:

• “During the war in Bosnia, the Turkish and US positions followed similar courses: both supported Bosnia’s struggle for survival.

TFP DURING and AFTER 1990s• Turkey secretly provided arms to Bosnians, and the United States winked at

Iran’s arms shipments to Bosnian muslims despite the UN arms embargo imposed on all warring sides.” (Uzgel, İ.) Actually, all the warring sides had their own sources of arms trade. The most significant divergence in the US and Turkish approaches to the conflict was the US government ‘s ambivalent attitude toward using force against the Bosnian Serbs. Turkey insisted on stronger actions ranging from lifting the arms embargo to bombing Serbian positions in Bosnia. In addition, Turkey presented a plan for stronger measures to end the violance to the United Nations, the Organization of Islamic countries, OSCE, and the Council of Europe.” (Uzgel, İ.)

• “The United States decided to act decisively after atrocities in Srebrenica in June 1995 and the massacre at the marketplace in Sarajevo the next month. The United States, coupling diplomacy with the bombing of Serbian positions and an advance by Bosnian Muslim-Croat Federation forces, brought the Serbs to the conference

TFP DURING and AFTER 1990s• table…Turkey strongly supported the Dayton Agreement, which halted

fighting between the Serbs and the Bosnians…The Turkish government contributed 1.000 troops to the peacekeeping forces based at Sarajevo and Zenica.” (Uzgel, İ.) Turkey also actively involved in “train and equip” projects to militarily strengthen the Bosnian-Croatian Federation. The United States provided about 100 million USD and Turkey trained several hundreds of Bosnian officers. Turkey forged a similar relationship with Albania. The military cooperaton between Turkey and Bosnia and Albania was hoped to give Turkey an upper hand in the competition with Greece in the region. Turkey also planned to develop efficient and large scale economic ties with Bosnia. However, despite efforts by some construction companies, “…Turkey’s economic ties lagged far behind its political-military ties with Bosnia.” (Uzgel, İ.)

TFP DURING and AFTER 1990sc. Bulgaria:Todor Zhivkov was in power between 1959 and 1989. This isa joke about his era:Zhivkov , towards the end of his era, wanted to meet withBridget Bardot, a once upon a time famous movie star. BBaccepted to meet with him on a condition: She has asked Zhivkov to open all the border gates of Bulgaria. When Zhivkov was informed about this condition he replied bysaying that “Oh, well! She wants to meet with me alone.”(Since he knew that Bulgarians would flow out of border if theywould have a chance.) Gypsies heard about the story and said: “Oh, well! Finally we’ll have a country of our own.”

TFP DURING and AFTER 1990s• “Turkey’s relations with Bulgaria also improved significantly, especially

because of the Turkish minority of 1 million in Bulgaria. Altough that group was subject to a harsh assimilation policy of the Todor Zhivkov regime, especially in the 1980s, the transition to a democratic system brought about radical changes in the minority’s issues.

• The change in status was marked by the establishment of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms…mainly composed of members of the Turkish community.

• Bulgaria’s geographic position is a major consideration for Turkey because sits astride Turkey’s land route to Europe.” (Uzgel, İ.) With the end of the Cold war Bulgaria chose a policy of “equidistance” toward Turkey and Greece. Bulgaria’s quest for security and its emphasis on demilitarization and good neighborliness contributed to Turkey’s security in the Balkans. Turkey and Bulgaria signed the

TFP DURING and AFTER 1990s• Sofia Document in December 1991, pledging not to hold military

exercises within 15 kilometres of their mutual border as well as to establish military cooperation.In 1992, two countries signed another agreement on good neighborliness, friendship and security. Turkey gave support to Bulgaria’s membership in NATO and the EU. Bulgaria became a NATO member in 2004 and an EU member in 2007.

• A number of factors have contributed to the improvement of relations between Turkey and Bulgaria such as the Turkish minority in Bulgaria, desperate economic conditions in Bulgaria and that country’s need to develop better economic relations with her neighbors, Bulgarian reversed attitude to PKK and terrorism issue in the early 1990s.

TFP DURING and AFTER 1990s• d. Croatia:• Turkey and Croatia were started negotiations with the EU in 3 October 2005 and became non-

permanent members in the UN SC in 2009. Croatia became NATO member in 2009.• e. Kosovo:• “The Kosovo problem and its turn to violance, which led to NATO intervention in March 1999,

posed one of the most complex foreign policy issues for Turkey and placed it into a delicate positon…Turkey had been concerned about the situation in Kosovo from the beginning. Its first contact with the Kosovar Albanians was in 1992 when their leader, Ibrahim Rugova, visited Ankara…There were several restraints on Turkey’s policy toward the Kosovo Albanians. First,

• The conflict in Kosovo threatened the delicate balance in Macedonia, with which Turkey had developed close ties…In addition, relations had been strained between the Kosovar Albanians and the small Turkish minority …that had never sided with the Albanians…Turkey’s most important diplomatic initiative during the crisis was the visit of Foreign Minister İsmail Cem to Belgrade in 1998…Turkey proposed that Kosovo’s autonomy should be restored and the rights of the Albanians respected, but also stressed support for Yugoslavia’s territorial integrity and maintainig existing borders.

• Kosovo declared independence on 17 Feb. 2008 and Turkey recognized Kosovo on 18 Feb. 2008.

TFP DURING and AFTER 1990s• f. Greece:

Problems related to the Aegean Sea: Territorial waters; continental shelf; demilitarization of the islands; and FIR.Problems related to minorities in Istanbul and Western Thrace.

i. The Cyprus issue:Establishment of the TRNC

The EU impact(brfore and after 1999)S-300 caseApproximity talks/meetingsAnnan Plan and the reactions of both sides: Main thesis and the clash of interests.

TFP DURING and AFTER 1990s• g. Montenegro: Declared independence in 3 June 2006, Turkey recognized in 12 June

2006. Applied for NATO membership at 2008, and the same year it was given NATO MAP.

• h. Republic of Macedonia:• Macedonia declared independence in Sept. 1991. Turkey became the second country to

recognize Macedonia and the first country to open an embassy in Skopje in 1993. A military cooperation agreement was signed in March 1995 envisaging technical assistance to Macedonai and allowed the Macedonian officals to be trained in Turkey.

• “Among Macedonia’s many problems, the one with Greece was the most dangerous…Turkey regarded Macedonia’s survival as an essential condition for stability in the Balkans…the Turkish minority in Macedonia (3.85% of the population) is also a factor in bilateral relations.

• i. Romania:• “Turkey’s relations with Romania …were shaped by three factors: Romania’s desire for

accession to NATO, Turkey’s sensitivity over PKK activities in Romania, and Romania’s emergence as Turkey’s biggest trade partner in the Balkans.


• j. Serbia• 3. Regional organizations:• a. Southeastern Cooperation Process• b. Regional Cooperation Council


• Turkey and the relations with the Russian Federation and the Caucasus States

• (Lecture by Burçin Canar )• Turkey and the Energy Politics• (Lecture by Dr. Cenk Pala)• Turkey and the issue of East Turkistan• (Lecture by Assoc. Prof. Dr. Erkin Ekrem)• Turkey and the Middle East• (Lecture by Fatih Koraş)

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TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY Summer School, 2008-2009

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