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IntroductionTheoretical Model
Institutional BackgroundExperimental Design and the Data
ResultsSummary and Discussion
Turnout, Political Preferences and Information:Experimental Evidence from Perú
Gianmarco León
Universitat Pompeu Fabra and Barcelona GSE
10th Trobada, Barcelona GSE
Gianmarco León (UPF and BGSE) Turnout, Political Preferences and Information
IntroductionTheoretical Model
Institutional BackgroundExperimental Design and the Data
ResultsSummary and Discussion
Motivation
Outline
1 IntroductionMotivation
2 Theoretical Model
3 Institutional Background
4 Experimental Design and the Data
5 ResultsBasic ResultsTesting the ModelPreference Agregation and Information Acquisition
6 Summary and Discussion
Gianmarco León (UPF and BGSE) Turnout, Political Preferences and Information
IntroductionTheoretical Model
Institutional BackgroundExperimental Design and the Data
ResultsSummary and Discussion
Motivation
Motivation
Electoral institutions that encourage citizens to vote are widelyused around the world
Objective:Democratization: everyone’s preferences are represented inthe electoral outcomeInduce voters to get involved in the political process
However,Voting, and enforcing these institutions is costlyInduce less informed, or uninterested voters into the polls
Gianmarco León (UPF and BGSE) Turnout, Political Preferences and Information
IntroductionTheoretical Model
Institutional BackgroundExperimental Design and the Data
ResultsSummary and Discussion
Motivation
Motivation
Electoral institutions that encourage citizens to vote are widelyused around the worldObjective:
Democratization: everyone’s preferences are represented inthe electoral outcomeInduce voters to get involved in the political process
However,Voting, and enforcing these institutions is costlyInduce less informed, or uninterested voters into the polls
Gianmarco León (UPF and BGSE) Turnout, Political Preferences and Information
IntroductionTheoretical Model
Institutional BackgroundExperimental Design and the Data
ResultsSummary and Discussion
Motivation
Motivation
Electoral institutions that encourage citizens to vote are widelyused around the worldObjective:
Democratization: everyone’s preferences are represented inthe electoral outcomeInduce voters to get involved in the political process
However,Voting, and enforcing these institutions is costlyInduce less informed, or uninterested voters into the polls
Gianmarco León (UPF and BGSE) Turnout, Political Preferences and Information
IntroductionTheoretical Model
Institutional BackgroundExperimental Design and the Data
ResultsSummary and Discussion
Motivation
Motivation
Voting is at the core of democracy. Yet, participation in electionsremain an open question for most of the economics and politicalscience literatureWe need to understand not only why people vote, but also it is keyto explain who votes, because it determines:
1 Who gets elected and what policies get enactedPerson and Tabellini 2000; Husted and Kenny 1997; Miller 2008; Fujiwara2011
2 To what extent elected officials are held accountableBanerjee, et al. 2010; Chong, et al. 2011; Ferraz and Finan 2008
Gianmarco León (UPF and BGSE) Turnout, Political Preferences and Information
IntroductionTheoretical Model
Institutional BackgroundExperimental Design and the Data
ResultsSummary and Discussion
Motivation
In this paper ...
I explore these issues using a combination of a natural and a fieldexperiment that effectively generates random variation in the finesfor abstention in Perú. The experimental design allows me toaddress four specific questions:
1 How changes in the cost of (not) voting affect turnout?2 What is the effect on the composition of the electorate?3 How does a change in the electorate affect public choice?4 Does mandating voting generate externalities in related
markets?
Gianmarco León (UPF and BGSE) Turnout, Political Preferences and Information
IntroductionTheoretical Model
Institutional BackgroundExperimental Design and the Data
ResultsSummary and Discussion
Motivation
Spoiler Slide
1 A lower fine for abstention reduces turnout. The elasticity ofvoting with respect to the cost is -0.21
2 Consistent with the theoretical model, this reduction inturnout is driven by:
Voters with a lower subjective value of voting/lessinterested in politicsThe uninformedCentrist voters
3 Voters who abstain due to the reduction in the fine: (i) do nothave different policy preferences, on average; (ii) do notacquire less political information; and (iii) are not more likelyto sell their vote, but when they do, have to be paid a higheramount
Gianmarco León (UPF and BGSE) Turnout, Political Preferences and Information
IntroductionTheoretical Model
Institutional BackgroundExperimental Design and the Data
ResultsSummary and Discussion
Outline
1 IntroductionMotivation
2 Theoretical Model
3 Institutional Background
4 Experimental Design and the Data
5 ResultsBasic ResultsTesting the ModelPreference Agregation and Information Acquisition
6 Summary and Discussion
Gianmarco León (UPF and BGSE) Turnout, Political Preferences and Information
IntroductionTheoretical Model
Institutional BackgroundExperimental Design and the Data
ResultsSummary and Discussion
The Voter’s Problem
C(L ; yi ,yL,yRΩi ) represents the utility loss of making a “voting mistake”
Gianmarco León (UPF and BGSE) Turnout, Political Preferences and Information
IntroductionTheoretical Model
Institutional BackgroundExperimental Design and the Data
ResultsSummary and Discussion
Candidate Choice
The utility loss of voting for candidate L is given by:
C(L ; yi ,Ωi ) = E [1u(yi ,yL) < u(yi ,yR) · (u(yi ,yR)−u(yi ,yL)) |Ωi ]
, where, u(yi ,yj) =−(yi −yj)2
Optimal voting rule:
v∗(yi ,Ωi ) =
L
R
if E [u(yi ,yL)−u(yi ,yR) |Ωi ] > 0if E [u(yi ,yL)−u(yi ,yR) |Ωi ] < 0
Gianmarco León (UPF and BGSE) Turnout, Political Preferences and Information
IntroductionTheoretical Model
Institutional BackgroundExperimental Design and the Data
ResultsSummary and Discussion
Candidate Choice
The utility loss of voting for candidate L is given by:
C(L ; yi ,Ωi ) = E [1u(yi ,yL) < u(yi ,yR) · (u(yi ,yR)−u(yi ,yL)) |Ωi ]
, where, u(yi ,yj) =−(yi −yj)2
Optimal voting rule:
v∗(yi ,Ωi ) =
L
R
if E [u(yi ,yL)−u(yi ,yR) |Ωi ] > 0if E [u(yi ,yL)−u(yi ,yR) |Ωi ] < 0
Gianmarco León (UPF and BGSE) Turnout, Political Preferences and Information
IntroductionTheoretical Model
Institutional BackgroundExperimental Design and the Data
ResultsSummary and Discussion
Candidate Choice
Candidate Choice Cut-off
τi =E[y2
R−y2L |Ωi ]
2E [yR−yL |Ωi ]
Optimal voting rule:
v∗(yi ,Ωi ) =
L
R
if yi < τi
if yi > τi
Gianmarco León (UPF and BGSE) Turnout, Political Preferences and Information
IntroductionTheoretical Model
Institutional BackgroundExperimental Design and the Data
ResultsSummary and Discussion
Turnout
t(yi ,Ωi ) =
10
if C (v∗i (yi ,Ωi ))−di ≤Mi
if C (v∗i (yi ,Ωi ))−di >Mi
A reduction in the fines for abstention (Mi ), will cause a reductionin turnoutThis reduction will be more important among voters who:
1 Have a lower subjective value of voting (di )2 Hold less information about the candidates (Ωi )3 Have an ideology closer to τi
Gianmarco León (UPF and BGSE) Turnout, Political Preferences and Information
IntroductionTheoretical Model
Institutional BackgroundExperimental Design and the Data
ResultsSummary and Discussion
Turnout
t(yi ,Ωi ) =
10
if C (v∗i (yi ,Ωi ))−di ≤Mi
if C (v∗i (yi ,Ωi ))−di >Mi
A reduction in the fines for abstention (Mi ), will cause a reductionin turnoutThis reduction will be more important among voters who:
1 Have a lower subjective value of voting (di )2 Hold less information about the candidates (Ωi )3 Have an ideology closer to τi
Gianmarco León (UPF and BGSE) Turnout, Political Preferences and Information
IntroductionTheoretical Model
Institutional BackgroundExperimental Design and the Data
ResultsSummary and Discussion
Outline
1 IntroductionMotivation
2 Theoretical Model
3 Institutional Background
4 Experimental Design and the Data
5 ResultsBasic ResultsTesting the ModelPreference Agregation and Information Acquisition
6 Summary and Discussion
Gianmarco León (UPF and BGSE) Turnout, Political Preferences and Information
IntroductionTheoretical Model
Institutional BackgroundExperimental Design and the Data
ResultsSummary and Discussion
Institutional Background
Voting is mandatory for citizens between 18 and 70 years oldConsequence of not voting → Civil disenfranchisementTo get back full citizen rights, a fine has to be paidEnforcement varies in different instances of government andprivate offices
Gianmarco León (UPF and BGSE) Turnout, Political Preferences and Information
IntroductionTheoretical Model
Institutional BackgroundExperimental Design and the Data
ResultsSummary and Discussion
Institutional Background
Before August 2006, the fine was S/.144 (~ US$50)New Law: The fine was reduced for everyone, and thedecrease was steeper for voters in poorer districts:
Extremely poor districts: S/.18 (~ US$6)Poor districts: S/.36 (~ US$12.5)Non-Poor: S/.72 (~ US$25)
However, information about the new costs of not voting is scarce
Gianmarco León (UPF and BGSE) Turnout, Political Preferences and Information
IntroductionTheoretical Model
Institutional BackgroundExperimental Design and the Data
ResultsSummary and Discussion
Perceive Fines - Baseline
0.0
02
.004
.006
.008
Density
0 50 100 150 200 250Perceived Fine
Full Sample
Density: Perceived Fine−Baseline
Gianmarco León (UPF and BGSE) Turnout, Political Preferences and Information
IntroductionTheoretical Model
Institutional BackgroundExperimental Design and the Data
ResultsSummary and Discussion
Outline
1 IntroductionMotivation
2 Theoretical Model
3 Institutional Background
4 Experimental Design and the Data
5 ResultsBasic ResultsTesting the ModelPreference Agregation and Information Acquisition
6 Summary and Discussion
Gianmarco León (UPF and BGSE) Turnout, Political Preferences and Information
IntroductionTheoretical Model
Institutional BackgroundExperimental Design and the Data
ResultsSummary and Discussion
Map of the Districts Sampled
Gianmarco León (UPF and BGSE) Turnout, Political Preferences and Information
IntroductionTheoretical Model
Institutional BackgroundExperimental Design and the Data
ResultsSummary and Discussion
Script for the Treatment Group
Thanks a lot for your collaboration with our study.Now, I would like to give you some information about the sanctions for notvoting.In August 2006, Congress approved a reduction of the fines for not voting (LawNo. 28859). According to this law, citizens who don’t vote are no longersubject to a fine of S/. 144, but the fine is lower for everyone, and its leveldepends of the poverty level of the district. According to the information youhave provided, if you don’t vote in the October election, you will have to pay afine of S/.[AMOUNT IN THE DISTRICT WHERE THE VOTER ISREGISTERED].
Gianmarco León (UPF and BGSE) Turnout, Political Preferences and Information
IntroductionTheoretical Model
Institutional BackgroundExperimental Design and the Data
ResultsSummary and Discussion
Script for the Control Group
Thanks a lot for your collaboration with our study.Now, I would like to give you some information about the sanctions for notvoting.Recall that in Perú, abstaining in any election is subject to a sanction, whichentails the payment of a fine.
Gianmarco León (UPF and BGSE) Turnout, Political Preferences and Information
IntroductionTheoretical Model
Institutional BackgroundExperimental Design and the Data
ResultsSummary and Discussion
Measurement
One of the advantages of my research design is that I am able tomeasure turnout objectively:
Gianmarco León (UPF and BGSE) Turnout, Political Preferences and Information
IntroductionTheoretical Model
Institutional BackgroundExperimental Design and the Data
ResultsSummary and Discussion
Basic ResultsTesting the ModelPreference Agregation and Information Acquisition
Outline
1 IntroductionMotivation
2 Theoretical Model
3 Institutional Background
4 Experimental Design and the Data
5 ResultsBasic ResultsTesting the ModelPreference Agregation and Information Acquisition
6 Summary and Discussion
Gianmarco León (UPF and BGSE) Turnout, Political Preferences and Information
IntroductionTheoretical Model
Institutional BackgroundExperimental Design and the Data
ResultsSummary and Discussion
Basic ResultsTesting the ModelPreference Agregation and Information Acquisition
Turnout
.9.9
2.9
4.9
6.9
8Tu
rnou
t
Non−poor Poor Ext. PoorPoverty Level of the District
Control Treatment
Gianmarco León (UPF and BGSE) Turnout, Political Preferences and Information
IntroductionTheoretical Model
Institutional BackgroundExperimental Design and the Data
ResultsSummary and Discussion
Basic ResultsTesting the ModelPreference Agregation and Information Acquisition
Perceived Fine (Non Poor): Baseline and Follow-up0
.002
.004
.006
.008
Density
0 50 100 150 200 250Perceived Fine
Control Treatment
Voters from Non−Poor Districts
Density: Perceived Fine−Baseline
0.0
05
.01
.015
Density
0 50 100 150 200 250Perceived Fine
Control Treatment
Voters from Non−Poor Districts
Density: Perceived Fine−Follow−up
Gianmarco León (UPF and BGSE) Turnout, Political Preferences and Information
IntroductionTheoretical Model
Institutional BackgroundExperimental Design and the Data
ResultsSummary and Discussion
Basic ResultsTesting the ModelPreference Agregation and Information Acquisition
Perceived Fine (Poor): Baseline and Follow-up0
.002
.004
.006
.008
Density
0 50 100 150 200 250Perceived Fine
Control Treatment
Voters from Poor Districts
Perceived Fine−Baseline
0.0
05
.01
.015
Density
0 50 100 150 200 250Perceived Fine
Control Treatment
Voters from Poor Districts
Perceived Fine−Follow−up
Gianmarco León (UPF and BGSE) Turnout, Political Preferences and Information
IntroductionTheoretical Model
Institutional BackgroundExperimental Design and the Data
ResultsSummary and Discussion
Basic ResultsTesting the ModelPreference Agregation and Information Acquisition
Perceived Fine (Extreme Poor): Baseline and Follow-up0
.002
.004
.006
.008
Density
0 50 100 150 200 250Perceived Fine
Control Treatment
Voters from Extremely Poor Districts
Density: Perceived Fine−Baseline
0.0
05
.01
.015
Density
0 50 100 150 200 250Perceived Fine
Control Treatment
Voters from Extremely Poor Districts
Density: Perceived Fine−Follow−up
Gianmarco León (UPF and BGSE) Turnout, Political Preferences and Information
IntroductionTheoretical Model
Institutional BackgroundExperimental Design and the Data
ResultsSummary and Discussion
Basic ResultsTesting the ModelPreference Agregation and Information Acquisition
Estimation Strategy
Given the imperfect compliance among the treatment group andlearning in the control group, I rely on the exogenous variation inthe changes in the perceived fines introduced by the treatment toestimate the local average treatment effect (LATE)The first stage is given by:
4Fine ij = β1NonPoorij ·Treatij +β2Poorij ·Treatij +β3Poorij +β4NonPoorij +γXij +δk +νij
The effect of changes in the perceived fines on turnout for voterswhose information set was updated by the treatment is estimated inthe second stage:
Voteij = β14Fine ij + β2Poor ij + β3NonPoor ij + γXij + δk + εij
Gianmarco León (UPF and BGSE) Turnout, Political Preferences and Information
IntroductionTheoretical Model
Institutional BackgroundExperimental Design and the Data
ResultsSummary and Discussion
Basic ResultsTesting the ModelPreference Agregation and Information Acquisition
Effect of the Treatment on Perceived Fine (FS)
Dep. Var: 4 Perceived FineNon-Poor Poor All
Treatment: Fine S/.72 -18.807 -19.317(4.905)∗∗∗ (4.854)∗∗∗
Treatment: Fine S/.36 -30.465 -30.340(4.756)∗∗∗ (4.692)∗∗∗
Controls Y Y YVillage FE Y Y YMean dep. var. -48.00 -64.99 -56.65Obs. 851 882 1733F-statistic 14.68 41.03 28.66
Gianmarco León (UPF and BGSE) Turnout, Political Preferences and Information
IntroductionTheoretical Model
Institutional BackgroundExperimental Design and the Data
ResultsSummary and Discussion
Basic ResultsTesting the ModelPreference Agregation and Information Acquisition
IV
Dep. Var: Voted in the 2010 ElectionNon-Poor Poor All
4 Perceived Fine 0.0014 0.0017 0.0016(0.0009)∗ (0.0006)∗∗∗ (0.0005)∗∗∗
Controls Y Y YVillage FE Y Y YMean dep. var. 0.948 0.941 0.945Obs. 850 882 1732F-statistic 14.68 41.03 28.66
Reduction in turnout for the average voter in: non-poor district 6.72pp;poor district 11.04pp.
Elasticity of voting with respect to the cost is -0.21
Gianmarco León (UPF and BGSE) Turnout, Political Preferences and Information
IntroductionTheoretical Model
Institutional BackgroundExperimental Design and the Data
ResultsSummary and Discussion
Basic ResultsTesting the ModelPreference Agregation and Information Acquisition
IV
Dep. Var: Voted in the 2010 ElectionNon-Poor Poor All
4 Perceived Fine 0.0014 0.0017 0.0016(0.0009)∗ (0.0006)∗∗∗ (0.0005)∗∗∗
Controls Y Y YVillage FE Y Y YMean dep. var. 0.948 0.941 0.945Obs. 850 882 1732F-statistic 14.68 41.03 28.66
Point estimates for poor and non-poor are not statistically significant:constant elasticity through the income distribution
Gianmarco León (UPF and BGSE) Turnout, Political Preferences and Information
IntroductionTheoretical Model
Institutional BackgroundExperimental Design and the Data
ResultsSummary and Discussion
Basic ResultsTesting the ModelPreference Agregation and Information Acquisition
Interest in Politics
Dep. Var.: Voted in the 2010 Election(1) (2)
4 Fine*Very interested in politics 0.0001(0.0018)
4 Fine*Interested in politics 0.0012(0.0007)∗
4 Fine*Not interested in politics 0.0018(0.0007)∗∗∗
4 Fine*Very interested in results 0.0007(0.0006)
4 Fine*Interested in results 0.0018(0.0007)∗∗∗
4 Fine*Not interested in results 0.0039(0.001)∗∗
The reduction in turnout due to a decrase in Mi is stronger among voterswith a lower di
Gianmarco León (UPF and BGSE) Turnout, Political Preferences and Information
IntroductionTheoretical Model
Institutional BackgroundExperimental Design and the Data
ResultsSummary and Discussion
Basic ResultsTesting the ModelPreference Agregation and Information Acquisition
Information About the Candidates
Dep. Var: Voted in the 2010 Election(1) (2) (3)
4 Perceived Fine 0.0024 0.0022 0.0024(0.0008)∗∗∗ (0.0007)∗∗∗ (0.0008)∗∗∗
4 Fine*Candidate recall -.0023(0.0012)∗∗
4 Fine*Party recall -.0022(0.0011)∗
4 Fine*Cand. + Party recall -.0027(0.0012)∗∗
A reduction in Mi causes a larger reduction in turnout among voters whohave less informartion about the candidates (Ωi)
Gianmarco León (UPF and BGSE) Turnout, Political Preferences and Information
IntroductionTheoretical Model
Institutional BackgroundExperimental Design and the Data
ResultsSummary and Discussion
Basic ResultsTesting the ModelPreference Agregation and Information Acquisition
Ideological Positions
Dep. Var: Voted in the 2010 Election(1) (2)
4 Fine*Left -.0009(0.0026)
4 Fine*Center 0.0015(0.0006)∗∗∗
4 Fine*Right 0.0009(0.0008)
4 Fine*Policy Extreme 1 (Pub. Goods) 0.001(0.0013)
4 Fine*Policy Center 0.002(0.0007)∗∗∗
4 Fine*Policy Extreme 2 (Club Goods) 0.0006(0.0009)
The reduction in turnout due to a decrase in Mi is explained by centristvoters (whose yi is closer to τi )
Gianmarco León (UPF and BGSE) Turnout, Political Preferences and Information
IntroductionTheoretical Model
Institutional BackgroundExperimental Design and the Data
ResultsSummary and Discussion
Basic ResultsTesting the ModelPreference Agregation and Information Acquisition
Preference Aggregation and Information Acquisition
Lower fines for not voting draw a lower share of the populationthe polls
Particularly, voters who are in the center of the ideologicalspectrum, those who have lower subjective value of voting,and uninformed voters select out of the pool
The natural question that follows regards the implications forthe aggregation of citizen preferences and informationacquisition
Theory is mixed on mandatory voting: Krishna and Morgan(2011), Ghosal and Lockwood (2009)Information acquisition: Martinelli (2005), Oliveros (2011),Degan (2011)
Gianmarco León (UPF and BGSE) Turnout, Political Preferences and Information
IntroductionTheoretical Model
Institutional BackgroundExperimental Design and the Data
ResultsSummary and Discussion
Basic ResultsTesting the ModelPreference Agregation and Information Acquisition
Policy Preferences
Dep. Var.: Voted in the 2010 ElectionCoeff. on Coeff. on
4 Perceived Fine 4 Perceived Fine*PolicyPolicyHealth 0.0019 -.0005
(0.0008)∗∗ (0.0009)Education 0.0009 0.0012
(0.0005)∗ (0.001)Infrastructure 0.001 0.0007
(0.0011) (0.0012)Order and Security 0.0022 -.0012
(0.0007)∗∗∗ (0.001)Promote micro-enterprises/training 0.0016 0.0002
(0.0005)∗∗∗ (0.0012)Agriculture 0.0022 -.0020
(0.0007)∗∗∗ (0.0008)∗∗Youth/Women 0.0013 0.0013
(0.0006)∗∗ (0.0011)Cleaning/Environment 0.0013 0.0007
(0.0005)∗∗ (0.001)Institutions 0.0018 -.0010
(0.0006)∗∗∗ (0.001)Social/work programs 0.0017 -.0004
(0.0006)∗∗∗ (0.001)
Gianmarco León (UPF and BGSE) Turnout, Political Preferences and Information
IntroductionTheoretical Model
Institutional BackgroundExperimental Design and the Data
ResultsSummary and Discussion
Basic ResultsTesting the ModelPreference Agregation and Information Acquisition
Information Acquisition
Dep. Var.:4 Candidate 4 Party 4 Cand.+Party
Recall Recall Recall4 Perceived Fine -.0002 -.0005 -.0004
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005)Village FE Y Y YObs. 1733 1733 1733
Voters who are sensitive to the changes in Mi don’t acquire informationdifferentially
Gianmarco León (UPF and BGSE) Turnout, Political Preferences and Information
IntroductionTheoretical Model
Institutional BackgroundExperimental Design and the Data
ResultsSummary and Discussion
Basic ResultsTesting the ModelPreference Agregation and Information Acquisition
Vote Buying
Dep. Var:Accepted Money S/. Accepted
for her vote? Directly4 Perceived Fine -.0010 -.0303
(0.0009) (0.0161)∗
Controls Y YVillage FE Y YMean dep. var. 0.287 2.20Obs. 1733 1733R2 -.0103 -.028F-statistic 28.675 28.675
A reduction in Mi (increase in the opportunity cost of voting) doesn’taffect the amount of vote buying, but makes the votes more expensive
Gianmarco León (UPF and BGSE) Turnout, Political Preferences and Information
IntroductionTheoretical Model
Institutional BackgroundExperimental Design and the Data
ResultsSummary and Discussion
Outline
1 IntroductionMotivation
2 Theoretical Model
3 Institutional Background
4 Experimental Design and the Data
5 ResultsBasic ResultsTesting the ModelPreference Agregation and Information Acquisition
6 Summary and Discussion
Gianmarco León (UPF and BGSE) Turnout, Political Preferences and Information
IntroductionTheoretical Model
Institutional BackgroundExperimental Design and the Data
ResultsSummary and Discussion
Summary and Discussion
1 The elasticity of voting with respect to the cost is -0.212 The reduction in turnout caused by the lower fine changes the
composition of the electorate
Voters who are in the center of the ideological spectrum, thosewho have lower subjective value of voting (or who are lessinterested in politics), and uninformed voters select out of thepool of votersVoters who select out of the electorate do not seem to havedifferent policy preferences than those who vote regardless ofthe finesVoters do not stop acquiring political information
Gianmarco León (UPF and BGSE) Turnout, Political Preferences and Information
IntroductionTheoretical Model
Institutional BackgroundExperimental Design and the Data
ResultsSummary and Discussion
Thanks!
Gianmarco León (UPF and BGSE) Turnout, Political Preferences and Information
IntroductionTheoretical Model
Institutional BackgroundExperimental Design and the Data
ResultsSummary and Discussion
Effect of the Treatment on Turnout (RF)
Dep. Var: Voted in the 2010 ElectionNon-Poor Poor All
Treatment: Fine S/.72 -.027 -.026(0.015)∗ (0.015)∗
Treatment: Fine S/.36 -.052 -.053(0.016)∗∗∗ (0.016)∗∗∗
Controls Y Y YVillage FE Y Y YMean dep. var. 0.948 0.941 0.945Obs. 850 882 1732
Effect of the treatment on turnout: -2.6pp. for non-poor; -5.3pp. for poor
Gianmarco León (UPF and BGSE) Turnout, Political Preferences and Information
IntroductionTheoretical Model
Institutional BackgroundExperimental Design and the Data
ResultsSummary and Discussion
Change in Perceived Fine
0−
20
−40
−60
−80C
hange in P
erc
eiv
ed F
ine
Non−poor Poor Ext. PoorPoverty Level of the District
Control Treatment
Gianmarco León (UPF and BGSE) Turnout, Political Preferences and Information
IntroductionTheoretical Model
Institutional BackgroundExperimental Design and the Data
ResultsSummary and Discussion
Turnout
Total Treatment Control T - C P-valueExtreme Poor 0.935 0.930 0.940 -0.010 (0.641)Poor 0.940 0.913 0.967 -0.054 (0.001)***Non-Poor 0.948 0.938 0.959 -0.021 (0.175)Total 0.942 0.927 0.958 -0.031 (0.002)***
Gianmarco León (UPF and BGSE) Turnout, Political Preferences and Information