Two Years On:

ALEF-Act for Human Rights

Syrian Refugeesin Lebanon

September 2013

This reporthasbeenproducedwiththeassistanceof IKV‐PaxChrist i andStichtingVluchtel ing. Thecontentsof this reportarethesoleresponsibi l ity of ALEF–actforhumanr ightsandcan

innowaybetakentoref lecttheviewsofSt ichtingVluchtel ing.

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Acknowledgement

ALEFispleasedtoexpressitsgratitudetoallthosewhocontributed,directlyorindirectly,totheproductionofthisreport,includingtheALEF’steam,boardmembersandstaff,inadditiontootherdedicatedfriendsthatvolunteeredforthesuccessofthisreportinparticulartheSyrianRefugeeMonitoringUnitteam:

‐ ResearchConsultant:RaneemBaassiri‐ ResearchTeam:MajdNaassan,GeorgesGhali,RayanAshkar

ALEFwouldliketopresentaspecialacknowledgementtothedonorandpartners,IKV‐PaxChristiandStichtingVluchtelingfortheirgeneroussupportandassistance,withoutwhichtheassessmentandfieldworkwouldnothavebeenpossible.

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ContentsAcronyms .............................................................................................................................. 4

ExecutiveSummary............................................................................................................... 5

Methodology......................................................................................................................... 7

Overview ........................................................................................................................... 9

I. RefugeeProtectionintheLebaneseContext.............................................................. 11

RelevantInternationalInstruments ................................................................................ 11

NationalLegalandAdministrativeFramework............................................................... 11

GovernmentResponse.................................................................................................... 13

FundingPolicies .............................................................................................................. 15

AidDistribution ............................................................................................................... 16

II. Cross‐cuttingProtectionConcerns.............................................................................. 19

AccesstoAsyluminLebanon .......................................................................................... 19

Freedomofmovement ................................................................................................... 21

SecurityfromViolenceandExploitation......................................................................... 24

SafetyandAccesstoLawEnforcementAgents .............................................................. 27

ArbitraryDetentionand/orTorture................................................................................ 28

GenderIssuesandGBV ................................................................................................... 30

AccesstoSocialServices:HealthandEducation............................................................. 33

III. ADouble‐EdgedCrisis:ImpactoftheRefugeeInfluxonHostCommunities........ 37

IV. Pavingthewayforpolicysolutions ....................................................................... 45

OptionsforProtectionandCrisisManagement.................................................................. 45

GeneralRecommendations................................................................................................. 48

DonorsandtheInternationalCommunity ...................................................................... 48

LebaneseGovernment: ................................................................................................... 48

UNHCRandpartners: ...................................................................................................... 48

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Acronyms

AND‐AkkarNetworkForDevelopment

AUB‐AmericanUniversityofBeirut

CLDH‐LebaneseCenterforHumanRights

GBV‐Gender‐BasedViolence

IFI‐IssamFaresInstituteforPublicPolicyandInternationalAffairs

ISF‐InternalSecurityForces

MOIM–MinistryofInteriorandMunicipalities

MOSA–MinistryofSocialAffairs

MOFA‐MinistryofForeignAffairs

MOPH‐MinistryofPublicHealth

MOL‐MinistryofLabor

MEHE‐MinistryofEducationandHigherEducation

MOD‐MinistryofDefense

OCHA‐OfficefortheCoordinationofHumanitarianAffairs

PSP–ProgressiveSocialistParty

SGBV‐SexualGender‐BasedViolence

UNHCR‐UnitedNationsHigherCommissionforRefugees

WFP‐WorldFoodProgram

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ExecutiveSummary

AttheendofSeptember2013,therewereover700,000registeredSyrianrefugeesin Lebanon according to UNHCR with more than a million on Lebanese territoryaccordingtothefiguresissuedbytheLebanesegovernment.

TheinfluxofSyrianrefugeesin2013rapidlytransformedtheemergencyintoacrisisandwascompoundedbyasharpdecreaseinfundingbyinternationaldonors.SincethereisnolegalprotectionframeworkinplaceforrefugeesinLebanon,giventhatitisnotpartytothe1951RefugeeConventionandits1967protocol,theoperationalframework between the Lebanese Government and UNHCR is based on amemorandumofunderstandingdesignedfortheIraqi2003refugeecrisis.UNHCRiscurrently pushing for a new MoU which takes into consideration the challengespresentedbytheSyriancrisis.ThelimitedresourceswhichwereavailablehasforcedUNHCRanditspartnerstocutbacktheassistancetheyofferedrefugeefamilies,andto targetonly themostvulnerableaccordingtoastringentselectioncriteriawhichtookeffectinOctober2013.

Given the poor social and economic conditions currently found throughout thecountry, non‐assisted Syrian familieswho do notmeet the vulnerability criteria ofUNHCR,will find it increasinglydifficult to findautonomous sources for livelihood.Efforts to secure a trust fund for Syrian refugees and host communities must beexpeditedtoavoidunemployment,poverty,andtensionbetweenboththerefugeeandhostcommunities.

ALEFexpressesitsconcernoverseverallingeringissuesstemmingfromthegrowingSyrianrefugeescrisis.

1‐ Syrianrefugees’UNHCRregistrationcarddoesnotentitlethemtorefugees’status intheeyesoftheLebaneseauthorities,thusbasingtheirstayontheLebaneseresidencylawwhichrequiresconstantrenewal.

2‐ The refoulement of some refugees at the border by Lebanese GeneralSecurity.

3‐ ImpositionofillegalcurfewsbymunicipalitiesonSyriannationals.4‐ Rising levels of violence and retaliation against Syrian refugeeswithin host

communities.5‐ Continued arrests of Syrian refugees by security forces and deportation

ordersbythejudiciary.6‐ ArbitrarydetentionandtortureofSyriandetaineesandprisoners.7‐ The involvement of representatives of political parties and official security

agenciesincommunalconflicts8‐ Theincreasedvulnerabilityofwomenandgirlstoforcedandearlymarriages

aswellassurvivalsexandvariousformsofGBV.

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9‐ Although stakeholders have facilitated access to social services, healthassistance conditions exclude vulnerable refugees, while the strain oneducational and health services due to soaring demand has resulted indecreasedqualityandshortageofsupply.

The impactofthegrowing influxofSyrianrefugeesontheirhostcommunitiesandsurrounding areas has become clearly visible to observers and inhabitants ofLebanon’s densely populated towns, cities and villages. The most welcoming ofLebanesehavewithtimeraisedthealarmovertheirmarginalizationandthreatenedlivelihoods.Evenwithinmoredevelopedurbancontexts,thesocialbarrierbetweenLebanese and Syrians has visibly intensified,with xenophobia permeating througheverydaydealingsfromrealestatenegotiations,toschoolgroundbehaviour,aswellasotherconfrontationsanycitycouldwitnessonanaverageday.

LebanonhasbeenstrugglingtocopewiththeflowofrefugeessincetheonslaughtofviolenceinSyria.TheinternationalcommunityhasreliedheavilyonLebanon’stestedresiliencetoadapttotherisingrefugeepopulationandencouragedthecountrytooffer“hostingsolutions”whileresettlementremainsundiscussable.

TheSyrianrefugeecrisisisnolongeronlyaboutthemanagementofthedisplaced,ithas become about creating durable solutions that address the root causes of thetensions that existwith host communitieswhich are preventing long lasting socialcohesion, especially with the already fragmented nature of the Lebanese society.ThebroadergoalofprovidingprotectiontoSyrianrefugeescannolongerberealisedwithoutaddressingsecurityandeconomicconcernsofhostcountries.

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Methodology

ALEF’sMonitoring and Reporting Unit has been engaged with Syrian refugee andhost communities in Lebanon, officially sinceOctober 2012, but also prior to thatthrough the regular monitoring and reporting activities that are within ALEF’smandate. Through ALEF’s analysis and meetings with stakeholders and policymakers, a serious concernwas detected regarding Lebanon’s capacity to host andprotectarisingSyrianrefugeepopulation.Furthermore,mediaandfieldmonitoringshowed an increase in the number of security incidentswithin host communities,whicharetriggeredbyacombinationofspecificcommunitydynamics(microlevel)aswellastheturnofeventswithintheSyrianconflict(macrolevel).

In lightof theabove,ALEFsoughttogatherempiricaldataonthesituation,asthebasis for future actions tomobilize an urgent policy debate on the refugee crisis.The following report is theproductof twomonthsofdatacollection. Itpresentsasituationanalysisof(1)cross‐cuttingprotectionconcernsforSyrianrefugees,and(2)conflictrisksandimpactonhostcommunities.

The reportwill be used byALEF, the donor, and partners in advocacy to push forpolicy recommendations among stakeholders/policymakers in embassies, EU,UN,relevant ministries, agencies etc. ALEF’s partners IKV Pax Christi/Pax ChristiInternationalwillusethereport foradvocacyonthe international,andparticularlyEuropeanlevel.

Duetoresource limitations,ALEFwasnotabletoconductacomprehensiveand indepthmappingof protection concerns on a national level. Instead,ALEF reliedonstakeholder interviews, field visits, and literature review in order to produce aqualitativesnapshotasopposedtoquantifiedandgeneralizableconclusions.

The first step of data collection comprised a comprehensive literature review,coveringNGOreports,fieldassessments,mediareports,andotherrelevantmaterial.The literature review was followed by secondary data collection from semi‐structuredinterviewswithlocal,socialandcommunityworkers,humanitarianreliefandprotectionpersonnel, andother stakeholdersengaged in thedomain. Finally,ALEF’s research teamconducted a series of field visits to selected locations in theNorth,South,Bekaa,andBeirut.Selectionoflocationswasbasedontwocriteria:

(1) Needs:needsofthestudytoanswertheresearchquestions+protectionneedsofcommunityitself.

(2) Accessibility:theavailabilityofgatekeepersandcommunityinformants,whichareimperativetothestudy.

Usingseveralsources inthecommunityALEFwasabletoproducearicheraccountandtriangulateinformation.On‐sitevisitsincluded:

1. In‐depthinterviews

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2. FieldObservation3. FocusgroupswithSyrianrefugees(whereappropriate/possible)

ALEFwouldliketothanktheNGOsandindividualsthatfacilitatedaccesstothefield,includingarcencielandAakarNetworkforDevelopment(AND).SpecificallywewouldliketoacknowledgeMr.RaedHanna,Mr.WafikHawwari,andMrs.MaysZiadehforintroducingustoSyrianrefugeesintheirrespectiveareas.

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Overview

According to official UNHCR figures, at the end of September 2013 there were763,097registeredSyrianrefugees inLebanon,over70%ofwhicharewomenandchildren.1ThenumberofSyriansinLebanonhasincreaseddramaticallyinaperiodofjustoneyear(2012‐2013),andfiguresarestillincreasingatthedateofwriting.Infact,UNHCRanticipatesthatnumberswillamountto1,000,000byDecember2013,notwithstanding 80,000 Palestinian refugees from Syria, and 49,000 Lebanesereturnees.2 Meanwhile, the Lebanese government has estimated that there arealready 1,000,000 Syrians in Lebanon, taking into account migrant labourers andpersonswhohavenotapproachedUNHCR.3

Syrian refugees are hosted in over 1,200 locations across Lebanese territories.4Breakingthis figurefurtherdown,Syrianrefugeesresidewithincitiesandtowns inabout2,800‘place‐codes’,whichcorrespondtosmallergeographicunitswithinthecadastralzones.5TheBekaaandtheNorthhostthehighestnumberofrefugees,with263,135 individuals in Bekaa and 227,210 in the North (24/9/2013). Meanwhile,181,774refugeescanbefoundinBeirutand90,978intheSouth.6

Despitethismassiveinfluxinaperiodofoneyear,UNHCRhasonlyreceived44%ofneededfundingatthedateofwriting.7Thetotalappealwasfor$1,216,189,393,ofwhich only $529, 659, 196was received.8 The fourth Regional Response Planwaslaunched in December 2012, with priorities set by UNHCR, other UN agencies,internationaland localNGOs,andtheLebanesegovernment.TheplanwasrevisedandthefifthRegionalResponsePlanwasre‐launchedtocovertheperiodofJanuarytoDecember2013.TheLebanesegovernment’sshareof the fundingappeal is justunder$450million,noneofwhichhasbeenreceived.

Althoughexactnumbersaredifficulttoascertain,especiallysincetherearepoliticalmotivations for both upgrading and downgrading the Syrian presence in Lebanon,whatiscertainisthatthemassiveinfluxhashaddirectandindirectconsequenceson

1UNHCR(2013).SyriaRegionalResponsePlan‐JanuarytoDecember2013.Availableonlineat:http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php2Ibid.3UNHCR(2013)SyriaRegionalRefugeeResponse:Inter‐agencyInformationSharingPortal.Availableonlineat:http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=122(lastaccessed:7Octobter)20134UNHCR(2013).SyriaRegionalResponsePlan‐JanuarytoDecember2013.Availableonlineat:http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php5InformationManagementWorkingGroup,UNHCRandpartners.MeetingMinutes26June2013.Availableonlineat:data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/download.php?id=2351.NFISectorCoordinationGroup–MeetingActionPoints21May2013.Availableonline:http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/download.php?id=21566UNHCR(2013)SyriaRegionalRefugeeResponse:Inter‐agencyInformationSharingPortal.Availableonlineat:http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=122(lastaccessed:7Octobter)20137UNHCRWebportal.Figurewaslastupdatedon27September2013.Availableonlineat:http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=1228Ibid.

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allpartiesinvolved.Itiswellknownintheliteratureonrefugeerightsthatnumbersdonotmakeadifferencetotheassistanceandprotection imperative.However, inthecaseofLebanon,numbershavemadeadifference,resultinginshortcomingsinbothprotectionandassistance.WhilethesecuritysituationinSyriashowslittlesignsof improvement, the time element has also been another crucial challenge in theSyrianrefugeecrisisinLebanonandelsewhere.Twoyearsonwards,thenumbersofSyrian families receiving humanitarian assistancehas dwindled,while tensionwiththe host communities inmost parts of the country has generated newprotectionconcerns.

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I. RefugeeProtectionintheLebaneseContext

RelevantInternationalInstruments

The1951UNConventionRelatingtotheStatusofRefugees(referredtohereafterasthe UN Convention on Refugees) is the key international legal instrument for theprotectionofrefugees.TheConventionoutlinesthelegalprotection,socialservices,andformsofassistancearefugeehastherighttoclaimfromthehoststateaswellasbasic human rights including freedom of religion, movement, education, health,accesstojusticeandaccessibilitytotraveldocuments.9

Other international instruments, complementary to refugee protection isinternationalhumanrights law,mainlythosethatcoverrightsbytargetgroup(e.g.womenandchildren),inadditiontoothersthatenshrinethedutytoprotect,respectand fulfil human rights norms regardless of political or security situation. Theseinclude:

InternationalCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRight:pertainingtothecivilandpoliticalrightsofallindividualsonaterritory,regardlessofnationalityinadditiontothefreedomofmovementandprotectionfromarbitrarydetention.

ConventionAgainstTortureandOtherCruel,Inhuman,orDegradingTreatmentorPunishment:stipulatestheprincipleofnon‐refoulment,protectionfromtorture

ConventionontheRightsoftheChild(CRC):protectionandassistanceofchildren

ConventiontoEliminateAllFormsofDiscriminationagainstWomen(CEDAW):coversprotectionofwomen,particularlyfromgender‐basedandsexualviolenceetc.

NationalLegalandAdministrativeFramework

Lebanonisnotpartytothe1951ConventionRelatingtotheStatusofrefugees,oritsadditionalprotocolof1967.However,theLebanesegovernmentstillhasthedutytouphold its international law commitments in accordance with Article 14 of theUniversal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR), and other relevant human rightsconventions.Theseconventionsconstitutionally takeprecedenceovernational lawalthough thisprinciple, theoretically, is seldompracticed incourts. Lebanon isalsounder customary and peremptory obligations to protect refugee rights and insurethesafeguardingofhumandignityandsecurity.

9RefugeeConsortiumofKenya(2012)“AsylumunderThreat”.Availableonlineat:http://www.rckkenya.org/rokdownloads/docs/Report‐Asylum‐Under‐Threat.pdf

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Over thecourseof thecurrentSyrianrefugeecrisis, theLebanesegovernmenthasreiterated time and again that Lebanon is not a place for refuge. Syrians, likePalestinians,Iraqisandotherrefugeesbeforethem,haveavolatilelegalstandinginthecountry.Article32oftheLebaneseLawofEntryandExit(1962)stipulatesthatforeignerswho illegally enter the territory can be imprisoned for onemonth to 3years,fined,anddeported.Intheabsenceofalegalprotectionframework,previousrefugee situations have instead been dealt with through Memoranda ofUnderstanding between the Lebanese government and UNHCR preventingdeportationandminimizingarrests.The2003MOUdescribedinthetextboxbelowdoesnotapplytoSyrianrefugees.10

SyriansenteringLebanonthroughlegalbordersareadmittedbytheGeneralSecurityfor an initial period of residency for 6 months, renewable for another 6 monthperiod.WhileIraqishadthird‐countryresettlementoptions,Syrianrefugeeshavenotbeenaffordedthesameoption,withtheexceptionofsomecountrieslikeGermanyand Sweden who have placed stringent criteria for Syrian applicants.11 The onlyofficialguaranteeagainstarrestanddeportation thatSyrianspossess is their time‐limitedentrypapersstampedbytheGeneralSecurityandtheUNCHR’sRegistrationCertificategranteduponregistrationforhumanitarianassistancepurposes.

AlthoughtheLebanesegovernmenthasthusfarcooperatedwithUNHCRanddealtwiththeSyrianinfluxfromahumanitarianperspective,commitmentisrestrictedtoan unofficial cooperation framework betweenUNHCR and the government. Therearenolegalguaranteesforprotection,whichexposesSyrianrefugeestotheriskofreinterpretation and/or revocation of status at any given time. 12 This risk isaugmented in Lebanon given the unstable security situation and the divergentpoliticalopinionstowardstheSyrianconflict.

Inthecourseof2013,UNHCRhasbeenworkingondevelopinganewMemorandumofUnderstandingwiththeLebanesegovernment.13

TheMoUwouldtackleissuessuchas:

‐ Receptionofrefugees‐ Statusdetermination‐ Temporarypermits‐ Durablesolutions‐ Regularinformationexchange‐ Jointtraining

10MinutesofALEF,UNHCRmeetingon20/11/2013

11Around8,000Syrianasylum‐seekersinSwedenweregrantedpermanentresidency(See:http://www.thelocal.se/50030/20130903/)whileGermanyopenedasylumapplicationsforrefugeesinLebanonwithspecificcriteria.12TheEconomistBlogs:Pomegranate(2013)“LivinginLimbo”15July2013.Availableonlineat:http://www.economist.com/blogs/pomegranate/2013/07/syrian‐refugees13UNCHR(2013)“UNHCRGlobalAppeal2013Update:Lebanon”.Availableonlineat:http://www.unhcr.org/50a9f82824.pdf

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‐ Strengtheningofresponsecapacity

At the date of writing, the proposed MoU remains pending at the Council ofMinisters. It has been circulated to relevant ministries including the MOSA andMOFA for feedback. However, politics continues to stand in theway of approval,particularly when it comes to interpreting the role of UNHCR. The possibility ofrepatriationandthedemographicconsequencesofthesurgeofmainlySunniMuslimSyriansinLebanoncontinuetocausefear,translatedintopoliticalhurdles.Theissueofgovernmentresponsetothecrisis inadditiontothepoliticizationoffundingareelaboratedinthesectionsbelow.

GovernmentResponse

PreviousrefugeecrisesinLebanon,suchastheIraqione,didfacepoliticaldifficultiesbutminoronesincomparisonwiththeSyrianrefugeecrisis.Lebanon’shistoriclinkstoSyria,thecollectivefearofrepeatingthehistoryofPalestinianrefugees,andthedivergent interpretations of the Syrian conflict are all factors that contributed toavoidadoptingasystematicandcoherentprotectionapproachorpolicy.

Thegovernment’sofficialstancehasbeenoneof“disassociation”,orrefrainingfromtakingastandsoas tosteerclearofbecoming implicated in theSyrianconflict. Inreality however, the ‘spill‐over’ of the Syrian conflict in Lebanon became moretangible over the course of 2013, with visible implication of Sunni Islamist andHizbullahfighterswithinSyria.TheQusayrbattleinMay2013inSyriaalsomarkedatangibleshiftinthepoliticalandsecuritysituationinLebanonduetotheostensibleinvolvement of Hizbullah and retaliatory threats on Lebanon by the GeneralCommissionoftheSyrianRevolution.14SinceJanuary2013,securitywithinLebanoncontinuedtodeterioratewithaseriesofexplosionsintheSouthernsuburbofBeirutaswellasTripoli;fightingbetweenproandanti‐SyrianregimesupportersinTripoli;cross‐border shelling in the North and the Bekaa; as well as attacks on armycheckpointsandmunicipalconvoysintheBekaa.

Beyondthesecuritysituation,thegovernmenthasbeenblamedforitsslowreactiontotherapidlyrisingnumbersofSyrianrefugees inthecourseof2012‐2013. ItwasnotuntilDecember2012thatagovernmentplantodealwiththerefugeecrisiswasissued.Theslowreactionisattributabletotheabove‐mentionedpoliticaldisputesinaddition to the fact that the Lebanese government has not received funding frominternational or regional donors despite repeated appeals. Governance vacuumsfurther stalled the implementationof the government’s responseplan, due to thepostponementofparliamentaryelections,theresignationofformerPrimeMinisterNagib Mikati in March 2013, and the continued difficulties in forming a newgovernment.

14Naharnet.“RebelssaytheylostbattleforQusayrbutvowtofight‘Lebanesemercenaries’”.5June2013.Availableonlineat:http://www.naharnet.com/stories/en/85746

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Despitetheplan,aunifiedresponsebytheLebanesegovernmentismissing,ascanbe noted in the divergent discourses used by Ministers and politicians in mediastatements.ThePresidentandMinistersassociatedwithPSPleaderWalidJumblattechoedspeechesofcaretakerPMMikati,infavourofaquickresponse,atthetime.Meanwhile,theforeignministerandcabinetmembers(nowcare‐takers)associatedwith General Michel Aoun have repeatedly either downplayed the impact of therefugee crisis, or called for closingof theborders andmore recently, expulsion orrefoulementofSyriansfromLebanon.15

Contention was also reflected in disagreement over terminology, whereby it wasagreed thatSyrianswouldbe referred toas “displaced”asopposed to“refugees”,seeingtheworddisplacedhasamilderandmoretemporaryconnotation.

Moreover, whereas debates have proposed the role of local governments incoordinating the refugee crisis, the sensitivity of the decentralization debate inLebanon adds another layer of complexity to the policy debate. There is a clearresistance on the part of the central government, through its mandated partiesincluding theMinistry of Social Affairs, theMinistry of Health, and the Council ofMinisterstodelegateresponsibilityandfundingtolocalgovernments.

So far, the internationalandregionalcommunityhasencouragedandcommendedtheLebanesegovernmentforits“openborder”policy,despitetheinfluxofrefugeesandrepercussions.TheU.N.isintheleadinadvocatingthecontinuingofthispolicy.Nonetheless, as per international standards and from a humanitarian perspective,theLebanesegovernmentcontinuestoupholdthispolicyandtherearenosignsofchangeinthenearfuture.

The government through the Higher Relief Committee was registering incomingrefugeesalongsideUNHCRinitially,buttheeffortstoppedin2012,allegedlyduetoinsufficientcapacitytotrackthegrowingnumbersof incomingrefugees.16 In2012,an inter‐ministerial committee composedof theMOSA, theMOPH,MOIM,MEHE,MOL,MOD, and Higher Relief Committee prepared a plan aiming to regulate thesituationofSyrianrefugeeswhenthenumbersstartedtoreacharound150,000.Theinitial plan was launched in December 2012, but was revised at the beginning of2013duetoaninflux.Criticismcirculatedoverthepresenceoftwoseparateplans,one of the UN and partners and the other for the government so efforts wereexertedtointegratethegovernmentplanintotheFifthRegionalResponsePlan.

Sincethentheinter‐ministerialcommitteeheadhasledacampaigntowarnagainstthenegativerepercussionsthatnon‐interventionwillhaveonboththerefugeeandhost populations. It can be noted that this strategy has sought to inter‐link theproblem of refugeeswith that of host communities, in light of the economic and

15Crisisgroup(2013).TooCloseforComfort:SyriansinLebanon.13May2013.Availableonlineat:http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Iraq%20Syria%20Lebanon/Lebanon/141‐too‐close‐for‐comfort‐syrians‐in‐lebanon.pdf16Ibid.p.6

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social impact of the influx. Representatives of the Lebanese government in theCouncil of Ministers have thus raised the warning alert for potential conflict andinsecuritydue to labourmarket competition, strainon infrastructureamongotherconsequences.

FundingPolicies

InJanuary2013,adonorconferencewasheldinKuwaitduringwhichtheLebanesegovernmentmadeanappeal for$370million.17Apledgeof$1.5billionwasgiven,withKuwait,Qatar,andSaudiArabiapledging$300millioneach.18Themoneywouldbe channelled through UN agencies as opposed to the government.19 Thegovernment has accused this policy of being politicized given the Gulf countries’stance towards the Hizbullah‐backed government at the time. Meanwhile, otherinternational donors have allegedly withheld funding due to distrust of thetransparencyandefficiencyoftheLebanesegovernment inmanagingthefunds, inlight of previous experiences. Nonetheless, the delay in establishing an adequatefundwithinternationaltransparencystandardshasbeencriticizedandmanycalledformoreeffortbydonorcountriesinfindingalternativesolutions.20

Sincethe issuingofthesecondgovernmentplan inconjunctionwithUNHCR’s fifthRegionalResponsePlan,thegovernmenthasbeenadvocatingforinternationalaid.On 24 September 2013, the Lebanese President spoke before the UN GeneralAssemblytopresentthe latesttrends intheSyrianrefugeecrisisandtoappeal forfundingthroughamulti‐donortrustfundmanagedbytheWorldBank.21Asaresult,the International Support Group for Lebanon (ISG) was formed, which is a newmodel for donor cooperation that takes into account the developmental needs ofhostcommunitiesinadditiontodirectassistancetoSyrianrefugees.Thismodelhasbeendescribedas“forminganexusbetweenhumanitarianaidanddevelopment”.22

17Naharnet.“Lebanonasksfor$370millionaidforSyrianRefugeesatdonorconference”.30January2013.Availableonlineat:http://www.naharnet.com/stories/en/7018418Westall,Sylvia.“Donorsmeettargetof$1.5billionaidorstrickenSyrians:U.N.”Reuters,30January2013.Availableonlineat:http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/30/us‐syria‐crisis‐idUSBRE90S0GU2013013019Ibid.20Minutesofround‐tableorganisedbyLCPSandKonradAdenauerStiftung:“ChallengesofManagingtheSyrianRefugeeInflux”.30May2013.21Alkantar,Bassam.“SyrianRefugeeReliefintheHandsoftheWorldBank”.AlAkhbarEnglish.18July2013.Availableonlineat:http://english.al‐akhbar.com/node/1646022WorldBank,featurestory.“Lebanonbearsthebruntofeonomicandsocialspill‐oversoftheSyrianconflict”.24September2013.Availableonlineat:http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2013/09/24/lebanon‐bears‐the‐brunt‐of‐the‐economic‐and‐social‐spillovers‐of‐the‐syrian‐conflict

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AidDistribution

One of the key criticisms surrounding the distribution of assistance to Syrianrefugeeshasbeenthelackofeffectivecoordinationamonghumanitarianagencies.As reportedby theCrisisGroupearlier this year, initially, “theabsenceofanearlyidentificationandmonitoringmechanismharmedaiddistribution;inseveralregions,where needs far exceeded local capacity, resources quickly depleted”. As timepassed, duplication of assistance became a problem, wherein some areas supplyexceeded demand. 23 Previous reports as well as ALEF’s field research show thatmanyrefugeescomplainedofreceivingtoomuchofonetypeofassistance,suchasmattresses,andtoolittleofwhattheytrulyneedsuchasfoodandrentassistance.Furthermore,refugeescomplainedoftheconditionsunderwhichtheyhadtocollectassistance, reporting overcrowding, shoving, and humiliation by humanitarianworkers and Lebanese security officers at the locations of collection. Aid workersinterviewed by ALEF admitted thatmany staff responsible for distribution are notadequately trained, anddemonstrated arrogant and aggressive behaviour towardsrefugees. Some distribution centres were understaffed and under enormouspressure, resulting in their inability to deal with overcrowding and persistence ofrefugees.ALEFpointsout,however, that theabove‐describedcriticismsaremainlyrelated to some NGOs outside the coordination framework with UNHCR andpartners,whoareoperatingwithlimitedaccountabilityandevaluationmechanisms.

According toWorldVision, “thepresenceof non‐traditional donors, such as thosefromtheGulfStates,hasprovidedbothwelcomeresourcesandnewchallengesforcoordination. These donors often fund programmes outside of the UN system,meaning that it is verydifficult to get an accurateoverall pictureof the resourcescontributed and to coordinate effective implementation on the ground”.24 ALEF’sinterviews with Syrian refugees revealed that refugees often regard these ‘non‐traditional’ donors as an alternative or additional source of assistance to UNHCR.Separate funding fromGulf countries often fills gaps in assistance byUNCHR, butALEFraisestheconcernthatsomefundedimplementingpartnersdonotnecessarilyoperateaccording to international standardsandbeneficiariesare concentrated inareasofaspecificsectorpoliticalallegiance.

Aid workers interviewed also informed ALEF that UNHCR’s relationship toimplementing and operational partners was unclear, wavering unpredictablybetweenapartnershipandadonor‐recipientrelationship.UNCHRhasbeencriticizedforitsshortcomingsineffectivefacilitationduringcoordinationmeetings,whicharestill occurring through sectorial working groups, as opposed to a cluster23CrisisGroup.TooCloseforComfort:SyriansinLebanon.13May2013.P.6Availableonlineat:http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Iraq%20Syria%20Lebanon/Lebanon/141‐too‐close‐for‐comfort‐syrians‐in‐lebanon.pdf24Ibid.

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mechanism.25 These meetings have also been criticized for being too focused onfundraisingandforbeingprimarilyforinformationsharingasopposedtooperationaldecision‐making.26

UNHCRhas also been criticized for its centralized approachwhereby the capacityandreachof localactorshasnotbeenproperlyharnessedfor the improvementofregistration and easing of the large caseload. Whereas waiting periods forregistrationhavedecreasedover time (waitingperiods reachedover threemonthsforsomerefugeesthatALEFinterviewed),thereisstillaminimumforty‐dayswaitingperiod.Althoughusually thetrend is thatregistration isusuallydonebyUNHCRorthe state agents with UNHCR’s support, the current centralized approach toregistration is particularly concerning when it comes to newcomer refugees thatenter the country irregularly. Depending on where they enter, some of theserefugeeshave to travel adistance to reach the closestUNCHR registration centre.Thisdistancemayinvolvecrossingatleastonecheckpoint,whichputsthematriskofarrestanddetention.

Currently,oneofthekeychallengesinmanagingtheSyrianrefugeeinfluxhasbeenthesevere fundingshortage facedbyUNHCRandother relevantagencies.For thisreason, as of October 2013, UNHCR, WFP and partners will be cutting back onassistancetofamiliesastheycannolongeraffordablanketcoverage.

The WFP with funding by ECHO has been conducting a ‘profiling exercise’ sinceMarch 2013 to determine vulnerability criteria upon which the targeting will bebased. The resultant formulawas inputtedonUNHCR’sbio‐data information,witheach input having a certain weight, in order to categorize Syrian refugee familiesaccordingtovulnerability.Someexceptionswereallowedincludedhouseholdswithyoungchildren,elderly,women‐headedhouseholdsamongothercriteria.

Themajority of Syrian families and individuals that ALEFmet with for this reportexpressed confusion over UNCHR’s and WFP decision to stop funding. Familiesinformed us that they received amessage saying that themonthly vouchers theyhavebeenreceivingwillbestoppedasofOctober2013.Severalfamiliesinquiredastohowtheycanreversethedecision if theybelievetheywereunfairlyeliminated.FamiliesnotedthattheyhadbeendependingonWFP’svouchersforfoodandnowtheyare lostas tohowtoproceed in theabsenceof jobopportunitiesorsupport.Manyof themhave already started searching for alternative sourcesof assistancethroughlocalNGOs.

ALEF raises questions regarding the effectiveness of the appeal process. Familiesneed to be better informed about the possibility and procedure of appeal. In

26Ibid.

18

principle,individualscanfilloutanappealformatthenearestcentre(municipality,community centre…); the form is reviewed and followed by a home visit toinvestigate theclaim. It isunclear fromthereonhowadecision is taken,how longtheprocesstakes,andmoreimportantlytowhatisthecapacitytoreverseexclusiondecision if a large number of eligible appeals are submitted. Furthermore, it isuncleartowhatextentUNHCR’sdatabaseareuptodate,especiallyforfamiliesthatregistered two years ago in Wadi Khaled for example. The conditions of thesefamiliesmayhavedeterioratedovertime.Furthermore,theexemptioncriteriasuchas‘women‐headedhousehold’andyoungchildrenorelderlymaynotnecessarilybeavulnerabilitycriteria inrealityasforexampletheycanbesupportedbyLebanesehosting families if inter Syrian‐Lebanese marriage exist. Although it isunderstandable that targeting on a case‐by‐case basis is impossible given thecaseload, it must be noted that there is a risk that this targeting exercise hasexcludedvulnerable familiesasa resultof itsautomatednature. Furthermore, thefateoffamilieswhowillnolongerbecoveredbyassistanceisconcerningfrombothahumanitarianandprotectionperspective.Thisisultimatelytheresponsibilityoftheinternational community and the Lebanese government, who need to expediteefforts,raisefundsnecessarytosupportSyrianrefugeesandhostcommunities.

19

II. Cross‐cuttingProtectionConcerns

AccesstoAsyluminLebanon

According to UNHCR, 88% of refugees enter Lebanese territory regularly throughofficial border crossings controlled by the Lebanese General Security Office.27 Forthosethatenterirregularly,mainlythroughtheNorthernandNortheasternbordersbutalsoonthemainbordercrossings,theirstayinLebanonisrestrictedtospecificareaswithlittlepossibilityformovement.Lebanon’sborderswithSyriaintheNorth,Northeast, and Southeast have been historically porous and not demarcated. Forexample, inthevillagesofWadiKhaled,bothsidesof thebordershareanobviousgeographical contiguity in addition to shared customs, economic activity, andlineage. However, irregular crossings which were previously commonplace arebecomingincreasinglydangerousduetotheproliferationoflandmines.

The Lebanese government has showed no signs of a change regarding the open‐border policy it has maintained since the beginning of the conflict. So far, theinternational and regional community has encouraged and commended theLebanesegovernmentforitsopen‐borderpolicy,despitetheinfluxofrefugeesanditsrepercussions.

The General Security has fortified its border control in the course of 2013 inresponse to the influx of Syrian refugees. In July 2013, the General Securityannounced that border agents would no longer admit Syrians coming from whatwere deemed ‘safe’ areas in Syria.28 Anecdotal evidence suggests that suchmeasurescomeinresponsetoallegationsthatmanySyriansarecrossingtheborderforcollectionofhumanitarianaid,thenreturningbacktoSyriaaftercollection.ALEFhas not been able to verify this but urges further investigation and closercooperationbetweenUNHCRandpartnersand the Lebanesegovernment soas toavoidblanketmeasuresthatharmvulnerablerefugees.

InAugust2013,themediareportedthattheGeneralSecuritywasdenyingentrytoPalestinian refugees coming from Syria, which was later denied by the GeneralSecurity.29 Upon investigating this further, ALEF found viable allegations that

27UNHCR(2013).SyriaRegionalResponsePlan‐JanuarytoDecember2013.Availableonlineat:http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php28NowMedia.“LebanonimposesentryrestrictionsonSyrians”.24July2013.Availableonlineat:https://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/lebanonnews/lebanon‐imposes‐entry‐restrictions‐on‐syrians29Kullab,Samya.DailyStar.”GeneralSecuritydeniesnewbordermeasuresasagenciesseekclarity”.15August2013.Availableonlineat:“http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon‐News/2013/Aug‐15/227432‐general‐security‐denies‐new‐border‐measures‐as‐agencies‐seek‐clarity.ashx#axzz2gZct3RfM;NowMedia.“AbouFaourrulesoutdeportationofSyrianrefugees”.30September2013.Availableonlineat:https://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/lebanonnews/abou‐faour‐rules‐out‐deportation‐of‐syrian‐refugees

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PalestinianrefugeesareinfactbeingsystematicallyrefusedattheMasnaaborderinadditiontobeingdeniedexitpermitswithinSyriabytheImmigrationandPassportsDirectorate.PalestinianrefugeesthatarebeingadmittedusuallyhaveproofoftravelarrangementswithLebanonbeingonlyapitstop.

Other types of refusals at the border occur mainly when Syrian refugees’ officialdocumentation has minor or severe damages (rips, breakage etc.) This is animmediatecauseforrefusal.Furthermore,anecdotalevidenceshowsthatwhereasthemajority of women and children are admitted, there are cases of refusals forsinglemenormenwithoutfamilies.RefusalshavealsobeenreportedincaseswhereSyrianrefugeesexittheborderstemporarilytorenewtheirentrypermitsandreturnback to Lebanon. In such cases, Syrian refugees have reported that there is noguarantee that theywillbeallowedback intoLebanon. Itmustalsobenoted thatSyrian families/individuals that are refused at the border cannot attempt to enteragainbefore a yearhaspassed; this is a graveprotection concern considering theproliferation of violence within Syria and the retaliatory consequences that theseindividualsmayfaceuponreturningtotheareastheyfled.

Attheoutsetoftheconflictin2011,theLebanesegovernmentwasinitiallyresortingto arrests anddetentionof Syrians entering illegally in theWadi Khaled region. InMay 2011, human rightswatchdogs denounced the arrest of 9 Syrians including aminor.30InAugust2012,14SyriansweredeportedbyLebaneseauthorities,fourofwhom reported a fear of persecution by the Syrian authorities.31 In response to alocalandinternationaloutcry,severalstatementsbygovernmentofficialshaveruledoutthepolicyofdeportation.32Nonetheless,officialpolicytowardsSyrianrefugeesremains unclear and divided along political lines, with March 8 ministers andpoliticiansbeinginsupportofmorestringentmeasurestorestricttheentryofSyrianrefugees.33Sincethen,withtheadvocacyworkofUNHCRandhumanrightsNGOs,deportationcaseshaveceasedduetoamoratoriuminplacesinceAugust2012.

Despitethecurrentgovernmentcommitment,ALEFisconcernedthat officialpolicytowards Syrian refugees remains unclear and divided along political lines, withMarch 8ministers and politicians being in support ofmore stringentmeasures torestrict the entry of Syrian refugees.34 For example, caretaker energy minister

30HumanRightsWatch(2011)“Lebanon:StopDetainingSyrianRefugees”20May2011.Availableonlineat:http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/05/20/lebanon‐stop‐detaining‐syrian‐refugees31HumanRightsWatch(2013)“CountrySummary:Lebanon”.January2013.Availableonlineat:http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/lebanon_3.pdf32Dakroub,Hussein.DailyStar.“Deportationofanti‐regimeSyrianscreatespoliticalstorm”.3August2012.Availableonlineat:http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Politics/2012/Aug‐03/183256‐deportation‐of‐anti‐regime‐syrians‐creates‐political‐storm.ashx#axzz2gZct3RfM33CrisisGroup.TooCloseforComfort:SyriansinLebanon.13May2013.Availableonlineat:http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Iraq%20Syria%20Lebanon/Lebanon/141‐too‐close‐for‐comfort‐syrians‐in‐lebanon.pdf34CrisisGroup.TooCloseforComfort:SyriansinLebanon.13May2013.Availableonlineat:http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Iraq%20Syria%20Lebanon/Lebanon/141‐too‐close‐for‐comfort‐syrians‐in‐lebanon.pdf

21

affiliated with the Free Patriotic Movement called in a press conference inSeptember 2013 for the denial of entry to Syrians and the deportation of thosealreadyinthecountry.35

The army intelligence in cooperation with other security agencies havemobilizedlocal informants in order to crackdown on the infiltration of combatants intoLebaneseterritory.Whereasenhancedsecuritymeasuresarenecessary,particularlyfromanational securityandrefugeeprotectionperspective, itmustbenoted thatforceddeportationofarmydefectorsthatareatariskoftortureandpersecutionbytheSyrianregimeamountstorefoulement,whichcontradictsLebanon’sobligationsundertheUNCATandrelevantinternational instruments.Furthermore,ALEFwarnsagainstthepoliticizationofsecuritypolicies,notingthatrefugeeshavereportedfearofthearmyintelligenceandtheinfluenceofpro‐regimepoliticalpartiesonrefugeeandsecuritypolicies.

Renewal of papers has also emerged from the data as a recurrent problematic.Syrians are granted entrance permits for a period of 6 months, renewable foranother 6 months for free. After this period, each family member should renewpapersat theGeneral Security fora feeof$200,orexit and re‐enter thecountry.The majority Syrian families, already living in destitute are unable to pay suchrenewal fees.Whereas UNHCR had been previously assisting financially with suchrenewals,lackoffundinghascausedahalttothispolicy.Familiesthatarescaredofexiting the border and re‐entering it in order to renewpapers for free are now aprecarioussituation.ThenumbersofSyriansinneedoffinancialassistancetorenewtheir papers as we approach the 3rd year of conflict has become too huge to becovered by assistance programs. ALEF urges the General Security to revise itspaymentpolicy.

Furthermore,casesoffalsificationofpapersandentrystampshavebeenreported,which places Syrian refugees at risk of arrest and detention. Those that areparticularlyvulnerablearefamilies/individualswithlittleawarenessthataretrickedby smugglers at the border into paying a sum of $100 or $200 for provision ofdocumentation,whichtheydonotknowisfalse.

Freedomofmovement

In general, Syrian refugees have chosen to reside in areas where they feel safe,according to religious, political, and/or kinship considerations.36 However, manyfamilieshavemoved fromonearea toanothersince their initialarrival (secondary35FirstPost,Fwire.“LebaneseministercallsfordeportingSyrianrefugees”28September2013.Availableonlineat:http://www.firstpost.com/fwire/lebanese‐minister‐calls‐for‐deporting‐syrian‐refugees‐1139137.html36CrisisGroup.TooCloseforComfort:SyriansinLebanon.13May2013.Availableonlineat:http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Iraq%20Syria%20Lebanon/Lebanon/141‐too‐close‐for‐comfort‐syrians‐in‐lebanon.pdf

22

displacement within Lebanon), while newly arriving refugees have also spread tonewparts of the country. As the crisis progressed in the secondhalf of 2013, theimperative tomove to a certain area hasmoved beyond purely political or safetyconsiderations,andhasbeenovershadowedbyprioritiesof livelihood,shelter,andservices. Increasingrentpricesandhostilityof thehostcommunityhavealsobeenreasonsforsecondarydisplacementwithinLebanon.

Syrianrefugees,whetherinurbanorruralsettings,generallyresorttoself‐imposedrestrictionofmovementinordertoprotectthemselves.Theirfearsvaryfromcrime,verbalandphysicalharassment, to theunstablesecurityconditions in thecountry.Tripsaroundcitiesandtownsaregenerallyrestrictedtonecessarymatters,suchascollection of aid, registration/interviewswithUNHCR, or visits to the health clinic.Refugeesthathaveenteredirregularly,orthosethathavenotrenewedtheirpapersforonereasonoranother,arealsorestrictedtotheirplacesofresidenceforfearofarrest and detention, particularly if they have to cross checkpoints. Familiesassociated with combatants or ex‐combatants, or those that have strong politicalaffiliations inSyria,generally fearbeingtrackeddownbytheSyrianregimeorpro‐regime Lebanese authorities. Fear of persecution even drives some to avoidapproachingUNHCRforregistration.

Asforexternallyimposedrestrictionsonmovement,ALEFobservedgraveprotectionconcerns particularly for Syrianmen working in unskilled and semi‐skilled jobs aswellasSyrianrefugeeslivingamonghostilehostcommunities.Themostconcerningpractice is the curfew on Syrian nationals imposed by a number ofmunicipalitiesacross the country. Earlier this year, themedia reported that themunicipalitiesofBaskinta, Benih (Aley), and Betshai‐Mardashe imposed night curfews on Syriannationals. 37 Itwasreportedthatresidents inAley(Benih) forexample,voluntarilyformednight‐watch vigilant groups to patrol themovementof Syrians in the areapastcurfewandthatpatrollersphysicallybeatSyriansthatdidnotcomply.38ALEF’sfield research confirms that curfews are imposed inNiha, Jezzine, Roum, Ankoun,MazraetYachouh,Mansourieh,AinSaade,QornetShahwan,HaretSaida,andZekritamongothers.UNCHRandpartnershavealsoreportedthatcurfewsareimposedinsomeareasofTripoli,BekaaandNabatiehregions.39ALEFalsoobservedevidenceofharassment of Syrian men in particular in the Southern suburbs of Beirut withperpetrators being representatives of dominant political parties that act as‘vigilantes’whomonitorthemovementofSyriansinthearea.

37Fleming‐Farell,Niamh.“AleyvigilantesenforcenighttimecurfewsonSyrians”.8April2013.Availableonlineat:http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Local‐News/2013/Apr‐08/212903‐aley‐vigilantes‐enforce‐nighttime‐curfews‐on‐syrians.ashx#axzz2PrAPqCUb38Ibid.39UNHCR.ProtectionWorkingGroupMeeting‐Minutes.17July2013,Beirut.Availableonlineat:data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/download.php?id=2473 ‏

23

Confiscation of IDs from refugees by municipalities is also a highly concerningpractice.IthasbeenreportedthatmunicipalitiesconfiscatetheIDsofSyriansthatdonotcomplywithcurfewsforafewdaysinsomeareas.InDerElAhmarinRashaya,themunicipality(underthepreviousmayor)hadbeenobligingnewlyarrivingSyrianrefugeestoregisterat themunicipalitybutoncetheydo, their IDsaretakenawayand kept at the municipality. In Bikfaya, refugees reported being taken intoquestioningbymenincivilianclothingclaimingtobesecurityofficers.

The law of municipalities stipulates that municipal police are responsible forensuring security in their respective jurisdictions with the support of the InternalSecurity Forces.40 However, the law does not adequately delineate the respectiverolesoftheMOIMandmunicipalities.MediastatementsbytheMinisterofInteriorhaveconfirmedthatmunicipalitiesdonothavethe legalgroundstoenactsecurity

40GovernmentofLebanon,MinistryofInteriorandMunicipalities.MunicipalAct:Decree‐lawno.118(30/6/1977andamendments).Availableonlineat:www.moim.gov.lb/ui/moim/.../Municipal_Act_Eng.doc

In Jezzine, themunicipality has been taking severely discriminatorymeasures againstSyriansresidinginthearea.InAugust2013,30Syrianmenwhoweregatheredinpublicin theeveningwere reportedly roundedupby themunicipalpoliceandbeatenup inthe Serail building. Local sources informed ALEF that this was one of several similarincidents that were occurring in Jezzine previously. After this particular incident,however, the army intervened and overt harassment reportedly abated for a shortwhileafter.Nonetheless,uponALEF’svisittoJezzineinSeptember2013,wefoundthatharassment continues in a covert manner and touching on Syrian migrant workers.Interviewed Syrian labourers confirmed that they cannot leave their residence after7:00p.m.andthattheyarenolongerallowedtowaitfortheiremployer’strucktopickthem up on the street. Themunicipality has obliged Lebanese employers to pick uptheir employees from their place of residence due to the prohibition of publiccongregationforSyrians.ReportshavealsoshownthatSyrianfamilies ingeneralhavebeenwarned to keep theirwindows closed in order not to cause disturbance. (See:SwissSolidareAssessmentAugust2013)

InterviewswithlocalcitizensshowedthattheyareinsupportofsuchmeasuresastheydonotbelieveSyrianshave the right towander the streetsof Jezzineas theyplease.ResidentsfearSyrianlabourersinparticularastheyassociatethemwiththeftduetoapreviousincidentoftheftinJezzineinvolvingaSyriannational.ALEFfoundnotracesofSyrian families in the streets, who remain in their places of residence in a specificneighborhood.

ALEFinterviewedalocallawyerwhoinformedusthatthesemeasuresarearbitraryandhavenolegalgrounds.Thearmypolicehastriedtointervenetoabatethem,buttheycontinuedue to themayor’spersonal inclinationand in response to local complaints.ALEF asked current and previous members of the municipality, Syrian residents, thelocalhospitalandtheRedCrossofficeaboutthewhereaboutsofthe30menthatwerebeaten. We were told that they left the area since the incident and nobody knowswheretheyare.

24

measures without coordination and approval by the MOIM, particularly if thesemeasuresinfringeontheauthorityoftheISF.41

More recently, theMinisterof Interiorproposeda securityplan thatenvisions thestrengtheningofmunicipalpolice in response to the tensesecurityconditions thathaveprevailed in recentmonths.Theplancalls forarmingofmunicipalpoliceandinstalling street cameras, among other items. The plan, however, has generatedconsiderabledebateasmanyfearthat itwouldbolstera trendof ‘self‐protection’,which isprone topoliticizationwith little tonooversight.42ThesecurityplandoesnotaddressthediscriminatorypolicyofcurfewsonSyrianrefugees,andmayinfactbeencouragingthecontinuationofadhocsecuritymeasuresbymunicipalities.Inanatmosphereofrisingdistrustanddiscontentamonghostandrefugeecommunities,leaving security at the discretion of elected local governments may heightenprotectionandsecurityconcerns.

Syrianrefugeesarealsodeliberatelytargetedaroundmajorsecurity incidentssuchastheexplosionsinDahyeandtheclashesbetweentheLebanesearmyandSheikhAssir supporters in Saida. During the incidents in Saida in July 2013, SyrianswereallegedlybeingtargetedatcheckpointsinstatedbyHizbullah.TwoSyrianmenwerearrestedbyHizbullah atAinDelb checkpoint inHaret Saidaon24 July 2013. Theywere taken to SayyedatAl Shuhada’ inHaret Saidawhere theywere detained forfour days before being handed to the army. The army released one man, andtransferredtheothertheGeneralSecurityashedidnothadexpiredlegalpapers.

SecurityfromViolenceandExploitation

IntermsoftrendsofviolenceaffectingSyrianrefugeessinceJanuary2013,ALEFhasmonitoredbothmicro‐levelthreatssuchascrimeorhostcommunityfeuds,aswellasmacro‐levelthreatsrelatedtosecurityincidentsalongthebordersandwithinthecountry. It can also be argued that the levels of violence against Syrian nationalsusuallycoincidewithvaryinglevelsofanti‐refugeesentimentbyhostcommunities.43(Pleaseseesection4)

41Fleming‐Farell,Niamh.“AleyvigilantesenforcenighttimecurfewsonSyrians”.8April2013.Availableonlineat:http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Local‐News/2013/Apr‐08/212903‐aley‐vigilantes‐enforce‐nighttime‐curfews‐on‐syrians.ashx#axzz2PrAPqCUb42Annahar.“Charbellaunchedplantoincludemunicipalitiesinsecuritykeepingandprovidingsafetynet”.(TranslatedfromArabicbyauthor).6September2013.Availableonlineat:http://goo.gl/dUknox43Lutz,Meris.DailyStar.“Activistvideotargetsanti‐refugeesentiment”.7February2013.Availableonlineat:http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Local‐News/2013/Feb‐07/205395‐activist‐video‐targets‐anti‐refugee‐sentiment.ashxDailyStar.“Tensionsbetweenhostcommunitiesandrefugees”.15February2013.Availableonlineat:http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Local‐News/2013/Feb‐15/206542‐tensions‐between‐host‐communities‐refugees.ashx#axzz2WqOIcAaN

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Syrian shelling on Lebanese borders in the North and the Bekaa continued in thecourse of this year, putting the lives of local and refugee communities at risk.44During a visit to Wadi Khaled in September 2013, ALEF observed damages tobuildingswhereinSyrianrefugeesresideasaresultofshellingafewdaysearlier.Wewerealsoinformedofthedangerofcross‐bordersnipersaswellaslandmines,whichrestrictsallresidents’movements.Isolatedincidentsofviolencewerealsoreportedthroughout the year. These include a shooting attack on a truck driver in Tripolitransporting fuel to Syria;45 the shooting of two Syrian nationals by a Lebanesecitizen inKabElias;46 kidnappingofAlawiteSyrians inWadiKhaledbya local tribeetc.47 Kidnappingshaveoccurred in reaction to instanceswere LebanesenationalshavegonemissinginSyriasuchasthecaseofthenineLebanesehostagesinAazaz(Syria).AtrendobservedbyALEFwasthetendencyforpersonalconflictsbetweenSyriansand Lebanese (e.g. landlord‐tenant; employee‐employer) to escalate into apoliticized confrontation, often drawing forth the involvement of individuals fromofficial agenciesand/orpoliticalparties.This trend isnotable inparticular inareaswith a majority Shiite population and a strong presence for Hizbullah and Amal.Conflicts rapidlyescalate intoaprovs.anti‐ regimedimension,andoftenputs thesafetyofSyrianrefugeesatrisk.Often,theLebanesepartytotheconflictinvitestheinvolvement of a local political faction or representative to resolve the conflict inhis/herfavor,whichmanifestsinthreateningbehaviororverbalthreatstowardstheSyrian individual.Forexample,ALEFcompiledacaseofapersonal feudbetweenaLebanese and a Syrian in the North; the Lebanese individual involved hisacquaintance in the army who subsequently sent threats by text message to theSyrianindividual.

In fact, Syrian refugees are at risk in places where they are a minority(political/sectarian). InTripoli, theongoingconflictbetweenJabalMehsenandBebElTebbenehaswellasthepresenceofadominantSunnipopulationwithlinkstothefighting in Syria createa riskyatmosphere forAlawite refugees.Alawites inTripolihavebeensubjected toviolence,discriminationandmaterial lossesdue toattacksontheirshops.Forexample, inApril,threeyoungmensabotagedabarbershopinAl‐Tal owned by Rabih dib Sleiman from Jabal Mohsen. The assailants forcefully

44DailyStar.“SyrianshellshitnorthLebanonbordervillages”.22February2013.Availableonlineat:http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Politics/2013/Feb‐22/207446‐syrian‐shells‐hit‐north‐lebanon‐border‐villages.ashx.45DailyStar.“GunmenfireonSyrianfueltrucks,driverwounded”.3April2013.Availableonlineat:http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Local‐News/2013/Apr‐03/212405‐gunmen‐fire‐on‐syrian‐fuel‐trucks‐driver‐wounded.ashx)46L’OrientLeJour.“Syrienshospitalisé”4April2013.Availableonlineat:http://www.lorientlejour.com/category/Liban/article/808322/Syriens_hospitalises.html47Abdallah,Robert.AlAkhbar.“ArmycontinuessearchforkidnappedSyrians”.(TranslatedfromArabicbyauthor).3March2013.Availableolineat:http://www.al‐akhbar.com/node/180498

26

evacuated the owner and set fire to the shop. This had happened simultaneouslywith another attack on a cellular phone shop in the same area; gunfire was alsoused. This falls within the context of prolonged tensions and reciprocal attacksbetweenJabalMohsenandBabAl‐Tabbaneh.TheyouthinTabbanehhadstartedacampaignaimedat“CleaningTripoli”andburningalltheshopsofthe“Nusayriyi”astheycalledtheAlawites.ThecampaignalsotargetedAlawitemunicipalitystaffandmerchantsbelongingtotheAlawitecommunity.48Finally, ahighprotectionconcern forSyrian labourersormigrantworkermenwasdetectedinmanypartsofthecountry.Syrianlabourers,someofwhomhavefamiliesregisteredwithUNHCRasrefugees,aresubjectedtodiscriminationbycitizensandmunicipal police officers. They are subject to exploitation by employers who canmanipulate wages and dismissals arbitrarily. Furthermore, ALEF detected cases oftheft targeting Syrian migrant workers, who have little recourse to justice.OrganizedthefttargetingSyrianlabourershadalsobeenreportedearlythisyearinthemedia. 49 Duringourvisit toHaretSaida inSeptember2013,aSyrian labourerresiding inthearea informedALEFthatthedaybeforewemethim,hiswallethadbeen robbed by individuals who approached him claiming to belong to a politicalparty.

WiththecontinuingsecondarydisplacementofSyrianrefugeeswithinLebanon,itisunlikely that the above‐described forms of targeted violence and exploitationwillcease. Schools, clinics, and other services are overwhelmed in the areas with theheaviestSyrianpresence, suchas theNorthand theBekaa.Theseareas,however,have been the most accommodating to the Syrian influx due to shared political,religious,andtriballinks.ShouldSyrianfamiliesresortmoreandmoretootherareaswith less pressure on services and infrastructure and lower rental prices,stakeholders should take note of the protection concerns that have surfaced thusfar,andtakepreventativeandnotjustreactionarymeasures.

48Boulous,Karen.NowMedia.“Zo’orantrytokillAlawitestaffinthemunicipalityofTripoli”.(TranslatedfromArabicbyauthor).1June2013.Availableonlineat:http://goo.gl/U7Io45Annahar."thebattleofburningshopsinTripoli”(TranslatedfromArabicbyauthor)9April2013.Availableonlineat:http://goo.gl/FHdkvn49DailyStar.“Syrianrefugeeshotinthelegbyunidentifiedman”.9February2013.Availableonlineat:http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Local‐News/2013/Feb‐09/205725‐syrian‐refugee‐shot‐in‐the‐leg‐by‐unidentified‐man.ashxDailyStar.“Waveofmuggingstargetsforeigners,manfoundhanged”.8February2013.Availableonlineat:http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Local‐News/2013/Feb‐08/205551‐wave‐of‐muggings‐targets‐foreigners‐man‐found‐hanged.ashx#axzz2WqOIcAaN

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SafetyandAccesstoLawEnforcementAgents

WhenALEFaskedSyrianrefugeesinBeirut,Saida,WadiKhaled,Tripoli,Tyre,andBarEliaswhethertheyfeelsafeinLebanon,theirinitialreactionwasthatyestheydoincomparison with the conditions they left behind in Syria. However, upon furtherprobing, refugees in each area complained of safety‐related issues in accordancewiththeenvironmenttheylivein.Forexample,intheShatilaPalestinianrefugeecampinBeirut,Syrianrefugeeswithaffiliations toanti‐regime forces inSyria felt threatenedby theirShiite,pro‐regimeenvironment. Others also feared for their safety from what they referred to as“gangs”,“drug‐dealers”,and“militiamen”thatdominatedthecamp,intheabsenceoftheruleoflawandofficialsecurityforces.Onefamilytoldusthateventheyoungmenofthefamilycannotwalkthroughthecampsafelywithoutbeingsubjectedtosomekindofharassment.“SyriansthatarenotPalestinianoriginallyareworseoffbecausetheyarecompletelyunprotected; if Iwalk in the streetanda little childhitsme, I can’tdoanything todefendmyself;Ihavetobelongtoacertainfactiontobeabletodefendmyself”.Asa copingmechanism, someyoungmen,at timesunder theageof18, resort tojoining armed factions within the camp in order to guarantee protection forthemselves and their families. ALEF was informed of a case of a sixteen‐year oldSyrianrefugeefromDoumawhovolunteeredforFathAlIntifada;hewasarmedandtaskedwithnight‐timesecuritykeepinginthecamp.Theextenttowhichcampsareutilizedas recruitmentgrounds cannotbeprovenwith the limitedallegations thatALEF collected, but there is a need for Palestinian leadership and Lebaneseauthorities to investigate and control the extent to which armed factions withinPalestinianrefugeecampsareembroiledintheconflictinSyria.InNabaaandBourjHammoud,Syrianrefugees informedus that they feltsafeandhadnotpreviouslyencounteredanyviolenceorsecurityproblem.Whenaskedwho

Snapshot

ASyrianrefugeewithaprotectionprobleminonevillageintheSouthwasofferedre‐locationtoanewresidenceinadifferentvillage,alsointheSouth.Herefusedthenewhouse,forfearthatitslocationisalsodominatedbythesamesect/politicallinethathadbeenathreattohimpreviously.Hehasbeensearchingforaccommodationina‘friendly’areaofhischoicebuthasbeenunabletofindaffordablerentalpricesduetothehighconcentrationofrefugeesinthatarea.

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theywouldresorttoincaseofsuchanincident,thefamiliesdescribedanabsenceofofficialsecurityforcesintheirimmediatesurroundings.Duetolackofawarenessofjudicialprocedurescompoundedbyasenseoffear,familieswouldmerelyresorttopersonalLebanesecontacts if theyhavethem.Forexample,onerefugee informedusthathehasafriendinHizbullah,whohelpshimincaseheneedsanythinglegally.Others resort to local community centers, especially religious‐based organizations,which provide a safety net particularly for members of the same faith/sect. ThistrendwasalsoobservedintheBekaa,inthetownsofBarEliasandMajdElAnjar.Meanwhile in Tripoli as well as towns in Wadi Khaled, the same ‘self‐protection’trendwasnoted.Refugeesdonottrustorrelyonofficialsecurityforcestoprovidethemwithsafety.InWadiKhaled,refugeesinformedusthattheyareeffectively‘ontheirown’andneed to fend for themselveswhen it comes toprotection. In someneighborhoodsinTripoli,refugeesrelyonakey,influentialcommunitymemberwhofacilitatesprotectionforthecommunitythroughhisconnectionswithlocalpoliticalparties, armed factions, religious figures/groups etc. Similarly, in the Bekaa andRashaya, religious groupsprovideprotection to vulnerable refugees.However, theextent towhich this protection covers gender‐based violence andmore ‘sensitive’protection issues isquestionableaswillbediscussed in thesection:Gender IssuesandGBV.

ArbitraryDetentionand/orTorture

Indetention,Syriansaresubjectedto thesystematic tortureand ill‐treatment thatallprisonersanddetaineesinLebanonface.Tortureispracticedduringarrest,duringinvestigation, and during detention, according toNGO sources. The arrest processofteninvolvesverbalabuseandhumiliationattheleast,especiallywhenthearmyorarmypoliceareinvolved.Syrians currently present in Lebanese prisons are either detained for crimes orillegal/irregular stay. Documentation‐related arrests increase and decreasesporadically but there are no systematic arrests.50 Most often, those that aredetained for documentation reasons are also detained for other crime‐relatedreasons.51ALEFwasunabletocollectaccuratefiguresalthoughestimatesthathavebeenpreviouslyannouncedplacethenumberataround6,000detainees.52

ArbitraryDetentionoccurswhenSyrianrefugeesareobligedtostayinprisonsortheGeneralSecuritydetentioncenterafterhavingcompletedtheirsentence;delays in

50InterviewwithMs.JulieKhoury,AJEM.28August2013;InterviewwithMs.MarieDaunay,CLDH.9September2013.52MinutesofPanelDiscussionorganisedbyCarnegieMiddleEastCenter:“SyrianRefugeesinLebanon:ImpactandRecommendations”.25June2013,Beirut.

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transferringinmateswhocompletedtheirsentencefromISFprisonstotheGeneralSecurityalsocauseasituationofarbitrarydetention.53Onthisallegation,UNHCRhascommented that it isnotawareofarbitrarydetentionofSyriansand itsdetentionmonitoringteamconfirmsthat ingeneral,Syriansarereleaseduponcompletionoftheirsentence.AnotherpointofcontradictoryinformationfoundbyALEFistheissueof legal assistance. Whereas UNHCR holds that Syrian inmates receive legalassistance on the same basis as non‐Syrian persons of concern, local NGOsmonitoringplacesofdetentionhavenotedthatSyrianrefugeesarenotofferedlegalassistancesystematically.54

Governmentpolicytowards‘illegal’entryorstayhasnotbeencommensuratewithinternational customary law,which is binding even if Lebanon is not party to the1951Convention.Theverynotionthatarefugeeshouldbearrested,detained,andprosecutedfor‘illegalstay’goesagainstinternationalrefugeelaw.Regardlessofthewaytheysoughtrefuge,Syrianrefugeesmustbeconsideredassuchandshouldbeprotected from the legal prosecution that applies innormal circumstances. Ratherthan conduct periodic crackdowns, the Lebanese government should improvereception,registration,andmanagementofSyrianrefugees.

UNHCRestimatesthat250,000refugeesoutoftheexpectedonemillionbytheendoftheyearwillfacelegalissuesregardingtheirlegalstatus.Thisamountsto25%oftherefugeepopulation,whowillprobablybeunabletorenewpapers,andthusfaceprotectionriskssuchasrestrictionofmovementandtherebyaccesstoservices.55

Ithasalsobeenreportedthatduringdetention,Syriansaresubjectedtoracismandpolitically‐motivatedabuse.AnecdotalevidencesuggeststhattheSyriandetainee’svulnerabilitytothiskindoftreatmentdependsontheareaofdetention(e.g.prooranti‐Syrian regime area). This is especially the case when arrests are related tocrimes linked with the conflict in Syria.56

53CLDH(2013).ArbitraryDetentionandTortureinLebanon.Availableonlineat:https://docs.google.com/a/cldh‐lebanon.org/viewer?a=v&pid=sites&srcid=Y2xkaC1sZWJhbm9uLm9yZ3xjbGRofGd4OjQ5YzYwOGM4YzY5NjEwMDc54MinutesofALEF,UNHCRmeetingon20.11.2013.InterviewwithMs.MarieDaunay,CLDH.9September2013.

55UNHCR(2013).SyriaRegionalResponsePlan‐JanuarytoDecember2013.Availableonlineat:http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php56InterviewwithMs.MarieDaunay,CLDH.9September2013.

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GenderIssuesandGBV

TheimpactoftheSyrianrefugeecrisistakesondifferentdimensionsonceexaminedfromagenderedlens.Inadditiontotheprotectionconcernsmentionedthusfarinthis report, Syrian refugee women and girls face additional gender‐specific risks.Previousassessmentshaverevealedthattypesofgender‐basedviolence(GBV)facedbySyrianwomenandgirlsinbothSyriaandLebanonincludesexual,physical,verbal,andpsychologicalviolence.Atthesametime,thechanginggenderroleswithinthefamily, the lack of opportunities for livelihood, and the impact of violationsexperienced in Syria have impacted Syrian refugeemen, compounding feelings ofpowerlessnessandhelplessness.57

Reportsandfieldresearchconfirmthehighvulnerabilityofwomenandchildrentodomestic violence in almost all areas and living arrangements (urban; rentedapartments; collective shelters).58 Overcrowded conditions and lack of privacyexacerbatepsychologicalpressure,andrenderwomenandchildrenmorepronetosexual or physical harassment. This is made worse in collective shelters and theinformal tented settlements in rural areas, which are not equipped for gender‐sensitive safety (e.g. lighting; distribution points; privacy).59 Furthermore, UNFPAreported in 2012 that an estimated 10% of Lebanese and refugee women havesubjectedtosomeformofSGBV.60

Adolescent girls are confinedwithin the home for ‘protection’ from the risks theymayface in thestreetorduringdistributionofassistance.Reportshaveconfirmedthatearlymarriages,whereaspreviouslycommon inpartsofSyria,have increasedforyounggirls inLebanon,particularly forprotection reasons.Furthermore,Syrianrefugeewomenhaveresortedto‘survivalsex’asasourceofmuch‐neededincome.Informants in the Bekaa and the North confirmed the prevalence of thisphenomenon in the villages; while ALEF compiled two cases of Syrian refugeewomen resorting to ‘survival sex’ topayoffdebts,andprovide livelihood for theirfamilies. It is not necessarily the case that this occurs within women‐headedhouseholds,astherearesomeinstanceswhenthehusbands,unabletoworkorfindwork,urgetheirwivestoengageinsurvivalsexasadesperatemeasure.

57InterviewwithMrs.RolaElMasri,Abaad.17September2013.58Seeforexample:AbaadandOxfam(2013)“ShiftingSands:ChanginggenderrolesamongrefugeesinLebanon”.September2013.Availableonlineat:http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/rr‐shifting‐sands‐lebanon‐syria‐refugees‐gender‐030913‐en.pdf59InternationalRescueCommittee.“SyrianWomenandGirlsfacingongoingthreatsandhumiliation”.GBVRapidAssessment.August2012.Availableonlineat:data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/download.php?id=900 60UNHCR(2013).SyriaRegionalResponsePlan‐JanuarytoDecember2013.Availableonlineat:http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php

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“Ourneighbor’s14yearolddaughterwasspottedoncebyamanwholivesnearbyandis15yearsolderthanher.Hewenttothefamilytoaskforherformarriage;thefamilydidn’twantandsherefusedbyhekeptonpressuringthemthatintheendtheymarriedheroff”.

Mental health problems related to thewar in Syria aswell as living conditions inLebanonhaveharmeddomesticrelationships,andtheincreasedpressureandsenseof helplessness among men has increased their resorting to physical, verbal, andsexualviolencewith theirwivesandchildren.Sincetheirarrival inLebanon,Syrianrefugee women have also had to take on new leading roles within the family,includingsearchingandcollectingaidassistance.Duringourvisitstofamilies,itwasthe women that automatically acted as spokespersons for the family andcommunity.Theirhusbandsandsonshavebeenunabletofindjobsinavolatileandhighlysaturatedlabourmarketforsemi‐skilledandunskilledjobs.Meanwhile,theyareresponsiblefornotonlytakingcareofthechildrenbutalsoensuringtheyreceiveassistance for themental health problems they have incurred as a result of theircircumstances.Onerefugeewomenwespoketobrokeintotearsasshetoldushowhersonhastriedtokillhimselfinvoluntarilyseveraltimes.

“Thechildrenaresorestless,theyaresoboredandcan’tleavethehouseandtheyarebeingalotmoredifficult.Evenmyhusbandisalotmoreirritablenowandhe’schangedwithmeeven.Forme,Idon’thaveanyonetotalktowhenIamfeelingdown”.

ALEFwasnotabletoverifyallegationsregardingrapeandmolestationincollectivesheltersbecauseofthedifficultyofaccessingthesitesandtheallegedvictims.Basedonsecondaryinformation,ALEFfoundthatwherethereareallegedvictimsofSGBV,theydonotresorttojusticeorservicesduetoculturaltaboos.Evenwhereservicesareavailable,SGBVcasesareusuallydetectedindirectlythroughotherformsofservicessuchashealthcheck‐ups.61

ALEFexpressesconcernover‘local’formsofprotectionthatareaffordedtorefugeesby religious groups in certain areas. Sometimes, it is members of local NGOs,community‐based organisations, or religious/community leaders themselves thatcontribute to stigmatising gender‐based violations. There is no guarantee that awomanorgirlwhoisreferredtoalocalcommunityorreligious‐basedorganisationisafforded protection in line with international standards. For example, from atraditionalreligiousperspective,protectionofwomenamountstomarryingtheminordertoprotecttheirhonor.Thereisahighriskthatthesemarriagesareforced,andif not, the woman’s financial, psychological, and livelihood vulnerability ismanipulated inorder toachieveherconsent. In this regard,ALEFcalls forcapacity

61InterviewswithRestart(22/8/2013);AND(22/8/2013);ArcEnCiel(21/8/2013);Himaya(21/8/2013);Caritas(17/9/2013)

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building of local activists and leaders on gender‐sensitive protection andwomen’srightsandheightenedmonitoringeffortsonalocalscale.

TheCaseforPreventiveProtection

M.isayoungmarriedwomanwhomoved6monthsagotoBeirutwithhertwoyoungchildren,leavingherhusbandbehindinSyria.ShecametotheneighbourhoodinBeiruttobeclosetoheroldsickfather.Foradim,window‐lesssingleroomwithunhealthylevelsofhumidity,sheispaying250,000L.L.,withhelpfromherhusbandwhoworksinSyriaaswellasanetworkofrelativesanddonationsaroundher.Herlandlordhasacceptedrepeateddelaysintherentasshestrugglestogatherthemoneymonthly.Herbiggestfearsarebeingkickedoutfromherhomeintothestreetandherbiggestproblemisthat“thereisnobodyhereforme”.Thereisonlyacurtainthatseparatesherfromthecrowdedalleyway,unlesssheblockstheairoutandclosesherbigmetaldoor.Shehasbeensubjectedtofoullanguagebyyoungmeninthestreets.Shesaysyoungmenstartedtocongregateoutsideherhouseoncetheysawthatsheisayoungwomanandalone.Forprotection,sheresortedtootherSyrianfamiliestoadmonishtheyoungmen.Inariskyneighbourhood,M.hasnootherprotectionotherthanaphonenumberfromUNHCRthatshecancallincaseoneday,oneofthoseyoungmenshouldtrespassthecurtainthatseparatesherfromthestreet.

S.cametoLebanonayearandahalfagowithherchildren.AllsheknowsaboutherhusbandisthathehasbeenindetentioninSyriafortwoyearsnow.GiventheconditionsthatS.foundherselfin,andthelackofopportunitiesforlivelihood,sheresortedtosurvivalsextoprovideforherchildren.Oneday,S.wenttocollectassistancefromalocalNGO;theLebaneseaidworkerkeptheronthesideandonceherturncame,hetoldhertocomebackatnighttocollectit.

H.isarecentdivorceewithonechild.Afterherdivorce,withoutasourceoflivelihoodandprotection,H.wasdesperateforhelp.Inhertimeofneed,shewasvisitedby2menwhointroducedthemselvesasaSalafistgroupfromanearbyvillage.H.didnottrustthemenbutneededallthehelpshecanget.Intheirsubsequentcorrespondenceandsecondvisit,theytoldH.thattheycannotofferherfinancialassistancewithherrentbuttheycanofferheraccommodationintheirresidentialcompoundinthenearbyvillage.H.hadheardbeforeaboutcasesof‘jihadmarriages’inthatvillage,andrefusedtheirofferforfearthatthesamewouldhappentoherandherdaughter.

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AccesstoSocialServices:HealthandEducation

TheMinistryofEducationandHigherEducation(MEHE)firstgrantedSyrianrefugeesaccesstopublicschoolsfortheschoolyear2011‐2012,followingadvocacyeffortsbyUNagenciesandinternationalandnationalNGOs.UNHCR/UNICEFandpartnersforexamplesupportedtheenrolmentofover20,000childrenforthefirstschoolshift,andarenowlookingtoprocessawaitinglistof30,000studentsforthesecondshifts,whichwillbeopeninschoolsacrossthecountry.62

AlthoughtheMEHEhasbeenengagedwithstakeholdersandrelevantUNagencieson a policy making level, on the ground, financial, administrative and logisticalhurdles are still preventing thousands of children from accessing education.Currently,ithasbeenestimatedthanabout30%ofSyrianrefugeechildrenresidinginLebanonareattendingschools.63Forthosethatareattendingschools,anothersetofproblemsarise inrelationtoretentionrates. In July2012,UNICEFreportedthatdropout rates among Syrian refugees are twice the national drop out average inLebanon.64

Findingsofpreviousreports,65confirmedbyALEF’sfieldresearch,havesummarizedproblemsintheeducationaldomainasfollows:

‐ Languagedifficulties‐ Inability to afford registration and other school fees (books, materials,

transportationto&fromschools)‐ Lackofspaceinschools(quotainpublicschools…)‐ Discrimination‐ Violence/corporalpunishment‐ Absenceofidentificationpapers/legalproofofpreviousschooling‐ Lackofmaintenanceofschoolbuildingsandinadequateinfrastructure‐ Inabilitytoaffordremedialschooling

The problems facing integration of Syrian refugee children into the educationalsystem aremulti‐dimensional. Firstly, the rapid increase of the number of school‐aged children has strained policy responses from the Ministry of Education andHigher Education (MEHE) who claimed that in a period of one year, school‐agedchildren to be integrated went from 1,500 (2011‐2012) to 30,000 (2012‐2013).AlthoughthepublicschoolingsysteminLebanoncanabsorbupto450,000students,whileonly37%ofchildren inLebanonare inpublicschools, thishasnotmadethe

62MinutesofALEF,UNHCRmeetingon20.11.2013

63MinutesofDiscussionforumorganisedbyLCPS,CentreforLebaneseStudies,andKonradAdenaurStiftung:“TowardsImprovingAccesstoEducationforSyrianRefugees”.30July2013,CrownePlaza,Beirut.64UNICEFandSavetheChildren(2012).EducationRapidNeedsAssessmentforDisplacedSyrianChildren:InSchools,CommunityandSafeSpaces.July2012.Availableonlineat:data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.phpdata.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/download.php?id=53565ForexampleseeWorldVision(2012)RobbedofChildhood,RunningfromWar.http://wvi.org/sites/default/files/Running%20from%20War%20FINAL%20UPDATED.pdf

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challengeeasier.PublicschoolsthataremoreorlessemptyandabletoenrolmanySyrianrefugeechildrenarelocatedingeographicareasthatdonotcorrespondwithdemand.ThebiggestdemandisfoundintheNorthwherepurportedlyinsomeareasSyrianrefugeechildrenmakeup90%ofthestudentsinschools.66Inplaceswithhighdemand, such as the town of Arsal, public schools have had to open double‐shiftclasses,withteachersandstaffworkingmainlyonavolunteerbasisintheafternoonwith Syrian refugee children.Moreover, it is important to note that the North ofLebanon has historically been neglected and the educational sector is notmaintained.Insomeplaces,schoolbuildingsamounttothefirstfloorofaresidentialbuilding,andinmostcasesbuildingstandardsareinadequateandrisky.

TheMEHEhasdevelopedconsultationandplanningmechanismssuchasaninternalcommittee on education during emergencies, which has been mandated withdeveloping the ministry’s policy on Syrian refugees. The MEHE however hascomplainedoflackoffundsandadequateassistancefromUNagencies.FromtheUNperspective, the challenge of funding cross‐cuts issues beyond education,considering that the crisis is entering its third year while emergency budgets aredesignedfromshort‐termresponsesonly.

Ontheground,educationalinterventionsarebeingcarriedoutbyanarrayofactors,including local and international NGOs, donor agencies, and the government. Themultiplicityofactorsandlackofcoordinationhasbeencitedasamajorchallengeinachieving positive impact.More importantly, Lebanese actors have complained ofdonorapproachesthatexcludeLebanesechildrenfrominterventions,whichcreatesa tension between Syria and Lebanese communities, especially in rural andimpoverished areas. Furthermore, projects that are being implemented byinternationalagenciesanddonorsdonotalwayscorrespondtotherealitiesontheground,especiallywhentheyare“ready‐made”asdescribedbylocalactors.67

AmongthesolutionsthathavebeenproposedandimplementedistheAcceleratedLearning Program developed in conjunctionwith UNESCO and partners; this givesyoungerSyrianstudentsthatchanceto“catchup”onthecurriculummorerapidly.Thisprogramiseasierforyoungerchildrenwhereas integrationbecomesharder intheintermediateandhigherlevels.SchooldropoutrateshavealreadybeenamajorproblemintheLebaneseschoolingsystem,andisreportedlyjustasbadifnotworsefor Syrian refugee teenagerswho either cannot copewith the new curriculum, orneedtodropouttogetmarriedorsupporttheirfamiliesfinancially.

Corporal punishment is another problem, already endemic in the Lebaneseeducational system. Violence in schools among peers as well as from teachers tostudents has been reported as a major problem that school directors are havingdifficultydealingwith.Aministerialmemorandumdatingbackto2001prohibitsuse

66MinutesofDiscussionforumorganisedbyLCPS,CentreforLebaneseStudies,andKonradAdenaurStiftung:“TowardsImprovingAccesstoEducationforSyrianRefugees”.30July2013,CrownePlaza,Beirut.67MinutesofDiscussionforumorganisedbyLCPS,CentreforLebaneseStudies,andKonradAdenaurStiftung:“TowardsImprovingAccesstoEducationforSyrianRefugees”.30July2013,CrownePlaza,Beirut.

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of violence by teachers for disciplinary purposes but monitoring is low andprevention often depends on the involvement and personal initiative of schooldirectorsandparentsthroughtraditionalconflictresolution.

Finally, the problem of documentation papers and proof of previous schooling ispreventingtheintegrationofrefugeechildrenintoschools.TheMEHEisadamantonobtaining legal papers before registering children. Currently, evaluation ofeducational level of the child is left to the initiative of the school directors, whodeterminewhatgradeachildisadmittedinto.Syrianrefugeesarealsobarredfromtaking official examinations, although an exceptional measure was taken for 350studentsthisyearafteradvocacyeffortsbyUNHCR.Theresultsoftheexaminationshowever remain pending until documentation papers are obtained. According toUNHCR,mostoftherefugeesinvolvedwereabletoobtaintherequireddocumentsfrom their home country while the rest were unsuccessful despite attempts byUNHCRtocoordinatewith theSyrianembassy.ALEFwas informedbyUNHCRthatcross‐borderadvocacyofthiskindwasdeemedtoosensitiveafterconsultationwithUNHCR‐SyriaandthereforethisrolehasbeenpassedontoUNICEF.68

ALEF’sinterviewswithfamiliesandinformantsinBeirut,theNorth,Bekaa,andSouthrevealed that most families value education for their children and would like toregistertheirchildrenbutcannotforseveralreasonsincluding:nospaceinschoolsnearby;distanceofschoolsthatdohavespacefromtheplaceofresidence;costsofregistration,books,andotherfees;thedifficultyofthecurriculumandtheinabilityoftheirchildrentointegrateandlearnintheLebanesesystem.TheFrenchlanguagehasbeenamajorhurdle for families thathavebeenable to registersomeof theirchildren. Parentswith no educational background and/or no knowledge of Frenchare unable to help their children cope and cannot afford to provide them withremedial classes. Some of the families we visited in Beirut informed us that theyhavebeenabletoadapttothischallengethroughthehelpofneighborsandwhenthe mothers themselves have put in the effort to learn French. In most caseshowever, refugee families are living in an overcrowded and confined space, themother faces enormous pressures, especially with smaller children who do notattendschool,andsoSyrianstudentsdonothavethespaceandsupporttheyneedtointegrateproperly.OneofthefamilieswemetinNabaa,Beirutinformedusthattheireldestdaughter,8yearsofage,isregisteredinanearbysemi‐privateschools,whichshehatestoattend.ThechildhasbeensubjectedtocorporalpunishmentbyherteacherswhopunishherforherinabilitytoreadinFrenchandkeepupwithherpeers.“Sheisalwaysaskingmamaisittheweekendyet?”

Oneofthebiggestfearsthatthefamilieshadfortheirchildrenistheriskthattheywill not be educated. In response to the problems their children face in accessingquality education in Lebanon, some families have opted to sending their childrenbacktoSyriatolivewithrelativesinordertoreceivebettereducation,whichdeniesthemtherighttofamilyunityandputstheirchildreninharmway.

68MinutesofALEF,UNHCRmeetingon20.11.2013

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FamiliesinterviewedbyALEFhavealsocitedhealthasaconcern;fearingthattheirchildrenmayonedayfallillandrequirehospitalizationorexpensivetreatment. Duetotheseverefundingshortages,UNHCRhadtoscaledownitsco‐paymentfrom85%ofcarecostto75%inApril2013.69

Families reported expenditure on health services as a major strain, especiallypurchase of medicine which is expensive and usually in low supply. It should benoted that Syrian refugeeswereused to a freepublichealth care system in Syria,unliketheprivatizedsysteminLebanon,whichhelpstointerpretthedissatisfactionthat some Syrian refugees express when it comes to accessing health care inLebanon.

“Theymakethingsdifficultforyou;youhavetogotoadoctorandpaydiagnosisthenyougetareferralfromthedoctorinordertobeacceptedintothehospital;whatifIdon’tthecostofadiagnosis?Idon’thavemoneyforxrays”.(Beirut)

Personswith chronic diseases are not covered by UNHCR; families that ALEFmetwith members who suffer from chronic diseases have had to struggle in thecollection of disparate donations to cover treatment. Families’ savings have beendepletedduetoforexampleoperationsthattheyhadtocoverthemselvesforfamilymembers.

“Givingbirthisthebiggestproblemwearefacingbecausemosthospitalsnearbyarenotlettingpregnantwomeninwithout

provingthattheycanpayforthedelivery.Weusuallyeitherask{localaidworker},orasheikhtohelpusoutinthissituation”.

(Tripoli)

InplaceslikeSaida,wefoundacross‐cuttingsatisfactionwiththehealthservicesprovidedbythetwoclinicscontractedwithUNHCRtoprovidehealthcareatareducedcost.However,somefamiliesinformedALEFthattheyareunabletocovereventhesmallcliniccost,especiallyiftheyhavemanychildrenthatrequirehealthcareregularly.

It has been reported that in December 2012, Syrian refugeesmade up 40% of allprimary health care visits in Lebanon. The strain on the health care sector hasresulted in shortagesofmedicine andhealthcare in general impactingboth SyrianrefugeesandtheLebanesepopulation.70

69MinutesofALEF,UNHCRmeetingon20.11.2013

70WorldBank.“Lebanon:EconomicandSocialImpactAssessmentoftheSyrianconflict”.September2013.Availableonlineat:http://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/document/MNA/LB%20ESIA%20Fact%20Sheet%20English.pdf

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III. ADouble‐EdgedCrisis:ImpactoftheRefugeeInfluxonHostCommunities

The World Bank in cooperation with partners (IMF, EU, UN Agencies…) hasconductedanEconomicandSocial ImpactAssessment (ESIA)of theSyrianCrisis inLebanon, at the requestof Lebanese government.71 The assessmenthas revealedalarming economic and social trends as a result of the Syrian crisis. Some of thefindingsaresummarizedbelow:

The government’s cumulative loss of revenues between 2012 and 2014 isestimatedat$1.1.Billion,withanexpandedfiscaldeficit.

Lebanon’sGDPgrowthisexpectedtodecreaseby2.9%eachyear. Between220,000and324,000Lebaneseareexpectedtobeunemployedby

2014. Demandforwaterandsanitationinfrastructureroseby7%, Production of solid waste has more than doubled, which has led to

contaminationofwaterresourcesandspreadingofdisease.72

Other reports have also pointed out a fall in wages, for example wages in theagricultural sector have decreased by 50% in the past two years. 73 Meanwhile,housingandfoodsecurityhasalsobeenthreatened,withincreasedpricesandlowersupply.

Intermsofdemographicfactors,insomevillagesintheNorthandtheBekaa,thenumberofSyrianrefugeesisbeginningtoexceedthenumberofLebaneseresidents.AccordingtotheMOSA,thenumberofSyrianrefugeesexceedsLebanesein30%ofmunicipalities.74UNHCRhaspredictedthatbytheendoftheyear1in5residentsinpopulationliveunderthepovertyline,with8%beingextremelypoor(livingonlessthat$2.4aday).Theregionsthathostthehighestnumbersofrefugeesarethepoorest.38%ofthepoorand46%ofextremelypoorLebaneseliveintheNorthof

71WorldBank.FeatureStory.“LebanonbearsthebruntofeconomicandsocialspilloversoftheSyrianconflict”.24September2013.Availableonlineat:http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2013/09/24/lebanon‐bears‐the‐brunt‐of‐the‐economic‐and‐social‐spillovers‐of‐the‐syrian‐conflict72WorldBank.“Lebanon:EconomicandSocialImpactAssessmentoftheSyrianconflict”.September2013.Availableonlineat:http://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/document/MNA/LB%20ESIA%20Fact%20Sheet%20English.pdf73InternationalRescueCommittee.“ReachingtheBreakingPoint:AnIRCbriefingnoteonSyrianrefugeesinLebanon”.June2013.Availableonlineat:http://www.rescue.org/sites/default/files/resource‐file/Lebanon%20Policy%20Paper,%20Final%20‐%20June%202013.pdf74MinutesofPanelDiscussionorganisedbyCarnegieMiddleEastCenter:“SyrianRefugeesinLebanon:ImpactandRecommendations”.25June2013,Beirut.

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Lebanon.75170,000Lebaneseareexpectedtofallintopovertyby2014asaresultoftheSyriancrisis,whilearoundonemillionwillbecomepoorerthattheyalreadyare.76Lebanese unskilled and seasonal labourers aswell aswidowedwomenwithmorethan three children are the poorest and most vulnerable.77 As can be seen, thevulnerabilitycriteriathatUNHCRandpartnershaveutilizedfortargetingassistanceto Syrian refugees are verymuch similar to the vulnerability characteristics of theLebanesepoor.78Forthisreason,andperhapsforthefirsttimeinhistory,theSyrianrefugeecrisishashighlightedthecontradictoryrationaleunderpinningdevelopmentvs. emergency assistance.Managing the refugee crisis is arguably no longer solelyabout meeting the needs of the refugee population, but also meeting thedevelopmentandpoverty‐reductionneedsofthehostcountry.

In Lebanon’s case, UNHCR’s mandate is too restricted to provide sustainablesolutions.More thanever,what isneeded isbetter coordinationbetweendonors,proactiveleadershipbytheLebanesegovernment,andtheeffectiveinvolvementofUN and development agencies. In the continued governance vacuum that hasensuedsincetheresignationofPrimeMinisterMikati inMarch2013,theabilityofthegovernmenttostepupandtakeresponsibilityforthedeterioratingconditionsofits own population is unlikely. For this reason, diplomatic and conflict resolutioneffortsonaglobalscalebyregionalandinternationalactorsareimperative.

According to government sources, 45municipalities have been identified as beingmostatriskofconflictasaresultofthesocio‐economicimpactoftheSyriancrisis.Immediateriskmitigationinterventionsareneededintheselocations,withsupporttargetingboth refugeeandhost communities.79ALEFcompileda seriesof cases inNabatieh,Jezzine,Shouf,Tyre,Saida,Metn,andWadiKhaledthatdemonstratetheimpactof tensionsbetweenhostand refugeecommunitieson safetyand security.Belowwesummarizeourconclusions:

Tensionisevidentinformalandinformalsettings,asLebanesepeoplearefrustratedwiththesocialservicesbeingprovidedsolelytotheSyriancommunity.

FrustrationbytheLebanesecommunityhasresultedinviolentconfrontationwithSyriannationals,particularlySyrianmalesandmigrantworkers.

75UNDP.“TheMilleniumDevelopmentGoalsinLebanon”.Availableonlineat:http://www.undp.org.lb/WhatWeDo/MDGs.cfm76WorldBank.“Lebanon:EconomicandSocialImpactAssessmentoftheSyrianconflict”.September2013.Availableonlineat:http://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/document/MNA/LB%20ESIA%20Fact%20Sheet%20English.pdf77 UNDP. “The Millenium Development Goals in Lebanon”. Available online at:http://www.undp.org.lb/WhatWeDo/MDGs.cfm78InterviewwithMr.RamziNaaman,CouncilofMinisters.(11/09/2013)79Ibid.

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LebaneseresidinginareaswithahighconcentrationofSyrianrefugeesreportedfearofkidnappingandcrime,especiallyintheeveningandatnight,whichhasrestrictedmovementofresidentsaftercertainhours.

EvenforLebanesewhowerepreviouslysympathetictothehumanitarianplightofSyrianrefugees,competitionforjobshasleftthemresentfulandfrustrated.Insomeareas,thishasresultedinthelooting,beating,orshuttingdownofcommercialestablishmentsownedoroperatedbySyrians.

SyrianrefugeesexpressedsignificantdisillusionmentwiththediscriminationtheyfacefromLebaneseonadailybasis,withtherecurrentsentiment“Ididn’tknowLebanesepeoplehatedusthismuch”.

Several assessments and opinion surveys have been conducted in the course of2013,whichhavealsoconfirmedincreasinglevelsoftensionsbetweenrefugeeandhost communities.80 For example, a survey conducted by FAFO and IFI at AUBrevealedthatthreeoutoffourLebanesebelievethatSyrianrefugeesposeathreatto national security. Meanwhile, seven out of ten believed that the UN shouldestablishrefugeecampsforSyrianrefugees.Accordingtothepolicybrief,“theinitialLebanese hospitality towards Syrian refugees has become strained due to theincreasedcompetition for scarceemployment,particularly in theunskilled sector”,withyouthfromlowersocio‐economicbackgroundsbeingthemostharmed.81

80Seeforexample:WorldVision,WorldBank,FAFO,IRC.81IFI‐AUB,Fafo.“PolicyBrief:LebaneseContraditoryResponsestoSyrianrefugeesincludeStress,Hospitality,Resentment”June2013.Availableonlineat:http://www.aub.edu.lb/ifi/Documents/policy_memo/20130705ifi_memo_Fafo_IFI_Policy_brief_Syrians_in_Lebanon.pdf

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Snapshots

Aneye‐witnesstoastreetfeudinSaidaonthe18thofAugust2013recountedtoALEF

thatafighthadbrokenoutspontaneouslybetweenaSyriannationalandalocal

Lebanesemanforunknownreasons.TheSyrianmanwhowasinvolvedwasdisabledand

unabletowalk.DuringtheverbalbrawltheLebanesemanshoutedtotheSyrian“you

aredisabledyouarenotevenahumanbeing,allSyriansareanimals”.

InKabEliasintheBekaa,localresidentscommonlyrefertotentedsettlementswherein

Syrianrefugeesresideas“musta’amarat”,whichtranslatedfromArabicconnotesthe

settlementsbeingbuiltbyIsraelonPalestinianlands.Thisterminologyreflectsthe

resentmentthatthehostcommunityhasengenderedinKabEliasandsurrounding

villagesovertime.

InBeiruton16September2013,awoman’spursewasrobbedintheSinElFilneighborhood.

Shewasleftwithableedingearandaninjuredrightarmasaresultoftheattack.Residents

calledtheRedCrossandthemunicipalpolicearrivedtothescene.Asthewomanwasbeing

aidedbytheRedCross,hersonarrivedarmedwithapistolandwasshouting“whorobbedyou,

whodidthistoyou?”HedisappearedandshowedupafewminuteslaterwitharandomSyrian

manhegrabbedoffthestreet.Grippinghimbytheneck,heforcedhisheadonthefloornear

hismother’sfeetandpointedthepistoltohisheadaskinghismother“isitthisone?”The

Syrianmanwascryingandpleading“howcouldIhaverobbedherifIamstillstandinghere?”

ThemunicipalpoliceeventuallycalmedtheLebanesemandownandconvincedhimtoletthe

Syrianmango.

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The fear of the Syrian refugee crisis developing into a situation of prolongeddisplacementcompoundsfearsofpolicymakers,aidagencies,andthegeneralpublicinLebanon.Threatscanbecategorizedasdirectandindirectthreatsasfollows:

DirectThreats IndirectThreatsInfiltration of armed combatants andex‐combatants

Host community economic and socialgrievances

Spill‐over of the Syrian conflict (e.g.fighting in Tripoli; explosions inSouthernsuburbofBeirut)

Social unrest as a result of economicdeprivation

Cross‐bordershelling CompetitionforlocalresourcesRetaliatorykidnappings Attribution of crime and disease to a

specificgroupLebanesearmedgroups’involvementinfightinginSyria

Some political and religiousmotivateddriven donations from certain donorcountries

Delays in formation of cabinet inLebanon and controversial securitysectorappointments

Opportunities to mobilize pre‐existinggrievances(e.g.sectariantensions)

Landminesandunexplodedordinance Reduced basic services as a result ofinfrastructuralstrain

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ConflictAssessmentCaseStudy:Akkar

AnumberofintervieweesonbothanofficialandgrassrootslevelrepeatedtoALEFthesamesentimentregardingAkkar:“AkkaraftertheSyrianrefugeecrisiswillnotbethe Akkar it was before the refugee crisis”. It is well‐known that Akkar has beenhistoricallydeprivedofgovernmentservices,withthehighestlevelsofpovertyinthecountry.82 Nonetheless, concern for living conditions in Akkar was more or lessrestrictedtoalimitedcircleofserviceproviders,developmentactorsandtoacertainextent, governmental cash assistance programs.TheimpetustosolveAkkar’sproblemswasneverthat strong, mainly due to the lack ofaccountability and equitable development andcomprehensive development policies by thegovernment but also due to alternative donoragendas, which mainly focused on conflict‐affected areas in recent years (e.g. post 2006war).

The very first arrivals of Syrian refugees in 2011wereconcentrated inWadiKhaled,which isnowthe oldest site of humanitarian operations byUNHCRandpartners.Fortwoyears,internationalagencies have maintained a presence in theregion; new local NGOs formed, while old onesmanaged to raise unprecedented amounts offunding.With the increasedmedia coverageandlocal research through refugee‐relatedassessments, the socio‐economic deprivation ofAkkar could no longer be ignored. This wave ofincreasedknowledgeamongthedonorandNGOcommunities, trickled through the media to thegeneral public, arguably has the power toincrease both top‐down and bottom‐upaccountability.ThemyriadrecommendationssentbackbyconsultantstoheadquartersinBeirutandEurope have managed to shift funding policiestowards targeting host communities as well asrefugees.

Thereisariskthatinthelong‐run,shiftingdonorprioritiesandtheceasingofemergencyattentionmay leave Akkar back in the dark. However, as will be explained below, enoughsocio‐economic and political trends have surfaced to make a strong case for the

82MadaAssociation.ForgottenAkkar:Socio‐EconomicRealityoftheAkkarRegion.January2008.Availableonlineat:http://www.mada.org.lb/resources/Forgotten_Akkar.pdf

Whatbreaksresilience?

ALEF has collected numerousaccounts of Lebanese‐Syriantensions that manifested intoprotection problems. Nonetheless,what must not be overlooked arethe numerous other cases ofgenerosity and humanitariantreatment, which have allowed thetwocommunitiestoco‐exist forthislong. For example, many Syrianrefugees informed us that despitetheirrepeateddelaysinpayingrent,their landlords have been veryunderstanding.

OneSyrianrefugee,A.H.,toldusthathis landlord was so accommodatingtohisfamily’sfinancialsituationthathe did not ask for the rent for fourmonths. This quickly changedhowever, when A.H. becameembroiledinapersonalconflictthatspread throughout the village,invitingpolitical/sectarianreactions.

Shortly after, his landlord politelyasked A.H.’s family to evacuate thehousewithinfourdays,notbecauseof the rent, but because he waspressuredtodosobyalocalpoliticalgroup. The Lebanese landlordpreferred to steer clear of trouble,prioritising his personal safety andhis loyalty to fellow Lebanese overhishumanitarianimpulse.

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continued and enhanced development of Akkar, if not for social justiceconsiderationsthenatleastforconflictpreventionpurposes.

ConsideringthefiguresofeconomicdeclineprojectedbytheWorldBank(pleaseseesectionabove),Akkarwillbehitthehardest,particularlyitsyouth.Asbroughtforthinnumerousstudies,alienated,unemployedyouthwithlittleopportunitiestofulfilltheirambitionsareoneofthekeysourcesofsocialandpoliticalinstability.83Aswillbeexplainedbelow,thiskindofunrestinLebanonalsotakesonanationalsecuritydimension in lightof the radical Islamic ideologies that finda strong‐hold inmanyareasoftheNorth.

TheresidentsofAkkarhavebeenprofoundlychangedduetotheirexposuretothehumanitarian operations that have disseminated throughout their villages since2011. As a local informant told us, “for the first time, residents realized thatcollective organising to achieve demandswas possible, because there is someoneout there that responds”. Awakened to their neglected rights, it has been arguedthat the disillusionment of the residents of Akkar has been given a voice, via theSyrian refugee crisis.More recently, the incident of the drowning of 17 Lebaneseimmigrants headed from Akkar to Australia received widespread national andinternational attention,84 further highlighting the shortcomings of the Lebanesegovernment.85

Inthepast,warningsoftheriseofextremismintheNorthhavebeen ignored.Forexample, during the Nahr El Bared conflict in 2007, 8 and 14 March politiciansdismissedFathEl Islamasa foreign intruder.Most ignoredtherootsof thegroup,and theextent towhich its cadreswerepredominantlyLebanesecoming fromtheNorth.Manyofthesemenresortedtoradicaloptionsasaresultofunemploymentandtheabsenceoflivelihoodopportunities.86RecentstatementsbypoliticiansintheNorthandmediareportshaveall revealedthattrainingandmobilizationofradicalIslamist groups in the North is spreading in relation to the Syrian conflict.87 Thisshowsthatconditionshavenotchanged;themilitarycampaignsthateliminatedFathEl Islamandmorerecently,SheikhAssirandsupporters inSaida,achievedashort‐termsecurityobjectiveatahighcost,whilethesocio‐economicrootcausesof theconflictremainunaddressed.

83Dhillon,N.;Yousef,T.(ed.)GenerationinWaiting:UnfulfilledPromiseofYoungPeopleintheMiddleEast.2009BrookingsInstitutionPress.84AlAkhbarEnglish.“LebanesemigrantsdrowninaccidentbetweenIndonesiaandAustralia”.27September2013.Availableonlineat:http://english.al‐akhbar.com/content/several‐lebanese‐migrants‐drown‐attempt‐sail‐australia85Fisk,Robert.TheIndependent.“AtragedyoffthecoastofIndonesiathatshouldshameLebanon’sneglectfulgovernment”.7October2013.Availableonlineat:http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/comment/a‐tragedy‐off‐the‐coast‐of‐indonesia‐that‐should‐shame‐lebanons‐neglectful‐government‐8862394.html86SeeforexampleanalysisbymediaanalysisonclashesbetweenarmyandSheikhAssirsupporters:http://www.saidacity.net/_NewsPaper.php?NewsPaperID=128860&Action=Details87Annahar.“AlAhdab:SyrianIntelligencecreatesinTripoligroupslikeAlNusraandFathAlIslam”.(TranslatedfromArabicbyauthor).30September2013.Availableonlineat:http://goo.gl/Odf1pn

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BycompoundingtheeconomicdifficultiesthatAkkarfaces,theSyrianrefugeecrisisarguablyheightenstheriskofconflict.Besidesthedirectrisksincurredbyresidentsdue to their proximity to the fighting in Syria, thehost communities inAkkar faceindirect risks of conflict in the form of ‘local grievances’. According to Milner,“grievance threats are rooted in understandings of distributive justice…‘grievance’referstoanindividual’soragroup’sperceptionof‘unfairdistribution’.”88Grievancesrelated toeconomicdeprivationare thusproven tomobilizegroup identity. In thecase of Akkar, group identities are prone to being mobilized around extremeideologies, therefore, it is not unlikely that this identity should take on militantforms. In fact, militarization is made more likely due to the abundance ofunregulatedweaponsandtheporousborderswithSyria.Furthermore,“whenagoalorobjectiveisblocked,frustrationensuesandisoftenmanifestedinaggression.”Intheabsenceofcommunicationchannelsbetweencitizenandgovernment,collectivearticulationofdemandsbyhost communitiesaremore likely tobeaggressiveandviolent.Therepeatedkidnappingsandblockingofroadsby localresidents inAkkarthroughouttheyearisbutonemanifestationoffrustrationintheabsenceofjustice,ruleoflaw,andaccountability.

Whatmakes the above conditions particularly dangerous at a time of heightenedtension between refugee and host communities is that economic conditions aredeterioratingandSyrianrefugeescanbecomemoreandmorethescapegoatandthetargetforreleaseoffrustrationbyLebanesecommunities.Ascanalreadybenotedinsocialtrends,theSyriansbecomethe“others”,theonesthatarekilling,stealing,spreading diseases, and taking jobs and husbands. This is applicable not only inAkkar,butevenmoresoinotherareasofthecountry.

Even though shared political and religious links between hosts and refugees hascreatedabuffer inAkkaroverthepast twoyears,evidencefromALEF’s fieldvisitsshowsnumerous incidentsof LebaneseattackingSyrian individualsor looting theirshops.Thiscanbeinterpretedbylookingattheworseningeconomicconditions.Astime passed, religion or ideology were no longer the only determinants of groupaffiliation. Economic priorities overshadowed political sympathies, and as a result,group identity shifted. Thiswasmadeworse by previous donor and humanitarianpolicies,which excluded the Lebanese community from assistance. The end resultfromtheperspectiveofthehostcommunitywas:“they”[Syrianrefugees]aretheones thataregettingassistance,while“we” [deprived residentsof thisvillage]aretheonesbeingexcluded.

AsMilnerbroughtforth:“…thenarrowerone’sconceptionofone’scommunity, thenarrowerwillbe thescopeof situations inwhichone’sactionswillbegovernedbyconsiderationsofjustice’”.

88Milner,James.RefugeeStudiesCentre.“SharingtheSecurityBurden:TowardstheConvergenceofRefugeeProtectionandStateSecurity”.RSCWorkingPaperNo.4.May2000.P.18Availableonlineat:http://www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/publications/working‐papers‐folder_contents/RSCworkingpaper4.pdf

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IV. Pavingthewayforpolicysolutions

OptionsforProtectionandCrisisManagement

UNCHR’sdualmandateofprotectionandassistance isoutlined inChapter2ofthe1950StatuteofUNHCR,whichalsostatesthattheseresponsibilitiesaretobesharedbythe internationalcommunity.ThethreedurablesolutionspursuedbyUNHCR inrefugeecontextsare: local integration, resettlement,and repatriation. In Lebanon,lawmakers and political parties, the composition of the society and the economicsituation complicate theoptionof local integration.This isevident in theusageoftheterm‘displaced’asopposedto‘refugee’,whichaimstoreinforcethetemporarynature of the situation. A statement by an official at the MOSA reflects thisatmosphere, “We are not creating an alternative home. Lebanon will not be the‘comfortableoption’”.89

TheExComConclusiononProtractedRefugeeSituations issued in2009 specifies aprotracted refugee situation as one that lasts for more than five years and isconcerned with 25,000 or more refugees. In Lebanon, some Syrians have beendisplacedfor3yearsnow,particularly intheregionofWadiKhaledinAkkar,whilenumbersareexpectedtoreachwelloveronemillion.Studieshaveshownthathalfofthecivilwarsaroundtheworldlastbetweentwoandfifteenyearswhile70%ofrefugees remain displaced formore than five years after civilwars. In the case ofSyria,adeterioratedeconomyandthedestructionofoveronemillionhousingunitsmeansthattherefugeecrisiswilllikelycontinueevenafteracessationofviolence.90

As for resettlement,UNHCRhasonlybeenable to secure for a limitednumberofrefugees,withprotectionproblems,resettlementtoathirdcountry.DuringourvisitstoSyrianrefugeesinvariouspartsofthecountry,wewereaskedrepeatedlyaboutresettlementoptions.ManyrefugeesinformedusthattheyareseekingtomovetoTurkey because it provides a better option for safety and livelihood,while othersimploredthatweadvocatewithforeignembassiestheoptionofresettlingthem.Theinternational community and neighbouring states continue to block the option ofresettlement,andachangeinpolicyinthenearfutureisunlikely.

InthepastUNHCRhasarguedthat“thekeytorespondingeffectivelytoprotractedrefugee situations is partnerships with all stakeholders to enable planning buildownershipandincreaseavailableresources”.91Theinternationaldebateonrefugee

89Mr.MakramMalaeb,MOSArepresentative.MinutesofPanelDiscussionorganisedbyCarnegieMiddleEastCenter:“SyrianRefugeesinLebanon:ImpactandRecommendations”.25June2013,Beirut.90Minutesofround‐tableorganisedbyLCPSandKonradAdenauerStiftung:“ChallengesofManagingtheSyrianRefugeeInflux”.30May2013.91UNHCR(2002),quotedin:RefugeeStudiesCentre.“Respondingtoprotractedrefugeesituations:Lessonslearntfromadecadeofdiscussion”.ForcedMigrationPolicyBriefing6.January2011.P.5Availableonlineat:http://www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/events/launch‐policy‐briefing‐6/RSCPB6‐RespondingToProtractedRefugeeSituations.pdf

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management has gradually shifted from focusing solely on immediate care andassistance,toanincreasedinterestinthepromotionoflocalsolutionsbyUNHCR.92In the case of Lebanon, local solutions seem increasingly difficult in light of thegovernance vacuum, the lack of funds, and the growing frustration of hostcommunities. Some policy experts have insisted that without the reduction ofnumbersofSyrianrefugeesinLebanon,solutionscannotbefound.93

TheSyrianrefugeecrisishascertainlyputinternationaldebatestothetest.Onekeyelement thatcanno longerbe ignored is the interestof thehostcountry,and theimpact thatprotractedrefugeesituationshaveonsecurityandstability. Arguably,thekindofinternationalsupportthatLebanonhasbeenreceivinghasleanedmoretowards fundraising, advocacy, and operational support as opposed to practicalburdensharingonprotectionandsecurity.

The security burden has been defined as “the threats perceived by a host staterelatedtothegrantingofasylumandtheresourcesrequiredtoeffectivelyaddressthose threats”.94 These threats are divided into direct and indirect threats: directspill‐over of the conflict vs. the threat of exacerbating already existing inter‐communaltensionsinthehostingcountry.95AswasseeninSection5ofthisreport,both kinds of threats are currently applicable in Lebanon. Therefore, securityconcerns canno longerbeomitted fromassistanceplanning.ThePreamble to the1951ConventionrelatingtotheStatusofRefugeesstates:“thegrantofasylummayplace unduly heavy burdens on certain countries, and…a satisfactorysolution…cannotthereforebeachievedwithoutinternationalcooperation”.96

Dealingwiththesecurityburdenhasbeendebatedbytheinternationalcommunityasfarbackasthelate1990s,suchasinthe14thmeetingoftheEXCOMStandingCommitteeandtheproposalknowsasthe“ladderofoptions”.97Themainfeaturesofthe“ladderofoptions”are:

1‐ Softoptions:contingencyplanningandpreventivemeasures+capacitybuildingoflawenforcementservices

2‐ Mediumoptions:monitoringandpolicing;UNHCRandpeacekeepingmissionswiththeoptionofmulti‐nationalcivilianobservers

3‐ Hardoptions:useofforceunderChapter7whenmigrationmovementsposeathreattointernationalpeaceandsecurity–militarydeployment

92UNHCR(2002),quotedin:RefugeeStudiesCentre.“Respondingtoprotractedrefugeesituations:Lessonslearntfromadecadeofdiscussion”.ForcedMigrationPolicyBriefing6.January2011.P.12Availableonlineat:http://www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/events/launch‐policy‐briefing‐6/RSCPB6‐RespondingToProtractedRefugeeSituations.pdf93Interviews:Dr.ShafikMasri;Dr.HibaKhodr,DepartmentofPoliticalStudiesandPublicAdministration,AUB(27September2013)94Milner,James.RefugeeStudiesCentre.“SharingtheSecurityBurden:TowardstheConvergenceofRefugeeProtectionandStateSecurity”.RSCWorkingPaperNo.4.May2000.P.2Availableonlineat:http://www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/publications/working‐papers‐folder_contents/RSCworkingpaper4.pdf95Ibid.96Ibid.p.1297Ibid.p.16

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UNHCR,theLebanesegovernment,andtheinternationalcommunityhaveyettofindan appropriate compromise between refugee assistance, national developmentassistance, and protection. Not addressing host country concerns will ultimatelyhave a negative impact on refugee protection, and will exacerbate developingcountries’reluctancetoofferasylum.Thishasbeenwitnessedinthepast,suchasinthe case of Tanzania in the 1990s. Tanzania received hundreds of thousands ofRwandanrefugees,butthepresenceofarmedelementsamongthemresulted inadestabilization of security and an eventual expulsion of all refugees in 1996.Similarly, Macedonia restricted asylum to Kosovar Albanian refugees for fear ofinsecurityinthelate1990s.98

TheuseoffearsandgrievancesbysomepoliticiansandcitizensasajustificationforexclusionandretaliationagainstSyrianrefugeesisanalarmingindicator.Ultimately,abalancedapproachneeds tobedeveloped inorder to take intoaccountsecuritythreats,butatthesametimepreventsecurityconcernsfrombecomingasourceofhumanrightsabuse.

98HumanRightsWatch(2000).WorldReport2000:TheEventsof1999”.Availableonlineat:http://goo.gl/kGi9EI

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GeneralRecommendations

DonorsandtheInternationalCommunity:

1. ExpediteeffortstosecureatrustfundforSyrianrefugeesandhostcommunitiesinorder toavoid thenegativeconsequencesofunemployment,poverty,and tensionbetweenboththerefugeeandhostcommunities.

2. Support local, community‐based assistance initiatives in order to empowerbeneficiariesandstrengthenthecapacityofbothrefugeeandhostcommunities inreliefaswellasgeneraldevelopment.

3. Ensurethat funding is inclusiveofthedevelopmentalandpoverty‐reductionneedsof the Lebanese host communities in order to ease assistance‐related tensionsamongtherefugeeandhostcommunities.

4. Start exploring the long‐term refugee returns’ strategies, by enabling conditionsconducive to return,whensecurity situationallows inSyrianareasoforigin.Thus,tackle, among others, development factors that render the return in safety anddignityasperinternationalstandards.

LebaneseGovernment:5. Address allegations regarding refusal at the borders for Palestinian refugees from

Syriainordertoavoidnon‐refoulementandarbitraryrefusal.6. Train General Security personnel at the borders on refugee case assessment or

establish protection hosting centers at borders by relevant UN agencies orpartners/INGOs.

7. Address frequentsecurity incidentsbetweenhostandrefugeecommunitieswithacomprehensive security plan that takes into account the right of refugees toprotectionandthesecurityofhostingcommunitymembers.

8. Ensurethatsecuritymeasuresareaccompaniedwithdevelopmentalinitiativessuchasjobcreationinordertotackletherootcausesofdiscontentamongrefugeeandhostcommunities.

UNHCRandpartners:9. Ensurethatthetargetingexerciseisbasedonfaircriteriainordertoavoidexcluding

vulnerablefamilies.10. Improve information dissemination mechanisms to refugees in order to quell

confusionoverservicesandassistance.11. Establishanefficientandtransparentcomplaintmechanismtobeeasilyaccessible

byrefugeesandprovideappropriateremedy.12. Prioritizenewprotection concerns arising from theeconomic and social impactof

theprolongedpresenceofrefugeesamonghostcommunities.13. Enhance preventive protection measures as opposed to merely case‐by‐case

responses.