Typologies of democratic regimes in eight Asian Countries...

Typologies of democratic regimes in eight Asian

Countries: a new perspective based on Latin American

experience

Juan José Rusailh, Facultad de Ciencias Sociales, Universidad de Buenos Aires

Ken Coghill, Department of Management, Monash University

WORK IN PROGRESS NOT TO BE CITED OR QUOTED WITHOUT THE PERMISSION OF THE AUTHORS

Review

Well into the third wave of democratisation described by Huntington (1991), comparative

politics’ scholars are still far from reaching consensus about a general accepted democratic

regime typology. The significance of this discussion within the academic community is

based on the assumption that institutional model adopted in a country will play a key role

on democratic stability and the quality of governance not only during transition to

democracy as Linz and Valenzuela (1994) argue but also on the consolidation and

maintenance of representative democracy (Roper, 2002 p. 253). Indeed, most of the

research on democratic regime classification has centered its attention on countries that

became democracies during the eighties and early nineties, particularly in the Latin

American region. For instance, in most of the Latin American countries that have made the

transition to democracy during the last two decades, the adoption of presidential systems -

albeit the scholarly claim to avoid the pitfalls of presidentialism - , have proved to work

disastrously in the past (Lijphart, 2001 p. 176). In contrast to the interest shown for Latin

American countries and more recently for Eastern European countries, the literature has

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Typologies of Democratic regimes

failed to address the issue of democratic regime type in South East Asia, thus neglecting

the analysis of the institutions of government in the most recent democratised countries.

From a historical perspective, however, there is an agreement on the diffusion and

institutionalization of presidential and parliamentary systems that took place around the

world during the twentieth century. On the one hand, the Westminster type of government

has influenced the transfer of parliamentary-like institutions in most former

Commonwealth colonies in Asia, Africa and the Caribbean and to those countries with

monarchic backgrounds (Lijphart, 1999 p. 10). Where there was a pre-existent head of state

as in every monarchy, what was needed was a head of government dependent on a

popularly elected parliament majority. On the other hand, Latin America was strongly

influenced by the ideals of the Framers of the United States Constitution, where there was

no pre-existent head of state. With the sole exception of Canada, all ‘continental’ Latin

American countries have adopted presidential constitutions. When transferring a particular

regime of government into a rather different institutional domain, several countries have

introduced modifications to the pure presidential and parliamentary typology, such as in the

case of Bolivia and Venezuela1, while others have literally exported the institutional

frameworks of the United States and the United Kingdom (Argentina and Australia).

In defining a typology of the existing regimes of governments, scholars such as Lijphart

(1994, 1999), Sartori (1997) and Shugart and Carey (1992) have taken the presidential-

parliamentary dichotomy as a starting point. This review of typologies deals primarily with

the executive-legislative relations likely to be found in parliamentary and presidential

governments and the regimes which deviate from the standard classification. We then

address the implications of the democratic regime typology for seven South East Asian

countries2. Lastly, it is suggested an alternative methodology to bridge the gap in

democratic regime classification. The use of contend experts panels to test ideas and the

relative weightings of variables in governance can prove to be a innovative tool to compare

institutionalised governance practice among South East Asian countries.

A review of Typologies

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Lijphart (1999) built his typology of democratic regimes by looking at ten different

variables3 of what he illustrates as the majoritarian and consensual models of democracy4.

He then describes three crucial differences between presidential and parliamentary systems

of government. In Chapter 7 of Patterns of Democracy Lijphart (1999, 117-118) argues

that these two types of governments can be clearly identified through the following

features:

a) the prime minister and cabinet dependence on the legislature’s confidence or censure;

b) the popular election of presidents in contrast to prime minister selection by legislatures

and;

c) the collegial or collective nature of the executive in parliamentary systems in contrast

to the one-person executive feature of presidential systems

Unfortunately, Lijphart’s typology of democratic regimes (1999, 119) does not say much

about those “types” that deviate or do not fit into the pure presidential-parliamentary

typology. Among these countries, Lijphart mentions the cases of the Swiss collegial

‘cabinet’, the semi-presidential cases of Austria, Finland, France, Iceland and Portugal and

Israel, a rather problematic one in terms of his classification, given the introduction in 1996

of a popular election to elect the prime minister. Another problem with this categorisation

is that presidential and parliamentary regimes can contain a mixture of both majoritarian

and consensus elements, therefore making Lijphart’s typology dubious about how to

distinguish between different types of democratic regimes5. It is precisely the lack of clear

distinction between the pure presidential and parliamentary types and the semi-presidential

system preferred by Sartori (1997) or premier-presidential systems (Shugart and Carey

1992) early described by Duverger (1980) what makes Lijphart’s categorization faulty.

The clearest effort in constructing an exhaustive typology of democratic regimes has been

the work of Shugart and Carey (1992). They address the distinctions among different

democratic regimes and classify them as (i) Pure presidential, (ii) President-parliamentary,

(iii) Premier-presidential, (iv) Parliamentary with president, and (v) Pure parliamentary. To

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keep our discussion tractable let us begin with a description of the most salient features of

presidential and parliamentary regimes.

Shugart and Carey’s (1992) and Sartori’s (1994) presidential-parliamentary typologies are

concerned with the relationship (separation or fusion) between the executive and the

legislative functions. Shugart and Carey (1992, p. 19) began by defining pure presidential

systems by three criteria concerning the formation and maintenance of powers:

1. the popular election of the chief executive is carried out;

2. the terms of the chief executive and assembly are fixed, and are not contingent on

mutual confidence; and

3. the elected executive names and directs the composition of the government.

They also add the lawmaking powers of presidents, which are expressed by the recourse to

decrees as a way to ensure that the popular endorsement of a policy program through a

presidential election can be translated into actual policy output (1992 p. 20). The decree

powers are important because they convey the power of the president and consequently

could make any classification flawed. For example, Sartori’s (1997) classification

coincides with the first three criteria of Shugart and Carey. A presidential system shall

suffice these three prerequisites to be labeled as such. Sartori also recognizes some

country-specific cases which deviate or have deviated from his three conditions as to be

labeled as pure presidential (i.e. Bolivia, Finland until 1988, Chile until Allende, etc).

Conversely, the defining characteristic of pure parliamentary regimes is the choice of the

head of state by parliament - the only sovereign and popularly elected institution -, and the

legislative-executive power sharing (Sartori, 1997 p. 101). The power sharing feature of

parliamentary systems is sometimes confused with the concept of interdependence or

mutual dependence between both branches. Stepan and Skach (1994) argue that a pure

parliamentary regime is necessary and sufficient, a system of mutual dependence where 1)

the chief executive power must be supported by a majority in the legislature and can fall if

it receives a vote of no confidence, and that 2) the executive power has the capacity to

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dissolve the legislature and call for elections (1994, p. 120). However, Sartori points out

that the power to dissolve parliament cannot be compared with parliamentary power over

government: “the first is a sporadic possibility, the second is a continuous control over

every piece of legislation” (1997, p. 117). The power sharing characteristic of

parliamentary regimes implies that there are not fixed terms either for parliament or for the

government in parliamentary regimes. Another fundamental difference of parliamentary

forms of government is the ‘collective or collegial’ character of executives (Lijphart, 1999,

p. 118) as opposed to the one-person executive found in presidential systems. The prime

minister occupies a position in its cabinet ‘that can vary from preeminence to virtual

equality with other ministers’ (1999 p. 118).

On the other hand, Shugart et al (1992) and Sartori (1997) agree on the prospect of a third

regime of government, namely semi-presidentialism or premier-presidentialism, to avoid

the problems of presidential systems identified by Linz (1994). According to Linz (1994, p.

69) the rigidity of fixed terms in office of presidents, the zero-sum character of presidential

elections and the problem of dual legitimacy of Congress and president are - among other

structural problems - the causes that have lead to conflict, deadlock or even breakdown of

presidential systems. While Shugart and Carey give validity to most of the criticism of

presidential regimes, they argue that criticism of presidential systems is overstated by the

comparative politics literature6. The authors identified at least four potential advantages of

presidential democracy over parliamentary democracy, namely i) accountability, ii)

identifiability, iii) mutual checks; and iv) an arbiter (1992, p. 44-49). Linz, in spite of his

criticism to presidential regimes, has recognised that accountability and identifiability are

the positive characteristics of presidentialism as the voters know who they are voting for

and who will govern should this candidate win (1994, p. 10). While it is true that

presidential regimes certainly offer greater accountability, candidates identifiability and

mutual checks between different branches of government, the arbiter function is a

contestable assumption. It is not clear how reliable the arbiter role of presidents might be as

it will depend on the leadership behavior in a given circumstance and the presidential

attitudes towards particular issues. Be it as it may, the arbiter role attached by Shugart and

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Carey to the presidency is certainly not of an unbiased mediator between two equal parties

as it might be the role of a monarch in a Constitutional monarchy 7.

The third typology - in Lijphart’s view, a mere and slight deviation of parliamentary

regimes - can be characterised as one in which there are both a prime minister and a

popular elected president. As it has been mentioned earlier, the first account of the semi-

presidential regime was given by Duverger (1980) when addressing the performance of the

Fifth French Republic. He describes this regime as an alternation between presidential and

parliamentary phases according to whether the assembly majority supports the president or

not. That is, semipresidential systems are not a synthesis of presidential and parliamentary

systems, but as Duverger puts it (1980, p. 186) “an alternation between presidential and

parliamentary phases”. Given the special features of the Fifth Republic, Shugart and Carey

call it premier-presidential, which bears three criteria (1992, p. 23):

1. Popular election of chief executive who has to coexist with a premier who is head of

government.

2. President has some political powers ranging from submitting a bill to the electorate

rather than to the parliament, referring legislation for judicial review to veto powers or

unilateral decree.

3. President has the power relating to the formation such as nominations for ministerial

portfolios and the power to dissolve the assembly.

Semi-presidential systems arise when there is a popularly elected president and a

parliamentary prime minister as in the case of Fifth French Republic with the cohabitation

of Mitterand and Chirac and more recently of Chirac as president and Lionel Jospin as

prime minister. The preference for semipresidentialism, in contrast to presidential regimes

according to Sartori8 is that it offers ‘a gridlock-avoiding machinery’ for the problem of

divided majorities “by reinforcing the authority of whoever obtains the majority” (1997, p.

124-125). Against Linz’s (1994, p 55) doubts about the merits of semi-presidential

regimes, Pasquino (1997 p. 137) also argues that semi-presidential systems “appear

endowed with both more governmental capabilities and more institutional flexibility than

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parliamentary and presidential systems respectively”. The Finland semi-presidential system

is a case in point where, up to 1991, the president enjoyed formal constitutional powers to

dissolve parliament. As noted by Lijphart (1999 p. 122) a constitutional amendment

reduced presidential power of dissolving parliament, but at the same time eliminated the

electoral college thus increasing president’s prestige. However, it should not be interpreted

that the Finish president was stronger before 1991 and became a figurehead afterwards. In

fact, the presidency was already weak as a simple majority in the parliament could easily

override any of its policy interventions.

In addition, Shugart and Carey present a defense of presidential systems based on evidence

contradicting Mainwaring (1993) in terms of the tendency to instability and breakdown

experienced by presidential regimes. In their account of the democratic regimes that have

broken down during the twentieth century, they identified twelve presidential and twenty-

one parliamentary regimes, along with six other countries that do not fall into the

presidential and parliamentary category (1992, p. 40).

Shugart and Carey also identify other variations from their two ideal types of democratic

regimes with popularly elected presidents, which they term presidential-parliamentary

regime (1992, p. 24), defined by the following characteristics:

1. The popular election of the president

2. The president appoints and dismisses cabinet ministers

3. Cabinet ministers are subject to parliamentary confidence

4. The president has the power to dissolve parliament or legislative powers, or both.

A distinctive feature of president-parliamentary regimes is that it provides equal authority

to dismiss members of the cabinet to the president and the parliament. Shugart and Carey

argue that while in presidential or premier-presidential regimes both president and

assembly may play a role in cabinet formation, only one of them has the power to dismiss

ministers (1992, p. 25). In short, cabinets have the dual responsibility to both the president

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and the assembly while the latter had no say in how to reconstitute the government (1992,

p. 74).

From a more theoretical standing, Elgie (1998, 2004) shows the democratic regime

classification proposed by Lijphart (1999), Shugart and Carey (1992) and others, fails to

distinguish between dispositional and relational properties, thus generating subjective

judgments and conceptual ambiguities about democratic regimes. Elgie (1998, p. 224)

argues that dispositional properties indicate “nothing per se about the powers of institutions

and office holders”, they only refer to institutional framework within which any given set

of power relations occurs. That is, a dispositional type of definition, according to Elgie

(2004) requires no judgement about how powerful a president is or can be (2004 p. 317).

He goes on to argue that if regime typologies are to be classified according to dispositional

properties, there are only three aspects that must be considered: firstly, whether there is

both a head of state and a head of government in the political system or whether one

institution is to be found; secondly, whether or not the incumbents are popularly elected;

and, whether or not these incumbent serve for a fixed term (1998, p. 226) By contrast,

relational properties can be defined as “description of the actual power situation” or

“statements concerning the actual capacity of presidents and prime ministers to mobilise

the political resources at their disposal” (p. 224). Elgie (1998) holds that powers such as

dissolving the parliament, using his/her veto powers or even issuing decrees is a relational

property because - in spite of the fact that it is expressed in the Constitution - it does not

tell us anything about whether or not the leader “will ever be able to invoke it” (1998, p.

225) He contends that classification should be made on the basis of dispositional properties

rather than relational properties as the latter involves judgments about particular

circumstances and may lead scholars to make contestable assumptions about the patterns of

executive power relations in individual countries (1998, p. 228)

In a similar vein, Siaroff (2003) identifies forty-one semi-presidential regimes based on

dispositional properties and then measures the presidential powers9 on these countries to

elaborate his own regime classification. He concludes by arguing that, based on

presidential power configurations, it is possible to classify regimes in five categories such

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as presidential systems, parliamentary systems with presidential dominance, parliamentary

systems with a presidential corrective, parliamentary systems with figureheads presidents

and parliamentary systems with figureheads monarchs (2003, p. 309). However, Elgie

(2004) noted that Siaroff’s final list of regimes types is derived from a mix of dispositional

and relational properties (2004 p. 325).

In what follows, this paper aims to analyse the executive-legislative relation in eight South

East Asian democracies. While it is clear the distinction made by Elgie (1998) between

dispositional and relational properties, this paper takes into account four variables of mixed

properties. The reason not to consider purely dispositional variables is that in the real world

operation of democratic regime is a very much qualitative exercise and dispositional

properties may not tell us anything about how power is in fact exercise in different

countries.

Executive-Legislative relations in 8 South East Asian Countries

In both parliamentary and presidential regimes the relationship between the executive and

the legislative is considered crucial for the implementation of policy programs and thus for

the survival of the government. On the one hand, a controversial or disputed bill in

parliamentary democracy can ultimately generate a vote of no confidence therefore forcing

either the replacement of the prime minister or parliamentary elections. In contrast, as it

was argued above, the same situation in presidential systems is likely to generate a

legislative deadlock (Linz 1994, Sartori, 1997). In the latter, presidents are either forced to

use their constitutional powers, if any, to legislate by decree or to step down. Here, we aim

to analyse four variables likely to be present in any democratic regime: 1) the legislative

powers of the executive materialised through decree powers; 2) whether the executive is

elected for a fixed term or whether is subject to parliamentary confidence 3) whether the

executive has the power to enter into international treaty with foreign countries and

supranational organisations and; 4) the executive-legislative relation for the approval of the

budget bill. Of these variables, only variable 2 is dispositional while 1, 3 and 4 are clearly

relational as they will depend on the interaction between the legislative and executive

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branches. Therefore, we place Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan

and Thailand along a continuous line in order to see the executive-legislative relation

according to the four variables (Figure 1 - Appendix) described above.

Decree Powers of the president

We have mentioned above that the recourse to issue decrees in a presidential system can be

justified by the popular endorsement this position holds if compared with elected members

of parliaments. The decree powers are important because they depict the legislative powers

of presidents and consequently could lead us to make flawed regime classifications. For

example, in his re-appraisal of Shugart and Carey classification, Metcalf (2000) argues that

the scoring of decree powers should also give an account of the explicit “requirement for

the countersignature of a member of the cabinet on a presidential decree” and that the fact

that president must approve all decrees should be also considered, specially “under

conditions of cohabitation” (2000, p. 671) likely to occur in semi-presidential regimes. In

any case, the question about the use or abuse of decree powers is central to the democratic

regime typology as it may be used to circumvent Congress in harsh policy proposals

(Conaghan, 1994 p. 349-350). Sartori also argues that the use of decrees in presidentially

divided power systems is likely to clash with congress while the power sharing features of

parliamentary systems allows to a smooth flow of decree proposals (p. 163). Furthermore,

he notes that in parliamentary regimes where there are provisions for issuing decrees,

“these situations are exceptional, must be justified and is submitted to stringent

conditions”(p. 164)

The Term in Office of the Executive

One of the dispositional properties identified by Elgie (1998) is the whether the executive

has a fixed mandate or it is subject to parliamentary confidence. According to Linz (1994)

the election of the president for a fixed term produces an inherent rigidity of presidential

tenure that in normal circumstances cannot be modified: not shortened and sometimes, due

to provisions preventing reelection, not prolonged (1994, p. 8) In contrast, parliamentary

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regimes allow for the removal of the prime minister through the vote of no confidence and

therefore avoiding serious political crises (1994 p. 9). For instance, according to Lijphart

(1994 p. 94) categorisation the Malaysian and Japanese prime ministers are selected by the

legislature and remain in office dependent on legislative confidence. The same occurs in

the case of Thailand’s constitutional monarchy where the prime minister is designated from

among the member of the House of Representatives following national elections.

Singapore, albeit its long dominance exercised by the People’s Action Party since 1963

(Lipset, 1998 p. 155) can also be classified as a parliamentary regime according to Stepan

and Skach (1994, p. 120). Conversely Indonesia, Philippines and South Korea feature

presidential systems where the executive is selected by popular votes for a fixed term and

is not accountable to the legislature. In the case of Taiwan, despite the popular election of

the head of state, there is also a head of government (prime minister) who is accountable to

the legislature (Siaroff, 2003, p. 300).

An issue closely related to the tenure in office of the executive is the process by which a

president or a prime minister can be dismissed from office. As noted by Linz (1994) for the

case of presidential systems, the rigidity of the duration of the mandate becomes an

essential political factor to which all actors in the political process have to adjust (1994 p.

8). Given that the impeachment of a president is an extraordinary action, Linz is concerned

with situations where the incumbent fails to make correct judgement - particularly in

relation to political, social or economic events - thus leading the country to a period of

unpredictability and increased uncertainty. If the president confronts a stiff congressional

opposition due to his misjudgment, it may lead the government to a congressional

deadlock. Shugart and Carey (1992), for instance, have suggested that in presidential

systems, the provision for dissolution would seem to provide an institutional resource to

resolve the problem of congressional deadlock (1992 p. 126) In any case, the natural way

in which several countries have overcome congressional deadlock is by making the

president resign under the pressure of party leaders and public opinion (Linz, 1994 p. 10).

Conversely, Linz noted that in parliamentary systems the prime minister can always

reinforce his authority and democratic legitimacy by asking for a vote of confidence (1994

p. 9). If a prime minister is unable to pass a vote of confidence he is either forced to

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dissolve parliament and call for new elections or to reshuffle his cabinet - by making some

concessions to opposition parties - to gather a parliamentary majority which would allow

for his survival in office. In short, while a vote of confidence allows the prime minister to

try to gather or reconfirm parliamentary support to enact legislation, presidential systems

do not have a constitutional device to reinforce president’s policy program. Therefore, if

presidential impeachment cannot be invoked, the likely outcome might be a congressional

deadlock that can only be overcome by a presidential resignation.

The executive power for enter into International Treaties

One of the shortcomings of regime classification is the absence of analysis of international

treaty making powers of the executive. While most of the literature has focused on the role

in foreign affairs matters of the executive (Shugart and Carey, 1992; Lijphart, 1999), this

issue is important because it has divided the parties in twelve of the thirty-six democracies

analised by Lijphart (1999 p. 85). Issues such as the opposition to membership to

supranational organisations or even international security matters - currently in the agenda

of most South East Asian countries - can have an detrimental effect on national politics

thus altering government coalitions or polarizing the society into ideological blocks.

However, for the region under study the consequences of the executive agreeing on

entering into a controversial international treaty remain to be seen.

Executive-legislative policy making relations

The policy-making process, that is, the process by which the government propose policy

programs and enact legislation through parliament to carry them out, in both presidential

and parliamentary systems is performed within the cabinet. However, in the Southeast

Asian countries under study here, political parties and bureaucracies play a key role in the

policy making process. For instance, Lijphart (1999) noted that the Japanese political

system, in spite of its parliamentary features, departs significantly from some key aspects

of the present-day Westminster model (1999, p. 4-9). George Mulgan (2003) recently noted

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that all major Japanese policies including those that require legislation must be submitted

to the ‘advance inspection’ and ‘prior approval’ of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)

policy-making machinery comprising its Policy Affairs Research Council (2003 p. 75).

While in most parliamentary systems there is a latent power by which the ruling party can

exercise its veto role to cabinet policies, in the case of Japan’s political system, the party

policy-making power is overt and regularised (2003 p. 77-78) Moreover, George Mulgan

(2003) also argued that the executive acts as a mere ratifier of policies that have emerged

from the party-bureaucratic policy-making process (p. 84) therefore consistently avoiding

the leading role of the prime minister and his cabinet usually performed in Westminster

systems. Similarly, the policy-making role in Singapore is strongly influenced by the elite

members of the People Action Party (PAP), a dominant political machinery which has

governed Singapore since 1959. As Shugart and Carey rightly point out, where a

parliamentary executive has a secure basis of support among a majority in the assembly it

can easily legislate in a virtually unimpeded manner (1992 p. 132). However, Singaporean

prime minister is comparatively more powerful than his Japanese counterpart in that the

former is given greater powers to carry out the PAP’s internally agreed policy agenda

while the latter - as it has been clear since Mr Koizumi was elected as prime minister in

2001- has to fight against a though resistance from his own party (The Economist, 2003).

In these circumstances, the policy-making process in both countries can be characterised by

an incremental peace where radical policy proposal and reforming ideas would hardly ever

find a fertile soil in the parliament.

Democratic Regimes in Southeast Asia

It has been argued that the comparative politics literature has largely ignored the question

about which of the democratic regimes discussed above can work better for Southeast

Asian countries. For instance, a commonly heard claim is that for ethnically divided

societies such as Indonesia and the Philippines, parliamentary systems will prove to be

more appropriate as the parliamentary composition can be reflected in representative

cabinets (Lijphart, 1999). On the contrary, in presidential regimes the winning candidate is

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necessarily the representative of one group to the exclusion of all other groups (Lijphart

2001 p. 173).

Moreover, in a recent study of electoral systems Diamond (1999 p. 104 cited in Lijphart

2001) noted that single-member district systems are ill-advised for countries with deep

ethnic, regional, religious, or other emotional and polarising divisions as they will exclude

from power any significant group. Conversely, for countries that are homogeneous in

ethnic, religious, and other respects, proportional representation will have some positive

effects such as the stimulation of higher voter participation and better representation of

women than majoritarian election systems (Lijphart, 1999, pp. 278–286). Nevertheless,

constitutional writers in Southeast Asia seem to have ignored these facts when designing

their own countries constitutions.

Of the eight Asian countries initially considered in this study, three are classified as liberal

democracies (Japan, Taiwan and South Korea), three fit into the electoral democracies

classification (Indonesia, Philippines and Thailand) and the remaining two (Malaysia and

Singapore) can be either classed as “ambiguous regime” or “competitive authoritarian”

ones (Diamond, 2002 p. 31). If the four distinctions in terms of the executive-legislative

relations discussed above are added, greater differences are likely to be expected among

these countries in terms of their democratic regime classification.

More in detail, Taiwan and South Korea represent the successful examples that democracy

and Asian values10 are compatible for the region. Since their democratic transition, both

countries have been able to produce open and competitive elections while consolidating a

party system. Taiwan has moved progressively to a multiparty system where even the pro-

China Kuomintang -once the authoritarian ruling party - is starting to take into account the

Taiwanese desire for greater freedom from China (The Economist, 2004). South Korea, in

turn, accounts for the most successful story of transition and democratic consolidation of

the current presidential regimes of the region, having been able to hand over the presidency

to the main opposition party in 1998 (see Journal of Democracy, 1998) thus consolidating a

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two-party system. One controversial issue, however, mentioned regularly in Korean

analysis is the difficult relationship between the state and the big and powerful chaebols

(business conglomerates) which so often dominate the political scene through accusations

of corruption and money politics (Root, 2002).

Japan has a Westminster regime - inherited from its Commonwealth past - but one quite

different from the UK system (George Mulgan, 2003) due to the role played by the Liberal

Democratic Party in the policy-making process. In spite of the prime minister attempts to

advance on a reforming agenda, political decisions have long flowed in one direction, from

elderly politicians to their long-suffering junior colleagues (The Economist, 2003b).

On the one hand, the Philippines and Thailand can be clearly considered electoral

democracies that “have some of the trappings of democracy, such as universal-suffrage

elections, but their elections are not free and fair because the necessary civil liberties are

lacking” (2001, p. 170). Rose and Shin have rightly argued that Thailand is without any

doubt a much freer society than it was a decade ago, however “it would be premature to say

that they have completed the process of democratization” (2001, p. 332). For instance, in

2001 elections, as many as one hundred of the Thai Rak Thai (TRT or Thai loves Thai)

party candidates allegedly cheated in races where millions of dollars went to buy villagers’

votes while forming government coalitions with ex-premiers whose tenures were noted for

disastrously poor governance (Root, 2002 p. 115). In addition, the Thai prime minister Mr.

Thaksin is determined to enlarge his coalition around his TRT party at the expense of

checks and balances (The Economist, 2002). Similarly to what happened in Thai elections,

during the latest Philippine presidential election it was largely reported widespread election

fraud, mainly centered on local contest. In spite of having well-educated individuals, a free

and independent media and an active civil society, Rogers (2004) has argued that

Philippine democracy exists in an atmosphere of institutionalised crisis11 (2004 p. 114)

adding more doubts about the viability of presidential systems in divided societies with

weak (non-ideological differentiated) party systems. More recently, a political reform

proposal led by Speaker of the House Jose de Venecia is promoting a shift from

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presidential to parliamentary government - a shift that incumbent president Macapal

Arroyo endorsed early in her campaign (2004 p. 120)

The case of Indonesia, if recent developments toward democratic transition experienced

during 2004 are taken into account, it may well be argued that Indonesia has finally

departed from being an ambiguous regime to an electoral democracy, according to

Diamond’s classification (2002). However, it still remains to be seen if a presidential

minority government with a quite novel electoral system in a ethnically divided society will

be able to overcome the regime instability usually attached to presidential regimes of

governments. Indonesia first directly elected president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono

represents the culmination of the reformasi period initiated after massive riots which

ousted Suharto from office in 1998. He has called recently to form a ‘united Indonesia’

cabinet representing diverse interests and views. However, it has been already reported that

the new administration would face an uphill battle in parliament as his cabinet is a result of

a political compromise between Susilo and the political forces that supported him, which

includes several controversial appointments (AFX News Limited, 2004). Given the multi-

party and ethnically diverse feature of Indonesia, one may wonder what would have been

the effectiveness in forming a government coalition had Indonesia chosen a parliamentary

system instead of a presidentialism.

Similarly, the United Malays National Organisation (UNMO), which has led the country

continuously since its independence in 1957, had suffered a serious setback in 1999 general

election, when the Islamic opposition party (PAS) headed by prime minister Abdullah

Ahmad Badawi won the general election. This path toward democratic consolidation in

Malaysia is a clear sign that ethnically divided societies will support a progressive Islamic

government led by an honest leader able to prevent the corruption and debasement of

Muslim societies (Lee, 2004 p 39)

Lastly, Singapore is still part of a doubtfully selected group usually referred as an electoral

autocracy (Diamond, 2002 p. 23). However, new prime minister Lee Hsien Loong, son of

the longtime ruler Lee Kwan Yew, seems to realise that Singapore needs to loosen up some

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restrictions on freedom of speech and assembly (NY Times, 2004). In spite of the fact that

elections take place periodically, the Peoples Action Party has dominated the political life

since its independence in 1963 and has continued to win large majorities in parliament

elections both because the opposition is fragmented and because the party controls the

entire bureaucracy, including the lowest levels of precincts (Lipset, 1998 p. 155). From a

Western perspective, a one-party state is neither competitive nor democratic. However,

intraparty factionalism is prevalent, and varying points of view are aired publicly. In recent

years, the PAP has also moved toward the establishment of various grassroots

organisations designed to elicit ideas from the public.

Conclusion

This paper has argued that the selection of a suitable regime of government is the key to

avoid instability and regime breakdowns. The literature review has been an attempt to

present the most distinguishable features of different regimes of government. Our interest

in analysing the executive-legislative relations led us to establish four qualitative variables

from which the executive or legislative dominance can be measured. To be sure, while

most Southeast Asian countries may fit into the patterns of either presidential or

parliamentary typology, our qualitative assessment strongly suggests wide differences

among them. In order to refine this exploratory assessment, we suggest that the use of

contend experts panels can prove to be an innovative tool to compare institutionalised

governance practice among Southeast Asian countries.

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APPENDIX

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References:

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Conaghan, Catherine M. (1994) Loose parties, “floating” politicians, and institutional stress: presidentialism in Ecuador, 1979-1988 in The failure of Presidential Democracy eds. Linz, J and Valenzuela, A. Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press

Diamond, L. (1999) Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press).

Elgie, Robert (1998) The classification of democratic regime types: Conceptual ambiguity and contestable assumptions in European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 33 p.219-238

Elgie, Robert (2004) Semi-presidentialism: concepts, consequences and contesting explanations in Political Studies Review Vol. 2 pp. 314-330

Journal of Democracy (1998) Elections watch, South Korea (9) 2 pp. 190-192

Lee Kuan Yew (2004) Islam and democracy in Southeast Asia in Forbes July 26, 2004 (174) 2

Lijphart, Arend (1994) Presidentialism and majoritarian democracy: theoretical observations in The failure of Presidential Democracy eds. Linz, J and Valenzuela, A. Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press

Lijphart, Arend (1999) Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries. New Haven: Yale University Press

Lijphart, Arend (2001) Democracy in the 21st century: can we be optimistic? in European Review, Vol. 9, No. 2, 169–184

Linz, Juan (1994) Presidential or parliamentary democracy: does it make a difference? in The failure of Presidential Democracy eds. Linz, J and Valenzuela, A. Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press

Lipset, Seymour M. (1998) Democracy in Asia and Africa, Washington: Congressional Quarterly Inc.

Mainwaring, Scott (1993) Presidentialism, multipartism, and democracy: the difficult combination” Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 26 (2) p198

Metcalf, Lee K. (2000) Measuring Presidential Power in Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 33 (5) p. 660-685

NY Times (2004) Singapore’s Moment August 30, 2004 pg. A.18

Rogers, Steven (2004) Philippine politics and the rule of law in Journal of Democracy (15) 4

Root, Hilton L. (2002) What democracy can do for east Asia in Journal of Democracy (13) 1

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Roper, Steven (2002) Are all semipresidential regimes the same? A comparison of Premier-Presidential Regimes in Comparative Politics, April 2002

Sartori, Giovanni (1997) Comparative Constitutional Engineering. New York: New York University Press

Shugart, Matthew Sober and Carey, John M. (1992) Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Siaroff, Alan (2003) Comparative presidencies: The inadequacy of the presidential, semi-presidential and parliamentary distinction in European Journal of Political Research Vol. 42 pp. 283-312

Stepan, Alfred and Skach, Cindy (1994) Presidentialism and Parliamentarism in Comparative Perspective in. The failure of Presidential Democracy eds. Linz, J and Valenzuela, A. Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press

The Economist (2002) Pleasing the voters March 2, 2002 taken from http://www.economist.com Accessed 15/12/04

The Economist (2003) Intimations of a sunrise - Japan’s election November 15, 2003 taken from http://www.economist.com Accessed 15/12/04

The Economist, (2003b) Look young,http://www.economist.com Accessed 15/12/04

please November 1, 2003 taken from

The Economist (2004) Independence day?http://www.economist.com Accessed 15/12/04

Taiwan March 27, 2004 taken from

1 In the case of Bolivia, if there is no clear winner in presidential elections, Congress must pick one candidate out of the three parties that gathered more votes. The Venezuelan presidents, in spite of being popularly elected, do not have the policy-making powers conferred through decrees to most presidents. 2 For convenience, we refer here to Asian countries in spite of the geographic distinction usually made between East, South East and South Asian countries. 3 These variables are: 1) concentration of executive power in one-party and bare-majority cabinets, 2) the dominance of cabinet which is composed of leaders of a cohesive majority party 3) the existence of a large two-party system, 4) a majoritarian system of elections where members are elected in single-member districts and which is particular disadvantageous to small parties 5) interest group pluralism that exerts pressure on the government in an uncoordinated and competitive manner, 6) Unitary and centralised government, 7) Concentration of legislative power in a unicameral legislature, as is the case in New Zealand, (the United Kingdom deviates- although not much - from the pure majoritarian model); 8) the Constitutional flexibility of an unwritten constitution; 9) Absence of judicial review and 10) A central bank controlled by the executive. See Lijphart (1999 p. 10-20)4 Majoritarian model of democracy is one which counts with the support of the majority of the people as a minimum requirement to form government while the consensus model seeks to maximise the size of these majorities by sharing, dispersing and limiting power. (see Lijphart, 1999 p. 2)5 Lawrence and Hayes (2000) have also argued that the ‘hybrid’ types presented by Lijphart are nonsensical as there are no empirical examples for them (see Lawrence, C. and Hayes, J. (2000) Regime stability and Presidential government: A preliminary analysis Paper presented at the 72nd Annual Meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, Atlanta, Georgia, 8-11 November 2000.

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7


6 Shugart and Carey prove that it was not the presidential system per se that was unstable but particular configurations of presidential powers such as the concentrations of legislative powers in the hand of the president which was problematic (see Shugart and Carey, 1992 p. 165) The arbiter or mediator role may be better suited for Kings in constitutional monarchies as they are a

symbol of country unification and his leadership is not jeopardised. 8 It should be noted, however, that Sartori critises the criteria used by Shugart and Carey (1992) of premier-presidential regime as lacking discriminatory power. Instead he proposed a definition based on five properties that semi-presidential systems must suffice (Sartori, 1997 p. 132-33)9 Siaroff (2003 pp. 303-305) takes into account the following categories of presidential power: 1)whether the president is popularly elected or not; 2) whether there are concurrent elections and synchronized terms for the president and the assembly; 3) the discretionary appointment of key individuals such as the prime minister of cabinets members; 4)the ability of the president to chair formal cabinet meetings and engage in agenda setting; 5)the power of the president to veto legislation; 6) whether the president has broad emergency or decree powers for national disorder and/or economic matters; 7)whether the president has a central role in foreign policy; 8) whether the president plays a central role in forming government, including selecting, removing or keeping in office a given individual and; 9) the ability of the president to dissolve the legislature at will 10 The term Asian values has been attached to most of the semi-democracies of the region as opposed to Western values of liberal democracy. As a developmentalist doctrine, Asian values mean that until prosperity is achieved, democracy remains an unaffordable luxury likely to generate economic, political and social instability. Singapore and Thailand are the most fervent supporters of Asian values. For a discussion about the role of Asian values and the democratisation process see Thompson, Mark R. (2001) Whatever happened to Asian values? In Journal of Democracy (12) 4 11 In the last four decades, only one president (Fidel Ramos, 1992-98) has entered and left office through a regular democratic process. (see Rogers, S (2004) Philippine politics and the rule of law in Journal of Democracy (15) 4

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Typologies of democratic regimes in eight Asian Countries...

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