UKOOA Telecoms Guidelines

Guidelines for Safety Related Telecommunication Systems on Fixed Offshore Installations Issue 1

August 2005 Whilst every effort has been made to ensure the accuracy of the information contained in this publication, neither UKOOA, nor any of its members will assume liability for any use made thereof. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission of the publishers. Crown copyright material is reproduced with the permission of the Controller of Her Majesty�s Stationery Office. Copyright 2005 UK Offshore Operators Association Limited

Acknowledgements: In publishing these guidelines, the UK Offshore Operators Association (UKOOA) acknowledges the assistance given to their preparation by Dave Magwood. ISBN: 1 903003 30X PUBLISHED BY UK OFFSHORE OPERATORS ASSOCIATION London Office: 2nd Floor, 232-242 Vauxhall Bridge Road, London, SW1V 1AU. Tel: 020 7802 2400 Fax: 020 7802 2401 Aberdeen Office: 3rd Floor, The Exchange 2, 62 Market Street, Aberdeen, AB11 5PJ. Tel: 01224 577250 Fax: 01224 577251 Email: [email protected] Website: www.oilandgas.org.uk

Guidelines for Safety Related Telecommunication Systems on Fixed Offshore Installations

Issue 1 August 2005 i

Contents

Preface List of Abbreviations Paragraph Page

1 Introduction 1 1.1 Purpose of Publication 1 1.2 Aims 1 1.3 Scope 1 1.4 Method 1

2 Summary of Regulations 2 2.1 Regulations for Safety Related Communications 2 2.2 The MAR Regulations 2 2.3 The PFEER Regulations 3

3 Prevention, Detection and Control 5 3.1 Measures for Protecting People and Plant 5 3.2 Communication Protective Measures 6

4 Emergency Response 7 4.1 Communications for Emergency Response 7

5 Emergency Communications on NAI and NUI 8 5.1 Overview of Requirements on NAI 8 5.2 Overview of Requirements on NUI During

Maintenance Visits 9 5.3 Communication Objectives for NAI and NUI 10 5.4 Communication Provisions 11


ii Issue 1 August 2005

Contents (cont�d)

Paragraph Page

6 General Provisions 13 6.1 Equipment Resilience 13 6.2 Power Supplies 14 6.3 Equipment Location 14 6.4 Telecommunications Cabling 15 6.5 Shutdown of Telecommunication Systems 15

7 Installation and Maintenance 17 7.1 Summary of Regulations 17 7.2 Regulations for Audible Alarm Systems 18

8 Training and Operations 18 8.1 Competencies 18 8.2 Operational Considerations for NUI Visits 18

Addendum 1 Recommended Practice for Fixed

Offshore Installations


Issue 1 August 2005 iii/iv

Preface

These guidelines for Safety Related Telecommunication Systems on Fixed Offshore Installations have been prepared in consultation with representatives of offshore operators, contractors and other organisations, who have interest or responsibilities in the provision of such systems.

It replaces two previous UKOOA publications � �Safety Related Telecommunication Systems on Normally Attended Fixed Offshore Installations� and �Safety Related Telecommunication Systems on Normally Unattended Fixed Offshore Installations�. Much of the guidance contained in these two publications has been incorporated into the latest revision.

The main changes involve new opening sections that summarise the regulatory requirements that govern the provision of telecommunication safety systems. In updating the guidelines, the choice of MF/HF radiotelephone, as a means of onshore communications, has been omitted in favour of more modern methods, and GMDSS VHF facilities have been introduced as the primary means of calling and communication with nearby ships and vessels during emergency situations.


Issue 1 August 2005 v

List of Abbreviations

ATS Air Traffic Services

BS British Standard

CAA Civil Aviation Authority CAP Civil Aviation Publications

DSC Digital Selective Calling

ECC Emergency Control Centre ECP Emergency Control Point EPIRB Emergency Position Indicating Radio Beacon

GA General Alarm GMDSS Global Maritime Distress and Safety System

HF High Frequency HLO Helicopter Landing Officer

ISDX Integrated Services Digital Switch

LOS Line of Sight

MAR Management and Administration MF Medium Frequency

NAI Normally Attended Installation NDB Non-directional Beacon NUI Normally Unattended Installation

OCC Operation Control Centre OIM Offshore Installation Manager

PA Public Address PABX Private Automatic Branch Exchange PFEER Prevention of Fire and Explosion, and Emergency Response

RF Radio Frequency RO Radio Operator ROC Restricted Operator�s Certificate

SARTS Search and Rescue Transponders SI Statutory Instrument(s)

TEMPSC Totally Enclosed Motor Propelled Survival Craft TR Temporary Refuge


vi Issue 1 August 2005

UHF Ultra High Frequency UKCS United Kingdom Continental Shelf UKOOA UK Offshore Operators Association Limited UPS Uninterruptible Power Supply

VHF Very High Frequency VOX Voice Operated Switch


Issue 1 August 2005 1

1 Introduction

1.1 Purpose of Publication

The purpose of this publication is to provide guidance on the provision of telecommunication systems that are required for safety purposes on Fixed Offshore Installations associated with Oil and Gas production in United Kingdom Continental Shelf (UKCS) waters.

1.2 Aims

It aims to assist those who are responsible for the design of such systems to confirm their compliance with the various Statutory Instruments (SI), Approved Codes of Practice (ACOPS) and associated guidance that govern the provision of protective and emergency communications on fixed offshore installations. It describes what is considered in the industry to be good practice and will also prove useful to those who need to confirm that existing systems remain compliant with current legislation.

1.3 Scope

The document relates to fixed installations, which may be either Normally Attended Installations (NAI), or Normally Unattended Installations (NUI). PFEER regulations apply equally to both, to ensure that during maintenance visits to NUI appropriate emergency communications are provided. Due to the commonality of legislation that exists between all types of fixed installation, it has been decided that the former UKOOA documents for safety related telecommunications on NAI and NUI be amalgamated into a single publication in this revision.

1.4 Method

The document will summarise the principal elements of the statutory requirements and outline their application, first in the provision of appropriate protective measures and secondly in the provision of emergency communications. The requirements for securing effective emergency response are then considered in more detail. A list of communication objectives is provided together with descriptions of the equipments that may be employed to meet these objectives.


2 Issue 1 August 2005

The choice of equipment is not mandatory and Operators may adopt different solutions, in particular situations, provided they remain compliant with the legislation and maintain an equivalent level of safety. The guidance will also consider telecommunications that are normally provided on offshore installations, for operational purposes, which may enhance safety in emergencies. It will also address the methods commonly employed to ensure the inherent resilience of these �safety-critical� systems together with their installation and maintenance requirements. The effectiveness of communications in an emergency is heavily dependent on the ability of those who operate the equipment provided. The standards of competency will also be outlined.

2 Summary of Regulations

2.1 Regulations for Safety Related Communications

The principal regulations that govern the provision of safety communications for offshore installations are contained in:

• Offshore Installations and Pipeline Works (Management and Administration) Regulations, SI 1995/738, referred to in later text as MAR

• Offshore Installations (Prevention of Fire and Explosion, and Emergency Response) Regulations, SI 1995/743, referred to in later text as PFEER

These regulations recognise that communications have an important role, not only in securing an effective emergency response, but also in providing a range of measures to assist in detecting emergencies and mitigating their effects.

2.2 The MAR Regulations

The MAR regulations specify a number of requirements to ensure the health and safety of personnel on offshore installations and those close by. The following table summarises the two regulations that will require the provision of communication systems.



2.3 The PFEER Regulations

The PFEER regulations have two objectives. The first is to provide preventive and protective measures, to manage fire and explosions, which will require systems for monitoring, detection and control. The solutions provided will generally require systems for the collection, transport and manipulation of data.

The second goal is to secure effective emergency response, to make provision for safe and systematic evacuation and to facilitate rescue. These will generally require the provision of a range of voice communication systems.

The following table summarises the salient parts of the PFEER regulations for which communications have a particular role or have relevance in this document.

Offshore Installations and Pipeline Works (Management and Administration) Regulations 1995 (MAR), SI 1995/738

Regulation 12 requires arrangements, appropriate for health and safety purposes, for effective communications: between the offshore installation, the shore, vessels, aircraft and other installations; and when helicopters land on, or take off from, unmanned installations, for effective communications between the aircraft and either a suitable attended offshore installation or suitable onshore premises.

1

Regulation 14 requires arrangements for the collection and storage of meteorological and oceanographic information; and such information relating to the motions of the offshore installation as is necessary for securing, as far as is reasonably practicable, the safe operation of the installation and the safety of persons on or near it.



In order to reflect the twin purposes of the PFEER regulations, and to aid clarity, the two objectives will initially be treated separately in the sections that follow. Those regulations that are common to both will be mentioned wherever it is appropriate.

Offshore Installations (Prevention of Fire and Explosion, and Emergency Response) Regulations 1995 (PFEER), SI 1995/743

Regulation 5 (Assessment) requires a systematic identification of major hazards with the potential to require evacuation, escape or rescue. Their likelihood and consequences, the measures needed to manage the consequences effectively and in the establishment of auditable performance standards for such measures.

Regulation 8 (Emergency Response Plan) requires the preparation of an emergency response plan that will include the organisational structure chosen to manage emergencies on the installation. The structure will show the chain of command, the roles and responsibilities of key personnel, the communication arrangements between them and the external agencies that may need to be involved.

Regulation 10 (Detection of Incidents) requires appropriate measures � for the detection of events that may require emergency response � or to enable information regarding such incidents to be conveyed forthwith to places from which control can be instigated.

Regulation 11 (Communications) requires appropriate arrangements; for giving warning of an emergency by audible and, where necessary, visual alarms, to all personnel onboard and for purposes of emergency response, for communication between persons on the installation, to those beyond engaged in activities associated with it, and between the installation and those beyond with a support or rescue role. It also specifies the characteristics of the audible and visual alarms that must be employed.

Regulation 12 (Control of Emergencies) requires appropriate measures with a view to limiting the extent of an emergency � including measures for the remote operation of plant � such measures being capable of remaining effective in an emergency.

Regulation 19 (Suitability and Condition of Plant) concerns the suitability of the emergency equipment provided to meet PFEER regulations, their construction and installation, and the maintenance required throughout their service life.

2

Regulation 20 (Life-saving Appliances) deals with survival craft (TEMPSC) communications and their radio location at sea.



PFEER 11 � Internal Comms (A5)

PFEER 5Assessment

Likelihood

Consequence

Performance

Det

ect

Sta

ndar

ds

Prevent � Collision Avoidance

� Intruder Alarms

� Condition Monitoring Systems

� Man Overboard Devices� Status Monitoring

� Functionality� Survivability� Reliabilty� Availability

� Navigation Beacons

Hazards

PFEER 10

Mitigate

� Remote Control Systems

� Emergency Shutdown Systems

PFEER 12

Measures

Measures

Measures

3 Prevention, Detection and Control

3.1 Measures for Protecting People and Plant

One of the goals of the PFEER regulations is to prevent fire and explosions, and to protect persons from the effects of any which do occur. At the heart of the legislation is PFEER Regulation 5 that requires a systematic assessment to identify potential major accident hazards, their likelihood and consequences, and the measures needed to moderate their effects.

The diagram below aims to summarise the assessment cycle in order to highlight the measures where communications can play a part. The application of performance standards to such measures has been indicated on the diagram, since they are integral to the regulation, but they will not be discussed further in this document.

The measures identified during the assessment will fall into one of the three categories indicated. Where there is a likelihood of an accident happening, which would potentially require an emergency response, detection measures must be considered. Ideally, detection systems should be automatic, and not require manual intervention, and remain operational during the emergency to the extent necessary to do the job required of them. The remaining measures are those that serve to control and mitigate the consequences of major accident events. Equipment used to control the extent of an emergency should be designed, as far as is reasonably practicable, to fail safe and should remain operational for as long as is needed to fulfil its function, taking into account the conditions to which it may be exposed.

Appropriate measures should be adequate to achieve the objectives set out in the regulations but not require expenditure which is completely out of proportion to the risk that their implementation seeks to avoid.



3.2 Communication Protective Measures

The measures listed below combine those that must be provided with those that may be appropriate according to the level of risk established during PFEER Regulation 5 assessment:

M1 Condition Monitoring: Systems employed to monitor platform stability over extended timescales. (The collection of meteorological and oceanographic data, and information relating to the motions of the offshore installation, is a specific requirement of SI 1995/738 (MAR) Regulation 14.)

M2 Aircraft Navigation Beacons: Non-directional Beacons (NDBs) to aid helicopter navigation during periods of poor visibility. (Offshore MF NDBs must conform to the engineering standards given in CAP 670 NAV02.)

M3 Collision Avoidance Systems: Installations close to sea lanes, particularly those that are unattended, will be at greater risk of collision. Radar systems can be employed to give early warning of potential collisions. Systems may be distributed amongst a group of installations and relay warnings via telemetry to a central control centre.

M4 Man Overboard Systems: Personal locator devices that are worn during overside work. The devices can be triggered manually, but will activate automatically when in contact with the sea, and incorporate search and rescue transponders to aid location.

M5 Intruder Alarm Systems: Detection devices that can be arranged to raise remote intruder alarms for the purpose of protecting safety critical systems.

M6 Emergency Shutdown Systems: Arrangements to remotely shut down plant during emergencies. They may be either manual or automatic according to particular requirements. In keeping with the fail-safe requirement, loss of any associated telemetry links will need to initiate an ESD condition after a predetermined time interval. Such systems may be used for safety purposes when drilling rigs or vessels are stationed above remote subsea wellheads.

M7 Remote Control and Monitoring Systems: Data based management systems to remotely monitor and control plant. These may be used to remotely operate other safety systems such as helideck lights and directional beacons on NUI. Systems used for remote control are required to be fail-safe.

M8 Status Monitoring Systems: Such as pipeline integrity systems that are needed to ensure the safe and environmentally secure transport of oil and gas in subsea pipelines. Refer to Addendum 1, Paragraph A3.3.

The resilience of the protective measures employed should be determined as part of the PFEER Regulation 5 assessment. The guidance supplied in Paragraph 6 being adapted as appropriate. Equipments that radiate RF energy should meet the requirements described in Paragraph 6.5.



WarnAll Personnel onboard

by Audible (and where necessary Visual) Alarms

AlertExternal Agencies

AlertOngoing Operations

Internal Communications for emergency response

Emergency

External Communications

Onshore Support & Emergency Services

External CommunicationsShips, Aircraft &

Nearby Installations

4 Emergency Response

4.1 Communications for Emergency Response

The second objective of the PFEER regulations is to secure an effective emergency response. The diagram below summarises the prominent parts of PFEER Regulation 11 that specify the communications that are required during an emergency. It requires the duty holder to make appropriate arrangements to rapidly alert all personnel onboard the installation that an emergency has occurred, or is occurring, and to alert those beyond who may be affected or can render assistance.

To ensure standardisation throughout the industry, the regulations specify the acoustic characteristics of the audible warnings that can be given and the colours of the visual flashing signs that may be needed.

The regulations then focus on the communications needed for emergency response. This requires provision of internal communications between personnel on the installation, either between those engaged in controlling the emergency and conducting rescue operations, or those mustering personnel and arranging their safe evacuation. Additional to these requirements is the provision of external communications with those beyond the installation who have a supporting role in managing the emergency or in the evacuation of personnel to a place of safety.

The provision of emergency communications required by Regulation 11 and the associated Approved Code of Practice, ACOP 114, should be based on the Regulation 5 assessment and may be affected by the Regulation 8 Emergency Response Plan. Due to differences in size and function, the requirements for an NAI will invariably be somewhat different to those required for an NUI during maintenance visits. These plans and assessments should be taken into account to ensure that the communications being provided correspond to the communication arrangements required.



P.O.B

E.C.C

Onshore Emergency

Support

Onshore Emergency

Services

Aircraft in Vicinity

Vessels in Vicinity

Local Offshore Installations

Ongoing Operations

Emergency Response Team

Medical SupportTeam

Muster Control Team

Process Control Team

Helideck Team Drilling/Well Response Team

5 Emergency Communications on NAI and NUI

5.1 Overview of Requirements on NAI

The diagram below shows the principal elements of a typical emergency response organisation needed to manage an emergency on NAIs. An organisation such as this will form part of the Operator�s Emergency Response Plan as outlined in Paragraph 2.3. At the centre of the diagram is the installation Emergency Control Centre (ECC) where the person in overall charge will muster (OIM). A Radio Operator (RO), who will be competent to operate the communications facilities provided, will normally assist him.

The arrows that link the various elements represent the communication facilities that are needed and it is evident that these facilities play a crucial role in the effective management of an emergency. To this end, such facilities are deemed �safety critical� and particular care is required in their design and maintenance to ensure they remain operational throughout the emergency, until either the situation has been resolved or the installation has been evacuated by air or sea. These considerations will be examined in more detail in Paragraph 6.

The diagram above is not definitive and is intended merely to illustrate the range of facilities that will generally be needed. Additional elements, such as a diving response team, or those identified during the assessment carried out under PFEER Regulation 5, may also need to be included.



ECC - OCC

Onshore Emergency

Support

Onshore Emergency

Services

Local Offshore Installations

Emergency Response& Rescue

Medical Support(FirstAider)

ECPPerson in Charge

Muster Control(Coxswain)

Aircraft in vicinity

Ongoing Operations

Vessels in Vicinity

5.2 Overview of Requirements on NUI During Maintenance Visits

Normally Unattended Installations will generally be monitored and controlled by a remote Operations Control Centre (OCC). This may be located on a nearby NAI or based at an onshore location.

If the OCC is located offshore, then the installation�s ECC will be provided with all the external communications facilities needed for effective emergency response. These would then become available in the event of an emergency on the associated NUI.

If the OCC is located onshore, it may not have the entire emergency facilities needed for emergency response. In such a case, the ECC will need to be located elsewhere to a place that is suitably equipped. Ideally, the OCC should be co-located with the ECC, wherever it is practicable to do so. The diagram below indicates a typical emergency response organisation that could be adopted when personnel visit an NUI.

One member of the visiting work party will be nominated to take overall charge in the event of an emergency and will muster at the installation�s Emergency Control Point (ECP), with the remote ECC providing close support. There will need to be sufficient communications facilities on hand for the ECP to alert vessels in the vicinity, to alert those involved with any associated ongoing operations, and to alert those beyond who have a role in the emergency response plan. The size and composition of the work party will need to be sufficient to mount an effective emergency response commensurate with the types of emergency that are foreseeable. On small installations that have no overnight accommodation, procedures will need to be in place to ensure that the work party is evacuated well before deteriorating weather conditions prevent it.



5.3 Communication Objectives for NAI and NUI

The list of objectives given below is based upon the requirements outlined in previous paragraphs. It represents the fundamental provision that will generally be needed, on NAI and manned NUI, to conform to PFEER regulations governing emergency communications.

Objectives for Internal (Onboard) Communications:

A1 An Installation Alarm System: An acoustic alarm that is audible throughout the installation, to warn of danger, signal assembly at muster stations or to prepare for evacuation.

A2 A Public Address System: To enable those managing the emergency to broadcast messages to all personnel onboard, to warn of hazards, issue instructions, and inform of incident status.

A3 Muster Station Communications: To provide communications between muster stations and the ECC/ECP.

A4 Emergency Response/Support Teams Communications: To provide communications between members of emergency response teams and with the ECC/ECP from all areas of the installation.

A5 Other Communications: The provision of other communications for the purpose of emergency response, between persons on the installation, as identified by the PFEER Regulation 5 assessment.

Objectives for External Communications:

A6 Ongoing Operations: To enable the ECC/ECP to communicate with any ongoing associated operations eg pipeline, heavy lifts, supply or diving operations.

A7 Onshore Emergency Services and Support: To enable the ECC/ECP to inform or call for external assistance or support.

A8 Nearby Offshore Installations: To enable the ECC/ECP to communicate with nearby offshore installations that may be able to provide assistance or to advise of changes in pipeline status that could have an effect on the safety of their operations.

A9 Vessels in Vicinity: To enable the ECC/ECP to alert and communicate with any ships in the vicinity, including standby boats or any other vessels that may be able to provide assistance during an emergency.

A10 Aircraft Communications: To enable the ECC/ECP and Helicopter Landing Officer (HLO) to communicate with helicopters involved in evacuation and rescue operations.

A11 TEMPSC Communications: To enable persons in survival craft to communicate with ships and helicopters in the vicinity.

It is recommended that, wherever it is practicable, two independent means of communication should be available to meet each objective, so that in the event of a complete failure of one system the objective can still be achieved.



5.4 Communication Provisions 5.4.1 Installation Alarm System: Objective (A1)

Due to the commonality of function and overall coverage, the acoustic alarm system will usually be integrated into the Public Address (PA) system. This will incorporate alarm tone generators producing signals that conform to the necessary characteristics. In noisy areas, where it is difficult to hear the alarms, supplementary visual �attention-getting� alarm lights must be provided. The alarms will normally be initiated by the installation�s fire and gas detection system but manual initiation from control points and from distributed �break-glass� points will generally be required. On small NUI, a stand-alone system may be more suitable to meet this requirement.

5.4.2 Public Address System: Objective (A2)

The PA system will generally be integrated with the alarm system as outlined above. The system should be duplicated, each part being physically and electrically separate and capable of providing full coverage. As a minimum, PA access stations will be needed in the ECC/ECP and any secondary command points provided. More detailed information for PA and alarm systems is provided in Addendum 1, Paragraph A2.1. On NUI, portable equipment may be employed for this purpose.

5.4.3 Muster station Communications: Objective (A3)

The requirement may be met either by the use of a fixed intercom system or telephones located at each muster station. Due to the mobility that is often needed when mustering personnel, fixed systems can be supplemented by the provision of IS hand-portable radios. Refer to Addendum 1, Paragraph A2.3.

5.4.4 Emergency Response/Support Teams Communications: Objective (A4)

Due to the particular need for mobility, emergency response teams will invariably use IS hand-portable radios. To ensure good coverage throughout the installation, talk-through base stations with aerial distribution systems will generally be needed. Refer to Addendum 1, Paragraph A2.4.

5.4.5 Other Communications: Objective (A5)

The equipment chosen to fulfil this objective will be dependent on the requirements established by the PFEER Regulation 5 assessment.



5.4.6 Communications with On-Going Operations: Objective (A6)

Such operations will usually be in close proximity to the installation eg heavy lifts or diving operations. Communications will normally employ marine VHF fixed transceivers or IS hand-portable radios. Pipeline operations will generally be controlled by a remote operations centre that will usually require a dedicated �hotline� via the main communications link. Such facilities are invariably supplemented by telephone systems. Refer to Addendum 1, Paragraphs A3.3 and A3.4.

5.4.7 Communications with Onshore Emergency and Support: Objective (A7)

To be effective, good quality direct communications should be provided. The requirement is best served by telephone services with Inmarsat or Iridium telephone systems employed as backup (refer to Addendum 1, Paragraph A3.1). On NUI, onshore communications may need to be indirect via the ECC. In these cases, good quality communications will be needed to the ECC. Ideally, the host ECC should have onward call routing to provide effective onshore communications.

5.4.8 Communications with Nearby Offshore Installations: Objective (A8)

Most installations will be equipped with inter-platform telephone services. Alternatively, marine VHF radios can also be employed. Inmarsat/Iridium telephone services can be used as backup. Refer to Addendum 1, Paragraphs A3.1 and A3.4.

5.4.9 Communications to Ships: Objective (A9)

Communications with ships is primarily achieved using marine GMDSS (DSC Channel 70) fixed station transceivers. These can be supplemented by fixed station transceivers that normally use the installation�s routine working channels. IS hand-portable radios can also provide backup. Platform UHF hand-portable radio system may be employed where vessels are equipped with fixed or hand-portable units on the frequencies assigned to the installation. Omnidirectional radio links that interface with the installation�s telephone system may be employed to enhance communications with standby vessels. The Inmarsat service can be used for vessels beyond VHF range. Refer to Addendum 1, Paragraph A3.4.



5.4.10 Communications to Helicopters: Objective (A10)

Airband VHF fixed transceivers should be provided in ECC/ECP, operating on the frequencies assigned by the CAA for the installation. Hand-portable airband radios will be required by the HLO. Marine VHF fixed base stations or hand-portable transceivers may be employed if aircraft are suitably equipped. Vessels in the vicinity not equipped with aeronautical VHF equipment may also need to communicate with helicopters on marine VHF frequencies. Refer to Addendum 1, Paragraph A3.6.

5.4.11 TEMPSC Communications: Objective (A11)

TEMPSC should be equipped with GMDSS approved VHF marine band transceivers. The equipment can be either fixed or portable and have sufficient battery reserves to remain operational until the personnel onboard are rescued. TEMPSC should also be equipped with radio beacons to assist search and rescue operations. Consideration should also be given to the provision of transponders or similar devices, which operate on emergency search and rescue frequencies, which can be attached to individual lifejackets to enable persons in the water to be located quickly. Refer to Addendum 1, Paragraph A3.5.

6 General Provisions

6.1 Equipment Resilience

During an emergency, communications have a vital role; accordingly, regulations require that Operators should ensure, as far as is reasonably practicable, that the communication arrangements employed remain effective throughout the emergency. To meet this requirement, designers need to give due consideration to the operational impact that foreseeable emergencies may have upon the communication systems provided. These considerations should include:

• Loss of Power � due to the shutdown of main and emergency power generators

• Fire or Explosion � causing physical damage to equipment located in or close to process modules or other areas potentially exposed to smoke and flames

• Gas Release � the presence of flammable gas in any area of the installation normally classified as non-hazardous

The following paragraphs outline the strategies normally employed to minimise the effects that each of these events may have on safety critical communication systems.



6.2 Power Supplies

The power to all communications equipment, provided or used for emergency purposes, should be fed from independent Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS) systems; each supplied with primary power from the emergency distribution board.

In the event that normal or emergency generators fail, or are inhibited for safety or other reasons, each UPS should be capable of supplying all of the safety critical equipment provided until such time as the emergency is resolved or the installation is evacuated. The duration of the UPS reserve should be sufficient to allow time for the mustering of personnel, time to assess and control the incident and time to carry out a safe and systematic evacuation should the need arise. The overall time duration should be evaluated for each installation.

For the purpose of sizing the UPS, it should be assumed that equipment will be operated at 25% full load and 75% standby basis.

Each UPS system, and its reserve batteries, should be within or close to the ECC/ECP to which it is supplying power.

6.3 Equipment Location

In an emergency, particularly if fire or explosion is involved, some of the communication facilities provided may be rendered inoperative. The failure of essential equipment at such a time could have serious consequences and suitable contingency arrangements should be provided. The principal strategy to guard against such failures is to duplicate and physically separate essential equipment wherever possible.

On NAI, the primary command and control point is the ECC in the Temporary Refuge (TR). Usually, other locations within the TR, such as Admin/HLO offices, will be well equipped to fulfil their daily function. The provision of additional communications facilities, in places such as this, would enable a secondary ECC to be established in the event of the primary ECC becoming inoperative or uninhabitable. The need for an alternative location should be determined as part of the formal Safety Assessment. ECCs should have access to all necessary communications systems needed to manage a major consequence or catastrophic emergency, as defined below, and meet the objectives set out in Paragraph 5.3. The communications systems associated with ECCs should be maintained in an operational state and, as far as practicable, be independent of each other.



Telecommunications equipment which is permanently installed on NUIs should be located in a non-hazardous area, preferably within or adjacent to the designated ECP. Wherever possible, consideration should be given to locating some standby or alternative systems in a separate area. Equipment locations should be determined as part of the formal Safety Assessment. Where there is no alternative equipment location for the ECP, backup systems should be based on the use of portable equipment. The communications systems at the ECP should be tested on arrival and remain operational until the work party leaves.

A �major consequence� � an event or combination of events that leads to shutdown of the main and emergency generators, or prevents the emergency generator from starting when shutdown of the main generator occurs, but which allows the personnel to remain onboard.

A �catastrophic consequence� � an event or combination of events that requires the main and emergency generators to be shut down and the personnel to be taken off the installation to a place of safety.

6.4 Telecommunications Cabling

Cabling outside equipment rooms for all telecommunications systems required to remain operational in an emergency situation should be fire resistant. This includes power cabling between these systems and their associated UPS (if the UPS is not in the same room as the telecommunications equipment). Other cables and waveguides used for telecommunications, including associated power cables, should be flame retardant, with low halogen content.

In general, cables outside equipment rooms should also be protected against physical damage. Cables from secondary ECCs to field equipment should be carried on widely separated routes to those employed by the primary ECC.

Consideration should also be given to safety critical equipment mounted externally to the TR. In the event of fire, hot smoke and flame may cause damage to items such as aerial feeders and aerials which are often mounted in exposed elevated positions. Wherever possible, cable routes and aerial locations should be chosen to minimise potential exposure.

6.5 Shutdown of Telecommunication Systems

A theoretical analysis, as described in BS 6656 �Guide to the prevention of induced ignition of flammable gases by radio-frequency radiation� (or the equivalent European standard when issued), should be carried out for each installation to ensure that, in normal operation, electromagnetic fields from telecommunications equipment are below the specified threshold level in any part of the installation with a hazardous classification.



In the event of flammable gas being detected in any area of the installation normally classified as non-hazardous, the following actions should be implemented:

(a) All radio transmissions should be restricted to a safe level appropriate to the installation, as defined in BS 6656, and assuming that all the available RF power is delivered into a spark. (Where this restriction would render the system unusable, it should be shut down.)

(b) All non-Ex certified equipment which is required to continue in operation should be protected by a gas detection system so that it may be shut down before an explosive concentration of gas is reached in the vicinity of the equipment.

(c) Non-Ex certified equipment in areas not protected by gas detection should be shut down immediately, preferably automatically, and isolated from equipment in other areas which may still be operational, except for antenna systems associated with equipment covered by (a) above.

In an accident emergency it is assumed that normal gas detection systems may not be operating, or may be covering only a restricted area. The same shutdown actions should therefore be taken as specified for a flammable gas release above. In addition, any communications systems normally fed from UPS systems, but which are not required in meeting the emergency communications objectives, should be shut down to conserve battery power.

In the design of the installation�s fire and gas detection system, it should be arranged that those communications facilities which are required to operate under all shutdown conditions are enabled to do so, up to the point at which flammable gas is detected in the vicinity of non-Ex certified equipment or batteries. The ECCs and associated telecommunications equipment rooms, battery rooms and UPS rooms should be protected by a local gas detection system, activated by the shutdown command or by the failure of the main gas detection system.

In the event of flammable gas being detected in any equipment room, the equipment in that area should be automatically shut down by disconnection of the power supply at the UPS. If flammable gas is detected in a UPS or battery room, the system should be shut down by disconnection of the battery using approved Exd switchgear.

Consideration should be given to the provision of a system by which any telecommunications systems remaining operational when the installation is evacuated in an emergency would be shut down automatically by a timer circuit, or by a manual shutdown button at the embarkation point.



PFEERReg 19

Constructed as to be fit for purpose

In efficient working order and in good

repair

Maintained in efficient state

Alarm SystemIndependently

examined

7 Installation and Maintenance

7.1 Summary of Regulations

The equipment chosen in compliance with PFEER regulations needs to be properly installed and maintained in good working order throughout its service life.

The diagram below summarises the key parts of PFEER Regulation 19 (Suitability and Condition of Plant) that govern the installation and maintenance of the equipment provided for protective or emergency purposes.

It requires that all equipment provided in compliance with PFEER regulations be so constructed or adapted as to be suitable for the purpose for which it used or provided; and be maintained in an efficient state, in efficient working order and in good repair.

The equipment selected and its installation and maintenance standards should comply with the Offshore Electricity and Noise Regulations, SI 1997/1993.

In general, the maintenance required will be met by conducting auditable periodic tests and inspections and by carrying out timely and effective repairs. Over longer timescales, a periodic assessment of the equipment should be carried out with the objective of replacing the equipment if it is subject to increasing breakdowns or facing obsolescence.

It is expected that several of the safety-related telecommunication systems (or sub-systems) will be identified by the duty holder as safety critical elements. It is then necessary to include these elements in the verification scheme for the installation, as required by the Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations, SI 1992/2885 Regulation 15.



7.2 Regulations for Audible Alarm Systems

Particular regulations apply to the installation�s audible alarm system. For this equipment, a written scheme for the systematic examination by a competent and independent person is required. This should be conducted when the equipment is initially commissioned and then subsequently at the intervals advised in the scheme. Examination is also required when first used following modification or significant overhaul. In this context, examination will entail careful and critical scrutiny to assess its suitability for purpose, its actual condition and the reporting of any remedial measures that may need to be taken.

8 Training and Operations

8.1 Competencies

All persons operating VHF aeronautical radio stations, including hand-held portable radio equipment, on a fixed offshore installation must hold an Offshore Aeronautical Radio Station Operator�s Certificate of Competence, issued by the Civil Aviation Authority, ATS Standards Department, ATS Licensing Section (refer to CAA Publication CAP 452).

The minimum operator�s qualification for use of the international marine VHF band is the GMDSS Restricted Operator�s Certificate (ROC).

Regular periodic exercise of the emergency communications systems associated with ECCs should be carried out to ensure their satisfactory operation, and the familiarity of personnel with their use. In particular, training should be given in the disciplined use of hand-portable radio equipment in an emergency situation, taking into account the practical restrictions and limited number of radio channels available.

8.2 Operational Considerations for NUI Visits

MAR Regulation 12 requires that aircraft landing on or taking off from an offshore installation, where there are no persons onboard before landing or after take-off, have effective communication between the helicopter and a suitable offshore manned installation. Where there is no suitable installation, then to suitable premises onshore.

In order that the HLO can communicate with the helicopter pilot during landing and take-off, they should carry an aeronautical-band VHF hand-portable radio with them during the journey to and from the installation.


Issue 1 August 2005 19/20

As soon as practicable, after arrival on an NUI, personnel should ensure that all communications systems are operational. These checks should cover both equipment permanently located on the installation and any temporary portable equipment brought onto the installation. Where the helicopter transporting personnel to the installation does not wait on the installation for the duration of the visit, these checks should be completed before the helicopter departs.

When selecting telecommunications equipment to be installed on NUI, the desirability of minimising the number and duration of visits required for maintenance should be taken into consideration. Equipment should be simple but highly reliable, and, in the event of failure, should be capable of being quickly replaced.


Recommended Practice for Fixed Offshore Installations Issue 1 August 2005 Add 1-i/ii

Addendum 1

Recommended Practice for Fixed Offshore Installations

Paragraph Page

A1 Introduction 1

A2 Internal (Onboard) Communications 1 A2.1 Public Address/General Alarm System 1 A2.2 Telephone System 2 A2.3 Muster Stations Communications 3 A2.4 Hand-portable Radio Systems 3

A3 External Communications 4 A3.1 Links to Shore and Other Installations 4 A3.2 NUI Communications to ECC/OCC 4 A3.3 Pipeline Supervision 5 A3.4 Marine Communications 5 A3.5 TEMPSC Communications 6 A3.6 Aeronautical Communications 6 A3.7 Crane Communications 7

A4 References 8


Recommended Practice for Fixed Offshore Installations Issue 1 August 2005 Add 1-1

A1 Introduction

This Addendum sets out the recommended methods of meeting the objectives listed in Paragraph 5.3. The recommendations are based on the facilities that are normally provided on NAIs. The provision of suitable emergency communications on NUIs may sometimes present particular challenges due to the lack of normal operations equipment that will be available. The balance between the use of fixed and portable equipment will therefore need due consideration. The communication objectives need to be met, but the solutions will need to be practical and the contingency arrangements in accord with the kind of hazards that may be encountered. The recommended practice given here may sometimes need to be adapted to suit the circumstances of a particular case. Alternative methods of meeting the objectives may be considered, provided they comply with the statutory requirements and maintain an equivalent level of safety.

A2 Internal (Onboard) Communications

A2.1 Public Address/General Alarm System

Two independent acoustic alarm/public address systems should be provided. The usual method of meeting these requirements is the provision of a fully duplicated integrated Public Address/General Alarm (PA/GA) system as described below. Other systems giving equivalent facilities may also be considered.

The central equipment for each half of the PA/GA system should be installed in locations as widely separated as is practicable, preferably in different modules. These locations should be within, or close to, the designated ECC/ECP. If the two locations are unavoidably in the same module, they should be separated by at least an A60 wall.

Each PA/GA system should be capable of sounding the appropriate audible alarms, and broadcasting announcements, to all parts of the installation where persons may be present during normal operations and ambient noise levels permit. The coverage must be such that the audible alarms are unmissable and broadcasts clear and distinct and provide good coverage of muster stations, evacuation routes and embarkation points. Each half of the PA/GA system alone should give complete coverage of these areas. Emergency messages may be preceded by an �alert� signal (eg a pre-announcement chime) to attract the attention of personnel.

Visual warnings in the form of high-intensity flashing beacons (xenon or rotating mirror halogen lamp types) should be provided, in areas subject to high ambient noise, to supplement the acoustic alarm signals.

All loudspeakers and flashing beacons used as part of the PA/GA systems should be Ex certified, even where installed in areas normally classified non-hazardous.


Recommended Practice for Fixed Offshore Installations Add 1-2 Issue 1 August 2005

Access to the PA system, to initiate the alarms or make announcements, should be provided in the ECC and any secondary ECCs. Operators may designate additional access locations as required. If access is provided at muster/evacuation points, the access units in these locations should be Ex certified to ensure that they can remain operational under all shutdown conditions.

Distribution zoning should not be used for GA signals or emergency PA announcements. Zoning may be used for routine PA announcements, but if used it is recommended that the number of zones should be kept to a minimum.

All PA/GA equipment, including the flashing beacons, should be fed from the ECC/ECP UPS systems. All cabling which distributes alarm signals should be continually monitored by automatic line monitoring systems capable of reliably detecting short-circuit and open-circuit conditions. Consideration should be given to providing systems which enable the integrity of the entire system, including loudspeakers and sounders, to be checked.

During alarm conditions, entertainment systems should be automatically muted so that alarms and broadcasts can be clearly heard in cabins and recreation areas. Alarm signals should be attenuated or muted during the transmission of emergency PA announcements to ensure that the instructions are intelligible. Consideration should also be given to the attenuation of the audible alarms once all personnel have been mustered.

On NUI, where there is limited deck space, the provision of fixed audible alarm and broadcast systems may not be practical and portable equipment would need to be employed with suitable backup arrangements by way of contingency. Portable alarm signalling equipment could be employed, supplemented on small NUI by loudhailers, adapted to sound the necessary alarm signals and provide a means for broadcasting emergency speech. Alarm paging systems and hand-portable radios could also be considered. All portable equipment would need to be suitably certified and particular precautions would be needed to ensure that the failure of any personal warning and messaging devices would not place persons at risk.

A2.2 Telephone System

Telephone services provide good quality communications and are invariably installed for day-to-day operational purposes. Their use during emergencies will enhance the effectiveness of emergency management in general and play a useful role in providing alternative means of internal communication and thereby improve resilience. Whenever a telephone system is provided for operational reasons, they should be considered to be an integral part of the internal communications provision for managing an emergency. The system should therefore be designed to continue to operate after loss of generated power from both normal and emergency generators, and at all levels of shutdown and flammable gas release, up to the point at which flammable gas penetrates the area housing the central exchange equipment.



As a completely Ex-certified system is not generally feasible, the design should include facilities to isolate any non-Ex certified elements in the event of flammable gas being detected in their vicinity. However, it should be arranged that some Ex-certified telephone instruments be provided in all areas.

The locations of Ex telephones throughout the installation should be clearly marked, using the standard European symbol. Further assistance in enabling personnel to locate the nearest telephone quickly in an emergency should be provided by the use of a distinctive bright colour for acoustic hoods, or large fluorescent signs adjacent to the instruments. The number to call in an emergency should be clearly marked by every telephone instrument. The main central PABX equipment should be installed within, or adjacent to, the main ECC. Consideration should be given to the provision of a secondary smaller emergency PABX in the other ECC, for use if the main PABX fails or is disabled.

On NUI, telephone facilities should be provided to enable direct communication from the ECP to the ECC and OCC.

A2.3 Muster Stations Communications

At least one permanently installed Ex-certified system should be available up to the point at which the installation is evacuated to provide communications between the ECC/ECP and muster stations. This facility may be provided by a dedicated voice intercom system, or by the use of the hand-portable radios. If hand-portable radios are used, the radios should be available at each muster point together with arrangements to ensure that their batteries are kept fully charged. Battery chargers should be shut down at the appropriate stage specified in Paragraph 6.5.

A2.4 Hand-portable Radio Systems

A system of intrinsically safe hand-portable radios should be provided. On large installations, to obtain adequate coverage of all areas where personnel may go, it will normally be necessary to operate via a base talk-through repeater, using two-frequency simplex operation. Other measures, such as radiating feeder cables or feed-through aerial couplers, will usually be necessary to ensure that signals can penetrate enclosed areas. The system should be designed to continue to operate after loss of generated power from both normal and emergency generators, and have the appropriate base-repeater shutdown arrangements that are described in Paragraph 6.5. Hand-portable units should be equipped with one or more single-frequency simplex channels for use in the event of base-repeater failure or shutdown.

Access to the system should be provided in both primary and alternate ECCs. Consideration should be given to installing a base-repeater in each ECC location, interlocked to ensure that both cannot be operational simultaneously.



Hand-portable radios should be certified intrinsically safe for the gas group and temperature classification appropriate for individual installations. Accessories such as remote hand-held speaker/microphones, headsets, etc, if provided, should be included in the certification. Units should be specified as being capable of operating in rain showers, and should preferably be fully waterproof (Ingress Protection Level IP66). Batteries for the hand-portable radios should be capable of supporting 12 hours use without recharging, assuming a 10% transmit, 10% receive, 80% standby duty cycle. For the protection of batteries, battery chargers should preferably include a method of indicating battery condition, and of automatic cutout when the battery is fully charged. Operational procedures should take into account the practical restrictions on the use of radio systems and the limited number of channels.

On small NUI the arrangements above should be adapted to suit the particular installation. A radio base station or dedicated portable transceiver should be permanently installed at the ECP with an aerial system sufficient to provide coverage throughout the installation. If a permanently installed base station is used, it should be fed from a UPS. If a dedicated hand-portable is used, a battery multi-charger should be permanently installed in the ECP together with spare batteries.

A3 External Communications

A3.1 Links to Shore and Other Installations

Each installation should have two independent means of communication to shore using permanently installed equipment. The links may route via nearby platforms and share their onshore traffic capacity or they may route directly to sites onshore. In either case, the two systems should take different routes and use independent equipment.

At least one of these links should be capable of safe operation for as long as practicable in the shutdown sequence and with loss of generated power from both normal and emergency generators. Access to this link should be provided in both ECCs. The links will normally employ LOS radio, Satellite terminals or subsea fibre and provide PABX or ISDX telephone services. Inmarsat or Iridium terminals should be installed to provide telephone backup.

A3.2 NUI Communications to ECC/OCC

Equipment to provide a speech circuit between the installation and the ECC and OCC should be permanently installed. This may be provided as a stand-alone single-channel link, or integrated with the supervisory/control communications system required for operational purposes. The circuit should preferably be in the form of a dedicated �hotline� point-to-point system, but dial-up alternatives such as a long-line extension from the PABX at the ECC/OCC is also acceptable.



Consideration should be given to ensuring that the speech circuit will remain available for use in any reasonably foreseeable emergency situation, including loss of the main generated power source and/or a release of flammable gas on the installation, until all personnel are evacuated, or until flammable gas penetrates the area in which the equipment is installed.

A backup means of contacting the ECC should also be available. Possible alternatives include: Inmarsat or Iridium Services using either a fixed or portable terminal; marine VHF if the ECC/OCC is on a nearby installation; cellular radio if close to shore.

A3.3 Pipeline Supervision

Where products are exported by pipeline, as a minimum there should be a continuously available dedicated voice �hotline� system linking the installation to the operational control rooms of other pipeline participants. A separate �hotline� system should be provided for each pipeline system. To ensure the safety and security of pipelines, supervisory systems will be needed to convey essential data from participants to the pipeline control centre. Communication data links that support pipeline supervision must be designed to meet the required level of integrity.

A3.4 Marine Communications

Access to marine-band GMDSS (DSC Channel 70) VHF fixed transceivers should be permanently available to each ECC. Operators may install further marine-band transceivers in other locations as necessary for normal operations. Those units in the ECCs should be fed from the ECC UPS, and should incorporate facilities to restrict the transmitted power to a safe level appropriate to the installation in the event of any confirmed flammable gas release. Intrinsically safe marine band VHF hand-portable radios should also be provided.

All marine-band radios should be equipped to operate on frequencies appropriate for the operational requirements, ie for ship-to-ship or onboard use. Private channels may be allocated for some operational requirements.

In an emergency situation, marine-band fixed stations and hand-portables may be required for communication to nearby installations and helicopters.

Hand-portable radios should be certified intrinsically safe for the gas group and temperature classification appropriate for individual installations. Accessories such as remote hand-held speaker/microphones, headsets, etc, if provided, should be included in the certification. Units should be specified as being capable of operating in rain showers, and should preferably be fully waterproof (IP66).



Batteries for the hand-portable radios should be capable of supporting 12 hours use without recharging, assuming a 10% transmit, 10% receive, 80% standby duty cycle. For the protection of batteries, battery chargers should preferably include a method of indicating battery condition, and of automatic cut-out when the battery is fully charged.

On NUI, a GMDSS marine-band transceiver or a GMDSS approved hand-portable fitted into an adapter should be installed in the ECP with at least one additional hand-portable available for backup.

A3.5 TEMPSC Communications

TEMPSC should be equipped with GMDSS approved marine band VHF transceivers and Emergency Position Indicating Radio Beacons (EPIRBs) or Search and Rescue Transponders (SARTs). Equipment that is battery operated needs to have sufficient capacity to power the equipment until the craft has been located and the occupants rescued. The minimum duration required is 8 hours but should ideally be 24 hours. (Based upon operation at the highest rated power of the equipment with a duty cycle of 1:9, the duty cycle is defined as 6 seconds transmission, 6 seconds reception above squelch opening level and 48 seconds below squelch opening level.)

A3.6 Aeronautical Communications

Access to aeronautical-band VHF fixed transceivers should be permanently available in each ECC. Operators may also provide additional transceivers in other locations, such as the Admin and HLO Offices, as necessary for normal operations. The fixed stations in the ECCs should be fed from the ECC UPS, and should incorporate facilities to restrict the transmitted power to a safe level appropriate to the installation in the event of any confirmed flammable gas release.

To provide extended coverage of air traffic or logistical control, to remote areas of operation, remotely controlled aeronautical bases stations may be employed. These may be individual base stations or groups using offset carrier techniques.

VHF aeronautical-band hand-portable radios should be provided to meet normal operational requirements. These hand-portable radios should preferably be certified intrinsically safe for the gas group and temperature classification appropriate for individual installations. Accessories such as remote hand-held speaker/microphones, headsets etc, where provided, should be included in the certification. Where it is not possible to obtain intrinsically safe aeronautical-band units, operational procedures should take this into account. In these circumstances, communications from the helideck to helicopters in emergency conditions where flammable gas may be present should use intrinsically safe marine-band radios. Units should be specified as being capable of operating in rain showers, and should preferably be fully waterproof (IP66).



Batteries for the hand-portable radios should be capable of supporting 12 hours use without recharging, assuming a 10% transmit, 10% receive, 80% standby duty cycle. For the protection of batteries, battery chargers should preferably include a method of indicating battery condition, and of automatic cut out when the battery is fully charged.

The aeronautical communications equipment provided must comply with the engineering standards given in CAA Publication CAP 670 COM 02 (Part C Section 1).

To assist helicopter operators in the location and identification of the installation, consideration should be given to the provision of an aeronautical Non-directional Beacon (NDB) or weather radar transponders. Where an NDB is installed, facilities for monitoring the transmissions should be provided. Operation of NDBs should be automatically inhibited in the event of flammable gas being detected anywhere on the installation.

Non-directional beacons must comply with the engineering standards given in CAA Publication CAP 670 NAV 02 (Part C Section 2).

In addition to routine maintenance and inspections, periodic verification of NDB radiation performance will also be needed to meet the requirements agreed between the CAA Safety Regulations Group and Offshore Operators.

A3.7 Crane Communications

Cranes should be fitted with equipment to provide communications between the crane operator and personnel working on the deck and to ships close to the installation. Special care is needed to ensure that the crane communications equipment is complaint with the operating conditions laid down in the Safety Case. If cranes are to continue operation during a release of flammable gas, then the equipment will require the appropriate level of protection and the isolation of crane equipment would need to be included in the installation shutdown philosophy. The communications equipment provided should either be capable of hands-free operation or have suitable arrangements to enable the safe use of the radios whilst the crane is in operation. Cranes will generally have enclosed cabs and employ either VHF or combined VHF/UHF transceivers (if the deck crew normally use UHF hand-portables.) The installation alarms and broadcast system would need to provide coverage of the crane cabs. On smaller installations, cranes may not have enclosed cabs and fixed communications equipment may not be practical. In these situations, the crane operator could employ intrinsically safe hand-portable radios with suitable accessories to permit hands-free operation. VOX operation with helmet mounted earpieces and microphones should be considered.



A4 References

(1) Offshore Installations and Pipeline Works (Management and Administration) Regulations 1995, SI 1995/738, The Stationery Office ISBN 0 11 052735 6.

(2) Offshore Installations (Prevention of Fire and Explosion, and Emergency Response) Regulations 1995, SI 1995/743, The Stationery Office ISBN 0 11 052751 8.

(3) CAP 670 Air Traffic Services Safety Requirements, Second Issue, 12 June 2003, Civil Aviation Authority 2003, ISBN 0 86039 907 9.

(4) Assessment of Inadvertent Ignition of Flammable Atmospheres by Radio Frequency Radiation, Guide BS 6656:2002, British Standards Institute.

(5) The Offshore Electricity and Noise Regulations 1997, SI 1997/1993, The Stationery Office ISBN 0 11 064828 5.

(6) Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations 1992, SI 1992/2885, The Stationery Office ISBN 0 11 025869 X.

(7) CAP 452 Aeronautical Radio Station Operators Guide Twelfth Edition January 2005, Civil Aviation Authority 2005, ISBN 0 86039 838 2.

Further Information:

Prevention of fire and explosion and emergency response on offshore installations: Offshore Installations (Prevention of Fire and Explosions, and Emergency Response) Regulations 1995. Approved Code of Practice and Guidance L65 HSE Books 1997, ISBN 0 7176 1386 0.

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