+ All Categories
Home > News & Politics > Ukraine and european security - Prof Sarah Birch

Ukraine and european security - Prof Sarah Birch

Date post: 23-Aug-2014
Category:
Upload: chin-huat-wong
View: 337 times
Download: 3 times
Share this document with a friend
Description:
Prof Sarah Birch's lecture at the Institute of Diplomacy and Foreign Affairs, Kuala Lumpur on July 1, 2014.
Popular Tags:
23
Ukraine and European Security Sarah Birch University of Glasgow 1 July 2014
Transcript
Page 1: Ukraine and european security - Prof Sarah Birch

Ukraine and European Security

Sarah BirchUniversity of Glasgow

1 July 2014

Page 2: Ukraine and european security - Prof Sarah Birch
Page 3: Ukraine and european security - Prof Sarah Birch

Ukraine as buffer between East and West• Ukraine lies at the geographical heart of Europe• But it is also lies on the border between the eastern and western

halves of the continent• This is reflected in the name ‘U-kraïna’, which etymologically means

‘on the edge’• This ‘edge’ can be seen in positive terms as a bridge; yet Ukraine has

often been a battleground between rival forces vying for control of Europe.

Page 4: Ukraine and european security - Prof Sarah Birch

A brief history of Ukraine• Between the world wars, the Ukrainian lands were divided into eastern

Soviet Ukraine and western Ukraine controlled by Poland, Czechoslovakia and Romania.• During the 20th century, heavy industry was built up in Soviet Ukraine (coal,

steel), attracting ethnic Russians to settle, especially in the far east• In 1944, the Soviet Union occupied and annexed western Ukraine, western

Belarus and the Baltic republics. • At this point, Crimea was part of Soviet Russia. • Following the Second World War, Stalin deported most of the Crimean Tatars

to Siberia, and their homes were seized by ethnic Russians, who settled in great numbers in Crimea during the 10-year period between 1945 and 1954.• In 1954 Crimea was transferred from Soviet Russia to Soviet Ukraine.

Page 5: Ukraine and european security - Prof Sarah Birch

Ukrainian institutions• In 1991-1992, the territory of Soviet Ukraine became an independent

state, as did the other 14 Soviet republics.• Ukraine has a semi-presidential executive, with a president and a prime

minister• The most recent parliamentary election was conducted under a mixed-

member (half PR, half FPTP) electoral system• Ukraine is divided into 25 regions plus the Autonomous Republic of

Crimea. The regions have very little power, however.• This institutional set-up means that whoever controls the presidency

has considerable control

Page 6: Ukraine and european security - Prof Sarah Birch

Ethnicity in Ukraine• Approximately 80% of citizens define themselves as ethnic Ukrainians• Ethnic Russians are the largest minority (15%).• Most Ukrainians are bilingual, though a substantial minority speak

Russian as their language of preference.• Regional divisions define Ukrainian politics. There is a pro-Russian and

largely Russian-speaking east, a pro-European largely Ukrainian-speaking west, with a large area in the middle that has ill-defined identities and language use. • Ethnic identity in Ukraine thus forms a continuum, which prevents

Ukraine from dividing politically along clear lines.

Page 7: Ukraine and european security - Prof Sarah Birch

National identification, first weeks of 2014 (Grigore Pop-Eleches and Graeme Robertson)

Page 8: Ukraine and european security - Prof Sarah Birch

Regionalism and institutional centralisation: a toxic mix• Ukraine’s centralised institutions have given considerable power to

the president• Regional political divides mean that party politics is dominated by

east-west divisions• This means that one region is bound always to feel under-represented

in state institutions• This gives an incentives to people from that region to use protest and

other extra-institutional means to voice their concerns

Page 9: Ukraine and european security - Prof Sarah Birch

Corruption• Corruption is one of the most significant political issues in Ukraine• Ukraine became very corrupt in the post-Soviet period, as state assets

were privatised via dubious means. • Anti-corruption sentiment has been behind a number of protest

movements since independence, including the movement that culminated in the so-called Orange Revolution of 2004, when egregious electoral fraud sparked mass popular demonstration which led the election to be re-run.

Page 10: Ukraine and european security - Prof Sarah Birch

Viktor Yanukovych• Viktor Yanukovych, of the eastern-based Party of Regions, was the

(ultimately) unsuccessful presidential candidate in 2004.• Yanukovych won a relatively fair election in 2010, however. • His period in office was characterised by a marked increase in

corruption, with members of Yanukovych’s immediate family as beneficiaries.• Yanukovych wavered between pro-Western and pro-Russian policies.• In 2013, a wave of protest was mounted against Yanukovych’s last-

minute decision to abandon plans for an association agreement with the European Union, following intense pressure from Russia.

Page 11: Ukraine and european security - Prof Sarah Birch

The ‘Euromaidan’• Following European tradition, the demonstrators camped out in Kiev’s

central Independence Square. Their encampment was largely non-violent. • Like most protests movements the ‘Euromaidan’ protest included

small numbers of more radical elements with undemocratic views.• The protesters’ demands were initially focused on the EU Association

agreement, but they soon widened to include other aspects of Yanukovych’s rule, including most prominently corruption

Page 12: Ukraine and european security - Prof Sarah Birch

The Euromaidan

Page 13: Ukraine and european security - Prof Sarah Birch

The protest turns violent• Promised negotiations over the protestors’ demands did not materialise• A law was introduced effectively banning demonstration by the opposition• The protestors became radicalised and some of them decided to resort to

violence, which resulted in violent retaliation from the police, who killed 5 protestors on 22 January• 18-20 February: Yanukovych sent in the riot police to clear the Maidan; the

protestors resisted with improvised weapons and burning barricades. • The police and the protestors clashed repeatedly, leaving 88 dead (including

16 policemen).

Page 14: Ukraine and european security - Prof Sarah Birch

Burning barricades on the Euromaidan

Page 15: Ukraine and european security - Prof Sarah Birch

Yanukovych flees following agreement• On 21 February Yanukovych tried unsuccessfully to mobilise the army

to act against the protests. • The foreign ministers of Poland, France and Germany brokered a

compromise on under which there would be early elections, constitutional reforms and a temporary coalition government. • Yanukovych had 48 hours in which to implement the agreement,

however, on the very night it was signed, he fled Kiev. • He failed to make contact with members of the Ukrainian parliament

or government and the result was a leadership vacuum.

Page 16: Ukraine and european security - Prof Sarah Birch

Parliament confirms new government• The following evening, the Ukrainian parliament invoked a provision

in the constitution under which if a president is unable to fulfil his duties, he can be replaced by an acting president. • This was done peacefully by a two-thirds majority. • Acting president Oleksandr Turchinov was appointed and presidential

elections called for May. The Party of the Regions disowned Yanukovych.• The government was replaced by a coalition government made up of

centrist and right-wing parties.

Page 17: Ukraine and european security - Prof Sarah Birch

The aftermath of the revolution• There was mass euphoria at the downfall of Yanukovych, whose

regime was unpopular throughout the country due to its excessive corruption.• Ukraine came out of this revolution far stronger, as it was for the first

time united, with the exception of Crimea and the partial exception of Eastern Ukraine.• Ukraine’s high level of centralisation and the centralising institution of

the president meant that almost all power was now in control of a government with which many in the east felt little affinity.

Page 18: Ukraine and european security - Prof Sarah Birch

The Russian reaction• The new government was perceived by Russia as a threat to its vision

of Ukraine as a strategic buffer.• The Russian economy has suffered in recent years, and President

Putin has been threatened with mass protests. • Putin’s control over Russia and Russia’s role as a regional power have

thus both been under strain recently. • Russian’s actions in Ukraine can be seen as a defensive move by Putin

to shore up his flagging strength and slow Russia’s decline as a world power.

Page 19: Ukraine and european security - Prof Sarah Birch

Russia occupies Crimea • Russia occupied Crimea in contravention of the 1994 Budapest accords, in

which Ukraine agreed to renounce its nuclear weapons in exchange for Russian guarantees that it would respect Ukraine’s territorial integrity.• The seizure of Crimea could quite well not have been Putin’s plan. Crimea

lacks its own water supply. Crimea was also heavily subsidised by the government in Kiev. • The occupation of Crimea has alienated Russia from the West and drawn

Ukraine closer to Western powers.• The Russian economy has, by contrast, suffered considerably. • The only positive outcome for Putin of the occupation of Crimea was that

Putin’s own popularity ratings rose.

Page 20: Ukraine and european security - Prof Sarah Birch

Russian efforts to destabilise eastern Ukraine• Following the occupation of Crimea, Russia began to destabilise

eastern Ukraine, sending undercover members of its military intelligence, mercenaries and other volunteers to foment unrest.• This has led so far to 300+ deaths.• Ukrainian efforts to quell the unrest are ongoing, though there are

still some areas of the east that are under the control of insurgents.• Following the election of president Petro Poroshenko on 25 May on

55% of the vote, the new Ukrainian government is beginning to consolidate its grip on power and bring order to the country.

Page 21: Ukraine and european security - Prof Sarah Birch

Assessment of the revolution and its aftermath• Russia may have won the battle in Crimea, but it has lost this war, as it

has lost the hearts and minds of virtually all the Ukrainian population, and it has not achieved any of its initial goals.• In many ways, Ukraine is in a stronger situation, having asserted its

sovereignty and autonomy, having reaffirmed its identity and having established considerable support and ties with the West, including the association agreement which began this episode last autumn.• The ongoing insurgency in the east remains a geopolitical problem,

however

Page 22: Ukraine and european security - Prof Sarah Birch

Ukraine and European security• Ukraine is now far more democratic and far more pro-Western than it has

been since it gained independence in 1991, bolstering European security.• Russia’s aggression and disregard for international law has given NATO a

new lease on life and caused it to move back toward its initial purpose.• The confrontation has left the European Union somewhat divided and has

put question marks over the possibility of a real European security policy.• The confrontation has divided the non-Western world: many people across

the globe are glad to see a state stand up to the West; at the same time, many smaller states are also dismayed at the erosion of international rule of law, and by Russia’s blatant disregard for Ukraine’s sovereignty.

Page 23: Ukraine and european security - Prof Sarah Birch

Question marks over state integrity?• It is unclear that other European states are at greater risk of breaking

up as a result of recent events in Ukraine, as the threats to Ukraine’s territorial integrity are external• Russia is unlikely to invade many European states in the way that it

has invaded Ukraine. Russia already controls parts of Moldova and Georgia, but it is unlikely to seek to extend its control, as there is little to be gained in doing so.• No other European powers would emulate Russian aggression• Secessionist movements in Catalonia and Scotland have a very

different character, as they have a wide domestic support base.


Recommended