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THIS DOCUMENT IS FOR WARGAME AND EDUCATIONAL USE ONLY AND DOES NOT REFLECT REAL WORLD OPERATIONS OR CAPABILITIES

For Wargaming Purposes Only

Joint Strategic

Campaign Plan (JSCP)

AY 2016-2017

January 2020

For Wargaming Purposes Only

UNCLASSIFIED THIS DOCUMENT IS FOR WARGAME AND EDUCATIONAL USE ONLY AND

DOES NOT REFLECT REAL WORLD OPERATIONS OR CAPABILITIES

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DISCLAIMER

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AIR FORCE WARGAMING INSTITUTE

Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DISCLAIMER ...................................................................................................... II TABLE OF CONTENTS .................................................................................... III LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES .................................................................. IV SECTION I – INTRODUCTION ......................................................................... 1

1. PURPOSE ............................................................................................... 1 2. SCOPE.................................................................................................... 1

SECTION II – STRATEGIC CONTEXT AND GLOBAL PRIORITIES ................ 3 1. THE JSCP AND NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY ............................. 3 2. NMS FOUNDATIONS AND TENETS ..................................................... 5 3. PRIORITIZATION OF WORK ................................................................. 9

SECTION III – RESOURCES AND FORCES .................................................. 11 1. GENERAL. .............................................................................................. 11 2. FORCE APPORTIONMENT GUIDANCE .............................................. 11 3. PLAN SOURCING GUIDANCE ............................................................ 12 4. ALLOCATION OF FORCES AND RESOURCES ................................. 12

SECTION IV – GLOBAL DEFENSE POSTURE .............................................. 15 1. GENERAL. .............................................................................................. 15 2. THEATER POSTURE PLAN FORMAT. ............................................... 15

SECTION V – CAMPAIGN PLAN REQUIREMENTS ...................................... 19 1. OVERVIEW ........................................................................................... 19 2. INTENT ................................................................................................. 19 3. STRUCTURE OF THE CAMPAIGN PLAN GUIDANCE ......................... 20

SECTION VI – GENERAL PLANNING GUIDANCE ........................................ 23 1. GENERAL. .............................................................................................. 23 2. ADAPTIVE PLANNING GUIDANCE ..................................................... 23 3. LARGE SCALE CONTINGENCY ......................................................... 28 4. LESSER CONTINGENCIES ................................................................. 28 5. PLANNING FOR CBRN CONTINGENCIES ......................................... 29 6. PLANS FOR FORWARD PRESENCE OPERATIONS ......................... 29 7. ACCESS AND HOST-NATION SUPPORT. .......................................... 29 8. LOGISTICS ........................................................................................... 29

SECTION VII – FUNCTIONAL PLANNING GUIDANCE ................................. 31 1. GENERAL. .............................................................................................. 31 2. CAMPAIGN PLANS .............................................................................. 31

APPENDIX A TO SECTION VII – GUIDANCE TO USSOCOM ............... 33

APPENDIX B TO SECTION VII – GUIDANCE TO USSTRATCOM ........ 34

APPENDIX C TO SECTION VII – GUIDANCE TO USTRANSCOM........ 35

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APPENDIX D TO SECTION VII – GUIDANCE TO Service

Commanders ......................................................................................... 36 SECTION VIII – REGIONAL PLANNING GUIDANCE .................................... 37

APPENDIX A TO SECTION VIII – GUIDANCE TO USAFRICOM ........... 41

APPENDIX B TO SECTION VIII – GUIDANCE TO USCENTCOM ......... 43

APPENDIX C TO SECTION VIII – GUIDANCE TO USEUCOM .............. 45

APPENDIX D TO SECTION VIII – GUIDANCE TO USMEDCOM……….47

APPENDIX E TO SECTION VIII – GUIDANCE TO USNORTHCOM and

CDRNORAD ........................................................................................... 49

APPENDIX F TO SECTION VIII – GUIDANCE TO USPACOM ............... 51

APPENDIX G TO SECTION VIII – GUIDANCE TO USSOUTHCOM ...... 54 SECTION IX – IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE ............................................ 58

1. General ............................................................................................. 58 2. Development of Plans .......................................................................59 3. In-Progress Reviews .........................................................................59

SECTION X - ASSESSMENTS .......................................................................... 60 1. Purpose ............................................................................................ 60 2. Assessment Content and Format .................................................... 60 3. Assessment Cycle ............................................................................... 61

LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES

FIGURE II-1 1-4-2-1 STRATEGY ............................................................................................ 5

FIGURE VI-1 ADAPTIVE PLANNING OPTIONS ................................................................... 23

FIGURE VI-2 JSCP OPTION RELATIONSHIPS ..................................................................... 24

FIGURE VI-3 DIPLOMATIC FDOS ............................................................................................. 25

FIGURE VI-4 INFORMATIONAL FDOS................................................................................................ 25

FIGURE VI-5 ECONOMIC FDOS ................................................................................................. 25 FIGURE VI-6 MILITARY FDOS................................................................................................... 26

FIGURE VI-7 RESPONSE AND TYPE FORCE RELATIONSHIP ............................................. 28

TABLE VIII-1 JSCP REGIONAL ASSUMPTIONS ................................................................... 37

TABLE VIII-2 COMMON REGIONAL TASKS ........................................................................... 38

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SECTION I – INTRODUCTION

1. PURPOSE.

This Joint Strategic Campaign Plan (JSCP) translates the national security strategy

into planning guidance for the Combatant Commanders of the Unified Commands and

Chiefs of the military services. This guidance includes a military strategy, strategic

tasks and objectives for contingency planning for peace and war.

2. SCOPE.

a. The JSCP implements the strategic policy direction provided in the Guidance for

Employment of the Force (GEF) and initiates the planning process for the development

of campaign, campaign support, contingency, and posture plans. The JSCP contributes

to the Chairman‟s statutory responsibility to assist the President and the SecDef in

providing for the strategic direction of the Armed Forces of the United States and

conduct contingency planning for the Nation.

b. The global security environment mandates a flexible, adaptive approach to planning

for the use of military forces in support of U.S. national security objectives. Combatant

commanders (CCDRs) must balance and integrate shaping the current environment and

future outcomes through proactive efforts such as security cooperation activities, with

preparations to respond to potential contingencies. The campaign plan requirement

tasked in this document provides a framework for this balancing effort, as well as

aligning and de-conflicting competing planning priorities, and mitigating near-term

risk by accounting for the impact of force availability and posture on planning for

contingencies and current operations.

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SECTION II – STRATEGIC CONTEXT AND GLOBAL PRIORITIES

1. THE JSCP AND NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY.

a. General. The Armed Forces are the Nation’s military instrument for ensuring our

security. Accordingly, the primary purpose of U.S. Armed Forces is to deter threats of

organized violence against the United States and its interests, and to defeat such threats

should deterrence fail. The military is a complementary element of national power that

stands with the other instruments wielded by our government. The Armed Forces’ core

competence is the ability to apply decisive military power to deter or defeat aggression

and achieve our national security objectives.

b. National Military Strategy (NMS). The purpose of the NMS is to prioritize and

focus the efforts of the Armed Forces of the United States as we provide for the

common defense by deterring attacks on our nation, our citizens, allies, and partners.

This defense strategy serves the broad national objectives of peace, freedom, and

prosperity. Diplomatic and economic efforts seek to promote these objectives globally

by encouraging democracy and free markets. U.S. defense strategy seeks to defend

freedom for the United States and its allies and friends, and it helps to secure an

international environment of peace that makes other goals possible. Our NMS depends

first and foremost upon the United States remaining secure from external threats. A

secure homeland is fundamental to U.S. global leadership; however, it is not the only

prerequisite. To protect and promote U.S. national interests, our national military

objectives are: counter violent extremism, deter and defeat aggression, strengthen

international and regional security, and shape the future force. The end state of this

strategy is to provide enduring security for the American people, in a stable and

prosperous international system.

c. Strategic Environment. We continue in a period of profound strategic change.

Today’s global security environment offers great opportunities for international

cooperation and progress while also posing profound dangers. The bipolar stability that

was the hallmark of the Cold War era is well past, superseded by explosive global

economic growth, unprecedented international integration, expanding transnational

movements of all types, near-instantaneous world-wide communications across myriad

paths, and rapidly proliferating technologies. This period of unprecedented human

integration - or “globalization” - has benefited many people around the world. However

it has also pressurized long-standing regional, cultural and ethnic tensions resulting in

turbulence. This has given rise to diverse yet interrelated strategic challenges of varying

intensity, immediacy, and danger. Key developments include:

(1) The rise of transnational terrorism.

(2) The spread of weapons of mass destruction.

(3) Rising regional instability.

(4) Increasingly powerful state adversaries.

(5) Growing competition for natural resources.

(6) The threat of natural disasters and pandemics.

(7) Cyber and space vulnerability and competition.

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d. NMS Objectives. The National Military Strategy (NMS) focuses on

achieving the following common defense objectives. These objectives are not in

priority order.

1. Protect Homeland & US Interest Abroad

2. Prepare a Joint Force to Deter, Deny, Defeat any Adversaries

3. Joint Force Resilient and Flexible

4. Build Alliances and Partnerships Enhanced

5. Access to Global Commons

6. Prevent WMD Proliferation

e. Strategic Approach. To succeed in meeting these objectives, we must integrate with

all elements of national power and work closely with friends and allies. The sustained

presence and persistent engagement of our forces deployed around the globe is the most

effective way for the military to develop lasting relationships, promote common

interests and facilitate the cooperative security that supports those mutual interests.

f. Full Spectrum Planning Strategy. To more clearly define Combatant Commanders

planning tasks, a planning strategy was developed to support achieving the national

military objectives. Planning for the defense of the homeland is the first and most

important part of this strategy. Secondly, the U.S. must maintain successful

engagement in any long term, on-going fight or contingency operations (i.e. global

operations against violent extremist organizations (VEO)). Thirdly, the U.S. must

promote security and deter aggression in four critical regions of the world (Europe, East

Asian littoral, Northeast Asia and Middle East/Southwest Asia). Finally, based on

national interests, the President and Secretary of Defense must preserve the options to

win decisively (WD) crises or conflicts; ending them on terms favorable to the US.

Figure II-1 illustrates this planning strategy.

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Homeland

Steady State Surge

Active Partnering w/ USG Agencies

Defense

Consequence Management

Global Deterrence

Active Partnering & Tailored Shaping

Transnational Deterrence

Active Partnering & Tailored Shaping

Regional

Deterrence

Interdiction

War on Terror/

IW

Info Ops/FID

WMD Elimination

Conventional

Campaign(s)

Info Operations

Counterinsurgency Stability Operations

Major Combat/Strike Stability Operations Reconstruction Spt Cons. Management

FIGURE II-1 1-4-2-1 STRATEGY

2. NMS FOUNDATIONS AND TENETS.

a. Defense Policy Goals. The challenges and opportunities of the security environment

over the past decade, as well as the demands of the war against terrorism, required the

U.S. military to chart a new strategic course. During the past decade, some

modifications in the U.S. military strategy and force structure have been made. United

States defense policy goals formulated a decade ago defined a new set of tenets that

comprise the military strategy, and created a new framework for managing risks. Over

this past decade these goals have been modified to respond to new challenges; however,

the basic foundation upon which these goals were established has remained fairly

constant.

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• Assuring Allies and Friends. The United States cannot retreat from the world.

The presence of American forces overseas is one of the most profound symbols

of the U.S. commitment to allies and friends. The U.S. military plays a critical

role in assuring allies and friends that the Nation will honor its obligations and

will be a reliable security partner. Through its willingness to use force in its

own defense and that of others and to advance common goals, the United States

demonstrates its resolve and steadiness of purpose and the credibility of the U.S.

military to meet the Nation's commitments and responsibilities. Toward these

ends, the U.S. military will promote security cooperation with allies and friendly

nations. A primary objective of U.S. security cooperation will be to help allies

and friends create favorable balances of military power in critical areas of the

world to deter aggression or coercion. Security cooperation serves as an

important means for linking the strategic direction of the U.S. with those of its

allies and friends.

• Dissuading Future Military Competition. Through its strategy and actions,

the United States influences the nature of future military competitions, channels

threats in certain directions, and complicates military planning for potential

adversaries in the future. Well-targeted strategy and policy can therefore

dissuade other countries from initiating future military competitions. The

United States can exert such influence through the conduct of its research,

development, test, and demonstration programs. It can do so by maintaining or

enhancing advantages in key areas of military capability. Given the availability

of advanced technology and systems to potential adversaries, dissuasion will

also require the United States to experiment with revolutionary operational

concepts, capabilities, and organizational arrangements and to encourage the

development of a culture within the military that embraces innovation and risk-

taking. To have a dissuasive effect, this combination of technical, experimental,

and operational activity has to have a clear strategic focus. New processes and

organizations are needed within the defense establishment to provide this focus.

• Deterring Threats and Coercion Against U.S. Interests. A multifaceted

approach to deterrence is needed. Such an approach requires forces and

capabilities that provide the President with a wider range of military options to

discourage aggression or any form of coercion. In particular, it places emphasis

on peacetime forward deterrence in critical areas of the world. It requires

enhancing the future capability of forward deployed and stationed forces,

coupled with global intelligence, strike, and information assets, in order to deter

aggression or coercion with only modest reinforcement from outside the theater.

Improving intelligence capabilities is particularly important, as these assets

provide U.S. forces with critical information on adversaries' intentions, plans,

strengths, and weaknesses. This new approach to deterrence also requires forces

that can strike with precision at fixed and mobile targets throughout the depth of

an adversary's territory; active and passive defenses; and rapidly deployable and

sustainable forces that can decisively defeat any adversary.

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• Decisively Defeat Any Adversary if Deterrence Fails. U.S. forces must

maintain the capability to support treaty obligations and defeat the efforts of

adversaries to impose their will on the United States, its allies, or friends. U.S.

forces must maintain the capability at the direction of the President to impose

the will of the United States and its coalition partners on any adversaries,

including states or non-state entities. Such a decisive defeat could include

changing the regime of an adversary state or occupation of foreign territory until

U.S. strategic objectives are met.

b. Strategic Tenets. These defense policy goals are supported by an interconnected set

of strategic tenets, or strategic concepts. It is only through careful attention and

commitment to each of these tenets that the national military objectives will be

achieved. These tenets comprise the essence of the National Military Strategy of the

United States.

• Managing Risks. The United States faces a world in which change occurs with

ever-increasing speed. New challenges are constantly emerging, while

longstanding threats endure. We must prepare for future challenges over time,

while meeting extant threats at any given time. This tension between

preparations for the future and the demands of the present requires the United

States to balance the risks associated with each. Because resources are always

finite, hard choices must be made that take into account a wider range of risks

than was necessary in the past. Some of these risks are familiar, such as the

possibility of a major war. Other risks – such as the possibilities of mass

casualty terrorism, cyber warfare, or CBRNE warfare – are less well understood.

• Adopting a Capabilities-Based Approach. The NMS is built around the

concept of shifting to a "capabilities-based" approach to defense. That concept

reflects the fact that the United States cannot know with confidence what nation,

combination of nations, or non-state actor will pose threats to vital U.S. interests

or those of U.S. allies and friends decades from now. It is possible, however, to

anticipate the capabilities that an adversary might employ to coerce its

neighbors, deter the United States from acting in defense of its allies and friends,

or directly attack the United States or its deployed forces. A capabilities-based

model – one that focuses more on how an adversary might fight than who the

adversary might be and where a war might occur – broadens the strategic

perspective. It requires identifying capabilities that U.S. military forces will

need to deter and defeat adversaries who will rely on surprise, deception, and

asymmetric warfare to achieve their objectives. Moving to a capabilities-based

force also requires the United States to focus on emerging opportunities that

certain capabilities, including advanced remote sensing, long-range precision

strike, transformed maneuver and expeditionary forces and systems, to

overcome anti-access and area denial threats, can confer on the U.S. military

over time.

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• Defending the United States and Projecting U.S. Military Power. Defending

the Nation from attack is the foundation of strategy. As the tragic September

2001 terror attacks demonstrate, potential adversaries will seek to threaten

targets within the borders of the United States, its allies, and its friends. As the

U.S. military increased its ability to project power at long-range, adversaries

have noted the relative vulnerability of the U.S. homeland. They are placing

greater emphasis on the development of capabilities to threaten the United States

directly in order to counter U.S. operational advantages with their own strategic

effects. Therefore, the NMS restores the emphasis once placed on defending the

United States and its land, sea, air, and space approaches. It is essential to

safeguard the Nation's way of life, its political institutions, and the source of its

capacity to project decisive military power overseas. In turn, the ability to

project power at long ranges helps to deter threats to the United States and,

when necessary, to disrupt, deny, or destroy hostile entities at a distance.

• Strengthening Alliances and Partnerships. America's alliances and security

relations give assurance to U.S. allies and friends and pause to U.S. foes. These

relationships create a community of nations committed to common purposes.

The NMS is premised on efforts to strengthen America's alliances and

partnerships and to develop new forms of security cooperation. The American

commitment to these security arrangements bolsters the security of U.S. allies

and friends. Likewise, as witnessed in the wake of the terrorist attacks on the

United States, NATO's invocation of Article V demonstrates the commitment of

America's partners to collective defense, which bolsters the security of the

United States. These mutually reinforcing security relationships underpin the

political stability on which the prosperity of civilized nations is built.

Additionally, these arrangements are based on the recognition that a nation can

be safe at home only if it is willing and able to contribute to effective security

partnerships abroad.

The need to strengthen alliances and partnerships has specific military

implications. It requires that U.S. forces train and operate with allies and friends

in peacetime as they would operate in war. This includes enhancing

interoperability and peacetime preparations for coalition operations, as well as

increasing allied participation in activities such as joint and combined training

and experimentation.

• Maintaining Favorable Regional Balances. The NMS also places emphasis

on maintaining favorable military balances in critical geographic areas. By

maintaining such balances, the United States can secure peace, extend freedom,

and assure its allies and friends. It can create high costs on a decision by

potential adversaries to pursue dangerous forms of military competition.

Finally, it may convince potential adversaries that the benefits of hostile acts

against the interests of the United States are far outweighed by their costs and

consequences.

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• Developing a Broad Range of Military Capabilities. Creating substantial

margins of advantage across key functional areas of military competition (e.g.,

power projection, space, and information) will require developing and sustaining

a portfolio of key military capabilities to prevail over current challenges and to

hedge against and dissuade future threats. Building upon the current superiority

of U.S. conventional forces, this portfolio will include capabilities for

conducting information operations, ensuring U.S. access to distant theaters,

defending against threats to the United States and allied territory, and protecting

U.S. assets in space. It will also require exploiting U.S. advantages in superior

technological innovation; its unmatched space and intelligence capabilities; its

sophisticated military training; and its ability to integrate highly distributed

military forces in synergistic combinations for highly complex joint military

operations.

• Transforming Defense. Finally, the NMS calls for continuing the

transformation of the U.S. Armed Forces over time. Transformation is at the

heart of this new strategic approach. The CJCS, the leadership of the Services,

and the Combatant Commanders recognize that building on the decade of

transformation that has already taken place within the military establishment is

absolutely necessary given the new strategic era and the internal and external

challenges facing the U.S. military. Substantial progress has been made over the

last decade by carefully balancing transformation against maintaining adequate

forces to meet these challenges and potential threats to our security.

3. PRIORITIZATION OF WORK.

The following prioritization of planning requirements is provided as a guide:

Combatant Command Level of Plan

1

USPACOM USCENTCOM USNORTHCOM

Level 4

USEUCOM USAFRICOM USMEDCOM USNORTHCOM USSOUTHCOM

Level 3/T

All Regional Combatant Commanders Level 3 All Combatant Commanders as applicable Level 2

1 Level of plans: 1 = Commander‟s Estimate, 2 = Base Plan, 3 = CONPLAN, 3/T = CONPLAN with

TPFDD, 4 = OPLAN. See CJCSM 3122.01 and JP5-0 for more information on levels of planning.

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SECTION III – RESOURCES AND FORCES

1. GENERAL.

This section provides CCDRs with guidance concerning the apportionment of forces. It

is informed by the resourcing and forces guidance contained in the GEF and the Global

Force Management Implementation Guidance (GFMIG).

2. FORCE APPORTIONMENT GUIDANCE

a. General. Apportioned forces are combat and related support capabilities provided to

CCDRs for planning purposes only. Apportionment supports the overlapping

requirements of the QDR and NMS. “Available Forces” are apportioned without

consideration to readiness status; however, apportioned forces are what a CCDR can

reasonably expect to be available, but not necessarily allocated for use when a

contingency plan transitions to execution.

b. Force Planning Construct. Forces are apportioned in accordance with the refined

force planning construct found in the latest Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). In

addition to normal force generation, sustainment, training activities, and partner

enabling theater security cooperation activities, US forces must:

(1) Be prepared to defend the homeland to include responding to and managing

the consequences of multiple nearly-simultaneous WMD attacks or other catastrophic

events.

(2) If directed, conduct a large scale, potentially long-duration irregular warfare

campaign to include counterinsurgency (COIN) and stability, security, transition, and

reconstruction operations. (Continuing operations against VEO and ongoing operations

like those of the first decade of the century - Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and

Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)-Afghanistan, constitute a large-scale, long-

duration, irregular campaign.)

(3) If directed, conduct and win up to two nearly-simultaneous large scale

campaigns (or one conventional campaign if already engaged in a large scale, long-

duration irregular campaign) while selectively reinforcing deterrence against

opportunistic acts of aggression or coercion.

(4) Be prepared to transition in one of the conventional campaigns to remove a

hostile regime, destroy its military capacity (to include WMD) and set conditions for the

transition to, or for the restoration of, civil society.

c. Force Apportionment Construct. The JSCP apportionment construct is based on the

assumption that the US Armed Forces will be engaged in homeland defense (HD), and

high priority VEO operations throughout the life cycle of this document, thereby

limiting readily available apportioned forces to one additional large scale conventional

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campaign. The apportionment construct accounts for the commitment of HD, any high

priority operations forces and force availability through the use of three force divisions

(see GFMIG). This new construct provides CCDRs a more realistic starting point for

planning by accounting for the unavailability of forces due to campaign execution,

training, equipping and dwell requirements.

3. PLAN SOURCING GUIDANCE

a. Preferred Forces.

(1) Preferred forces are forces identified by the supported CCDR to continue

employment, sustainment and transportation planning and assess risk. These forces are

planning assumptions only, are not considered "sourced" units, and do not indicate that

these forces will be contingency or execution sourced. The preferred forces identified

for the plan by the CCDR should not be greater than the forces apportioned for

planning.

(2) To the degree the CCDR is able to make sound assumptions with respect to

preferred forces for planning, the Joint Force Providers (JFPs) will begin with a higher

fidelity solution should the plan be designated for contingency or execution sourcing.

Combatant commands and Services are encouraged to work with JFPs and their

components to make the best possible assumptions with respect to preferred forces for

planning.

b. Contingency Sourcing. Contingency sourced forces are specific forces identified by

JFPs, assisted by their Service components and the parent Services, which meet the

CCDR‟s planning requirement at a specified point in time. The Joint Staff provides

specific guidance through a list of sourcing assumptions and planning factors contained

in the contingency sourcing message. The JFPs have final approval of the total

sourcing solution and provide the approved solution back to the supported CCDR in the

CCDR requested format. The Joint Staff provides specific guidance for the selection of

forces in a contingency sourcing message.

(1) Variables for contingency sourced units include but are not limited to the

current disposition of forces, a specified as-of date, categories of forces to be excluded

from consideration, defined C-Day or C-Day window, substitution and mitigation

options or factors, readiness reporting requirements and training requirements.

(2) JFPs will take into account location, availability, and readiness when

contingency sourcing to evaluate whether sufficient forces are available to meet the

stated requirements of a plan.

4. ALLOCATION OF FORCES AND RESOURCES.

The GEF provides force allocation guidance for use by the Global Force Management

Board (GFMB) and JFPs. The GEF also provides functional CCDRs and Services with

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global prioritization guidance for resources (time, funding, and effort). Geographic

CCDRs will find resourcing priorities in the regional guidance sections of the GEF.

Development of campaign and campaign support plans should be informed by this

allocation and resourcing guidance.

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SECTION IV – GLOBAL DEFENSE POSTURE

1. GENERAL.

This enclosure provides guidance to CCDRs and the Services on preparing posture

plans in accordance with the global defense posture guidance issued in the GEF and FY

2022-25 Guidance for Development of the Force (GDF). This posture guidance may be

modified after the Deputy Secretary of Defense approves an implementing instruction

for global defense posture process reform.

a. Theater posture plans must be integrated and synchronized with the CCDR‟s Theater

Campaign Plan. The posture plan must demonstrate the CCDR‟s efforts to integrate

posture planning with the campaign plan’s theater objectives and near-term objectives.

b. Each geographic CCDR (excluding CDRUSNORTHCOM) will submit a Theater

Posture Plan as an annex to their Theater Campaign Plan. The CJCS will forward

Theater posture plans to USD (P) and USD (AT&L). In the event a CCDR‟s Theater

Campaign Plan is not ready for submission when the Theater Posture Plan is due, the

CCDR will submit the Theater Posture Plan separately.

c. Theater posture plans also serve as subordinate plans to the global defense posture

synchronization report. This annual synchronization report is developed by OSD and

approved by the Deputy Secretary of Defense. It will serve as DOD’s primary internal

source document for codifying the regional posture plans and synchronizing them with

the Department’s efforts in each of the four global defense posture “lines of operation:”

strategy development, diplomacy, implementation, and sustainment.

d. Geographic CCDRs will account for and support the posture needs of functional

CCDRs and others (e.g., Defense agencies), as appropriate, in the development of their

Theater posture plans. Functional CCDRs, Service Chiefs, and Directors of Defense

agencies (DDAs) will ensure their global perspectives on access and capability needs in

the posture network are integrated with geographic CCDR posture plans through the

staffing process for theater posture plans.

2. THEATER POSTURE PLAN FORMAT.

Theater posture plan submissions will consist of three sections – a narrative overview, a

matrix with information on approved/proposed footprint locations and host-nation

relationships, and the CCDR’s assessment of the current plan.

a. The narrative section will provide an overview of the Theater Posture Plan with the

following information for each posture line of operation, as applicable:

(1) An overview of major ongoing and new initiatives,

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(2) The general status of the CCDR’s efforts to develop and execute the plan, to

include:

(a) Priority areas of regional and seam planning efforts,

below,

(b) An executive summary of the assessment required in paragraph 2c

Congress,

(c) Needed decisions and related milestones,

(d) Outreach2

efforts to other Commands, host-nation partners, and

changes,

(e) Resourcing and execution efforts and issues related to approved posture

(f) Areas of planning/execution that merit further attention in the global

defense posture synchronization report,

(g) Areas of planning/execution that may be better synchronized with

theater campaign planning.

(3) Identify existing or emerging risks to assured access and capability in the

AOR. This should include a discussion of any diplomatic and implementation

challenges that may cause DOD to reassess posture plans and eliminate or refine

previously stated access and/or capability requirements. Examples are operating

challenges, impacts on quality of life and force well-being, political obstacles, funding

delays, and training shortfalls.

(4) Provide an overview of key, proposed refinements to the posture plan, to

include geographic and functional CCDR posture requirements for changes in footprint

and host-nation arrangements for DOD review and assessment.

(5) Where possible, provide anticipated costs for executing approved and

planned posture changes, to include any new proposals. CCDRs should highlight any

anticipated congressional issues with the posture plan.

(6) Where applicable, identify any issues arising from the intersection of the

posture plan with other DOD efforts, for example, global force management decisions

and building partner capacity efforts.

b. The locations matrix will provide updates on both infrastructure/locations and host

nation arrangements.

2

Outreach is defined as efforts to develop DOD-internal consensus on new posture initiatives and DOD-

external diplomatic efforts to develop and/or solidify posture changes with host nations.

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(1) Arrange the infrastructure update by location/installation (Main Operating

Base (MOB)/Forward Operating Site (FOS)/Cooperative Security Location (CSL)) and

country. For each location/installation provide the following information:

(a) The broad purpose of each location/installation,

(b) The host Service,

(c) The major equipment types permanently stationed at the

location/installation,

(d) The estimated number of military personnel stationed at the

location/installation,

(e) The availability of MWR programs and services,

(f) The current year and five-year planned military construction

requirements listed by title and cost,

(g) Proposed changes to designations and capabilities needed at existing

installations,

(h) New access and/or capability needs of both geographic and functional

combatant commands in the AOR. This includes recommendations to close

installations and recommend desired new CSL/FOSs. If recommending new

CSL/FOSs, include the same information listed in (a)-(g) above.

(2) Arrange the host nation arrangements update by location and country.

Include the following information for each location:

(a) The status of relevant host-nation arrangements in place or being

developed, to include formal legal arrangements or informal arrangements,

(b) The status of any host-nation consultations or negotiations,

(c) Planned next steps for diplomatic efforts, to include DOD-wide actions

or necessary support,

(d) Future milestones and critical timing issues to include identifying

agreements expiring in the next 2-3 years, and

(e) Shortfalls in international agreements that need to be addressed to

support implementation of planned posture changes.

c. The CCDR‟s posture plan assessment will address the following:

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(1) Assess activities and missions by sub-region and/or by country. Illustrate

the linkage between key locations and/or host-nation arrangements to regional security

objectives and mission priorities outlined in the campaign plans. Where applicable,

explain needed refinements in the posture plan and necessary adjustments to campaign

plans to support these refinements, as well as implementation of existing plans.

(2) Assess host-nation relationships by country. Assess the status of host-nation

relations in the AOR to include host-nation issues with key planned or proposed posture

changes.

(3) Assess MOB/FOS/CSL readiness. Provide a regional map that overviews

the planned MOB/FOS/CSL network and provide the status of FOS/CSL development

by location. This should include an assessment of progress in implementing approved

FOS/CSL changes, as well as an assessment of new FOS/CSL proposals. Use the

posture lines of operation as an organizing construct (e.g., still in strategy development

and assessing alternatives, in full operational capability and being used or sustained,

facing fiscal or training constraints in implementation, etc.).

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SECTION V – CAMPAIGN PLAN REQUIREMENTS

1. OVERVIEW.

This section provides guidance concerning the intent and structure of the campaign plan

requirement. It should be read in conjunction with Chapter V of the GEF, The

Campaign Planning Construct. That chapter provides the logic behind the requirement

and what it is intended to accomplish. It also describes how the campaign plan is

intended to achieve integration not only across all steady-state activities within a

particular combatant command, but also across combatant commands. The GEF

guidance does not tell CCDRs how to develop their campaign plans. Campaign plans

should be developed using the planning process described in JP 5-0. The campaign

plan should generally follow the 5-paragraph Adaptive Planning and Execution

(APEX) Basic Plan format, and information normally contained in key annexes should

be addressed. Because security cooperation guidance is incorporated in the GEF

campaign guidance, security cooperation planning should be incorporated within the

combatant command’s broader campaign and contingency planning efforts, to include

the integration and synchronization of shaping and security cooperation activities.

Campaign plans should be synchronized with and support ongoing named operations

such as OIF. Currently distinct planning efforts such as Combating WMD (CWMD)

will be incorporated as subordinate campaign plans.

2. INTENT

a. As described by JP 5-0, a campaign is a series of related major operations aimed at

accomplishing strategic and operational objectives within a given time and space.

Planning for a campaign is appropriate when the contemplated simultaneous or

sequential military operations and activities exceed the scope of a single major

operation. While intended primarily to guide the use of military power, joint

operational plans for campaigns should consider all instruments of national power and

how their integrated and/or coordinated efforts work to attain national strategic

objectives. This coordinated approach is particularly important for campaign planning

since, in many instances, other USG agencies have the lead role for shaping activities,

which DOD efforts must complement and support. The campaign plans tasked by the

JSCP integrate security cooperation, shaping, and other steady-state activities, with

operations and contingency plans to attain intermediate objectives that contribute to the

broad, strategic objectives established in the GEF.

b. In accordance with the strategic policy guidance provided by the GEF, the JSCP

tasks CCDRs to develop and execute campaign plans that integrate, synchronize, and

prioritize daily activities in support of strategic objectives, to include security

cooperation and shaping actions. CCDRs will use their campaign plans to articulate

resource requirements in a comprehensive manner, vice an incremental basis.

Campaign plans also provide a vehicle for conducting a comprehensive assessment of

how the combatant command’s activities are contributing to the achievement of

intermediate objectives and strategic objectives.

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c. The JSCP tasks CCDRs to develop three different types of campaign plans as

appropriate to address their regional and functional responsibilities.

(1) The Chairman directs CCDRs to develop campaign plans when achieving

strategic objectives requires joint operations and activities conducted in multiple AORs.

Campaign plans establish the strategic and operational framework within which

subordinate campaign plans are developed. The campaign plan’s framework also

facilitates coordinating and synchronizing the many interdependent, cross-AOR

missions such as security cooperation, intelligence collection, and coalition support. An

example is USNORTHCOMs Campaign Plan for Pandemic Influenza (PI). This plan

provides the strategic framework that guides the development of geographic CCDR

pandemic influenza plans. These regional plans, synchronized with both the Theater

Campaign Plan and USNORTHCOM’s Campaign Plan, direct the execution of

operations and activities in each geographic CCDR‟s AOR.

(2) A theater or functional campaign plan encompasses the activities of a

supported CCDR, which accomplish strategic or operational objectives within the

CCDR’s AOR or functional responsibilities. The campaign plan is the operational

extension of a CCDR‟s strategy, and translates strategic concepts into unified actions.

The JSCP tasks all CCDRs to develop Campaign Plans that integrate security

cooperation, shaping, and other steady-state activities, with operations and contingency

plans. CCDRs may develop strategies to inform campaign plan development, but these

are not formally tasked in the JSCP.

(3) The JSCP tasks CCDRs to develop subordinate campaign plans in support

of global or theater campaigns. For example, geographic CCDRs are tasked to develop

plans in support of DOD’s VEO Campaign Plan. Subordinate campaign plans should

be consistent with the strategic and operational guidance and direction developed by the

supported CCDR. The subordinate campaign plans should nest under the CCDR’s

Theater Campaign Plan, as well as the Functional Campaign Plan they support. This

nesting provides the mechanism to synchronize and prioritize all steady state activities

across the CCDR’s planning requirements and eliminate redundant or contradictory

activities.

d. Subordinate campaign plans are nested under the Theater Campaign Plan and

synchronized with the Functional Campaign Plans. The relationship of Theater

Campaign Plans, Functional Campaign Plans, subordinate campaign plans, and

contingency plans are unique to each functional CCDR.

3. STRUCTURE OF THE CAMPAIGN PLAN GUIDANCE.

The JSCP provides the Chairman‟s strategic military direction to CCDRs to implement

the President‟s strategic policy guidance contained in the GEF. The JSCP does this by

translating and consolidating GEF regional and functional guidance into specific

campaign and contingency planning requirements to CCDRs. Outlined below is the

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structure of the combatant command appendices and the type of guidance contained in

them.

a. General Planning Guidance. Each combatant command appendix begins with

general planning guidance that applies to both campaign and contingency planning

requirements. This section guides coordination to cover regional and functional seams

between combatant commands and other USG agencies.

b. Campaign planning requirements. This section formally tasks the combatant

command campaign planning requirements and includes the following:

(1) The campaign plan description, which includes the level of plan required.

The campaign plan should use the APEX Volume II Basic Plan format as a start point to

establish an appropriate level of commonality across combatant commands. CCDRs are

free to modify the subparagraphs within the Basic Plan to account for the unique aspects

of their AORs and specific planning requirements. While specific annexes are not

required, CCDRs must address how they will conduct interagency coordination,

strategic communication, and security cooperation activities. If the CCDR addresses

these within Annexes, the CCDR can modify the APEX format as necessary. There is

no requirement to develop or maintain a separate Theater Security Cooperation Plan

(TSCP) or Strategy. If CCDRs decide to retain a separate TSCP, it should be

incorporated into the campaign plan.

(2) The JSCP provides specific planning tasks that link to GEF strategic

objectives, priorities, and security cooperation activities. These planning tasks are not

objectives and clearly nest under the strategic objectives specified in the GEF. The

CCDR is expected to develop intermediate objectives that contribute to the achievement

of the GEF strategic objectives.

(3) Functional or regional planning assumptions are intentionally limited in

number and only provided where necessary to enable combatant command planning to

continue. Global planning assumptions that apply to all CCDRs are provided in Section

II.

(4) Additional planning guidance to cover seam issues between combatant

command AORs particular to the campaign plan, as required.

(5) Other planning requirements or considerations, as required.

c. Contingency Planning Requirements. Under the new campaign plan construct,

contingency plans are conceptually considered “branches” of the overarching campaign

plan. Shaping activities associated with precluding full contingency plan execution or

with enabling follow-on execution if required should be addressed in the campaign

plan. Guidance for each contingency plan requirement is similar to previous JSCPs and

includes:

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(1) The formal tasking to the combatant command to write a specific

contingency plan and the level of planning detail required.

(2) Detailed planning options that the commander must address in the plan. If

appropriate, the guidance will provide the commander with the freedom to address

planning options as part of one plan with branches or multiple, stand-alone plans.

(3) Functional or regional planning assumptions are intentionally limited in

number and only provided where necessary to enable combatant command planning to

continue. Global planning assumptions that apply to all CCDRs are provided in Section

II.

(4) Specific guidance necessary to cover seam issues between combatant

command AORs particular to the contingency plan, as required.

(5) Any other planning requirements or considerations, as required.

d. Posture Planning Guidance. The JSCP tasks CCDRs to develop Theater Posture

Plans, integrated and synchronized with Theater Campaign Plans, and in accordance

with the regional and functional posture guidance contained in the GEF. The format for

Theater Posture Plans is presented in Section IV.

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I = Intelligence Indicators W = Warning C = Deploy Forces D = Conflict

FIGURE VI-1 ADAPTIVE PLANNING OPTIONS

SECTION VI – GENERAL PLANNING GUIDANCE

1. GENERAL.

Planning assumptions for warning and force availability, reserve call-up, mobilization,

movements, and other executive emergency measures, while necessary to develop

operational plans, will likely change at execution. An element of uncertainty

encompasses diplomatic, informational, military and economic considerations. Thus,

the effective use of available response time requires that the President and Secretary of

Defense have a menu of discriminate preplanned options. The adaptive planning

guidance described in this section addresses this requirement.

2. ADAPTIVE PLANNING GUIDANCE.

Adaptive planning guidance is premised on an assumption that crises can and will arise

under a variety of circumstances that will, in turn, elicit a variety of responses. The

JSCP assigns planners the task of developing response options keyed to a specific set of

conditions at the onset of a crisis. These options – FDO, DDF, and NWA – and the

crises with which they are associated are portrayed in Figures VI-1 and VI-2.

SITUATION RESPONSE

Peacetime / Instability Flexible Deterrent Options

I C C C

Crisis / Imminent Conflict / Conflict Deploy Decisive Force

I W C D

No Warning Attack No Warning Attack

I D C

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Major War or Lesser Contingency

Deter Defend Attack

Crisis / Imminent Conflict / Conflict (No Warning Attack)

FDO Deploy Decisive Force No Warning Attack

FIGURE VI-2 JSCP OPTION RELATIONSHIPS

Although Combatant Commanders are directed to develop response options on the basis

of specific threats, the intent of the JSCP is to produce plans varied and flexible enough

to apply with only modest modification to unforeseen regional threats and unexpected

contingencies.

a. Flexible Deterrent Options. Adaptive planning underscores the importance of early

response to an emerging crisis. It facilitates early decision making by laying out a wide

range of interrelated response paths that begin with multiple deterrent-oriented options

tailored to avoid the classic dilemma of „too much too soon' or 'too little too late‟. These

deterrent-oriented early response options are called FDOs.

(1) During the planning process, Combatant Commanders‟ plans will include

requests for appropriate political and economic options by non-DOD agencies, to be

executed in concert with military options. Examples of diplomatic, informational,

economic and military options are depicted in Figures VI-3 through VI-6.

(2) All regional operation plans will have FDOs. It is expected that FDOs will

have a regional flavor, uniqueness or variation. Also, certain FDOs will be linked to

actions not under the direct purview of the supported Combatant Commander, such as

lift staging and readiness upgrades in CONUS. For the most part, plans for FDOs

should use active, in-place and/or designated augmentation forces. In some crises,

additional CONUS-based forces may be needed to bolster deterrence, as a “Major

Flexible Deterrent Option” (MFDO). A FDO should be approximately brigade,

squadron or strike group size. Primarily active-duty support forces should furnish

combat support and combat service support.

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* Reduce international diplomatic ties

* Increase cultural group pressure * Alter existing meetings, programs, or schedules * Prepare to withdraw U.S. embassy personnel

* Pursue measures to increase regional support

* Identify the national leader who may be able to solve the problem

* Develop or work within existing coalition (avoid unilateral actions when possible)

* Alert and introduce special teams: Public diplomacy, MTT, Communication

* Initiate noncombatant evacuation procedures

* Use the UN or other international institutions

* Identify clearly the steps to peaceful resolution

* Restrict activities of diplomats; Reduce national embassy personnel

* Take actions to win support of allies and friends

* Coordinate efforts to strengthen international support

* Promote democratic elections

* Heighten informational efforts directed at the International community, opinion

leaders within the national population and coalitions formed to overcome the

situation FIGURE VI-3 DIPLOMATIC FDOS

* Promote U.S. policy objectives through public policy statements

* Take measures to increase public support

* Keep selected issues as lead stories * Heighten public awareness of the program and potential for conflict

* Maintain an open dialogue with the press

* Invite in impartial observers * Impose sanctions on C

4ISR technology transfer

* Protect friendly C4ISR assets

* Interrupt satellite downlink transmissions * Implement psychological operation plans

* Increase C4ISR processing and transmission capability

* Publicize violations of international law FIGURE VI-4 INFORMATIONAL FDOS

* Seize real property in the United States

* Embargo goods and services

* Cancel United States-funded programs

* Heighten informational efforts directed at financial institutions

* Reduce or eliminate corporate transactions

* Freeze monetary assets in the United States

* Freeze international assets

* Enact trade sanctions

* Encourage corporations to restrict transactions

* Reduce security assistance programs

* Subsidize allies‟ efforts to improve CBRNE defense capabilities FIGURE VI-5 ECONOMIC FDOS

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* Deploy Joint Task Force (JTF) Headquarters-Forward to area

* Deploy ISR assets to the area * Increase military exchanges and staff visits to the area * Develop and deploy tailored Air and Space Expeditionary Task Force (AETF)

* Conduct aircraft fly-overs

* Pre-stage sealift and airlift reception assets to air and seaports of embarkation

* Deploy Expeditionary Strike Group/ Marine Expeditionary Unit (ESG/MEU)

* Open pre-positioned stockage facilities

* Open and secure sea and air Lines of Communications (LOCs)

* Deploy carrier strike group (CSG) to the region

* Activate Presidential Reserve Call-up (PRC)

* Initiate or increase show of force actions

* Begin moving forces to air and seaports of embarkation (APOEs and SPOEs)

* Pre-stage or deploy contingency ready brigades

* Establish curfews and impose restrictions on leaves, separations, and retirements

* Implement meaconing, interference, jamming and intrusion of enemy information

assets

* Deploy naval Surface Action Group (SAG) to the region

* Move Maritime Prepositioning Ships (MPS) to the region

* Move Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) to the region

* Upgrade alert and DEFCON status

* Increase exercise activities, schedules and scope

* Increase strategic reconnaissance

* Increase naval port calls or air squadron visits to the area

* Use naval or air capability to enforce sanctions

* Deploy intelligence collection and analysis to the area

* Exercise CBRNE passive defense

* Pre-stage airlift and airlift support assets

* Position logistic infrastructure where possible

* Increase informational efforts: PSYOP, mission awareness, measures directed at the

opponent's military force FIGURE VI-6 MILITARY FDOS

(3) In planning FDOs, Combatant Commanders should avoid placing forces in a

position where they may be at risk if a potential adversary is not deterred. FDOs should

facilitate escalating to the DDF response should it appear that the signaling of U.S.

resolve has not been effective. Finally, FDOs should also be capable of rapid de-

escalation should the crisis abate.

(4) To facilitate the review of FDOs, Combatant Commanders will include

them as part of their “Combatant Commander's Strategic Concept” for each operation

plan (OPLAN) during concept review, IAW the appropriate JOPES Volume II (CJCSM

3122.03A) format. The description of these options will include anticipated

mobilization and transportation requirements.

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b. Deploy-Decisive Force. Because decision-makers might elect not to respond to

ambiguous warning and an adversary might not be deterred by FDOs, planners must

plan for later actions resulting from receipt of unambiguous warning. These actions

must include the rapid deployment of a supportable warfighting force sufficient to

defend U.S. interests (augmentation), followed by forces sufficient to end the conflict

quickly and decisively (reinforcement, as approved by the President and/or Secretary of

Defense). Combatant Commander Plans should reflect the probability that forces

apportioned for NWA, if required and not otherwise committed, would be made

available to supplement apportioned augmentation forces.

c. Response to a No-Warning Attack. There is a possibility that an attack against U.S.

forces or vital interests could occur without prior warning or deterrent moves. The U.S.

force deployments would, therefore, not occur until after conflict had been initiated.

Combatant Commanders will consider using an existing plan as a point of departure,

saving valuable time during execution. Plans for the deployment and employment of

assigned and apportioned forces will be included in all MW OPLANs. Counterattack

plans should presume the availability of reinforcing forces capable of achieving

overwhelming superiority. Forces apportioned for earlier options (FDO, DDF) are also

available for planning for NWA.

d. Specific Guidance for Adaptive Planning and TPFDDs. In general, the adaptive

planning OPLANs required pursuant to the GEF document will have Time-Phased

Force and Deployment Data (TPFDD) based on available forces outlined in the GFMIG

(these forces may include the Presidential Reserve Call-up (PRC) and partial

mobilization). For TPFDD development, the order of forces listed within the GFMIG

document force tables does not preclude a CCDR from sequencing the deployment of

all apportioned forces in order to execute his concept of operation. The intent of

sequencing force apportionment is to furnish a regional focus to forces, minimize multi-

apportionment of units, and offer the flexibility of having plans to respond to other

contingencies. Figure VI-7 summarizes the relationships between the response options

and the adaptive planning response force.

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RESPONSE PLANNING TYPE FORCE

Flexible Deterrence Options Ambiguous Warning Slow Building Crisis

Active Duty In-Place Forces

Augmentation Forces

(i.e. Strike Force, CSG, AETF)

Major FDO Ambiguous Warning Strong Signal of U.S. Resolve

Active Duty In-Place Forces

Augmentation Forces

Reserve / Guard

Augmentation Forces

(Primarily Volunteers)

Deploy Decisive Force

Unambiguous Warning

Conflict Imminent

Active Duty Heavy Forces (In-Place and Augmentation)

Reserve / Guard

Augmentation Forces

PRC and Partial Mobilization, if required

No Warning Attack Overwhelming Force

Includes all of the above and Reserve Forces and Partial Mobilization

FIGURE VI-7 RESPONSE AND TYPE FORCE RELATIONSHIP

3. LARGE SCALE CONTINGENCY

Major regional threats to U.S. interests could occur in a number of different places.

Because potential foes could consider U.S. involvement in one crisis/operation as

affecting the ability of the United States to protect its interests elsewhere, Combatant

Commander plans should support the possibility of multiple regional contingencies

(large and small). Planning for multiple contingencies does not mean that our military

strategy is designed to fight multiple large scale conventional campaigns. It simply

enables a Combatant Commander to deter an adversary or defend vital national interests

in one theater while priority attention is focused elsewhere. Under these circumstances,

a Combatant Commander will prepare a Concept Summary dealing with the

consequences, requirements, constraints, and shortfalls of executing a second

contingency. Combatant Commanders may assume the availability of forces

apportioned; however, it is possible that not all apportioned forces will be available at

execution. Should multiple contingencies actually occur concurrently; the President

and/or Secretary of Defense will establish priorities and decide on deployment or

redeployment of forces based on global strategic requirements at the time of execution.

4. LESSER CONTINGENCIES.

Lesser contingency plans are for operations against a less compelling national interest

or threat than involved in a large scale conventional campaign. A LC may vary in size,

scale and duration and may involve a significant number of both active duty and

Reserve Component (RC) forces for crises and conflicts like Operations JUST CAUSE

(Panama) and ALLIED FORCE (Kosovo). Nevertheless, where appropriate, plans

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for LCs will be consistent with the adaptive planning as described in this section.

Combatant Commander planning for LCs may include the use of some reserve forces

where and when appropriate and necessary to move a force. Combatant Commanders

must clearly identify the circumstances where this use will be required in their LC

plans.

5. PLANNING FOR CBRN CONTINGENCIES.

All plans will be based on the assumption that opponents either possess CBRN weapons

or could obtain them at some point in the planning period.

6. PLANS FOR FORWARD PRESENCE OPERATIONS.

For this planning period, specific areas of interest are Operational Training and

Deployments, Security Assistance, Protection of U.S. Citizens Abroad (Noncombatant

Evacuation Operations and Combating Terrorism), Combating Drugs, Homeland

Security, and Humanitarian Assistance.

7. ACCESS AND HOST-NATION SUPPORT.

Any U.S. operation may require access by U.S. forces to lines of communication and

facilities not in U.S. territory, air space or territorial waters. Commanders must plan for

allied contributions to logistics, lift, administration, rear area security, medical, C4ISR

support and allied combat forces, whenever feasible.

8. LOGISTICS.

a. General. Guidance and planning factors for support, materiel sustainment and

strategic mobility are found in the GEF document.

b. Threat Distribution. As a result of lessons learned from operations in the Balkans,

Liberia, Guatemala, as well as in the Gulf War, Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan, plans

will include guidance distributing the threat among Service components and identifying

the expected duration of each phase of the operation. Contingency threat distribution in

joint operations is required to ensure resources support the Combatant Commander‟s

Strategic Concept as it applies to the joint force as a whole. Independent resourcing by

Service component commands that does not take into account the operational

contributions of all Service component commands collectively or the expected duration

of specific phases of the operation may place unacceptable strains on critical strategic

lift assets and can impede the closure of forces.

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SECTION VII – FUNCTIONAL PLANNING GUIDANCE

1. GENERAL.

a. The GEF provides functional guidance applicable to multiple functional CCDRs,

geographic CCDRs, DDAs, NGB, and the Services. The JSCP consolidates and

translates this functional guidance into specific campaign, campaign support,

contingency, and posture planning tasks.

b. While the consolidated planning tasks are in the JSCP, the JSCP does not repeat the

strategic objectives or detailed security cooperation guidance found in the GEF.

Planners must refer to the GEF functional guidance sections to be fully informed when

they develop campaign, campaign support, contingency, and posture plans.

2. FUNCTIONAL CAMPAIGN PLANS.

The JSCP tasks the development of Campaign Plans to address the threat of VEO and

CWMD. In accordance with UCP roles and responsibilities, the JSCP tasks a CCDR

to be the global synchronizer for each of these plans. To establish consistency across

the two Campaign Plans, the following paragraphs provide guidance for both the

global synchronizer, as well as geographic CCDRs writing supporting plans.

a. A global synchronizer for planning is the lead CCDR responsible for directing the

coordinated planning efforts of CCDRs, Services, and Defense agencies in support of a

designated Campaign Plan to achieve the integrated, yet decentralized, execution of

global activities and operations.

(1) Unless directed by the Secretary of Defense, the global synchronizer’s role

is not to execute specific plans, but to align and harmonize plans and recommend

sequencing of actions by CCDRs, Services, and Defense agencies to achieve the

Campaign Plan’s strategic objectives.

(2) While geographic CCDR plans are designated to develop supporting plans

to a Functional Campaign Plan with global priorities, this designation does not alter

current command relationships. Geographic CCDRs remain the supported

commanders for the execution of their plans unless otherwise directed by the SecDef.

The SecDef remains the final approval authority of supporting plans unless he

delegates that authority.

b. The global synchronizer will:

(1) Provide a common plan structure and strategic framework to guide and

inform development of CCDR, Service, NGB, and Defense agency supporting plans

and mitigate seams and vulnerabilities from a global perspective.

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(2) Establish a common process for the development of supporting plans.

(3) Conduct global synchronizer conferences to enhance development of

supporting plans consistent with the established strategic framework and to coordinate

and conduct synchronization activities.

(4) Disseminate “best practices” to CCDRs, Services, and Defense agencies.

This includes the consolidation and standardization of execution planning TSP

processes, products, and collaborative tools.

(5) Review and synchronize all supporting plans to ensure they align with the

Campaign Plan and make recommendations for the prioritization of forces and

capabilities across combatant commands from a global perspective.

(6) Provide advice and recommendations to geographic CCDRs, JS, and OSD

during the IPR process to enhance integration and synchronization of supporting plans

with the Campaign Plan.

(8) Accompany geographic CCDRs as they brief their supporting plans through

final approval, as required.

(9) Provide campaign plans to geographic CDCRs prior to IPRs with

enough time for CCDRs to review and propose modifications prior to the IPR.

(10) Conduct assessments to measure progress in achieving the campaign plan’s

strategic objectives. c. CCDRs, Services, NGB, and Defense agencies will:

(1) Provide detailed planning support to the global synchronizer to assist

development of Functional Campaign Plans.

(2) Fully support global synchronizer conferences and planning efforts.

(3) Develop supporting plans consistent with the strategic framework, planning

guidance, and process established by the global synchronizer. Supporting plans must

use the same lines of operation and phases established by the global synchronizer.

(4) Provide supporting plans to the global synchronizer prior to IPRs with

enough time for the global synchronizer to review and propose modifications prior to

the IPR.

d. The global synchronizer and CCDRs will seek to resolve issues prior to SecDef

IPRs. As a last option, unresolved issues will be adjudicated during IPRs.

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APPENDIX A TO SECTION VII – GUIDANCE TO USSOCOM

1. General Planning Guidance

a. Planning must be consistent with the functional guidance contained in the GEF and

identify the type of security cooperation activities that will be synchronized with GCCs

to contribute to strategic objectives.

b. In accordance with interagency planning guidance in the GEF, coordinate campaign

and contingency plans with interagency partners throughout the planning efforts.

2. Campaign Planning Requirements3

a. Develop and synchronize all Department of Defense plans for global operations

against violent extremist organizations and networks.

b. As directed, be prepared to, conduct global operations of the DOD plans that support

the global campaign against terror.

c. Receive, review, coordinate and prioritize the Geographic Combatant Commanders‟

regional plans, and make recommendations to the joint staff on force and resource

allocations.

3. Functional Posture Planning Requirements

a. Develop posture concept that reflects USSOCOM‟s access and capability needs

within the global posture network. This concept will support SecDef, CJCS, and GCC

efforts to conduct trans-regional posture planning.

b. Coordinate with GCCs to integrate USSOCOM‟s posture needs within their theater

posture plans and support the development of these plans.

4. Campaign Support Planning Requirements

a. Develop a Campaign Support Plan that includes activities conducted in support of

theater and functional campaign plans.

b. Develop the Campaign Support Plan in parallel with the theater and functional

campaign plans it supports and in full coordination with supported CCDRs.

c. The Campaign Support Plan will comply with GEF prioritization guidance and

balance competing demands for limited global resources.

3

Academic Note: Requirements developed from USSOCOM posture statement, NIPRNET, 18 Sep 09

UNCLASSIFIED


34


APPENDIX B TO SECTION VII – GUIDANCE TO USSTRATCOM 1. General Planning Guidance







a. Develop global plans to deter attacks on US vital interests.

b. Develop global plans to ensure US freedom of action in space and cyberspace.

c. Develop plans, in support of US Joint Force Commander operations, to deliver

integrated kinetic and non-kinetic effects to include nuclear and information operations.

d. Review and synchronize regional combating of weapons of mass destruction plans.

3. Functional Posture Planning Requirements

a. Develop posture concept that reflects USSTRATCOM’s access and capability needs

within the global posture network. This concept will support SecDef, CJCS, and GCC

efforts to conduct trans-regional posture planning.

b. Coordinate with GCCs, CSAs, and applicable Defense agencies to integrate

USSTRATCOM‟s posture needs within their theater posture plans and support the

development of these plans. 4. Campaign Support Planning Requirements

a. Develop a Campaign Support Plan that includes activities conducted in support of


b. Develop the Campaign Support Plan in parallel with the theater and functional

campaign plans it supports and in full coordination with supported CCDRs.

c. The Campaign Support Plan will comply with GEF prioritization guidance and


4

Academic Note: Requirements developed from USSTRATCOM open source website, “Mission

Statement”, NIPRNET, 18 Sep 09

UNCLASSIFIED


35


APPENDIX C TO SECTION VII – GUIDANCE TO USTRANSCOM

1. Functional Planning Requirements

a. Develop a global distribution campaign plan that enables rapid and responsive

transportation and sustainment support to geographic combatant commanders.

b. Develop a posture concept that reflects USTRANSCOM’s access and capability

needs within the global posture network. This concept will support SecDef, CJCS, and

GCC efforts to conduct trans-regional posture planning.

c. Coordinate with GCCs to integrate USTRANSCOM’s posture needs within their

theater posture plans and support the development of these plans.

2. Campaign Support Planning Requirements

a. In its role as a joint force mobility force provider and the defense distribution process

owner, develop a campaign support plan that includes activities conducted in support of


b. Develop the campaign support plan in parallel with the theater and functional

campaign plans it supports and in full coordination with the supported CCDRs.

c. The campaign support plan will comply with GEF prioritization guidance and

balance competing demands for limited global distribution resources.

UNCLASSIFIED


36


APPENDIX D TO SECTION VII – GUIDANCE TO Service Commanders

Campaign Support Planning Requirements

a. Individual service components, in coordination with Joint Staff / J-8, provide forces

to the combatant commands and have primary responsibility to their services for

requirements validation. The CONUS force provider service components are:

• United States Army Forces Command (FORSCOM)

• United States Fleet Forces Command (USFLTFORCOM)

• Air Combat Command (ACC)

• United States Marine Corps Forces Command (MARFORCOM)

• Special Operations Command (SOCOM) b. Each service command will develop a Campaign Support Plan that includes

activities conducted in support of theater and functional campaign plans. c. The Campaign Support Plan should address the following roles:

(1) As the service force provider of conventional forces, develop conventional

force/capability sourcing solutions in accordance with SecDef-approved GFM and GRF

guidance, and joint combat capabilities assessments. Joint Staff J-8 will coordinate the

efforts between services to ensure the most efficient use of forces in support of CCDR

requirements.

(2) As the respective service force trainer and enabler, highlight joint training

designed to support theater campaign plans and joint enabling capabilities (e.g., joint

communications support element, Joint Public Affairs Support Element, Joint Center for

Operational Analysis, standing joint force headquarters) available for supporting current

operations.

(3) As the respective service capability developer, address interoperability and

integration issues worked in support of campaign plans. d. Develop the Campaign Support Plan in parallel with the theater and functional

campaign plans it supports and in full coordination with the supported CCDRs. Joint

staff J-8 will be the coordinator for individual service components. d. The Campaign Support Plan will comply with GEF prioritization guidance and


UNCLASSIFIED


37


SECTION VIII – REGIONAL PLANNING GUIDANCE

1. The GEF provides functional and regional guidance applicable to multiple GCCs.

The JSCP consolidates and translates the applicable functional and regional guidance

into specific campaign, contingency, and posture planning tasks.

2. While the consolidated planning tasks are in the JSCP, the JSCP does not repeat the

strategic objectives or detailed security cooperation guidance found in the GEF. CCDRs

must refer to the GEF functional and regional guidance sections to be fully informed

when they develop campaign, contingency, and posture plans.

3. Planners should refer to Section VII, paragraph 2, for guidance concerning the roles

and responsibilities pertaining to the Campaign Plans for VEO and CWMD.

4. Regional Plans.

a. General. The focus for current planning is regional, and conflict may arise under a

variety of circumstances from slow building to imminent conflict situations.

b. Planning Assumptions. Assumptions governing regional conflicts, applicable to all

Combatant Commanders, are in Table II-1 and will be incorporated into operation plans

as appropriate. Items not under U.S. control must be covered by plan assumptions

concerning them.

TABLE VIII-1 JSCP REGIONAL ASSUMPTIONS

R-1 No Attacks on U.S. assets in space.

R-2 Combatant

Commanders will

plan to use the

mobilization and

transportation

necessary to move

and sustain the

forces.

R-3 LOCs outside the

theater will

remain open.

R-4 The

threatened nation

will furnish bases

for reinforcement

and support.

R-5 Pre- positioned War

Reserve Material

Stock (PWRMS)

will be per

FY20xx

program.

R-6 Nuclear

and lethal

chemical

weapons are

likely to be

available to the

enemy.

R-7 Mobilization

will not occur

except as noted.

c. Common Tasks and Planning Considerations. A number of tasks and planning

considerations are common to all commands. Table II-2 lists selected common regional

tasks. Commands may develop plans for the situations the commander considers

UNCLASSIFIED


38


necessary. Planning considerations are included to assist the development of OPLANs,

CONPLANs, and Concept Summaries.

TABLE VIII-2 COMMON REGIONAL TASKS

(1) Rules of Engagement (2) Movement of Forces (3) Command Relationships

(4) Nuclear Weapons Control (5) Intelligence Coordination (6) Special Operations

(7) Civil Affairs (8) Host-nation Support (9) De-escalation/Conflict Termination

(10) Support Host-nation Restoration

(11) Continuity of Operations (12) Conduct Exercises

(13) Reconnaissance Operations

(14) Maritime Operations (15) Air Traffic Control

(16) NASA Support (17) Humanitarian Assistance (18) Enemy Prisoners of War (EPW)

(19) Military Deception (20) Search and Rescue (21) Psychological Operations

(1) Rules of Engagement (ROE). Establish and maintain ROE in conformity

with the peacetime ROE for U.S. Forces. Submit proposed ROE for those situations not

covered by existing rules to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff for review and approval

or staffing and forwarding to the President and Secretary of Defense for approval.

(2) Movement of Forces. When appropriate, include considerations for the

movement of forces as specified in Forces (Section I). Combatant Commanders will

plan supporting operations security (OPSEC) and deception operations, as required.

(3) Command Relationships. Supporting Combatant Commanders coordinate

planning with supported Combatant Commanders, participate in the planning process,

and prepare supporting plans, as required. Commanders establish relationships with

international commands, organizations, and activities and participate in combined

planning, as required. Include necessary actions to receive and deploy units and support

contingency deployments.

(4) Nuclear Weapons Control. Not applicable for regional planning.

(5) Intelligence Coordination. Issued separately as needed.

(6) Special Operations. Coordinate with the Commander, Special Operations

Command on special operations matters.

(7) Civil Affairs (CA). Conduct CA activities in support of the U.S. National

Military Strategy to successfully fulfill the U.S. legal and treaty obligations, coordinate

host-nation and nation-building activities, and, if necessary, perform additional civil-

military operations.

UNCLASSIFIED


39


(8) Host-Nation Support (HNS). Include provisions for using HNS to meet in-

country and in-theater requirements. Areas for consideration of HNS programs are

reception and onward movement of forces and selected logistic and security functions.

(9) De-escalation and Post-Conflict Planning. Include considerations for de-

escalation, crisis termination, and post-conflict requirements throughout the planning

cycle, as required.

(10) Support for Host-Nation Restoration. At the conclusion of hostilities,

planning for and the implementation of operations directed at normalization of host-

nation operations will take place. Interagency coordination and responsibilities will

dominate as priorities and requirements are identified and programs are implemented

with the consensus of the host-nation leadership.

(11) Continuity of Operations. The integration of military and civil operations

is complicated, but paramount to the accomplishment of U.S. objectives and

maintenance of U.S. interests in any contingency.

(12) Exercises. Plan and conduct exercises across the operational continuum to

project positive perceptions of U.S. and allied capabilities to respond credibly to any

crisis. Exercises should consider interoperability; incorporate indications, warning and

alerting procedures; joint and combined command, control, and communications (C3)

involving the National Military Command System (NMCS); and tests of selected

military and supporting civil functions. Commands will submit after-action reports on

exercises.

(13) Reconnaissance Operations. Plan for maximum efficient use of all

available assets.

(14) Maritime Option. The following range of maritime options should be

included in plans:

(a) Conduct reconnaissance and surveillance operations to seize and

destroy the ships and aircraft of hostile nations and conduct aerial mine-laying.

areas.

(b) Control and protect U.S. and allied shipping and LOCs in critical

(c) Conduct mine countermeasures operations against mine warfare

operations by hostile forces.

(d) Deploy amphibious forces and/or maritime pre-positioned force

squadrons or pre-positioning ships to the region as an indication of the possible

use of ground forces or for the purposes of deception or surveillance.

UNCLASSIFIED


40


(15) Air Traffic Control. Include provisions in existing plans for continued

support by the Federal Aviation Administration for air traffic control operations in the

AORs of the combatant commands during periods of war or national emergency.

(16) NASA Support. Support NASA, as directed, and be prepared to conduct

search and rescue missions in support of the space transportation system (STS).

(17) Humanitarian Assistance. Hurricanes, typhoons, earthquakes, drought, and

manmade events may require DOD forces to lend support to government disaster relief

assistance agencies with minimum notice and support civil agencies, as directed by the

DOD executive agent.

(18) Enemy Prisoners of War. Include provisions for the internment of EPWs.

(19) Military Deception. Conduct military deception operations to support

OPSEC, deterrence, preparation for hostilities, intervention operations, combat

operations, and attainment of other strategic objectives.

(20) Search and Rescue. Establish a theater search and rescue system for the

recovery of personnel and materiel. Include provisions for coordinating the capabilities

of available theater Service and allied resources.

(21) Psychological Operations. Conduct psychological operations (PSYOP) in

coordination with the chiefs of U.S. diplomatic missions in support of national

objectives, policies, interests, and military missions.

UNCLASSIFIED


41


APPENDIX A TO SECTION VIII – GUIDANCE TO USAFRICOM







c. Planning should address procedures and authorities required for information sharing

and USG intelligence fusion necessary to detect and respond rapidly to threats to the

USAFRICOM AOR.


a. Prepare a Theater Campaign Plan, in concert with other U.S. government agencies

and international partners, to promote a stable and secure African environment in

support of U.S. foreign policy.

b. Develop a options, in coordination with USSTRATCOM, to prevent the spread of

weapons of mass destruction.

c. Be prepared to conduct operations to deter attacks upon friendly states by hostile

neighbors and, if necessary, assist in their defense.

3. Contingency Planning Requirements6

a. Develop a series of OPLANs for the combined defense of friendly states in North

Africa against attacks from neighboring potential aggressors.

b. Develop CONPLAN to combat the spread and effects of VEOs throughout the AOR.

c. Develop a series of CONPLANs to assist friendly countries in combating external

attacks or externally supported insurgency and subversion.

d. Peace Operations. Develop plans for the support or conduct of peace operations and

CONPLANs for the conduct of peace enforcement operations in the USAFRICOM

AOR.

5 Academic Note: Requirements developed from USAFRICOM Fact Sheet, USAFRICOM website,

NIPRNET, 22 Sep 09 6

Academic Note: Requirements developed from USAFRICOM Fact Sheet excerpts, USAFRICOM

website, NIPRNET, 22 Sep 09

UNCLASSIFIED


42


e. Develop CONPLANs to provide a range of indirect and direct U.S. military support

to international humanitarian relief activities in the region, with particular attention to

potential humanitarian crises in Africa.

f. Develop CONPLANs to help protect populations from deadly contagions.

4. Posture Planning Requirements

Prepare a Theater Posture Plan, integrated and synchronized with the USAFRICOM

Theater Campaign Plan, in accordance with the posture guidance provided in the GEF

and JSCP Section IV.

UNCLASSIFIED


43


APPENDIX B TO SECTION VIII – GUIDANCE TO USCENTCOM









USCENTCOM AOR.


a. Develop options to maintain access to Strategic Resources. In coordination with U.S. allies and friendly nations in the region, ensure continued, unimpeded access to the

petroleum reserves in the Persian Gulf. In particular, prevent any hostile power from

gaining control or threatening closure of the Strait of Hormuz.

b. Develop options to deter attacks on or defend friendly nations from external threats.

Foster programs that improve the defense capabilities of friendly nations in the region

through approved security assistance programs.

c. Develop options to encourage and enhance regional stability, through the

development of political and economic activities within, and cooperative security

arrangements among, friendly nations.

d. Develop options to deter the spread of WMD.

e. Develop options to counter transnational terrorist and VEO that threaten the security

of the United States and our allies in the region.

3. Contingency Planning Requirements

a. Develop a series of OPLANs to provide direct U.S. military assistance to deter

attacks on friendly countries and, in the event that deterrence fails, to defend them from

external attack.

b. Develop an OPLAN to ensure the security of the Strait of Hormuz from control or

interdiction by hostile powers.

7

Academic Note: Requirements developed from USCENTCOM posture statement excerpts, NIPRNET,

22 Sep 09.

UNCLASSIFIED


44


c. Develop a series of OPLANs, in coordination with USSOCOM, for the employment

of U.S. forces directly against regional VEO groups.

d. Develop a CONPLAN, in coordination with USSTRATCOM, to address

proliferation and combating WMD within the USCENTCOM AOR. 4. Posture Planning Requirements

Prepare a Theater Posture Plan, integrated and synchronized with the USCENTCOM



UNCLASSIFIED


45


APPENDIX C TO SECTION VIII – GUIDANCE TO USEUCOM









USEUCOM AOR.


a. NATO. (1) In coordination with other NATO allies and the NATO integrated military

structure, support the Partnership for Peace (PfP) and deter the threat or use of force

against any NATO member nation.

(2) Encourage NATO allies and PfP members to improve their force

contributions to the alliance for collective defense and potential out-of-area operations.

(3) Foster actions by other regional organizations, such as the European Union

(EU) and Forum for Security Cooperation, to expand their capability to conduct

activities and operations, which promote stability in Europe and the Mediterranean area.

b. Eastern Europe (EE).

(1) Encourage the process of democratization in the EE nations, including the

independent states of the former Soviet Union.

(2) Promote the full participation of EE nations and traditionally neutral

European states in PfP activities.

(3) Through approved security assistance and military-to-military programs,

encourage EE nations to maintain adequate military forces to provide for their own

defense and to contribute to peace operations and collective defense actions with NATO

and PfP nations.

c. Regional Support to U.S. Policy.

(1) Increase support, in the nations of the region, for U.S. policies, diplomatic

initiatives, and U.S. executions.

(a) Develop options to counter international drug trafficking

(b) Develop options to deter proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

8 Academic Note: Requirements developed from USEUCOM section of previous AFWI developed JSCP

and GFM documents from AY08-09

UNCLASSIFIED


46


(2) Develop options that encompass agreement by regional countries to provide U.S. and coalition partner access to bases, over-flight rights, and, as appropriate, host

nation support activities.

(3) Encourage the denial of such support to potential aggressors. 3. Contingency Planning Requirements

a. Develop OPLANs for the defense of NATO member nations and for potential out-

of-area operations by the NATO integrated military structure.

b. Develop CONPLANS to deter the threat or use of force by potential aggressors in

Europe.

c. Develop plans to provide a range of indirect and direct U.S. military support to

international humanitarian relief activities in the region, with particular attention to

potential humanitarian crises in Africa in support of USAFRICOM.

d. Develop a series of plans, in coordination with USSOCOM, for the employment of

U.S. forces directly against regional VEO groups.

e. Develop a CONPLAN, in coordination with USSTRATCOM, to address

proliferation and combating WMD within the USEUCOM AOR. 4. Posture Planning Requirements

Prepare a Theater Posture Plan, integrated and synchronized with the USEUCOM



UNCLASSIFIED


47


APPENDIX D TO SECTION VIII – GUIDANCE TO USMEDCOM

1.General Planning Guidance


identify the type of security cooperation activities that will be synchronized with

GCCs to contribute to strategic objectives.

b. In accordance with interagency planning guidance in the GEF, coordinate

campaign and contingency plans with interagency partners throughout the planning

efforts.

c. Planning should address procedures and authorities required for information

sharing and USG intelligence fusion necessary to detect and respond rapidly to

threats to the USMEDCOM AOR.

2.Campaign Planning Requirements

a. Develop options to maintain access to Strategic Resources. In coordination with

U.S. allies and friendly nations in the region, ensure continued, unimpeded access to the

petroleum reserves in Mercury and Venus. In particular, prevent any hostile power from

gaining control or threatening closure of the Tangy Straits.

b. Develop options to deter attacks on or defend friendly nations from external

threats. Foster programs that improve the defense capabilities of friendly nations in

the region through approved security assistance programs.

c. Develop options to encourage and enhance regional stability, through the

development of political and economic activities within, and cooperative

security arrangements among, friendly nations.

d. Develop options to deter the spread of WMD.

e. Develop options to counter transnational terrorist and VEO that threaten the

security of the United States and our allies in the region.

3. Contingency Planning Requirements

a. Develop a series of CONPLANs to provide direct U.S. military assistance to deter

attacks on friendly countries and, in the event that deterrence fails, to defend them

from external attack.

b. Develop an OPLAN to ensure the security of the Tangy Straits from control

or interdiction by hostile powers.

c. Develop a CONPLAN to provide direct U.S. military assistance to deter attacks

48


UNCLASSIFIED


on Mercury by Jupiter and, in the event deterrence fails, to defend Mercury from a

Jupiterian attack.

d. Develop a series of OPLANs, in coordination with USSOCOM, for the

employment of U.S. forces directly against regional VEO groups.

e. Develop a CONPLAN, in coordination with USSTRATCOM, to

address proliferation and combating WMD within the USMEDCOM

AOR. 5. Posture Planning Requirements

Prepare a Theater Posture Plan, integrated and synchronized with the USMEDCOM



UNCLASSIFIED


49


APPENDIX E TO SECTION VIII – GUIDANCE TO USNORTHCOM and CDRNORAD









USNORTHCOM AOR.


a. Develop options to defend, protect, and secure the United States and its interest

b. As CDRNORAD, develop options to prevent air attacks against North America,

safeguarding the sovereign airspaces of the United States and Canada, and providing

aerospace and maritime warning for North America.

c. Develop options to support federal, state and National Guard partners in responding

to natural and manmade disasters

d. Develop options to enhance the capability to conduct WMD interdiction and

consequence management operations.

e. Coordinate all plans through appropriate USG and state agencies as required to

support specifics within AOR.


a. Develop OPLANs for the defense of U.S. borders

(1) Conduct operations and training exercises to demonstrate capabilities

throughout the region out to a range of 500 NM.

9 Academic Note: Requirements developed from USNORTHCOM mission and vision statement excerpts,

USNORTHCOM website, NIPRNET, 22 Sep 09. 10

Academic Note: Requirements developed from USNORTHCOM section of previous AFWI developed

JSCP and GFM documents from AY08-09

UNCLASSIFIED


50


(2) As Commander, NORAD, provide early warning and surveillance of North

America. Provide interceptor forces in a tiered state of readiness for protection of the

continental United States against external or internally based air attacks.

b. Develop CONPLANs to support CONUS Internal – Defense Support to Civilian

Agencies (DSCA).

(1) In cooperation with the Department of Homeland Security, develop plans

and establish procedures and systems for the prompt, legal utilization of military forces

assisting civil authorities in support of response and recovery operations following

terrorist attacks or natural disasters.

(2) Establish and maintain a command and control system for forces employed

in support of civil authorities.

c. Develop CONPLAN for the support of CONUS-external defense.

(1) In cooperation with USSOUTHCOM, establish relationships with naval and

military forces in the countries of South and Central America for the purpose of

enhancing the maritime defense of the hemisphere, including the interdiction of drug

traffic into the United States.


Prepare a Theater Posture Plan, integrated and synchronized with the USNORTHCOM



UNCLASSIFIED


51


APPENDIX F TO SECTION VIII – GUIDANCE TO USPACOM









USPACOM AOR.


a. As the supported commander, prepare a Theater Campaign Plan that operationalizes

the CCDR’s theater strategy and prioritizes near- and long-term activities, operations,

and plans to achieve the theater strategic objectives specified in the GEF.

(1) Prepare this campaign plan in basic plan format. See Section V for further

guidance on campaign plan format and content.

(2) Establish a baseline status for each theater strategic end state specified in the

GEF. This baseline may be qualitative in nature. The CCDR will measure progress

from this baseline as a part of the campaign plan assessment tasked in Section X.

(3) The campaign plan should identify all DOD activities in the AOR that

contribute to achieving the theater strategic objectives, to include those activities for

which the CCDR is not responsible. To support this effort, the GEF tasks the Services,

CSAs, and applicable Defense agencies and Field Activities to fully coordinate their

activities in the AOR with the CCDR.

(4) In accordance with the guidance in Section IV, submit a Theater Posture

Plan as an annex to the Theater Campaign Plan.

(5) Operations and activities developed under this plan will fully incorporate

security cooperation and other positive shaping activities to achieve the theater strategic

objectives specified in the GEF.

b. Develop options to deter attack on the Homeland through presence and posture of

U.S. forces in the region.

11

Academic Note: Requirements developed from USPACOM Strategy – 2 Apr 09 excerpts, NIPRNET,

23 Sep 09.

UNCLASSIFIED


52


c. Develop options to guarantee freedom-of-movement and secure access to global

supply chains and lines of communication and commerce.

d. Support USG efforts to foster growth and development of bi-lateral and multilateral

relationships within the AOR.

e. Develop options to detect, disrupt, and counter VEO and their organizational support

systems, in coordination with USSOCOM global effort.

f. Develop options to deter the spread of sensitive weapons of mass destruction

technology as well as chemical, biological, and radiological weapons material.


a. Northeast Asia (NEA) (1) Japan. Develop bilateral plans for the cooperative defense of Japan. Plans

should reflect all possible threats, including the use of weapons of mass destruction.

(2) South Korea. Develop and maintain bilateral OPLANs for the defense of the

Republic of Korea against any external threats that may arise. Planning scenarios

developed should maximize South Korean efforts to contribute to their own defense and

host nation efforts to facilitate U.S. forces in the defense of the Republic of Korea, and

as required, for the defense of regional peace and stability.

b. Southeast Asia (SEA).

(1) Develop a series of CONPLANs to support countries within the sub-region

and region threatened with external attack or internal subversion.

(2) Plans should reflect various levels of U.S. force involvement from logistics

support only; to air, sea and SOF force/small unit involvement; to major U.S. air, sea

and ground force involvement.

c. South Asia. Develop plans to mature the relationship with our strategic partner India

as a leader on security cooperation in order to maintain stability of Indo-Pakistani

relations.

d. Lines of Communication. Develop a series of plans to ensure freedom of navigation

throughout the region to include threats to strategic choke points and straits.

e. Develop a series of plans, in coordination with USSOCOM, for the employment of

U.S. forces against regional VEO groups.

f. Develop a CONPLAN, in coordination with USSTRATCOM, to address

proliferation and combating WMD within the USPACOM AOR.

12

Academic Note: Requirements developed from USPACOM section of previous AFWI developed JSCP

and GFM documents from AY08-09

53


UNCLASSIFIED


g. Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR). Develop plans to provide

military support to HADR plans and efforts in the PACOM AOR.





UNCLASSIFIED


54


APPENDIX G TO SECTION VIII – GUIDANCE TO USSOUTHCOM 1. General Planning Guidance








USSOUTHCOM AOR.


a. As the supported commander, prepare a Theater Campaign Plan that operationalizes

the CCDR’s theater strategy and prioritizes near- and long-term activities, operations,

and plans to achieve the theater strategic objectives specified in the GEF.

(1) Prepare this campaign plan in basic plan format. See Section V for further

guidance on campaign plan format and content.

(2) Establish a baseline status for each theater strategic end state specified in the

GEF. This baseline may be qualitative in nature. The CCDR will measure progress

from this baseline as a part of the campaign plan assessment tasked in Section X.

(3) The campaign plan should identify all DOD activities in the AOR that

contribute to achieving the theater strategic objectives, to include those activities for

which the CCDR is not responsible. To support this effort, the GEF tasks the Services,

CSAs, and applicable Defense agencies and Field Activities to fully coordinate their

activities in the AOR with the CCDR.

(4) In accordance with the guidance in Section IV, submit a Theater Posture

Plan as an annex to the Theater Campaign Plan.

(5) Operations and activities developed under this plan will fully incorporate

security cooperation and other positive shaping activities to achieve the theater strategic

objectives specified in the GEF. b. Develop options to deter potential aggressor states from threatening other regional

nations with direct attacks, support for insurgency or subversion. c. In the Caribbean, develop options to:

13

Academic Note: Requirements developed from USSOUTHCOM section of previous AFWI developed

JSCP and GFM documents from AY08-09

55



UNCLASSIFIED


(1) Combat terrorism and subversion that would undermine the democratic

nations of the region or upset the stability of the region as a whole.

(2) Interdict or otherwise prevent the flow of illegal drugs into the United States

from the Caribbean.

(3) Ensure secure sea and air lines of communication to the nations of the

region for the flow of trade, resources and people.

(4) Develop a combined arms operations capability with the friendly nations of

the Caribbean and, as feasible, the Organization of American States (OAS) and other

regional groupings.


a. Develop OPLANs in conjunction with friendly defense authorities to provide for their

defense and provide protection and assistance against external attack or subversion.

b. Develop CONPLANs to conduct approved counter-narcotics surveillance and drug

interdiction operations in USSOUTHCOM area of responsibility in coordination, as

appropriate, with USNORTHCOM, other U.S. Government agencies and friendly

nations in the region.

c. In the Caribbean, develop appropriate plans to:

(1) Defend the U.S. Virgin Island territories from external threat.

(2) Defend the seaward approaches to the Panama Canal.

(3) Defend the Caribbean region arising from threats external to the region.

(4) Defend Guantanamo Bay, Naval Station, CUBA.

(5) Develop combined arms operational capabilities with national and OAS

forces to provide for defense from external attack or internally against subversive forces

that threaten the violent overthrow of democratic governments.

d. Develop a series of plans, in coordination with USSOCOM, for the employment of

U.S. forces against regional VEO groups.

14

Academic Note: Requirements developed from USSOUTHCOM section of previous AFWI developed

JSCP and GFM documents from AY08-09 and review of USSOUTHCOM website, NIPRNET, 24 Sep

09

UNCLASSIFIED


56







UNCLASSIFIED


57




UNCLASSIFIED


59



SECTION IX – IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE

1. General. Plan development and review will be in accordance with the APEX process. See CJCSI

3141.01 for more detailed plan development and review guidance.

a. APEX allows CCDRs to develop a full range of flexible options and respond to

rapidly changing strategic and military conditions. It increases senior civilian

leadership involvement in the planning process by placing emphasis on the “front end”

elements of planning – threat analysis, mission analysis, assumption development,

feasibility assessment, and concept of operations development through SecDef IPRs.

Following plan approval, reviews ensure plan currency and foster increased flexibility

through development of plan branches.

b. APEX will produce net-centric, “living plans.” A living plan is maintained

continuously within a collaborative environment to reflect changes in guidance or the

strategic environment. The currency of living plans provides an accurate foundation

and detailed framework which will lead crisis response.

(1) CCDRs are in no way constrained by the recurring reviews of approved

plans from continuously updating and enhancing their plans.

(2) If a CCDR determines that significant adaptations to the plan are required,

an IPR(s) should be scheduled with the Secretary of Defense or his designated

representative.

c. Commanders are responsible for preparation of current plans for the execution of

tasks as assigned in this and the GEF. These tasks conform to planning guidance and

may be further amplified in follow-on guidance. Tasks assigned in the GEF document

constitute requirements for planning, or other actions, by CCDRs. Plans are categorized

as operation plans, concept plans or concept summaries.

(1) Operation plans (OPLANs) are prepared in either complete format, concept

plan format (CONPLAN), or concept summary.

(2) All plans must conform to domestic and international law, including the law

of armed conflict and international agreements that are binding on the United States.

d. Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES). JOPES Volume I

(CJCSM 3122.01) outlines the planning process and gives guidance for preparation,

submission and review of operation plans and Time-Phased Force and Deployment

Data (TPFDD). APEX Planning Formats and guidance (CJCSM 3130.03)

contains planning and execution formats and guidance.

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2. Development of Plans

As a general rule, CCDRs will complete campaign plans before developing their

contingency plans. The campaign plan will be the first of the CCDR’s plans to be

developed and reviewed.

a. Top Priority Plans. In order for plans to be relevant to the strategic and political

environment, CCDRs should submit their top priority contingency plan for approval in

less than 1 year (with a goal of six months) from the publication of the JSCP. CCDRs

who have more than one top-priority plan will submit their remaining plans in order of

priority, completing each of them in less than one year, with a goal of six months.

b. Lesser Priority Plans. Where necessary to support completion of top-priority plans

to the specified level of detail, CCDRs may defer development of lesser priority plans.

Such plans should be submitted no later than two years from the publication of this

document. Where existing plans adequately meet the planning requirements, they

should be maintained or updated as necessary.

c. Combatant commands and organizations will be prepared to bring approved

CONPLANs to OPLAN detail within 60 days of a SecDef order to do so. Timelines for

plan submission and IPRs may be separately adjusted with the Secretary of Defense

when CCDRs are involved in major ongoing operations/campaigns.

d. CCDRs will use the APEX technology systems of record to develop force and

sustainment requirements and force flows for the appropriate plans tasked in this

document.

3. In-Progress Reviews

a. Periodic IPRs are completed at successive steps in the planning process. These IPRs

constitute a disciplined dialogue among senior leaders to shape plans as they are

developed. Further, they expedite planning by ensuring that the plan addresses the most

current strategic assessments and needs. They generate valuable feedback for planning

staffs and provide a forum for guidance on coordination with the interagency and

multinational communities. IPRs provide the opportunity for discussion of key issues

or concerns, identification and removal of planning obstacles, and resolution of

planning conflicts. IPRs ensure that plans remain relevant to the situation and the

SecDef’s intent throughout their development.

b. Unless otherwise directed, plans tasked as Commander’s estimates or identified as

not requiring IPRs will not be submitted for review.

c. A campaign plan’s initial IPR should be within 3 months of the issuance of this

planning guidance.

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SECTION X - ASSESSMENTS

1. Purpose. a. Campaign plan assessments provide the Chairman with a CCDR’s assessment of

how well his command is executing the strategic guidance provided in the GEF and

JSCP. The Chairman will use these assessments to inform development of the

Chairman’s Military Advice (CMA) document.

b. CCDR campaign plan assessments will be integrated into the Chairman’s

Contingency assessment process – the Comprehensive Joint Assessment (CJA),

developed as part of the revision to the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS). This

assessment guidance will be revised as the JSPS and its assessment components

mature. This section does not apply to campaign support plans. Guidance concerning

assessments of campaign support plans is provided in each of the appendices tasking

campaign support plans.

2. Assessment Content and Format.

Campaign plan assessments should follow the format and content guidance presented

below.

a. CCDR’s Overall Assessment. Provide an overall assessment of the CCDR’s ability

to accomplish the objectives of the CCDR’s campaign plan and the level of the risk to

their ability to meet UCP responsibilities and support the National Security Strategy

within their AOR/functional area. The assessment is intended to provide the Chairman

with a concise summary of the most pressing issues, risk drivers, and mitigation

requirements. There is no specific format for this overall assessment.

b. Strategic Environment

(1) Identify any assumptions that are no longer valid or necessary to support

campaign planning, as well as required new assumptions.

(2) Assess the strategic environment within your area of responsibility

(functionally or geographically), to include identifying emerging trends, threats, and/or

opportunities.

(3) Recommend adjustments to GEF priorities based on progress in achieving

GEF strategic objectives.

c. Assess achievement of strategic objectives

(1) Provide an assessment of ongoing operations that includes progress toward

achievement of GEF-tasked objectives, the near-term objectives established by the

CCDR, and support to other CCDRs.

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(2) Assess seam issues impacting achievement of objectives.

d. Assess capability shortfalls

(1) Provide an assessment of forces and resources related to achieving

campaign plan objectives. Identify any force, resource, or posture shortfalls that

impact accomplishing campaign plan objectives.

(2) Identify other limiting factors, e.g., policy, processes, legal or multi-lateral

agreements. Provide recommendations to address shortfalls, limiting factors, or

mitigate risk.

e. Tool Effectiveness Assessment

(1) Identify the most critical tools, capabilities, and resources for achieving

campaign plan objectives. This includes the adequacy of the security cooperation

programs and tools identified in the GEF to achieve campaign plan objectives.

(2) Where applicable, assess program execution performance (e.g., efficiency,

timely execution, within budget).

3. Assessment Cycle.

CCDRs will submit assessments to the Chairman in October of each year; consistent

with the JSPS assessment process. Upon receipt, the Chairman will forward assessment

information from paragraphs 3.b and 3.e. to OSD to support their assessment processes

and guidance development (e.g., GDF). NLT 15 January of each year, CCDRs will

submit an addendum to the overall assessment report that captures the execution of

fourth quarter activities. This addendum informs key Department programmatic

assessments and finalization of the CMA, and will be shared with OSD. CCDRs

responsible for Fu n c t i o n a l Campaign Plans will use the October geographic

CCDR assessments to inform their 15 January addendum.

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