Routing

American representative government suffersfrom the handicap of a largely uncompetitive polit-ical system. American politics has fewer and fewercompetitive elections. In arguing that political com-petition matters a great deal, this paper traces theincreasing trend toward uncompetitiveness anddetails the role and nature of incumbency advan-tage in fostering an uncompetitive political system.

Current redistricting practices and campaignfinance regulations, in tandem with publiclyfinanced careerism, have significantly negativeconsequences for the health of the political sys-tem. This study analyzes several of the majorinstruments of campaign finance regulation,such as contribution limits, public financing,and the ban on soft money, in terms of their rela-tionship to political competition. Simply put,campaign finance regulation and public financ-

ing have not improved political competition. In the past, campaign finance restrictions and

taxpayer-subsidized elections have generatedunintended consequences. The most recent reg-ulatory round is no exception to that rule. Thisstudy also looks at other reforms, namely, termlimits and improvements to the redistrictingprocess, in light of their comparatively successfulrecord regarding political competition.

Changes in the manner in which districts aredesigned, campaigns are funded, and politiciansare tenured require immediate implementation.In short, elected officials should be disconnectedfrom campaign and election rule making andregulation. There will not be an improvement inpolitical competition until the incumbent foxends his tenure as guardian of the democratichenhouse.

Uncompetitive Elections andthe American Political System

by Patrick Basham and Dennis Polhill

_____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Patrick Basham is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute’s Center for Representative Government. Dennis Polhill is asenior fellow at the Independence Institute.

Executive Summary

No. 547 June 30, 2005

Introduction

American politics has fewer and fewercompetitive elections. Should one be con-cerned about this situation? In arguing thatpolitical competition matters a great deal,this paper traces the trend toward decliningcompetitiveness and details the role andnature of incumbency advantage in fosteringan uncompetitive political system. Several ofthe major instruments of campaign financeregulation, such as public financing, contri-bution limits, and the ban on soft money, areanalyzed in terms of their relationship topolitical competition. Other reforms, name-ly, term limits and reform of the redistrictingprocess, are discussed in light of their com-paratively successful record regarding politi-cal competition.

As James Madison noted in Federalist 63, theHouse of Representatives was viewed as a“numerous and changeable body”1 reflectingthe shifting popular will. The decline in con-gressional political competitiveness is grosslyinhibiting the extent to which the contempo-rary House serves this function of democraticresponsiveness.2 The word “election” derivesfrom the Latin electus, meaning “to pick out”or “to select,” thereby implying choice, compe-tition, and the possibility of both success andfailure. The evidence shows that Americanelections no longer offer those elements in ameaningful fashion. In recent elections, 98percent of incumbent representatives success-fully sought reelection. Only a few dozen ofthe 435 congressional districts experiencetruly competitive elections.3 During the 1980s,99.3 percent of unindicted congressional andstate legislative incumbents won reelection.4

American representative government clearlysuffers from the handicap of a largely uncom-petitive political system. Political scientistRoss Baker observes:

Incumbency has become so entrenched. . . that many voters lack any real say inwho represents them. Democratic andRepublican House incumbents alikeshare a semi-perpetual easement on

their seats that more nearly resembleshereditary entitlement than the com-petitive politics we associate with ademocracy.5

Rhetorically, at least, everyone favors morepolitical competition. According to the liberalpolitical columnist Albert R. Hunt, “Theappalling lack of competition in Congressionalelections is another void in the system.”6 In thelong term, most analysts and electoral partici-pants agree that this state of affairs is clearlyincompatible with a healthy political system.

It is reasonable to assume that more candi-dates for office and the increased turnover ofrepresentatives would produce better choicesfor voters.7 Economist Anthony Downsfamously informed us that political competi-tion produces parties and policies reflectingthe median voter’s preferences.8 Political com-petition has been found to heighten voterinterest, stimulate the adoption of distinctivepolicies by candidates and parties, and producehigher voter turnout.9 Competitive electionsalso help to legitimize the political system andaid in the political socialization of new citi-zens.10 According to economists PranabBardham and Tsung-Tao Yang, “increasedaccountability for incumbents would appearto carry at least one unambiguous benefit forconstituent welfare: to the extent that incum-bent rulers have a personal interest in main-taining power, their incentives to respond tothe public’s wishes are stronger when the pub-lic can more easily strip them of their power.”11

Unfortunately, voters’ ability to strip incum-bents of their power has steadily eroded overthe past several decades.

Incumbency Advantage

People who hold office enjoy tremendousadvantages in electoral competition. EconomistDavid S. Lee’s empirical analysis found “strik-ing evidence that incumbency has a significantcausal effect of raising the probability of subse-quent electoral success.”12 A number of socialscientists have measured incumbency advan-

2

American representative

government clearly suffers

from the handicap of a

largely uncompetitive

political system.

tage in quantitative terms, thereby providing anunbiased estimate of incumbency advantage. Infederal politics, political scientists AndrewGelman and Gary King found that incumben-cy is worth an 11 percent increase in expectedvote share to the average officeholder.13 Politicalscientists Gary Cox and Scott Morgensternfound a comparable advantage accruing toincumbents at the state level.14

The advantages of incumbency not onlyare important, but their importance has risenover time.15 Over the past 50 years, the per-centage of the vote that a candidate receivessimply for being an incumbent has risen to 11percent from just 2 percent.16 Another mea-sure of this trend is found in the congression-al reelection rate. The reelection rate is not asreliable a measure of the competition problemas is the incumbency advantage measurebecause it is biased somewhat by incumbentchoice, that is, some incumbents do not seekreelection in the face of anticipated defeat, butit is still indicative of a tremendous advantageto incumbents. Over the past 50 years, the con-gressional reelection rate has averaged morethan 90 percent and has gradually risen.17 Thereelection rate for House members has beenabove 90 percent in every election year exceptone since 1976.18 Both the 2000 and 2002 con-gressional elections saw 98.5 percent of Houseincumbents reelected. In 2004, 402 represen-tatives sought reelection; only 7 were defeated.The reelection rate for House incumbents was98.3 percent.

The number of safe congressional seatsgrew significantly over the decade. There arenow close to 400 safe House seats. After elim-inating turnover due to death, poor health,and indictment, one is left with only 1 to 2percent turnover due to electoral defeat. Notonly do incumbents win more often thanthey used to do, but they win by increasinglywide margins. The number of marginal con-gressional districts, that is, districts won byclose vote margins that could be categorizedas competitive, has fallen dramatically overthe past 40 years. Political scientists JamesCampbell and Steve Jurek found that, in thetypical election year between 1956 and 1964,

94 districts were decided by a margin of lessthan 10 percentage points (55 percent to 45percent of the vote or closer).19 From 1966 to1972, the number of marginal districts fell to59. The past three decades saw the number ofmarginal seats fall further. In the 2002 elec-tion, just 38 races had a small victory margin.

In the 1992 election, 65 percent of incum-bents running for reelection won in a land-slide (that is, a victory margin in excess of 20percent).20 In 1998 and 2000, 90 percent ofsuccessful congressional candidates securedat least 55 percent of the popular vote, con-stituting the least competitive elections (withone exception) since 1946. In 2002, nearly 80percent of House races nationwide producedlandslide victories.21

In the first 14 House elections after WorldWar II, one party or another gained an aver-age of 27 seats; in the past 14 elections, theaverage gain was only 16 seats.22 In 2002,nonincumbent challengers defeated just fourHouse incumbents, a modern-day record.23

One in five incumbent representatives isreturned to Capitol Hill following an uncon-tested race in his or her district, that is, one inwhich the incumbent has no major partychallenger. In 2002, 81 incumbents received afree pass back to Congress (Figure 1).24

Incumbency advantage is a concept that isnot lost on the public. A Rasmussen pollfound that 72 percent of Americans agreedwith the statement that “in American elec-tions, members of Congress have unfairadvantages over people who want to runagainst them.”25

Causes of Incumbency Advantage

Some scholars argue that the Americanpolitical system is not malfunctioning; instead,they say, the disproportionate success enjoyedby incumbents in elections reflects what thevoters want. That position is most closely iden-tified with the political scientist John Zaller. Hefleshes out his argument about why incum-bents win reelection at high rates by building

3

Not only doincumbents winmore often thanthey used to do,but they win byincreasingly widemargins.

upon what political scientists Robert S.Erikson and Gerald C. Wright term “electoralselection.”26 According to Zaller, because oftheir manner of selection, incumbency advan-tage reflects the fact that incumbents are sim-ply better politicians than most of their oppo-nents and are therefore usually able to bestthem in electoral combat.27

Are incumbents simply better politiciansthan their challengers? Without question,the average incumbent possesses valuablecommunications, fundraising, and legislativeskills that reflect a longer period of timespent mastering the political arts than theaverage challenger spends. The skills deficitexperienced by the average challenger con-tributes to his or her electoral disadvantage.

Nevertheless, if the electoral playing fieldis indeed fairly even, absent the “better politi-cian” variable we should experience a fargreater number of challenger victories in con-gressional elections. Although a majority ofincumbents may be better politicians thantheir respective challengers, that almost everyincumbent is a far better politician than hisor her challenger is extremely unlikely. Onemust also ask why incumbency advantagehas increased so significantly over the

decades, not simply in terms of less turnoverand higher reelection rates but also in termsof greater margins of victory and fewer parti-san seat gains. For the better politician thesisto hold, today’s average incumbent wouldhave to be vastly better as a politician thanthe average incumbent of yesterday. That isalso highly unlikely.

Public SubsidiesThere are several artificial factors that

directly contribute to the average member ofCongress’s incumbency advantage enteringany given election. Members supply them-selves through public subsidy with signifi-cant resources to pursue reelection. Thoseresources include the congressional frankingprivilege that allows incumbents to floodtheir districts with free mail. Members sendout hundreds of millions of pieces of mailannually that serve to raise their political pro-files.28 Members also employ large adminis-trative and political staffs both on CapitolHill and in their district offices. In 1999,members of Congress had 11,488 full-timestaffers, many of whom focused on helpingconstituents with their problems, therebygenerating support in the home district.29

4

Members ofCongress supply

themselvesthrough public

subsidy with significant

resources to pursue reelection.

0

10

2030

40

50

60

7080

90

100

1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002

Figure 1Uncontested House Races (1982–2002)

Source: Center for Voting and Democracy, http://www.fairvote.com/reports/index.html.

Election Year

Num

ber

Members enjoy unlimited free travel back totheir districts,30 access to the media, free tele-vision studio facilities, and, most recently,free websites for communicating with theelectorate. Of course, members also enjoylawmaking power, including district-specificpork-barrel spending.31 The salary, travel,office, staff, and communication allowancesalone are estimated to be worth more than $1million annually per House member. In addi-tion to being subsidized by taxpayers, thesevote-enhancing instruments share a com-mon origin. Members of Congress awardthemselves these benefits.

RedistrictingRedistricting has evolved into the electoral

instrument that perhaps best serves to protectand strengthen incumbency advantage.Redistricting creates political winners andlosers and, in the process of doing so, literallyreshapes American democracy. Political scien-tist Jonathan Williamson describes redistrict-ing as “both a necessary chore and an electoralopportunity.”32 Consequently, the party orpolitician who controls redistricting has anenormous electoral advantage.33 In general,redistricting plans tend to focus on incum-bency protection and partisan gain, or both.When one party controls the redistrictingprocess, that party endeavors to draw districtlines in ways that favor its candidates.34 Thatform of redistricting is known as gerryman-dering, that is, the redrawing of electoral dis-tricts to favor one political party over another.

Partisan gerrymanders are very effective inincreasing a party’s share of legislative seats.35

The creation of so-called safe districts allowsthe two major parties to work together tominimize their respective election risks. Theminority party usually prefers a level of cer-tainty regarding its base number of legislativeseats. To the extent that political partiescooperate and compromise with each other,the redistricting process has degeneratedinto a conspiracy against competitive elec-tions, undermining the fundamental notionof representation. This anti-competitivetrend led economist Randall Holcombe to

conclude that “political markets are dividedin the same way that cartels would dividemarkets in order to make each member amonopolist in his own territory to helpenforce the cartel agreement.”36

In many states, gerrymandering may be amore serious problem today than it has everbeen in American history.37 Representativedemocracy is a system of government wherebycitizens control the government through theirchosen representatives. In the United States,however, political representatives increasinglychoose those they will represent, as electionresults tend to be predetermined by gerryman-dering. Even politicians such as Tom Davis (R-VA) say that it used to be the voters who chosethe politicians. Now the politicians choose thevoters. Therefore, redistricting has importantconsequences for the health of the Americanpolitical system. Under a system of gerryman-dered districts, the health of American democra-cy is at risk. Gerrymandering diminishes votersovereignty over elections.38 Partisan legislativegerrymandering severely undermines electoralcompetitiveness, arguably to the point of violat-ing the Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause,as it consigns electoral majorities to minoritystatus on the basis of their political views.39

Scholarship at the state level finds that partisanredistricting actually harms the quality of repre-sentation in state legislatures.40

Thanks to increasingly sophisticated gerry-mandering, the redistricting process makes itharder for newcomers to run for officebecause it strengthens the advantages incum-bents already enjoy. The redistricting thatoccurred in 2001 and 2002 will predeterminemost election outcomes for the rest of thisdecade. Following the 2000 census, the twomajor parties carved up the national politicalmap into a few hundred political fiefdomswith the help of computer programs thatallow parties to design, with pinpoint accura-cy, advantageous districts.41 Political scientistsRichard Forgette and Glenn Platt documenthow “partisan balance nationwide, a decline indistrict level competitiveness, and ideologicalpolarization among House members signifi-cantly raises the political impact of small

5

Even politicianssuch as TomDavis (R-VA) saythat it used to be the voters whochose the politicians. Nowthe politicianschoose the voters.

increases in partisan bias.”42 Consequently,many more congressional races became non-competitive affairs. The 2002 electoral battle-ground was smaller than ever, as only 30 to 45seats were truly competitive,43 compared with121 seats a decade earlier.44 Of the few dozencompetitive seats, only 11 were toss-up con-tests that either party could just as easily win,down from 44 in 1992 (see Figure 2).45 Theinfluential congressional prognosticatorCharles E. Cook Jr. notes:

Perhaps most alarming about thisdecline in competition is that, typically,greater competition and turnover char-acterize the first couple of congression-al elections after redistricting. Then leg-islators settle into their new districtsand the level of competition goes downuntil new maps are drawn. If the com-petition is this low in the first electionafter a redistricting, imagine what it willbe like by 2008 and 2010.46

Observing the state of California, for exam-ple, one is struck by the fact that the nation’slargest delegation to the House—53 seats—hadonly one competitive race (in the 18th District)

in 2002. That contest occurred only because ofDemocratic state representative Dennis Car-doza’s primary defeat of disgraced seven-termRep. Gary Condit, scandal-tarred by the inves-tigation of the disappearance and murder ofChandra Levy, Condit’s former intern.

Today, the average House incumbent facesa more competitive party primary than gener-al election contest.47 The more notable battlesin 2002 occurred within four primary elec-tions in each of which two incumbents of thesame party battled one another in primarycompetition. Across the country, according toRob Richie, executive director of the Center forVoting and Democracy, in practice “the onlyway you can lose a seat that’s safe is by losing aprimary.”48 According to voting expert DanJohnson-Weinberger, national field directorfor the center, “a lot of states are drawing outcompetitive districts. This might make forinteresting primaries . . . but it makes for coro-nations in the general elections.”49

Because of gerrymandering, almost 90percent of Americans live in congressionaldistricts where the outcome is so certain thattheir votes are irrelevant.50 Consequently, ger-rymandering contributes to the removal of apotentially meaningful vote from tens of mil-

6

Almost 90 percentof Americans livein congressional

districts wherethe outcome is so certain that their

votes are irrelevant.

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

450

Races with onecandidate strongly

favored

Races leaning towardone party

Toss-up races

1992 2002

Figure 2Competitiveness in House Races , 1992 vs. 2002

Source: Cook Political Report, May 1992 and May 2002 surveys.

Num

ber

lions of Americans.51 As long as gerryman-dering is permitted, control over redistrictingwill have more influence on election out-comes than any other factor, including voterpreferences.

Gerrymandering has helped the membersof the U.S. House to become a political aris-tocracy. However, the problem of politiciansusing redistricting to create safe seats is notlimited to the U.S. House. At the state level, theproblem is equally disconcerting. Althoughsafe seats typically feature a token partisanopponent, some seats are so safe that it is futilefor anyone to bother. Of the roughly 6,000state legislative seats filled every two yearsnationwide, about 40 percent feature a race inwhich only one party fields a candidate.52

Given that partisan change is unlikely within adistrict, changes in the ideological intensity ofthe parties themselves can have a significantimpact on policy outcomes.

Campaign Finance Regulation What can be done to stop the trend toward

near-universal “safe seats”? Can we increasethe amount of competition in the political sys-tem? This section examines the impact thatspecific campaign finance regulations havehad, and can be expected to have, on ourincreasingly uncompetitive political system.

Regulations on campaign finance areostensibly designed to prevent corruption orthe appearance of corruption in the politicalprocess, but a consequence of such regula-tions may be a reduction in the competitive-ness of elections. Campaign finance regula-tions place limits on the manner in whichcandidates and parties acquire contributions,the size of those donations, and the way inwhich they are spent in pursuit of electoralsuccess. Such restrictions affect the competi-tive balance between incumbents and chal-lengers (and potential challengers) in bothpredictable and unpredictable ways.

Most campaign finance regulators professto believe American politics should havemore competition. Contrary to the regula-tors’ wishes and forecasts, however, as wehave seen, the incumbent advantage problem

has grown worse since the passage of the firstpackage of comprehensive campaign financeregulations in 1974.

Two decades later, under the provisions ofthe Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of2002, soft money donations to the nationalparties were prohibited, the limit on hardmoney donations was increased to $2,000,and severe constraints were placed uponindependent political advertising. Those pro-visions collectively constitute the most sig-nificant changes to campaign finance lawsince the Watergate era. Thanks to the reten-tion of contribution limits, the ban on softmoney, and new regulations affecting inde-pendent advertising, the latest attempt toregulate political behavior will almost cer-tainly prove equally unsuccessful at fosteringpolitical competition.53

Contribution Limits. A person may cur-rently donate up to $2,000 to a congression-al candidate.54 That is a “hard money” contri-bution; the candidate may use it directly forhis own campaign. Such limits on contribu-tions to candidates were designed to ensurean uneven campaign playing field that favorsthe incumbent.55 Extensive scholarship byGary Jacobson and other political scientistsconfirms what politicians recognize at firstglance: it is difficult for a challenger to oustan incumbent unless the former spends atleast as much as, and probably more than,the latter during the campaign period.56 Onlyby spending large sums on television adver-tising, direct mail solicitations, and grass-roots organization can a challenger developthe levels of name recognition, issue identifi-cation, and voter mobilization needed tocatch up with the years (frequently decades)of subsidized campaigning and pork-barrelspending that characterize an incumbent’sterms in office.

Under the rhetorical guise of warding offunspecified corruption, an incumbent is happyto limit himself to $2,000 donations. Certainly,he may detest the phone calls he has to makeand the fundraising breakfasts, lunches, anddinners he has to attend. But at night he sleepswell in the knowledge that his challenger back

7

A consequence ofcampaign financeregulations maybe a reduction inthe competitive-ness of elections.

home must do the same (more, if the challengeris serious about winning) without, in mostcases, a comparable network of contacts,donors, and lobbyists whose longstanding col-lective investment in the incumbent’s careerensures their continuing financial commit-ment. Hence, incumbent politicians raise, onaverage, two to three times the amount of cam-paign contributions that their challengers do.57

For example, political action committees(PACs) contribute nearly eight times moremoney to incumbents than to challengers.58 Aspolitical scientist James Campbell has noted,there is considerable evidence to suggest thatthe fundraising advantage has made a highlysignificant contribution to the incumbencyadvantage in recent decades.59

In practice, contribution limits are simplypolitical price controls, and, as such, they areboth ineffective and costly.60 Contribution lim-its have three negative consequences. First, con-tribution limits raise the costs of fundraisingabove what they would be with no limits.Without contribution limits, challengers wouldraise money relatively quickly as many wouldreceive very large contributions from a smallnumber of contributors. Incumbents, by con-trast, thrive under contribution limits becausethey are fully adapted to the regulations. Theypossess the enormous advantage of a perpetualfundraising organization that solicits relativelysmall contributions from a very large numberof predominantly longstanding donors.Second, contribution limits greatly reduce thelikelihood that a challenger will successfullyoust an incumbent; that reduces competitionbelow the level necessary for a healthy politicalsystem. Third, this boon to incumbency advan-tage makes candidate recruitment much hard-er. Such long odds against success provide anenormous disincentive for qualified, successfulpeople to put themselves forward as candidatesin the first place, thereby reducing the quality ofthe pool of potential challengers and would-besuccessors should—by scandal, death, or resig-nation—an incumbent fail to gain or seekreelection.61

Soft Money Ban. The ban on soft moneyfundraising by the national parties may be

expected to make future elections even moreuncompetitive.62 In general, banning softmoney tips the scales further toward incum-bents. To overcome an incumbent’s advan-tage, a challenger must raise significant sumsof money. Challengers who defeat Houseincumbents raise, on average, well over $1million.63 The new regulations will make itharder for parties to support challengers tothe extent necessary for them to competewith an incumbent. Without the necessaryparty resources pouring into targeted dis-tricts, serious challengers will threaten fewerincumbents, thereby further reducing politi-cal competition.

Recent scholarship suggests that weaken-ing the role of parties in campaigns under-mines electoral competition. While interestgroups and individual donors tend to favorincumbents, parties give disproportionatelyto challengers because they want to maxi-mize their share of seats in a legislature.64

Both major parties use soft money toincrease the competitiveness of individualcongressional races. A 2000 analysis showsthat PACs tend to donate to incumbentswhile parties concentrate equally on vulnera-ble incumbents and credible challengers.65 Inclose races, a soft money ban makes a chal-lenger’s life more difficult than it already was.Jacobson’s study of congressional electionsindicates that any loss of campaign fundshits challengers especially hard at the polls,compounding the problems caused by limitson party contributions.66

The argument that the new campaignfinance regulations may reduce the competi-tiveness of elections is buttressed by state-level experience. Many states have enactedregulations on campaign finance, includinglimits on how much can be given to politicalparties. Political scientists’ fears of dampen-ing political competition by limiting the roleof parties are justified. A close analysis ofthose state limits shows that restrictions onhow much parties can raise and contribute totheir nominees hinder the ability of candi-dates, especially those in close races, to raisemoney.

8

The ban on softmoney may be

expected to makefuture elections

even moreuncompetitive.

Political scientists Thad Kousser and RayLaRaja analyzed the effects of campaignfinance regulations on the competitiveness ofstate elections.67 Pursuing electoral success effi-ciently leads parties to contribute to challengersin competitive districts if the challengers have achance of winning.68 Kousser and LaRaja used arepresentative sample of 15 states and analyzeddonations to 2,234 candidates, all of whom ranfor contested seats during 1996. They foundthat limits on how much parties can raise andcontribute to their nominees do not penalizeincumbents as harshly as they do challengers,since sitting lawmakers can attract more moneyfrom interest groups and individual donors.Because current officeholders begin with abroader fundraising base, and because cam-paign dollars yield decreasing returns, any lossin contributions caused by limits on partieshurts incumbents less. Most important, thosefundraising obstacles, which are attributable tostate regulatory limits on party activity, reducethe vote totals of challengers, thereby reducingthe competitiveness of elections. Therefore,Kousser and LaRaja argue that restrictions onparty activity to prevent corruption should becarefully weighed against the costs to politicalcompetition.

Regulated Advertising. The new federal cam-paign finance regulations protect incumbentsfrom criticism during general elections by ban-ning advocacy paid for by contributions aboveFederal Election Campaign Act limits. The newrestrictions on “electioneering communica-tions” by independent groups will further ham-per the efforts of the average challenger. Mediasupporters of campaign finance regulationdecry independent advertising campaigns,referring to them as ads for “sham”69 or“phony” issues.70 Sen. John McCain (R-AZ)campaigned in favor of new campaign financeregulation in part to rid our election-time air-waves of such “misleading issue ads.” Those adsare produced by special interest groups, such asthe National Rifle Association, the NationalRight to Life Committee, Planned Parenthood,and the Sierra Club—that is, private groups vol-untarily supported by millions of ordinaryAmericans.

Overall, independent advertising campaignsare disproportionately critical of incumbents.Those campaigns generally are funded by andrepresent the views of individuals and groupsrepresenting business, labor, or single-issueinterests that are organized in opposition to aparticular candidate or a current or proposedpiece of legislation. Generally, those groups dis-proportionately advertise against someone orsomething, They advertise their frustrationswith the voting record of particular elected offi-cials, warning their respective memberships(and potentially sympathetic segments of theelectorate) about the likelihood of “more of thesame,” performance wise, if a given incumbentreceives another electoral endorsement.

In sharp contrast, the legislation doesnothing to further limit PAC money, whichgoes overwhelmingly to incumbents.71 Until1996, proponents of campaign finance legisla-tion had focused their energies on eliminatingor sharply restricting the role of PACs.72

Ironically, during the final 60 days of generalelection campaigns in the future, the channel-ing of third-party advertising through PACs,paid for only in hard money donations, willincrease the number of PACs and the prolifer-ation of PAC-run microcampaigns.

The cumulative effect of the loss of softmoney and constraints on independent adver-tising will be to reduce political competitionby limiting information.73 Therefore, evenfewer candidates will step forward to challengeincumbents in the first place, thereby furtherreducing political choice.

Public Financing. Advocates of publicfinancing argue that America’s privatelyfinanced political system breeds uncompeti-tiveness. Those advocates maintain that evermore regulation and greater public subsidiescombined with voluntary spending limits(spending limits are unconstitutional unlesspaired with public financing) will producemore competition than the current systemdoes or a deregulated system would.

Public financing would allegedly overcomeexisting barriers to entry into politics by pro-viding challengers with a predictable source offunding. However, the empirical record sug-

9

Restrictions onparty activity to prevent corruptionshould be carefully weighedagainst the coststo political competition.

gests that public financing programs do notenhance electoral competition. Political scien-tists Michael Malbin and Thomas Gais’sresearch on assorted public financing efforts atthe state level found no evidence that publicfinancing increases electoral competition.Their study concluded, “There is no evidenceto support the claim that programs combiningpublic funding with spending limits have lev-eled the playing field, countered the effects ofincumbency, and made elections more com-petitive.”74 As my colleague John Samples hasobserved, believing that public financing willincrease competitiveness constitutes the tri-umph of hope over experience.75

Presidential Public Financing with SpendingLimits. The public financing of presidentialelections has not spurred electoral competitionin either the primaries or the general elec-tions.76 Proponents of public financing arguethat the number of candidates who haveaccepted public money and run in primariesindicates that it enhances competition. In fact,that proves nothing about the effects of publicfinancing on electoral competition. Samples’sanalysis of data on candidates in the presiden-tial general elections and primaries for sevenelections before and after the inception of pub-lic financing found that the presidential publicfunding system had no effect on candidateentry in the primaries or the general election.

Public presidential funding may be creditedwith three additional presidential campaignsin seven general elections (those of JohnAnderson in 1980, H. Ross Perot in 1996, andRalph Nader in 2000). In comparison, the pri-vate system in place prior to 1976 producedfour serious candidates, apart from the majorparty candidates, in the previous seven generalelections. Therefore, American taxpayers spent$153 million to support presidential generalelection campaigns, an investment that hasyielded one candidate fewer than the privatesystem of financing it replaced. In addition, thedata suggest that introducing public financingmight have led to fewer primary candidatesafter 1976.

State-Level Public Financing. The record atthe state level is no more promising as judged

by the experience of Maine, a state on the cut-ting edge of the national movement to restruc-ture campaign finance through public financ-ing of political candidates. On November 5,1996, voters passed the Maine Clean ElectionAct by ballot initiative. That was the first pieceof state or federal legislation to offer publicfinancing to state-level candidates who volun-tarily accept spending limits and refuse privatecontributions. The legislation applied to statesenate and house candidates beginning withthe 2000 primary and general election cam-paigns. The success or failure of Maine’s exper-iment may significantly influence the fortunesof comparable campaign finance restructur-ing efforts at both the state and federal levels.Many proponents of public financing main-tain that the so-called Maine plan should serveas a blueprint for national campaign financeregulation.

An empirical analysis of the results of the1998 and 2000 Maine state elections showsthat the adoption of public financing for the2000 election did not result in a substantial-ly more competitive election than occurredunder private funding in 1998.77 Reformerspredicted enhanced electoral competition asa result of “clean election” reforms, but theevidence for Maine implies the opposite.Comparison of districts that had “clean” can-didates in 2000 with those that did not indi-cates that the “clean” districts displayed noimprovement on two of three dimensions ofelectoral competitiveness, and actually per-formed far worse on a third. Specifically,“clean” districts exhibited no significant dif-ference in victory margins or in contested-ness (the frequency with which candidateswere unopposed) relative to “nonclean” dis-tricts. In the case of openness (the tendencyof incumbents to run), “clean” districts werefar more likely to have incumbents runningin 2000 and far more likely to have switchedfrom an open race in 1998 to one in which anincumbent was running in 2000.

That analysis of the Maine election sup-ports the following conclusions: the overallaverage margin of victory in both state senateand house races declined by a statistically

10

Public financingprograms do notenhance electoral

competition.

insignificant margin; races for open seatsthat featured publicly financed candidatesdo not clearly show that taxpayer financingleads to more competitive elections; and,despite limits on campaign spending byincumbents, the advantages of holding officewere almost impossible to overcome.

Arizona’s experience with public financingtells a story similar story to Maine’s. Comparedwith the general election of 1996, ten 1998Arizona house races saw an increase in thenumber of candidates while eight saw adecrease. In the senate, eight races had morecandidates while seven had fewer candidatesrunning. However, that marginal increase incompetition should not be credited to publicfinancing. Term limits played a role in openingseats and fostering competition. Five of theeight senate races with more candidates than in1996 involved seats opened up by term limits.78

At the state level, the lesson is that evidenceto date does not support the proposition thatpublic financing leads to more political com-petition. Instead of making incumbents morevulnerable to challenge, public financing hashelped to entrench incumbents, diminishingelectoral competition.

Fostering Political Competition

In their respective guises, campaign financeregulation and public financing have notimproved political competition. In the past,campaign finance restrictions and taxpayer-subsidized elections have generated unintend-ed and unanticipated consequences. The mostrecent regulatory round is no exception to thisrule. Is it possible to identify other reforminstruments that could more plausibly inject amodicum of competition into the Americanpolitical system?

Redistricting ReformAs soon as congressional districts were intro-

duced, the controversy about how to designthem began.79 Contemporary congressionalredistricting efforts fall into three categories: the

use of partisan panels or commissions, the useof nonpartisan or bipartisan commissions orpanels, and the delegation of responsibility tothe state legislature.80 In 42 states, redistricting isthe domain of the state legislature and the gov-ernor with legislators having the final say.Therefore, as political scientist JonathanWinburn details, “Control of redistricting is fun-damentally a legislative action open to manipu-lation for partisan gain.”81

In three states (Iowa, Indiana, andConnecticut), redistricting panels draw themaps for congressional districts and submitthem to the legislatures for approval. Iowaassigns redistricting to its nonpartisanLegislative Service Bureau, a professional body.In seven states (Alaska, Delaware, Montana,North Dakota, South Dakota, Vermont, andWyoming), special commissions both drawand approve the maps. A significantly largernumber of states use independent commis-sions to redraw state legislative district lines.82

Electoral instruments such as redistrictingserve to protect incumbents. Subjective criteriawill always be the victim of manipulation.Redistricting that is favorable to one group isequally injurious to others. Unfortunately, thereare no easy solutions to the problem. Neverthe-less, removing politicians’ control over redistrict-ing and using objective redistricting criteria canhelp to lessen the problem. Redistricting reform isabout moving in the direction of less malleable,more objective criteria.

To make elections somewhat more compet-itive, at least initially after redistricting, it maybe necessary to use nonpartisan or bipartisancommissions or panels. Unlike most democra-cies, most American states place redistrictingauthority in the hands of politicians ratherthan an independent commission, such as theUnited Kingdom’s Boundaries Commission.83

Partisan control of redistricting presents a seri-ous threat to the health of the American demo-cratic system.84 By contrast, according to polit-ical scientists Brian Schaffner, MichaelWagner, and Jonathan Winburn, “When statesuse bipartisan or nonpartisan redistrictingmethods, the majority party tends to gain littlethrough the process, and often that party loses

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Partisan controlof redistrictingpresents a seriousthreat to thehealth of theAmerican democratic system.

seats.”85 Typically, bipartisan commissionmembers include the attorney general, secre-tary of state, or members appointed by the gov-ernor or legislative leaders. Political scientistMark E. Rush finds that a nonpartisan redis-tricting procedure can “remove the prima faciebasis for challenging a redistricting plan asbeing predatory.”86

The preference for a diminution of parti-san control has an intellectual lineage datingto the country’s founding. Historian MaxFarrand recounts that, “James Madison . . .espoused the concerns of legislative controlover popular sovereignty in his writings andspeeches around the time of the FederalConstitutional Convention. Madison trustedthe ‘normal process of representation’ in sit-uations where representatives share a com-mon interest with their constituents, not onein which they ‘have a personal interest dis-tinct from that of their constituents’.”87

According to the Madison Proviso, “nodemocratic institution should have the finalauthority to determine the rules or settle thedisputes about its own membership.”88

Iowa’s professionalized approach to redis-tricting may demonstrate that politics can belargely, if not entirely, removed from theredistricting process.89 Four of the state’s fivecongressional districts were potentially com-petitive in the first election after redistricting,which is a far higher degree of political com-petition than exists in other states.

It may also be necessary to adopt and rigid-ly apply additional objective criteria. Compact-ness is the most obvious criterion missingfrom current redistricting. Political scientistsRichard Forgette and Glenn Platt recommendthat districts be composed of a tightly definedarea. The presumption is that representativesand constituents may find it easier to interactand communicate with each other in a com-pactly shaped district. A stringent compactnessstandard may significantly constrain electoralmanipulation.90 Before the 2010 census, redis-tricting software may have the ability to create,evaluate, and compare a sufficiently largenumber of redistricting alternatives to ensurethat the most compact plan is found.

Currently, software programs are effective atevaluating alternative plans. They should beused to apply a compactness measurementmethod. Then, the redistricting commissionshould be mandated to select and implementthe most compact plan.

In determining the most viable path toreforming the redistricting process, it may beadvantageous to make the most of federalismto encourage experimentation at the statelevel. A state-by-state approach to resolvingthe redistricting issue and curing gerryman-dering-related abuses could involve the citizeninitiative petition process in those states thatemploy this direct instrument of democracy.In practice, that would entail giving the votersthe authority to approve district maps.91 Forexample, in 2000 public concern over theincreasingly uncompetitive nature of Arizonaelections led voters in that state to approve atthe ballot box the creation of an independent,five-member, bipartisan commission to drawcongressional and state legislative districtlines.

Liberalization of Campaign FinanceAmerica’s campaign finance system, though

based on private contributions, is far from freeof government intervention and subsidy. Sincethe early 1970s, federal law has heavily regulat-ed all campaigns and elections, includingHouse contests. Nevertheless, House reelectionrates have continued to climb. Therefore, com-plaints about competition may be better direct-ed at that regulated system.

At the very least, the heavily regulated sta-tus quo has coincided with the problem ofincumbency advantage. Given that neitherlimits on contributions and spending norpublic financing have proven themselvescapable of enhancing political competition,perhaps assistance may come in the form offewer, rather than greater, constraints on therole of money in electoral politics.

The liberalization of the campaignfinance system would probably result inmore campaign spending. The absence ofcontribution limits would permit wealthyAmericans to donate far larger sums to their

12

Resolving the redistrictingissue and curing

gerrymandering-related abuses

could entail giving the votersthe authority toapprove district

maps.

preferred candidates and parties. Spendingmore, rather than less, money on campaignsmay be good for America’s political health.The criticism that there is too much spend-ing ignores the positive contribution thatcampaign spending makes to our representa-tive democracy.92

Higher campaign spending on more cam-paign literature, political advertising, andgrassroots activity to register, identify, andmobilize voters may produce both an elec-torate that is better informed about politicsand a politics that is more competitive. A bet-ter informed electorate and increased politicalcompetition are worthy goals for a representa-tive democracy. Higher campaign spendingmay make both goals more attainable.

The unintended and unforeseen conse-quences of the newest constraints on politi-cal speech serve only to further the journey ofAmerican political campaigning down a pathseemingly anathema to the stated desires ofthe leading campaign finance regulators.Perhaps it is time to stop looking to regula-tions to rescue our political system.

Term LimitsIn addition to campaign finance liberal-

ization, the expansion of term limits to thecongressional level in tandem with reform ofthe congressional redistricting process wouldlikely point the nation’s political system in amore competitive direction.

Skepticism about and distaste for politicalcareerism are central to the American experi-ence.93 Nonetheless, careerism flourishes be-cause incumbents are virtually certain to bereelected, largely because of the inherent advan-tages of holding office. Therefore, the effort tolimit the duration of terms in elective office con-stitutes, in large measure, an attempt to over-come the costs of the incumbency advantage.94

A tradition of voluntary retirement after onlyone or two terms in the U.S. House ofRepresentatives lasted until nearly the end of the19th century.95 From 1830 to 1850, turnover inthe U.S. House averaged 51.5 percent. After theCivil War, legislative tenure gained new impor-tance when the introduction of the seniority

principle for congressional committee member-ship changed the dynamics of obtaining leader-ship positions.96 Consequently, between 1860and 1920 U.S. House members’ average tenureincreased from four to eight years and has con-tinued to rise ever since. The average Housemember currently serves for 13.2 years.

Careerism poses several problems for our sys-tem of representative democracy. Careerist legis-lators have become a political class attentive totheir own interests. In the view of conservativecolumnist George F. Will, “Term limits are need-ed as an auxiliary precaution against the peren-nial lust for power,”97 as “careerism is the sharedcreed of Democrats and Republicans.”98

One of the most effective ways to level thepolitical playing field and mandate frequentlegislative turnover would be to limit congres-sional terms through the passage of a consti-tutional amendment.99 At present, 75 percentof Americans live under term limits at thestate or local level, or both. Congressionalterm limits would immediately reduce the bar-riers to entry to federal politics. That is, termlimits would produce more open seats, whereno incumbent runs. As the long odds againstousting an incumbent deter better-qualifiedpotential candidates from running for office,the term limits experience at the state levelsuggests that congressional term limits wouldattract a different kind of candidate and, con-sequently, would provide far more citizen leg-islators, that is, people who are not profes-sional politicians.100

Term limits have made state and local elec-tions much more competitive.101 As expected,turnover rates have increased. On average,term-limited legislatures have lost a third oftheir pre-term-limits incumbents.102 The num-ber of special elections increased as term-limit-ed incumbents left office early to take private-sector positions or to begin campaigning forother offices. In 2004, term limits prevented261 legislators in 12 states from seeking reelec-tion. The projected tendency of lame duck,term-limited legislators to shirk their dutiesappears to be mitigated by the fact that termlimits may “merely focus the reelection goals oflegislators on other offices. Legislators might

13

It is time to stoplooking to regulations torescue our political system.

attempt to move up to statewide office, run forcongressional seats, or even drop down from alegislature’s upper house to its lower cham-ber.”103 As economists John R. Lott Jr. andKermit Daniel explain:

Making the date that incumbents leaveoffice more certain encourages the entryby challengers even before the seatbecomes vacant, if only to be better posi-tioned once the incumbent does leave. . . .Term limits may thus make electionsmore competitive even before politiciansfind them binding.104

Traditionally, incumbents have been able toinsulate themselves from serious competition.However, experience at the state level suggeststhat voter choice is increased by term limits.Under term limits, far more people are runningfor elective office, with record numbers of candi-dates in such disparate states as Arkansas,Michigan, and Oklahoma. Political scientistRichard Powell found increased competition forU.S. House seats where state legislators are termlimited.105 Political scientists Wayne Francis andLawrence Kenney found a comparable increasein competition for state senate seats.106

Since the introduction of term limits in1994, California has experienced relativelycrowded, competitive state primaries and gen-eral elections. Impending term limits serve as astimulus to political competition. Theprospective imposition of term limits on theCalifornia state legislature more than doubledvoluntary turnover (from 11 to 25 percent) intwo years.107 In California the average turnoverrate between 1972 and 1992 was 20 percent inthe state assembly and 12 percent in the statesenate. Since 1990 the assembly’s turnoverrate has grown to 36 percent and the senate’sturnover rate has risen to 17 percent.108

Political scientist Stanley M. Caress found a 20percent increase in the number of voluntaryretirements and an increase in the number ofspecial elections from an average of 1 per yearbetween 1980 and 1989 to an average of 10 peryear between 1990 and 1993.109 The imposi-tion of state-level term limits in 1990 led to a

1992 increase of more than 25 percent in can-didate filings for the state senate and morethan 50 percent for the state assembly. Lottand Daniel concluded that

California’s legislative term limits . . .races have become closer contests andmore candidates are running for office.By any measure, term limits have coin-cided with large changes in the level ofpolitical competition. . . . The changesare so large that more incumbents arebeing defeated, races are closer, morecandidates are running, and fewer singlecandidate races occur than at any othertime during our sample period.110

Term limits were also relatively effective atopening up Maine’s electoral process to greatercompetition. The state’s term limits also cameinto effect in 1996 and caused a 40 percentturnover of the state legislature, an institutionthat prior to term limits had featured turnoverin the 25 to 30 percent range. Interestingly,newly competitive seats benefited more fromthe introduction of term limits than from theintroduction of taxpayer financing.111 InColorado, in the term-limited state senate elec-tions, the number of candidates per seat was 35percent higher than in the non-term-limitedstate senate races.112 In Michigan, 67 of 110 statehouse legislators ended their final terms in1998; 64 new legislators entered the state housefollowing the 1998 elections.113 In the South,half of the 100-seat Arkansas state houseopened up in 1998 as a result of the 1992 termlimits law.114 Meanwhile, Florida’s term limitscame into effect in 2000. Consequently, 55 of120 state House members and 11 of 40 statesenators were term limited out of office. Duringthe 1992–2000 electoral cycles, Floridiansobserved an unusually high number of long-time incumbents either retire or run for higheroffice. On November 7, 2000, Florida’s voterselected first-time legislators to 52.5 percent ofstate house seats.115 Ohio’s term limits also didnot come into effect until 2000. Ohio’s March2000 primary slate was the most crowded in 20years with an uncharacteristically high number

14

Elected officialsshould be

disconnectedfrom campaign—

and election—rulemaking and regulation.

of nominations unresolved until primary day.116

Seventy percent of Ohio state house membersand 79 percent of state senators were term limit-ed out of office. Prior to term limits, turnover inOhio ranged from 15 to 20 percent.117

Unsurprisingly, a bipartisan majority ofincumbent politicians continues to opposeterm limits. A survey by the Council of StateGovernments found 76 percent of politiciansopposed to term limits.118 Term limits fore-shadow electoral changes that are unsettlingfor career politicians. Incumbents fully appre-ciate that, absent term limits, it is unlikely thatthe currents of public opinion will rock thecareerist politicians’ electoral ship.

Term limits advance representative democra-cy by guaranteeing the regular turnover of politi-cians in and out of office. Without term limits,the average challenger finds it extremely difficultand expensive to overcome the inherent advan-tages of incumbency. This remedial measureremains overwhelmingly popular and appearseffective at fostering political competition.

Conclusion

American representative government suffersfrom the handicap of a largely uncompetitivepolitical system. Current redistricting and cam-paign regulatory practices, in tandem with pub-licly financed careerism, have significantly nega-tive consequences for the health of the politicalsystem. Therefore, changes in the manner inwhich districts are designed, campaigns arefunded, and politicians are tenured need seriousconsideration. In short, elected officials shouldbe disconnected from campaign—and election—rule making and regulation. There will not be animprovement in political competition until theincumbent fox ends his tenure as guardian of thedemocratic henhouse.

Notes1. Terence Ball, ed., The Federalist: With Letters of Brutus(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p.305.

2. Richard Forgette and Glenn Platt, “Redistricting

Principles, Processes and Incumbency Protection,”paper presented at the Midwest Political ScienceAssociation annual meeting, Chicago, April 15–18,2004, p. 15.

3. For a more thorough examination of the prob-lem, see John Samples and Patrick Basham,“Election 2002 and the Problems of AmericanDemocracy,” Cato Institute Policy Analysis no.451, September 5, 2002, pp. 6–10.

4. Cited in Doug Bandow, “Real Term Limits: NowMore Than Ever,” Cato Institute Policy Analysis no.221, March 28, 1995, p. 7, http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-221.html.

5. Ross K. Baker, “Why Your Vote Often Means SoLittle,” Los Angeles Times, March 18, 2002, http://www.mail-archive.com/election-methods-list@eskimo.com/msg07462.html.

6. Albert R. Hunt, “Don’t Stop at McCain-Feingold,”Wall Street Journal, February 21, 2002, p. A19.

7. See George F. Will, “The Improving Case for TermLimits,” Washington Post, June 18, 1992, p. A23; andAlexander Tabarrok, “A Survey, Critique, and NewDefense of Term Limits,” Cato Journal 14 (1994):333–50, http://www.cato.org/pubs/journal/cjv14n2-9.html.

8. Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy(New York: Harper & Row, 1957).

9. See Kim Fridkin Kahn and Patrick J. Kenney, TheSpectacle of U.S. Senate Campaigns (Princeton, NJ:Princeton University Press, 1999); and Raymond E.Wolfinger and Steven J. Rosenstone, Who Votes?(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1980).

10. Jack Dennis, “Groups and Political Behavior:Legitimation, Deprivation, and Competing Values,”Political Behavior 9 (1987): 323–73; and Edward G.Carmines, “Political Issues, Party Alignments,Spatial Models, and the Post–New Deal PartySystem,” in New Perspectives on American Politics, ed.Lawrence C. Dodd and Calvin Jillson (Washington:CQ Press, 1994).

11. Pranab Bardham and Tsung-Tao Yang, “PoliticalCompetition in Economic Perspective,” Institute ofBusiness and Economic Research, paper E04-341,2004, http://repositories.cdlib.org/iber/econ/E04-341.

12. David S. Lee, “The Electoral Advantage toIncumbency and Voters’ Valuation of Politicians’Experience: A Regression Discontinuity Analysis ofElections to the U.S.,” National Bureau of EconomicResearch, Working Paper no. 8441, August 2001,Abstract.

13. Andrew Gelman and Gary King, “Systematic

15

Consequences of Incumbency Advantage in USHouse Elections,” American Journal of PoliticalScience 35 (1991): 110–38.

14. Gary Cox and Scott Morgenstern, “TheIncreasing Advantage of Incumbency in the USStates,” Legislative Studies Quarterly 20 (1993):495–514. See also David Breaux and Malcolm Jewell,“Winning Big: The Incumbency Advantage in StateLegislative Races,” in Changing Patterns in StateLegislative Careers, ed. Gary F. Moncrief and Joel A.Thompson (Ann Arbor: University of MichiganPress), 1992, pp. 87–105.

15. See, for example, Robert S. Erikson, “TheAdvantage of Incumbency in CongressionalElections,” Polity 3 (1971): 395–405; David Mayhew,Congress: The Electoral Connection (New Haven, CT:Yale University Press, 1974); John R. Alford and JohnR. Hibbing, “Increased Incumbency Advantage inthe House,” Journal of Politics (1981); James Campbell,“The Return of the Incumbents: The Nature of theIncumbent Advantage,” Western Political Quarterly 36(1983); L. Sandy Maisel, “The Incumbency Advan-tage,” in Money, Elections and Democracy, ed. M. L.Nugent and J. R. Johannes (Boulder, CO: Westview,1990), pp. 119–42; and W. R. Reed and D. E.Schansberg, “The Behavior of Congressional Tenureover Time: 1953–1991,” Public Choice 73 (1991):182–203.

16. Steven Ansolabehere, Charles Stewart III, andJames M. Snyder Jr., “Old Voters, New Voters, andthe Personal Vote,” American Journal of PoliticalScience 44 (2000), p. 17.

17. John Harwood, “No Contests: House IncumbentsTap Census, Software to Get a Lock on Seats,” WallStreet Journal, June 19, 2002, p. A8.

18. Norman J. Ornstein, Thomas E. Mann, andMichael J. Malbin, Vital Statistics on Congress1999–2000 (Washington: American EnterprisePress, 2000), pp. 57–58.

19. James E. Campbell and Steve J. Jurek, “The Declineof Competition and Change in CongressionalElections,” in Congress Responds to the Twentieth Century,ed. Sunil Ahuja and Robert Dewhirst (Columbus:Ohio State University Press, 2003), chap. 3.

20. Cited in Forgette and Platt, p. 14.

21. Cited in Samples and Basham, p. 8. See alsoSam Hirsch, “The United States House ofUnrepresentatives: What Went Wrong in the LatestRound of Congressional Redistricting,” ElectionLaw Journal 2 (2003): 179–216 (Table 1).

22. Harwood, p. A8.

23. Cited in Robert Pack, “Land Grab: The Pros and

Cons of Congressional Redistricting,” WashingtonLawyer, April 2004, p. 25.

24. Cited in Samples and Basham, p. 8. See alsoHirsch.

25. Rasmussen poll, cited in James C. Miller III,“Incumbents’ Advantage,” Citizens for a SoundEconomy Foundation, Washington, December17, 1997, p. 5.

26. Robert S. Erikson and Gerald C. Wright,“Voters, Candidates, and Issues in CongressionalElections,” in Congress Reconsidered, ed. LawrenceC. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer (Washington:CQ Press, 1993).

27. John Zaller, “Politicians as Prize Fighters:Electoral Selection and Incumbency Advantage,”paper presented at the annual meeting of theAmerican Political Science Association, Boston,September 1998.

28. Gary C. Jacobson, The Politics of CongressionalElections, 4th ed. (New York: Longman, 1997), pp.30–31.

29. Constituent service increases an average incum-bent’s popular vote by 5 to 10 percent. See, for exam-ple, Eric Felten, The Ruling Class (Washington:Regnery Gateway, 1993), p. 183. See also Morris P.Fiorina, “Some Problems in Studying the Effects ofResource Allocation in Congressional Elections,”American Journal of Political Science 25 (1981): 543–67;Diana Evans Yiannakis, “The Grateful Electorate:Casework and Congressional Elections,” AmericanJournal of Political Science 25 (1981): 568–80; GeorgeSerra and Albert D. Cover, “The ElectoralConsequences of Perquisite Use: The CaseworkCase,” Legislative Studies Quarterly 17 (1992): 233–46;Morris P. Fiorina, Congress: Keystone of the WashingtonEstablishment, 2d ed. (New Haven, CT: Yale UniversityPress, 1989), pp. 53–58; Ornstein, Mann, andMalbin, p. 131; and George Serra and David Moon,“Casework, Issue Position, and Voting in Congres-sional Elections: A District Analysis,” Journal of Politics56 (1994): 200–13.

30. Jacobson, The Politics of Congressional Elections, p. 29.

31. See, for example, Robert M. Stein and Kenneth N.Bickers, “Congressional Elections and the PorkBarrel,” Journal of Politics 56 (1994): 377–99; Gerald W.Scully, “Congressional Tenure: Myth and Reality,”Public Choice 83 (1995): 203–19; and Kenneth N.Bickers and Robert M. Stein, “The ElectoralDynamics of the Federal Pork Barrel,” AmericanJournal of Political Science 40 (1996): 1300–1327.

32. Jonathan Williamson, “Redistricting’s Effect onCandidate Emergence in U.S. House Elections,”paper presented at the American Political Science

16

Association annual meeting, Philadelphia, August27–30, 2003, p. 1.

33. Matt A. Barreto and Louis DeSipio, “Dude,Where’s My District? The Electoral Consequencesof the Gain and Loss of Latino Representation inLos Angeles,” paper presented at the MidwestPolitical Science Association annual meeting,Chicago, April 15–18, 2004, p. 3.

34. Brian F. Schaffner, Michael Wagner, andJonathan Winburn, “Incumbents Out, Party In?Term Limits and Partisan Redistricting in StateLegislatures,” paper presented at the MidwestPolitical Science Association annual meeting,Chicago, April 15–18, 2004, p. 2.

35. Ibid., p. 2; Harry Basehart and John Comer,“Partisan and Incumbent Effects in State LegislativeRedistricting,” Legislative Studies Quarterly 16 (1991):65–79; Harry Basehart and John Comer, “Redis-tricting and Incumbent Reelection Success in FiveState Legislatures,” American Politics Quarterly 23(1995): 241–53; Peverill Squire, “The PartisanConsequences of Congressional Redistricting,”American Politics Quarterly 23 (1995): 229–40; andAndrew Gelman and Gary King, “EnhancingDemocracy through Legislative Redistricting,”American Political Science Review 88 (1994): 541–59.

36. Randall Holcombe, “A Note on Seniority andPolitical Competition,” Public Choice 61 (1989):287.

37. Redistricting expert Michael McDonald, quotedin Liz Marlantes, “Redistricting Shifts Clout, butPlays It Safe,” Christian Science Monitor, June 10,2002, http://www.csmonitorservices.com/csmonitor/display.jhtml;jsessionid=JALLG20QTVBOZKGL4L2SFEQ?_requestid=35467.

38. Jonathan Winburn, “The Fix Is In? A Look atthe Partisan Influence of Redistricting in the2002 Elections,” paper presented at the MidwestPolitical Science Association annual meeting,Chicago, April 15–18, 2004, p. 5.

39. Forgette and Platt, p. 2.

40. Schaffner, Wagner, and Winburn, p. 17.

41. For a fuller discussion, see Harwood, p. A1.

42. Forgette and Platt, p. 2. See also Gary Jacobson,“Terror, Terrain, and Turnout: Explaining the 2002Midterm Elections,” Political Science Quarterly 118(2003): 203–23; and Bernard Grofman, WilliamKoetzle, and Thomas Brunnell, “An IntegratedPerspective on the Three Potential Sources ofPartisan Bias: Malapportionment, TurnoutDifferences, and Geographic Distribution of PartyVote Shares,” Electoral Studies 16 (1997): 457–70.

43. John Fund, “It’s Time to Draw the Line onGerrymandering,” Wall Street Journal, March 13,2002, http://www.patrickballantine.com/archive/john_fund_wsj200203.htm.

44. See, for example, the spring 1992 edition ofThe Cook Political Report, a nonpartisan electionnewsletter, which assessed congressional races forthe fall campaign.

45. Charles E. Cook, cited in Harwood, p. A1.

46. Charles E. Cook, “Off to the Races: PartisanEquilibrium,” National Journal, March 19, 2002,http://nationaljournal.com/members/buzz/2002/races/031902.htm.

47. Pack, p. 25; Rupert Cornwell, “The Court Casethat Could Reshape US Democracy,” Independent,December 11, 2003, http://news.independent.co.uk/low_res/story.jsp?story=472097&host=3&dir=70;“Politics as Warfare,” The Economist November 8, 2003;Tony Quinn, “In California, Politicians Choose—andVoters Lose,” Los Angeles Times, September 29, 2002, p.M3; and Fred Barnes, “An Election Year with NoRaces,” Weekly Standard, June 24, 2002.

48. Rob Richie, quoted in Kelley Beaucar Vlahos,“The Only Winner So Far in Bruising RedistrictingBattle: Incumbents,” Fox News.com, December 10,2001, http://www.foxnews.com/0,3566,40386,00.html.

49. Quoted in Allison Stevens, “Number ofUncontested Races Extremely High,” Hill, April 24,2002, http://www.hillnews.com/042402/c2k2_uncontests.shtm.

50. Susan Page, “More Than Ever, Incumbents inDriver’s Seat,” USA Today, October 30, 2002, p. 1A.See also Forgette and Platt, p. 2; Samuel Issacharoff,“Gerrymandering and Political Cartels,” HarvardLaw Review 116 (2002): 593; and Samuel Issacharoffand Richard Pildes, “Politics as Markets: PartisanLockups of the Democratic Process,” Stanford LawReview 50 (1998): 643.

51. “Campaign Finance and Redistricting: JudgmentDay,” The Economist, December 13, 2002, p. 32.

52. For an analysis of redistricting’s impact on theoutcome of state legislative races in 2002, see TimStorey, “2002 State Legislative Elections,” Spectrum:The Journal of State Government 76 (2003): 7–11.

53. James E. Campbell, “The Stagnation ofCongressional Elections,” in Life after Reform: Whenthe Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act Meets Politics, ed.Michael J. Malbin (Lanham, MD: Rowman andLittlefield, 2003), pp. 141–58.

54. If adjusted for inflation, the $1,000 contribu-

17

tion limit enacted in 1974 would be worthapproximately $3,500 today.

55. See, for example, Burton A. Abrams andRussell F. Settle, “The Economic Theory ofRegulation and Public Financing of PresidentialElections,” Journal of Political Economy (1978):245–57, and Peter H. Aranson and Melvin Hinich,“Some Aspects of the Political Economy ofElection Campaign Contribution Laws,” PublicChoice 34 (1979): 435–61.

56. See Gary C. Jacobson, “Campaign SpendingEffects in US Senate Elections: Evidence from theNational Annenberg Election Survey,” paper pre-sented at the American Political Science Associationannual meeting, Chicago, September 2–5, 2004;Gary Jacobson, “Money and Votes Reconsidered:Congressional Elections, 1972–1982,” Public Choice47, no. 1 (1985): 7–62; Gary Jacobson, “The Effectsof Campaign Spending in House Elections: NewEvidence for Old Arguments,” American Journal ofPolitical Science 34 (1990): 334–62; John R. Lott,“Does Additional Campaign Spending Really HurtIncumbents? The Theoretical Importance of PastInvestments in Political Brand Name,” Public Choice72 (1991): 87–92; Christopher Kenny and MichaelMcBurnett, “A Dynamic Model of the Effect ofCampaign Spending on Congressional VoteChoice,” American Journal of Political Science 36 (1992):923–37; and Amihai Glazer, “On the Incentive toEstablish and Play Political Rent Seeking Games,”Public Choice 75 (1993): 139–48.

57. See L. S. Maisel, “The Incumbency Advantage,” inMoney, Elections and Democracy pp. 119–42; A. I.Abramowitz, “Incumbency, Campaign Spending,and the Decline of Competition in U.S. HouseElections,” Journal of Politics 53 (1991): 34–56;National Taxpayers Union, Federal CampaignContribution Habits of Forbes 400: A Few Drops in a Sea ofCampaign Bucks, Policy Paper 101, March 20, 1998,http://www.ntu.org/main/press.php?PressID=308&org_name=NTUF.

58. Tabarrok.

59. See, for example, Campbell, “The Stagnationof Congressional Elections.”

60. Patrick Basham, “Destroying Political Com-petition,” National Post, June 13, 2002, http://www.cato.org/egi-bin/scripts/research/articles/basham-020613.html.

61. See, for example, Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier,“A Dynamic Analysis of the Role of War Chests inCampaign Strategy,” American Journal of PoliticalScience 48 (1996): 352–71; and Jay Goodliffe, “WarChests and Information,” paper presented at theAmerican Political Science Association annualmeeting, Philadelphia, August 28–31, 2003.

62. This section draws heavily on the extensiveanalysis provided in John Samples, “Making theWorld Safer for Incumbents: The Consequencesof McCain-Feingold-Cochran,” Cato InstitutePolicy Analysis no. 393, March 14, 2001.

63. Ornstein, Mann, and Malbin, pp. 83, 89.

64. Michael J. Malbin and Thomas L. Gais, TheDay after Reform: Sobering Campaign Finance Lessonsfrom the American States (Albany, NY: RockefellerInstitute Press, 1998); Frank Sorauf, InsideCampaign Finance (New Haven, CT: Yale UniversityPress, 1992); and Anthony Gierzynski and DavidA. Breaux, “The Financing Role of Parties,” inCampaign Finance in State Legislative Elections, ed.Joel A. Thompson and Gary F. Moncrief(Washington: Congressional Quarterly Press,1998), pp. 188–206.

65. Stephen Ansolabehere and James M. SnyderJr., “Soft Money, Hard Money, Strong Parties,”Columbia Law Review 100 (2000): 605.

66. Gary C. Jacobson, “The Effects of CampaignSpending in House Elections: New Evidence for OldArguments,” American Journal of Political Science 34(1990): 334–62; idem, “Money and Votes Recon-sidered: Congressional Elections, 1972–1982,” PublicChoice 47 (1985): 7–62; idem, Money and CongressionalElections (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press,1980); and idem, “The Effects of CampaignSpending in Congressional Elections,” AmericanPolitical Science Review 72 (1978): 469–91.

67. Thad Kousser and Ray LaRaja, “The Effect ofCampaign Finance Laws on Electoral Competition:Evidence from the States,” Cato Institute PolicyAnalysis no. 426, February 14, 2002.

68. Gary C. Jacobson, “Party Organizations and theDistribution of Campaign Resources: Republicansand Democrats in 1982,” Political Science Quarterly100 (1985): 603–25; and Paul S. Herrnson, “NationalParty Decision Making, Strategies, and ResourceDistribution in Congressional Elections,” WesternPolitical Quarterly 42 (1989): 301–23.

69. “The Ruses to Block Reform,” editorial, NewYork Times, March 4, 2002, http://www.nytimes.com/2002/03/04/opinion/_04MON1.html.

70. “McCain-Feingold Goes to Court,” editorial,New York Times, April 1, 2002, p. A22.

71. Stephen Ansolabehere and James M. Snyder Jr.,“Money and Office: The Sources of the IncumbencyAdvantage in Congressional Campaign Finance,” inContinuity and Change in House Elections, ed. David W.Brady, John F. Cogan, and Morris P. Fiorina(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000), pp.65–87.

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72. Dan Balz, “In Long Battle, Small VictoriesAdded Up,” Washington Post, March 21, 2002, p. A6.

73. See Campbell, “The Stagnation of CongressionalElections.”

74. Malbin and Gais, p. 137.

75. John Samples, “The Failures of TaxpayerFinancing of Presidential Campaigns,” CatoInstitute Policy Analysis no. 500, November 25,2003, p. 9.

76. This section draws primarily on ibid.

77. The data in this section are drawn principallyfrom Patrick Basham and Martin Zelder, “DoesClean Money Make for Competitive Elections?The Failure of Maine’s Experiment with TaxpayerFinancing of Campaigns,” Cato Institute PolicyAnalysis no. 456, October 16, 2002.

78. Robert J. Franciosi, “Is Cleanliness PoliticalGodliness? Arizona’s Clean Elections Law after ItsFirst Year,” Goldwater Institute Arizona IssueAnalysis no. 168, November 2001, p. 9.

79. For an overview of the history of congressionalredistricting, see David Butler and Bruce Cain,Congressional Redistricting: Comparative and TheoreticalPerspectives (New York: Macmillan, 1992).

80. Schaffner, Wagner, and Winburn, p. 8.

81. Winburn, p. 4.

82. Michael McDonald, “A Comparative Look atU.S. State Redistricting Processes,” State Politicsand Policy Quarterly, 4 (2004) (forthcoming).

83. “How to Rig an Election,” The Economist, April27, 2002.

84. Winburn, p. 5.

85. Schaffner, Wagner, and Winburn, p. 3.

86. Quoted in Kenneth Jost, “RedistrictingDisputes,” CQ Researcher, March 2004, p. 10.

87. Max Farrand, The Records of the Federal Conventionof 1787 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966).

88. Quoted in Winburn, p. 4.

89. See Fred Barnes, “Where Incumbents Tremble. . . ,” Weekly Standard, September 30, 2002; RonaldBrownstein, “Iowa Puts Politicians through thePaces,” Los Angeles Times, October 15, 2002, p. A1;and Adam Clymer, “Democracy in MiddleAmerica,” New York Times, October 27, 2002, sec.4, p. 5.

90. Forgette and Platt, p. 6.

91. See, for example, Lynda Gledhill, “RecallMastermind Focuses on Redistricting Reform,”San Francisco Chronicle, November 1, 2003, p. A5;and Nancy Vogel, “Recall Backers TargetDistricts,” Los Angeles Times, October 31, 2002, p.B1.

92. Patrick Basham, “Spending Is Not a Problem,”USA Today, October 27, 2004; John J. Coleman,“The Benefits of Campaign Spending,” CatoInstitute Briefing Paper no. 84, September 4, 2003;and James Bopp, “Campaign Finance ‘Reform’:The Good, the Bad, and the Unconstitutional,”Heritage Foundation, March 19, 1999.

93. See, for example, Mark P. Petracca, “The Poisonof Professional Politics,” Cato Institute PolicyAnalysis no. 151, May 10, 1991, http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-151.html.

94. See, for example, Edward H. Crane, “Reclaimingthe Political Process,” in Market Liberalism: A Paradigmfor the 21st Century, ed. David Boaz and Edward H.Crane (Washington: Cato Institute, 1993), pp.53–64.

95. Alan Grant, “The Term Limitation Movementin the United States,” Parliamentary Affairs 48(1995): 515–30.

96. See Samuel Kernell, “To Stay, To Quit, or ToMove Up: Explaining the Growth of Careerism in theHouse of Representatives, 1878–1940,” paper pre-sented at the annual meeting of the AmericanPolitical Science Association, Philadelphia, August28–31, 2003; and Nelson W. Polsby, “TheInstitutionalization of the U.S. House of Represen-tatives,” American Political Science Review 62 (1968):144–68.

97. George F. Will, “Perpetual Incumbency Machine,”Washington Post, November 10, 1991, p. C7.

98. George F. Will, “The Improving Case for TermLimits,” Washington Post, June 18, 1992, p. A23.

99. See, for example, Patrick Basham, “Assessingthe Term Limits Experiment: California andBeyond,” Cato Institute Policy Analysis no. 413,August 31, 2001; Bandow; and Stephen Mooreand Aaron Steelman, “An Antidote to Federal RedInk: Term Limits,” Cato Institute Briefing Paperno. 21, November 3, 1994, http://www.cato.org/pubs/briefs/bp-021.html.

100. See Patrick Basham, “Assessing the TermLimits Experiment,” pp. 7, 11–12; and John C.Armor, “Term Limits Do Work: Fifty Years in theElection of State Governors,” Term Limits Outlook(U.S. Term Limits Foundation) 2, no. 4 (1993).

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101. John Hood, “Not Gone, But Forgotten: TermLimits Live On,” National Review Online, June 25,2001, http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/comment-hood062501.shtml.

102. Francis X. Clines, “Term Limits Bring WholesaleChange into Legislatures,” New York Times, February14, 2000, http://www.nytimes.com/library/politics/camp/021400ohio-limits. html.

103. Thad Kousser, “Term Limits and LegislatorPerformance,” paper presented at the conferenceon Coping with Term Limits: Ohio and theNation, Ray C. Bliss Institute of Applied Politics,Columbus, Ohio, April 12–13, 2000.

104. Kermit Daniel and John R. Lott Jr., “TermLimits and Electoral Competitiveness: Evidencefrom California’s State Legislative Races,” PublicChoice, 90 (1997): 165–84.

105. Richard J. Powell, “The Impact of TermLimits on the Candidacy Decisions of StateLegislators in U.S. House Elections,” LegislativeStudies Quarterly 25 (2000).

106. Wayne L. Francis and Lawrence W. Kenney,“Equilibrium Projections of the Consequences ofTerm Limits upon Expected Tenure, InstitutionalTurnover, and Membership Experience,” Journalof Politics 59 (1997): 240–52.

107. John C. Armor, “‘Foreshadowing’ Effects ofTerm Limits: California’s Example for Congress,”Term Limits Outlook 3, no. 1 (June 1994): 3.

108. Mark P. Petracca, “A Legislature in Trans-ition: The California Experience with TermLimits,” Institute of Governmental Studies,University of California, Berkeley, Working Paper

96-1, 1996.

109. Stanley M. Caress, “The Impact of TermLimits on Legislative Behavior: An Examinationof Transitional Legislature,” PS: Political Science &Politics 29 (1996): 671–77.

110. Daniel and Lott.

111. Basham and Zelder.

112. Bob Bucher, “Are Term Limits Working?” Inde-pendence Institute, Denver, December 30, 1998, http://i2i.org/SuptDocs/OpEdArcv.oped98 1230.htm.

113. Cited in Susan Heavey, “Term Limits TakeEffect,” Washington Post, March 5, 1999, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/special/termlimits/termlimits.htm; and Michael E. Con-way, “Times of Change,” State Government News,February 2000, p. 12.

114. Cited in Lois Romano, “Term Limits GiveNeophytes Legs to Run,” Washington Post, May 28,1998, p. A1.

115. Hood.

116. Clines.

117. Rick Farmer and Richard J. Powell, “MovingOn, but Not Moving Out: Comparing Career Pathsof Term Limited Legislators,” paper presented atthe American Political Science Association annualmeeting, Philadelphia, August 28–31, 2003.

118. Cited in Paul Jacob, “A Stake through theHeart,” U.S. Term Limits weekly radio commentaryno. 23, April 5, 1999, http://www.termlimits.org/Press/Common_Sense/cs23.html.