Contents List of Figures and Tables viii Acknowledgements ix List of Abbreviations x Introduction 1 1 Why Euroscepticism Matters 12 Eurosceptics: channels of influence in the EU 13 Euroscepticism and the evolution of EU governance: towards a less supranational Union? 24 Euroscepticism outside the EU: implications for international relations 33 Euroscepticism: a welcome thorn in the EU’s side 37 Conclusion 42 2 Varieties of Euroscepticism 43 Euroscepticism across time: a historical overview 43 Utilitarian Euroscepticism 46 Political Euroscepticism 50 Value-based Euroscepticism 57 Cultural anti-Europeanism 61 Conclusion 66 3 A Geography of Euroscepticism 68 Different countries, different Euroscepticism(s) 69 Accession processes and seniority as an EU member 73 Collective utilitarian assessment of EU membership 76 Degree of fit between the EU and national institutions 79 Reference to ‘Europe’ in nation-building processes 83 Strength and sense of national identity 90 Euroscepticism at regional level 94 Conclusion 99 v
Transcript
Contents
List of Figures and Tables viii
Acknowledgements ix
List of Abbreviations x
Introduction 1
1 Why Euroscepticism Matters 12Eurosceptics: channels of influence in the EU 13Euroscepticism and the evolution of EU governance:
towards a less supranational Union? 24Euroscepticism outside the EU: implications for
international relations 33Euroscepticism: a welcome thorn in the EU’s side 37Conclusion 42
2 Varieties of Euroscepticism 43Euroscepticism across time: a historical overview 43Utilitarian Euroscepticism 46Political Euroscepticism 50Value-based Euroscepticism 57Cultural anti-Europeanism 61Conclusion 66
3 A Geography of Euroscepticism 68Different countries, different Euroscepticism(s) 69Accession processes and seniority as an EU member 73Collective utilitarian assessment of EU membership 76Degree of fit between the EU and national
institutions 79Reference to ‘Europe’ in nation-building processes 83Strength and sense of national identity 90Euroscepticism at regional level 94Conclusion 99
4 Political Elites 100Elites’ conversion to ‘Europe’: ‘limited, short-ranged
and tactical’ (Haas 1958) 101Explaining party-based Euroscepticism 106Parties of government: a mainstreaming of
Euroscepticism? 113Political elites in the European Parliament:
enthusiastic Europeans? 128Conclusion 133
5 National Institutions 135The compliance problem: Euroscepticism through
the back door? 137Administrations, courts and parliaments: loyal
applicants of EU law? 143Member states and the European Court of Justice:
towards a more tense relationship 151Conclusion 160
6 Popular Euroscepticism 161Patterns of support before Maastricht: an ambiguous
public opinion 162Post-Maastricht Euroscepticism: symptom of a
national democratic malaise 167Utilitarian scepticism and concerns over the
redistributive consequences of integration 173Identity-related concerns 180Exclusive understandings of national identity 184Conclusion 189
7 The Media 191The media and the EU: from pro-EC militancy to
critical investigation 192The Europhilia of established media: some nuances 195The tabloid press and the new media 201National media versus European public sphere? 209Conclusion 218
8 Civil Society 219The EU: empowering or weakening civil society? 220Churches: a pro-European commitment under stress 223
vi Contents
Trade unions: disillusionment with ‘social Europe’ 227Social mobilizations and new social movements:
alter- or anti-European? 235Conclusion 244
9 Understanding Euroscepticism 246The dimensions of Euroscepticism: scepticism about
the EU 246Specific or diffuse: what kind of support for the EU? 249Utilitarian, normative and identity-based scepticism 251Implications for the study of international governance 256Conclusion 258
10 Conclusion: The Future of Euroscepticism and the Future of the EU 260The future of Euroscepticism: three scenarios 261How can the EU respond to Euroscepticism?:
three options 264New meta-narratives or back to functional legitimacy? 272
Further Reading 276
Bibliography 279
Index 305
Contents vii
Chapter 1
Why Euroscepticism Matters
When Margaret Thatcher made her famous speech to the College ofEurope in Bruges on 22 September 1988 it was seen as a radicalmanifesto and a defining cornerstone of Eurosceptic discourse. But ifwe compare her denunciation of the EU’s alleged regulation excesses
The Community is not an end in itself … [It] is a practical meansby which Europe can ensure the prosperity … of its people …[Working more closely together] does not require power to becentralised in Brussels or decisions to be taken by an appointedbureaucracy … [We do not want] a European super-state exer-cising a new dominance from Brussels … Our aim should not bemore and more detailed regulation from the centre. (Thatcher1988)
with the text of the European Council’s Laeken declaration of 15December 2001 on the future of the European Union,
[C]itizens also feel that the Union is behaving too bureaucrati-cally … What citizens understand by ‘good governance’ is open-ing up fresh opportunities, not imposing further red tape. Whatthey expect is … better responses to practical issues and not aEuropean super-state or European institutions inveigling theirway into every nook and cranny of life. (European Council 2001)
these two quotations sound surprisingly similar. What was consid-ered a Eurosceptic discourse in the Thatcher era has now becomecommon parlance in relation to the EU. Indeed, as this chapter willshow, Eurosceptics have played a significant role in the integrationprocess as agenda-setters and ‘entrepreneurs of contentious issues’(Usherwood 2004:14). As such, they have influenced, in part, theterms of the debate on European integration and the definition ofthe EU’s agenda.
12
It is argued here that Euroscepticism matters for three mainreasons. First, the EC was founded as a compromise between differ-ent, even competing views as to its nature and its finalities. Today,the issue of the debate is whether the Union will further develop intoa supranational, political community or ‘spill back’ towards moretraditional forms of interstate cooperation. At stake is thus theendurance of a unique system of multinational governance andpooled sovereignty between states. Second, the debate betweenEurosceptics and advocates of political unification has implicationsfor global governance. Indeed, if the EU were to be reduced to a merefree trade area, as many Eurosceptics in and outside the EU wish, it isunlikely that the agenda for a more regulated trade liberalizationwould be supported by other major players on the world stage.Third, Euroscepticism can be analyzed as one of the symptoms of thetransformation of democracy in a globalizing world. Not only didEurosceptics raise the key question of legitimacy at the EU level, thusplaying a crucial role in the development of a more democratic EU,public Euroscepticism as a sociological phenomenon also sheds lighton the challenging impact of market integration on national democ-racy and on the relationship between state and society.
The chapter begins by explaining how Eurosceptics in nationalgovernments can exert an influence on EU-level decision-makingand argues that specific features of the EU institutional system tendto compound this influence. In a second section, the chapteranalyzes how Euroscepticism influenced the evolution of EU gover-nance and changes in the balance of power between EU institutions,in a context where there is no clear support for supranational solu-tions among governments. A third section assesses the impact ofEuroscepticism on the EU’s external relations and on how it isperceived by third country actors, showing how competing views onthe future of the EU interact with a more global debate on the futureof global governance. The chapter concludes, in the fourth section,by analyzing Euroscepticism as a welcome thorn in the EU’s side, asit prompts the EU to confront not only its own democratic deficit,but also how this deficit affects democratic governance at thedomestic level.
Eurosceptics: channels of influence in the EU
Although Eurosceptic parties’ electoral weight is significant, theirinfluence on decisions affecting the EU is mainly indirect, as it is
Why Euroscepticism Matters 13
channelled through national governments. In this respect, some ofthe institutional features of the EU allow for a disproportionateinfluence of Eurosceptic orientations on the integration process, notonly in day-to-day decision-making, but also in ‘history-makingdecisions’ (following Peterson and Bromberg’s typology (1999:10))that determine the shape of the EU and the direction of the integra-tion process. Moreover, the impact of Euroscepticism on the inte-gration process is compounded by the more frequent use ofreferenda (as opposed to parliamentary ratification) in order tosettle debated EU issues (at least in the case of EMU and the EUConstitutional Treaty).
A limited influence in the EU’s institutional triangle
On average, Eurosceptic parties, be they of the hard or the soft sort,appeal to roughly one-fifth of the EU’s electorate. While electoralsupport for hard Eurosceptic parties in national elections remainsvery limited, with 4 to 5 per cent of the vote, the mean electoralscore for Eurosceptic parties (both soft and hard) oscillates between15 and 20 per cent (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2002:16–24; Ray2007:165). This corresponds roughly to the proportion ofEurosceptic representatives in the EP (see pp.130–1). This signifi-cant electoral weight, however, does not translate into direct influ-ence on EU-level decision-making within the EU’s institutionaltriangle (the Parliament, Commission and Council).
Regarding the EP, the overwhelming majority of overtlyEurosceptic MEPs are confined to small Eurosceptic groups. Thissmall influence is further reduced by their limited ability to engage inparty networking at the EU level, as there are no Eurosceptic transna-tional party federations. Furthermore, the most Eurosceptic groups inthe EP are characterized by low levels of internal cohesion. For exam-ple, the overall cohesion rate of the Independence and Democracy(IND-DEM) group between 2004 and 2009 was only 47 per cent(compared with 91 per cent for the pro-European Greens)(Votewatch.eu 2009). Besides, the most Eurosceptic groups are rarelypart of a winning majority during EP votes. Between 2004 and 2009,for instance, the radical left-wing GUE-NGL (United European Left-Nordic Green Left) and the radical right-wing IND-DEM were part ofa winning majority in 52 per cent and 46 per cent of cases respectively,compared with 86 per cent for the main group European People’sParty-European Democrats (EPP-ED) (Votewatch.eu 2009).
14 Understanding Euroscepticism
As far as the European Commission is concerned, Euroscepticshave a limited influence on the formation of the College ofCommissioners. Since Commissioners are appointed on the basis ofa list of candidates pre-selected by national governments, in agree-ment with the Commission’s President, there is little probability thata strongly Eurosceptic candidate might end up in the College.Besides, the fact that the EP now organizes hearings for individualcommissioners, in order to test their competences and overallcommitment to their future portfolio, might act as a filter, prevent-ing controversial and/or overtly Eurosceptic candidates from access-ing the College. Certainly, not all Commissioners areEuro-enthusiasts. The case of Frits Bolkestein, whose nomination asDutch Commissioner in 1999 triggered a controversy in theNetherlands over his allegedly Eurosceptic position (Harmsen2004:108), illustrates this. More fundamentally, governments havesometimes prevented the nomination of strongly Europhile politi-cians from accessing the Commission’s presidency, as John Majordid with Jean-Luc Dehaene in 1994 and Tony Blair with GuyVerhofstadt in 2004.
Concerning the Council, any direct influence of hard or stronglyEurosceptic elements is limited by two factors. First, being mostlyprotest-based parties, strongly Eurosceptic parties in the EU arerarely represented in governments. Second, most of the Council’swork is prepared by COREPER-level ambassadors and by theCouncil’s working groups and thus remains relatively immune tothe turmoil of domestic politics. Despite being a diplomatic organ,the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) is perme-ated by a strong culture of compromise. Member states’ representa-tives share a commitment to ensuring the performance and smoothfunctioning of the Council, which influences the defence of nationalinterests (Lewis 1998). Similarly, the Council’s working groups,composed of national civil servants, have developed specifictransnational communication networks which do not rely on anarrow definition of national interests (Beyers and Dierickx 1998).
In this context, Eurosceptics’ main channels of influence in theEU are national governments. First, there might be Euroscepticfactions among mainstream incumbent parties (as in the case of theBritish Labour and Conservative parties, the Italian Forza Italia,etc.). Second, coalition governments may include Eurosceptic coali-tion partners (examples include the Communist party in Frenchgovernments and the extreme right parties Lega Nord and
Why Euroscepticism Matters 15
Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ) in the Italian and Austriangovernments). Third, governing parties might be tempted totoughen their stance in the Council in order to confront a strongEurosceptic opposition in domestic politics (as the British Labourparty did during negotiations on the Lisbon Treaty in 2007).Consequently, institutional devices giving single governments adisproportionate influence in decision-making are likely tocompound Eurosceptics’ impact on the integration process. Threesuch devices are examined below: the rotating EU presidency,voting systems in the Council and provisions on treaty reform.
The rotating Council presidency: a platform for Euroscepticgovernments?
The rotating presidency of the Council can certainly provideEurophile governments with a good opportunity to attempt tofurther integration (as was the case in the Dutch presidency duringthe Maastricht Treaty negotiations, for example). Moreover,national presidencies can boost the popularity of the EU in the coun-try that holds the presidency, as has been argued elsewhere(Semetko et al. 2003). However, the rotating presidency (which ismaintained by the Lisbon Treaty, except for the European Counciland the External Relations Council) can also be a serious challengefor the EU.
Indeed, it endows a single government, for a six-month period,with the responsibility of managing the daily business of the EU, ofacting as a broker between all the actors involved, of displayingleadership skills and of representing the EU on the world stage (seeSchout and Vanhoonacker 2006). Consequently, domestic govern-ments face a difficult task. They still represent national interests atthe EU level, but, at the same time, their presidential role requiresthe ability to rise above the fray and avoid an overly parochial,narrow-minded defence of one’s preferences, especially in times ofcrisis or when crucial decisions are on the agenda. This is the case,for instance, during Intergovernmental Conferences (IGCs), whenamendments to existing treaties are negotiated.
Certainly, several factors limit the room for manoeuvre of anygovernment holding the presidency. First, the presidency’s ability toinfluence the EU’s agenda is limited, at least in the first pillar of theEU, by the Commission’s monopoly on legislative initiative.Moreover, member states have unequal resources (in terms of EU
16 Understanding Euroscepticism
expertise, staff, etc.) enabling them to influence the EU’s agendaaccording to their preferences (Hix 2005:81). Second, peer pressureand the wish to have a ‘successful’ presidency might deter them fromtaking initiatives that could harm their own country’s reputation.Third, other actors, such as the Council’s General Secretariat, othernational delegations, and the Commission, have to be taken intoaccount by the presidency when it tries to broker deals (Schout andVanhoonacker 2006:1054).
In this context, peer pressure and ‘path-dependency’ logic limitthe ability of Eurosceptic segments inside governments to push theiragendas. This was illustrated, for instance, by the 2003 Italian and2009 Czech EU presidencies. In both cases, government coalitionswere deeply divided over European integration and the main coali-tion party (the Italian Forza Italia and the Czech ODS) includedsignificant Eurosceptic factions. Furthermore, both presidencieswere scheduled at times when crucial decisions had to be made onEU institutional issues: the first three months of the IGC on the EUConstitutional Treaty in 2003, and the deadlock over the ratifica-tion of the Lisbon Treaty following the Irish referendum of 2008. Infact, both presidencies could only delay institutional reforms; theywere not able to prevent them. While the Italian presidency tried tooppose significant institutional reforms during the 2003 IGC (theextension of EP powers in the adoption of the EU budget, the exten-sion of the scope of qualified majority voting (QMV) to judicialcooperation, etc.) (Quaglia and Moxon-Browne 2004:19), it couldonly postpone them until the end of 2003, when the Irish govern-ment took over. Similarly, the Czech presidency in 2009 found itselfin a paradoxical situation. It was expected to negotiate a deal withthe Irish government in order to overcome Irish voters’ hostilitytowards the Lisbon treaty, whilst Czech President Vaclav Klaus hadused every possible means (including lodging a complaint before theCzech Constitutional Court) to block the ratification of the treaty inhis own country (Král, Bartovic and Rihácková 2009:23–5).Eventually, the Czech government negotiated the deal, which pavedthe way for a second referendum and the entering into force of theLisbon Treaty.
However, the presidency can be used as a platform byEurosceptic actors. This was the case, for instance, with VaclavKlaus’ speech in the EP on 12 February 2009 at the beginning of theCzech EU presidency, as he made his case against political integra-tion and the current EU institutional system, in a speech strongly
Why Euroscepticism Matters 17
reminiscent of Margaret Thatcher’s Bruges speech. Furthermore,EU presidencies can be used by segments inside governments or thestate apparatus to push through Eurosceptic initiatives, as was illus-trated by the French presidency in the second half of 2008. Whilethe French presidency was hailed by many as a case of successfulleadership, the Mediterranean Union Initiative, launched by theFrench government, triggered considerable controversy in the EU.Initiated by Henri Guaino, adviser to French President NicolasSarkozy, this project initially aimed at revitalizing links betweensouthern EU countries and partner countries from North Africa andthe Middle East. Initially called the Mediterranean Union, it wasconceived – and rightly perceived – as a rival to the existingBarcelona process (managed by the European Commission onbehalf of the EU) and as a way to circumvent EU institutions in aregion of traditional French influence. Moreover, it left out non-Mediterranean EU countries. Strongly criticized by other memberstates’ governments (such as German Chancellor Angela Merkel,who warned against a ‘splitting’ of the Union) and lukewarmlywelcomed by the European Commission, the project had to beamended to get rid of its most Eurosceptic elements. Renamed‘Union for the Mediterranean’, it is now being developed within theexisting EU framework of the Barcelona process and encompassesall EU members. This is a good example of how peer pressure andpath dependency limit a presidency’s ability to circumvent the EUinstitutional system. However, even in the revised version of theproject, the Commission clearly appears to be marginalized in theUnion for the Mediterranean, which is co-presided, on a rotatingbasis, by one EU member state and a partner country. Moreover, theCommission is not officially represented in the secretariat of theorganization.
Decision-making procedures in the Council
Alongside the rotating presidency, the decision-making proceduresin the Council, which allow one member state, or a small group ofmember states, to paralyse the Union’s entire decision-makingprocess, tend to give a disproportionate influence to Euroscepticparties or factions inside governments. Such is the case with unani-mous voting (as opposed to QMV), which remains the rule inseveral areas.
Certainly, whether the extension of the scope of QMV in the
18 Understanding Euroscepticism
Council enhances the EU decision-making capacity can be debated.On the one hand, decision-making in the Council is strongly perme-ated by a consensual political culture and formal voting is rare.Between 1998 and 2004, for instance, the Council formally voted inless than 20 per cent of cases. Moreover, decision by consensustends to remain the rule, even when the treaty provides for QMV(70 per cent of cases over the same period) (Hayes-Renshaw et al.2006). On the other hand, treaty provisions on QMV can be used bygovernments that support the adoption of a proposal to put pressureon reluctant governments, if the latter could lose in a formal vote.
Indeed, unanimous voting has historically allowed softEurosceptic governments to impose their views on others. The firstinstance of this was the so-called ‘empty chair crisis’ triggered byFrench President Charles de Gaulle in 1965, in order to prevent theextension of the scope of QMV, which was foreseen in the TEC. Fora long time, the ill-named Luxembourg compromise (adopted in1966) has allowed individual countries to veto significant pieces oflegislation. For instance, following the 1965–66 crisis, proposals fora directive on the free movement of capital in the EC were abandonedby the Commission for two decades. Similarly, unanimous voting hasallowed Tory-led British governments to oppose the adoption ofsignificant pieces of legislation in the social and fiscal fields.
Provisions on treaty reform
What is true for day-to-day EU policy-making also applies to major,history-making decisions on institutional reforms. Indeed, treatyprovisions on the amendment of EU treaties (Article 48 of the Treatyon European Union (TEU)) foresee that, once member states havedetermined the amendments to be made to the treaties ‘by commonaccord’, ‘the amendments shall enter into force after being ratifiedby all the Member States in accordance with their respective consti-tutional requirements’.
Certainly, the unanimity requirement (both for the adoption andfor the ratification of amendments) may be considered as moredemocratic than the majority logic, at least for those who under-stand the EU primarily as a union of states. Furthermore, for pro-Europeans, the unanimity requirement may act as a safeguardagainst risks of institutional spillbacks, such as a situation in whicha majority of governments would be willing to trim the powers ofthe Commission.
Why Euroscepticism Matters 19
At the same time, requiring unanimity for the adoption ofamendments allows one single government to block negotiations ontreaty reform. As a consequence, Eurosceptic governments, orgovernments which are under pressure from Eurosceptics in thenational arena, can block or delay significant reforms. For example,during the 1997 Amsterdam European Council, GermanChancellor Helmut Kohl blocked the extension of the scope ofQMV, which was supported by all other governments. ChancellorKohl’s attitude was mainly due to his weakened position in domes-tic politics on the eve of a crushing electoral defeat and to a growingEuroscepticism in some of the Länder (Peterson and Bromberg1999:18). Another example relates to the negotiations on theLisbon Treaty in June 2007, when the Polish government, led byEurosceptic Prime Minister Jaroslaw Kaczynski, insisted on post-poning the implementation of the new treaty provisions on doublemajority voting until 2014.
The unanimity requirement for the ratification of amendmentsalso allows one country to block the entering into force of majortreaty revisions. The failed ratification of the EU ConstitutionalTreaty is a good example of this. Following its rejection by theFrench and Dutch electorate, the ratification process was put onhold by the European Council in June 2005, at a time when eighteenmember states, accounting for 56 per cent of the EU population, hadratified the treaty. Finally, the lack of a uniform procedure to ratifytreaty reforms tends to bias the distribution of political clout amongmember states during IGCs, by strengthening the position of thosemember states where treaty revisions are to be ratified by referen-dum and where high levels of public Euroscepticism make this rati-fication uncertain. This was illustrated by negotiations on theLisbon Treaty in 2007, as the UK (where Prime Minister Blair hadcommitted himself to upholding a referendum on the EUConstitutional Treaty) relied on this argument in order to obtainsignificant opt-outs.
The mounting pressure for national referenda
The increasing use of referenda in relation to European integrationin the course of the 1990s is illustrative of how Eurosceptics influ-ence the agenda of mainstream parties on issues of integration. Infact, it is not the demand for referenda per se which can be analyzedas a Eurosceptic claim, but rather demands for referenda in an
20 Understanding Euroscepticism
exclusively national context. Whether EU-wide (as opposed tonational) referenda could contribute to a de-nationalization ofdomestic public debates on EU issues, as has been argued elsewhere(Habermas 2008:11), remains uncertain. However, the nationalcontext certainly biases the terms of the debate by obscuring theEuropean dimension of the issues at stake in a referendum.
Between 1972 and 2009, 36 EC/EU-related referenda (half ofwhich were accession referenda) were organized in current EU coun-tries – the number rises to 43 if one adds non-EU countries(Norway, Greenland, Liechstenstein and Switzerland) and refer-enda on the European Economic Area (EEA). Accordingly, betweena fifth and a third of referenda related to European integration haveresulted in the rejection of major treaty changes, EU accession orparticipation in EMU (see Table 1.1).
Traditionally, advocates of further integration have been reluc-tant to promote direct democracy in an EU context. Beyond tradi-tional arguments pointing to the limits of referenda in general (thelow levels of information voters have on complex issues and theplebiscitary use of referenda, for example), those who oppose theuse of referenda in relation to EU issues put forward three argu-ments. First, referenda on EU issues tend to be intrinsically biased infavour of ‘No’ campaigners. Indeed, arguing in favour of institu-tional deepening, monetary union or enlargement is especially diffi-cult since gains are either long-term and/or abstract. As aconsequence, the arguments of Yes campaigners are often eithervery general or negative (emphasizing, for instance, the conse-quences of a No). Secondly, EU citizens have very unequal votingrights in this respect, given the variety of national constitutionalprovisions on the use of referenda. Among the 36 referenda thathave been organized in the EC/EU between 1972 and 2009, 40 percent took place in only two countries (8 in Ireland and 6 inDenmark). Third, there is a discordance between the dimensions ofintegration that are affected by referenda outcomes and the willing-ness of voters to express their preferences on specific EU policies.Indeed, EU-related referenda concern the EU’s ‘constitutive issues’(Bartolini 2006:35), i.e., issues of membership and institutionalreforms. However, large segments of voters defeat institutionalreforms in order to express dissatisfaction with the content of EUpolicies or opposition to further EU enlargement. Hence, there is arisk that EU-related referenda raise expectations for policy changethat are unlikely to be fulfilled, thus creating further frustrations
Why Euroscepticism Matters 21
about the EU. The 2005 French referendum illustrated this, as alarge majority of voters voted against the alleged ‘neo-liberal’ bias ofEU policies. In a similar vein, the 2001 Irish referendum on the NiceTreaty appeared to have been driven, to a significant extent, byhostility towards the coming EU enlargement.
Despite these reservations, since the beginning of the 1990s polit-ical elites have been under mounting pressure to hold referenda inorder to legitimize major EC/EU institutional reforms. This can beattributed to several factors. To begin with, it is due to a globaltrend dating back to the 1970s, as Western democracies started
22 Understanding Euroscepticism
TABLE 1.1 EC/EU-related referenda in EU countries. 1972–2009
* On whether Denmark. Ireland and the UK should join the EC.** On continued membership of the EC.
experiencing increasing demands for more direct and participatorydemocracy. Moreover, it results from EU-related developments.First, the Maastricht Treaty and its provisions on EMU haveprompted the creation of single-issue parties, like the BritishReferendum Party and the German Bund Freier Buerger, whichdemanded referenda on EMU. Second, the acceleration and thewidening of the scope of EU enlargement waves since 1994 haveprompted calls for referenda on the accession of new countries tothe EU. Third, the so-called ‘constitutionalization’ of the EU, withthe drafting of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the EU
Why Euroscepticism Matters 23
*** On whether the EP should be given a mandate to draft a European constitution.
Constitutional Treaty, conveyed the idea of a change in the natureof the integration process. Thus, even if it is somewhat improper inrelation to the EU (Bartolini 2006:38; Dehousse 2005), the term‘Constitution’ has added further pressure on European elites to holdreferenda on the EU Constitutional Treaty in countries where it wasnot a constitutional requirement (as was the case in the four coun-tries where referenda on the treaty were held in 2005). A good illus-tration of this is the case of the Netherlands, where Parliament hasbeen pushing the agenda for referenda on EU enlargement and onthe Constitutional Treaty since 2002 (Harmsen 2004:114–15).
Euroscepticism and the evolution of EU governance:towards a less supranational Union?
What is at stake in the debate between soft Eurosceptics and advo-cates of a tightly integrated Union is not the existence of the EU assuch but the nature of the EU. As has been shown, hard Euroscepticsare lightweights in electoral terms (at least in most countries duringnational elections). Moreover, several crises in the course of the inte-gration process have illustrated the robustness of EC institutions.President de Gaulle’s failure to promote alternative institutions inthe field of political cooperation, with the so-called Fouchet plan(1961–62), was a case in point. What is more, even in times ofheightened tension with the EU, Eurosceptic governments do notquestion the legitimacy of the Union as such. A good example of thiswas the stance of the British Conservative government during the1996 BSE crisis, when it made clear that it would only use legalmeans to contest the decision of the EU veterinary committee not tolift the ban on British beef. By doing so, John Major’s governmentclearly stated that it accepted in advance the authority of the ECJ onthis issue, even if it was under intense pressure from a vociferouslyanti-European tabloid press (Neyer and Wolf 2000:9). Regardingthe nature of the Union, there are two conflicting views (with someintermediate positions between the two). Whereas most softEurosceptics wish the Union to operate more like an internationalorganization (with unanimity-based decision-making and a stream-lined Commission acting as secretariat, except in market-makingpolicies), advocates of the EU as a political community think theunderlying logic of the EU should be that of integration. While theEU certainly combines, in complex ways, both logics (interstatecooperation and integration), the dividing line between the two
24 Understanding Euroscepticism
positions relates to the principle of supranationalism. To pro-integration advocates, the sui generis nature of the EU, as an origi-nal way of managing interdependence between countries, resides inthe idea that a general interest can be defined that is more than themere addition of national interests and more than the lowestcommon denominator between governments’ positions. The defini-tion of this general interest must be entrusted to supranational insti-tutions (in this case the Commission), whose independence vis-à-visthe states should be safeguarded. By contrast, most Eurosceptics arehighly sceptical of supranationalism and understand the EU’s legiti-macy as relying exclusively on the states.
In this respect, it is argued in this section that soft Euroscepticshave influenced the terms of the debate on the evolution of EU gover-nance, as the decreased centrality of the Community method attests.Parallel to this, as changes in the balance of power inside the EU’sinstitutional triangle have occurred, the European Commission hashad increasing difficulties in defining and promoting the Union’sgeneral interest, a trend to which Euroscepticism at elite and publiclevels has contributed. Finally, it is argued that soft Eurosceptic ideasare more likely to be influential in a context where the EU lacksgovernmental leadership, as recent IGCs have illustrated.
The decreasing centrality of the Community method
The core positions of soft Eurosceptics on EU institutional issueswere outlined in Margaret Thatcher’s Bruges speech: opposition toa so-called ‘European super-state’ or ‘federal Europe’, a strict limi-tation of the Commission’s powers, and an emphasis on theEuropean Council as the overarching institution of the Union, seenas a way to trim the Commission’s powers (1988:6–7). These coretenets of Thatcher’s understanding of the EC have permeatedsuccessive reforms and evolutions of EU governance since the early1990s, allowing, to some extent, for a ‘Thatcherisation of the EU’(Usherwood 2004:15). The weakening of the historic Communitymethod and the development of new forms of governance of anintergovernmental nature attest to this influence.
Historically, the Community method has been seen as a guaran-tee of supranationalism. It refers to a specific mode of governance,where all institutions jointly participate in the exercise of power.More specifically, it entrusts the Commission with a monopoly onlegislative initiative, implies majority voting in the Council, the
Why Euroscepticism Matters 25
adoption of legislation under the co-decision procedure, and fullpowers of judicial review and legal adjudication for the ECJ. TheCommunity method has been targeted by Eurosceptics since the early days of integration, notably because the Commission’smonopoly on legislative initiative endows this institution with aclearly political role, that of the motor of integration. ToEurosceptics, however, the Commission is and should remain an ‘appointed bureaucracy’ (Thatcher 1988:7). Furthermore, the Community method implies a specific political culture – theconstant search for compromises and the acceptance of ‘dissymmet-ric concessions’ between partners (at least in the short run), whichpresupposes a relatively high degree of trust between governments(Olivi 2001:111).
Eurosceptic leaders have contributed to undermining the politicalculture that underlies the Community method. Indeed, the firstbreach with the Community method was initiated by FrenchPresident Charles de Gaulle, with the use of national veto power (in1963, 1965 and 1967). De Gaulle’s successive vetoes have had alasting impact on the EC’s predominant political culture. From thattime on, member states were no longer prepared to postponeconcessions. The Commission’s political role was also affected, as itbecame clear, especially with the Empty Chair crisis (1965), thatintegration could only be furthered on the basis of ad hoc agree-ments between the most influential member states (Olivi2001:111–5). Similarly, Margaret Thatcher’s famous claim duringthe 1984 Fontainebleau European Council (‘I want my moneyback’) legitimized the logic of a ‘fair return’, versus the principle of‘dissymmetric concessions’. Certainly, governments’ willingness tocounter-balance the Community method was not limited toEurosceptics. The formal creation of the European Council in 1974could be analyzed, partly at least, from that angle. Indeed, theincreasing coordinating role of the European Council has tended todevelop at the expense of the Commission’s power of initiative(Majone 2006:615). Negotiations on the Maastricht Treaty repre-sented a landmark in this respect, as most governments rejected theDutch presidency’s proposal to generalize the Community methodand opted for a pillar structure, with largely reduced powers forsupranational institutions in the second and third pillars.
What is more, since the end of the 1990s, the decreasing central-ity of the Community method was facilitated, in part, by the devel-opment of new forms of governance of an intergovernmental
26 Understanding Euroscepticism
nature, such as the Open Method of Coordination (OMC).Presented as a ‘third way’ between harmonization and intergovern-mental cooperation, the OMC, defined by one EU scholar as ‘inte-gration without law’ (Dehousse 2004:166), is a lax coordinationmechanism relying on soft law. It aims at fostering the diffusion ofthe ‘best practices’ in areas where the EU has no or little power(such as employment and social policies). Even if it gives theCommission the mission of defining guidelines for policy reform,the OMC clearly enhances the role of the European Council andcompletely bypasses the EP and the ECJ. The OMC is also emblem-atic of a specific type of discourse on EU governance, which tendsto emphasize the intergovernmental dimension of the EU. Forinstance, advocates of the ‘network Europe’ metaphor call for thedevelopment of ‘market-like relations’ between the differentcomponents of the EU, laying greater emphasis on ‘horizontal’(instead of ‘top-down’) relations and ‘decentralisation’ (Leonard1999:9–12). In this respect, the ideological background of theOMC is very reminiscent of the ideas of Dutch soft Eurosceptics(such as former Secretary for European Affairs Dick Benschop andformer EU Commissioner Frits Bolkestein), who also advocate agreater emphasis on interstate relations as an alternative to a strongCommission leadership, a greater reliance on soft law and a stricterrespect of the subsidiarity principle. In line with Thatcher’s views,they want the Commission to refocus on core tasks, such ascompleting the internal market and guaranteeing free competition(Harmsen 2004:101).
A weakened Commission
The ability of the Commission to demonstrate leadership skills hascertainly always varied across policy areas and time. Moreover, theCommission may exercise different forms of leadership (Nugent2001:217), so that the relative decline of one form of leadership maybe compensated, at the same time, by increased opportunities toprovide other forms of leadership. Keeping these nuances in mind, itseems that, in the course of the last decade, the Commission hasshifted from a proactive leadership, seeking to expand the Union’spowers, to a more defensive strategy, aiming first and foremost atstrengthening its own legitimacy. Parallel to this, the role of theCommission as an agenda-setter, as the driving engine of the integra-tion process, seems to have declined. This trend is due to multiple
Why Euroscepticism Matters 27
factors, and notably to the growing power and political clout of theEP, as was illustrated in 1999 by the collective resignation of theCommission’s College under EP pressure. It is also due to increasingtensions between the Commission’s multiple types of accountabili-ties, since reforms aimed at enhancing ‘democratic accountability’(bringing the Commission closer to citizens) may diminish theCommission’s ability to take national interests into account (‘diplo-matic accountability’) (Christiansen 1997). Expressions of elite andpublic Euroscepticism have also contributed to the development ofthis more defensive strategy on the part of the Commission. In thecourse of the 1990s, ‘Commission bashing’ by national govern-ments became quite frequent. An illustration of this was the 1998joint Kohl–Chirac letter, in which the Commission was indirectlyblamed for its alleged inappropriate interference in domestic affairsand its supposed remoteness from average citizens (quoted in Meyer1999:634). Moreover, declining levels of public support for EUmembership, as well as recent referenda, further restrained theCommission’s room for manoeuvre in acting as promoter of theCommunity’s general interest. This political context had a threefoldimpact on the Commission: on the reform of its governance andworking methods, on its roles as initiator of legislative processes andguardian of the treaties, and, albeit indirectly, on re-nationalizationtendencies inside the College of Commissioners.
Reform of the Commission’s governance and working methodsThe influence of Eurosceptic criticism on the reform of theCommission’s work is illustrated by the fact that terms like ‘central-ism’, ‘red tape’ and ‘bureaucracy’ have become common parlance inrelation to the Commission, which increasingly has to justify itsinitiatives. In communicating on its proposals, the Commissionincreasingly articulates a self-justifying discourse, centred onnotions of subsidiarity and impact assessment. Since the MaastrichtTreaty has elevated subsidiarity to a core principle for the exerciseof the EC’s (non-exclusive) powers, the Commission has to justifyits proposals with regard to this principle. In a similar vein, since2002, the Commission has had to conduct a threefold impact assess-ment (economic, social, environmental) for each legislativeproposal, an assessment which, since 2006, has included potentialadministrative costs. The introduction of systematic impact assess-ment illustrates a wider climate in which the Commission tries torespond to criticism over alleged red tape and bureaucracy. To this
28 Understanding Euroscepticism
end, it set up, in 2007, a high-level group on administrative burdens,chaired by former Bavarian Minister-President Edmund Stoiber(Euractiv 2007), who has long advocated a repatriation of theUnion’s powers to the regional level and regularly criticized theCommission’s alleged regulation excesses (Leconte 2003:424–5).
A lower profile as agenda-setter and guardian of the treatyWeak governmental enthusiasm for integration and recent refer-enda have also affected the Commission’s key roles as agenda-setter(deriving from its monopoly on legislative initiative) and asguardian of the treaties (notably, the possibility of engaging ininfringement procedures against member states failing to complywith EU law).
The 2005 referenda in France and the Netherlands and the 2008referendum in Ireland illustrated how expressions of publicEuroscepticism may affect the Commission’s power of initiative. Agood example of this is the Directive Proposal on TemporaryAgency Workers, initially tabled in 2002, which aimed at guaran-teeing better protection for temporary workers across the EU. Thisdirective proposal was very controversial in some member states,especially in the UK, where a referendum on the EU ConstitutionalTreaty had been foreseen. In September 2005, a couple of monthsafter the French and Dutch referenda, the Commission announced itwould ‘reconsider’ the proposal, as part of a wider initiative on‘better legislation’ (European Commission 2005a:4). Similarly, theresults of the first Irish referendum on the Lisbon Treaty promptedthe Commission to abstain from presenting a legislative proposal ona Common Corporate Consolidated Tax Base (CCCTB), as it hadannounced it would do in 2008 (European Commission 2007c:7).The need for a CCCTB had been stressed, however, by theCommission itself, as a way to eliminate tax base competition forcorporate headquarters in the internal market. As concerns over apossible harmonization of corporate tax systems had been one ofthe core arguments of No campaigners during the referendum, theCommission’s services did not wish to jeopardize the second Irishreferendum on the Lisbon Treaty. This perspective also preventedthe French presidency (in the second half of 2008) from taking boldinitiatives in the areas of defence and tax harmonization (The IrishTimes 2008a).
Moreover, concerns over risks of fanning Euroscepticism alsoinfluence the Commission’s role as guardian of the treaties. This is
Why Euroscepticism Matters 29
especially likely in cases where specific EU legislation proves highlycontroversial at the domestic level. In the past, for instance, theCommission hesitated to start an infringement procedure againstGermany for faulty compliance with the Packaging Directive (onwaste recycling), taking into account ‘the high level of politicalconflict such a step would have provoked in this sensitive regulatoryarea’ (Haverland 2000:99). Recently, the prospect of a second Irishreferendum on the Lisbon Treaty in October 2009 deterred theCommission’s services from starting infringement proceduresagainst Ireland. The financial crisis that broke out in 2008 rein-forced this low-profile strategy. In October 2008, the Irish govern-ment reacted to the financial crisis by offering unlimited guaranteesto citizens who deposited their savings in the biggest Irish banks.This decision could have been highly detrimental to free competitionin the internal market, as there were serious risks of massive shifts ofsavings from non-Irish banks to Ireland. However, despite mount-ing pressure to act, the Commission did not start an inquiry intowhether the Irish government had violated treaty provisions on stateaid.
Re-nationalization tendenciesTo the extent that Euroscepticism serves as a pretext for a moreblunt articulation of national interests by member states (see thecase of the IGCs below), it might have contributed to re-national-ization tendencies inside the Commission, among Commissioners’cabinets and the College of Commissioners.
Existing studies have refined the ideal-typical perception of theCommission as a purely supranational institution that is entirelydetached from national influences and loyalties. For now, it seemsthat the Commission has developed neither a common identity nora shared emotional commitment to further European integration(Cini 1996:223). Even among the Commission’s civil servants, whoare often assumed to be the forerunners of a new cosmopolitan iden-tity, patterns of national identification and logics of solidarityamong fellow nationals persist. This phenomenon is compoundedby appointment procedures for top civil servants in the institutionand by member states’ attempts to enhance the influence of theirnationals at the summit of the Commission’s hierarchy (Meyer1999:627; Bellier 2000:144–8). These practices may hamper theCommission’s ability to act as the promoter of a general interest,thus possibly fostering public scepticism as to its legitimacy. Indeed,
30 Understanding Euroscepticism
member states’ interference within the Commission’s organizationmakes it less transparent and less comprehensible to citizens.
Similarly, within the College of Commissioners, several factorshave contributed, since the late 1990s, to a weakening of the princi-ple of collegiality and to the reaffirmation of national logics (Jacqué2008:459), notably the increasing political influence ofCommissioners’ cabinets inside the institution. In order to counterthe tendency of member states to consider commissioners as repre-sentatives of national interests, the Lisbon Treaty foresaw a reduc-tion in the size of the College (which would operate, from 2014 on,on the basis of equal rotation between member states), thus break-ing with the current principle of ‘one Commissioner per memberstate’. Such a reform was also deemed necessary in order to maintainthe authority of the Commission’s President over his team and allowa smaller team to focus on core priorities. However, the prospect oflosing a Commissioner in the College raised concerns in smallermember states, notably in Ireland, where it was one of the reasonsunderlying the rejection of the Lisbon Treaty in 2008.Consequently, in order to secure Irish ratification of the same treatyin a second referendum, the European Council decided in June 2009that ‘the Commission shall continue to include one national of eachMember State’ (Council of the European Union 2009:2). Certainly,this decision does not question other Lisbon Treaty provisionsaimed at enhancing the authority of the Commission’s Presidentover his team (for instance, by allowing him personally to removeindividual Commissioners). However, this concession is likely tofurther the re-nationalization of the College and undermineattempts to reinforce the president’s leadership capacities.
A lack of governmental leadership
This lack of leadership is not compensated for at the governmentallevel, as recent European Councils and the latest IGC have illus-trated. During the last decade, the blunt articulation of nationalinterests among heads of state and government was clearly percepti-ble at successive European Councils (notably in Berlin in 1999, Nicein 2000 and Brussels in 2005), marking ‘the return to brutal periodsof defence of the national interest’ (Majone 2006:610). Certainly,European Councils in the past had also witnessed tough bargainingbetween member states (as was most famously the case inFontainebleau in 1984). However, the increasing media coverage of
Why Euroscepticism Matters 31
European Councils, as well as the discrepancy between discourseson the EU as a ‘community of values’ and hard interstate bargain-ing, can only foster scepticism among citizens. As media scholarshave shown, this ‘hard bargaining’ image of European Councilsconveys a negative view of the EU among the public, which may beconducive to Eurosceptic orientations (see p.199).
Negotiations on the Lisbon Treaty during the 2007 IGC were alsoa good example of this lack of governmental leadership. Certainly,for advocates of further integration, the Lisbon Treaty is a success, asit implies enhanced powers for the EP, an extended scope for major-ity voting, the principle of a double majority, and new powers for theEC. However, the 2007 IGC contrasted with previous exercises incrisis management in the life of the EC/EU. Previously, when a singlecountry rejected a new amending treaty by referendum (as in the caseof Denmark in 1992 and Ireland in 2001), governments did not re-open negotiations on the treaty but, instead, sought specific solutions(usually in the form of European Council resolutions) in order toaccommodate the concerns voiced by national electorates. This time,governments decided to re-open negotiations on the EUConstitutional Treaty, a text they had signed in 2004. Furthermore,the Dutch and French 2005 referenda empowered Euroscepticgovernments, such as the British and Polish ones, by reinforcing theirdemands for derogations (relating to the EU Charter of FundamentalRights, as well as cooperation over police and criminal justice for theUK). The 2005 referendum also put considerable pressure on theDutch government, which defended a tough line against the Union’ssymbols and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (Ziller 2008:24).This is due to the fact that concerns over national identity and apossible extension of the Union’s powers had been key motivationsunderlying the Dutch No (see p.180). More generally, EP observersin the 2007 IGC deplored ‘the wording of several passages of theTreaty … entailing an unjustified shift to a negative tone, which givesan impression of mistrust vis-à-vis the Union and its institutions andthus sends a wrong signal to public opinion’ (European Parliament2007:9). Finally, during the 2007 IGC, few governments were will-ing to put forward initiatives to further integration. For instance, aproposal by the Italian delegation (led by former CommissionPresident and Prime Minister Romano Prodi) to add a protocol onenhanced cooperation in monetary policy and macro-economiccoordination to the Lisbon Treaty was only supported by a handfulof delegations (notably the Belgian and Luxembourg ones).
32 Understanding Euroscepticism
Euroscepticism outside the EU: implications forinternational relations
At stake in the debate between soft Eurosceptics and advocates of atightly integrated community is also the role that the EU is expectedto play in international relations. Indeed, many Eurosceptics (fromboth right and left) argue that the EU is too ‘inward-looking’(Thatcher 1988:10). While left-wing critics emphasize the impact ofEU protectionism on developing countries, right-wing critics aim atmaking the EU a free trade area open to global trade. To (right-wing) Eurosceptics, the EU should drive the agenda for global trade,without developing a political self-understanding of its role in inter-national relations. Such was the meaning, for instance, of HenryKissinger’s famous ‘Year of Europe’ speech, in which the Secretaryof State declared that ‘the United States has global interests andresponsibilities. Our European allies have regional interests’(Kissinger 1973:594). This speech was (correctly) interpreted bymany Europeans as a statement confining EC political cooperationto a merely regional scope.
By contrast, for advocates of a political union, the EU has aspecific contribution to make in the stabilization of the internationalsystem – an idea that was first articulated in the Declaration onEuropean Identity, adopted by the nine EC countries in reaction toKissinger’s speech (Council of the European Communities 1973).EU enlargement especially, it is argued, allows the EU to act as a‘transformative power’ (Leonard 2005) by reinforcing processes ofpolitical and economic transition in candidate countries. Moreover,as the most regulated market in the world, the EU could drive theagenda for more regulations (environmental, social, financial, etc.)at a global level. This section highlights the stakes of the debatebetween these two different understandings of the EU’s interna-tional role. It shows how expressions of Euroscepticism within andoutside the EU might affect the EU’s ability to enlarge further anddrive the agenda for global governance.
Enlargement: the end of geographical spill-over?
Although opposition to further EU enlargement does not necessar-ily correspond to Euroscepticism, it might be developing into asignificant dimension of Euroscepticism, both at elite and publiclevels. As was mentioned (p.7), hostility to further enlargement
Why Euroscepticism Matters 33
tends to be associated with hostility towards further integrationamong segments of domestic political elites. Similarly, it was a key dimension of the No vote during the 2001 (Ireland) and 2005 (France and the Netherlands) referenda (see pp.178–9).Furthermore, between 2002 and 2009, public support for furtherenlargement in the EU experienced a nine percentage point decline;in the older member states, there was a fourteen percentage pointdecline. In 2009, a relative majority of EU citizens were opposed tofurther EU enlargement – even more so in the older member states,where less than 40 per cent supported it (EB 71:159). In this context,the accession of new countries to the EU might be delayed orimpeded, thus undermining the logic of ‘geographical spill-over’identified by neo-Functionalists in the 1960s. Geographical spill-over refers to the soft power of the EU, or its capacity to attractneighbouring countries by making alternative forms of cooperationprogressively irrelevant (as the case of the European Free TradeArea illustrated).
Pro-enlargement advocates argue that a halt to future EUenlargements, especially in the case of Turkey, might not onlyreduce the EU’s influence in international relations; it might alsoendanger the stabilization and democratization processes of candi-date countries. In the United States, in the aftermath of the 2005Dutch and French referenda, this concern was voiced by members ofthe foreign policy establishment, as the debate on the future oftransatlantic relations held by the US House of Representatives’Committee on International Relations illustrated. As one represen-tative stated, ‘I am particularly concerned that EU expansion willfall victim to the ongoing constitutional crisis. Halting the enlarge-ment process is contrary to the interests of the European Union and,I would argue, the United States and sends the wrong political signalto those nations whose entire political, judicial and economicreform efforts are based on the possibility of accession’ (UnitedStates House of Representatives 2005:11).
Moreover, perceptions of a widely reluctant public opinion in EUcountries can increase opposition to EU accession in candidatecountries, two of which (Croatia and, to a lesser extent, Turkey)display high levels of public Euroscepticism. In Turkey, publicsupport for EU accession has been declining markedly since 2004.Since 2002, expressions of reluctance towards Turkey’s accessionwithin the EU might have contributed to this phenomenon. First,debates on the reference to Christianity in the preamble of the EU
34 Understanding Euroscepticism
Constitutional Treaty showed that large segments of political elitesunderstand the EU as a community rooted in Christian values, aperception shared by a majority of Turkish citizens (Cautrès andMonceau 2008:586). Second, public opinion polls showing thatopposition to Turkish accession was widespread in the EU, as wellas the role this issue played in the 2005 referenda, may have fosteredpublic Euroscepticism in Turkey.
Eurobarometer surveys highlight how Turkish Euroscepticismhas evolved in parallel with scepticism towards Turkey’s accessionwithin the EU. They indicate a continuous decline in levels ofsupport for EU accession in Turkey between 2004 and 2008, from70 per cent to 40 per cent (CCEB 2004:7; EB 70:32). This is corrob-orated by polls published in the Turkish press, showing that theproportion of hard Eurosceptics (those who think their countryshould definitely stay out of the EU) increased threefold during thatperiod, from 8 per cent to 25 per cent (Milliyet 2006).
Eurosceptic agendas outside the EU: hostility towardsglobal governance
The outcome of the debate between advocates of a minimalist inter-national role for the Union and those who support political unionwill also have global consequences. Certainly, the EU only accountsfor eight per cent of the world’s population, so its future influence ata global level should not be overestimated. However, its experiencein conflict resolution through law and market regulation in a multi-national context may serve as a role model for advocates of regionalcooperation and a more regulated globalization in other parts of theworld. The failure of political union in the case of the EU – the mostsuccessful form of interstate cooperation up till now – would send asignal to the rest of the world, increasing scepticism towards institu-tions of global governance.
This was illustrated by reactions to the 2005 and 2008 referendain the United States among (neo-)conservative think-tanks such asthe Heritage Foundation, the American Enterprise Institute or theForeign Policy Research Institute. As explained below, theirattempts to influence the debate on the future institutional andpolitical development of the EU is part of a wider agenda, aimed atweakening institutions of global governance and preventing theemergence of regulatory authorities at regional and internationallevels.
Why Euroscepticism Matters 35
In the discourse of the neo-conservatives, three motives underliethe hostility towards a more integrated EU. The first motive relatesto the perception that the EU might develop policies that are at oddswith what neo-conservatives identify as US national interests.Among those interests is the wish to prevent the setting up of regu-lations (either at EU or global levels) that might harm the interests ofUS companies (notably those operating in the EU, for example inIreland). Similarly, there is a wish to prevent the development of acommon EU foreign policy that might be at odds with perceived USinterests. In that respect, the Lisbon Treaty entails reforms thatcontradict US interests, including the strengthening of the foreignand defence policies and the EP’s new trade policy powers, whichmight reinforce the EU’s defence of specific societal preferences(such as for Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs)) in interna-tional trade negotiations. That is why, according to the HeritageFoundation, ‘the re-emergence of the EU constitution [in the form ofthe Lisbon Treaty] represents a fundamental threat to Americaninterests’ (McNamara 2006:1). The second motive is a strong oppo-sition to the strengthening of multilateralism and internationalorganizations. Reactions of neo-conservative thinkers to the 2005and 2008 failed referenda illustrate this. For instance, John Bolton,a former US ambassador to – and self-declared foe of – the UnitedNations, sees the EU’s attempts to forge a common security anddefence policy as a welcome pretext to withdraw US commitment toEuropean security through NATO, if not to suppress NATO alto-gether (Bolton 2008:2). In a similar vein, contributors to theHeritage Foundation suggest that intra-EU cleavages between free-traders and allegedly protectionist governments should be exacer-bated in order to undermine the EU common trade policy and createa coalition of free-trading nations around the US, as an alternativeto the World Trade Organization. This would create a ‘global freetrade alliance’, understood as an ‘economic alliance of the willing,determined to liberalize trade among its members’, which wouldoffer free trade agreements ‘between the US and any other countrythat has demonstrated a commitment to free trade and investment,minimal regulations and property rights’ (Huisman 2005:2). Thethird motive relates to a form of value-based Euroscepticism (see p. 57 for a definition of the term). Neo-conservatives are indeedconcerned that US society might be ‘contaminated’ by so-calledEuropean values (for instance, on the issue of the death penalty),notably through the internationalization of US federal law, via the
36 Understanding Euroscepticism
case law of the Supreme Court (which has forged contacts with itsEU counterpart, the ECJ) or via international, legally binding texts,which the EU could promote in international organizations (seeMcNamara 2006; Bolton 2008).
These think-tanks have tried to influence subsequent nationalpublic debates on the EU, as was the case in Ireland. For instance,the Foreign Policy Research Institute offered Declan Ganley, anIrish businessman and Eurosceptic political entrepreneur, a plat-form to publish his views on the EU Constitutional Treaty in 2003(see Ganley 2003). During the referendum campaign on the ratifi-cation of the Lisbon Treaty in 2008, the Irish press widely reportedon the No campaign’s alleged use of US funds, prompting Irishauthorities to set up an independent commission to investigatethese allegations (European Parliament 2008). Furthermore, USEurosceptic think-tanks have forged alliances with Euroscepticgroups in the EU in order to influence perceptions of the EU amongthe US foreign policy establishment (see Chamorel 2006:165;Vaïsse 2004:453) and to ‘support the idea of a EU made up ofsovereign nation-states’ (McNamara 2006:6). An example of this isthe Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom, hosted by the HeritageFoundation.
Criticism of regional or global forms of governance, however, isnot always rooted in anti-regulation concerns. It might also resultfrom the perception that governance beyond the nation state alsochallenges modern understandings of democracy – that is, in thewords of one EU scholar, ‘the idea that some degree of coherence isnecessary between cultural identities, socio-economic practices andrules/institutions’ (Bartolini 2003:8).
Euroscepticism: a welcome thorn in the EU’s side
By pinpointing how global forms of governance can put nationaldemocracies in question, Eurosceptics have made a crucial contri-bution to debates on the legitimacy of the EU. First, the mainreforms that have helped democratize the EU were prompted, to alarge extent, by Eurosceptic criticism. Second, in terms of policies,Eurosceptics have questioned inefficient status quos and raised theissue of the limits of integration. Third, Euroscepticism raises a keyquestion for the EU: what should be the role of politics and politi-cal conflict in a political system that, in its very essence, relies onrelatively de-politicized and consensual interactions? In that
Why Euroscepticism Matters 37
respect, Euroscepticism confronts the EU with an uncomfortablequestion: the impact of its own alleged democratic deficit onnational democracy.
Eurosceptic criticism and the democratization of the EU
Many of the reforms that have contributed to democratizing EUinstitutions have indirectly resulted from Eurosceptic initiatives orchallenges to EC institutional authority. For instance, President deGaulle’s 1961–62 Fouchet plan, which aimed at weakening EECinstitutions through the creation of a (potentially rival) purely inter-governmental organization, with a powerless parliamentary assem-bly, spurred the determination of small member states andEuropean parliamentarians to reinforce the legitimacy of the EP andpush for its direct election by citizens (Wallace 1995). The mostsignificant institutional development that occurred in the 1990s, theextension of the EP’s powers, resulted from criticism over the EU’s‘democratic deficit’. The development of ECJ case law can also beinterpreted, in part, from that perspective. For instance, the chal-lenge of some national constitutional courts regarding the primacyof EC law (as illustrated, for example, by the ‘Solange I’ ruling of theGerman constitutional court in 1974) prompted the ECJ to guaran-tee the protection of fundamental rights, by referring to the generalprinciples of EC law and the European Convention for theProtection of Human Rights (ECHR) (Jacqué 2008:444).
What is more, Eurosceptic criticism has prompted the EU toadapt to new standards in terms of transparency, information andcommunication. Indeed, from the end of the 1970s on, publicauthorities in Western democracies have been confronted withdemands emanating from civil society, asking for more trans-parency and more accountability. In the EU’s case, the first moves inthe setting up of an EU transparency initiative were initiated in1993, following debates surrounding the ratification of theMaastricht Treaty, as were the first significant informationprogrammes targeting the average citizen (the so-called Princeprogrammes). By the same token, the 2005 referenda led theEuropean Commission to launch a more interactive EU communi-cation strategy, aimed at ‘listening’ to citizens’ concerns (EuropeanCommission 2006a). Like major international organizations, theEU reacted to public criticism by shifting from a rather passive infor-mation policy to a more proactive communication strategy.
38 Understanding Euroscepticism
Policy status quos and the limits of integration
EU policies have also evolved as a result of Eurosceptic criticism.For instance, the accession of countries whose governments wereseen as Eurosceptic has led to significant policy developments. TheUK’s EEC accession prompted the crafting of the EEC’s regionalpolicy (with the creation of the European Fund for RegionalDevelopment). Moreover, Eurosceptic leaders have oftencontributed to debates about the evolution of EU policies, thusbreaking the status quo on ‘frozen’ policy choices, as MargaretThatcher did when she criticized the heavy focus of the EEC budgeton the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) (a claim taken over byPrime Minister Tony Blair when he held the EU presidency in2005). In a similar vein, new forms of governance, such as theOMC, have prompted useful discussions on the limits of integra-tion. Notwithstanding the fact that a majority of EU citizens do notwant more EU power in fields such as social policy or taxation,attempts at harmonization in these policy areas might have adverseimpacts on the competitiveness of European economies (Wyplosz2005).
The lack of political conflict: the main cause of the‘democratic deficit’
Eurosceptics’ main merit, nonetheless, is to have stressed the limitsof a purely functionalist type of legitimacy, which has long beenprevalent at the EC/EU level. President de Gaulle was among thefirst leaders to bluntly raise the issue of public consent when heoffered to submit his intergovernmental vision of Europe to an EC-wide referendum (Wallace and Smith 1995). This clashed with thefunctionalist understanding of legitimacy that was predominantwithin EC institutions, and which assumed that popular consentwould come gradually, as citizens realized that the EC fulfilled anexpanding number of relevant functions. Since the 1985 Adonninoreport on a ‘citizens’ Europe’, this understanding of legitimacy haspermeated every attempt by EC institutions to ‘bring citizens closerto the EC’. To the extent that EC institutions have tried to promotethe emergence of EC-level actors, these were assumed to be pro-European. This was the case, for instance, with Jacques Delors’concept of a European civil society, which sought to strengthen theCommission’s legitimacy by forging a special relationship with
Why Euroscepticism Matters 39
interest groups, at the risk of empowering lobbies. In a similar vein,Article 191 TEC on European political parties provided that ‘polit-ical parties at European level are important as a factor for integra-tion within the Union. They contribute to forming a Europeanawareness’. This article raised concerns that the EU might refusefunding for European political parties that were consideredEurosceptic or even, in an exaggerated version of the debate, thatthe ECJ might ban allegedly Eurosceptic parties (see the debate inthe House of Commons 2001:39). Indeed, the provision referringto parties as a ‘factor for integration’ is suppressed in the LisbonTreaty.
In a similar vein, recent contributions to academic debates on thelegitimacy of the EU have emphasized the lack of political conflictwithin the EU political system as the main cause of the democraticdeficit. The lack of a ‘government–opposition nexus’ at the EU level,the absence of an organized opposition and the predominantconsensual political culture in the Council and in the EP lead, it isargued, to a ‘waning of Opposition’ at the EU level (Mair 2007:15).In a similar vein, other contributions (Lord and Magnette 2004)have argued that the existence of conflicting views about the sourcesof the EU’s legitimacy (and how this legitimacy should be enhanced)should not be seen as a weakness of the EU political system. Rather,the open-ended, disputed nature of the EU, which has beensubjected to permanent deliberation since the founding period of theEC, could enhance its legitimacy and facilitate its acceptance atmember state level. Thus, what the EU needs is not less, but morepolitical conflict.
The impact of integration on national democracy
In this respect, the phenomenon of Euroscepticism highlights thedouble-edged impact of European integration on national democ-racy. On the one hand, the EU played a key role in processes ofdemocratic transition in southern and eastern Europe. It has madeEU membership conditional upon the respect of democracy, the ruleof law, and human rights, and has adopted significant pieces oflegislation on non-discrimination. On the other hand, Europeanintegration might also have indirect adverse impacts on nationaldemocracy, by, for instance, contributing to the waning of opposi-tion at the domestic level. Europeanization might indeed contributeto the disempowerment of democratic counter-weights, such as
40 Understanding Euroscepticism
trade unions. The latter have not only been affected by wide-rangingmutations in labour markets, but also by processes of market inte-gration. At the same time, no unified trade union movement has yetemerged at EU level. Consequently, the loss of power at one levelhas not been compensated at another. As far as political parties areconcerned, integration contributes to reducing the range of policiesavailable to governments, thus further blurring the differencebetween left and right and diminishing political competitionbetween clearly discernible alternatives (Mair 2007:14). Wide-rang-ing market integration might thus reinforce public perceptions ofthe political elites’ lack of manoeuvre, if not irrelevance, in the faceof global challenges (Bartolini 1999). Moreover, while no robustEuropean party system has yet emerged at EU level, at domestic levelEuropean integration exacerbates perceptions of a growing distancebetween party leaderships, intermediate levels and regional partyorganizations (Raunio 2002). That is why European integrationmight actually exacerbate the current lack of trust citizens have inpolitical parties (in 2009, only 19 per cent of citizens in the EUtrusted political parties (EB 71:15)).
In a similar vein, processes of Europeanization also challengecollective perceptions of national institutions. As the latter becomeincreasingly interlinked with EU institutions and the administra-tions of other member states, a process of ‘administrative fusion’(Wessels 1996) takes place, resulting in increasing complexity, lesstransparency and less accountability. This has significant conse-quences for state/society relations. Administrative fusion ‘diffusesresponsibilities and reduces transparency … For the normal citizen,the “state” becomes less and less a clear object of “identification”’(Wessels 1996:100).
Finally, market integration also challenges mechanisms of redis-tribution and collective solidarity, as the free circulation of capitalfurther reduces public decision-makers’ room for manoeuvre, forexample in taxation policy. It can also challenge national solidarityin more indirect ways. For instance, by favouring transnationalcooperation between prosperous regions (a good example of thisbeing Four Motors for Europe, a trans-regional cooperationbetween Baden-Würtemberg, Catalonia, Lombardy and Rhône-Alpes), European integration might indirectly contribute to adecreased sense of inter-regional solidarity within states (Judt1992:114).
Why Euroscepticism Matters 41
Conclusion
In analyzing developments in European governance, this chapterhas shown how Euroscepticism, among other trends, hascontributed to the decreasing centrality of key aspects of suprana-tional decision-making, as it was understood in the foundationalperiod of the EC. Moreover, it has highlighted the possible impactof Euroscepticism on processes of geographical spill-over and hasshown how different expressions of Euroscepticism are intertwinedwith a more global competition between different views on interna-tional governance.
The impact of Eurosceptics, however, is by no means limited toattempts to block or paralyze the process of European integration.As the chapter argues, Eurosceptics have prompted attempts tomake the EU more democratic and more efficient by exposing thelimits of functional legitimacy and by questioning inefficient policystatus quos. Furthermore, for scholars of democracy, the phenome-non of public Euroscepticism is also a warning. As analyzed later inthe book, it is one of the many symptoms of the malaise of democ-racy and highlights how market integration processes at regional orglobal levels influence state/society relations and citizens’ orienta-tions towards institutions of representative democracy.
42 Understanding Euroscepticism
alter-globalization movement238–43
anti-Americanism 6, 105, 109anti-marketeers 3
Berlusconi, S. 114, 125, 217Blair, T. 15, 20, 39blogs 207–8Bolkestein, F. 15, 27, 49, 50, 65,
