1
A final version of this paper was published in Technological Forecasting & Social Change 80
(2013): 711-722. Please quote the published version.
Understanding normative foresight outcomes:
Scenario development and the „veil of ignorance‟ effect
Liviu Andreescu, Spiru Haret University
Radu Gheorghiu, Institute for World Economy
Marian Zulean, University of Bucharest
Adrian Curaj, Politehnica University, Bucharest
Abstract
The article approaches the question of the extent to and the ways in which the participatory
construction of normative narratives in system foresight influences the shape of the outcomes.
We discuss foresight as a system of inquiry into decision-making problems characterized by
three key features – distancing, holism, and participation-intensiveness. We put forward the
hypothesis that participative approaches to normative scenario development, which are
structurally similar to a Rawlsian “original position” setup, generate a concern with the
procedural arrangements governing the future world in the scenario, rather than simply with the
events or states in the story of the future. This concern with “constitutional basics” may be
regarded as an expression of participants‟ attempt to ensure that, in the future world, each party
will have a seat at the table and a voice in the conversation. As a result, the construction of
normative narratives may be interpreted in terms of an effort to smooth out tensions that are
inevitably embedded in scenarios. The hypothesis is illustrated, in the article‟s final section, with
a recent exercise on the future of higher education.
2
Keywords: system foresight; normative scenario; participation; original position; consensus;
holism; deliberative democracy
1. Introduction
The question we asked ourselves as we approached the final stages of a large-scale, participatory,
vision-oriented process was: “What kind of normative narrative should one expect from a system
foresight exercise”? At the most basic level, the answer is, of course, plain: the picture of a
somewhat distant future which is recognized by the participants in the exercise as desirable and
as an appropriate guide for future policy action. But does this type of output have some structure-
or substance-related characteristics or features that are generic, i.e., which one would expect to
encounter in most normative scenarios in system foresight, or at least in those arrived at by
similar routes?
While the literature on scenario building and scenario planning has recently been enriched by
typologies and taxonomies [28,2,24], none of those we consulted adequately responded to this
question. Van Notten et al. [28], for example, distinguish between normative and what they
somewhat misleadingly refer to as descriptive scenarios, but do not systematically relate either of
them to other features within their three typological dimensions (project goal, process design,
and scenario content).1 Bishop et al. explicitly point out that, while they initially intended to
distinguish among scenario techniques in terms of a “descriptive” and a “normative” approach, it
“turned out that each technique could be adapted for one or the other...” [24, p. 21]. Borjeson et
al.‟s [2] discussion of normative scenarios is confusing (as we show presently), among others
because it appears to include in this class only so-called developmental or event-sequence
scenarios, but not also end-states or snapshot scenarios. Other taxonomies, though clearly
framing normative scenarios as a separate class, are hardly more specific in pinpointing any
distinguishing outcomes.
1 There is one exception, namely their claim that backcasting scenarios are normative “by nature” [28, p. 429]. We
discuss this question further down, in the subsection on normative scenarios.
3
We therefore return to our question: does the added normative (as opposed to exploratory)
dimension of scenarios in system foresight exercises influence the shape of these narratives in
predictable or recognizable ways? The expectation that such scenarios have defining features
would not be far-fetched. It is a commonplace of post-positivist theories of science that the
structure of the system of inquiry partly determines the outcomes [17]. Our claim in this paper,
which we put forward as a hypothesis to be tested by future research, is that participatory system
foresight exercises yield normative narratives which tend to focus, explicitly or implicitly, on the
basic values and procedural arrangements governing the desired future world.
The article‟s first main section looks at system foresight as a system of inquiry, that is, as the
paradigm within which the type of scenario building we are interested in is undertaken. We
highlight those assumptions in foresight which, in our view, are conducive to the kinds of
outcomes described by our hypothesis. This also provides an appropriate context for clarifying
the meaning of the term “normative” as employed herein.
The hypothesis is properly fleshed out in the second section. To this end, we suggest an analogy
with a famous thought experiment in political philosophy – John Rawls‟s “original position” /
“veil of ignorance”. While appealing to such an analogy may seem surprising, we note that
scenarios themselves are thought experiments (“heuristic devices … for attempting to break
away from conventional thinking” [35, p. 149]). Indeed, as thought experiments the “original
position” and normative scenario building share several very significant structural features.
The third section spells out some implications of our hypothesis for the development of
normative narratives. We also suggest a less traditional perspective on working with scenarios,
specifically as a normative conversation on “fields of tensions”.
Finally, we provide an outline of a recent large-scale system foresight exercise in higher
education, focusing on its scenario development phase. This serves as a case study which lends
prima facie support to our hypothesis. However, we leave it to subsequent analyses of past and
future foresight endeavours to determine whether the hypothesis may be properly generalized at
all and, if so, to what extent.
4
It must be emphasized that, while “foresight” is a concept which covers a wide array of
prospective practices, we are concerned here with one particular, albeit relatively broad, type.
Although, for the sake of convenience, we will employ below the phrase “system foresight”
without further qualifications, what we have in mind is a type of practice that (a) has, as its
object, large social institutions and the associated systems of organizations (such as education or
R&D&I); (b) entails a participatory process involving diverse categories of actors and
stakeholders; and (c) aims to deliver, among others, a shared normative narrative of the future
(often, a vision) as a guide to action. Furthermore, this normative narrative usually emerges as
the result of some form of consensus among participants and therefore claims for itself a degree
of representativeness (though not in the statistical sense) or, at least, of inter-subjective
agreement.
Each and every one of the features above is essential to our argument. Conversely, we do not
claim that the hypothesis put forward here holds with equal force beyond this qualified
understanding of system foresight, in foresight for small organizations, for example, or in
scenario-building efforts that do not allow the normative narratives to emerge through some
manner of agreement achieved in a mostly bottom-up process.
2. Foresight as a system of inquiry and the role of scenario building
To set the stage for this section‟s discussion, it is worth commencing with the observation that
the type of foresight alluded to above – large-scale, participation-intensive, systemic – is today
ripe for exploration, among others because of its substantial growth over the past few decades.
Miles et al. documented a rather remarkable accumulation of “national” foresight exercises
between the early 1990s and the middle of the last decade [14], while Slaughter found a few
years ago that government dominates “the world of FS/foresight work” [36, p. 9]. National
foresight is today complemented by regional endeavours, while the original S&T focus of system
foresight has also been broadening, as with the higher education foresight discussed in the final
section of this article. The national or regional – as opposed to organizational – dimension of
recent foresight has had an impact on specific practices, introduced new challenges, and, perhaps
most importantly, created new expectations [14]. Scenarios and visions for complex national or
regional institutional systems – and even continental ones, judging by foresight‟s “footprint in
5
the further consolidation” of the European Research Area [37] – render questions such as the one
asked here quite timely.
This being said, it is difficult to do justice to foresight in terms of a brief characterization or a set
of features, particularly given the number of foresight schools and the wealth of foresight
practices currently in use, some of which do not even attach to themselves the “foresight” label
[14]. Although, in our discussion, we strive to capture several relevant core assumptions of
foresight in general, we are particularly concerned with the variety which is applied to large-
scale social institutions (to institutional systems or “organizational fields”) [38], relies on
participatory processes, and employs normative scenarios as a key method. This will be referred
to as “system foresight”. While this approach obviously restricts the range of foresight practices
tackled here, it covers a sufficiently wide gamut of exercises and experiences to lend a broader
interest to our argument.
2.1. Assumptions underlying foresight as a system of inquiry
For the purposes of this article, foresight as a system of inquiry – or paradigm, to use a broader
term – relies on, among others, three important assumptions:
in inquiring into the future, one must distance oneself sufficiently from the present [6,39]:
additional freedom from the latter leads to better anticipation of the former;
the future should be approached holistically [36], that is, systemically rather than in a
reductionist manner, with no part of the future system being considered as a priori more
important than any other [16, p. 31];
the processes whereby the future is explored should be participatory, ideally to the point
where “[e]veryone who will be impacted by the „plan‟ that results from a futures process
should be part” of the latter [32, p. 4].
As a paradigm, foresight doubtlessly relies on other fundamental assumptions, sometimes
deeper-level ontological and epistemic ones, such as several key claims about complexity and
uncertainty (from which, in fact, its holism derives) [4]. Nevertheless, foresight‟s future-oriented
distancing, its holism, and its participatory nature are essential and sufficient for our argument.
6
They explain why the “scenario method” has been hailed as the “the tool par excellence of
futures studies” [30, p. 15] or as “the archetypical product of futures studies … [embodying its]
central principles” [24, p. 5].
Scenario development is a convenient method in system foresight because, firstly, it is well
suited to putting distance between participants and their present circumstances. By either
eschewing trend extrapolations (the “official” or “continued growth” view of the future [32]) or
employing them primarily as heuristic devices, scenario building allows, according to its
practitioners, for both temporal and epistemological distancing. The aim is to “look more widely,
more deeply, and longer into the future” [39, p. 102] rather than to be spot on. This arguably
enables participants to “see the present or future anew” [6, p. 78].
Secondly, the relatively substantial degree of freedom – implicit in the distancing effort – taken
in building scenarios renders holism particularly appropriate as a governing perspective. In this
sense, scenario development is a “systemic method” [36]. It typically presupposes long-range
futures in order to allow for “structural, and hence more profound” change [2]. Rather than
getting bogged down into details, many of which are inherently uncertain or based on
questionable assumptions, scenarios promise “deep understanding” and “the ability to ... spot
developments before they become trends, to see patterns before they fully emerge, and to grasp
the relevant features of social currents that are likely to shape the direction of future events.” [25,
p. 2] Furthermore, as a trend-breaking [22] or certainty-breaking tool, scenarios strive to keep
presentist reductionism at bay.
Thirdly, the distancing act naturally makes room for a participatory and activist approach to the
future. Whereas near, predictable futures are arguably sometimes best handled by experts, the
latter‟s role in the imagining and/or creation of futures appears less dependable. Furthermore,
since holism typically implies the recognition that systemic change depends on mutually
reinforcing transformations at both institutional and social level [27], a collective, participatory
learning-by-doing component appears attractive. Scenarios are especially convenient in this
context because several of their features enable broad participation: they often don‟t presuppose
advanced technical skills from most participants, can accommodate a variety of forms of input
into the process, are quite flexible as a technique and format, and can be convincingly interpreted
7
as a process-oriented enterprise [3]. Thus, as Inayatullah noted, scenarios are about “the victory
of agency over structure” [6, p. 78], about the power to shape the future through the exercise of
collective will and imagination against the constraints imposed by present structures and mental
models. As a result, everyone is welcome at the table.
The synergy of distancing, holism and participation-intensiveness also renders normative
scenarios particularly attractive in foresight. Such narratives, whether packaged as sets of
desirable alternative futures or as singular visions of the future, rely on participation to a
qualitatively greater extent than exploratory scenarios, because they must not only deliver fresh
or original or heuristically useful insights, but also command the assent or the recognition of
participants (and often also of the communities whose voices they represent). Furthermore,
especially where the normative scenario is a single, “unifying” vision, it will tend to cover very
broad sections of the future system. Without guaranteeing a holistic perspective, this tends to
sustain it.
2.2. Normative scenarios in foresight
It is appropriate, at this point, to explain how we construe the term “normative” in this context.
We do not define normative scenarios in terms of “explicitly normative starting points …
[describing] future situations or objectives and how these could be realised” [2, p. 728], if by
“starting point” it is meant that such scenarios are built from pre-existing commitments to certain
goals or ends. According to this view, the “starting” goals or ends are not themselves the object
of normative inquiry, being predefined or preselected in some way. Rather, in our construal of
“normative”, the desirable future situations or the goals in the scenario-building exercise emerge
themselves as the result of a process with specific features. Typically, this process implies an
eventual consensus or agreement which, in view of its having been reached through the
involvement of the relevant actors and stakeholders, may claim a sufficient degree of
representativeness or inter-subjective assent, which is also a key source of normativeness. The
normative narrative(s) may then serve to guide future action aimed at achieving something
resembling the desirable image(s) of the future.
8
Whether or not the normative scenarios are actually followed by strategic commitments or policy
action is less significant for their normative status. What is important is that they be offered for
such purposes. As a matter of fact, neither the desirability of a picture of the future, nor the fact
that it emerges as the product of agreement or consensus, nor both of these conditions together
are sufficient to lend a scenario its normative force. The latter becomes normative only if, in
addition, it is put forth as a goal for action (and sometimes also as a path to that goal).
While, in the system foresight context taken here as a reference, a normative scenario implies
desirability, consensus, and suitability for future action, there is also a weaker sense of
“normative” in the literature. It is encountered, for instance, in the observation that most
scenarios are informed by values. Thus, against the claim that alternative scenario sets “should
be conceived as value-neutral” [26, p. 114], it can be convincingly argued that all scenarios,
including early exploratory ones, are entrenched in norms and values [28] and are even
ideologically charged [22]. Sometimes this is acknowledged explicitly and, indeed, capitalized
on. In one of the approaches associated with the Manoa School, for example, the four archetypal
alternative futures are “cosmolog[icall]y, epistemolog[icall]y, and often deontolog[icall]y”
grounded [32, p. 7]. The same is true of techniques wherein scenarios are not fixed at the
beginning of the exercise. Frequently, scenario sets for organizations are developed based on
variables teased out during discussions on the organization‟s history, culture, its current goals,
etc. These starting points are clearly normative in the weaker sense discussed here, whether this
is recognized during scenario building or not. Yet this is not the meaning of “normative” we are
interested in, because virtually all scenarios are normatively embedded in this sense.
It is also worth distinguishing “normative” as deployed here from a stronger, more limited (and
limiting) meaning of the word: a scenario, usually embodying a set of strategic choices, which
commands the open, official commitment of the relevant decision-makers [7]. While such
commitment frequently constitutes one ideal of visioning, this strong version of normativeness is
not required for the purposes of our argument. Rather, we employ “normative” with reference to
a desirable story which is recognized as such by a diverse and, where possible, representative
community. The narrative‟s backing by decision-makers able and willing to take action is not a
necessary condition for normativity.
9
3. The hypothesis unveiled: normative scenarios as “constitutional basics” of the future
world
Let us now return to the question which prompted the development of our hypothesis: does the
added normative (as opposed to exploratory) dimension of scenarios in system foresight alter the
shape of these narratives in predictable ways? We put forward that adding the constraint of
normativity on top of the three aforementioned features of scenario development – the distancing
act, the holistic perspective, and the participatory structure – will tend to generate narratives
which focus on the basic values and the key procedural arrangements that govern the desirable
future world. To put it differently: the consensus underlying the desirable picture of the future
will be the expression of an agreement not only on the “content of the future”, but – and
essentially – also on the foundational values and procedures enabling the residents of the future
world to negotiate their interests. Even though the desirable picture will, on its surface, depict
various future events or states of affairs, in practice it will frequently be the vehicle for a deep-
structure agreement on what we would venture to call the “constitutional basics” of the future
world.
The triad of distancing, holism, and participation-intensiveness plays a central role here.
Distancing, whatever its advantages as far as anticipation is concerned, increases epistemic
freedom as well as epistemic and psychological uncertainty about the future. Reflective
participants will soon understand that their role in the future world is not easy to predict. The
uncertainty is strengthened by the foresight ideal of participation-intensiveness: given the holistic
perspective and the systemic nature of the exercise, the actors and stakeholders involved will
typically belong to diverse groups. Presumably, each party to the scenario building effort will be
confronted with varied, often conflicting worldviews and with specific individual or group
agendas about the future. In response to epistemic uncertainty and ideological diversity,
participants will want to make sure that they will still have a say in the jointly constructed future.
They will set a baseline for their future bargaining power (a maximin strategy, in game-
theoretical terms). This should generate a concern, whether manifest or concealed, with
“constitutional basics” – the procedural arrangements governing the future world in question.
10
An analogy with a familiar thought experiment in political theory may serve as an illustration.
John Rawls‟ “original position”, first widely publicized in his A Theory of Justice [20] and then
subject to various revisions [19,21], is sufficiently well-known beyond political philosophy and
political science circles for the brief presentation below to suffice. Before outlining it, it bears
pointing out that scenarios as currently practiced in futures studies are quintessential thought
experiments – heuristic devices whereby participants‟ current mental models are suspended in
order to stimulate new perspectives on the object of inquiry [35]. Seen in these terms, Rawls‟
approach to social justice is, much like vision-based foresight exercises, based on an imaginary
scenario which presupposes a leap of faith. It is also based on an intuition which, as noted
previously, plays a crucial role in scenario development as well: by putting some distance
between decision-makers and their present circumstances the scenario-building exercise will
enhance their imagination; act as an empathy-generating device [10] facilitating consensus; and,
partly as a result, yield a more objective (or inter-subjective) [19] outcome.
The goal of Rawls‟ “original position” thought experiment is to develop the principles of justice
underlying a well-ordered society. Following in the footsteps of social contract theories, the
American political thinker chose a deliberative procedure for his setup. Specifically, he asked the
participants in an “original position” to determine the appropriate basic principles of justice for
an imagined future society, without any of these founding parents knowing their actual social
position and their natural endowments therein – hence the “veil of ignorance”. Under the veil,
participants are unaware of their conceptions of the good in the hypothetical society, but are
supposed to choose rationally the principles that would enable each to adequately pursue their
vision of the good, whichever that may be. The purpose of the “veil” conceit is thus, much like in
scenario development, to enable the participants to achieve distance from their current interests
and viewpoints. By asking the prospective residents of the society to derive its governing
principles from a position in which each remains ignorant of his or her future condition, Rawls
hopes to trigger a suspension of those parts of participants‟ ethical models that are, in fact,
morally irrelevant, but which often affect, in practice, their moral worldviews.
As Rawls subsequently restated his argument, a key challenge which this thought experiment
tried to resolve is the “pluralism of incompatible yet reasonable comprehensive doctrines” [21, p.
11
xvi], i.e., the irreducible plurality of legitimate worldviews held by the members of a complex
political community. The deliberating parties are, in effect, asked to define the principles of
justice for their future society by shedding their present-day footwear and imaginatively putting
themselves in the shoes of any conceivable dweller (or at least a number of substantially
different conceivable dwellers) of the future world. One of the frequent criticisms levelled
against the original position – but which need not concern us here – is that this act of imaginative
suspension may demand too much in practice [23].
In the case of normative scenario building in system foresight, a veil-of-ignorance effect is
achieved by requesting participants to construct and reflect on a desirable picture of a future that
is sufficiently distant to minimize perceived threats to actors‟ and stakeholders‟ present-day
circumstances and interests. Like the participants in the original position, the actors and
stakeholders in system foresight are recognized to have legitimate interests and views which may
be at odds with the views and interests of other participants. In reflecting normatively on higher
education in fifteen- or twenty-years‟ time, for example, foresight participants are invited to
think beyond their current social and professional coordinates: by that future time, the powerful
senior academics and administrators will probably have retired, younger ones will have secured a
comfortable position (or opted for another career), students will have long since graduated, their
parents will have stopped contributing to tuition, business leaders will have seen their ventures
develop in unpredictable ways, and so on. In other words, such an approach to normative
scenario building offers, by design, not merely the opportunity to think collectively, but also an
incentive to think beyond one‟s contextual interests in remaking the future. It enhances actors‟
and stakeholders‟ empathy not simply through participant diversity and a conversational process,
but by inviting them to explore the future from a position of relative freedom from current
concerns.
We hypothesize that this superior (though hardly absolute) degree of freedom plays a key role in
shaping normative scenarios in system foresight: like Rawls‟ founding parents deciding behind
the veil on the basic principles of their well-ordered society, foresight participants are stimulated
by the somewhat remote horizon of the scenarios, their bird‟s eye perspective, and their need to
come to an agreement, to reflect on “constitutional” arrangements ensuring access and voice in
12
the future system. What emerges is, in Rawlsian terms, an “overlapping consensus” on value and
procedural basics which accommodates the variety of participants‟ “comprehensive worldviews”
(or views on the system that is the object of the system foresight inquiry). Just as the Rawlsian
ethical inquiry, “[r]ather than address all questions that might concern citizens … is confined to
what Rawls calls society‟s „basic structure‟” [11, p. 635], so the normative scenario generated in
the system foresight inquiry will tend to focus on the elementary conditions for participation in
the making of the future.
To sum up, the two setups compared by means of the analogy are remarkably alike in their
structural essentials. Both presuppose a deliberative format in which participants holding a
legitimate plurality of reasonable worldviews are invited to reach a normative agreement on the
basis of these worldviews. Both induce the participants, through trade-specific tricks such as the
veil of ignorance or distancing techniques, to set aside their present concerns in their
deliberations. True, the deliberating denizens of Rawls‟ future society are supposed, by the very
goals of their conversation, to discuss and agree on basic principles; whereas this is not
necessarily the case – at least not in terms of overt goals – with system foresight exercises. But
our point is precisely that Rawls‟s thought experiment is especially designed to be conducive to
such a debate about basic values and procedures, and that, on the other hand, normative scenario
development in system foresight closely resembles this design. If the features of the design, and
in particular the circumstances of the veil of ignorance, naturally move Rawls‟ deliberating
citizens towards an agreement on constitutional arrangements, then it should not be surprising
that system foresight exercises, which follow a relatively similar plan, tend to proceed along a
similar path toward a similar end-result.
4. Some implications for working with normative scenarios
If the hypothesis is correct, it has two kinds of implications on working with normative
narratives in system foresight. First, it tells us what we can legitimately expect to happen during
normative scenario building, and suggests that attention should be paid to particular dimensions
of this process. Secondly, the hypothesis points to some limitations of current work with
scenarios and to possible solutions for managing or circumventing them.
13
4.1. Rethinking the relevant dimensions of scenario building
As to the first matter, if the representativeness of the normative scenario matters (if it is the way
in which the outcomes of the process are legitimized, for example), achieving consensus on
foundational values and procedures should not be considered an inadequate or insufficient
outcome. Not all normative scenarios will have a rich, lush story to tell about the future.
Sometimes participants do not fully agree on the shape of things to come, and the jointly created
story skimps on many issues – trends, events, circumstances – usually considered important.
(Outsiders will often notice that.) Nevertheless, even such a scanty narrative will almost always
contain significant deep-structure clues about how participants conceptualize their roles and
interaction in the future world. At a minimum, the story will provide the common terms on
which the participants are prepared to share the future with each other.
It may turn out to be comparatively more difficult to generate public policies or organizational
strategies based on a consensus barely going beyond value and procedural basics. By virtue of
their generality, the latter will be compatible with a wide spectrum of strategic or policy actions.
Nonetheless, such an agreement could still go a longer way towards engendering lasting
consensus compared with approaches which enrich the normative narratives by covertly forcing
consensus on more than the (uncoerced) participants would be prepared to accept.
This brings us to the issue of designing the “normative conversation” yielding the desirable
narrative(s). We have insisted above that the hypothesis advanced herein depends on distancing,
a holistic perspective, as well as on participation-intensiveness. It is high time to emphasize that
a genuinely participatory structure implies an authentic bottom-up approach to scenario building.
By this we mean something approximating, as far as possible, an “ideal deliberative procedure”
[29] which entails free dialogue, pluralism of views and aims, a recognition of each party‟s
deliberative capacities, a shared goal of reaching a reasoned agreement, and a collective
commitment to solving the issues at hand through the associative process under way (the
scenario building or visioning exercise and, after they are over, the conversation and community
they engendered).
14
Not all narrative-building techniques are equally friendly to such a normative conversational
format. Many scenario techniques rely rather extensively, even though usually for heuristic
purposes, on models of the system to which the foresight inquiry is applied. Such models are
supposed to ensure a more disciplined exploration of the future, and are helpful in generating
intuitive scenarios that are related to each other in clear-cut ways. The double-variable approach
is a typical example. The Manoa School‟s archetypal alternative futures [32] and the “good, bad,
ugly” (GBU) or GBN approach also fit the profile. In these types of scenario work, the generated
or partly predetermined narratives are, properly speaking, alternatives, in the sense that one
scenario excludes the others, though they are not usually assigned probabilities (they are either
equiprobable, or their probability is not in question). In the normative stage of the exercise, one
scenario is then typically selected as the preferred narrative, or a preferred narrative is
constructed out of desirable features derived from the alternatives.
From the perspective advanced here, the problem with this approach is that, while the inquiry
into the future appears more disciplined, the “space of the possibles” is also comparatively
limited, sometimes in rather arbitrary fashion.2 (This is by no means to deny that such limiting
has its heuristic value.) The diversity of participant viewpoints is also restricted, because
whoever takes part in the exercise ultimately either has to buy into the whole conceptual model
on which the scenario development is based, or will be marginalized in the conversation. The
marginalization does not have to be personal – the participant who does not buy into the model
but accepts it as “the rules of the game” may be very active. But his or her original viewpoint
2 Let us discuss just one example from the literature, which is instructive precisely because the construction itself is
quite ingenious. In proposing a “hybrid strategic scenario method”, Miller suggests a scenario-based approach to the
future of electricity – as contemplated circa 1900. He also confronts head-on the complex issue of “select[ing]
specific scenarios from what is still a vast space of possibilities” [15]. His solution to meeting this complex
challenge is intuitive but, upon reflection, appears improvised and reductive: focus on the function and / or
organizational attributes (or other similar pairs) of the scenarios‟ subject. So Miller comes up with three values for
function (war, replacement for existing sources of energy, autonomous power for new products) and two values for
organization (centralized versus decentralized production), yielding six scenarios, which are then placed on a grid-
like map of the “pervasiveness” of energy, operationalized as “ease of use” and “range of uses”. This strategy is, in
fact, reductive many times over: first, in selecting pervasiveness as the issue (why not ethical concerns à la
Frankenstein [the book], especially in light of the War of Currents?!), then in positing a simple causal relationship
between the mode of production and ease-of-use (decentralization signifies overcoming technical barriers of
production, according to Miller, though in fact centralized production may well be conducive to general access as
well). This adhockery is, in fact, designed to generate a “rigorous” way to cope with the messiness of the field of
possibles. We suggest, instead, that the messiness be accepted as unavoidable and that one should rather strive to
provide an adequate medium to come to terms with it.
15
will have been sidelined. Sometimes, sceptical participants accept to play the game, and they do
so actively and joyfully, but this should not be considered a sign that their initial scepticism has
dissolved. Their doubts as to the exercise‟s usefulness, and their consequent reluctance to
eventually act upon the results, may legitimately persist. To conclude, this type of scenario work
is perhaps more suitable for individual organizations, where the diversity of ideological mindsets
is not typically so high. It seems less appropriate in the case of institutional systems, which
involve a substantial diversity of actors and stakeholders and, by extension, of ideological
viewpoints.
4.2. Designing normative conversations on the future
We argue in favour of a more genuinely bottom-up approach which we see, in light of our
hypothesis, as better attuned to future-orientated inquiries into institutional systems. With the
exception of heuristic exploratory phases, this kind of system foresight relies not primarily on
models, but on the virtues and constraints of a normative dialogue. Given the nature of the
system inquired into, the numerous and diverse participants in the exercise, reflecting the
complex nature of the institutional system, will typically bring to the table their often
irreconcilable views of the latter. Strictly speaking, no participant or group truly sees “the
system”, because there is no single system for all the participants involved; each category of
participant has its own version(s) thereof.
Furthermore, participants‟ views are usually underpinned by complex and often unacknowledged
ideologies and will be, as a result, difficult if not downright impossible to change in substantial
fashion. This makes double-variable, archetypal or GBU/GBN approaches risky, because they
sometimes lure participants in with models or assumptions to which they, in fact, would not
subscribe on appropriate reflection. This is why the end-goal of the normative conversation
should be to facilitate consensus not only on the desirable picture of the future (often a simplified
sketch and a poor guide to tough future choices), but also on a “constitutional” framework of the
future. The latter will render difficult strategic or policy options and the trade-offs they involve
more manageable.
16
Let us illustrate this distinction between focus on the surface-level picture and, respectively, on
the deep-level “constitutional framework” with an example from the literature. Inayatullah [30]
describes Galtung‟s “transcend” technique [40] for the resolution of conflicts among visions by
referring to an exercise in which participants had to work with two appealing images of the
future of a city: a “green sustainable city” and a “far more exciting modern international
glamorous city” [30, p. 19]. The participants are said to have “transcended” the gap by relying on
innovation, which was considered implicit in or compatible with the modern facet of the
glamorous city, in order to ensure a sustainable dimension for the latter. Hence the appealing
picture of a sustainable glamorous metropolis.
But how far does this reconciliation of two desirable pictures of the future take us? What price
consensus? In the example above, consensus is attained, it seems to us, by assuming that two at
least superficially opposed worldviews are compatible “deep down”, at the – to use a term
employed by Inayatullah elsewhere [31] – mythological level. The unified vision for the city is
ideologically familiar from the catchphrase “sustainable development”. But to be content with
this level is to avoid a critical examination of the very notion of a sustainable glamorous
metropolis, and of sustainable development more generally. This vision, while tempting, gained
political momentum precisely on account of its vagueness and its ideological elasticity. As we
have been reminded, the “initial vagueness [of sustainable development] is no longer a basis for
consensus, but a breeding ground for a situation where whoever can pin his or her definition to
the term will automatically win a large political battle for influence over the future” [41, p. 1-2].
In other words, the sustainable glamorous metropolis seems an attractive idea partly because it
eludes, for the moment, many of the hard choices.
We doubt that, in the context of a scenario-based inquiry into institutional systems, the hard
choices of the future can be clearly mapped. Yet what can be achieved, and this may provide a
way out of the predicament outlined in the previous paragraph, is to lay out the values and the
procedural arrangements governing the conversations in the future. If the future is that of a city,
these basic values may turn out to be “an exciting life space” (of which glamour is just one
appealing, but neither sufficient, nor necessary, characteristic), “long-term sustainability” (for
which a green dimension may be important, but not absolutely essential), and so forth. Moreover,
17
how these values would be balanced in the many decisions on the future of the city, while hard to
specify in advance within the framework of the scenario-building exercise, can at least be tackled
in terms of the basic rules for the normative conversation that will extend into the future, long
after the system foresight is over. It could be established, for instance, that all factions will be
proportionally or equally represented in the decision-making process; that the roles of the experts
will be limited (or extensive) in some domains of decision but not in others; that one basic value
can be advanced only with minimal detrimental effects on others, or only if such effects are
offset within a specified time frame, etc. This, we put forward, should be a critical focus of the
normative conversation in successful system foresight exercises.
4.3. Normative scenarios as fields of tensions
This brings us to one final issue: the question of consistency in normative narratives. One
frequent assumption in scenario development is that the narratives generated are or should strive
to be internally consistent, that they (should) contain no significant inner tensions. This view is
almost explicit in the construction of double-variable narratives which neatly divide the field of
possibles into stories which, while they may partly overlap, certainly appear to be coherent,
homogeneous packages. As a matter of fact, the quest for internal consistency seems to be
widespread among scenario practitioners of many stripes. Thus, Rikkonen defines a scenario as
“an internally consistent story about the path from the present to the future.” [42, p. 208]
Bradfield et al. list internal consistency among “the common baseline criteria by which all
scenarios are evaluated regardless of developmental methodology” [3, p. 810]. Roubelat likens
scenarios to ideologies, which he defines as “consistent systems of ideas and beliefs” (a curious
assumption in postmodern times) [22, p. 519-520]. Checking scenarios for consistency is
explicitly recommended as a distinct, important stage of the scenario-building process [26,2].
Frequently, however, the assumption of or quest for internal consistency is either the result of a
problematic trade-off, or simply unwarranted. Consistency is sometimes achieved at the expense
of complexity, that is, by positing simple causal relations and ruling out specific combinations of
variables as impossible. Yet, as some authors have noted, “it is striking how often situations
occur that were simply … excluded as „logically impossible‟ or „inconsistent‟ during the process
of scenario building.” [18, p. 167] Scenarios often remain consistent by offering a bird‟s eye
18
view of the future: from “up there”, so little detail is seen that inconsistencies pass undetected
and are consequently presumed inexistent. On the other hand, when scenarios include tacit
contradictions or dilemmas, they are rendered at best useless and, at worst, misleading by being
(as they often are) swept under the rug.
We suggest that, if one looks at scenarios in the normative conversational frame proposed above,
inconsistencies are no longer necessarily a flaw. They should instead be welcome as a relief from
the causal limitations that are often introduced either surreptitiously or ad hoc in the construction
of narratives. As Postma and Liebl urged, a step “to increase the complexity of scenarios,
consists of allowing the exclusion of causality restrictions and the inclusion of inconsistency
effects, particularly paradoxical trend clusters [as in „glocalisation‟ or „Bourgeois
Bohemians‟…” [18, p. 169] As a matter of fact, in creating scenarios such inconsistencies or
tensions may often be involuntarily incorporated and even unavoidable. This seems obvious in,
for instance, the sustainable glamorous city in the example above. But it is likely the case also in
the seemingly more consistent pictures of the green city (Why bother? Why not make it a
countryside?) or of its glamorous international counterpart (Maybe glamour depends on
restrictions of access and thus on limited, jealously guarded internationalization? And where do
we hide “the other half”, those who sustain economically the international glamour?). And by the
way: can one imagine a myth without at least one major inner contradiction?
Tensions and potential inconsistencies should not be eliminated from scenarios by logical sleight
of hand or by feigning ignorance of complexity, but rather rendered manifest and then diligently
explored. Perhaps one should think of sets of multiple scenarios not so much as spaces of
possibles, but as spaces of tensions in which the inconsistencies are turned, through the creation
of alternative narratives and the eventual making of normative choices, into objects of
conversation and exploration. Exploring the tensions becomes then a principle guiding scenario
development, while the normative narratives are stories of potentially successful, albeit always
incomplete and fragile, negotiations of contradictions or dilemmas. A thorny and often glossed-
over issue in scenario development, the “select[ion of] specific scenarios from what is still a vast
space of possibilities” [15, p. 354], is thus resolved by being dissolved into the problem of
19
creating a space of negotiation in which the “fields of tensions” may be approached by the varied
participants.
5. The hypothesis illustrated: the future of higher education
The final section of the article is intended as an illustration, by way of a case study, of a system
foresight exercise which, upon reflection and with the benefit of hindsight, seems to fit the
profile described by our hypothesis. It should be emphasized that the exercise is not offered as a
test of the hypothesis. That would require a systematic analysis of a substantial number of past
and future exercises. If anything, the system foresight outlined below simply played a part in the
generation of the hypothesis. Furthermore, as noted in the introduction, the foresight project team
did not know what to expect from the normative outcome. Neither were we immediately aware,
after the generation of the vision on Romanian higher education in 2025 – the object of the
foresight in question –, what the results meant or how they could be interpreted. Our construal of
the visioning exercise in light of the hypothesis which it inspired took shape later, as we reflected
on our experience. This interpretation remains just one of the possible readings and alternative
analyses may doubtlessly be put forward. This being said, the reading proposed here seems
persuasive. Its chief value lies in suggesting a different angle on the meaning of normative
scenarios in system foresight.
The process3 outlined in this section was described in some detail elsewhere [1,5]. In what
follows, the analysis will be limited to the scenario building part, which is sufficient for this
article‟s goals. Nonetheless, a brief panoramic picture of the entire process will be provided in
order to set out the context of the scenario development exercise.
The idea of a system foresight exercise on Romanian higher education in 2025 emerged in the
context of a previously successful experience with “national” foresight for the R&D system.
Higher education seemed a good or better candidate because it has been the subject of incessant
reforms throughout its two-decade post-communist existence, yet these changes were judged
3 The process was part of the FSE-funded project Quality and Leadership for Romanian Higher Education, which
was carried out between 2009-2011 under the coordination of the (Romanian) Executive Agency for Higher
Education and Research Funding. For additional information, see http://www.edu2025.ro/ (an English version of the
website is also available).
20
unsuccessful. After twenty years of inconsistent reforming, education in Romania was assessed
quite bluntly as “ineffective, irrelevant, and of poor quality” [43, p. 1]. Furthermore, the system
has been in a state of flux, having witnessed a radical overall expansion, accompanied by a
(perceived) drastic reduction in scholastic standards and international competitiveness, as well as
by endless fretting over issues such as quality, homogeneity, fairness, disconnectedness from
social needs and aspirations, and indifference to market trends. Therefore, a vision on the future
of higher education and a subsequent set of policy lines were seen as potentially powerful reform
tools.
5.1. The structure of the scenario building and visioning process
The vision on Romanian higher education in 2025 was generated in the form of a normative
picture of the future derived from a set of four desirable future scenarios. By and large, the
system foresight followed a rather established model with several distinct stages, as described
by, for instance, Da Costa et al. [4]: diagnosis, followed by a participatory exploration process
relying primarily on scenario work, by strategic orientation (achieved, in this case, through the
visioning process), and by policy-making.
The scenario building combined a more analytical “from present to future” approach [12] with a
creative exploratory phase in which four desirable pictures of the future were developed by as
many groups of participants. Elements of the desirable scenarios were then used as a basis for the
generation of the vision. This was followed by a policy formulation stage (in a “from future to
present” backcasting approach [33,34]), ignored here as less relevant for our present purposes. In
a nutshell, the structure of the scenario building process was the following (Fig. 1):
Fig. 1. The structure of the scenario development process – an outline
[insert Figure 1 picture here]
The initial step was to identify potential matters of interest. This involved three activities:
o A computerized semantic scan of literature on higher education yielded a set of issues
and sub-issues of potential interest for the process. Some 600 titles were scanned and
analyzed, among others by means of combined Zoom and Tropes software.
21
o A series of brainstorming workshops mixing real-time interaction with carefully
managed anonymity – a combination made possible by the electronic platform iLab –
expanded the results of the literature review into a set of five broad themes (and
associated subthemes). The latter served as a general thematic framework for the
early phases of the scenario building.
o A heuristic system-view integration of the themes and subthemes.
Secondly, a large database of some 6,500 higher education stakeholders and experts was built
through a viral questionnaire and a nomination-conomination process. The identification of
stakeholder skill and will took the five themes and the subthemes into account. Based on
criteria such as stakeholders‟ previous activities or the number of nominations, around 600
experts were considered directly relevant for the project and either took part in its activities
or were invited to do so.
Five thematically-oriented expert panels, consisting of around 15 members each, elaborated
analyses of current issues in Romanian higher education, described relevant trends, identified
sets of future challenges, and mapped the stakeholders.
Based on the analyses and the charting of trends and future challenges, a group of some 100
panelists and invited stakeholders generated, during a three-day workshop facilitated by six
international experts, four desirable scenario drafts or frames. The scenario frames were
loosely related to the thematic areas, but were not required to – and in practice did not – stay
within their bounds. No unique set of techniques was employed, as each international
facilitator was free to use their preferred scenario toolkit.
The four scenario frames were fleshed out during a series of creative workshops involving
higher education actors and stakeholders (a substantial number of whom participated for the
first time in the process). The workshops lasted four days and involved around 200 persons in
total. While several established techniques (role-playing, card games, World Café) were
used, this exercise also relied on unstructured dialogue among the participants. A set of
metaphors describing the desirable future HE system were also generated to enrich each
22
scenario frame. Eventually, each scenario-developing group voted on the three best
metaphors and the scenario frames were consolidated into final narratives.
In the last phase of the scenario building process, a vision for Romanian higher education in
2025 was generated from the four desirable scenarios in the manner discussed below.
5.2. The substance of the vision on Romanian higher education
It is instructive to examine both the substance of the four scenarios and their dynamics in the
process through which the vision took shape. The scenario frames were developed within five
broad thematic areas: the development of human capital, knowledge generation, relationships
with business and the community, social values, and international competitiveness. Obviously,
these five broad themes overlap to a considerable extent. This was not considered a problem, as
participants in the scenario workshop were given room to expand their narratives in whatever
direction they saw fit. Consequently, the four desirable scenarios on the future of higher
education (Appendix figure) were not envisaged as alternatives, but as partial, overlapping
pictures of the future. They also conflicted with each other to a degree and, notably, harboured
significant internal tensions.
The four desirable narratives were designed to serve as the foundation stone for the final,
composite normative scenario – the vision on Romanian higher education in 2025. The process
relied primarily on negotiations among the members of a 15-person visioning group, consisting
of the leaders of the four scenario panels, alongside other prominent figures in Romanian higher
education and civil society. The project team and a few international advisers also assumed an
active role in the visioning, carrying out clustering and other sense-making exercises and
consolidating the results after each of the five rounds of debates, which brought about
substantial, sometimes drastic changes. After achieving agreement on the substance of the vision,
the resulting document was submitted to five focus groups consisting of stakeholders not
previously involved with the project. The goal of the focus groups was to test the presentation
rather than the substance of the vision.
The dynamics of the four desirable scenarios in the visioning negotiations (see Appendix) is
worth dwelling on. The image at the heart of the “Blue Ocean” scenario, a higher education
23
system with room for diverse academic organizations occupying a variety of academic market
niches, was soon accepted as an appealing description of the future. This scenario provided the
macro-level picture of the system, and instated the value of diversity as the first pillar of the
vision. At the same time, it generated a contentious proposition: the three institutional archetypes
projected in the same scenario encountered fierce resistance from several members of the
visioning group. They were perceived as a major source of tension, since, the reasoning of the
opponents went, a “true blue” Blue Ocean is one in which many types of organizational forms
are free to evolve, prosper and perish. Defining in advance a few standard organizational types
would be exceedingly limiting, as well as potentially harmful to the idea of diversity. Although
the notion of institutional archetypes had adamant supporters, it was abandoned eventually.
The second pillar of the vision was also a value: personalization, defined as highly customized
educational paths and experiences (primarily for students, but ultimately for all those involved in
higher education). The value responded to the core insight of the first scenario (“The University
of Life and Work”) and was judged to be consonant with institutional diversification. Several
key images in this narrative were retained (modular academic contents, widespread e-learning,
numerous non-traditional programs, non-academic practitioner involvement in curricular design).
The proposals not incorporated in the vision were considered too restrictive.
The third pillar, transparency, was devised as a procedural value. This choice had a prevalent
pragmatic dimension, since “transparency” was construed not primarily in its broad liberal sense,
but chiefly in terms of ensuring the conditions necessary for individuals, organizations, and
buffer institutions to negotiate their roles in a diverse and personalized higher education. Thus,
the vision described a higher education system in which there is general free access to a wide
range of publicly- and privately-maintained “transparency tools” – portals with comparative data
on programs and providers, alternative classifications and rankings of varied formats,
information and guidance services, etc.
The visioning negotiations ultimately sidelined most of the issues raised in the other two
scenarios – meritocracy, quality assurance, fundamental and/or applied research, the balance of
funding by state and private agencies, and so on. These were not selected as significant elements
of the vision, perhaps because they are currently hotly contested questions in Romanian higher
24
education which demand tough choices in the immediate future. Reaching an agreement on such
matters would have been an unlikely development, and the vision-building effort provided an
opportunity to eschew them in order to focus on the broader, deeper questions concerning the
future of the Romanian university.
5.3. The normative conversation in light of the hypothesis
Returning now to our hypothesis, we find several aspects of the visioning negotiations
particularly relevant.
The parties systematically and self-consciously avoided to be specific about the details of
the future system. The various organizational models advanced in the four desirable
scenarios represented a major bone of contention, and none were ultimately accepted as
appropriate for inclusion in the vision. Other questions touching on policy choices for the
here and now – such as the structure of the funding system, quality assurance procedures,
the balance between fundamental and applied research – were likewise eschewed. We
interpret this as a sign of the broadly shared feeling that the vision should be sufficiently
general and permissive to allow decisions on such matters to develop in time, naturally
and pragmatically.
Instead, it was the basic values governing higher education in 2025 that captured the
negotiating parties’ attention. The visioning group was hardly disinterested in funding,
quality assurance, governance, vocationalization, or the like. All or most participants had
strong beliefs in these respects, sometimes occasioning heated arguments. Partly as a
result, the visioning group concentrated their consensus-making efforts on the sphere of
values, and negotiated diversity, personalization, and transparency as the vision‟s three
pillars. We regard this as an indication that the object of the negotiating parties‟
consensus tends to shift towards the deep structure or the “constitutional framework” of
the future system.
The vision’s core values, selected from among the many proposed, signalled the parties’
preoccupation with ensuring that the future system remains open to them. The three
pillars were hardly the only values given pride of place in the four desirable scenarios.
25
The latter also highlighted accountability to the community, meritocracy, academic
freedom, professional ethics, employability, the nurturing of democratic citizenship, and
others. Yet none of these captured participants‟ interest in negotiating an inclusive
system, in which they would have a voice. Instead, diversity emerged relatively soon as
the appealing value, although it goes against traditional reflexes in Romanian higher
education policy (which emphasizes one-size-fits-all quality standards, identical
organizational structures, etc.) [44]. Personalization materialized as the flipside of
organizational diversity and was, to a large extent, conceptualized in terms of
programmatic diversification. Transparency was advanced as a procedural value, in order
to ensure that, faced with a potentially bewildering diversity, none of the parties to the
visioning negotiations and their constituencies are left out in the cold, deprived of the
means to make suitable choices.
A significant part of the discussions within the visioning group reflected on the tensions
in the four desirable scenarios, which the vision sought to transcend. Thus, for example,
the “University of Life and Work” scenario espoused an extreme personalization of
educational experiences and career paths, yet urged universities to organize their services
based on labour market forecasts. The “Knowledge Constellation” turned universities
into hubs in the global web of knowledge, while ignoring precisely the decentralizing
effects of the information revolution. The “Athenaeum” envisaged a universally esteemed
university, but tightly tied its core functions to market forces. Finally, the “Blue Ocean”
simultaneously supported diversity and sought to keep it under control through
predefined institutional archetypes. One can read the vision as an attempt to temporarily
transcend these tensions – by prioritizing among the desirable scenarios‟ values (e.g.,
diversity over tight coupling to market needs), by inventing new solutions (e.g.,
transparency as a tool in dealing with diversity and personalization), and, ultimately, by
selectively ignoring some of the tensions and thus postponing a resolution for later on in
the conversation.
In our interpretation of the vision on Romanian higher education in 2025, the negotiating parties‟
choices expressed an option not primarily for particular states of affairs in 2025, but rather for
26
what we referred to as “constitutional basics”. Dominant desirable narratives, such as the “Blue
Ocean”, were, in the process of being generally embraced, stripped down of specifics and of their
more constricting content. The message appeared to be that one should agree on the principles
governing the ocean – its major undercurrents –, but stop short of being prescriptive about its life
forms. It is not difficult to recognize here a sketch of deliberative democracy [8,9].
6. Conclusions
The hypothesis we put forward in this article is that normative scenarios in system foresight tend
to focus on “the frame of the future”, rather than merely on the picture inside the frame.
Although the interest of scenario practitioners is often captured by the surface picture, given its
overt preoccupation with future events and states of affairs, the deep structure of normative
narratives is equally significant. The latter is an expression not only of myths or latent ideologies
– which, to be sure, some scenario techniques do their best to explore –, but also of the
configuration of the normative conversation yielding the narrative.
In system foresight, this structure includes a distancing act in which a leap of faith is taken, away
from the present; a holistic perspective on “the system” whose future is inquired into; a
participatory process which invites a diversity of ideological commitments; and the eventual
making of some form of consensus. This combination generates, among participants, a concern
with the basic values and the procedural arrangements (the “constitutional basics”) governing the
future world. The participants‟ epistemic freedom allows them to be bolder, more imaginative,
and more empathetic; and their epistemic insecurity about their precise roles in the future world
provides them with a strong incentive to craft a place where they are all ensured appropriate
levels of participation and sufficient powers of negotiation.
So far, this hypothesis remains untested, and the exercise on the future of Romanian higher
education outlined above is offered merely as an illustration. To determine if and to what extent
the hypothesis may be generalized, systematic research on present and future foresight exercises
is necessary.
[insert Appendix here]
27
References
[1] L. Andreescu, R. Gheorghiu, M. Zulean, A. Curaj, System foresight for Romanian Higher
Education, in: A. Curaj, P. Scott, L. Vlasceanu, L. Wilson (Eds.), European Higher
Education at the Crossroads: Between the Bologna Process and National Reforms,
Springer, Dordrecht, 2012.
[2] L. Börjeson, M. Höjer, K.-H. Dreborg, T. Ekvall, G. Finnveden, Scenario types and
techniques, Futures 38 (2006) 723-739.
[3] R. Bradfield, G. Wright, G. Burt, G. Cairns, K. van der Heijden, The origins and evolution
of scenario techniques in long range business planning, Futures 37 (2005) 795-812.
[4] O. Da Costa, P. Warnke, C. Cagnin, P. Scapolo, The impact of foresight on policy-making:
insights from the FORLEARN mutual learning process, Technology Analysis & Strategic
Management 20 (2008) 369-387.
[5] S. Elena-Perez, O. Saritas, K. Pook, C. Warden, Ready for the future? Universities‟
capabilities to strategically manage their intellectual capital, Foresight 13 (2011) 31-42.
[6] S. Inayatullah, Questioning Scenarios, Journal of Futures Studies 13 (2009) 75-80.
[7] M. Godet, The art of scenarios and strategic planning: tools and pitfalls, Technological
Forecasting & Social Change 65 (2000) 3-22.
[8] A. Gutmann, D. Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement, Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, MA, 1996.
[9] A. Gutmann, D. Thompson, Why Deliberative Democracy?, Princeton University Press,
Princeton, NJ, 2004.
[10] M. Hoffman, Empathic emotions and justice in society, Social Justice Research 3 (1989)
283-311.
[11] G. Klosko, Political constructivism in Rawls‟s Political Liberalism, American Political
Science Review 91 (1997) 635-646.
[12] M. Lindgren, H. Bandhold, Scenario Planning: The link between future and strategy,
Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2003.
28
[13] D. Loveridge, Foresight: The Art and Science of Anticipating the Future, Routledge, New
York, 2009.
[14] I. Miles, J. Cassingena Harper, L. Gheorghiou, M. Keenan, R. Popper, The many faces of
foresight, in: L. Gheorghiou, J. Cassingena Harper, M. Keenan, I. Miles, R. Popper (Eds.),
The Handbook of Technology Foresight: Concepts and Practice, Edward Elgar,
Cheltenham, 2008.
[15] R. Miller, Futures literary: A hybrid strategic scenario method, Futures 39 (2007) 341-362.
[16] I. Mitroff, M. Turoff, Philosophical and methodological foundations of Delphi, in: H.
Linstone, M. Turoff (Eds.), The Delphi Method: Techniques and Applications, Addison-
Wesley, Reading, MA, 1975.
[17] D. Polkinghorne, Methodology for the Human Sciences: Systems of Inquiry, SUNY Press,
Albany, NY, 1983.
[18] T. Postma, F. Liebl, How to improve scenario analysis as a strategic management tool?,
Technological Foresight & Social Change 72 (2005) 161-173.
[19] J. Rawls, Political liberalism: Reply to Habermas, The Journal of Philosophy 92 (1995)
132-180.
[20] J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, rev. edn., Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1999.
[21] J. Rawls, Political Liberalism, rev. edn., Columbia University Press, New York, 2005.
[22] F. Roubelat, Scenarios to challenge strategic paradigms: Lessons from 2025, Futures 38
(2006) 519-527.
[23] M. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, 2nd ed., Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, 1998.
[24] P. Bishop, A. Hines, T. Collins, The current state of scenario development: an overview of
techniques, Foresight 9 (2007) 5-25.
[25] H. Tsoukas, J. Shepherd, Managing the Future: Foresight in the Knowledge Economy,
Blackwell, Oxford, 2004.
[26] K. van der Heijden, Scenarios: The Art of Strategic Conversation, 2nd ed., John Wiley &
Sons, Chichester, 2005.
29
[27] M. van de Kerkhof, A. Wieczorek, Learning and stakeholder participation in transition
processes towards sustainability: Methodological considerations, Technological
Forecasting & Social Change 72 (2005) 733-747.
[28] P.W.F. van Notten, J. Rotmans, M.B.A. van Asselt, D.S. Rothman, An updated scenario
typology, Futures 35 (2003) 423–443.
[29] J. Cohen, Deliberation and democratic Legitimacy, in: A. Hamlin, P. Petit (Eds.), The
Good Polity: Normative Analysis of the State, Blackwell, New York, 1989.
[30] S. Inayatullah, Six pillars: futures thinking for transforming, Foresight 10 (2008) 4-21.
[31] S. Inayatullah, Causal Layered Analysis: Poststructuralism as method, Futures 30 (1998)
815-829.
[32] J. Dator, Alternative Futures at the Manoa School, Journal of Futures Studies (2009) 1-18.
[33] K.H. Dreborg, The Essence of Backcasting, Futures 28 (1996) 813-828.
[34] J. Robinson, Future subjunctive: backcasting as social learning, Futures 35 (2003) 839-856.
[35] J.S. Walton, Scanning Beyond the Horizon: Exploring the Ontological and Epistemological
Basis for Scenario Planning, Advances in Developing Human Resources 10 (2008) 147-
165.
[36] R. Slaughter, The state of play in the futures field: a metascanning overview, Foresight 11
(2009), 6-20.
[37] JRC-IPTS, European Foresight, http://forera.jrc.ec.europa.eu/index.html.
[38] P. DiMaggio, W. Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and
Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields, American Sociological Review 48 (1983)
147-160.
[39] P.C. Bishop, K.E. Strong, Why Teach the Future?, Journal of Futures Studies 14 (2010) 99-
106.
[40] J. Galtung, Transcend and Transform: An Introduction to Conflict Work, Pluto Press,
London, 2004.
[41] H.E. Daly, Beyond Growth. The Economics of Sustainable Development, Beacon Press,
Boston, 1996.
[42] P. Rikkonen, Scenarios for future agriculture in Finland: a Delphi study among agri-food
sector stakeholders, Agricultural and Food Science 14 (2005) 205-223.
30
[43] Presidential Commission, Romania educatiei, Romania cercetarii (2007).
http://edu.presidency.ro/upload/raport_edu.pdf.
[44] L. Andreescu, R. Gheorghiu, V. Proteasa, A. Curaj, Institutional Diversification and
Homogeneity in Romanian Higher Education: The Larger Picture, in: A. Curaj, P. Scott, L.
Vlasceanu, L. Wilson (Eds.), European Higher Education at the Crossroads: Between the
Bologna Process and National Reforms, Springer, Dordrecht, 2012.