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Understanding structural realism

By: Saed Kakei,

Ph.D. Student (No1144759),

Theories of Conflict and Conflict Resolution I (CARD 7040-DL2)

Professor Dustin Berna, Ph.D.

Nova Southeastern University

Department of Conflict Analysis & Resolution – PhD Program

March 16, 2012

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Understanding structural realism

Introduction

Fundamentally, Structural Realism–also known as Neorealism, argues that the struggle for power

in international politics is the main key to survival. However, unlike classical realists, structural

realists take some ethical considerations into their power-politics maintaining that rather than

connecting the quest for power to human nature, “it is the structure or architecture of the

international system that forces states to pursue power” (Mearsheimer in Dunne et al., 2010, p.

78). In other words, the struggle for power and international conflict are attributed to the “lack of

an overarching authority above states and the distribution of power in the international system”

(Dunne and Schmidt in Kaufman et al., 2005, p. 169). This causes us to ask a few questions such

as: what is the theoretical construction of structural realism? What are the assumptions of this

theory? What are the variations of structural realism and how do they differ from each other?

And finally, what do the critics say about this theory? To answer these and other related

questions, I will follow a descriptive analytical method to demonstrate the nature of this diverse

and multifaceted school of thought and explain the major ideas of its most prominent pioneers.

Theoretical construction of structural realism

Structural realism derives from classical realism except that instead of human nature, its

focus is mainly on the international politics with greater emphasis put on the struggle for power.

According to Dunne and Schmidt, the key idea in J. J. Rousseau’s book of “The State of War,”

stipulates that “it is not human nature, but the anarchical system which fosters fear, jealousy,

suspicion, and insecurity (2005, p. 166).

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Redefining Hans J. Morgenthau’s Balance of Power theory, Kenneth N. Waltz takes the

key thoughts of the classical realism into his “Theory of International Politics.” Like classical

realists, Waltz asserts that anarchy is the nature of international politics which leads states to

embrace the common sense of “self-help” in pursuit of their vital security needed for survival. In

contrast to classical realism, Waltz argues that while states remain the main actors playing

essential roles in the international system, greater reflection must be given to the non-states

actors through a level of analysis or structure-agency debate. He sees the international system as

a structure whereby the state with individuals below the level of the state act as unitary agency

for the state. Moreover, unlike classical realists, Waltz advocates bipolarity by stating that “the

great powers of a bipolar world are more self-sufficient, and interdependence loosens between

them” (Waltz in Kaufman et al., 2004, p. 327).

When applying his abstract theory to foreign policy, especially security issues, Waltz

argues that nuclear proliferation would increase global stability. In other words, the greater the

numbers of nuclear powers would result in a lesser international aggression. With this very

reason, Waltz demonstrated why his notion was not viable at least for the policy professionals in

the U.S. government.

John J. Mearsheimer is probably the most ardent of the structural realists to criticize and

oppose Waltz’s concept of nuclear proliferation, among other things. Branding him as a

“Defensive Realist” Mearsheimer explains that Waltz, and alike, “maintain that it is unwise for

states to try to maximize their share of world power, because the system will punish them if they

attempt to gain too much power. The pursuit of hegemony, they argue, is especially foolhardy”

(2010, p. 78). Instead, Mearsheimer proposes his own theory of “Offensive Realism” which

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discloses that states in the anarchical system are inherently aggressive and that there is no status

quo or satisfied states with the amount of power in their possessions. However, critics of

Mearsheimer’s aggressive build-up of power, known as modern realists, argue that aggressive

status will create a security dilemma since the maximization of power by any one state will

perpetuate greater power competition (2005, p. 176).

1. The ontological aspect

During the Cold War era, the world has seen an increasing number of new actors playing

significant roles in the international system. These new actors were and still are made of

international governmental organizations, multinational corporations, and transnational non-

governmental organization which, collectively and without evaluating what impact they may

have, play a role in the international system that is impossible to ignore. As such, a process is

needed to construct a systemic theory with which the defects of the classical realism, among

other theories, could be remedied (Waltz, 1979, p. 1). Additionally, benefiting from the three

levels of analysis used by social scientists to explain state behaviour and the causes of war,

Waltz perceives that the struggle for power and the interaction between these actors, including

the state actors, require a new theory with independent variables which he termed as “Theory of

International Politics” (2005, p. 169). Ontologically, we understand therefore that structural

realism not only keeps the main principles of traditional realism regarding the states as essential

actors, but also adds to them the new international non-state actors as necessities which are

foolhardy be ignored in any analysis.

2. The epistemological aspect:

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Structural realism attempts to effectively respond to the wide criticism which classical

realism has received for not been able to understand and absorb the true nature of international

politics. On the one hand, while affirms anarchy to be the ordering principle of international

relations because of the lack a single authority, structural realists explain however that national

interest and the quest for power must not be exaggerated. In so doing, structural realists are

trying to connect their theories to the other fields of social sciences so that their gained

knowledge could contribute to the needed comprehensive picture of the study of international

politics, on the other hand.

3. The methodological aspect

In 1954, his now classic book titled “Man, the State, and War,” Waltz states that after

studying the realist literature, he discovered that scholars came up with a different interpretation

for state behaviour and the causes of War because they were using various levels of analyses. He

adds that some of them had focused on the “Man” and others had focused on “the State.” Yet,

only a few were pointing to the importance of analysing the system. Accordingly, he wrote his

book as a necessity to contain all those trends. In the book, Waltz argues that the best possible

way to analyse international politics is to use a systemic methodology. He adds that instead of

focussing on the state level which will not be sufficient to predict the outcome of the overall

system; and, instead of focussing on human behaviour which will not provide sufficient analysis,

he reached the conclusion that the true causes of war is the international system itself due to its

chaotic structure. Therefore, metaphysical debates should be replaced by a systematic theory

which “remedies the defects of present theories” such as Morgenthau’s Balance of Power theory

(1979, p. 8).

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In chapter five of his 1979 book titled “Theory of International Politics” and under the

rubric of “Political Structures,” Waltz, like most social scientists who apply systemic theories to

their work, isolates structure from the rest of the other sub-systemic variables such as

individuals, institutions, agencies within a state. He does that rigorously believing that the

domestic political structure is the most important factor in the development of international

relations.

In chapter eight titled “Structural Causes and Military Effects” of the same book, Waltz

focuses on the relationships between the “cause” (independent variable) and the “effect”

(dependent variable). In so doing, he challenges the conventional wisdom regarding the

dimensions of distributions of power. Waltz, methodologically, argues that a bipolar system with

two great powers is more stable and peaceful than a multipolar system with three or more great

powers for at least three reasons. First, a multipolar system increases instability and prone to

miscalculation. Second, multipolar systems suffer from “buck-passing.” In other words, when

the risk-seeking allies fail to honour their commitments, the possibility of quickly containing

revisionist states greatly decreases. Third, multipolar systems are more dangerous because

reluctant allies are dragged into a conflict they would otherwise like to avoid. Additionally, tight

alliances would leave all members subject to the sudden desires of the most powerful and or

radical member which may rapidly increase the spread of ignited war (1979, pp. 161-193).

The most important assumptions of structural realism

1. The main international actors interact in an anarchic system. This means that there is no

central international government to enforce rules and regulations or protect the interests

of the larger international community.

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2. Because the structure of the international system is a major determinant of actor

behaviour, states therefore are self-interest oriented. The anarchic competitive system

pushes states to favour self-help over cooperative behaviour.

3. States are rational actors, selecting strategies to maximize benefits and minimize losses.

4. States see all other states as potential enemies and threats to their national security. This

distrust and fear creates a security dilemma, and this motivates the policies of most states.

5. The most critical challenge presented by anarchy is survival (Mearsheimer in Dunne et

al., 2010, p. 79-80).

For structural realists, threats are a variable function of power asymmetries. If a state has

more power than another state, then the feelings of facing risks are legitimate because nothing in

the anarchical system prevents states from using their power against each other to resolve a

conflict. Waltz acknowledges that although power is a complex combination of economic, social,

and geopolitical factors, it can simply be used to rank states by their capacities (1979, p. 131).

This acceptance implies that the distribution of power, and consequently power asymmetries, are

distinctive attributes of the system.

Waltz's systemic theory treats system stability and therefore state identity as symmetric.

In fact, Waltz claims that when it comes to security, all states behave in similar manner because

their leaders reside in an anarchic system in which they value survival, estimate power in the

same way, and they balance against threats according to their similar sensitivities toward power

asymmetries (1979, p. 127). Waltz also argues that competition will remove states that are

resistant to socialization because the latter, in the long run, will force all leaders to share the

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same core values and beliefs. When revisionist states emerge at random intervals to alter the

balance of power, they will either be eliminated from the system or held in check (1979, p. 127).

Variations of structural realism

Although Waltz is accused of being an academic eccentric, he has led about two dozen

younger academic specialists in international relations and security studies. His academic

students have developed their own theories relating to such topics as the dynamics of multipolar

systems, offensive versus defensive theories, supplementary unit-level variables, and stable

versus unstable deterrence factors. Rather than providing an exhaustive analysis of these

variations of structural realism, I will very briefly underline only three of their most important

here.

A. Defensive vs. offensive theory: while Waltz argues that anarchy leads to the logic of self-

help in which states seek to maximize their security, Mearsheimer disputes this claim

stating that the anarchical self-help system compels states to maximize their relative

power position. Waltz reasons his argument providing that “because power is a possibly

useful means, sensible statesmen try to have an appropriate amount of it.” He adds that

“in crucial situations, however, the ultimate concern of states in not for power but for

security” (1979, p. 80). In his theory of ‘offensive realism’, Mearsheimer calls Waltz’s

above argument as ‘defensive realism’ stating that “offensive realism parts company with

defensive realism over the question of how much power states want” (2010, p. 21). He

argues that since all states have some offensive power, there is a considerable level of

uncertainty associated with their intentions. Therefore, no one should believe in satisfied

or status quo states; rather all states have to search persistently to gain power at the

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expense of other states. In other words, peace could be achieved by accumulating power

more than any other states.

B. Neoclassical realism: with the end of cold war, realist scholars such as Randall

Schweller, Fareed Zakaria, and Gideon Rose decided to move beyond the rigid

assumptions of structural realism arguing that the systemic theory of international politics

provided by structural realism is incomplete. It needs to be augmented with better

accounts of unit-level variables such as how power is perceived by state leaders and their

respective societies and how state-society relationships motivated by the exercised

leadership (Dunne and Schmidt, 2005, p. 170).

C. Rational choice realists: while these thinkers accept the basic assumptions of structural

realism, they are advocating the use of advance social science methodologies such as

game theory in order to examine realist hypotheses. Also, this rational choice group claim

that since anarchy does not prevent strong patterns of cooperation from occurring under

certain conditions, therefore, international institutions matter. By that, the problem of

relative gains means that they use less of instrumental force than neo-liberals contend. In

other words, rational choice realists share some common values with the neo-liberals.

Criticisms of structural realism

Despite structural realism’s ability to articulate the realist theory in new directions, it is

not surprising that it has attracted a great deal of criticism. In fact, some post-cold war era

scholars argue that structural realism has still not only failed to produce accurate explanations of

international politics, but also failed to provide a theoretically complete explanation of war.

Again, without providing detail discussions, I will summarize only the main critiques facing

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structural realism in two categories: critiques made by other realists, and critiques made by non-

realists.

Realists’ critiques structural realism

First, classical realists such as John G. Ruggie (1983) criticized Waltz arguing that

structural realism assumes an unchanging structure and an eternal regularity of behaviour in

international politics, adding that this assumption goes back to Morgenthau. For Ruggie, Waltz’s

systemic theory obfuscates real the structural differences between the modern industrialized

period and the medieval feudal period (1983, Pp. 273-276). More significantly, it uncovers the

main lacuna in structural realism - the lack of a theory of change.

First, Rational choice realists argue that Waltz restricts his definition of structure (i.e., the

distribution of power per say) as the most important systemic variable. Theoretically, this

definition is problematic. Because, if any variable gets utilized in the distribution of power, then

such a variable could be a systemic variable.

Second, neoclassical realists argue that Waltz’s structural realism refuses to recognize

state level tests. According to Waltz, his Theory of International Politics "explains why states

similarly placed behave similarly despite their internal differences. The explanation of states'

behaviour is found at the international, and not at the national level" (Waltz, 1996, 54).

Neoclassical realists are contesting this asserting that the state-level behaviour, in fact, accounts

for the systemic level patterns that Waltz expects them to observe.

Third, offensive realists, especially Mearsheimer, argue that contrary to Waltz’s claim,

“multipolarity is less war-prone” and that “the more great powers there are in the system, the

better prospects for peace” (2010, p. 86). Mearsheimer provides two reasons for this: First,

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deterrence of the revisionist states is much easier in multipolarity. Second, the amount of

hostility in a multipolar system is much less than that of bipolarity because states pay less

attention to each other in a multipolar system.

Forth, structural realist theory does not predict the distribution of power in the

international system. Rather, it predicts the behaviour of states and the stability of the system

given a particular distribution of power.

Non-realists’ critiques structural realism

One of the major early criticism of structural realism that has been of lasting note came

from Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye in their 1977 book entitled “Power and

Interdependence: World Politics in Transition.” Both of these liberalist scholars feel that the

“realist assumptions define an ideal type of world politics” and if they were challenged

simultaneously, a world could be imagined “in which actors other than states participate directly

in world politics, in which a clear hierarchy of issues does not exist, and in which force in an

ineffective instrument of policy” (In Kaufman et al., 2005, p. 511).

Another early criticism came from Richard K. Ashley, a post-structuralist, who in his

1984 article titled “The Poverty of Neorealism” brands structural realism as a ‘structuralism’ that

treats “the given order as the natural order” and blasts neorealism for its “economism and

scientism” (1984, p. 228).

Liberalists such as Jack Snyder and Robert Jervis argue that attempting to be

parsimonious, Waltz has produced a theory too incomplete to account for the complexities of the

international system. They look at factors other than anarchy and the distribution of power to

explain international behaviour. In particular, they see the need to examine the role of internal

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politics (1993, p. 4). This leads us to point out some major problems with Waltz's systemic

theory and the way in which he conceptualizes the level of analysis problems in general terms

leaving out the interaction factor which is considered to be the most important factor in

international politics. For those who are not realists or those who have taken a conflict resolution

approach, not all interstate relationships are the same nor do states need to be dominated by a

power-politics relationship. The structure of the international system does not appear to be

dominated by the logic of anarchy which, according to realists, compels great powers to play

power politics, behave in a self-help manner, and seek hegemony.

Aspects of structural realism that I contend with include how the international system is

described as well as the behavior of the hegemon. With the end of cold-war and the advent of

globalization, the current international structure can be said flourishing with multilateral

organizations and rapidly spreading of liberal ideas and values. However, structural realists have

yet to provide convincing account for how these change the structure of the international system

and in particular, how this affects structural realist theory.

Conclusion

Structural realism has been an extremely influential theory in international relations,

particularly in the United States. Since the publication of Waltz’s “Theory of International

Politics” in 1979, structural realism, invigorating debates revitalized the realist paradigm, just as

the intensification of the Cold War under President Ronald Reagan in the early 1980’s created a

receptive audience for a new “scientific” version of realism.

Although Waltz’s work carries a systemic focus, it has shown to have both strengths and

weaknesses—its particular strength lies in pointing out and explaining important continuities in

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world politics. However, it cannot be considered part of the rational choice revolution in political

science. Consequently, variations of realism with emphasis on structural constraints and strategic

action made Waltz’ theory appealing to those thinking about structural models of international

politics. Still, there are important unresolved issues within the realist theory of international

politics. Among the most important of these are whether states are security or power maximizers,

and whether this makes a difference for their behavior toward one another. As this paper

provided, structural realism has several problems, and it has certainly not yet reached acceptable

answers.

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References:

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pp. 225-286

Dunne, T. and Schmidt, B. C. (2005). Realism. In Baylis, J, and Smith, S. The globalization of

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Ruggie, J. G. (1983). “Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Toward a Neorealist

Synthesis.” World Politics 35/2 (January): pp.261-285.

Mearsheimer, J. J. (2010). Structural realism. In Dunne, T., Kurki, M. and Smith, S. (2010).

International relations theories: Discipline and diversity. (2nd ed.). Oxford: Oxford

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Keohane, R. O. and Nye, J. S. (2004). Complex interdependence. In Kaufman, D., Parker, J.,

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