Research DirectionNAFTA has changed Union bargaining power
NAALC
Complementarity of labour
Why does this matter?
Mexican Wage Inequality
Effects of Multinational Trade Agreements2
Efficient Contracting Model
Union threat point increases
(Surplus Max) U => U0
(Barg. Power) U0 => U1
3
Mexican Wage Inequality(Bosch & Manacorda 2008)
“After 1997, The minimum wage is hence unable to account for
this subsequent fall in
inequality.”
5
Mexican Wage Inequality(Bosch & Manacorda 2008)
“After 1997, The minimum wage is hence unable to account for
this subsequent fall in
inequality.”
5
Mexican Wage Inequality
Low Skilled Industries were protected by TariffsLiberalization lowers wages (Hanson & Harrison 1999, Robertson 2001)
Increased Demand for High Skilled LabourMaquilladoras (Feenstra & Hanson 1997)
Returns to education (Lopez Acevedo 2006, Cragg & Epelbaum 1996, Robertson 2001)
6
Mexican Wage Inequality
The Fall in inequality after NAFTA is given much less attention (Robertson 2007, Hanson 2003)
Robust to data source and inequality measureAiola and Jhun (2005), Robertson (2004), Lopez-Acevedo (2006), Harrison & Hanson (1999), Hanson (2003)
7
Mexican Wage Inequality
The Fall in inequality after NAFTA is given much less attention (Robertson 2007, Hanson 2003)
Robust to data source and inequality measureAiola and Jhun (2005), Robertson (2004), Lopez-Acevedo (2006), Harrison & Hanson (1999), Hanson (2003)
17% of Mexican Labour Force is Unionized (OECD Labour Force Statistics)
7
NAALC
North American Agreement on Labour Cooperation
Set of North American Labour Rights
Legitimacy to Labour Unions
Legitimacy to Labour Grievances
Transparency
8
NAALCKay (2005, 2011)
Now when we have a submission someone in the Mexican government will call and want to know why this, why that. They don’t ignore it anymore, and this didn’t exist before. We spoke but they didn’t listen, we existed but they didn’t see us. I think now that they listen, and they listen because what we do hurts them. And what we do is within the law. (Benedicto Martinez: FAT, 7/27/99)
9
NAALC
Kay (2005, 2011) con’t
NAFTA was the common enemyopportunity to meet transnational allies
NAALC required continual partnershipMust File Grievance in a Foreign Country
10
NAALC
Common Relative Gain in Bargaining PowerSanctions reduce firm power
Uneven Relative Gain in Bargaining PowerUnions with transnational allies gain the most
Selection Bias
11
Complements?Robertson (2006)
Estimated Cross Price Elasticities
Maquiladora sector always a complement
GATT (pre-NAFTA) substitutesMexican & US manufacturing in similar activities
Post-NAFTA: complements12
Complements?
Uneven Relative Gain in Bargaining Powerimpact on whole productivity chain
transnational allies
13
Complements?
Kay (2005, 2011) & Hathaway (2000)
solidarity & common mission ”The idea that we could form an organizing alliance with the idea that rather than just publicly condemn what was going on, we would try to fight it by identifying locations where our jobs had moved and targeting them for organization. And undertaking actual campaigns to improve wages and conditions in those locations, knowing that the result would not be that the work would return to the United States but trying to take the edge of exploitation out of what’s going on here by raising wages and conditions for workers in the Mexican facilities”
(Bob Kingsley: UE, 1/ 23/01). 14
Complements?
Shleifer & Vishny (1993) Corruption
Complements: cheap labour in Mexico will increase demand for US high skilled labour and thus increase wages in those sectors.
transfer payment optimal
UE acting in own self interest (another paper?)15