UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY

DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

Disarmament and International Security

First Committee

The First Committee deals with disarmament, global challenges and threats to peace that affect the international

community and seeks out solutions to the challenges in the international security regime.

It considers all disarmament and international security matters within the scope of the Charter or relating to the

powers and functions of any other organ of the United Nations; the general principles of cooperation in the

maintenance of international peace and security, as well as principles governing disarmament and the regulation of

armaments; promotion of cooperative arrangements and measures aimed at strengthening stability through lower

levels of armaments.

The Committee works in close cooperation with the United Nations Disarmament Commission and the

Genevabased Conference on Disarmament. It is the only Main Committee of the General Assembly entitled to

verbatim records coverage.

The First Committee sessions are structured into three distinctive stages:

1. General debate

2. Thematic discussions

3. Action on drafts

It is the only Main Committee of the General Assembly entitled to verbatim records coverage pursuant to Rule 58

(a) of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly.1

1 http://www.un.org/en/ga/first/

Discussing the loopholes in Small arms and light

weapons conventions

Introduction:

The international community’s concern with the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons (SALW) derives from

the recognition that illicit SALW have a major adverse humanitarian impact that cannot be ignored. Small arms play

a prominent role in all present-day conflicts, resulting in thousands of deaths and the displacement of millions of

people; the proliferation of illicit SALW threatens to disrupt peacebuilding and development efforts; and it is small

arms that are used by criminal gangs that spread insecurity and fear in our cities.

There has been progress made in the fight against the proliferation of illicit SALW subsequent to the 2001 United

Nations Conference that adopted the Programme of Action on the illicit trade in SALW though the task is a prolonged

one. The issue connects security, development, health, trade, human rights and other fields, thus making coherent

approaches particularly challenging.2

Weapons of choice:

Small arms are cheap, light, and easy to handle, transport and conceal. A build-up of small arms alone may not create

the conflicts in which they are used, but their excessive accumulation and wide availability aggravates the tension.

The violence becomes more lethal and lasts longer, and a sense of insecurity grows, which in turn lead to a greater

demand for weapons.

Most present-day conflicts are fought mainly with small arms, which are broadly used in inter-State conflict. They

are the weapons of choice in civil wars and for terrorism, organized crime and gang warfare.

Taking their toll, violating rights

The majority of conflict deaths are caused by the use of small arms, and civilian populations bear the brunt of armed

conflict more than ever. Also, small arms are the dominant tools of criminal violence. The rate of firearmsrelated

homicides in post-conflict societies often outnumbers battlefield deaths. These weapons are also linked to the

increasing number of killings of UN employees and peacekeepers, as well as workers from humanitarian and non-

governmental organizations.

Small arms facilitate a vast spectrum of human rights violations, including killing, maiming, rape and other forms of

sexual violence, enforced disappearance, torture, and forced recruitment of children by armed groups. More human

rights abuses are committed with small arms than with any other weapon. Furthermore, where the use of armed

violence becomes a means for resolving grievances and conflicts, legal and peaceful dispute resolution suffers and

the rule of law cannot be upheld.

2 http://www.poa-iss.org/Publications/Small_Arms_2008.pdf

Development denied

Contemporary armed conflict is the main cause of people fleeing their homes, and is now the most common cause

of food insecurity. Armed violence can aggravate poverty, inhibit access to social services and divert energy and

resources away from efforts to improve human development. Countries plagued by armed violence are behind in

attaining the Millennium Development Goals. High levels of armed violence impede economic growth. According to

the World Bank, nothing undermines investment climates as much as armed insecurity.3

Definition:

There is no universally accepted definition of a 'small arm' or of a 'light weapon'. However there is a proposal put

forward by the 1997 UN Panel of Governmental Expert (available on www.un.org) which considers portability a

defining characteristic. The Panel’s list includes civilian, private, and military weapons that fire a projectile with the

condition that the unit or system may be carried by an individual, a small number of people, or transported by a

pack animal or a light vehicle. The Panel’s list is organized into 'small arms' and 'light weapons':

• small arms: revolvers and self-loading pistols, rifles and carbines, assault rifles, sub-machine guns and light

machine guns.

3 http://www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/salw/

• light weapons: heavy machine guns, hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers, portable

antiaircraft guns, portable anti-tank guns, recoilless rifles, portable launchers of anti-tank missile and rocket

systems;portable launchers of anti-aircraft missile systems (MANPADS); and mortarsof calibres of less than 100 mm.

UN Action SALW

Small arms and light weapons are used in conflicts around the world, causing injury and death. Small arms control

was first broached by UN Resolution A/RES/46/36 (December 1991), which was expanded upon by A/RES/50/70

(January 1996). This latter resolution mandated a panel of experts to research the type of small arms and light

weapons being used in the world's conflicts and to study which weapons might apply to fall under an arms control

regime. The recommendations of expert reports returned to the General Assembly, A/52/298 (1997) and A/54/258

(1999) led to a July 2001 United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms, with a follow-up in July 2006.

On 26 September 2013 the UN Security Council passed Resolution 2117, which urged nations to remain committed

to small arms embargoes and SALW control protocols.

Work on SALW via the United Nations is coordinated by the Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), though the

UN Coordinating Action on Small Arms (CASA) mechanism, which comprises 21 UN departments and agencies

working on different aspects of small arms and light weapons control. The United Nations Institute for

Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), carries out research in arms control affairs and has published many articles and

books related to small arms and light weapons.

On 2 April 2013, the UN General Assembly voted overwhelmingly to adopt the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) to govern

the legal international trade in many types of conventional weapons, from warships and aircraft to small arms and

light weapons. A basic obligation of the treaty is that all States Parties should establish or maintain controls in the

area. In this way, the treaty also helps the international community to address unregulated or illegal trade in

conventional weapons. The treaty opened for signature on 3 June 2013. To date, two-thirds of UN member states

have signed the treaty (130 states), and 72 have ratified it. The treaty entered into force on December 24, 2014.

Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its

Aspects

The Programme of Action is a politically binding international instrument that aims to curb the proliferation of illicit

small arms and light weapons. It was adopted unanimously by UN Member States at the July 2001 United Nations

Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects. The PoA seeks to develop and

strengthen agreed norms and measures with a view to promoting concerted and coordinated international efforts

to curb the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons. It also intends to develop and implement agreed

international measures to curb illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in those weapons, to mobilize political will

throughout the international community and to encourage cooperation to such ends. In addition, the PoA aims to

raise awareness about SALW issues and to promote responsible actions by States to help prevent the illicit

manufacture, export, import and transfer of such weapons.

The Programme also contains a wide range of political undertakings and concrete actions that Member States

committed themselves to at the national, regional and global levels. They include, for example, developing, adopting

and strengthening SALW national legislation, SALW transfer controls, destruction of weapons that are confiscated,

seized, or collected, as well as fostering international cooperation and assistance with a view to strengthening the

ability of States to identify and trace illicit arms and light weapons. Member States are encouraged to submit

national reports [LINK to CAB web site]on the implementation of the PoA to assess progress in the effort to combat

illicit small arms and light weapons.4

Arms Trade Treaty:

The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) is a multilateral, legally-binding agreement that establishes common standards for the

international trade of conventional weapons and seeks to reduce the illicit arms trade. The treaty aims to reduce

human suffering caused by illegal and irresponsible arms transfers, improve regional security and stability, as well

as to promote accountability and transparency by state parties concerning transfers of conventional arms. The ATT

is not an arms control treaty, per se, and does not place restrictions on the types or quantities of arms that may be

bought, sold, or possessed by states. It also does not impact a state’s domestic gun control laws or other firearm

ownership policies.

The ATT is the product of nearly two decades of advocacy and diplomacy. After years of preparation, a UN diplomatic

conference was formally convened in July 2012, but fell short of reaching consensus on a final text and another two

week-long diplomatic conference was convened in March 2013 to complete work on the treaty. However, Iran,

North Korea, and Syria blocked consensus on the final treaty text, leading treaty supporters to move it to the UN

General Assembly on for approval. On April 2, 2013, the UN General Assembly endorsed the ATT by a vote of 156-3,

4 http://www.un.org/events/smallarms2006/faq.html

with 22 abstentions. The treaty opened for signature on June 3, 2013. The ATT requires 50 ratifications before it can

enter into force.

What the Arms Trade Treaty Does

• The Arms Trade Treaty requires all states-parties to adopt basic regulations and approval processes for the flow of weapons across international borders, establishes common international standards that must be met before arms exports are authorized, and requires annual reporting of imports and exports to a treaty secretariat. In particular, the treaty requires that states “establish and maintain a national control system, including a national control list” and “designate competent national authorities in order to have an effective and transparent national control system regulating the transfer of conventional arms”; • prohibits arms transfer authorizations to states if the transfer would violate “obligations under measures adopted by the United Nations Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, in particular arms embargoes” or under other “relevant international obligations” or if the state “has knowledge at the time of authorization that the arms or items would be used in the commission of genocide, crimes against humanity, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, attacks directed against civilian objects or civilians protected as such, or other war crimes”; • requires states to assess the potential that the arms exported would “contribute to or undermine peace and security” or could be used to commit or facilitate serious violations of international humanitarian or human rights law, acts of terrorism, or transnational organized crime; to consider measures to mitigate the risk of these violations; and, if there still remains an “overriding risk” of “negative consequences,” to “not authorize the export”; • applies under Article 2(1) to all conventional arms within the seven categories of the UN Register of Conventional Arms (battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, large-caliber artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, and missiles and missile launchers) and small arms and light weapons; • requires that states “establish and maintain a national control system to regulate the export of ammunition/munitions fired, launched or delivered by” the conventional arms listed in Article 2(1) and “parts and components…that provide the capability to assemble” the conventional arms listed in that article • requires each state to “take the appropriate measures, pursuant to its national laws, to regulate brokering taking place under its jurisdiction” of conventional arms covered under Article 2(1); • requires each state to “take measures to prevent…diversion” of conventional arms covered under Article 2(1);

requires each state to submit annually to the treaty secretariat a report of the preceding year’s “authorized or actual export and imports of conventional arms covered under Article 2(1)” and allows states to exclude “commercially sensitive or national security information”

Loopholes in Arms Trade Treaty:

1. THE TREATY’S THRESHOLD FOR REFUSING ARMS EXPORTS IS FAR TOO HIGH

The treaty states that arms should not be exported if there is an “overriding risk” of serious violations of international

humanitarian or human rights law. This word “overriding” is open to interpretation. It could be taken to mean that

arms exports should only be stopped in extreme or exceptional circumstances, or that a state could decide that the risk of abuse was not enough to “override” the perceived benefits of the arms export.

For example, a supplier could decide that while a client country was likely to commit human rights abuses, that was

not strong enough to override the client’s “right to self-defence” or “regional stability” or even the need to protect

an important “strategic partnership”. This is particularly apposite for the UK, where the government’s drive to promote arms sales always overrides human rights concerns.

The original Control Arms draft said that arms transfers should be refused if they were “likely” to be used to commit

serious violations. Later drafts raised the threshold to “substantial risk,” and in 2012 it was further raised to

“overriding risk”. The NGOs tried hard to get that changed back to “substantial,” with support from many countries,

but the US insisted that “overriding” must remain.

2. THE TREATY HAS NO EFFECTIVE REQUIREMENTS FOR RECORD-KEEPING AND REPORTING

One of the selling points of an ATT was that it would “help introduce new levels of transparency and accountability”

to an otherwise murky trade by requiring comprehensive record-keeping and public reporting of all arms transfers.

On this issue, the treaty has failed. Whereas the original draft required states to submit annual reports on arms

transfers to be published by an international body, the final text only requires states to record a minimal list of arms

exports that need not even include the type, model, quantity or value of the exports.

States are supposed to submit this minimal information to a UN Secretariat, but this information will not be

published, and states are allowed to leave out anything they deem as “commercially sensitive or national security information.”

This represents a considerably lower standard of reporting than is currently carried out by some of the world’s

largest arms exporters, including the UK, US and Germany – an outcome that Oxfam warned “risks undermining current best practice in transparency in the international trade in arms.”

Without proper reporting provisions, there will be no way to tell whether the treaty is effective in stopping any arms exports.

3. THE TREATY EXCLUDES CERTAIN TYPES OF WEAPONS

The treaty only covers specific types of conventional weapons. The list excludes certain types of arms including

surface-to-air missiles, armoured troop-carrying vehicles, light artillery, tear gas and, notably, drones. The

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) warned that this failure to reflect modern military technology made the ATT “likely to be a relic before it ever comes into force”.

While the treaty does mention ammunition and components, these are exempt from some of the treaty’s key

provisions. At the insistence of the US, there is no requirement to keep records or report the export of ammunition

or components. Furthermore, states are not required to regulate the import, transit, trans-shipment, brokering or diversion of ammunition or parts.

Given the key role that ammunition plays in sustaining conflict, this is a huge loophole. It also means that arms

dealers will be able to avoid key regulations by trading in “knock-down kits” – kits of parts for assembly in the

destination country – instead of whole weapons

4. THE TREATY DOESN’T COVER ALL TYPES OF ARMS TRANSFERS

Arms transferred as part of a “defence co-operation agreement” – an arrangement whereby the military forces of

two or more countries work together – are exempt from the treaty. Arguing for this loophole to be closed, Control

Arms pointed out that “There is nothing to prevent States classifying all of their international arms trading operations as ‘defence cooperation agreements’ thereby circumventing the treaty’s provisions.”

Furthermore, whereas the original draft applied to all types of international arms transfers, the final text only covers

arms sales, which means that it doesn’t apply to arms that are loaned, leased, bartered or transferred as gifts or as

part of an “aid” package. (It was China that insisted on this, not wanting to be prevented from giving arms to its allies.)

Finally, the treaty does not cover licensed production agreements, whereby a country that owns the design to a

particular weapons system grants a license to another country to manufacture that weapons system. This type of arrangement has been used by arms companies for decades as a way of avoiding arms embargoes.

5. THERE IS NO INTERNATIONAL ASSESSMENT OR ENFORCEMENT

The responsibility for assessing the risk of an arms export is entirely down to the exporting country. There is a clear conflict of interest here: a country that wants to export arms will tend to decide that there is no “overriding” risk.

Furthermore, an exporter’s decisions are not open to international review and there are no legal sanctions for

violating the treaty. The US made it clear that it would not accept the creation of an international body to enforce

the ATT.

6. THE TREATY GIVES THE ARMS TRADE LEGITIMACY

One of the treaty’s core principles is “the respect for the legitimate interests of States to acquire conventional arms

to exercise their right to self-defence… and to produce, export, import and transfer conventional arms”. It focuses

specifically on stopping “illicit” trade. However, this distinction between the “legitimate” arms trade and the “illicit” arms trade is bogus.

The vast majority of international arms transfers, including those to human rights-abusing governments and conflict

areas, are legal. Countries like the US, UK and Russia supply large quantities of arms to repressive regimes around the world, but the treaty leaves plenty of scope for them to declare these sales as “legitimate”.

Furthermore, by recognising the “legitimate interests” of states to acquire arms, the treaty privileges states at the expense of non-state actors such as stateless peoples and ethnic groups oppressed by their own governments.

For example, the treaty asserts the right of Israel, as a state, to acquire arms for “self-defence” but does not accord

the same right to the Palestinian people who live under Israeli military occupation. In this way the treaty could help to reinforce a status quo in which powerful states militarily dominate marginalised populations.

The treaty also explicitly recognises “the legitimate political, security, economic and commercial interests of States

in the international trade in conventional arms” (emphasis added). In the final vote at the UN, the Bolivian delegate

abstained, deploring that “the ‘weapons and death industries’ would rest easy knowing that the Treaty favoured their economic interests,” adding that “priority had been given to profit over human suffering.”

In a treaty whose intent is to reduce the terrible harm caused by the arms trade, there should be no place for

declaring huge swathes of the arms trade to be “legitimate”. As Campaign Against Arms Trade – a sceptic of the ATT – points out; “there is no such thing as a ‘responsible’ arms trade.”5

Who is impacted the most by small arms and light weapons:

Civilians---

Millions of people are caught in the crossfire of warfare or become victims of armed crime. Many are women and

children.

Children---

The light weight and small size of these weapons has made it possible [easy] for children to be recruited or compelled

to become soldiers. Child soldiers were particularly exploited in recent wars in Liberia and the Sudan.

Political dissidents, union organizers, land rights activists, journalists, etc.---

Small arms are the principal tool of intimidation used by repressive police and military forces. The massacre in

Chiapas last December of 45 unarmed civilians, carried out by government-affiliated paramilitary forces with

highpowered AK-47 assault rifles, is one of countless examples.

Foreign relief and development workers---

Armed conflict often creates the humanitarian emergencies that relief workers are called in to alleviate. In addition,

aid workers are increasingly coming under fire---being killed, kidnapped, or threatened.

5 https://ceasefiremagazine.co.uk/failure-arms-trade-treaty/

International peacekeeping troops---

The United Nations found that small arms and light weapons pose the principal threat to international troops seeking

to establish or maintain peace among combatants.

Local and foreign businesspeople---

Wealthy businesspeople are often kidnapped or extorted with these arms. More generally, the widespread diffusion

of weapons undermines economic development and often results in the total collapse of a functioning economy.

Tourists and the tourism industry---

Armed violence has a devastating impact on local tourism, which is the largest industry in the world today and the

leading source of revenue for many countries. In several recent cases, such as the massacre of 66 people at Luxor,

Egypt last November, tourists are particularly targeted.6

Solutions to This Problem:

1. Increase International Transparency:

At present, efforts to monitor and control the diffusion of small arms and light weapons are hampered by a lack of

detailed information on the production, sale and transfer of such munitions. Few governments provide detailed data

on imports and exports of light weapons, and the UN Conventional Arms Register covers major weapons only.

2. Increase State Accountability:

In the current international milieu, control over the import and export of small arms and light weapons rests with

national governments; thus, efforts to better regulate the trade in such munitions will be most effective at the

national level.

3. Regional and International Efforts:

While priority should be given to the development of effective controls at the national level, efforts should also be

made to establish systems of oversight and control at the regional and international levels. Action at the regional

level is particularly important because light weapons are often circulated by regional networks of illicit dealers,

insurgents and permissive government agencies.

6 http://fas.org/asmp/campaigns/smallarms/primer.html

4. Reducing Surplus Weapons:

Addressing the problem of surplus weaponry generated by decades of Cold War competition is especially important

because many states—particularly former Eastern bloc countries—are eager to sell arms for hard currency with few

or no questions asked.

5. Post-Conflict Measures:

A high priority should be placed on efforts to remove the large quantities of small arms and light weapons that often

remain in-country once a particular conflict has ended. Too often, the availability of such weapons facilitates either

a renewal of the conflict (as in Angola) or a destabilization of efforts to build a peaceful civil society (as in South

Africa).

6. International Capacity-Building:

Ultimately, any regime to control global trafficking in small arms and light weapons will only be as effective as the

weakest links in the system. As long as black-market dealers enjoy safe havens in which they can operate with

impunity, it will be difficult or impossible to enforce tougher international standards on the light weapons trade.7

Points to Ponder:

1. Has the Arms treaty outlived its life?

2. Is the issue of small arms and light weapons to difficult tackle?

3. Has the UN failed in understanding the problem of SALW?

4. Do we need a Comprehensive treaty on SALW?

5. Is there a need to redefine SALW?

6. How should we address the loopholes in SALW?

7 http://www.armscontrol.org/print/391

Research Links:

http://www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/salw/ http://www.poa-iss.org/poa/poahtml.aspx

http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/B-Occasional-papers/SAS-OP07-UN-Conference.pdf

http://cns.miis.edu/inventory/pdfs/sarms.pdf

International Cooperation against World Drug

Problem

What are drugs? A drug is any chemical you take that affects the way your body works. Alcohol, caffeine, aspirin and

nicotine are all drugs. A drug must be able to pass from your body into your brain. Once inside your

brain, drugs can change the messages your brain cells are sending to each other, and to the rest of

your body. They do this by interfering with your brain's own chemical signals:

neurotransmitters that transfer signals across synapses.9

8https://www.google.co.in/url?sa=i&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=images&cd=&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUKEwj63LyZz4HKAhVNCo4KHe8oD9oQjB0I Bg&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.pharmaceutical-technology.com%2Ffeatures%2Ffeaturedrug-addiction-medication-vaccine-

drugabuse%2Ffeaturedrug-addiction-medication-vaccine-drug-abuse-

2.html&psig=AFQjCNGUDD_Zp5yUHDdPAVvDqZ94EvGjw&ust=1451497259720193 9http://www.sciencemuseum.org.uk/WhoAmI/FindOutMore/Yourbrain/Howdodrugsaffectyourbrain/Whatisadrug.aspx

Introduction:

8

The world drug problem continues to constitute a serious threat to public health and to the safety and well-being of

humanity – particularly children, young people and their families . In 2009, the high-level segment of the fiftysecond

session of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) adopted the Political Declaration and Plan of Action on

International Cooperation towards an Integrated and Balanced Strategy to Counter the World Drug Problem. The

Declaration recommended that the United Nations General Assembly hold a special session to address the world

drug problem and that, in 2014, the Commission should conduct a high-level review of Member States’

implementation of the Declaration. In early 2016, a United Nations General Assembly Special Session (UNGASS) on

the World Drug Problem will review progress in implementation of the Political Declaration. All relevant institutions

in the United Nations system are invited to contribute fully to the preparations for this special session and to submit

specific recommendations on the issues to be addressed by the General Assembly at that session. During the

preparatory process there have been calls for the public health perspective to be given greater consideration in drug

policy. In 2014 the Joint Ministerial Statement of the high-level review by the Commission of the implementation by

Member States of the 2009 Political Declaration and Plan of Action: called for “continued cooperation between

Member States, the International Narcotics Control Board and the World Health Organization to ensure the

adequate availability of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances under international control, including opiates,

for medical and scientific purposes, while concurrently preventing their diversion into illicit channels, pursuant to

the international drug control conventions, and to provide recommendations on the scheduling of substances”;

considered to further “promote and strengthen effective national drug control strategies based on scientific

evidence, with components for drug demand reduction that include primary prevention, early intervention,

treatment, care, rehabilitation, recovery and social 2 reintegration, as well as measures aimed at minimizing the

public health and social consequences of drug abuse”; reaffirmed “the need to further strengthen public health

systems, particularly in the areas of prevention, treatment and rehabilitation, as part of a comprehensive and

balanced approach to demand reduction based on scientific evidence”.8

History:

Drugs have played an important medicinal role in human society, and “harmless” drugs such as caffeine are widely

and legally used in all parts of the globe. The international trade in drugs has a long history; imperial Britain, for

example, shaped the 19th-century opium trade by selling Indian-produced opium to China in exchange for tea and

silk, and fought “Opium Wars” to defend its right to do so. In the early 20th century, the United States, Britain and

other countries began to change their position on drug use, although, as the history of prohibition shows, their

concept and acceptance of “dangerous” drugs was not identical to our own.

8 http://www.who.int/substance_abuse/publications/drug_role_mandate.pdf

By the 1970s and 1980s, the international drug trade had taken on many of the key features we recognize today,

the most notable of which are its pervasiveness and its scale. According to a United Nations survey, the worldwide

dollar value of illegal drugs is second only to the amount spent on the arms trade. Estimating the value of an illegal

enterprise carried on in dozens of currencies around the world is tremendously difficult, but the United Nations

Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention generally describes the production, trafficking and sales of illicit drugs

as a $400-billion-a-year industry. Some of these drugs are produced and consumed domestically, but much of the

drug trade takes place between states. Unlike the international trade in arms, however, which largely flows from

developed nations that produce arms to less developed nations that use arms, the international drug trade has

traditionally flowed from developing to developed nations. At the risk of oversimplification, cocaine production has

dominated in Central and South America, while heroin has dominated in both Southeast and Southwest Asia.9

UNITED NATIONS INTERNATIONAL DRUG CONTROL PROGRAMME:

FACTS AND FIGURES

International Drug Control

The drug control system is governed by a series of treaties, adopted under the aegis of the United Nations, which

require that governments exercise control over production and distribution of narcotic and psychotropic substances,

combat drug abuse and illicit trafficking, maintain the necessary administrative machinery and report to

international organs on their actions.

The existing treaties are: the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, which established the International

Narcotics Control Board (INCB); that Convention as amended by the 1972 Protocol; the 1971 Convention on

Psychotropic Substances; and the 1988 United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and

Psychotropic Substances.

The United Nations helps countries find innovative ways of controlling the supply of and demand for drugs. The

United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND), a subsidiary body of the Economic and Social Council is the

main policy-making body for all international drug control matters. The International Narcotics Control Board strives

to restrict the availability of drugs to medical and scientific purposes, to prevent their diversion into illegal channels

and to combat illicit trafficking. All United Nations drug control activities are coordinated by the United Nations

International Drug Control Programme (UNDCP).

The United Nations International Drug Control Programme

Established in 1990, UNDCP became operational in 1991. It provides leadership in international drug control,

monitors trends in drug production, consumption and trafficking, and promotes the implementation of drug control

treaties. It serves as the worldwide centre of expertise and information on international drug control.

9 http://www.parl.gc.ca/Content/LOP/researchpublications/bp435-e.htm

In particular, UNDCP:

• Constitutes the central organizational element of the United Nations in matters of drug control, with exclusive

responsibility for coordinating and directing all United Nations actions against illicit drugs;

• Acts on behalf of the Secretary-General in carrying out the responsibilities assigned to him under international

treaties and resolutions by United Nations bodies on international drug control;

• Monitors implementation and ensures that these functions are fully carried out;

• Provides secretariat and substantive support services to the governing body of the Programme (the Commission

on Narcotic Drugs) and to the International Narcotics Control Board;

• Provides advice to Member States concerning implementation of the international drug control treaties and

assists States that accede to them;

• Designs and implements worldwide: drug-related technical cooperation programmes that are intended to reduce

the illicit production, manufacture, trafficking and abuse of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances; and

programmes to enhance the efficacy of measures to control the illicit supply of drugs and substances of abuse;

• Coordinates technical cooperation strategies in drug control at the regional and international levels;

• Is the repository of technical expertise on drug control for the Secretariat - including the regional economic

commissions and other United Nations bodies, and for Member States and, in this context, advises them on

national and international drug control matters;

• Maintains ongoing contacts with research institutes, associations and universities outside the United Nations in

order to obtain and exchange information on the most recent research findings on drug control; launches or

participates in joint research projects;

• Promotes coordination and cooperation with regional and interregional organizations carrying out activities

relating to drug control outside the United Nations system; and

• Manages the financial resources of the Fund of the United Nations International Drug Control Programme.10

10 http://www.un.org/ga/20special/presskit/pubinfo/info1.htm

UNODC:

UNODC is a global leader in the fight against illicit drugs and international crime. Established in 1997 through a

merger between the United Nations Drug Control Programme and the Centre for International Crime Prevention,

UNODC operates in all regions of the world through an extensive network of field offices. UNODC relies on voluntary

contributions, mainly from Governments, for 90 per cent of its budget.

UNODC is mandated to assist Member States in their struggle against illicit drugs, crime and terrorism. In the

Millennium Declaration, Member States also resolved to intensify efforts to fight transnational crime in all its

dimensions, to redouble the efforts to implement the commitment to counter the world drug problem and to take

concerted action against international terrorism.

The three pillars of the UNODC work programme are:

• Field-based technical cooperation projects to enhance the capacity of Member States to counteract illicit drugs,

crime and terrorism

• Research and analytical work to increase knowledge and understanding of drugs and crime issues and expand

the evidence base for policy and operational decisions

• Normative work to assist States in the ratification and implementation of the relevant international treaties, the

development of domestic legislation on drugs, crime and terrorism, and the provision of secretariat and

substantive services to the treaty-based and governing bodies

In pursuing its objectives, UNODC makes every effort to integrate and mainstream the gender perspective,

particularly in its projects for the provision of alternative livelihoods, as well as those against human trafficking.

Drug Lords:

A drug lord, drug baron, kingpin, or narcotrafficker is a person who controls a sizable network of persons involved

in the illegal drug trade. Such figures are often difficult to bring to justice, as they are never directly in possession of

something illegal, but are insulated from the actual trade in drugs by several layers of underlings. The prosecution

of drug lords is therefore usually the result of carefully planned infiltrations of their networks, often using informants

from within the organization.

Drug Cartels:

What is considered a drug cartel may vary wildly and can include everything from street gangs to traditional mafia

groups to loosely affiliated individual dealers. However, a drug cartel is generally defined as any organization that

promotes, controls, or is significantly involved in drug trafficking. In recent decades, fear of these groups has had a

large impact on the law and law enforcement.

The danger of cartels is the fact of their organization. With organization comes power and influence that can

destabilize entire communities. In 1920s Chicago, for example, cartels not only engaged in the illegal drug trade (the

sale of prohibited alcohol, at the time) but were also involved in embezzlement schemes, intimidation, extortion,

and murder, and had so much influence that government officials and police conveniently ignored the

perpetrators.11

Drug Haven’s of the world:

1. Afghanistan

With the fall of the Taliban in 2001, the drug lords of Afghanistan have slowly worked their way towards becoming

the world’s top producer of opium today. More than 90% of the world’s opium is produced in the country, a major

part of The Golden Crescent, the name given to Asia’s principal area of illicit opium production covering Afghanistan,

Iran and Pakistan.

2. Burma (Myanmar)

Burma or Myanmar is a pillar of the so-called Golden Triangle, one of Asia’s two main areas of illicit opium production

which also include Laos, Vietnam, and Thailand. It is the world’s second largest producer of illicit opium. Run by a

military junta, Burma’s government has been on paper trying to eradicate opium production, but its senior officials

have been persistently reported to be involved in the drugs trade, and that drug money continues to pour into

government coffers.

3. Mexico

You know a country has a very serious drug trade problem when one of its most-wanted drug traffickers makes it to

the Forbes list of the richest persons in the world. Joaquin “Shorty” Guzman, leader of the Sinaloa drug cartel in

Mexico, was just recently listed by Forbes as the 701st richest person in the world with a net worth estimated at $1

billion.

Since the beginning of 2008, more than 7,000 people have been killed in the drug-fueled violence that has practically

turned some parts of Mexico into a virtual war zone. Killing civilians and beheading rivals from other cartels,

policemen and soldiers have become commonplace, and the efforts of the US and Mexican governments to put

them down hasn’t yielded any significant results just yet. Equipped with grenade launchers, automatic weapons,

11 http://criminal.findlaw.com/criminal-charges/drug-cartels-and-organized-crime.html

body armor, Kevlar helmets, these cartels are some of the most sophisticated and dangerous organized criminal

groups ever faced by the US government.

4. Colombia

The Medellin and Cali cartel’s, which have come close to making Colombia a narco-state in the 1990s, may no longer

exist, but Colombia remains the world’s top producer of cocaine, with 70% of the world’s coca leaf grown there, and

approximately 90% of the world’s cocaine processing market.

Other existing players in Colombia’s drug trade include the smaller North Coast Cartel and the Marxist guerrilla group

FARC, which has become increasingly involved in the drug trade, controlling farming, production and exportation of

cocaine in those areas of Colombia under their control.

5. Peru

Peru is the second biggest producer of cocaine in the world, next only to Colombia. Historically, Peruvian farmers

have been growing coca, the raw ingredient for cocaine, since before Spain colonized the country centuries ago.

They continue to do so, considering that coca itself is legal, but making cocaine from it is not. Nevertheless, studies

show that as much as 90 percent of that coca goes to the production of cocaine, a fact which contributes greatly to

the growth of a multibillion-dollar shadow economy in Peru.

Further complicating Peru’s drug problems is the resurgence of a supposedly inactive Shining Path, a Maoist

organization whose guerilla war with the government has claimed the lives of more than 70,000, as a major force in

the Peruvian drug trade.

6. Bolivia

Ranking third behind Colombia and Peru in cocaine production is Bolivia, which, according to a recent United Nations

report, has allocated 28,900 hectares of its land to coca production in 2007, a figure that is more than double than

what Bolivian law allows. This leniency towards coca growing however, is hardly surprising, considering that the

sitting president, Evo Morales, did not only farm coca himself during his youth, but was also head of Bolivia’s coca

growers association before he became president.

Adding more to Bolivia’s drug woes is the fact that Bolivian drug lords have become more sophisticated and

ultimately violent, churning out the illegal drug faster through state of the art laboratories, as well as starting violent

turf battles that threaten to turn the country into another Mexico.

Apart from being a top cocaine producer, Bolivia is steadily assuming the role of a major transit point for cocaine

shipments from Peru to Brazil.

7. The Bahamas

For such a tiny island nation like The Bahamas, it sure has a thriving illegal drugs trade. A recently released United

States narcotics report has revealed that more than a dozen drug-trafficking organizations are operating in this

Commonwealth territory. This underlies the central role in drug smuggling that it has assumed over the last two

decades, starting with Medellin Cartel cofounder Carlos Lehder’s initiative to use The Bahamas as a transit point for

drugs from Colombia into the United States. Lehder, who is currently incarcerated in the US, even went to the extent

of commandeering an entire Bahamian island, called Norman’s Cay, and made it his own drug fortress, where 300

kilograms of cocaine would arrive every hour.12

Steps taken to reduce/tackle Illicit Drug Trade:

1. Increased patrolling at Borders.

2. Increased coordination and cooperation btw Border Police and Narcotics department.

3. Identification of drug prone regions and local problems through the UNODC Annual Report on Drug trade.

4. UNIDCP (United Nations International Drug Control Programme).

5. Reducing cultivation of Cocaine, Marijuana etc by regularly keeping a check.

12 http://www.thegooddrugsguide.com/blog/0754/7-countries-where-drug-lords-lord-it-over/

Things to Ponder Upon:

• Has the UNODC been successful in tackling Drug Menace?

• Is there a need to increase cooperation among regional organisations like EU, SAARC for tackling Drug Menace?

Is the existing mechanism available at Airports, Port, borders etc sufficient to identify and catch Illegal drug

trade?

• Do we need to consider Drug trade under larger context of Money Laundering, terrorism etc?

Research Links:

http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1465&context=ijgls

http://www.un.org/en/ga/president/66/Issues/drugs/drugs-crime.shtml

https://www.unodc.org/ https://www.ncjrs.gov/ondcppubs/publications/policy/99ndcs/iv-g.html

http://www.unesco.org/most/sourdren.pdf