United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
JHUMUNC 20XX
2
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
Topic A: Integrating Refugees into the Society of a New Nation
Topic B: Central American Refugees of Organized Crime
Topic A: Integrating Refugees
into the Society of a New
Nation
Introduction
The United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was
originally established by the General
Assembly of the United Nations in 1951.
The original establishment was intended to
last for three years, but the committee was
found to be vital enough to merit several
five-year extensions. In the mandate of the
UNHCR, the term “refugee” is specifically
defined as the following: “A person who,
because of fear of persecution arising from
his race, religion, nationality, membership of
a particular social group or political opinion,
is outside the country of his nationality and
unable or unwilling to avail himself of that
country’s protection.”1
The term also applies to every person
who, owing to an external aggression,
occupation, foreign domination or events
seriously disturbing public order in either
part or the whole of his country of origin, is
compelled to leave his place of habitual
residence in order to seek refuge in another
place outside his country of origin.2 It
1 "Refugees." UNHCR News. N.p., n.d. Web. 10
Aug. 2016.
2 "OAU Convention Governing the Specific
Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, Adopted
should be noted that this definition may or
may not include asylum seekers, migrants,
stateless people, and internally displaced
people. Nations should keep these other
classifications in mind when creating
policies as they may unintentionally affect
these other populations.
Historical Background
Out of the 20th
century, World War
II experienced the largest displacement of
people from their native countries. Thus, the
Allies set up the UNHCR in order to provide
relief for people fleeing conflict (i.e.
refugees). Then in the 1950s and 1960s, the
decolonization movements swept across
Asia and Africa, starting with India in 1947,
when 14 million people were displaced as a
result of the partition of India and Pakistan.
The civil conflicts that ensued caused
millions to flee from Algeria, Congo,
Angola, and Nigeria to neighboring
countries, and even after peace was restored,
newly established military regimes often
uprooted ethnic communities.3
by the Assembly of Heads of State and
Government at Its Sixth Ordinary Session,
Addis-Ababa, 10 September 1969." UNHCR
News. N.p., n.d. Web. 13 June 2016.
3 Lydia DePillis, Kulwant Saluja, Denise Lu, “A
visual guide to 75 years of major refugee crises
around the world,” The Washington Post, 21
Dec. 2015. Web. 27 Nov. 2016.
3
During the 1970s and 1980s, the
proxy battles of the Cold War displaced
millions of people from Afghanistan and
between countries in the Horn of Africa.
Furthermore, as the power of the Soviet
Union declined, nationalist communities in
Eastern Europe began to fight for self-
determination, which resulted in people
moving between Armenia and
Azerbaijan, and within Georgia
and Tajikistan. Then after the fall of the
Berlin Wall in 1989, millions of Russian
natives flooded Russia from the recently
independent states.4
In the 21st century, displacement
levels hit a historic low in 2005, but began
increasing as a result of a series of conflicts,
including the United States invasion of Iraq.
By the middle of 2015, the UNHCR
estimates that the total number of refugees
had hit a historic high of over 60 million
people because of the mass of people
uprooted from the conflict-ridden regions of
Syria and South Sudan.5
To understand the current refugee
crisis and draft good policy to solve it, an
actor must first understand the history that
has shaped the crisis. Primarily, the
convention relating to the “Status of
Refugees,” also known as the “1951
Refugee Convention,” is a multilateral treaty
that defines who is a refugee, and establishes
the rights of individuals who are granted
asylum, as well as the responsibilities of
nations that grant said asylum.6 For
example, Article 3 states that a contracting
(or host) state must apply provisions of the
Constitution to refugees without
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.
6 "Chapter V – Refugees and Stateless Persons".
United Nations Treaty Series. 22 July 2013.
Archived from the original on 14 November
2012. Web. 05 July 2016.
discriminating against race, religion, or
country of origin.7 Most relevant to our
commission is Article 17, which states that:
“…the Contracting States shall give
sympathetic consideration to
assimilating the rights of all refugees
with regard to wage-earning
employment to those of nationals, and
in particular of those refugees who
have entered their territory pursuant to
programs of labor recruitment or under
immigration schemes.”8
According to the 1951 Refugee
Convention, restoring the dignity of refugees
and ensuring the provision of human rights
includes an approach that would lead to their
integration in the host society.9 More recent
thinking, however, emphasizes both the
importance of maintaining individual
identity and the possibility of “promoting
self-reliance pending voluntary return,”
whereby local integration would be
temporary.10
7 "OAU Convention Governing the Specific
Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, Adopted
by the Assembly of Heads of State and
Government at Its Sixth Ordinary Session,
Addis-Ababa, 10 September 1969." Article 3.
UNHCR News. N.p., n.d. Web. 13 June 2016.
8 Ibid.
9 Article 34 of the 1951 Convention Relating to
the Status of Refugees, Adopted on 28 July 1951
by the United Nations Conference of
Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and
Stateless Persons convened under General
Assembly resolution 429 (V) of 14 December
1950; entry into force 22 April 1954, in
accordance with article 43. Web. 15 June 2016.
10 Crisp, Jeff. “No Solution in Sight: The
Problem of Protected Refugee Situation in
Africa.” New Issues in Refugee Research,
Working Paper No.75, Geneva: UNHCR, p. 26.
Web. 15 June 2016.
4
When drafting a meaningful
resolution, delegates should consider
examples provided by past conventions. The
first three perambulatory clauses taken from
the 1969 Convention Governing the Specific
Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa are
shown below:
1. “Noting with concern the constantly
increasing numbers of refugees in
Africa and desirous of finding ways
and means of alleviating their misery
and suffering as well as providing
them with a better life and future,
2. Recognizing the need for and
essentially humanitarian approach
towards solving the problems of
refugees,
3. Aware, however, that refugee
problems are a source of friction
among many Member States, and
desirous of eliminating the source of
such discord”11
As shown above, perambulatory
clauses should begin with verbs in the
present progressive tense (e.g. noting,
recognizing, etc.). Preambulatory clauses are
historic justifications for action. Use
preambulatory clauses to cite past
resolutions, precedents, and statements
about the purpose of action. Contrastingly,
the operative clauses (which should follow)
are policies that the resolution is designed to
create, which are used to explain what
actions the committee will take in order to
address the issue. A few examples of
operative clauses from the same 1969
Conference are included below.
1. “Member States of the OAU shall
use their best endeavors consistent
with their respective legislations to
11 1969 Convention Governing the Specific
Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa. Web. 05
July 2016.
receive refugees and to secure the
settlement of those refugees who, for
well-founded reasons, are unable or
unwilling to return to their country of
origin or nationality.
2. The grant of asylum to refugees is a
peaceful and humanitarian act and
shall not be regarded as an
unfriendly act by any Member State.
3. No person shall be subjected by a
Member State to measures such as
rejection at the frontier, return or
expulsion, which would compel him
to return to or remain in a territory
where his life, physical integrity or
liberty would be threatened for the
reasons set out in Article I,
paragraphs 1 and 2.”12
To create a detailed resolution, think of
every aspect of your plan. For example, if
your resolution calls for a new program,
think about how it will be funded and what
body will manage it. Be realistic and try to
cite facts whenever possible. When possible,
try to reference past resolutions to establish
precedence and show awareness of current
international law. Most importantly, be
aware of contemporary conditions and get
creative with active clauses trying to
improve the issues at hand. Make sure your
body can take the action suggested and do
not create objectives for your resolution that
cannot be met. Finally, try to find multiple
sponsors. Your committee will be more
likely to approve the resolutions if many
delegates contribute their input and achieve
their countries’ goals.
12
1969 Convention Governing the Specific
Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa. Article
2. Web. 05 July 2016.
5
Contemporary Conditions
Today, most refugees spend years
living in the unsafe conditions of border
zones, while their legal status in the host
country is uncertain.13
They are not granted
full asylum, but are unlikely to be able to
resettle in a third country. These drawn-out
refugee situations are characterized by a
"care and maintenance" or "durable
solutions" model of assistance in countries
of first asylum, meaning that only the basic
needs of refugees residing in camps are
met.14
As the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees explains it,
“The shift from emergency to ‘care
and maintenance’ usually begins when
the refugee population in a camp
becomes relatively stable.
Environmental activities developed
during this phase should be proactive,
taking a long-term approach to
managing natural resources for the
benefit of people and the environment.
Management plans should be prepared
and guidance provided to field staff on
integrating environmental components
into project and program
implementation.”15
However, though the situation has
been deemed stable and these programs can
be implemented, refugees in border zones
are typically left with little ability to support
13
Traynor, Ian, and Helena Smith. "EU Border
Controls: Schengen Scheme on the Brink after
Amsterdam Talks." The Guardian. Guardian
News and Media, 26 Jan. 2016. Web. 15 June
2016.
14 "Environmental Concerns during Refugee
Operations." UNHCR News. N.p., n.d. Web. 07
July 2016.
15 Ibid.
or educate themselves and their children.
One of UNHCR’s most important duties is
to find long-term, durable solutions to the
problems created and experienced by
refugees.16
While it may be difficult to
eliminate all environmental impacts from
refugee-hosting areas, given that a host
country has been generous enough to make
asylum provisions for the welfare of
refugees, every effort should be made to
overcome some of the main impacts.
Local integration is notably under-
utilized even though it is a legitimate idea
that presents an alternative to refugee
camps. In the roughest sense, this means
permanently settling refugees in host
communities in countries of first asylum.
Local integration has never been broadly
implemented in developing countries.
Instead, many host governments,
particularly in Africa, have allowed “self-
settlement” of refugees without official
assistance in local host communities.17
However, local integration has rarely been
pursued systematically or formalized in a
way that gives refugees an official and
secure legal status.18
This concept has lately
received little attention from host
governments and donor agencies, but is
attracting revived attention for its potential
to promote economic development, protect
refugee rights, and provide long-term
solutions to persistent crises. Only a few
governments, including Uganda, Mexico,
and Belize, have offered local integration
16
"About Us." UNHCR News. N.p., n.d. Web.
13 June 2016.
17 Beaudou A., Cambrézy L., Zaiss R.,
"Geographical Information system, environment
and camp planning in refugee hosting areas:
Approach, methods and application in Uganda,"
Institute for Research in Development (IRD);
November 2003. Web. 11 June 2016.
18 Ibid.
6
opportunities to refugees who cannot or do
not wish to repatriate.19
Case Study: Uganda
While Uganda has historically dealt
with numerous prolonged refugee situations,
the previous decade has seen a greater influx
of refugees than any other time in history.
However, the government of Uganda’s
response to this refugee crisis has had
notable benefits. As of December 2002, the
UNHCR reported a national total of 197,082
refugees living in Uganda, primarily from
Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo
(DRC), and Rwanda.20
However, it is
important to note that this statistic reflects
the number of refugees who are registered
with UNHCR and who live in settlement
areas. According to conservative estimates,
there are approximately 50,000 self-settled
refugees in the country.21
In reality, the
number is probably far greater. Moreover,
there are 10,000 refugees registered with the
Office of the Prime Minister as self-
sufficient urban refugees, and estimates put
approximately 5,000 to 10,000 others living
in Kampala without assistance or
protection.22
19
Gingyera-Pincywa, A.G.G. 1998. “Uganda’s
Entanglement with the Problem of Refugees in
its
Global and African Contexts.” Uganda and the
Problem of Refugees. Kampala: Makerere
University Press. Web. 4 June 2016.
20 UNHCR Public Information Office. Refugee
Statistics as of end of December 2002. Web. 13
June 2016.
21 UNHCR Uganda, 1999. Strategy Paper: Self
Reliance for Refugee Hosting Areas, 1999 –
2003. With Office of the Prime Minister,
Kampala, Uganda. Web. 23 July. 2016.
22 UNHCR Uganda, 1999. Strategy Paper: Self
Reliance for Refugee Hosting Areas, 1999 –
Education is a sector directly
affected by the implementation of Ugandan
policy. Of particular relevance is the SRS
advocates “integrating refugee primary and
secondary schools into the district education
system.”23
In so doing, the SRS aims to
develop “mechanisms for the inclusion of
the refugees into the Universal Primary
Education (UPE) being implemented in
Uganda.”24
In both developed and
developing host countries, the preference is
for temporary protection and restrictions on
refugees, including channeling them into
camps, pending their repatriation.
While these methods worked
particularly well in their respective
countries, viable paths to refugee integration
vary widely. Some of the most common
scenarios are described below. Full
integration refers to refugees who are
granted asylum, residency, and full and
permanent membership status by the host
government. Under these circumstances,
refugees acquire the protection of the host
state and enjoy the full range of economic,
social, and civil rights accorded to
permanent legal residents, including access
to citizenship under the same terms as
others.
Local integration may take place
when it is not safe for refugees to return
home after a prolonged period in exile.25
Local integration is a long and complicated
process with legal, economic, social, and
2003. With Office of the Prime Minister,
Kampala, Uganda. Web. 23 July. 2016.
23 Office of the Prime Minister/UNHCR
Uganda. 1999. “Strategy Paper: Self Reliance
for Refugee Hosting Areas in Moyo, Arua, and
Adjumani Districts, 1999-2005,” 19 July. 2016.
24 Ibid.
25 "Local Integration." UNHCR News. Web. 01
Aug. 2016.
7
cultural ramifications, in which the eventual
goal is for refugees to acquire the nationality
of the host country. Within the past decade,
approximately 1.1 million refugees around
the world have become citizens in their
country of asylum.26
Local integration
imposes considerable demands on both the
individual and the receiving society. In such
cases, a host government may decide to
allow refugees to integrate locally, in the
first-asylum country.27
Local integration
may or may not lead to permanent residence
and eventual citizenship.
Self-settlement occurs when refugees
share local households or set up temporary
accommodations, and when local families or
community organizations assist refugees.
Self-settled refugees have no legal refugee
status within the host country. The UNHCR,
although recognizing the refugee status of
this group, is unable to provide any formal
protection. These refugees are often active
in the local economy despite the legal
restrictions on such activities.
Encampment means that refugee
camps are purpose-built and administered by
the UNHCR and/or host governments.28
Food, water, and services such as schooling
and health care are provided by relief
agencies. Refugees in camps are not
expected to be self-sufficient, and camps are
seldom planned for long-term use or
population growth. Host governments and
many relief agencies prefer camps, not only
because they make managing assistance
easier, but also because they are believed to
facilitate repatriation since harsh camp
conditions make staying less attractive. Host
countries may also classify a site as either an
26
"Local Integration." UNHCR News. Web. 01
Aug. 2016.
27 Ibid
28 Ibid.
“Encampment” or “Non-Encampment” for
their own gains. One critic gave an example:
“In Lebanon and Jordan the (non-)
encampment of Syrian refugees is
serving states’ labor market goals. The
Lebanese economy ‘requires’ large
numbers of non-encamped low-wage
Syrian workers, but the Jordanian
regime assists its Transjordanian
support base by restricting poor
Syrians’ access to the labor market
through encampment.”29
Organized or local settlements are
planned, segregated villages created
specifically for refugees, and they differ
from camps in that refugees are expected to
become self-sufficient pending their
repatriation. Furthermore, within these
organized or local settlements, there is more
permanent housing construction, and there is
access to land provided by the government,
but there is limited movement allowed
outside official areas of residence.
Opportunity and Flexibility In countries of first asylum, refugees
settle in different ways and continue to
move between various settlement options
over time. Camps and other assisted
settlements tend to fluctuate in numbers as
the population moves continuously.30
Refugees will frequently leave camps in
order to find work, explore repatriation and
resettlement options, trade, enlist in rebel
29
Turner, Lewis. "Mediterranean Politics."
Explaining the (Non-)Encampment of Syrian
Refugees: Security, Class and the Labour
Market in Lebanon and Jordan: : Vol 20, No 3.
Taylor& Francis Online, 15 Sept. 2015. Web. 10
Aug. 2016.
30 45, Working Paper No. NEW ISSUES IN
REFUGEE RESEARCH (n.d.): n. pag. Web. 06
Jine. 2016.
8
movements, or join family members.
Reasons to return to the camps include when
food supply is limited, or when external
security threats exist.31
In a mutually
beneficial relationship, locals use the health
facilities and markets of refugee camps and
settlements, and refugees use the local
markets and land.
In the case of long-term refugee
situations, local integration can be a viable
solution for the security and growth of both
the refugees and the host country. Self-
settled refugees, who significantly
outnumber officially assisted refugees, can
survive by relying on their own
resourcefulness, receiving support from the
local community, and utilizing economic
opportunities in the region. However, not
all environments can support local
integration, and an environment’s stability
and security should be assessed. If local
integration will in fact create more
problems, then other options should be
developed. The merits of local integration or
assisted self-settlement must be carefully
evaluated before either is pursued.
A situation in which local integration
may be desired, and therefore promoted, by
a host government is when local integration
can augment the country’s economic
growth. This can occur by enabling the
economic viability of refugees (e.g. refugees
could be given access to land, and to the
social services and employment
opportunities available to nationals), and by
allowing them the rights and freedoms under
international law.32
For example, if given
freedom of movement, refugees could be
economically active and participate in the
31
Ibid
32 United Nations Treaty Series. 22 July 2013.
Archived from the original on 14 November
2012. Web. 05 July 2016
local economy.33
In this way, host
governments and the UNHCR could support
and facilitate refugee economic productivity,
which would ultimately benefit both the host
country and the refugees.
A Focus on Local Integration
A government’s decision to pursue a
local integration program raises complicated
questions about implementation and
cooperation with other agencies. Designing
international assistance programs that enable
local integration is a tricky matter because
these kinds of programs fall between relief
and development. Host governments are
reluctant to assign development-earmarked
funds to projects involving non-nationals,
and development agencies see refugee
assistance as the prerogative of relief
agencies. Therefore, in order to promote
local integration, donor communities need to
shift their priorities away from repatriation
and resettlement.34
Lessons learned from other relief-to-
development programs can be applied. In
general, successful local integration
programs should be sustainable, and should
benefit both refugees and their host
communities.35
Local integration programs
should also be in compliance with the
policies and programs of the host
governments.36
33
Barber, Ben. "Feeding refugees, or war? The
dilemma of humanitarian aid." Foreign Affairs
(1997): 8-14. Web. 05 July 2016
34 Turner, Lewis. "Mediterranean Politics."
Explaining the (Non-)Encampment of Syrian
Refugees: Security, Class and the Labour
Market in Lebanon and Jordan: : Vol 20, No 3.
Taylor& Francis Online, 15 Sept. 2015. Web. 10
July. 2016.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
9
Community Relations Delegates should remember that the
success of integration depends as much on
the relationship between the local population
and the refugees as it does on the host
government’s position. Positive effort by the
host country is almost always a benefit and
can lead to useful legislation, but in the day-
to-day life of a refugee, it is best to have
friendly neighbors. When refugees are
welcomed and accepted by the locals, or at
least not resented, they are better able to
make a living and face fewer security
threats.37
Host communities sometimes view
refugees as unfortunate guests who will
eventually return to their own country. Such
a belief may explain the initial willingness
of local people to accommodate the
refugees, but it may also explain why
refugees are not ultimately easily integrated
into their host communities. Resentment can
ensue when impermanence is proven to be
false (e.g. either a new influx of refugees
occurs or refugees remain). When drafting a
resolution, delegates should remember that
when an entire local community is
mobilized to help integrate refugees, the
results are much more effective than when
the job is left to top officials.
Case Study: Norway
Recently war-torn countries such as
Syria, Somalia, and Afghanistan have
poured refugees into the borders of Norway,
leading the country to quietly emerge as one
of the largest contributors of humanitarian
aid to Syrian refugees.38
According to the
37
1994. "Refugees in the Sudan: Unresolved
issues." in Adelman, H. & Sorenson, J. (eds.)
African Refugees: Development Aid and
Repatriation, Boulder, CO: Westview Press &
Web. 10 July. 2016
38 Hjelmgaard, Kim, and Valeria Criscione.
"Little Norway Spends Big on Syrian Refugee
country’s Directorate of Immigration, just
over 31,000 people, about a third of them
from Syria, applied for asylum in Norway in
2015.39
Agder Research, as a social science
research institute centered in Southern
Norway, has focused their efforts to create
and implement positive change through a
theoretical and practical knowledge of
innovation in society, industry, and public
administration.40
In 2014, this included
running two pilot studies in two Agder
County municipalities, the town of Arendal
and the municipality of Lindesnes
specifically, to investigate if certain
approaches can aid integration. The
researchers hypothesized that where patterns
of mobility and prior migration characterize
the host society, refugees are less likely to
be viewed as temporary guests who should
move on and out. In Arendal, it was found
that educators were more than willing to
step up and complete extra tasks to help
teach their students (refugees attempting to
learn their new local language) more than
just the curriculum.
“[Educators would] get involved in a
number of tasks, such as translating
letters. But even more demanding jobs
crop up, such as helping tackle
mourning processes in connection with
family deaths or helping re-unite
families. Sometimes they get desperate
cries of help from women who are
Crisis." USA Today. Gannett, 10 Feb. 2016.
Web. 5 July. 2016.
39 Norway. Directorate of Immigration 2015.
Web. 5 July. 2016.
40 "About Us." Agderforskning. N.p. Web. 10
July. 2016.
10
battered by their husbands or
immigrants who are suicidal.”41
However, the study also noted that
these professionals did not tend to be
properly compensated for their extra efforts
and often found the tasks overwhelming.
Delegates should consider how forming a
plan to back the helpful willingness of locals
might be most effective improvement they
can make for refugees integrating to a new
society.
In the Municipality of Lindesnes, the
Agder researchers studied what happened
when duties were shifted from local
government offices to the residents. This
helped tremendously to involve new
members of the community who were
unlikely to participate if a conscious effort
had not been made to involve them. As one
researcher put it, “It is often hard to get
immigrant women, for instance from
Afghanistan, out in the job market as
participating members of society… Now,
nearly all the women from Afghanistan in
Lindesnes have work, courses or job-
training placements to go to.”42
This effort in Lindesnes had a doubly
good effect because many refugees in
Norway are coming from recently or
currently war-torn countries such as Syria,
Afghanistan, or Somalia.43
Many have
experienced violence from authorities and
41
"About Us." Agderforskning. N.p. Web. 10
July. 2016.
42 Stein, Barry N. 1991. “Refugee Aid and
Development: Slow Progress Since ICARA II,”
in Refugee Policy: Canada and the United
States, Howard Adelman (ed.) Toronto: York
Lanes Press. Web. 13 June. 2016.
43 Hjelmgaard, Kim, and Valeria Criscione.
"Little Norway Spends Big on Syrian Refugee
Crisis." USA Today. Gannett, 10 Feb. 2016.
Web. 5 July. 2016.
have a resulting mistrust of public officials.
Having peers, who were completing these
previously-government-assigned duties, to
turn to was deemed incredibly helpful by the
Adger Study.44
While local integration can
be a positive approach in and of itself, it is
important that such programs be linked to
repatriation programs. Such links could
promote a strategic regional approach that
creates joint communities, diversifies the
economy, and stimulates development in
both the refugee-hosting area and the home-
country areas to which refugees return.
According to Barry Stein, an analyst
and professor of political science at
Michigan State University, host
governments’ degree of receptiveness to the
idea of local integration tends to depend on
three key factors.45
These are the real and
perceived security threats that accompany
refugees, the perceived or actual economic
and environmental resource burdens, and the
attitudes and beliefs of both refugees and
locals about the refugees’ length of stay.46
Security Concerns A frequent argument made by host
governments is that refugees bring security
problems to the refugee-hosting area, and
that it is therefore better to restrict them to
camps where these problems can be
controlled.47
Indeed, there is evidence that
refugees import with them the security
44
Ibid.
45 Stein, Barry N. 1991. “Refugee Aid and
Development: Slow Progress Since ICARA II,”
in Refugee Policy: Canada and the United
States, Howard Adelman (ed.) Toronto: York
Lanes Press Web. 13 June 2016.
46 Ibid.
47 Nicole Lee. "A life of escaping conflict: 'I
don't feel like a Burundian – I am a refugee'".
the Guardian. Web. 11 June 2016.
11
problems of the regions they flee, and create
new crime and security problems.48
However, it is also true that refugees are
often blamed for pre-existing social or
economic problems such as rises in crime
rates, declining standards of living, and
public health crises (e.g. AIDS). In recent
years, due to the belief that refugees are
responsible for these social and economic
issues, the governments of Kenya, Tanzania,
and Thailand have insisted that all refugees
live in camps.49
However, international organizations
do provide some security in refugee camps.
Locally integrated and self-settled refugees
may be only somewhat less vulnerable than
camp dwellers because the lack of protection
services from international organizations can
leave them subject to petty crime and other
problems in the host community. Still, it is
worth noting that placing refugees in camps
often worsens security problems for both the
host country and the refugees. In addition to
military problems like raids or direct attacks
on camps, camp culture and organization
can create a climate of violence and
intimidation.50
Camp conditions often lead
to high rates of violence against women and
children, and few camps are organized to
address such problems since they typically
lack effective systems of law and order.51
Moreover, since most camps are not closed
48
Human Rights Watch Plan (PDF). Human
Rights Watch. p. 17-18. Web. 12 June 2016.
49 Stein, Barry N. 1991. “Refugee Aid and
Development: Slow Progress Since ICARA II,”
in Refugee Policy: Canada and the United
States, Howard Adelman (ed.) Toronto: York
Lanes Press Web. 13 June 2016.
50 Daniel, E.V., and Knudsen, J. eds. Mistrusting
Refugees 1995, University of California Press.
Web. 13 June 2016.
51 Ibid.
entities, the problems of crime, violence,
and militarization leach out into the
surrounding community.
Environmental and Economic Concerns
Many host governments believe that
refugees should be restricted to camps or
settlements so that they are less likely to
compete with locals for scarce resources and
infrastructure.52
Host communities fear they
will lose land and access to affordable
homes, schools, and health facilities as a
result of population influx. This was
increasingly seen last summer during
debates regarding “Brexit,” or the decision
of the United Kingdom to leave the
European Union.53
Some of these strains,
however, can be offset by international
assistance. Such aid could fund the
construction of new schools or health clinics
for the local population and the refugees,
thereby alleviating local fears.
Land constraints are also of concern,
but largely depend upon the region.
Mexico's Chiapas region, for example, is
characterized by longstanding struggles over
land. Under these circumstances, locals are
more likely to resent refugees, and to resist
them from having access to land; even
though if allowed access to land, refugees
could increase productivity. Communities
also fear that refugees will compete with
locals for jobs. However, in situations where
unemployment is already high, refugees do
not cause unemployment. In general,
refugees remain economically
disadvantaged compared to locals.
52
Fahik, Ali. "Defence and Peace Economics."
The Impact of Syrian Refugees on the Labor
Market in Neighboring Countries: Empirical
Evidence from Jordan: : Vol 27, No 1. N.p., 22
June 2015. Web. 10 July. 2016.
53 Ibid.
12
Beyond the economic sphere,
environmental strains such as deforestation,
water pollution, and the overuse of
rangeland are also feared, particularly in the
initial stages of a refugee influx.54
However,
the environmental impact of self-settled or
locally integrated refugees must be
compared with that of camps. Empirical
findings by researchers have indicated that
self-settled refugees have much greater
flexibility in selecting environmentally
sustainable locations, or in adopting more
sustainable practices, than their counterparts
in camps.55
Questions a Resolution Should
Answer
1.What is each nation's “fair share” of
contribution when solving international
issues?
The Oxfam Fair Share Measure was
developed as an attempt to determine
how many refugees each nation should
host.56
The Measure determines what is
owed by each nation based on three key
indicators to help guide the level of
commitment of the contributing country.
These are listed as:
54
1990. “The Long Term Impact and
Consequences of Two Refugee Settlement
Options: The Case of Angolan Refugees in
Zambia”. Arusha. Paper presented at the
International Refugee Conference. Web. 13 June
2016.
55 Ibid.
56 "A Fairer Deal for Syrians International
Commitments Needed to Arrest the Deepening
Crisis in Syria and the Region." Human Rights
Documents Online (n.d.): n. pag. 9 Sept. 2014.
Web. 13 June 2016.
1. The level of funding each country
makes available for the humanitarian
response, relative to the size of its
economy (based on gross national
income),
2. The number of Syrian refugees each
country has helped to find safety
through offers of resettlement or
other forms of humanitarian
protection, again based on the size of
the economy,
3. The country’s commitment to ending
human rights violations as measured
by the country’s halting the transfer
of arms and ammunition.57
2.Does every nation owe contribution?
While each nation’s sovereignty must be
respected, if a nation pledges a certain
contribution, it is important for delegates
to determine a way to hold nations to
their pledged contributions. For 2016,
the international community has pledged
$10 billion for Syria. However,
according to the United Nations, less
than half of the 2015 pledge has
materialized.58
For example, Norway
contributed 385% of its allocated portion
of an $8.9 billion funding appeal for
Syria. It was beaten only by Kuwait,
which gave 554%. Germany donated
152%, and the U.S. donated 76%.59
57
Ibid.
58 Hjelmgaard, Kim, and Valeria Criscione.
"Little Norway Spends Big on Syrian Refugee
Crisis." USA Today. Gannett, 10 Feb. 2016.
Web. 05 Aug. 2016.
59 Ibid.
13
3.Is there any legitimacy to the claim of a
nation maintaining cultural integrity?
Cultural integrity is the idea that a nation
may dilute its culture upon accepting a
large number of foreigners, or that
funding other nations to help refugees
takes away funds that could be used
domestically instead. Moral obligations
to refugees are what philosophers call
Good Samaritan obligations: obligations
to help are only when the need is great,
and the helper can do so at a low cost to
itself. The legitimacy of “cultural
integrity” is a philosophical and
sociological quandary.60
4.What types of contributions can a nation
give?
A few examples of how nations can
contribute to refugees are by providing
shelter, food and water, medical and
psychological care, legal assistance,
education, or monetary aid to other
nations and relief agencies.
5.Could monetary compensation be
provided in exchange for refusing to
admit refugees, and if so, does this
create an unfair situation for developing
nations?
Nations that do not wish to admit
refugees should be allowed to provide
monetary aid to other nations and relief
agencies. This does seem to create an
unfair situation for developing nations,
but once again, each nation’s
sovereignty must be respected. As
aforementioned, the Oxfam Fair Share
Measure was developed as an attempt to
determine what is owed by each nation.
One of these factors is the level of
funding each country makes available
60
Serena Parekh, “Moral Obligations to
Refugees,” The Critique, 06 Jan. 2016. Web. 27
Nov. 2016.
for the humanitarian response relative to
the size of its economy. Therefore,
developing nations should only be asked
to contribute what is feasible given their
gross national income.
6.What is the value of a stateless person’s
life to other nations?
Many refugees possess a diversity of
skills and experiences that can be
productive in a host nation’s workforce.
For example, some refugees are doctors,
engineers, teachers, lawyers, or
technology and finance specialists who
hope to rebuild the careers they had in
their home countries before they had to
leave due to persecution or civil unrest.
Even refugees who do not possess any
specialized skill can contribute to the
local economy.61
7.How do concerns of safety and terrorism
affect a nation’s willingness to accept
refugees?
Although taken from a November 2001
press release, it poignantly states:
“The United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees this
morning urged world governments
and politicians to avoid falling into
the trap of making unwarranted
linkages between refugees and
terrorism. In the wake of the 11
September terrorist attacks on the
United States, it was understandable
that governments were looking to
enhance security safeguards against
abuse of international asylum
regimes, but it would be a terrible
irony if those who had fled from
terror were to become unwitting
61
Alice Beste, “The Contributions of Refugees:
Lifting Barriers to Inclusion,” United Nations
University, 31 Jul. 2015. Web. 27 Nov. 2016.
14
victims of the war against
terrorism.”62
Therefore, the UNHCR recognizes
concerns of safety and terrorism, but
reminds member states to differentiate
refugees from terrorism.
Bloc Positions
Europe The region most impacted by the
refugee crisis today is Europe. Roughly one
million refugees fled Afghanistan, Iraq, and
Syria and made their way to Europe in
2015.63
In the past five years, Greece has
taken the bulk of the migrant flow and there
has been a notably steep decline in
immigrant arrivals in Turkey and the
members of the European Union.64
Though
several steps have been taken by nations like
Norway to implement cohesive integration
programs, there is still considerable work to
be done.65
Delegates would do well to
remember that refugees’ population
characteristics and attitudes play a key role
in successful integration. Interest in
integration depends on whether a refugee
intends to be repatriated, or to resettle in a
62
“Refugees Victim of Terrorism, Not Its
Perpetrators, High Commissioner Tells Third
Committee, As Refugee Debate Opens,” United
Nations Meetings Coverage and Press Releases,
19 Nov. 2001. Web. 27 Nov. 2016.
63 Norway. Directorate of Immigration 2015.
Web. 5 July. 2016.
64 Ibid.
65 Hjelmgaard, Kim, and Valeria Criscione.
"Little Norway Spends Big on Syrian Refugee
Crisis." USA Today. Gannett, 10 Feb. 2016.
Web. 5 July. 2016.
third country.66
Some refugees initially view
their stay in the host country as temporary,
but over time this view can change, and the
refugee may seek integration. However, if a
refugee holds onto the hope of repatriation,
and continues to view his situation as
temporary, he may resist integration or any
form of settlement that could ironically
interfere with his repatriation.67
Africa Considering Africa regionally is
likely the best approach when developing
policy to benefit refugee integration. Sub-
Saharan Africa contains more than 26
percent of the world’s refugee population.68
The UNHCR have previously announced
that over 18 million refugees are of concern
to the commission. That number has
increased in recent years due to the crisis in
Nigeria, South Sudan, and the Central
African Republic.
Another nation to consider specially
is Egypt, where tens of thousands of
Sudanese refugees have arrived. Their
official status as refugees is highly disputed
by the Egyptian government, and as
resources were thin they have been subject
to racial discrimination and police violence.
Of the $20 million budget promised in 2016
to help these people in need, the UNHCR
has so far only received a quarter. Delegates
should note that consideration for the local
governments of these nations is especially
important considering the past history of
colonization. As the governments tend to be
considerably less stable and have less
influence internationally, recognizing their
66
Ibid.
67 "About Us." Agderforskning. N.p. Web. 10
July. 2016.
68 “Africa” UN High Commission on Refugees:
> About Us > Where we Work. Web. 10 July.
2016.
15
sovereignty in determining matters of
integration is vital. Even so, several nations
such as South Africa are impressively
developed. Clauses should be drafted to
account for the vast differences between
these nations.
Asia The issue of integration varies by
region. By the end of 2014, the Asia-Pacific
region was accommodating approximately
117,000 asylum seekers and 3.8 million
refugees. This is 18.6% of the world’s
refugee population. Malaysia and Indonesia
provided temporary shelter for up to 7,000
of the migrants stranded at sea, and Japan
pledged $3.5 million in emergency
assistance, but did not offer to take in any
displaced people. However, the wealthiest
nations in the Asia-Pacific region have
largely avoided hosting refugees. When
boats bearing thousands of migrants
appeared off Southeast Asian shores a
month later, China and India did little to aid
the refugees. Additionally, Australia, widely
regarded as an affluent nation in the Asia-
Pacific region, declared it would not resettle
the migrants. Humanitarian considerations
result in most countries in the Asia-Pacific
tolerating the unauthorized presence of
asylum seekers and refugees within their
borders most of the time.
In many regional countries civil
society organizations are attempting to fill
the protection gap through service provision,
advocacy, or both. Unlike the UNHCR,
which may be perceived as trying to impose
a foreign agenda on a country against its
national interest, these civil society
organizations have local legitimacy because
they act and speak for local constituencies.
Pakistan and Iran were the top two host
countries in the region. Pakistan hosts 38
percent, and Iran hosts 25 percent, of the
Asia-Pacific population of asylum seekers
and refugees. While this does provide some
support, many people seeking asylum today
are from the Asian Pacific region, and would
likely adjust well in a more similar culture.
Rohingya Muslims fleeing religious
persecution in Myanmar, or poor
Bangladeshis seeking jobs, have an
especially difficult time finding hosts today.
North America Nations in North America vary in
accommodation of refugees, which can
severely affect immersion. The U.S. refugee
resettlement program, which accepted two-
thirds of the 98,000 refugees who were
permanently resettled in 2013, is the world’s
largest refugee resettlement program. Due to
the scale of the program and the
growing diversity of resettled refugees, there
is an increasing range of challenges.69
Meanwhile, the Canadian refugee system
has two main parts: (1) the Refugee and
Humanitarian Resettlement Program, and
(2) the In-Canada Asylum Program. This
system works particularly well because the
Canadian government tends to place equal
weight on considering refugees applying for
asylum both outside and within Canadian
borders. Canada works closely with the
UNHCR to identify refugees for
resettlement.
The role of Mexico should be
carefully considered as it is a starting point
for emigration as thousands of Mexicans and
other Latin Americans try to cross the
border with the United States. The migrant
population in Mexico is essentially
comprised of three main groups: (1) North
American migrants, mainly US citizens that
retire in small Mexican villages; (2)
European migrants that migrated to Mexico
in the early 20th century; and (3) Latin
69
"The Integration Outcomes of U.S. Refugees:
Successes and
Challenges." Migrationpolicy.org. N.p., 28 Oct.
2015. Web. 30 Oct. 2016.
16
American migrants that include economic
migrants, asylum seekers, and transit
migrants.70
Mexico tends to be extremely
accommodating and has actually seen high
rates of immigration in the past decade.
Latin America Unlike other regions, many Latin
American countries were not party to the
1951 U.N. Convention on Refugees. Instead,
these nations developed The Cartagena
Declaration, which delegates should become
familiar with. Several countries that signed
it have found it more difficult to actually
enact a more effective protection system,
and considering ways to achieve this would
be highly beneficial.71
Today, the Colombian conflict has
expanded into the border regions, which
increasingly pushes civilians over the
border. Against the Declaration, Venezuela
militarized its borders, establishing strict
control over admissions into the country.72
In 1996, Venezuela’s army offered
humanitarian assistance to refugees for a
few days, and then deported them back
across the border. Comparably, Ecuador has
cooperated with the UNHCR on a
comprehensive refugee protection plan in
accordance with international law.
Ecuador has arguably been the most
successful nation in implementing policy,
which integrates refugees into social life in
their new host country. As of June 2015, the
70
By Daniel | Published: September 9, 2010.
"Migration and Integration in Mexico
City." Migration and Integration in Mexico City.
N.p., n.d. Web. 30 Oct. 2016.
71 Esthimer, By Marissa. "Protecting the
Forcibly Displaced: Latin America's Evolving
Refugee and Asylum
Framework." Migrationpolicy.org. N.p., 07 July
2016. Web. 30 Oct. 2016.
72 Ibid.
country hosts over 133,000
refugees.73
Several other nations have
opened their doors to Syrian refugees, with
Argentina and Uruguay, creating special
programs to resettle refugees since the war
started in 2011.74
Conclusion
Refugee crises are important to
address quickly and effectively. In situations
where refugees must remain outside their
homeland for a long time, local integration
can provide a realistic alternative to refugee
camps. However, the success of local
integration depends on the cooperation of
host governments, the local community, and
the refugees themselves. If such a program
threatens the security and stability of either
the local community or the refugees, it is not
an option. If, on the other hand, such
concerns are addressed, economic
development, better respect for human
rights, and more cooperative relationships
can be combined to create long-lasting
solutions. Delegates should consider how
their clauses could assist willingly helpful
locals, which may be the most effective
improvement that can be made for refugees
who are attempting to integrate into their
new lives.
73
Ibid.
74 Brodzinsky, Sibylla. "Latin American
Countries Welcome Syrian Refugees." The
Guardian. Guardian News and Media, 09 Sept.
2015. Web. 30 Oct. 2016.
17
Topic B: Central American
Refugees of Organized Crime
Introduction
Guatemala, Honduras, and El
Salvador constitute the Northern Triangle,
which is widely regarded as the most violent
region in the world. Much of this violence
stems from civil wars occurring in these
countries, dating all the way back to the
1980s. Violence has continued to run
rampant due to several contemporary
factors. The influence of crime groups has
contributed its fair share to the violence
through the notorious weapon and drug
trades. Furthermore, state governments are
as much to blame over the violence as crime
groups. Due to corruption among state
officials and ineffectiveness at governing,
the governments have allowed this violence
to persist. Tens of thousands of Hondurans,
El Salvadorans, and Guatemalans have fled
to the U.S. to seek asylum. While the U.S.
has made some efforts to admit refugees, it
has deported many refugees as well. As
delegates read further, they will see that this
problem is too big for the individual
governments of Honduras, Guatemala, and
El Salvador to fix on their own. But
together, with the United States and
international organizations, such as the
United Nations, this problem can be
effectively addressed.
Historical Background
Both internal and external factors
explain the stronghold of organized crime in
Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala,
which form a region known as the Northern
Triangle. Domestically, these countries
were rocked by civil wars in the 1980s,
leaving behind a legacy of violence and
fragile institutions, which has sustained
organized crime in the area. The warfare in
El Salvador and Guatemala produced as
many as 75,000 and 200,000 casualties
respectively as well as a large pool of
demobilized and unemployed men with easy
access to weapons.75
In Guatemala, groups,
such as illegal armed groups and clandestine
security apparatuses, have developed from
state intelligence agencies and military
organizations.76
Furthermore, the civil wars
instilled a lack of trust in police and security
forces following numerous accusations of
human rights abuses; as many as 95 percent
of crimes go unpunished in some areas.77
While avoiding their own civil wars, the rest
of Central America experienced the adverse
effects of neighboring conflict, particularly
Honduras. Decades later the resulting
political cesspool included weak,
underfunded governments plagued by public
corruption which failed to effectively curb
criminal violence and instead gave rise to
surrogate authorities and powerful sub-
actors.78
The government's’ inability to
protect citizens and the lack of
accountability of the states has led to an
increase in violent activity. A reduction of
the current level of violence in Central
America, which recorded almost 40 murders
per day in 2006, could potentially produce
significant economic gains. A study
conducted by the World Bank predicted that
a 10 percent drop in the homicide rate could
75
Renwick, Danielle. "Central America's Violent
Northern Triangle." Council on Foreign Relations.
Council on Foreign Relations, 19 Jan. 2016. Web.
76 Ibid
77 Eguizábal, Cristina. "Crime and Violence in
Central America's Northern Triangle." Woodrow
Wilson Center Reports on the Americas. Wilson
Center, 2015. Web.
78 Shifter, Michael. "Countering Criminal Violence in
Central America." Council on Foreign Relations.
Council on Foreign Relations, Apr. 2012. Web.
18
boost per capita annual income growth by a
full 1.0 percent in El Salvador and by 0.7
percent in Guatemala and Honduras.79
Smuggling of Migrants from the
Northern Triangle
The illegal status of migrants
facilitates the exploitation of their labor.
These poor, displaced, and often illiterate
refugees are willing to work for lower or no
wages and under worse conditions without
the ability to file a legal complaint or else
they face deportation.80
Often, enforcing
laws against the smuggling of migrants is as
much about protecting borders as it is about
protecting an extremely vulnerable
population. Smuggled workers face
trafficking, extortion, or abandonment in the
face of law enforcement. This can result in
extreme cases of violence as exemplified
with the Tamaulipas massacre in 2010,
during which 72 migrants were killed by the
Zeta gang as a result of gang rivalry, the
refusal of extortion, and forced labor.81
Citizens of the Northern Triangle
often try to migrate to the United States in
search of a better life. Since the process of
migrating legally to the U.S. can be tedious
and costly, many refugees come to the U.S.
illegally. There are two ways that refugees
can become “irregular migrants.” If they can
afford to fly in and get a visa, the first way is
they overstay their visa. If they are not able
to get a visa then there is the second, and
frequent method of going through Mexico
79
Serrano-Berthet, Rodrigo, and Humberto
Lopez. "Crime and Violence in Central
America: A Development Challenge." World
Bank. World Bank, 2011. Web.
80 Leggett, Ted. "Transnational Organized Crime
in Central America and the Caribbean." United
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. UNODC,
Sept. 2012. Web.
81 Ibid.
and secretly crossing the border into the
U.S. Most immigrants aren’t able to do this
on their own, which is why they enlist the
help of professional smugglers. 82
Additionally, irregular migrants from the
Horn of Africa, South Asia, China, and the
Caribbean use the smuggling routes.
Migrants and people seeking
protection are vulnerable to abuse and
violence en route, as well as to scams by
officials at borders. Since irregular migrants
try to stay away from law enforcement, this
makes them vulnerable. Not only are they
away from their homes, but also without the
law protecting them, they are susceptible
targets. Smugglers are aware of this and may
betray the migrants. For example, if they
feel that law enforcement might catch them,
smugglers will sometimes abandon the
migrants in the middle of the journey even
in dangerous weather and rough terrain.
Even worse, some smugglers have been
known to hold migrants hostage and force
family members to send payments for loved
ones or kidnapping and trafficking migrants.
Laws against the smuggling of migrants do
not just protect the borders. These laws also
protect refugees who are in a vulnerable
position.83
In some cases, even if migrants
are successful at entering a safe country, this
is not the end of their troubles. Some
refugees find themselves unable to escape
the menace of the violent street gangs even
in exile. Those caught and destined for
deportation, and those denied asylum, face
potentially deadly consequences once they
return home.
82
"Transnational Organized Crime in Central
America" N.p., n.d. Web. 18 Oct. 2016.
83"Smuggling of Migrants from the Northern
Triangle" N.p., n.d. Web. 18 Oct. 2016.
19
International Drugs and Arms Trade External factors also contribute to
the history of criminal violence in Central
America, including its geographic proximity
to the international trade in drugs and arms
between South America and the United
States. Of the numerous contraband flows,
the most paramount is cocaine trafficking,
which has catalyzed violence in the area and
empowered transnational criminal
organizations, many of which are associated
with Mexican drug-trafficking organizations
(DTOs).84
DTO’s have largely controlled the
U.S. illicit drug market, raising the drug
issue to the forefront of U.S. foreign policy
concerns.
However, temporarily successful
anti-drug programs in one country or sub-
region have often led traffickers to alter their
cultivation patterns, production techniques,
and trafficking routes and methods in order
to avoid detection. Countries that had
previously been used as refueling stops have
become storage and logistics centers for
transnational trafficking groups. Cocaine has
been trafficked through Central America for
decades, but this flow increased dramatically
after 2000 and again after 2006 due to the
escalation in Mexican drug law
enforcement. Moreover, U.S.-led
interdiction efforts in Colombia, Mexico,
and the Caribbean have caused traffickers to
shift their focus to new routes along the
Guatemalan/Honduran border. According to
official reports, 80 percent of documented
drug flows into the United States originate
from this region. The resulting displacement
effect underscores the importance of
coordinated strategies to address the entire
contraband flow, so that one country’s
success does not become another’s
problem.85
84
Renwick.
85 Leggett.
The flow of cocaine and illicit
firearms is also part of a bigger problem in
Central America. All these organized crime
activities can be connected to criminal
violence. This type of violence has run
rampant in Central America, with drug
trafficking groups being involved in much of
it. While there has been a high level of
violence in Central America since the civil
wars in the 1990s, there has been a
resurgence of violence since 2000. This
violence primarily affects Belize and
countries of the northern triangle region,
Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador.
Honduras has been particularly affected
recently, in the last five years murder rates
have more than doubled. Honduras
experienced one of the highest national
murder rates in modern times, 92 per
100,000, during 2011. 86
Transnational Gangs and Territorial
Groups The diverted trafficking routes have
created a power struggle with local
organized crime groups to create a perilous
power imbalance. DTOs sometimes partner
with transnational gangs (regionally known
as “Maras”) to transport and distribute
narcotics, sparking turf wars87
. The region’s
largest gangs, MS-13 and M-18, which may
have as many as 85,000 members combined,
were both born in Los Angeles (MS stands
for “Mara Salvatrucha”). Salvadorans who
had fled the civil war in the 1980s first
created M-18 in the 1960s by Mexican
youth and MS-13. The presence of the
86
"Cocaine, Organized Crime Groups, and
Violence." N.p., n.d. Web. 18 Oct. 2016.
87 Ribando Seelke, Clare. "Latin America and
the Caribbean: Illicit Drug Trafficking and U.S.
Counterdrug Programs." Congressional
Research Service. CRS Report for Congress,
2011. Web.
20
Maras in Central America grew in the mid-
1990s after former President George Bush
authorized large-scale deportations from the
United States of undocumented immigrants
with criminal records.
Central American territorial groups
are usually more active in Guatemala. One
notable group is the Mendoza family of the
province of Izabal. The Mendozas are
landholders and the lands they control are
frequently used for agribusiness, or
agriculture under commercial principles.
Some of the alleged crimes committed by
this demographic include anti-union
violence, in addition to drug running. The
Mendozas are able to maintain influence
over society due to their political
connections and legal and illegal business
ventures. One of the family members is a
part of various football committees, which
allows them to use their business profits for
social gain. 88
Another significant group Los
Chamales is followers of Juan “Chamale”
Ortiz Lopez and Rony Lopez. The Chamales
are extremely popular with the people,
through their continued support of the
community. The group is so involved in the
area that Juan Ortiz is actually a pastor in
the local church that he funds. Even though
Juan Ortiz has himself been arrested, Los
Chamales has still maintained influence over
the people. Residents of some municipalities
have even gone as far as detaining the police
for trying to enforce the law.89
In
communities such as these, it is easy to see
why transnational gangs and territorial
groups have remained in power for so long.
These groups have the support of the people,
and the police are powerless when they have
to worry about normal citizens and crime
organizations.
88
"The Importance of Territorial Groups in
Central America." N.p., n.d. Web. 18 Oct. 2016.
89Ibid
In 2007, UNODC concluded that the
“Mara” groups (MS-13 and M-18) play a
very small role in transnational cocaine
trafficking, which continues to be the case.90
The Zetas, the Maras, and other territorial
groups appear to be involved in migrant
smuggling, human trafficking, and the
firearms trade. This involvement may
increase if cocaine revenues decline.91
However, some statistics indicate that
competition between these groups is more
responsible for the intense violence in the
area than the actual flow of drugs. Despite
the low transit of cocaine through El
Salvador, it has sustained the third highest
murder rates in the world.92
The global
TOCTA found, however, that most
transnational organized crime is market-
based. As long as supply and demand exist,
removing particular intermediaries is not
sufficient to destroy the market, especially
in a globalized world.
Domestic Efforts to Stop Violence in the
Northern Triangle “Mano dura” otherwise known as
“heavy hand” policies which expanded
police powers and enacted harsher
punishments for gang members were
implemented circa the 2000s by the
Northern Triangle governments to minimal
success. Rather than reduce crime, the
resulting mass incarcerations of these
policies served to indirectly exacerbate the
conflict by transforming the overcrowded
prisons into gang-recruiting centers. In
2012, the Salvadoran government under
President Mauricio Funes’ administration
helped broker a truce between the MS-13
and M-18 gangs. Homicides fell by more
90
Leggett.
91 Leggett.
92 "Most Dangerous Cities in the World."
WorldAtlas. World Atlas, 23 June 2016. Web.
21
than 40 percent that year.93
When the peace
deal unraveled in 2014, killings surged,
almost doubling the national murder rate in
San Salvador from 61.21 to 108.54 per
100,000 people, the highest rate since the
country’s bloody civil war came to an end in
1992.94
It is currently ranked as the third
most dangerous city behind San Pedro Sula
in Honduras that held the top position in
2015 at 171.2 murders per 100,000 people
per year but dropped to second at 111.03 in
2016.95
Illegal drug distribution, extensive
poverty, and gangs all combine to affect the
notorious living conditions in the Northern
Triangle.
United States’ Role Though the United States has offered
substantial aid to Central American efforts
to address criminal violence, it also
contributes to the problem through its high
levels of drug consumption, relatively
relaxed gun control laws, and deportation
policies that have sent home more than a
million illegal migrants with violent records.
Between 2001 and 2010 the US deported
129.726 convicted criminals to Central
America, more than 90% to the “Northern
Triangle.”96
Minimal information of such
high numbers of people deported, many of
them criminals, would make it difficult for
any country to handle.
As recently as 2014, President
Obama met with the heads of state from the
countries of the Northern Triangle to discuss
the issue. Being that the U.S. is the largest
93
Renwick.
94 Fontanini, Francesca. "As Gang Violence
Worsens, More Salvadorans Flee." UNHCR
News. The UN Refugee Agency, 6 Feb. 2016.
Web.
95 World Atlas.
96 Shifter.
market in the world for narcotics, Obama
acknowledged that the U.S. has joint
responsibility in solving this problem. In
addition to a booming black market in
narcotics, U.S. government policy has
contributed to this issue. According to
experts, between 2010 and 2012 the U.S.
deported around a hundred thousand
immigrants with criminal records back to
countries of the Northern Triangle. By
sending so many potentially dangerous
people in such as short amount of time, the
U.S. admits this could contribute to the
violence. 97
As a result of these meetings, the
Obama administration has made an effort to
try to alleviate the refugee crisis. One
proposal by the administration was to send
financial support to the Northern Triangle.
In the fiscal year 2016, the administration
requested $1 billion from Congress for its
U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central
America.98
The plan hopes to increase
annual spending in the Northern Triangle,
particularly concerning security,
governance, and economic development.
Also, the administration also called for an
expansion of the refugee program. The plan
is admit as many as 9,000 people a year
from the Northern Triangle. Furthermore,
the proposal also involves the UN helping to
screen refugee claims in Latin America.
With the U.S. seeking to help eliminate the
problem instead of contributing to it, there is
some hope that there will be improvements
made on this issue. 99
97
Renwick, Danielle. "Central America's Violent
Northern Triangle." Council and Foreign
Relations. July 8. 2013. Web.
98 Ibid
99Ibid
22
Contemporary Conditions
Wars and persecution have driven
more than 65 million people from their
homes, the highest number since the
UNHCR records began.100
The UNHCR
considers the current situation in Central
America to be a protection crisis,
particularly concerned about the rising
numbers of unaccompanied children and
women on the run who face forced
recruitment into criminal gangs, sexual- and
gender-based violence and murder.”101
Reasons for flight also include resisting
recruitment as drug dealers, the killing of
relatives, and being witness to a gang crime.
Alongside large-scale violence and
persecution at the hands of armed criminal
actors, poverty and unemployment are the
primary drivers of refugee and migrant
flows from the Northern Triangle. Victims
range from school children and bus drivers
to business owners, police officers and their
families, leaving a growing number with no
option but to flee, according to UNHCR.102
The regional impact of organized
crime within the Northern Triangle is mostly
felt in continued outflows of people and
forced displacement. The number of asylum
claims from people fleeing violence in El
Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala has risen
dramatically. Between 2009 and 2013, the
United States registered a sevenfold increase
in asylum seekers at its southern border, 70
percent of whom came from the Northern
Triangle.103
Already the country with the
100
Sturm, Nora. "UNHCR Calls for Urgent
Action as Central America Asylum Claims
Soar." UNHCR News. The UN Refugee
Agency, 5 Apr. 2016. Web.
101 Ibid.
102 Ibid.
103 Renwick.
highest number of refugees seeking asylum,
the U.S. has recently seen a large increase in
migrants from the Northern Triangle. In just
2015, 3,423 people, the majority from El
Salvador and Honduras, sought asylum in
Mexico. At the United States' urging,
Mexico stepped up enforcement along its
southern border, apprehending 70 percent
more Central Americans in 2015 than it did
in the year before.104
The nearby countries
of Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Belize, and
Panama also reported a big increase in
migrants from the Northern Triangle.
UNHCR has documented a 1,185% increase
in the number of asylum applications from
citizens of these three countries in Mexico,
Panama, Nicaragua, Costa Rica and Belize,
combined, from 2008 to 2014.105
In Costa
Rica, they received a 176% increase from
2013 to 2015, with 2,203 asylum claims in
2015. Among the most troubling aspects of
this migration is the fact that the number of
unaccompanied children from the Northern
Triangle has doubled each year since 2011
causing the U.S. government to estimate that
60,000 children are arriving to U.S. soil and
seeking safe haven this fiscal year.106
The
United States received almost 100,000
unaccompanied minors from El Salvador,
Guatemala, and Honduras from October
2013 to July 2015.107
This figure brought
attention to the region’s larger emigration
trend. While the number of children from
Mexico has far outpaced the number of
children from either Guatemala, El
104
Renwick.
105 "Children on the Run: Unaccompanied
Children Leaving Central America and Mexico
and the Need for International Protection."
UNHCR. Ed. Pamela Goldberg. The UN
Refugee Agency, 2012. Web.
106 Ibid.
107 Ibid.
23
Salvador, or Honduras, the difficulty with
obtaining a full picture of who these
children are and their motives for making
the treacherous journey to the U.S. is their
prompt return to Mexico after no more than
a day or two in the custody of the US
authorities.
In the beginning of 2016, U.S.
authorities began to deport immigrants who
had just arrived whose asylum claims had
been denied. However, in July the Obama
administration announced that while its aim
was to deter would-be migrants, it would
allocate $750 million in foreign aid and
expand its refugee program to admit more
immigrants from the Northern Triangle.
Approximately 9,000 people each year with
the United Nations help to screen refugees
from Latin America.108
Past UN and Allied Action
Currently the UNHCR is working
closely with the governments of the region
and civil society partners to enhance
screening capacity to identify people forced
to flee violence and persecution in the
Northern Triangle.109
The UNHCR is also
encouraging governments to introduce legal
avenues for refugees to reduce their
dependency on smugglers and traffickers
and expose themselves to exploitation and
abuse. It recently welcomed the U.S.
government’s initiatives to address the
forced displacement from Central America,
citing that the measures offered safe, legal
alternatives for people to seek protection
abroad via a third country, increased
resettlement opportunities, and expanded a
108
Davis, Julie Hirschfeld. "U.S. to Admit More
Central American Refugees." The New York
Times. The New York Times, 26 July 2016.
Web.
109 Sturm.
program providing life-saving help and
protection to children fleeing affected
countries.110
In September 2014, the governments
of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras
proposed the “Plan of the Alliance for
Prosperity in the Northern Triangle.” The
five-year, $20 billion plan is intended to
stimulate the productive sector, develop
human capital, improve public safety, and
strengthen institutions.111
Although the three
northern triangle governments intend to fund
about 80% of the plan, they seek additional
financial support from the private sector and
international donors. Central America
Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) has
yielded mixed results.112
Through the Central American
Regional Security Initiative (CARSI), the
U.S. attempts to strengthen and improve
Honduran initiatives in law enforcement
cooperation and prevention programs.
Programs like these have been successful,
but so far only in isolated areas. Despite
problems resulting from the difficult
political environment, there is still hope that
reforms may finally spread.113
President
Hernandez of Honduras has identified drug
trafficking and organized crime as two of
the biggest security problems. Gangs
particularly pose a threat in urban centers,
where they are able to extort local business
110
Hansford, Brian. "UNHCR Welcomes U.S
Initiative to Help Central American Refugees."
UNHCR News. UNHCR News, 29 July 2016.
Web.
111 Meyer, Peter, and Clare Ribando Seelke.
"Central America Regional Security Initiative:
Background and Policy Issues for Congress."
Congressional Research Service. Congressional
Research Service, 17 Dec. 2005. Web.
112 Ibid
113 Ibid
24
and run local drug networks virtually
unhindered. These gang-related activities
have also led to increased levels of violence.
The United Nations has actually identified
the growing levels of violence to the
growing cause of emigration. Even worse,
even though many Hondurans emigrate due
to violence, refugees deported from the U.S.
often join the ranks of organized crime
groups.114
Not only do the people have to worry
about violence from gangs, but also from
state law enforcement. In fact, according to
the Universidad Nacional Autonoma de
Honduras Violence Observatory, 149 people
were killed by police from 2011-2012.115
A
local newspaper, El Heraldo, has reported on
the corruption that has become typical of the
Honduran police. One article includes the
name of around 200 officers involved in
drug trafficking, robbery, and other illicit
activities. Despite public outcry to clean up
the police department, purges of police
officials usually focus on lower officers and
not on any of the senior level officers that
are actually involved in criminal activity. 116
Even though CARSI has had some
success in making law enforcement more
effective, the reforms have not been
widespread enough. Violence has continued
to spread, especially gang-related activities.
In addition to that, local police forces are
struggling, with not much being done to
eliminate corruption in higher-level officers.
With some more time, hopefully these
programs initiated by CARSI will spread
further throughout Honduras.
114
Ibid
115 Meyer, Peter, and Clare Ribando Seelke.
"Central America Regional Security Initiative:
Background and Policy Issues for Congress."
Congressional Research Service. Congressional
Research Service, 17 Dec. 2005. Web.
116 Ibid
Effect of Governance When organized crime takes control
of an area, this leads to a weaker
government. Although Central American
governments are not known for being
reliable, once crime groups start to gain
influence in a country, the government loses
presence. And with no one enforcing the
laws, these organized crime groups do not
feel any pressure to follow the laws
governing them. As a result, rich families
tend to hire private security, so much that is
has become a huge business in Central
America. There are more private security
guards than police in most Central American
countries. Vigilante justice has emerged
among the poorer people, who cannot afford
to hire someone else, with no money
available to hire private security, some
people decide to fight crime themselves. In
state in which organized crime rules and the
government are useless, various forms of
governance arise. Although private security
and vigilante action may work well initially,
the only long-term solution is to put in place
a strong government. 117
Due to the corruption and
ineffectiveness of state governments, outside
groups have stepped in to help “clean up”
the government. In 2007, the U.N. created
an independent body tasked with
investigating and prosecuting criminal
groups “believed to have infiltrated state
institutions.”118
Along with conditions
established in Guatemala's 1994
Comprehensive Agreement on Human
Rights, the independent body created the
“International Commission Against
Impunity in Guatemala” (CICIG). Together
117
"Impact - United Nations Office on Drugs and
Crime." N.p., n.d. Web. 18 Oct. 2016.
118 Renwick, Danielle. "Central America's
Violent Northern Triangle." Council and
Foreign Relations. N.p., n.d. Web 10 Oct. 2016
25
with Guatemala's attorney general, the
CICIG began investigating corruption
among government officials. An
investigation into a customs corruption
scheme resulted in the arrest of the current
president, Otto Perez Molina. Voters have
grown so fed up with the traditional political
class that in 2015, they voted a comedian
with no political experience as president.119
Due to the effectiveness of CICIG in
Guatemala, it would be wise to believe that
similar institutions have been created in El
Salvador and Honduras. Both the U.S. State
Department and anticorruption activists have
proposed that a version of CICIG be created
in El Salvador and Honduras. There is even
public outcry over such a decision in
Honduras. Several allegations have been
made against the ruling National Party. One
of which is that members of the party were
involved in embezzlement of social-security
funds. It is corrupt government officials that
are preventing similar institutions to CICIG
from being created. Without some kind of
check on government officials' powers, state
governments will continue to be ineffective.
120
Economic Impact The issue with security can have a
profound economic impact on a state. When
the U.S. Peace Corps moved out of
Honduras in 2012, this showed that even
international volunteer groups with tons of
resources, can be forced to leave due to fear
of violence. Another prime example is the
cost of combating crime. Since the countries
use money and resources to solve this
problem, they are essentially taking money
away from other initiatives. For example,
119
Ibid
120 Renwick, Danielle. "Central America's
Violent Northern Triangle." Council and
Foreign Relations. N.p., n.d. Web 10 Oct. 2016.
Honduras maquiladoras, a program intended
to stimulate employment and growth, was
forced to shut down because there was not
enough money to keep it going. The lack of
business involvement in the Northern
Triangle is also a sign of how bad the
security problem is.
In a poll of firms of various sizes,
more than a fifth said that crime was the
main reason why they would not invest in
Guatemala and El Salvador. In fact, a
insightful analysis made by the World Bank
said, "As a result of these factors, the World
Bank has recently estimated that a 10% drop
in the homicide rate could boost per capita
annual income growth by 1% in El Salvador
and by 0.7% in Guatemala and
Honduras."121
The lack of security in
countries of the Northern Triangle can be
detrimental to the economy. With a stagnant
economy, the country is not able to spend
money on infrastructure in order to try to
improve conditions for the people. This has
become a never-ending cycle with a lack of
security hurting the economy, and a horrible
economy preventing security from
improving. 122
Attempts to Stop the Violence Starting around the year 2000,
Northern Triangle governments put in place
a series of policies that increased police
powers and created harsher punishments for
gang members. These tougher policies, also
known as “mano dura” or “heavy hand”
policies, did very little to reduce crime. In
fact, they may have led to an increase in
crime, by causing a growth in gang
membership. Increasing the amount of
inmates just increases the burden on prisons
121
Renwick, Danielle. "Central America's
Violent Northern Triangle." Council and
Foreign Relations. N.p., n.d. Web 10 Oct. 2016
122"Ibid
26
that are already overcrowded. In many
cases, the gangs basically run the prisons
and are able to recruit even more members
to their cause.
These mass incarceration policies
have received negative attention, especially
since 2012, when a prison fire in
Comayagua, Honduras, resulted in more
than 300 fatalities among inmates. Various
human rights organizations have raised
concerns over the conditions in the prisons
and police violence against civilians. As
mentioned before, public hatred of the
government will only do more to strengthen
territorial groups. Not only are these policies
ineffective in controlling the violence of
gangs, but they are counterproductive as
well.
Alternatives to stricter policies, such
as negotiating peace between rival gangs
have also been attempted. For example,
under President Funes' administration in
2012, El Salvador was able to organize
peace among the MS-13 and M-18 gangs.
Immediate results were achieved, when
homicides decreased by more than 40
percent. However, not much else improved,
with crimes such as extortion still occurring
at the same rate against civilians. The U.S.
has also played a big role in trying to fix this
issue. After the “surge” in migration in
2014, the U.S. helped encourage a plan
among the countries of the Northern
Triangle to improve infrastructure. Along
with the Inter-American Development Bank,
the governments of El Salvador, Guatemala,
and Honduras created the Alliance for
Prosperity. The alliance consists of a five
year $20 billion plan that is intended to
boost economic growth, promote job
creation, and improve public safety.123
Leaders from the three countries agreed that
123
"Renwick, Danielle. "Central America's
Violent Northern Triangle." Council and
Foreign Relations. N.p., n.d. Web.
80 percent of the funding would come from
their respective nations as part of the deal.
However, it has still yet to be determined
whether the funding will be approved by
their corresponding legislatures.124
Questions a Resolution Should
Answer
1. What can be done to fix the police
forces in the countries of the Northern
Triangle?
While you can always increase
spending to make a larger police force,
there still remains the issue of police
corruption. The people will never
respect the police force if they feel that
it is corrupt. A potential solution could
be the use of an outside governing
body that won't overlook corruption.
2. What can be done to aid the military in
each country
Increasing the spending for the
military could solve the issue of an
ineffective military in some sense.
However, this will do nothing to solve
the issue of corruption among the
ranks. In addition to getting an outside
governing body to be in charge of the
military, there could also be initiatives
in place to get the people to trust the
military more.
3. What agencies, outside of the actual
country, can be involved?
While political agencies, such as the
U.S. and the United Nations have
played a role in stopping the violence
in the Northern Triangle, not much
progress has been made. Maybe
private organizations can help better
the conditions in the country, so people
124
Ibid/
27
will be less likely to resort to violence.
The International Federation of Red
Cross and Red Crescent Societies
(IFRC) and Action Against Hunger
(AAH) are just a few groups that could
help ease conditions in the countries of
the Northern Triangle.
4. Should the U.S. increase or decrease
its involvement in helping the Northern
Triangle?
The illegal drug trade in the U.S. has
definitely played its role in
strengthening the gangs of the
Northern Triangle. In recent years the
U.S. has focused on helping these
countries, admitting that it is partly to
blame. If the U.S. continues to spend
efforts to help the countries and not
much progress is made, an important
decision needs to be made regarding
its involvement.
5. What should other countries, besides
the U.S. and countries of the Northern
Triangle, do to help?
Even though the U.S. has been
obligated to help out in the Northern
Triangle, other Latin American
countries near the Northern Triangle
are affected by the violence that goes
on in the region. The delegations of
Mexico, Belize, and Nicaragua should
consider what they can offer to be a
part of the solution.
6. Should any intervention in the
countries be politically based or
economically based?
A politically based intervention could
help because the government affects
the lives of the people. At the same
time, an economically based
intervention could help because if the
conditions of the people are better than
this makes the government's job easier.
Both methods can achieve the same
results, the decision lies in which one
will be the most effective.
7. Should other nations allow more
refugees to immigrate to their country
until the crisis in the Northern
Triangle is resolved?
While the violence doesn't seem like
it's going to stop any time soon, there
are millions of people looking for a
stable place to live. Resolutions can
consider a short term solution in which
more refugees from the Northern
Triangle are allowed to migrate to
foreign countries. This would only be a
commitment for a few years, seeing as
if the violence stops, most people will
choose to move back home.
Bloc Positions
Asia and Africa In 2015, the death toll in the
Northern Triangle of Central America was
higher than four West African countries
struggling with the Boko Haram insurgency
and even higher than the death tolls in
Somalia, Libya, and South Sudan.125
On
January 25, 2016, 275 civil rights, labor
rights, faith-based, immigrant, human rights,
humanitarian, and legal service
organizations requested that the Secretary of
the U.S. Department of Homeland Security
(DHS), in consultation with the Secretary of
State, designate El Salvador, Guatemala, and
Honduras for Temporary Protected Status
(TPS) in light of the dramatically escalating
violence that has precipitated a humanitarian
125
"Northern Triangle Temporary Protected
Status National Letter." Refugees International.
N.p., 25 Jan. 2016. Web.
28
crisis of refugees fleeing the Northern
Triangle countries.126
North America Since the surge of revolutions in
Central America in the 1960s and 1970s,
Canada has channeled funds through the
UNHCR, Red Cross, and Canadian NGOs to
provide emergency aid such as food,
medicine, and clothing as well as assistance
in finding durable solutions and relocating
displaced people.127
The Canadian
government shifted its immigration policy
after the U.S. Congress passed the
Immigration Reform and Control Act
(IRCA) and causing a dramatic increase in
the number of petitions for asylum in
Canada. In response, Canada introduced
new deference measures and tougher
criminal penalties on those who “smuggled”
or aided the undocumented.
Europe The reality of gang violence in the
Northern Triangle is a global humanitarian
problem. In 2013 the United Nations
Population Division estimated a total of 4.2
million Central American immigrants
worldwide, the vast majority residing in the
United States, with the rest scattered in
Central America and Europe.128
The only
major donor currently funding humanitarian
programs in the northern triangle is the
European Union’s humanitarian aid
department: ECHO. ECHO currently
partners with the UNHCR, to help displaced
populations in El Salvador, and with the
126
Ibid.
127 Garcia, Maria Cristina. "Canada: A Northern
Refuge for Central Americans." Migration
Policy Institute. N.p., 1 Apr. 2006. Web.
128 Siegfried, Kristy. "Gang Violence in Central
America Is a Humanitarian Crisis." The Inside
Story on Emergencies. IRIN, 1 September 2016.
Norwegian Red Cross and the Norwegian
Refugee Council in Honduras and El
Salvador to make schools safer and children
less vulnerable to recruitment by gangs.129
However, according to Vicente Raimundo,
ECHO’s regional head for Central America,
the European and larger international
community is has failed to acknowledge the
seriousness of the humanitarian problem in
Central America and needs to do more.
Latin America The U.S., Guatemala, Honduras, and
El Salvador have reached a joint agreement
to work together to improve conditions in
their countries. This agreement, known as
the Alliance for Prosperity Plan primarily
tries to deal with the issues of poverty and
violence. The hope is by funding efforts to
improve infrastructure in the Northern
Triangle, this will reduce the factors
responsible for mass migration of people to
other countries. Other Latin American
countries have criticized this plan because of
the significant involvement of the United
States. Critics believe that progress will only
be made if each country’s government takes
accountability for fixing the problems. In
response to this, El Salvador’s government
has worked with the United Nations Office
of Drug and Crime to eradicate corruption in
its country. Similar efforts have been made
recently by the governments of Honduras
and Guatemala. 130
129
Ibid.
130 Garcia, Mercedes. "Alliance for Prosperity
Plan in the Northern Triangle: Not A Likely
Final Solution for the Central American
Migration Crisis." Www.coha.org. N.p., 3 Mar.
2016. Web. 26 Nov. 2016..
29
Conclusion
There are a multitude of aspects that
contribute to the growing crisis of refugees
fleeing organized crime in Latin America.
The violence of the Northern Triangle has
continued for several years and will
probably not see an end unless a major
initiative is taken up. While El Salvador,
Guatemala, and Honduras have made
measures to stop the violence, they have
proved ineffective for the most part. In order
to stop the violence, outside groups will
need to help these countries. Not only that,
but there are multiple sides to this issue.
First, nations need to aid the law
enforcement in these countries, so they can
properly ensure the safety of the citizens.
Second, the committee needs to help
the country’s law enforcement to regain the
trust of their people. If nations are successful
in reforming the law enforcement and
preventing corruption, then the people’s
trust will follow. Moreover, if agencies
crack down on the illegal drug trade, then
the various gangs of the Northern Triangle
will not be able to make money off the trade.
This will effectively leave the gangs
powerless without the money they make
from the trade. It is paramount that these
issues are resolved, and decisions should be
made regarding who will solve them, and
what the process will be to solve them. The
lives of refugees in these regions are at
stake, and measures should be implemented
to prevent them from becoming refugees in
the first place and protecting their human
rights.