AMSTERDAMUNIVERSITYCOLLEGEMODELUNITEDNATIONS
UnitedNationsSecurityCouncil
StudyGuide
5th–7thApril2019
2
TABLEOFCONTENTS
WORD OF WELCOME 4 UN SECURITY COUNCIL 5
HISTORY 5 MANDATE 6
Relevant UN Charter Articles and Chapters 6 Peacekeeping Missions 6
REFERENCES 6
UNSC SPECIFIC ROP 7 MOTIONS: 7
Motion to declare a vote substantive 7 VOTING PROCEDURE: 7
Majority 7 Veto 7 Abstaining 7
WRITTEN WORKS 8 Sponsors and signatories 8 Presidential statement 8
TOPIC A: RE-EVALUATING THE ROLE OF THE UNSC RESOLVING THE KASHMIR CONFLICT 9 INTRODUCTION: 9 OVERVIEW OF THE ISSUE: 9
Overview of Region: 9 Demographics 10 Magnitude of the Conflict 10
GEOPOLITICAL IMPORTANCE OF KASHMIR 11 Location 11 Water 11
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE CONFLICT 12 Origins of the Conflict 12 Incidents between 1980 and 2000 13 Recent Developments in the Region 14
TIMELINE OF IMPORTANT EVENTS: 15 KEY ACTORS 16
India 16 Pakistan 16 Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) /Hizbul Mujahideen/Al Qaeda/ Kashmir 17 China 18
PREVIOUS INVOLVEMENT OF THE UNITED NATIONS: 18 Full List of UNSC Resolutions on Kashmir (Excluding resolutions on The Indo-Pakistan relationship including nuclear development): 18 Historical Development: 18 Other (potentially) relevant UN resolutions: 20
PREVIOUS NOTEWORTHY BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS 20 Indus Waters Treaty (1960) 20 Tashkent Agreement (1965) 20 Simla Agreement (1972) 20 Lahore declaration (1999) 21 Agra Summit (2001) 21
QUESTIONS A RESOLUTION COULD ANSWER 21
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CLOSING REMARKS 22 SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH: 23 REFERENCES 24
TOPIC B: STABILIZING EASTERN AFRICA THROUGH THE INCLUSION OF WOMEN IN PEACEBUILDING EFFORTS 26
INTRODUCTION: 26 OVERVIEW OF THE ISSUE 27
Region 27 Magnitude of the Problem 28
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE CONFLICT 29 Overview of Key Conflicts in the Region 29 Women in African Countries 30
CURRENT SITUATION 31 Poverty 31 Democratisation 32 Regime type 32 Population structure 32 Repeated violence 33 A ‘bad neighbourhood’ 33 Slow growth and rising inequality 33
KEY ACTORS 34 Eastern African Countries 34 United Nations 34
QUESTIONS A RESOLUTION SHOULD ANSWER 34 CLOSING REMARKS 36 SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH: 36 WORKS CITED 37
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WORDOFWELCOME
DearDelegates,
Welcome to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), we are Calvin Smid and IshvarLalbahadoersing.WearebothwellknowntotheworldofMUNaswellastoAUCMUN.WewillconveneinAmsterdamforAUCMUN,wherewebothstudiedsopleasedonothesitatetoaskmeanyquestionsaboutvenues,schedules,orAmsterdam.Itisagreatpleasuretobeco-chairingthisveryextremelyinterestingcommitteewithcomplextopicstobediscussed.Wehopeyouwouldshowapassionfortheissuestobediscussedandforthedebatethatwilltakeplace.Wecan’twaittowelcomeyoutoourpastuni:AmsterdamUniversityCollegeinthebeautifulAmsterdam,weare also verymuch looking forward to seeing you all in debate and reading your wonderfulpositionpapersandeventuallyresolutions.Mostimportantly,let’smakefriendsandhavefun!
Yours,
CalvinSmidandIshvarLalbahadoersing
ChairsoftheUNSC|AUCMUN2019
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UNSECURITYCOUNCIL
HISTORY
TheUnitedNationsSecurityCouncil(UNSC)isoneofthesixprincipalorgansoftheUnitedNations(UN). Its tasks are tomaintain international peace and security in addition to accepting newmembers to the UnitedNations and approving any changes to the UnitedNations Charter.Itspowersincludetheestablishmentofpeacekeepingoperations,theimplementingofinternationalsanctions,andtheauthorizationofmilitaryactionthroughSecurityCouncilresolutions.Assuch,itistheonlyUNbodywiththeauthoritytoissuebindingresolutionstomemberstates.
TheSecurityCouncilwascreatedafterWorldWar II to replace itspredecessor, theLeagueofNations,inmaintainingworldpeace;thefirstmeetingwasheldonthe17thofJanuary,1946.InthebeginningtheUNSCwasalmostnotactivebecauseoftheColdWarwhichcausedthedivisionbetweentheUSandUSSRincludingtheirrespectiveallies.
AftertheSovietUnioncollapsed,theUNSCbecamemoreeffectiveintheireffortswhileincreasingthequantityofmissionsandissuestheCouncilwasinvolvedin.Forinstance,itauthorizedmajormilitary and peacekeepingmissions in Namibia (1989-1990), Cambodia (1991-1993), Kuwait(1991-2003), Somalia (1992-1995), Rwanda (1993-1996), Bosnia (1995-2002), and Sudan(2005-2011).
TheSecurityCouncilconsistsoffifteenmembers.Russia,theUnitedKingdom,France,China,andtheUnitedStatesserveasthebody'sfivepermanentmembers,oftenreferredtoastheP5.ThesepermanentmemberscanvetoanysubstantiveSecurityCouncilresolution,includingthoseontheadmissionofnewmemberstatesorcandidatesforSecretary-General.TheSecurityCouncilalsohas tennon-permanentmembers, electedona regionalbasis to serve in two-year terms.Thebody'spresidencyrotatesmonthlyamongitsmembers.
SecurityCouncilresolutionsaretypicallyenforcedbyUNpeacekeepers;thesearemilitaryforcesvoluntarilyprovidedbymemberstatesandfundedindependentlyofthemainUNbudget.Asof2016, 103,510 peacekeepers and 16,471 civilians were deployed on sixteen peacekeepingoperationsandonespecialpoliticalmission.
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MANDATE
The UNSC mandate is established by the UN Charter, and determines that the primaryresponsibilityofthecouncilis:‘themaintenanceofinternationalpeaceandsecurity’.Inordertosuccessfullyfulfillitsimportantrole,theUNCharter,especiallyunderChapters6and7,allowsthecounciltousemoreforcefulmethodsthananyotherorganoftheUN,suchasbindingresolutionsandpeacekeepingoperations.Asmentionedbefore,traditionally,theUNSChas15members,ofwhichtheP5membershavevetopowers.StateswhodonotcurrentlyholdaseatintheUNSCarecalledobserverstatesandcanparticipateinUNSCproceedings,yetwithoutvotingprivileges.1
RELEVANTUNCHARTERARTICLESANDCHAPTERS
o Article29:allowsforthecreationofsubsidiaryorganso Article 33:Calls upon nation states to peacefully settle issues through traditional
diplomaticmeanso Articles34&36:Investigatedisputes,andrecommendprocedureso Article 41:Demand certain issue-specific (non-military) measures to be taken in
ordertoresolveissueso Article 42:Should thesemeasures be deemed inadequate, or turn out ineffective,
militaryactionsmaybetakeno ChapterXI:thedeclarationregardingnon-self-governingterritories
PEACEKEEPINGMISSIONS
TheUNSChasthediscretiontodeployapeacekeepingmission,andindoingsoithastobespecificinprovidingthemissionsmandate,whicharetailoredtothespecifictopicathand.However,adegree of consistency between peacekeeping missions show aspects of typical peacekeepingmandates.Thereforepeacekeepingmissionsarecommonlyusedto:
- Preventconflictorspilloverofconflict- Stabilizepost-conflictsituations- Assistinmoderatingpeaceagreementsortalks- Leadstatesthroughtransitionalperiods
REFERENCES
UN Peacekeeping. (2019, March 12). MANDATES AND THE LEGAL BASIS FORPEACEKEEPING. Retrieved from Peacekeeping.Un.Org:https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mandates-and-legal-basis-peacekeeping
1UNPeacekeeping,2019
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UNSCSPECIFICROP
MOTIONS:
MOTIONTODECLAREAVOTESUBSTANTIVE
TheP5nationshavetherighttodeclareanyproceduralvotesubstantive,meaningtheywouldhave the right to veto a certain procedural matter, or allowing other nations registered as“present” to abstain fromvoting.Themotiondoesnot require a seconding, andpasses at theChair’sdiscretion.
VOTINGPROCEDURE:
MAJORITY
TheUNSCsimplemajoritystandsat9/15votes,notthestandard50%.Thismaybesubjecttochangedependingonthequorumofthecommittee.
VETO
Thefivepermanentmembers(P5),namelytheUnitedStatesofAmerica,theUnitedKingdomofGreatBritainandNorthernIreland,theRussianFederation,thePeople’sRepublicofChina,andtheRepublicofFrancehavetherighttovetoanymotionbroughtforwardunderasubstantivevote. The right to veto is a nation’s power to overrule the standardmajority voting rules ofprocedure.Avetovoteneedsnosupportfromothernationspresenttopassandbeenacted.
ABSTAINING
ShouldaP5membernotagreewitharesolution,butalsonotwishtovetoagainst it, theycanabstain.
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WRITTENWORKS
SPONSORSANDSIGNATORIES
Minimumof5total.
PRESIDENTIALSTATEMENT
If thecommittee fails topassa resolutionand there isnoconsensus in the foreseeable futurewhilsttheconferencecomestoanend,ChairsmayconsidertoreleaseaPresidentialStatement.Thisisnotamotion,andmustbebroughtforthattheChair’sconsiderationalthoughdelegatesmayaskwhetheritisappropriatebeforethematterispresented.
Oncebrought forth, delegatesmaydraftupa statement.ThePresidential Statement followsasimilar format to a resolution, but has no distinction between preambulatory and operativeclausesandisnotlegallybinding.
Aswitharesolution,thestatementmustfirstbecheckedbytheChairsbeforebeingpresented.Shoulditbefinalized,theChairswillpresentthestatementdirectlytothecommittee,afterwhichthecommitteemovesdirectlyintovotingprocedure.
Pleasenotethat thestatementmustbepassedbyconsensus;shouldtherebeobjections, thedelegatesmustaddresstheseinarewriteofthestatement,ordropthestatementaltogether.
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TOPICA:RE-EVALUATINGTHEROLEOFTHEUNSCRESOLVINGTHEKASHMIRCONFLICT
INTRODUCTION:
Datingasfarbackas1947,theKashmirconflictisoneoftheoldestongoinginternationalconflictsinmodernhistory.InitsessenceaterritorialquestionbetweenIndiaandPakistanarisenoutofthemismanagementoftheColonialdepartureoftheBritish,theregionhasalwaysbeenoneoftheprimarycausesofconflictsbetweenthetwonuclearpowers.Tensionshaverecentlyreignited,most notably last February (2019) when, firstly, a suicide bomber with links to al-Qaeda inPakistan killed 44 indian soldiers. India responded with airstrikes on suspected terroristlocations, to which Pakistan retaliated with its own airstrikes. Despite many bipartisan,multilateralandUN-efforts toresolve thedispute, littleprogresshasbeenmade in the last70years.IntheSecurityCouncilofAUCMUN2019,byreopeningthediscussion,weaimtofinallychangethispatternofinaction.
Pleasenotethatthisresearchreportisabriefreportontheorigins,contextandintricaciesoftheconflict,andshouldserveasthestartingpointoftheresearch,notthefinish.
OVERVIEWOFTHEISSUE:
OVERVIEWOFREGION:
TheKashmir and Jammuregion (hereafter referred to asKashmir) is a region surroundedbyPakistan,ChinaandIndia.Theregioncomprisesof139,000km2,andiscurrentlysplitbetweenPakistan(35%),China(20%)andIndia(45%)(BBCNEWS,2019).ThedivisionarylinebetweentheIndianpartandthePakistanipartisknownasthe‘LineofControl’(LoC),howeverallpartiesclaimfullorpartialownershipovertheregion.
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DEMOGRAPHICS
TheIndiancontrolledpartofKashmir(blueinthemap)isdividedintothreeparts,KashmirValley,Jammu,andLadakh.Thetotalpopulationis12,541,000withapproximately67%Muslims,30%Hindusand3percentmiscellaneous(mostlySikhs).2Belowyouwillfindatablewiththeethnicdivisionperregion,andamapidentifyingthedifferentregions.
MAGNITUDEOFTHECONFLICT
TheKashmirconflicthasnotbeenofthesamemagnitudeassomeoftheothermoreprominenttwentiethcenturyconflicts(Bosnia,Sudanetc.),howeverestimatesofcasualties’rangebetween20,000and100,000andmanymorewoundedanddisplaced,withmostsourcesclaimingittobearound45,000-60,000.3Asisoftenthecaseinconflictslikethese,it isdifficulttomakeagoodestimate of the scope of the problem due to conflicting (state) media reports on the sameincidents. Furthermore, the timeframeof the conflict and thedifferent sub-conflicts andwarsmakeitmorecomplicated.
Beyondthelossoflife,theconflicthashadseriousramificationsfortheregion,withanestimated22%of thepeople inKashmir livingbelow thepoverty line.Tourism, an important sourceofincomeofKashmirduringlesscontentiousperiodsoftheconflict,isdiscouragedbytheloomingconflict.Intheperiodof1989-2002(amoreturbulentperiodasbecomesclearlater)therewasanestimatedlossof27milliontourists,amountingto3.6billionUSD.Moreover,inthesametimeperiod,over1,151governmentbuildings,643educationalbuildings,11hospitals,337bridges,10,729privatehousesand1,953shopshavebeendestroyedinapproximately5,268attacksoninfrastructure.4Estimatesindicatethatina5-yearperiod(2004to2008)theconflictleadtoaloss
2BBCNEWS,2019
3ProjectPloughshares,2016
4Kalis&Dar,2013,p.121
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of 12.25 billion USD.5 Moreover, especially in the predominantly Muslim areas of Kashmir,illiteracyratesarerelativelyhighandaccesstoschoolsisnotalwaysavailableduetotheongoingconflict.6
GEOPOLITICALIMPORTANCEOFKASHMIR
Fundamental to understanding the Kashmir dispute is understanding the region and thegeopolitical importance of the area. Therefore, this section outlines some of the features ofKashmirthatmakeitanimportantregionforbothIndiaandPakistan.
LOCATION
Kashmirislandlocked,andcanbeseenasthegatewaytoAfghanistanforbothPakistanandIndia,inadditiontoRussiaandChina(amongstothernations).ThisisofimportancebecauseofthefactthatthetraditionaltraderouteofthemainsilkroadgoesthroughKashmir,anditisthegatewayoftradeforbothPakistanandIndia.7Butit’sgeographicalimportancegoesbeyondmeretraderoutes.ForbothIndiaandPakistan,Kashmirisofextremestrategicimportance.Indiahastwomaincompetitorsintheregionwithwhichithashadproblemsinthepast:1)Pakistanand2)China. Surrendering Kashmir would make the two countries neighboring states, which isconsideredabigthreattoIndia,whichisespeciallyevidentintheSiachenconflict(whichwillbediscussedlater).Moreover,thefactthattheareaisextremelymountainousmeansitoffersbothanaturalprotectionagainsteachother,aswellasacoverforpotentialmilitaryoperations,bothofwhichareofstrategicimportanceforPakistanandChina.
WATER
Secondly,KashmirisimportantbecauseitcontainstheInduswaterbasin,andthestartofmanyofthelargeriversintheregion.India,butespeciallyPakistandependsonthiswaterinflux,andgivingthesourceofthewateruptoIndiawouldessentiallyleavethesurvivaloftheircountryinthehandsofIndia.ThewaterfromtheriversandBasinisusedmainlyforagriculturalpurposes,butalso for fishingandelectricity.8Currently the IndusWaterTreatymanages thedivisionofwaterbetween the twonations, however therehavebeen several violationson this treatyoneitherside.Moreover,climatechangeandenvironmentaldegradationarealso threatening theBasin,andnewwaysofwatermanagementmightbenecessaryinthefuture.
5Ibid.
6Kalis&Dar,2013
7Kalis&Dar,2013,p.122
8binShamsuddin,2014,p.30-34
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HISTORICALOVERVIEWOFTHECONFLICT
ORIGINSOFTHECONFLICT
TheKashmirConflictisaresidueoftheaftermathoftheterritorialdivisionthatfollowedtheendoftheSecondWorldWar.UndertheBritishcolonialrule,theKashmirregionhadenjoyedasemi-autonomousstatus,howeverwiththeBritishdeparturein1947,the‘princelystate’ofKashmirwas pressured into either joining Indian or Pakistani Rule. The division between India andPakistanlargelyreliedontheethnicbackgroundofthetwo,IndiahavingalargeHindumajority,whereasPakistanhasaMuslimmajority.9
Whereasmost ‘Princelystates’ thathadenjoyedthesamestatusasKashmirweresuccessfully‘persuaded’tomergewitheitherIndiaorPakistan(mostlyIndia),theKashmirPrincemanagedtoholdoutonthedecision, inanattempttogain independenceinstead.Thisresultedinthefirstviolentstrugglein1947,whichendedwithaPakistani-backedinvasionofKashmirbyPashtuntribesmen. In response, the Prince, Maharaja Sir Hari Singh, who had been given the legalauthoritytomaketheaccessiondecisionbytheBritish,decidedtosidewithIndia-whichwasthecondition for them to send military troops to the Maharaja in order to be able to fight thePakistani-backedrebels.ThisdecisioninspiredastrongresponseamongtheMuslimmajorityoftheKashmirregion,especiallyconsideringthatthePrincewaspartoftheHinduminority.ThisresultedinawarbreakingoutbetweenKashmiriMuslimsbackedbyPakistanandtheKashmiriHindusbackedbyIndia.Allegedly,thegovernmentofIndiaagreedtohelpfightthiswarsothatitcouldsecureasafeplebisciteontheselfdeterminationofthedifferentcommunitiesintheregion.However,PakistanaccusedIndiaofmastermindingthismove,inordertoinheritmoreterritoryintheregion.10
Afterthisinitialinvasionandbreakoutofskirmishes,theconflictmovedintoastalematesituation.In1949,underthesupervisionoftheUNmilitaryobservergroup,atemporaryCease-FireLineAgreementwasdrawnupandratifiedbybothparties,solidifyingastatusquo.Thefiringofgunsstopped,however,becauseofconflictingdemandsfromnegotiationsbetweenIndiaandPakistan,the stalemate remainedcontentious.11Forawhile, theKashmir situationhad takenmoreof abackseat in international politics, notwithstanding continuous tension, occasional borderincidents,andservingasanimpedimentonPakistan-IndianRelations.Itisimportanttonotehere,thatneitherbilateralnegotiationsnormovestowardsaplebisciteweremade.Anyelectionthattookplaceregardingtheissuewasaccusedofbeingsomehowrigged.
In1965, the stalematewas suspendedbetweenApril andSeptemberwhenPakistan launchedoperationGibraltar,designedtoinfiltrateforcesintoJammuandKashmirtoinspireaninsurgency.
9BBCNEWS,2019
10Wirsing,1996
11Kalis&Dar,2013,p.117-118
13
Indiaretaliatedwithafull-scalemilitaryattackonPakistan.Thefightingcontinuedfor17daysandacease-firewasdeclaredfollowingaUN-InitiativebackedbytheUSandSovietUnion.12
AspartoftheendoftheIndo-PakistaniWarof1971,awarbetweenthetwofoughtprimarilyinandovertheregionofDhaka(notKashmir),theSimlaagreementwasdrawnupbetweenthetwonations.NotonlytheindependenceofBangladesh(formerlypartofPakistan)wassecuredinthisagreement,but italsocreatedastatusquoinKashmir.TheSimlaagreementdrewupthefirstformalcease-firelineinKashmir(theLoC)andheldthatnopartyshallseektochangethislineunilaterally.Furthermore,itholdsthattheconflictshouldberesolvedbybilateralnegotiationsexcludinganythird-partyinvolvement.
INCIDENTSBETWEEN1980AND2000
AlthoughhavingestablishedtheLoC,tensionsbetweenthetwoweremaintainedthroughouttherestofthe1970’sand1980’s.Theplannedbilateralnegotiationsnevermaterialized,andanoddstatusquoarose,inwhichnoneoftheunderlyingproblemswereresolved.Atseveraloccasionsthe tensions boiled over into incidents or conflicts,most notably the Siachenwar (1984), theMuslimuprisingsin1990,andtheKargilwar(1999).
TheSiachenwarlastednearly20years,inwhichbothIndiaandPakistanclaimedcontrolovertheSiachenregion.Theresultofashortcomingofthe1947ceasefireagreement,andasubsequentoversightoftheSimlaagreement,theSiachenglacierareaintheNorth-EastofKashmirwasnotdivided. Due to its barren soil, few inhabitants and the relative unimportance of the area toKashmir as awhole, itwasnot deemed ‘worthy’ to include in the agreement. This ‘oversight’resultedina20yearwarwitharound10,000casualties.Bothsidesremainheavilymilitarizedinthearea.13
In the 1990’s the conflict gained another dimension with insurgent uprisings from withinKashmir, rather than intra-statewarfare. Theuprisings are a conflict largely betweenMusliminsurgentsintheIndianruledpartofKashmir(Kashmirvalleyinparticular).However,especiallyinthebeginning,theinsurgencylackedorganization,assomemilitantsadvocatedanaccessiontoPakistan, whereas others fought for self-determination. Lack of democratic development inKashmirintheIndian-ruledpartissaidtohaveinspiredtheinsurgency.Intheyearsleadingupto1990,severaldemonstrations,strikesandpoliticalattackstookplace,andtensionsboiledoverin1990resultinginIndia’slargestdomesticconflictwhichhasresultedinbetween25,000and50,000deathssince.14
12NewWorldEncyclopedia,2018
13Chari,2013
14Kalis&Dar,2013
14
TheKargilwar(1999)wasaresultofPakistaniinfiltrationontheIndiansideoftheLoC.Pakistaniauthorities claimed that thewarwas a result of an uprising of theMuslimmilitantswithoutPakistani involvement, however India claims to have documentation linking the Pakistanigovernment to the militants. In two months, the Indian forces had recaptured most of theinfiltratedareasontheirsideoftheLoC.15
Theturnofthecenturyin2000,unfortunately,didnotentailaturnofthepageintheKashmirconflict.Tensionsreachedextremelyhighlevelsin2001and2002afterbothPakistanandIndiaallegedly successfully acquiredWeapons ofMassDestruction, after years of developing them.AfteranattackontheIndianparliament,bothcountriesheavilymilitarizedtheLoCresultinginastand-off.IndiaclaimsthattheattackwascarriedoutbyaPakistan-basedterrorgroup,howeverPakistanfirmlydeniestheallegations.Ontheotherhand,Westernconcernsontheissuewereprimarilyaboutbothcountries’nuclearcapabilities.DiplomaticmediationbytheUK(amongstothernations)helpeddiffusethetensionin2002andresultedinamutualdemilitarizationoftheLoC.Themediationhowever,failedtoprovideanystructuralorlongtermsolutions.
RECENTDEVELOPMENTSINTHEREGION
AlthoughbothIndiaandPakistanmaintainedtheirstalematethroughoutthe2000’s,violenceintheregionwasstillarelativelycommonoccurrence.Severalmilitantgroups,suchasAl-Qaeda,mostlyoperatingfromPakistanregularlyattackedfacilities,andnumberofvictimsonbothsidescontinued to risewith theongoing insurgencyagainst Indian rule in theKashmirValley.Thatbeing said, the first recentnotable conflict since the early2000’s between India andPakistanoccurredbetween2014and2015,whenonceagainconflictconcerningtheLoCarose.
In2014,bothcountriesaccusedeachotherofviolatingtheunspokentermsoftheLoC,following‘unprovoked’ firing on both sides claiming approximately 120 casualties,most ofwhichwerecivilians. Both sides regularly reminded the other of their nuclear capabilities. In 2015 bothpartiesagreedtomaintainingthestalemateandstoppingtheprovocations.16
In2016,theIndiangovernmentkilledBurhanWani,acommanderofoneofthemajor‘insurgencyorganizations’ in Kashmir: Hizbul Mujahideen. In response anti-Indian protests eruptedthroughouttheareaoftheKashmirvalley,whichhadbeentheprimaryoperationbaseofHizbulMujahideen.TheIndiangovernmentrespondedtotheseprotestswithashowofforce:imposingcurfew,raisingmilitary-andpolicepresence,andbreakingupprotests.17
15TNN,2018
16Miglani,2001
17Fahad,2018
15
Moreover, within a day of the first protests, the Indian government suspended the access tointernetonmobiledevicesinKashmir.ItaimedtopreventKashmirinewssourcesfromprintingnewspapersormagazinesinthefollowingmonth;bothclaimsweredeniedtobeintentionalbytheIndiangovernment.Moreover,arrestsofseveralhumanrightsactivists,deniedrequestsforhumanrightsupervisionbytheUN,andreportsofmediacensorshipputinternationalpressureonIndia.18IndiawasaccusedbyPakistan,AmnestyInternationalandtheHumanRightswatchofviolatinghumanrightstreaties.Especiallytheuseof‘pelletguns’asamethodofprotestdispersionbytheIndianGovernmentwasheavilycriticized.Theseuprisingsresultedintheallegeddeathof90civilians,andover15,000injured.19
Mostrecently,inFebruaryofthisyear,tensionsrosetolevelsithasnotriseninyears.Followingasuicidebombattackthatkilled46IndianmilitarypoliceofficersintheIndian-administeredpartofKashmir,Indiavowedto“completelyisolate”Pakistan.20TheattackswereclaimedbyJaish-E-Muhammad(JEM),oneoftheterroristorganizationsoperatinginKashmir.IndiablamesPakistanfornotcrackingdownonterroristorganizationswhereas,Pakistandeniesanyinvolvementintheattacks. India responded by recalling its diplomats and conducting airstrikes on PakistaniTerritorywhichonsuspectedJEMlocations.TheseairstrikeswerethefirststrikesbyeithersideontheoppositesideoftheLoCsince1971.21Atthetimeofwritingthesituationremainshighlycontentiousanddelegatesareadvisedtokeepaneyeoutfornewsonfutureevents/incidentsintheKashmirregion.
TIMELINEOFIMPORTANTEVENTS:
1947-1948 –FirstIndo-PakistaniWar
1965-1965 –SecondIndo-PakistaniWar
1971-1971 –SimlaAgreement
1984-2003 –SiachenWar
1990-present–InsurgencyintheKashmirregion.
1998-1998 –PakistanandIndiaenter‘nuclearclub’
1999-1999 –KargilWar
2014-2015 –BorderSkirmishesbetweenIndiaandPakistan
2016-2017 –KashmirUnrest
2019-present–PulwamaUnrest
18Mathur,2016
19BBC,2016
20BBC,2019
21Ibid.
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KEYACTORS
INDIA
IndiahasrepeatedlystatedthatKashmirisanintegralparttotheircountry.Originally,atthestartof theconflict in1947, theywerewillingtosupport toaplebiscitedeterminingthe fateof theKashmirregion,theynowbelievethathistoryhasshownthatKashmirhaswillinglybecomepartofIndia.ThePrincehadlegalpowertodecidethefateofKashmir,andchoseforanaccessiontothe State of India.Moreover, the Kashmir people have been integrated in the Indian politicalinstitutions,havebeengivenampleopportunity to internal self-determination, and inas suchhavenogroundsforexternalself-determinationoraccessiontoPakistan(oranyotherstate).ItbelievestheargumentthattheMuslimpopulationbelongstoPakistanfortheirsharedreligionisunsound,as Indiaconsiders itselfamulticulturalnation,andmoreoverhas thesecond largestMuslimpopulationintheworld(120,000,000)(onlyIndonesiahasmore).Thecurrentdiscontentin Kashmir is a result of Pakistani infiltration and propaganda, which is why it is currentlyunwillingtoenterintonegotiations.2223
PAKISTAN
PakistanmaintainsthatKashmiristhejugularveinofPakistan,meaningthatwithoutcontroloverKashmirPakistancannotlive(ananalogyespeciallysuitablebecauseoftheimportanceofwaterforPakistan).TheybelievethatIndia’slegalclaimtotheregionisinvalidbecausethePrincewhosignedtheaccessionpaperwas1)atyrantnotsupportedbythepeople,and2)putunderpressurebyIndiantroops.Moreover,PakistanaccusesIndiaofmanyhumanrightsviolationsagainstthepeopleofKashmir.Theyblame Indian forces for themurderingofKashmiri civilians, and therapingoftheirwomen.
Pakistanblames India for the failureoforganizingaplebiscite, andrefers to the ‘two-nations’principle inarguingthat theMuslimmajorityareasshouldbelongtoPakistan.Moreover,withregards to the Simla agreement, Pakistan holds that it entailed exploring the possibility forbilateralnegotiationswithoutexcludingthehelpoftheUNorthirdparties.Moreover,thefactthattheSimlaagreementcallsforseekingtoresolvetheconflictwithbilateralnegotiationsdoesnotsupersedetheearlierUNSCresolutionsthattriedtoestablishtheplebiscite.
Pakistanhowever,alsohasitsdomesticproblems.Pakistanhasalongstandinghistoryofpoliticalinstability, and the current government, although stable, faces tough decisions with strongopposition.AccordingtotheWorldBank’sPoliticalStabilityIndex,Pakistanhasbeeninastateofweakpoliticalstabilitysince2006,scoringbetween-2.4and-2.8onascalewherewhere-2.5isweak, and 2.5 is strong. Corruption, frequent leadership changes and conflict between thedifferentbranchesofgovernmenthavecreatedproblemsforPakistan.Moreover,theyareaccused(amongstothersbyIndia)ofhavingconnectionswithseveralterroristorganizations.24
22EmbassyofIndiainWashingtonDC,2009
23Kalis&Dar,2013
24Ibid.
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JAMMUANDKASHMIRLIBERATIONFRONT(JKLF)/HIZBULMUJAHIDEEN/ALQAEDA/KASHMIR
Seenasfreedomfightersbysome,andasterroristsbyothers,manymilitantgroupsarecurrentlyoperatingfromeitherPakistanorKashmir.Mostofthesegroupsarecurrentlystilloperatingforeither an accession to Pakistan, but mostly for independence of Kashmir. Some of the moreprominentorganizationswillbebrieflyoutlinedbelow:
o JammuandKashmirLiberationFront(JKLF):Originallyamilitantorganization,ithasrecentlytriedtoconvertitselfintoapoliticalparty.ItassertsthepositionofaKashmiriindependence, despite having strong ties with - and being trained by - Pakistan.HistoricallytheJKLFhasbeensplitandreunitedintoseveralfactionswithdifferentideason how to gain Kashmiri Independence, whether through means of violence and/orpolitics.TheyrepresentthelargemajorityofKashmirthatwantstogainindependence,with polls indicating that between 87% and 95% of the local population want anindependent Kashmir. However, the validity of these numbers may be questioned.Moreover, scholars have questioned the ability of Kashmir to become an independentnationdueto,amongstotherthings,thelackofresourcesandinfrastructure.25
o Harkat-ul-Mujahideen(HUM)andJaish-e-Mohammed(JEM):Thesearethetwomostactive terrorist organizations operating in Kashmir, and both groups have allegedconnections to largerorganizations suchasal-Qaeda.Whereas theHUM is fighting forindependenceofKashmir, the JEMwants toaccede toPakistan.Especially the JEMhasrepeatedlybeenconnectedtoPakistan,howeverofficiallythegrouphasbeenrecognizedas a terrorist organization by both Pakistan and India since 2002. Both groups arecurrentlystillactivelyperpetratingattacksonIndianfacilities,inaguerrilla-warfashion.Moreover recently, ISIS has claimed incidents in the region, and ISIS flags have beenspottedinKashmir.However,recentreportsindicatethattheirfootholdintheregionisstillnotaslargeasthatoftheHUMandJEM.26
Combined,organizationslikethisexpressthefeelingsoftheKashmirpeople.Thisisapositionthathastobetakenintoaccountaswell.Moreover,thefactthatKashmirisabreedinggroundof(potential)terroristorganizationsshouldbothinspiremoreinterestinthesituation,aswellasbeingtakenintoaccountintheresolution.
25Kalis&Dar,2013;GlobalSecurity,2019
26BBC,Pulwamaattack:WhatismilitantgroupJaish-e-Mohammad?,2019;Kalis&Dar,2013
18
CHINA
China,asanothernationborderingtheKashmirregionhasastronginterestinthematter.TheybelievethatthepartborderingChina(AksaiChin)shouldbecomeapermanentpartofChina.TheydonotrecognizethebordersofKashmirasdrawnupbyBritainin1947.Moreover,ChinaleanstowardssupportingPakistanontheissue,becauseofitscomplicatedhistorywithIndia,sincetheIndo-Chinawarin1962.Thewarwasaresultofaborderdisputebetweenthetwocountries,andendedwhenChinaunilaterallydeclaredaceasefirewhenithadobtaineditsclaimedterritories.BothpartiesthenestablishedtheLineofActualControl(LAC)thatsetthebordersbetweenChinaandPakistan.ThesebordersarecurrentlystillsomewhatcontestedbyIndia,andIndiaclaimsthatChinaoccasionallystillviolatestheterms,suchasin2013.Inresponsetotheseclaims,ChinaandIndianegotiatedaborderagreementthatpreventsborderpatrolsturningintoincidents.27WithregardstoKashmirChinacurrentlyformsamajorblockintheroadwithregardstocombattingtheJEM,astheyholdthatthedefinitionsofterrorismemployedbyIndiaarenotcongruentwiththeirowndefinitionofTerrorism.Moreover,theeconomiesofPakistanandChinaareincreasinglyintegrating.28
PREVIOUSINVOLVEMENTOFTHEUNITEDNATIONS:
FULLLISTOFUNSCRESOLUTIONSONKASHMIR(EXCLUDINGRESOLUTIONSONTHEINDO-PAKISTANRELATIONSHIPINCLUDINGNUCLEARDEVELOPMENT):
UNSCResolutions:#38,#39,#47,#51(1948),#80,#91,#96,#98(1950-1952),#122,#123,#126(1957),#209,#210,#211,#214,#215(1965),#303,and#307(1971)
HISTORICALDEVELOPMENT:
TheattentionoftheUNwasfirstdirectedtotheconflictaround1948.ThiswasinthemidstoftheongoingbattlebetweenIndianandPakistanitroops,atatimewherePakistanhadreclaimedlargepartsoftheKashmirregion.IndiabroughtforwardaformalcomplaintintheUNSCastheyheldthatthePakistaniInvasionwasanunlawfulactofaggressionfollowingthelegalaccessiontoIndiaby the Prince a year earlier. In response, the UN passed several (#38, #39, #47, and #51)resolutionsthatcalledfortheimmediateceasefireoftheconflictedandsuggestedthesettlementof the dispute should result from a ‘democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite’.MoreoverseveralUNorganizationsweresetup,suchastheUNCommissionforIndiaandPakistan(UNCIP),andtheUnitedNationsMilitaryObserversGroup(UNMOG).29
TheUNCIP consistedof five individuals,noneofwhichwereborn inAsia. From itsonset, thecommissionwasmetwithhostilitybybothIndiaandPakistan.AftermultiplevisitsandtalkswithIndiaandPakistan,theyunanimouslyadoptedResolution47whichconsistedofthreeparts:1)Ceasefire,2)TruceAgreement,3)Apost-truceConsultation.Thisresolutionimplicitlyconfirmed
27TimesofIndia,2019
28Panda,2019
29binShamsuddin,2014
19
thepositionofPakistanas the invaderbymakinga truceagreementprecede theconsultationregardingthefutureoftheregion.Moreover,therewasnomentionofaplebiscite.Followingthisinitialresolution,thecommissionstartedtoworkonthetermsoftheceasefire,truceagreementandplebiscite,butwereonceagainmetwithresistancefrombothcountries,andintheendfailedtoproduceaworkingdocument.
Following the failure of the UNCIP (1948), one representative of the UNSC, General A. G. L.McNaughton,informallyconsultedbothIndiaandPakistanregardingademilitarizationplan.Indoingso,hemadenodistinctionbetweenPakistanandIndiaandcalledfordemilitarizationonboth fronts, resulting inresolution80.Amediatorwasappointed,however thesenegotiationsfailedaswell.
In a following attempt to resolve the issue, theUNSC started proceedings to try and create aplebiscite under the auspices of the UN. However, several problems prevented this fromhappening. Firstly, the need for demilitarization, and secondly the degree of control over theplebiscitebybothnations‘toensureafreeandfairelection’.Theseproblemswereattemptedtobesolvedwithresolutions#96and#98.However,in1957,threeresolutionswerepassedthatinessenceadmittedthefailureoftheproposedplebiscite,andwereaimedtomanageandcontainthesituation.
ThethirdwaveofresolutionsbytheUNSCwereacceptedin1965,during,andintheaftermathofthe second Indo-PakistaniWar. Resolutions 209, 210, 211, 214 and 215 urged, in ascendingdegreesofstrength,bothpartiestorefrainfromfighting,andinsteadlistentoUNMOGandrespectthe LoC. All of these resolutions were disregarded, after which resolution #215 demandedrepresentativesofbothIndiaandPakistantomeetwithrepresentativesoftheUNSGtodiscusspossibleplans forward.Thismeetingwasheldand the fighting stopped,howevernoneof thefundamentalissueswereresolvedordiscussedinthemeetings,ratherfocussingonacquiringanimmediatecease-fire.
Following the Indo-Pakistani war of 1971, the Simla agreement between India and Pakistanspecificallymentionedaresolutionshouldbesoughtthroughbilateraltrade,thereforeeffectivelyexcludinganyUNinvolvementontheissue.ThelatestUNresolutionontheissuethereforealsodatesback from1971 (#303, and#307)which calledonbothparties to respect the ceasefireagreement,andallowinternationalaid.
In the following half-a-century, no more UNSC resolutions were produced. This is partiallybecauseoftheSimlaAgreementbetweenPakistanandIndiathatstipulatesbilateralagreementsshouldbemadewithoutthird-partyinvolvement.Scholars,however,havealsoarguedthatthereisagenerallackofinterestbypowerfulnationsinresolvingtheconflict.ItisinterestingtonotethatthenucleardevelopmentoftheDPRK,IranandIraqweretopprioritiesforboththeUNand
20
themajorpowers(primarilytheUS).Incomparison,however,theacquiescenceofWMDforbothIndiaandPakistanhaveyieldedquitetameresponses.[30,31,32]30
OTHER(POTENTIALLY)RELEVANTUNRESOLUTIONS:
-Resolution#1172(1998):EssentiallycondemnsbothIndiaandPakistanfordevelopingNuclearcapabilities,andoffersmediationontheKashmirissueinreturnfordenuclearization.
-UNSCresolution#1373(2001):Abindingresolution(underCh.VIIoftheUNstatutes)whichfocusesonpreventingnationstatesfromfunding/supportingTerrorismorganizations(amongstotherthings.Pakistanhasbeenaccusedofaidingterroristorganizations.
PREVIOUSNOTEWORTHYBILATERALNEGOTIATIONS
INDUSWATERSTREATY(1960)
BecauseoftheimportanceofwaterintheKashmirregion,tobothnations,in1960thewaterinthe regionwas divided between the two. The treatywas brokered by theWorld Bank. It tooestablishedthatIndiacould(somewhatlimitedly)usesomeofthewaterfromPakistan’sriversbecause of the fact that they receivedmorewater flow. Thiswater could be used for limitedirrigation, but fully for fishing, power generation and other non-consumptive uses. Since thetreaty,therehavebeennofurtherwaterwars,disputeshavebeensettledinlegalcourts.31
TASHKENTAGREEMENT(1965)
ThisagreementendedtheSecondIndo-PakistaniWar,afterbeingpushedbytheUnitedNationsSecurity Council, particularly the US and the USSR. The agreement tried to create a morepermanentsettlement,withtheoutcomeoftheagreementbeingareturnoftheterritoriesthateithersidehadclaimedinthewar.Nofurtherprogresswasmade,althoughitisworthnotingthatthethen-IndianprimeministerdiedinTashkentundersuspiciouscircumstances.32
SIMLAAGREEMENT(1972)
Aspreviouslymentioned,theSimlaagreementendedtheIndo-Pakistaniwarof1971,andcreatedtheindependentstateofBangladesh.ItalsoestablishedthatIndiaandPakistanmustresolvetheKashmirissuethroughbilateralnegotiations,andreaffirmedtheLoCasitwaspriortotheconflict,andthatneithersideshallseektoalterthislineunilaterally.AccordingtoIndia,thisagreementhasmadeUNMOGirrelevant,asthisbilateralagreementsufficesasamethodofmaintainingtheLoC.33
30Bukhari,2016;Chakravarty,2016;Wani&Suwirta,2014
31Kalis&Dar,2013;binShamsuddin,2014
32EditorsofEncyclopaediaBritannica,2019
33MinistryofExternalaffairsIndia,1972
21
LAHOREDECLARATION(1999)
AbilateralagreementbetweenIndiaandPakistanthatestablishesamutualunderstandinginthedevelopmentofnuclearweapons.Providedamutualconfidenceinwhichthethreatofanucleararmsracewasavoided.Whereasinitiallyagreatsignofcooperationbetweenthetwo,thestartoftheKargilwarseveralmonthslaterplacedanotherstrainontheIndo-Pakistanirelations.34
AGRASUMMIT(2001)
AsummitaimedatreducingnucleararsenalsandsettlingtheKashmirissues.Howeverthesetalkscollapsedwithin twodays.Theconclusionof thissummitwasthatneitherpartywasreadytomakeconcessionsyet.35
QUESTIONSARESOLUTIONCOULDANSWER
TheKashmirconflictisoneofthelongestandmostintricateongoingconflicts.Inassuch,ithasmanydimensionsinwhichresolutionscouldcontributetoresolvingtheissueofKashmir.Thesedimensionsneednotallbeincluded,assometimesbabystepsinaresolutionarebetterthannostepsatall.However,thisisa(andbynomeansexhaustive)listofsomeofthemosturgentissues.
WHOSHOULDRULE(ANDOVERWHATPART)OVERKASHMIR?
Firstandforemost,theissueofterritorialityshouldbediscussed.Asthisproblemisessentiallyaproblemaboutterritorialityorself-determination.Youhavethreebroadoptions,KashmirjoiningPakistan,KashmirjoiningIndia,OrKashmirbecomeindependent.Thentothese3generaloptions,therearemanysub-optionssuchasadivisionofKashmiranddividingthembetweentheseveralactors involved. The fact that the area is of such strategic importance to all sidesmakes theterritorialdivisionevenmoredifficulttorealize.
Whereasthisisthecoreissue,itwillbeextremelydifficulttocometoaterritorialdivisionintheSecurity Council, not in the least place because of the fact that India maintains bilateralagreementsonthedivisionarerequired.Therefore,focusingonfacilitatingconditionstoestablishapotentialbilateralagreementonterritorialdivisionsshouldalsobetakenintoconsideration.Moreover, the mandate of the Security Council is to maintain peace and security, territorialdisputesareunderminingtheseprinciples,butithasnoauthoritytojudgeonself-determination.What it can do, is lay out conditions that will decrease the violence in the area, reduce thecontentionbetweenIndiaPakistanandChina,andtrygainsometractionintheconflict.
HOWCANDEMILITARIZATIONOFTHEPRESSUREPOINTSBEACHIEVED?
OneofthewaystodothatisthroughademilitarizationoftheLoC.Currently,onallsidesthereisa largeMilitarypresence,asashowof forcetotheother.Notonlydoesthisresult infrequentincidentsbetweentroops,italsoindicatesthelackoftrustbetweentheparties.Areductionofthesetroopscouldbeoneofthebabystepsinbuildingtrustbetweenthenations.
34MinistryofExternalAffairs,1999
35MinistryofExternalAffairsIndia,2001
22
HOWCANACTSOFTERRORISMANDPOLITICALVIOLENCEBEBETTERPREVENTENTED?
AnotherimportantpartoftheproblemisthepoliticalviolencethatishurtingKashmir.Whereasthedifferentgroups,albeitterroristormerelypoliticalgroups,havelargebasesofsupportwithinKashmir,awaytocrackdownonviolentincidentshastobesought.ThiswouldlikelynecessarilyinvolveboththegoodwillofPakistanandIndia,andpropagandacampaignsofbothnationswilllikelyhavetobesuspendedsomehowbeforesuchastepcanbetaken.Thiswillneedacooperationofallparties involved,anda levelof intelligencesharing thatbothcountriesarecurrentlynotcomfortablewith,althoughintelligencesharingbetweenthetwodoesoccur.Anotherimportantstepcouldbeguaranteeingabetterpathtoself-determinationforthepeopleofKashmir.
HOWSHOULDTHEACCESSOFWATERFROMTHEDIFFERENTREGIONSBEDIVIDED?
Another important aspect to take into account is thewatermanagement. As thewater in theKashmirregionisoffundamentalimportancetobothIndiaandPakistan,possiblerevisionoftheIndusWateract,orthebetterenforcementofsaidactmighthelpremovethewatermanagementasapointofcontention.
INWHATWAYSCANWEENSURETHERESPECTOFHUMANRIGHTSINKASHMIR?
Indiantroopshavebeenaccusedofthekillingofciviliansandrapingofwomenunderthepretenseofthembeingpartoftherebels/terroristorganization.MeasuresthatwillguaranteetheHumanRightsoftheKashmirpeoplearelikelydecreasetheirattractiontoterroristorganizations,andwouldgenerallyincreasepeaceintheregion.Findingawaytoenforceviolations,makingsurethat fewerviolationsoccurcouldbe twoways todo this.Thesearehowevermoredifficult torealizeinpractice.
ISTHEREAPOSSIBILITYFORDENUCLEARIZATION?
EventhoughtheLahoreDeclarationandtheAgraSummithave laidsomefundamentals inthemanagementofNuclearWeapons,theUNSCshouldkeeptheseweaponsinmind,andapossiblereduction of both arsenals may be sought to 1) build trust, and 2) realize the goal ofdenuclearization.However,willbothnationsbeupforthis,oraretheystickingwiththetheoryofNuclearpeace?
CLOSINGREMARKS
Onceagain,wewouldliketostressthattheissueofKashmirisextremelycomplicated,andthatacomprehensiveresolutionresolvingalldifferentaspectsoftheconflictshouldbesoughtbutisnotrealistic.Welookforwardtobothyourpositionpapersandyourideasforresolvingtheissue.
23
SUGGESTIONSFORFURTHERRESEARCH:
o ReportonHumanrightsviolationsin-andthegeneralpoliticalsituationof-Kashmiraftertheviolentuprisingsin2016.BytheOfficeoftheUNCommissionforHumanRights
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/IN/DevelopmentsInKashmirJune2016ToApril2018.pdf
o UNarchivefilesontheissueofKashmirhttps://search.archives.un.org/personnel-matters-living-conditions-in-kashmir
o BBC overview of the different territorial divisions that have been proposed and/orsuggested
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/south_asia/03/kashmir_future/htmo AnonlinebookwhichoutlinesthedevelopmentofKashmiriaccessiontoIndia,froman
Indianperspectivehttps://web.archive.org/web/20111105091213/http://www.kashmir-information.com/kashmirstory/chapter1.html
o UNSCresolution#47http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/47
o SimlaAgreementhttps://mea.gov.in/in-focus-article.htm?19005/Simla+Agreement+July+2+1972
o WaterIndusTreatyhttps://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTSOUTHASIA/Resources/223497-1105737253588/IndusWatersTreaty1960.pdf
24
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BBC.(2019,March9).Pakistan'sdilemma:Whattodoaboutanti-Indiamilitants.BBC.
BBC.(2019,February15).Pulwamaattack:Indiawill'completelyisolate'Pakistan.BBC.
BBC.(2019,February15).Pulwamaattack:WhatismilitantgroupJaish-e-Mohammad?BBC.
BBC NEWS. (2019, March 6). The Future of Kashmir. Retrieved from news.bbc.co.uk:http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/south_asia/03/kashmir_future/html/
binShamsuddin,M.N.(2014).THEROLEOFTHEUNITEDNATIONSINTHEKASHMIRCONFLICT:ANANALYSIS.TheJournalofDefenceandSecurity,25-43.
Bukhari, S. S. (2016).Managing theKashmirConflict:ACollaborativeApproach. Journalof theResearchSocietyofPakistan,149-158.
Chakravarty,I.(2016,September26).TheUNinKashmir:Apottedhistoryofresolutionsthatlednowhere.Scroll.in.
Chari,P.(2013,October02).RELEVANCEOFSIMLAAGREEMENT:ACLOSELOOKAFTERFOURDECADES.Tribune.
CNN.(2019,March1).KashmirFastFacts.CNN.
Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica. (2019, March 12). Tashkent Agreement. Retrieved fromEncyclopaediaBritannica:https://www.britannica.com/event/Tashkent-Agreement
Embassyof India inWashingtonDC. (2009, July).AComprehensiveNoteon Jammu&Kashmir.Retrieved from Kashmir Library.org:http://www.kashmirlibrary.org/kashmir_timeline/kashmir_files/Indian_Position.html
Fahad,S.(2018,July10).Kashmir:2YearsAfterBurhanWani.TheDiplomat.
GlobalSecurity.(2019,March12).JammuandKashmirLiberationFront(JKLF).RetrievedfromGlobalSecurity.org:https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/jklf.htm
IndiaTimes.(2019,January2).PresenceofISISinKashmirnotthatbig:J&KDGP.IndiaTimes.
Kalis, N., & Dar, S. (2013). Geo-political Significance of Kashmir: An overview of Indo-PakRelations.JournalOfHumanitiesAndSocialScience,115-123.
Kumar, H., & Anand, G. (2016, November 14). Kashmir Is Paralyzed by an ‘Adored’ Band ofMilitants.NewYorkTimes.
Mathur,B.(2016,July9).MobileinternetservicessnappedinJammu.GreaterKashmir.
Miglani,S.(2001,December14).12dieinIndianparliamentattack.Guardian.
Ministry of External affairs India. (1972, July 2).SimlaAgreement. Retrieved frommea.gov.in:https://mea.gov.in/in-focus-article.htm?19005/Simla+Agreement+July+2+1972
25
Ministry of External Affairs India. (1999, February 2). Lahore Declaration February, 1999.Retrieved from mea.gov.in: https://mea.gov.in/in-focus-article.htm?18997/Lahore+Declaration+February+1999
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Wirsing,R.(1996).TheKashmirConflict.CurrentHistory,171-176.
Zuthsi,C.(2019).KashmirconflictisnotjustaborderdisputebetweenIndiaandPakistan.TheConversation.
26
TOPICB:STABILIZINGEASTERNAFRICATHROUGHTHEINCLUSIONOFWOMENINPEACEBUILDINGEFFORTS
INTRODUCTION:
EversinceAfricancountrieshavebecomeindependent,devastatingconflictshavebecomeanormratherthananexception.Atleast24ofthe54nationshaveexperiencedconflictinoneformoranother.36AnoverwhelmingamountoftheseconflictstookplaceinEasternAfrica,especiallyintheHornofAfrica,whichovertheyearsexperiencedbothintraandinter-stateconflicts.
Themostsignificantmilitaryconflictsinclude:
- EthiopianCivilWar(1935-1937)
- EritreanWarofIndependence(1961-1991)
- Eritrean-EthiopianWar(1998-2000)
- OgadenWar(1977-1978)
- SecondSudaneseCivilWar(1983-2005)
- SomaliCivilWar(2009-present)
- BurundiCivilWar(1993-2005)
- Lord'sResistanceArmyinsurgencyinUganda(1987-present)
- RwandanGenocide(1994)
- Uganda-TanzaniaWar(1978-1979)
Contrary to the themeofpolitical instability in theregion,Kenyahasenjoyedrelativelystablegovernments. The peace has beenpunctuated at times by instances of violence, including theattemptedcoupd’étatin1982,buttheseonlytookplaceforashorttimeandthecountryisoverallstable.BurundiandRwandasufferedcivilwarsandactsofgenocideduringthetwentiethcentury,whileSomaliaontheotherhandispunctuatedbymilitaryconflict.
Theroleofmenandwomenhasbeenverydifferentintheseconflictswiththelatterbeingmoreadverselyaffectedintermsofdeaths,physicalinjuries,displacementandlossoflivelihood.Effortshavebeenmadetoincreaseparticipationofwomeninsolvingtheseconflicts,mainlythroughtheuse of international legal systems to lobby for the inclusion ofwomen, proactive activities ofwomen groups and activists, as well as international support and solidarity for the plight ofwomen inEasternAfrica. Countries in the regionhave someof thehighest success rates (e.g.Rwanda,Ethiopia)inthesematter,aswellassomeoftheworst(e.g.Somalia,Sudan).However,
36ACLED,2014
27
the results of these efforts are not as expected and not very visible in terms of numbers.Consequently,thisencouragesstatestocooperateandlearnfromeachother.
IntheSecurityCouncilofAUCMUN2019,thisproblemshouldbetackledandaneffectivewayoftheinclusionofwomeninpeacebuildingeffortsshouldbefound.Thisresearchreportisabriefreportontheorigins,contextandcomplexitiesoftheconflict,andismeanttogivethecommitteea general understanding of the topic in order to build further upon the report find specificsolutions.
OVERVIEWOFTHEISSUE
REGION
██EasternAfrica(UNsubregion)
██EastAfricanCommunity
██CentralAfricanFederation(defunct)
██ geographic East Africa, including the UN subregion and East AfricanCommunity
28
EasternAfricaisshowninthemapabove37.Itcanbedefineddifferentlyaccordingtodifferentsources; for thepurposesof this conferencewewill considerEasternAfricaasdefinedby theUnitedNations.Itconsistsoftwoparts:EastAfricaandtheHornofAfrica.EastAfricaismadeupofKenya,Tanzania,andUganda.TheHornofAfricaismadeupofSomalia,Djibouti,Eritrea,andEthiopia.EgyptandSudanaresometimesconsideredtobepartofEastAfricaduetogeographicalreasons,butthedefinitionoftheUnitedNationsincludes:
- MozambiqueandMadagascar–sometimesconsideredpartofSouthernAfrica
- Malawi,Zambia,andZimbabwe–oftenincludedinSouthernAfrica,andformerlyoftheCentralAfricanFederation
- BurundiandRwanda–sometimesconsideredpartofCentralAfrica
- Comoros,Mauritius,andSeychelles–smallislandnationsintheIndianOcean
- RéunionandMayotte–FrenchoverseasterritoriesalsointheIndianOcean
MAGNITUDEOFTHEPROBLEM
NotonlywithinEasternAfricaistheinclusionofwomeninpeacebuildingastruggle.Structurallywomenareoftenexcludedwhichcanbeseenfromthesefacts:
- Between1990and2017,womenconstitutedonly2%ofmediators,8%ofnegotiators,and5%ofwitnessesandsignatoriesinallmajorpeaceprocesses.38
- Women’sparticipationinpeacenegotiationsincreasesthedurabilityandthequalityofpeace.Arecentstudyinvestigating82peaceagreementsin42armedconflictsbetween1989and2011foundthatpeaceagreementswithfemalesignatoriesareassociatedwithdurable peace. Additionally, this study shows peace agreements signed by femaledelegatesdemonstratehigherimplementationrateforagreementprovisions.39
- Gender-sensitive language in peace agreements is critical to setting a foundation forgender-inclusionduringthepeacebuildingphase.Yet,datashowadownwardtrendsince2015;only27percentofpeaceagreementssignedin2017containedgender-responsiveprovisions.40
- Insufficientattentionhasbeenpaidtotheimplementationofgenderprovisionsinpeaceagreements.Ofpeaceagreementssignedbetween2000–2016,onlysevenpercentrefertospecificmodalitiesforimplementationofgenderprovisions.41
37Wikipedia,2018
38Kalis&Dar,2013,p.117-118
39NewWorldEncyclopedia,2018
40UNSecurityCouncil,2018
41Bell&McNicholl,n.d.
29
- Atrendanalysison1,500peaceandpoliticalagreementsadoptedbetween2000and2016(140processes)showedthatonly25agreementsdiscusstheroleofwomen’sengagementinimplementation.42
InEasternAfricathistrendisnotalltoodifferentfromtheglobalfiguresshownabove.AsofMarch2013, therewere less than fourpercent femaleUNpeacekeepers in theworld.Andonly1.49percentofthetotalmilitarypersonnelarewomen.AdemonstrativeexampleofthiswouldbetheMbagathiprocess,whichtookplaceduringtheSomaliCivilWar.Therewasintenselobbyingforinclusionofwomenandwomengroups,yetonlyabout55of1,000delegateswerewomen.Ofthese,21wereregisteredasobserversand34asofficialdelegates.Fromthose34,only26tookpartasmembersoffactiongroupsortheTransitionalNationalGovernment(TNG).Thenationalparliament in 2012 comprised only 13.8 percent of women, despite the Transitional FederalGovernment(TFG)targetof30percent.43
HISTORICALOVERVIEWOFTHECONFLICT
OVERVIEWOFKEYCONFLICTSINTHEREGION
Asmentionedbefore,thesituationinEasternAfricahasbeenextremelyunstableintheperiodafterdecolonization.Someconflicts,suchastheSomaliCivilWarandtheLord’sResistanceArmyinsurgency in Uganda are still happening presently. Over the years of conflict, many of thecountriesinthisregionnowsufferfromchaoticandunstablegovernmentinfrastructuressinceindependence.44
The EritreanWar of Independence (1961–1991) lasted 30 years and caused around 150.000deathsinthecountry,aroundthreepercentoftheirtotalpopulation.Consequently,Eritreahadlittletimetostabilizetheregionaftertheirindependencein1947.
TheEthiopianCivilWar(1974–1991)causedamassivenumberofcasualtiesestimatedat theminimum of 1.4 million people. The Ethiopian Civil War was a civil conflict fought betweenEthiopia's communistgovernmentsandanti-government rebels fromSeptember1974 to June1991. The Eritrean-Ethiopian War (1998-2000) caused both countries a total of 300.000casualties.45
TheOgadenWar(1977-1978)wasthestartofunrestinSomalia,whichlaterdevelopedintotheSomaliCivilWar(1991-present).Theseeventsresultedinmorethan500.000casualtiesandover1.1millionpeopledisplaced.ThecurrentconflictinSomaliaisstillongoing.46
42Ibid.
43UN,2013
44UNAfricaRenewal,2019
45UNNews,2018
46Goulding,M.1991
30
TheUganda-TanzaniaWar(1978-1979)andtheLord'sResistanceArmyinsurgencyinUganda(1987-Present)causeaveryunstablesituationinUganda,whichisunfortunatelyongoing.Over100.000havebeenkilledandnearly500.000displaced.47
TheSecondSudaneseCivilWar(1983-2005)wasawarinaseriesofthreecivilwars.Itendedwiththesouthof thecountryhavingsixyearsofautonomyandan independencereferendum.Even though Sudan does not belong to Eastern Africa according to the UN, it should still bementioned.Anestimated1to2millioncasualtiesresultedfromtheSecondSudaneseCivilWar,while the South Sudanese CivilWar is still ongoing with around 400.000 casualties and stillcounting.48
TheBurundiCivilWarwasanarmedconflictlastingfrom1993to2005.ThecivilwarwastheresultoflongstandingethnicdivisionsbetweentheHutuandtheTutsiethnicgroupsinBurundi,justlikewhathappenedinRwanda.Theconflictbeganfollowingthefirstmulti-partyelectionsinthecountrysinceindependencefromBelgiumin1962.Theestimateddeathtollstandsat300.000,withchildrenhavingbeenusedwidelybybothpartiesinvolved.49
TheRwandanGenocide(1994)isperhapsthemostwell-knownoftheseconflicts:thegenocideagainsttheTutsi-samassslaughterofTutsiinRwandaduringtheRwandanCivilWar,whichstartedin1990.ThegenocidewasdirectedbymembersoftheHutumajoritygovernmentduringthe100-dayperiodfrom7Apriltomid-July1994.Anestimated500.000to1.000.000Rwandanswere killed - an estimated 70 percent of the Tutsi population. The genocide andwidespreadslaughterofRwandansendedaftertheTutsi-backedandheavilyarmedRwandanPatrioticFront(RPF), led by Paul Kagame, took control of the capital and the country. This resulted in anestimated2.000.000Rwandans,mostlyHutu,beingdisplacedandbecomingrefugees.50
Everyregion inEasternAfricahasbeenmarredbydevastatingconflict;someof thesearestillongoing.Therehasnotbeenasignificantperiodoftimewhenthewholeregionwasconflict-free,althoughcertaincountrieshavebeenabletokeepthepeaceforlongerperiodsoftime.Allthesewars and conflicts resulted in the dire need of stabilizing Eastern Africa with potentiallypeacebuildingmissions.51
WOMENINAFRICANCOUNTRIES
AtthemomentwomeninEasternAfricafacemanychallengesthatrestrictthemtoproperlybeincluded inhelping theregion tobestabilized.These include the lackofpolitical strength andpoliticalvision:womensufferfrom“politicalilliteracy”.Theylackanideologicalframeworkthatcouldgiveteethtoastrongpositionadoptedbyacollectivewoman.Peacebuildingasapoliticalactivityandthereforerequirespoliticalstrategyforengagement.52
47ibud
48UNMIS,2019
49UNDPPA,2019
50UN,2019
51UNAfricaRenewal,2019
52Dolphyne,F.A.1991;UNWomenAfrica,2019
31
Next,womenalso face the lackofexperience, exposureandskills innegotiation,advocacyandlobbyingtechniques:womenhavealwaysbeenkeptsecludedfromthepoliticalarenaandsphereofdecision-making;therefore,inmanysituationstheyareunabletoparticipate.53
Thisalsomeansthattheyhavealackofapoliticalplatform:withoutapoliticalplatform,womenareonthemarginsofactionandlackconfidenceinparticipatinginthepeacebuildingprocess.Thelackofexperienceandpoliticalplatformnaturallyleadtoalackofvisibility.Women’sconflict-resolutionactivities are confined to the informal sector, veryoftenat theperipheryofofficialpeacenegotiation.Inaddition,evenifwomencontributetothepromotionofpeace,theyarenotinvitedtoparticipateinformalnegotiations.54
Moreover,women inAfricahavea lackof resources (material and financial).Mostof the timewomen’sgroupslackthemeanstobackuptheiractions.Insomeinstances,theyareunabletogetacrosstothemedianetworktoenhancetheirpeacecampaignbecausetheydonothaveabudgetfor multi-dimensional activities. Further, they are not part of main fundraising channels andnetworks.Theyworkonavoluntarybasisatthegrassrootslevels,poolingtheirownresourcestogethertogetanoffice,desk,andphoneline.55
Lastly, women in Eastern Africa have a lack of sustainability in political participation.Representationdoesnotnecessarilymeanmeaningfulandrecognizedparticipationthathasanimpactonsubstantialinputsinpeaceagreement.Inaddition,onceapeaceprocessisover,womenoftenreturntomoretraditionalactivities, losingtheirgainsandpublicpresence.These lossesmakeitverydifficultforwomentoreturntothepublicstagelaterwhenresolutionbegins.56
CURRENTSITUATION
Atthemoment,therearestillconflictsongoinginUgandaandSomalia57.Apartfromthesecases,EasternAfrica isa regionwhich isverysensitive tonewconflicts,whichhas todowithsomesociologicalaspectswhichexplainthattheareahasahighpotentialtoviolence.Theseaspectswillbeexaminedbelow:
POVERTY
Internalarmedconflictismuchmoreprevalentindevelopingcountriesthanindevelopedones.Thisisbecausedevelopingstateslacktheabilitytoensurelawandorder.UpdatedforecastsusingtheInternationalFuturesforecastingsystemindicatethataround37%ofAfricansliveinextremepoverty(roughly460millionpeople).By2030,32%ofAfricans(forecastat548million)arelikelytoliveinextremepoverty.So,whilethetotalpercentageiscomingdown(around5%less),the
53Ibud.
54Ibud.
55ibud.
56ibud.
57PeaceInside,2018
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absolutenumberswilllikelystillincreasebyaround90million.It’sthereforeunlikelythatAfricawillmeetthefirstoftheSustainableDevelopmentGoalsonendingabsolutepovertyonacurrentgrowthpathofroughly4%GDPgrowthperannum58.
DEMOCRATISATION
Democratisationcantriggerviolenceintheshorttomediumterm,particularlyaroundelections.Wherethereisalargedemocraticdeficit,asinNorthAfricabeforetheArabspring,tensionbuildsup;EasternAfricaisinasimilarposition,aswellasstillrecoveringfromthevariouscivilwarshavebeenfoughtinrecenttimes.
Ademocraticdeficit–wherelevelsofdemocracyarebelowwhatcanbeexpectedwhencomparedtoothercountriesatsimilarlevelsofincomeandeducation–oftenleadstoinstability.Instabilityisalsofuelledbythemanipulationofelectionsandconstitutionsbyheadsofstatetoextendtheirstayinpower.
REGIMETYPE
Thenatureofthegoverningregimeisanotherstructuralfactor.Moststablecountriesareeitherfulldemocraciesorfullautocracies.ButmostEasternAfricancountrieshavemixedregimeswithsome elements of democracymixedwith strong autocratic features. They present a façade ofdemocracybut lack itssubstantiveelements.Mixedregimesare inherentlymoreunstableandpronetodisruptionsthaneitherfulldemocraciesorfullautocracies.59
POPULATIONSTRUCTURE
EasternAfrica’spopulationisyoung,withamedianageof19.Bycomparison,themedianageis41inFrance(arelativelyyoungcountrybyEuropeanstandards).So,22%ofadultFrenchareintheyouthbulgeof15-29yearscomparedto47%ofAfricans60.
Young countries tend to be more turbulent because young men are largely responsible forviolence and crime. These youngmen are at the prime of theirworking capabilities, and theeconomies of many African states are not capable of supplying the job market with enoughpositionsfortheburgeoningworkforce.Ifyoungpeoplelackjobsandratesofurbanisationarehigh,socialexclusionandinstabilityfollow.61
58Independant,2018
59UNAfricaRenewal,2016
60RogueChiefs,2017
61ibud.
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REPEATEDVIOLENCE
Ahistoryofviolenceisgenerallythebestpredictoroffutureviolence.CountriessuchasSudanand Ethiopia are trapped in cycles of violence62. Historically speaking, these cycles are verydifficulttobreak.Itrequiresahugeeffortandisveryexpensive,oftenrequiringalarge,multi-dimensionalpeacemissionthatonlytheUNcanprovide.But,scalingpeacekeepingbackratherthanscalingitupistheorderofthedayattheUN.63
A‘BADNEIGHBOURHOOD’
Whereacountryislocatedcanincreasetheriskofviolencebecausebordersarenotcontrolled,and rural areas not policed. Most conflict in Africa is the result of a domino-effect fromneighbouringcountries64.Violencespillsovernationalbordersandaffectsothercountrieswhilepoorlytrainedandequippedlawandorderinstitutionsgenerallycannotoperateregionally.
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SLOWGROWTHANDRISINGINEQUALITY
Africaisconsiderablyunequal,sogrowthdoesnottranslateintopovertyreduction.Inaddition,theworldisinalowgrowthenvironmentafterthe2007/8globalfinancialcrisis,withaverageratesofgrowthsignificantlylowerthanbefore.Africaneedstogrowataverageratesof7%ormoreayearifitistoreducepovertyandcreatejobs,yetcurrentlong-termforecastsareforratessignificantlybelowthat.
AllthesefactorsplayaroleandneedtobetackledwhenstabilizingEasternAfrica.Additionally,the role and inclusion ofwomen needs to be discussed. How to outweighwherewomen areessentialandhowtheycanefficientlymakeprocessesmoreeffectiveintermsofpeacebuilding.66
62BBC,2019
63UNPeacekeeping,2019
64Reliefweb,2014
65RiftValleyInstitute,2016
66Ibud
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KEYACTORS
EASTERNAFRICANCOUNTRIES
Governments of these countries obviously have to initiate action in stabilizing thepart of thecontinent.Thiscanbedonethroughpeacenegotiationswithothernations,butthefirststepistoensure that thegoverningof theirowncountry is stable.Additionally, thesociologicalaspectsdiscussedaboveshouldbesolvedinthelongterm,oratleastaplanhastobemade.Moreover,theroleofwomenshouldbediscussedonanational,regionalandinternationalbasisinorderforwomentoplayabiggerroleinensuringpeacebuildingintheAfricanregions.
UNITEDNATIONS
TheUnitedNationsSecurityCouncilneedstocometogethertodecidehowothernationscanhelpthesituationinEasternAfrica.Assistingthecountriesbysendingexternalhelpcouldbeanoptionorguidingthecountrieswithsettingupstructures.Sofar,otherthanbuildingbasesincountriessuchasKenya,theUNSChasnotbeenverymuchinvolved,norhasanyotherdepartmentoftheUNinspecific.
QUESTIONSARESOLUTIONSHOULDANSWER
Firstly the sociological aspects that shouldbe tackled, inorder to even create a sableEasternAfrica.Plansorclausesforsolvingtheseissuesshouldbeincluded.Next,asolutionforthelackofwomenshouldbepresentedintheresolution.Theinvolvementofthenationalgovernmentscanplay a rolewithin finding outcomes, but theUN(SC) can also be used to come to an eventualsolution.
Furthermore,thefollowingthemescanbeusedinaresolution:
WOMEN’SPARTICIPATION
Women’s involvement in peace processes have positive impacts in pushing for thecommencement, resumption or finalization of negotiations, particularlywhenmomentumhasstalled,ortalkshavefaltered.Whatshouldbewomen’sinvolvement?Howcanweincorporatecurrentinvolvementswithnewinput?Howshouldwomenparticipate?
PROTECTINGTHERIGHTSOFWOMENANDGIRLSINHUMANITARIANSETTINGS
Increased attention has been paid to violence against women and girls, particularly sexualviolence inconflict, resulting ingreatervisibility,high-leveladvocacy,and thedevelopmentoftechnicaltools.However,toolittlefundingisallocatedtoprogrammingandservicesforsurvivors.How can we ensure more funding is given? Where should this funding come from? How isguaranteedthefundingendsupwell?
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TOWARDANERAOFTRANSFORMATIVEJUSTICE
Justicemustbetransformativeinnature,addressingnotonlythesingularviolationsexperiencedbywomen,butalsotheunderlyinginequalitieswhichrenderwomenandgirlsvulnerableduringtimes of conflict and which inform the consequences of the human rights violations theyexperience.
KEEPINGTHEPEACEINANINCREASINGLYMILITARIZEDWORLD
Thereisneedforalargerfocusondemilitarization,andthedevelopmentofeffectivestrategiesforconflictpreventionandthenon-violentprotectionofcivilians.Moreover,thestudyhighlightsthat women’s presence in the security sector has been found to significantly lower rates ofcomplaintsofmisconduct,ratesof improperuseofweapons,aswellasraisethecredibilityofforces,increaseaccesstocommunitiesandvitalinformation,andleadtoagreaterreportingofsexual and gender-based crimes. Given this information, how can we include women in thesecuritysector?
BUILDINGINCLUSIVEANDPEACEFULSOCIETIESINTHEAFTERMATHOFCONFLICT
Womeninconflict-affectedandrecoveringcountrieslackeconomicopportunitiesnecessaryforsurvival,remainconfrontedbydailyviolenceintheirhomesandcommunities,struggletocopewithheavyburdensofcareanddependency,andcontinuetoenduretheemotionalandphysicalscars of conflict,without support or recognition. In the aftermath of conflict, violence againstwomenoften increases,underliningthe importanceofrebuildingruleof lawinstitutions.Howshouldcanwedecreaseviolenceagainstwomenintheaftermath?Howcanwesupportwomenduringandafteraconflict?
PREVENTINGCONFLICT
States that have lower levels of gender inequality are less likely to resort to the use of force.Strongerrecognitionisrequiredoftheinfluenceofgendernorms,genderrelations,andgenderinequalitiesonthepotentialfortheeruptionofconflict.Howcanweimplementgenderequalityandwhatrolecanwomenorgovernmentplayhere?
COUNTERINGVIOLENTEXTREMISM
Across regions, a common thread shared by extremist groups is that in every instance theiradvancehasbeencoupledwithattacksontherightsofwomenandgirls—therightstoeducation,participationinpubliclifeandautonomousdecision-makingovertheirownbodies.Whatcanwedotocountertheseextremistsbeliefsandgroups?
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CLOSINGREMARKS
Weareawarethatthisissuehastwoproblems:“HowtostabilizeEasternAfrica?”and“Howtoincludewomeninpeacenegotiations?”.Thisiswhatmakesthistopicincrediblydifficulttosolve,sincethecombinationchallengesforcreativesolutionsbutalsomanyclausesinordertosolvetheproblems posed.Wewish you good luck and are looking forward to the position papers andpotentialresolutions.
SUGGESTIONSFORFURTHERRESEARCH:
o ParticipationofWomeninPeaceBuildinginSomalia:ACaseStudyofMogadishuhttp://www.ipstc.org/media/documents/IPSTC_OP_No6.pdf
o BuildingpeaceinEasternAfricahttps://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/building_peace.pdf
o TheRoleofWomeninPeacebuildingandCommunityDevelopmenthttp://www.academia.edu/9710791/THE_ROLE_OF_WOMEN_IN_PEACEBUILDING_AND_COMMUNITY_DEVELOPMENT
o ConferenceonpromotingtheroleofwomeninpeacedevelopmentintheAfricanhornhttps://www.peacewomen.org/content/role-women-promoting-peace-and-development-horn-africa
o AfricanWomenonPeacehttp://www.chr.up.ac.za/images/publications/centrepublications/documents/gender_unifem_african_women_peace.pdf
o NewsarticleonWomen’sPeaceroleso https://www.c-r.org/news-and-views/news/strengthening-womens-peace-roles-east-
and-central-africa
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