""6', RIFLE f//
AleEVALUATION /
S~~~STUDY. (U :• ; z
/ -- ---------
DISTR!f-UIO!'AApp ~~ NOV S0o9~Approved !,c.r 7'-, .-. .
UNITED STATES ARMY
COMBAT DEVELOPMENTS COMMANDT
Inventoried & Retention Justifie•&
Scopy of 50 Copieg
N B ri~-- ~Custdian USACDC Contfol Noý. S62-486S A I eries A 6"
"• LA" ,DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTE•,•,UylDECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 •S "
DOD DIR 5200.10
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20 Dec 1962
RIFLE EVALUATION STUDY (U)t1
1. (S) Objective. ATo evaluate the employment of small armsto determine the 'desired military characteristics of a rifle; toassess the 1414, M14 (USAIB), AR-15, AK-47, and SPIW to determinethe preferable weapon in meeting the desired military characteris-tics; to make recommendations on retention of the M14, adoption ofthe ARo15, and development of the AK-47 type and SPIW.,,ý---
2. (U) References.
a. Letter, Office of the Chief of Staff, Department ofthe Army, 26 October 1962, subject: "Rifle Evaluation (U)."
b. Letter, ODCSOPS, Department of the Army, 9 November1962, subject: "Rifle Evaluations (U)."
c. Message, DA, DCSOPS, CDDC, 921911(S), 21 November 1962.
d, Letter, CDCRE-E, Hq USA Combat Developments Command,14 December 1962, subject: "Rifle Evaluation (U)," with oneinclosure.
3. (S) Employment.
a. The principal user of the rifle in combat is the riflesquad infantryman; the desired rifle characteristics depend primarilyon his needs. The mission of the rifle squad is to close by footmovement to within visual observation of enemy personnel and torender them ineffective by killing, wounding, or capturing them orby restricting their movement. Foot movement permits dispersionconcealment, and freedom of movement not possible in any type ofvehicle. However, a variety of air and ground vehicles are employedto transport the rifle squad as close as possible to the enemy inorder to minimize the distance to be traversed on foot.
b. The targets which must be engaged by the rifle squadare those which, because of their proximity, protection, or fleet-ing nature, cannot be engaged by other weapons such as machine guns,mortars, and artillery. To engage these targets, both area andpoint, the infantryman usually must close to within 400 meters. This .is the maximum distance that the rifleman usually can detect suitable ,3point targets on which rifle fire can be adjusted effectively. How-ever, the rifle squad can, at times, identify and engage lucrativetargets at greater ranges.
Ay ;l,* vc
%"myvIi*ive, the rife squad
c. In rendering the enemifmust be capable of delivering a large volume of aimed fire in arelatively siort time with minimum casualties to itself. This
large volume is to kill, wound, and demoralize the enemy, forcehim to seek cover, and reduce his ability to return fire effec-tively. R-fle squad targets at times also include large massesof enemy attacking at close proximity ("human sea" attacks).Therefore, ideally all rifles should be capable of automatic fireeven though not bh.bituaLly employed in this mode.
d. Tiia t.chike guuprovides a capability for rapid re-action in de'livering point or area sustained fires principallyat ranges up to about 1100 meters, the maximum range at whichits fires can be observed and adjusted effectively. Unlikeindirect fire weapons, mchine gun fire can be adjusted from theweapon and shifted almost instantaneously to engage targets ofopportunity or to furnish continuous close support to advancingrifle squads. It also can deliver sustained prearranged firesunder all conditions of visibility, and can deliver overhead firewith aa acceptable degree cf troop safety. Thenachine gun assiststhe rifle squad to close witih the enemy by delivering largevolumes of suppressive fires beyond the range capability of theindividual hand-held weapon. The machine gun also reduces theeffectiveness of attacking enemy infantry before they come within
effective range of the rifleman. Because of its weight andammunition consumption themaehilne gln requires a crew to serve it.Its rapid reaction, its prearranged fire capability, and itsability to cover ranges from 400 to 1100 meters complement butdo not supplant any of the rifles of the rifle squad, regardlessof whether all or some of these rifles are capable of automaticfire.
e. The irregularity of terrain dictates the requirementfor a weapon to deny the enemy the protection of close-in (400meters or less) areas that are defiladed from the relatively flattrajectory of rifles and rmchine guns. Such targets very frequentlycannot be taken under fire by supporting units becautse of safetyconsiderations, minimum range capabilities, and the need for rapidreaction. The lack of visibility over such areas further dictatesa weapon that produces a relatively large lethal area such as thatobtained by high explosive ffagmentation grenades. Additionally,the lethal area of high explosive fragmentation fires permitsefficient attack of massed area targets. To fill the gap betweenthe range of the hand grenade and 400 meters, there is need for agrenade launcher. Until each man in a rifle squad has an effective
iI
grenade launching capabiie necessary to includeindividuals armed with the M79 grenade launcher in the squadorganization. Ideally, each rifle should be capable of launchinggrenades without degrading the ability of the rifle to deliverquickly either automatic or semiautomatic fire. The weightpenalty for the grenade capability should be minimLzed. In addi-tion to its requirement for an antipersonnel grenade the squadalso has a requirement for a grenade capable of destroying enemyarmor.
f. When infantry employs armored personnel carriers(APC's), it generally employs them for movement,not fighting.The APC is not designed to be a fighting vehicle, but rather ameans for transporting infantry with some protection from shellfragments and small arms fire to the point where the tacticalsituation requires dismounting. Basipally, the APC is only ameans of protected transport and in combat is usually escorted byfighting vehicles. The need to fire rifles from the APC isunusual and is limited to a requirement that two vien other thanthe comnander be able to fire from the opened hatches.
g. As regards reducing the squad to 5 or 7 men, sucha reduction would also reduce the size of the area the squadcould control effectively., Therefore, if the size of the squadis reduced, additional squads will be required to control a givenarea. Because the principal duty of the squad leader is to controlthe actions of others, increasing the number of equads results ina higher proportion of leaders and a lesser proportion of thosewhose principal duty is to engage the enemy directly. The span ofcontrol within the present 10-man squad is within the capabilitiesof one leader. Tactically, squads frequently must be transportedseparately as a unit., With a 5 to 7 man squad, more carrierswill be needed and total requirements for their opecation andmaintenance will be increased.
h. There is no eviderce, except for isolated instances,of the bayonet being used in recent combat to produce casualties.That it is effective for psychological jpurposes in combat has notbeen established factually but is widely accepted by e;•periencedinfantrymen. It 4is a valuable tool for use in control of civildistutbances since it can be used actually or as a threat withoutresort to gunfire. The rifle should be able to accept a bayonetif this capability can be obtained without significant detriment toother desired characteristics. Preferably the bayonet should be ofthe so-called "fighting knife" type so that it economizes on weightand serves a dual purpose,
3
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4. (S) Desired Rif o• racteristics. The desired] 'rifle characteristics, based' : 1h iussion in the previous
paragraph and other obvious considerations, are:
a. Reliability. Able to function consistently and withsafety to the user.
b. Durability. Capable of withstanding prolonged use andrough treatment without loss of reliability in all environments.
c. Lightweight. As light as possible, including ammuni-tion and the accessories that must be carried by the rifleman.
d. Simplicity. Simple to operate and maintain; no morecomplex that the present Ml rifle.
e. Accuracy. Able to engage effectively area and pointtargets up to 400 meters range.
f. Flexibility. Capable of use in either automatic orsemiautxMstiC mode.,
g. Lethality. Capable of firing types of ammunitioncomparable in lethality to that of the standard 7.62qm round andthe area rounds now fired by the M79 projector.
h. Human Engineering. Usable without excess dispomfortto the user. Configured for ease of carrying and use underadverse conditions such as dismounting from vehicles, parachuteoperations, and movement in heavy underbrush.
i. Position Disclosure. Position disclosing effectsshould be minimized and should be no greater than those of theMl rifle.
5. (S) Assessment.
a. A detailed assessment of the characteristics of theM14, M14 (USAIB), AR-15, AK-47, and the Special Purpose IndividualWeapon (SPIW) to include their competing attributes and comparativemerits are given at Inclosures 1 and 2.
b, The AR-15 represents a marked improvement over theM14 rif1p primarily because of lower weapon and ammunition weight.Except for the SPIW, it comes closest to meeting the desiredcharacteristics listed in paragraph 4 above. However it has twocharacteristics which would have to be corrected before the AR.-15
4
were considered an acceptable military rifle in any role: itspoor rifle-ammunition reliability and its poor night firingcharacteristics.
c. The M14 (USAIB) is a definite improvement over theM14(M) in the automatic rifle role and in the few tests conductedhas shown itself to be superior to the AR-15 in the automatic
rifle role at ranges beyond 400 meters.
d. The AK-47 is basically a submachine gun and is inftriorto both the M14, W (uSAIB), and AR-15 in range effectiveness,
ammunition lethality and other desired rifle characteristics.
e. The SPIW, if and when developed to design criteria,will come closest to meeting the desired characteristics.
6. (S) The following factors also are pertinent:
a. The round fired by the M14 family has been adoptedas NATO standard small arms ammunition. A sampling test by U. •.Army, Europe showed interchangeability of NATO rounds of variousnational makes.
b. U. S. Army Forces in Europe are completely equippedwith the M14 rifle.
c. .At the end of Fiscal Year 1962, the U. S. Army hadan inventory of about 415,000 M14 rifles. This will increase toabout 735,000 M14 rifles by the end of Fiscal Year 1963. Theproduction base approximates 375,000 a year and the current pro*curement objective is about 2,500,000 M14 rifles by the end ofFiscal Year 1969.
d. There are apparently no significant differencesbetween the costs of the A14 and AR-15 rifles and their aiu;%i-tion.
e. If achieved, present predictions are that 6PIW, ascompared with the AR-15, would effect a reduction of approxivately40% in ammunition weight, an increase in automatic rate of fire,improved lethality at ranges over 200 meters but possibly a decreasein lethality at lesser ranges. Flechette ammunition is still underdevelopment with a presently predicted type classification inFY 1966 (hence probably not available in quantity until 7Y 1968 or1969). The proposed SPIW grenade launching capability, if developed,appears to be adaptable Lo other riflis.
-i'--
7. (S) Conclusions.
a. If the basic decision were to be made now, withoutreference to the impact resulting from the decisions already made,in my opinion the prefe-able rifle for world-wide usage w 1d bethe AR-15. Even in these circumstances, however, i would, notsaindardize the AR-15 without an expedited improvement program tocorrect the unraliability of the rifle-armunition comibinatior andthe poor night firing qualities. Both qppear corre.-table.
b. Under present conditions, the AR-15 should be inmprovedas noted in "a" above and then introduced into the U, S. Army as anaugmentation of the 1414 rifle.
c. For those units retaining the M14, the M14 (USAIB) ora version thereof should be stand4rdixed for use by the automaticriflemen in each squad.,
8. (S) Recontmendations.
a. Continue use of the M14 by U. S. Army Forces ia 'Europeand equip all u:nits earmarked for deployment to Europe with theM14 except airborne and Special Forces units.
b. Correct the AR-15 deficiencies in reliability andnight firing capabilities.
c. Equip the following with the AR-15 in priority shown:
(1) Aiz Assault units
(2) Airborne units
(3) Special Forces units.
d. Slow co.version from M-1 to M-14 in other areas.
Final decision witi' respect to these units can be based on theexperience of the units listed in c,
e. in unit.-; ':tued with the M14, replace tie M14 wlth aversion of the M114 (USAIB) for 4utomatic riflemen only.
f. conintuan the SPIW program looking toward a long-rangemarked improvement over all other wopons considered.
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9. It should be notedsthat thre ip wide disagreement at all
levels both as to the worth of the AR-15 and the wisdom of intro-ducing it into the U. S. Army. These conclusions and recommenda-tions are mine as Commanding General, U. S. Army Combat DevelopmentsCommand.
4 Incls JOHN P. DALEY1. Physical Charac- Lieutenant General, U. S. Army
teristics, secret Commanding2. Summary of Weaporns /
Comparison, secret3. Bibliography,uncl4. Distribution
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I. TB 381-1, Department of the Army, July 1958, "Combat EquipmentTechnical Intelligence Bulletin."
2. Report of United States Army Infantty Board, Project Number 2812(Cont), 'Evaluation of NATO 7.62mm Duplex Ammunition," R6eadquarttrsUnited States Continental Army Command, 24 April 1961.
3. Personnel Research Associates Repor; 56-3, "A Study of the i-nfart-ySquad TOE," March 1956.
4. Message AJIIS-R 12-14-A, Headquarters bnited States Army infantrySchool, 16 December 1961, reference United States Army T-f!ntrySchool position pertaining to degree which Infantry should Lecapable of fighting mounted from armored personnel carriersuccessor to M113.
5. ORO-T-161 Pamphlet, Operations Research Office, 2 July 1962,"The Effects of Terrain on Battlefield Visibility."
6. Operations Research Office Report by Brigadier General S. L. A.Marshall, "Infantry Operations and Weapons Usage in Korea,Winter 1950-51"
7. "Infantry Reference Data, ROAD," September 1962, United StatesArmy Infantry School.
8. Report, "Rifle Squad and Evaluation Program, 22 May - 31 Jul1961," United States Army Infantry School.
9. Staff Paper ORO-SP-144, Operations Research Office, July 1960,"Battle Sight Setting,"
10. Staff Paper ORO-SP-102, Operations Research Office., April 1959,"Range Estimation for Infantry Squad Weapons."
11. Report of Project Number 3008, United States Army InfantryBoard, 2 December 1962, "Comparative Evaluation of AR-15(Armalite) and M14 Rifles."
12. Staff Paper RAC-SP-1 (SEA), "Suitability and Effectiveness ofWeapons and Equipment Used in US-Supported Operations with thpRoyal Laos Army (U)," Sept 62.
Incl 3 (Bibliography)
13. Ordnance Technical intelligence, OIN 13042, 7 May 1956, "FiringTest:, Soviet 7.62xmn Assault Rifle Kalashnikov (AK), MCN 9866."
14. Report, "A Test of Gun, Light Machinea, 7.62mm Mcoel RPL, Sovietand Gun, Light Machine, ?.62mm. Mod 52, Cze,'h," Ordnan.ze Sub-project Number 2142, February 1958.
15. Development and Proof Servicos, April 1962, Report o-i "Tlest ofRifle, Assault, 7.62.nn, bodel 1958, Czech."
16. Ordnance Technical Intelligen:ce CI'A 3270., April 1959,'Vow-alBallistics Tests of the Soviet 7,62inm Ballet, MCN 8300,"
17. Industry Briefing Packet, Spezial Purpose Indiv•dual Weapon,United States Army Weapons Comiand, 11 October 1962.
18. Final Report, United States Army Combat Developments Experi-mentation Center, 24 June 1959. "Rifle Squad Armed with aLightweight High Velocity Rifle."
19. FM 7-15, January 1962, "'nfantty, Airbcrn,± infantry and M-,:h-anized Infantry Rifle Platoons and Sq,-ats."
20. FM 7-11, January 1962, "Rifle Com0:,ay, 7c_.flint.ry, Airborn,-'
Infantry and Mechanized Infantryv"
21. Teabnical Memorrandum ORO-T.-161, Opesretioits RessýIrcl- OffLet2 July 1962, 't lhe Effects of Uarraib. orl Battle.fiid VtsiiitvY
22. Staff Paper ORO-SP-158, Op_•,a:.tions Resesarch Offa,-•: wnEv.r 1960.
"Rifle Accuracies and Hit Probabilities in Ccmbae:."
23. Technical Memorandum 0Rr-1-]60. Ope.ratinc.'s Rtseaccb Offi.t,19 June 1952, "Operational R'2q1•ir,-:ameu.ts for an lIf,-:trv u¾.n.Weapon."
24. Peport, Second World--Wide Coyba: Arms Co-cferd-- h-ed ad For :.
Leavenworth, Kansas, June 1962, "Fire. Support.-"
25. Technical Memorandum ORO-T-397, Oprzations Re-searck- Cf f.-May 1961, "SALVO I! Rifle Fielh Lxp-rim•tt."
26. Staff Paper ORO-SP-103, Operations Rzsearch Office, April 1959,"Design of Experiment for Effe:ts of Weapon Cenfiguratior.Weight, Sights and Recoil t Rifle Aczuracy."
*1Z
I~I.
27. Staff Paper ORO-SP-46, Operations Research Office, marzr :1958"SALVO II Rifle Rxperiment Preliminary Results."
28. Technical Memorandum ORO-T-378, Operations Researc' Offic,June 1959, "SALVO I Rifle Field Exparime-t."
29. Department of the Arm. Pamphlet Number 30-79, 31 March 1939."Soviet Tactics, Motorized Rifle Coepany.,"
30. Department of the Army Pamphlet Number 30-.53, 6 Detým1. •r 19A1"Handbook on the North Viet.namese Axmed Forzes."
31. Department of the Army Pamphlet Nnmber 30-57, 3 Nlov-ml=r 1961"Handbook on the East German Army line Division Organizdti.o- "
32. Department of the Army Pamphlet Numrber 30-50-2, 1 Aptil 190."Handbook on the Satellite Armies."
33. Department of the Army Pamphlet Number 30-50-1, 17 .arc>- 1961"Handbook on the Soviet Army,"
34. Department of ihe Army Pamphlet Number 30-72, April 1960."Soviet Tactics, Motorized Rifle Regiment."
35. Department of the Army Pamphlet Numbetr 30-73, 17 Octo!c- 1961"Soviet Tactics, Motorized Rifle Divisicn."
36. Department of the Army Pamphlet Number 30-78, 15 Octobex 19c-s"Soviet Tactics, The Mechanized Division and the TFAJek P:xi~i.
37. Department of the Army P-amphlet Number 30-51, 7 D•.ce',bmr lUf.O"Handbook on the ChinesO Crommunist Army."
38. Department of the Army Pamphlet Number 30-89, Maroh 19.»","Chinese Communist Tactics ."
39. FM 101-10, February 1959, "Staff Officers" Field Maniiats,Organization, Technical and Logistic D:ata."
40. Report of Board to Review Rifle and Bayor-et Problems, HiqUSCONARC, 19 December 1958.
3
41. Letter, File AGAM-P(M)474(II Apr 61) DCSOPS, Hq Department of theArmy, Subject: "Basis of Issue for the Selector for the 7.62mm.M-14 Rifle," dated 19 April 1961.
42. Report on Comparative Evaluation of AR-15 and M-14 Rifles(Report NO DPS-799), Aberdeen Proving Ground, Ded 62.
43. US Army Arctic Test Board Report of Project Nr ATB 33-001,1 Dec 62.
44. Technical Note Nr 1482, Dec 62, USA Ballistic Research Labora-tories, "Comparative Effectiveness Evaluation of the M-14 andOther Rifle Concepts" (U).
45. US Army Combat Developments Command "Comparative EvaluationAR-15 and M-14 Rifles (C)", 14 Dec 62.
46. STA9AG No. 2310, Small Arms Ammunition Used by the ArmedForces of NATO Nations, dated 27 Feb 57.
47. Brochure, The United States Army Infantry Board Presents theM14 (USAIB) Rifle, dated 15 Nov 62.
48. USATEC letter report on Comparative Evaluation of U. S. ArmyRifle 7.62mm, M14; Armalite Rifle Caliber..223, AR-15: SovietAssault Rifle AK-47; 12 Dec 62.
4
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RIFLE EVALUATION STUDY (U)DISTRIBUTION
50 - DCSOPS
Information:
5 - USA CONARC
5 - USA MC
10 - USA CAG
5 - USA CDEC
5 -USA CSSG
5 -USA Inf CDA
) 2 - USA SDEG
1 - USA OSWD
1 - USA IAS
Within Hq USA CDC
2 - Dir C&DD
2 -Dir PP&I
2 -Dir MR
3 - Dir OR&E
Si - Dir D&OM
I D&R File
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UNITED STATES ARMY INFANTRYBODFORT BENNING GEORGIA'A APROJECT
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