DC-541006 v10 0307083-0100
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
In re: WORLDCOM, INC., et al. Debtors. _____________________________________
Chapter 11 Case No. 02-15533 (AJG) Jointly Administered
FIRST INTERIM REPORT OF DICK THORNBURGH,
BANKRUPTCY COURT EXAMINER
November 4, 2002 Kirkpatrick & Lockhart LLP 1800 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036 (202) 778-9000 (202) 778-9100 (fax) Counsel to Dick Thornburgh, Bankruptcy Court Examiner
Table of Contents
I. INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................................1
II. PROCESS OF EXAMINATION AND NATURE OF FIRST INTERIM REPORT..........2
III. SUMMARY OF INITIAL OBSERVATIONS....................................................................6
IV. FACTUAL BACKGROUND..............................................................................................9
A. Overview of the Telecommunications Industry: The Breakup of AT&T and the Advent of a Highly-Competitive Marketplace............................................................................9
B. The Evolution of WorldCom: Growth that Presented Significant Challenges. .........11
C. Five Phases of Growth and Transformation ................................................................12
1. The Emergence of LDDS (1983 – 1989): Expansion of a Reseller Network and Becoming a Public Company......................................................................................12 2. From LDDS to WorldCom (1990 – 1995): Expansion to a National and International Long Distance Provider and Acquisition of Significant Transmission Facilities.............................................................................................................................14 3. WorldCom (1996): Expansion into Local Markets and Internet Service.............16 4. WorldCom (1997 – 1998): Consolidation of Its Leadership Position in Local and Long Distance Telecommunications Services...................................................17 5. WorldCom (1999 – 2001): Expansion of Wireless and Web Services..................19
D. WorldCom 2001: The Downturn for Telecom: Falling Share Prices, Failure of a Tracking Stock Initiative and Signs of Trouble.....................................................................20
E. Recent Developments ..................................................................................................22
1. March 2002 – SEC Investigation...........................................................................22 2. April 2002 ..............................................................................................................23
a. Significant Reduction of Workforce ..........................................................23 b. Resignation of Mr. Ebbers .........................................................................23
3. May 2002 ...............................................................................................................24 a. Change of Auditors ....................................................................................24 b. Draw Down on Line of Credit ...................................................................24
4. June 2002 ...............................................................................................................24 a. Lowering of Credit Rating .........................................................................24 b. Discovery of the Capitalization of Line Costs ...........................................24 c. June 25 Public Announcement of Restatement of Earnings ......................29 d. SEC Enforcement Action Against the Company and Appointment of the Corporate Monitor..................................................................................................30
5. July 2002 – Chapter 11 Filings ..............................................................................30 6. Further Restatement of EBITDA ...........................................................................31 7. Criminal and SEC Actions Against Former Officers and Employees ...................31
F. The Company’s Response to Developments in 2002 ..................................................32
1. New Members of Senior Management ..................................................................32 2. New Directors ........................................................................................................33 3. Enhancements to the Company’s Accounting, Audit and Internal Control Functions ............................................................................................................................33
a. Permanent Controller and Establishment of SubControllers .....................33 b. Restatements Group ...................................................................................34 c. New CFO Positions ....................................................................................34 d. An Increase of Internal Audit Staffing.......................................................34
G. WorldCom’s Current Business. ...................................................................................35
H. The Management Structure at WorldCom...................................................................36
I. The Board of Directors ................................................................................................37
1. Composition...........................................................................................................37 2. Board Meetings ......................................................................................................38 3. Director Compensation and Stock Ownership.......................................................39 4. Board Committees..................................................................................................40
a. The Audit Committee.................................................................................41 b. The Compensation and Stock Option Committee .....................................41
V. The Finance and Accounting Process ................................................................................43
B. The WorldCom Finance Group ....................................................................................44
C. Overview of Revenue Budgeting and Planning...........................................................46
1. Annualized Budget Plans .......................................................................................46 2. Monthly Revenue Forecasts, Analyses and Outlooks............................................47 3. Process to Meet Projected Revenues .....................................................................47
D. The WorldCom Financial Reporting Process ..............................................................48
E. The Role of the Independent Auditors .........................................................................49
1. Independent Auditor’s Responsibilities vs. Management’s Responsibilities ........49 2. WorldCom’s Relationship with Arthur Andersen .................................................50 3. The Company’s Internal Audit Function...............................................................52
a. The Role of the Internal Audit Department ...............................................53 b. Preliminary Observations Regarding the Company’s Internal Audit Department...................................................................................................................54
1. The Absence of a Comprehensive Audit Plan.......................................................55 2. Audit Committee Oversight ...................................................................................55 3. Reports to Company Management .........................................................................56 4. Staffing and Compensation....................................................................................57 5. Dealings with Arthur Andersen .............................................................................57
VI. ACQUISITIONS AND OTHER TRANSACTIONS........................................................58
A. Volume of Transactions ...............................................................................................59
B. Apparent Absence of Defined Strategic Plan ..............................................................60
VII. PERSONAL ENRICHMENT AND RELATED CONTROLS.........................................63
B. The Compensation Packages Awarded to Mr. Ebbers.................................................64
C. A Compensation System That May Have Been Vulnerable to Abuse by Mr. Ebbers and Others ....................................................................................................................65
1. The Role Played by Mr. Ebbers in Many Compensation Decisions ......................66 2. The May 2000 Retention Bonus Program .............................................................68 3. The Compensation Committee's Role: Theory and Practice ................................69
D. The Compensation Committee's Role In Authorizing Over $400 Million in Loans and Guaranty Payments To Mr. Ebbers or His Banks ..................................................71
1. Mr. Ebbers' Increasingly Serious Debt Problems ......................................71 2. The Compensation Committee's Approval of the WorldCom Loans and Guaranty That Benefited Mr. Ebbers .................................................................................73 3. Matters Relating to the Loans and Guaranty Requiring Further Investigation......78
a. Due Diligence by the Compensation Committee.......................................78 b. Documentation of the Loans and Guaranty ...............................................79 c. The Below-Market Interest Rate................................................................79 d. Use of the Loan Proceeds and Proper Disclosures ....................................80
VIII. WorldCom’s Relationships With SSB and Jack Grubman................................................81
B. SSB Was WorldCom's Primary Investment Bank .......................................................83
C. SSB Allocated Lucrative IPOs to Mr. Ebbers and Other WorldCom Directors..........84
D. The Enthusiastic Ratings and Reports of SSB Securities Analyst Jack Grubman ......87
1. The Role of Securities Analysts.............................................................................87 2. WorldCom's General Interactions with Securities Analysts ..................................88 3. Mr. Grubman's Extremely Favorable Analyst Reports ..........................................89 4. Mr. Grubman's Departures From The Role of An Independent Securities Analyst ...............................................................................................................................97
E. WorldCom's Record In Meeting Analyst Expectations ...............................................99
IX. ACCOUNTING AND FINANCIAL REPORTING ISSUES .........................................104
A. Reserves and their Role in a Company’s Financial Statements.................................106
B. Line Cost Capitalization.............................................................................................109
C. The Preparation of Misleading Reports .....................................................................109
D. Other Accounting Issues Under Investigation...........................................................110
1. Intercompany Balances........................................................................................110 2. Goodwill Impairment ...........................................................................................112 3. Capitalized Labor .................................................................................................114 4. Accounting for Avantel S.A. and Embratel Participacoes, SA............................115
a. Avantel.....................................................................................................116 b. Embratel...................................................................................................116
On July 21, 2002, WorldCom, Inc. and substantially all of its direct and indirect subsidiaries
(collectively, “WorldCom” or the “Company”) filed voluntary petitions seeking relief under
Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code. These cases, which have been consolidated for
procedural purposes and are being jointly administered, represent the largest bankruptcy in the
history of the United States. WorldCom made its initial bankruptcy filings approximately four
weeks after the Company publicly disclosed on June 25, 2002 that it had discovered substantial
accounting irregularities that would result in adjustments to its financial statements totaling more
than $3.8 billion.
The day after WorldCom filed its bankruptcy petitions, this Court granted the motion of the
United States Trustee on July 22, 2002, for the appointment of an Examiner pursuant to 11 U.S.C.
§ 1104(c)(2). The Court’s Order provided that the Examiner “shall investigate any allegations of
fraud, dishonesty, incompetence, misconduct, mismanagement or irregularity in the management of
the affairs of [the Company] by current or former management, including but not limited to issues
of accounting irregularities.” The Court directed the Examiner to coordinate with the United States
Department of Justice, the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) and other
federal agencies investigating matters related to WorldCom to avoid duplication of effort. The
Court also ordered the Examiner to file a report of his examination with the Court within 90 days of
On August 6, 2002, the Court signed an Order approving the appointment of Dick
Thornburgh, a former United States Attorney General, as Examiner. This required the filing of a
report with the Court by November 4, 2002. Mr. Thornburgh, Counsel with Kirkpatrick &
Lockhart LLP, engaged his firm as counsel and J.H. Cohn LLP as his forensic accountants and
financial advisors to assist him with respect to the examination of the Company. Given the
enormity and complexity of this examination, Mr. Thornburgh, through counsel, and with the
consent of the Company and its counsel, submitted to the Court on November 1, 2002 an Order
modifying its initial scheduling directive to provide for the filing of a First Interim Report by
November 4, 2002, and for subsequent reports of examination to be filed every 120 days thereafter
until the examination is completed. This constitutes the First Interim Report of the Examiner, his
counsel and financial advisors.
It is important to note at the outset that this First Interim Report is the work product of the
Examiner and that it is intended to fulfill his responsibilities under this Court’s Orders of July 22
and August 6, 2002. Accordingly, this Report should not be used in any other proceeding and the
statements and information contained herein should not be viewed as an admission by any person
or findings by any other person or entity.
II. PROCESS OF EXAMINATION AND NATURE OF FIRST INTERIM REPORT
Our examination is intended to discharge the broad mandate prescribed by the Court in its
Order authorizing the appointment of an Examiner, dated July 22, 2002. Toward that end, we are
investigating a large number of issues related to the conduct of WorldCom management prior to the
bankruptcy filings. Our goal is to assess thoroughly, objectively and responsibly the acts and
omissions of current and former management, as well as the integrity of the Company’s
management, accounting and financial reporting processes and its internal controls, so that we can
report to the Court regarding these matters.
The examination consists of several facets, each of which is active and ongoing. We have
requested from WorldCom numerous documents and information that pertain to aspects of the
Company’s operations and management. The Examiner notes the cooperation of WorldCom
during a difficult and tumultuous time for the Company. In all, we have collected more than
million pages of documents. Such documents and information include, among others:
(i) accounting and financial reporting records; (ii) materials related to the function and organization
of the Company’s management structure, including the duties and responsibilities assigned to
particular individuals or business units; (iii) records regarding the Company’s internal oversight or
control functions and related reporting systems; (iv) materials concerning executive compensation,
bonuses and other benefits conferred upon WorldCom management; (v) records related to loans
made by WorldCom to Bernard Ebbers, the former Chief Executive Officer of the Company;
(vi) documents respecting certain corporate acquisitions and other transactions involving
WorldCom; and (vii) documents related to communications and dealings with securities analysts
and investment banks by WorldCom and certain of its officers or employees.1
We also have requested materials from, and exchanged certain documents and information
with, the Special Investigative Committee of the Company’s Board of Directors, its counsel,
Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering, and its accountants, PriceWaterhouseCoopers, which commenced an
investigation shortly after WorldCom publicly disclosed certain accounting irregularities relating to
the capitalization of line costs on June 25, 2002. We have attempted to coordinate our efforts with
those of the Special Investigative Committee to avoid duplication and reduce expenses. The
Committee and its professionals have provided significant assistance to the Examiner and his
professionals, including briefings on the status of their investigation and other work product. Much
1 Initially, the Company raised certain concerns regarding the potential waiver of the attorney-client privilege or other protections that may be caused by production of certain relevant documents to the Examiner. These concerns served to delay our receipt of a substantial number of materials. In order to address these concerns, we sought, with the Company’s consent, an order from the Court providing that the delivery of documents and information to the Examiner by WorldCom and related parties shall not constitute a waiver of the attorney-client privilege, work product protection or any other recognized privilege or protection. We obtained such an order from the Court on September 23, 2002.
of the testimonial evidence that we have received to date was derived from interviews conducted by
the Special Investigative Committee. In addition, we have sought the assistance of KPMG LLP
(“KPMG”), the Company’s newly appointed independent auditors, which have been engaged to
audit the financial statements of WorldCom for the years ended December 31, 2000 through
December 31, 2002. We anticipate that we will continue to work with the Special Investigative
Committee and its professionals, as well as with KPMG.
Consistent with the Court’s July 22 Order, we also are coordinating extensively with the
United States Department of Justice and the SEC, which are investigating matters related to
WorldCom, to avoid unnecessary duplication of effort. As noted above, this First Interim Report
constitutes the work of the Examiner and nothing in it should be construed as a statement by, or
finding of, these agencies. We anticipate a continuing dialogue with the Department of Justice and
the SEC regarding matters related to their investigations and our examination. We also are
coordinating with the Honorable Richard C. Breeden, the Corporate Monitor appointed by the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York in a proceeding commenced by
the SEC against WorldCom. Mr. Breeden has provided important assistance to the Examiner. The
Examiner also notes the significant role played by the Honorable Jed S. Rakoff in proceedings
concerning WorldCom. Further, we are maintaining an active dialogue regarding matters related to
our examination with the counsel and its financial advisors for the Official Committee of
Beyond these activities, we have interviewed, or reviewed notes of previous interviews
conducted by others of, a significant number of present or former employees, officers or directors
of WorldCom. These interviews included a large number of present or former employees of
WorldCom who performed accounting or finance functions at various offices or facilities
maintained by the Company, as well as members of the Company’s Board of Directors, certain of
the Company’s internal audit personnel, present or former members of its in-house legal team,
certain investor relations personnel, and employees who worked primarily on acquisitions or other
corporate development matters prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petitions. We anticipate that we
will conduct, or participate in, a substantial number of additional interviews in the future. In some
cases, we also have directed requests for particular documents or information to certain former
officers or employees of WorldCom or their counsel.
Even with all of these efforts, we have gathered only a relatively small portion of the
records necessary to enable us to report thoroughly and accurately to the Court regarding the
matters outlined in its July 22 Order. The task ordered by the Court is enormous and in the
relatively limited time since the Examiner was appointed we have been able to address most of the
relevant issues in only a preliminary fashion. Our inability to access many relevant documents and
other information until after we obtained an order from the Court that addressed the Company’s
privilege concerns, further delayed our efforts. Moreover, due to the pending governmental
investigations, we have not had access to all persons who have information relevant to our
examination. Accordingly, a substantial amount of additional investigation is required before we
can reach definitive conclusions – both qualitatively and quantitatively – regarding relevant acts,
omissions and events involving the present or former management of WorldCom. Accordingly, in
this First Interim Report, we only outline certain of our initial observations and to highlight some
of the areas that we believe warrant further investigation and analysis. We intend to refine and
expand these preliminary observations, and to detail our specific findings, in subsequent reports to
Significantly, there are a number of conclusions that we have reached which are not set
forth herein due to representations by investigative agencies that their disclosure at this time would
adversely affect the process of determining possible criminal or civil liability of persons involved
III. SUMMARY OF INITIAL OBSERVATIONS
Although we have conducted our examination over a relatively short period of time and are
not drawing conclusions on many matters, a picture is clearly emerging of a company that had a
number of troubling and serious issues. These issues relate to the culture, internal controls,
management, integrity, disclosures and financial statements of the Company. The Company’s June
25, 2002 disclosure of a $3.8 billion restatement regarding the line cost capitalization may be the
largest issue in terms of dollars, but it was by no means the only significant problem related to the
Company’s financial reporting, public disclosures and related matters. Our initial observations,
which are discussed more fully below, can be summarized as follows:
• WorldCom was a company that grew tremendously in both size and complexity in a relatively short period of time. Its management, systems, internal controls and other personnel did not keep pace with that growth.
• WorldCom grew in large part because the value of its stock rose dramatically. Its stock was the fuel that kept WorldCom’s acquisition engine running at a very high speed. WorldCom needed to keep its stock price at high levels to continue its phenomenal growth.
• WorldCom did not achieve its growth by following a predefined strategic plan, but rather by opportunistic and rapid acquisitions of other companies. The unrelenting pace of these acquisitions caused the Company constantly to redefine itself and its focus. The Company’s unceasing growth and metamorphosis made integration of its newly acquired operations, systems and personnel much more difficult. This dramatic growth and related changes also made it difficult for investors to compare the Company’s operations to historical benchmarks.
• One person, Bernard Ebbers, appears to have dominated the course of the Company’s growth, as well as the agenda, discussions and decisions of the Board of Directors.
Critical questioning was discouraged and the Board did not appear to evaluate proposed transactions in appropriate depth, even though several members of the Board had a significant percentage of their personal wealth tied to the value of the Company’s stock.
• The Audit Committee of the Board of Directors did not appear to operate effectively or aggressively based on our preliminary review. We are in the process of further examining the work of the Audit Committee, as well as its relationships with the Company’s Internal Audit Department and with the Company’s independent auditors, Arthur Andersen LLP (“Arthur Andersen”).
• The Compensation and Stock Option Committee of the Board of Directors seemed largely to abdicate its responsibilities to Mr. Ebbers. It approved compensation packages that appear overly generous and disproportionate to either the performance of the Company or competitive pressures. We are still in the process of reviewing the activities of this Committee.
• Arthur Andersen determined that WorldCom was a maximum risk client. Although we are still reviewing the audit work of Arthur Andersen, it does not appear that the audit procedures employed by Arthur Andersen were appropriate for the risk profile it ascribed to WorldCom.
• WorldCom’s Internal Audit Department focused almost exclusively on operational issues – i.e., identifying potential inefficiencies and not financial or accounting matters. Given this focus on operational issues, it was a credit to the personnel of the Internal Audit Department that they investigated the line cost capitalization issue in 2002. WorldCom’s failure to have its Internal Audit Department develop and implement a comprehensive risk-based and financial controls oriented internal audit plan contributed to the weakness of WorldCom’s internal controls.
• The relationship between WorldCom and Salomon Smith Barney (“SSB”), its primary investment banker, seems to have been unusually close and potentially problematic. We are still investigating this relationship and we will report further on it in future reports. Some of the matters that we are investigating include the relationship of a SSB research analyst, Jack Grubman, with the Company, including his attendance at various meetings of the Company’s Board of Directors and evidence that Mr. Grubman alerted the Company ahead of time to the questions he would ask in conference calls between securities analysts and WorldCom management, as well as the wildly enthusiastic analyst reports issued by SSB and others with respect to WorldCom at a time when the stock was plummeting.
• WorldCom put extraordinary pressure on itself to meet the expectations of securities analysts. This pressure created an environment in which reporting numbers that met these expectations, no matter how these numbers were derived, apparently became more important than accurate financial reporting.
• A second restatement in the amount of an additional $3.8 billion, which was announced by WorldCom in August 2002, includes the restatement of reserves of approximately
$2.3 billion. We have identified a number of other entries related to reserves that require review to determine if any were used to boost improperly WorldCom’s earnings.
• To accomplish and conceal their financial manipulations, it appears that WorldCom personnel created several false internal financial reports. Although we have significant information on these reports, we are not including details in this First Interim Report in deference to the ongoing governmental investigations.
• It appears that if WorldCom’s revenue figures did not meet or exceed the budgeted amounts, the Company would increase improperly revenues. Between the first quarter of 1999 and the first quarter of 2002, adjustments were made to approximately 400 items totaling over $4.6 billion. At least $423 million of this amount already has been restated by WorldCom. We have reached no conclusion on the other adjustments and will be reviewing them in a future report.
• WorldCom manipulated its reported financial performance by drawing down excess or other reserves into earnings. At around the time that the reserves were being drawn down, WorldCom agreed to combine with Sprint Communications, Inc. (“Sprint”) in October 1999. This combination would have allowed the Company not only to replenish its reserves, but also to increase them dramatically. When the government ultimately refused to approve the Sprint merger in July 2000, and signaled that it would not be sanctioning other large mergers, WorldCom did not have adequate excess reserves to draw down as a vehicle to increase earnings going forward. Shortly after this time, the Company took the brazen and radical step of converting substantial portions of its line cost expenses into capital items. These conversions ultimately added approximately $3.8 billion improperly to income. The disclosure of these improprieties was the subject of the June 25, 2002 restatement announcement.
• Finally, it seems clear that there were numerous failures, inadequacies and breakdowns in the multi-layered system designed to protect the integrity of the financial reporting system at WorldCom, including the Board of Directors, the Audit Committee, the Company’s system of internal controls and the independent auditors. The Company did not have in place sufficient checks to prevent the improper accounting machinations of the Company’s management.
IV. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
WorldCom began in 1983 as a small company named Long Distance Discount Services,
Inc. in Jackson, Mississippi. Within 15 years, it had become a global telecommunications giant
and one of the largest companies in the world. Few companies in the annals of American business
have grown so large and so fast in such an intensely competitive marketplace.
A. Overview of the Telecommunications Industry: The Breakup of AT&T and the Advent of a Highly-Competitive Marketplace.
Since 1983, the United States telecommunications industry has been transformed from a
monopoly to an extremely competitive marketplace. Some of the principal factors that have driven
competition include: (i) the elimination and relaxation of legal and regulatory barriers to markets;
(ii) the advancement of new technologies and services, including data transmission and Internet
services; and (iii) consolidation.
Prior to 1984, AT&T effectively controlled the facilities for both local and long distance
service throughout the United States. The government’s breakup of AT&T, pursuant to a long-
anticipated divestiture order entered by a federal court, brought many new telecommunications
companies into the market. The divestiture order generally divided the telecommunications
marketplace into providers of local service and providers of long distance service. The divestiture
order gave the seven Regional Bell Operating Companies monopoly status in their respective
regions for local telephone service, but required them to provide access to long distance service
providers to connect with their networks. The order opened long distance service to competition.
Following divestiture, AT&T, which remained a long distance service provider, continued
to dominate the long distance marketplace because of, among other things, the perceived quality of
its service and customer loyalty to its brand. Two types of long distance competitors to AT&T
emerged – facilities-based carriers, which owned and built transmission facilities, and non-
facilities-based carriers or “resellers.” “Reselling” generally involved purchasing transmission
capacity at wholesale rates from facilities-based carriers and reselling the capacities to commercial
and residential customers.
The profitability of a telecommunications carrier is dependent on its ability to generate
revenues that exceed its transmission expenses or “line costs.” In the evolving competitive
environment of the 1980s, AT&T and other facilities-based carriers, with their higher fixed costs,
apparently found it difficult to generate sufficient traffic through their internal customer bases. As
a result, those carriers sold transmission capacity to resellers at wholesale rates.
Resellers designed their rates generally to be lower than those AT&T charged its residential
and commercial customers and competitive with the rates of other facilities-based carriers. By the
1990s, overcapacity of transmission facilities, and other factors, began to reduce profit margins for
resellers. In addition, advances in the quality of services provided by fiber optic and digital
technology enhanced the ability of other facilities-based carriers to compete with AT&T on the
basis of service, as well as price. These various factors intensified the impetus for competitors to
consolidate in order to improve efficiency and to finance the acquisition of new technology that
might reduce costs and open lines of business and revenue.
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 (“Telecom Act”) and concomitant changes in the
regulatory policy of the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) further increased
competition by, among other things, removing legal barriers for long distance carriers to provide
local telephone services and vice versa. The elimination of these barriers spurred the consolidation
of local and long distance service providers into companies that could offer single-source local and
long distance service.
Against this backdrop of changing regulation and substantially increased competition,
WorldCom grew from a modest reseller within a narrow geographic area to a diversified
telecommunications giant with a global presence. For present purposes, the Company’s
transformation may be summarized as follows.
B. The Evolution of WorldCom: Growth that Presented Significant Challenges.
The Company’s SEC filings reflect that WorldCom’s growth evolved from its commitment
to the following principles:
• competition and capital requirements in the telecommunications industry would result in consolidation of competitors to a few dominant companies;
• to survive, WorldCom needed to grow its services, customer base and facilities rapidly and continually;
• the most effective means to grow was the acquisition of existing telecommunications companies with desirable shares of geographic or service markets; and
• investment in new technologies was critical to reducing marginal costs, attracting customers and meeting their demand for new and better services.
From 1985 to 2001, WorldCom acquired other telecommunications companies at an
unrelenting pace – over 60 acquisitions in just over 15 years. Regulatory filings reflect that some
of these transactions constituted the largest mergers of their time in the telecommunications
industry. Public statements by WorldCom executives suggest that these acquisitions were intended
to achieve strategically broader geographic coverage of the Company’s services, more and better
transmission facilities, new services (such as data transmission, Internet, web hosting and wireless
services), and new markets. Hindsight has shown, however, that some areas projected to offer high
profit margin and growth – such as Internet and wireless service – failed to sustain high growth
rates and produce adequate returns, and profit margins declined due to the extensive, industry-wide
overcapacity in transmissions facilities.
The Company’s focus on acquisitions presented significant challenges. Given its modest
early capital base and to minimize reliance on cash outlays for acquisitions, the Company often
relied significantly on its stock to pay for many acquisitions. The need to maintain the value and
attractiveness of that “currency” placed considerable pressure on WorldCom to achieve
consistently impressive share price performance and high stock prices.
Another challenge for WorldCom involved its integration of acquired assets, operations and
related customer services. Rapid acquisitions can frustrate or stall integration efforts. Public
reports, and our discussions with WorldCom employees, raise significant questions regarding the
extent to which WorldCom effectively integrated acquired businesses and operations. A
companion set of issues relates to the extent to which the Company integrated or expanded its
systems and internal controls to accommodate new and changing businesses, cultures and reporting
Finally, the Company’s unprecedented and unceasing growth may have obscured the ability
of investors to focus upon and evaluate objectively the actual strength and financial performance of
the Company at particular junctures. With the Company so constantly changing form through
expansion, reliable benchmarks of historical performance against which investors could measure
current performance may have been difficult to find.
C. Five Phases of Growth and Transformation
1. The Emergence of LDDS (1983 – 1989): Expansion of a Reseller Network and Becoming a Public Company.
From 1983 to 1985, Long Distance Discount Services, Inc. was licensed to provide long
distance service to Mississippi businesses and residents. In 1984, the Company had annual
revenues of approximately $1 million.
In 1985, the Board of Directors of Long Distance Discount Services, Inc. elected Bernard
Ebbers as the Company’s chief executive officer (“CEO”). At that time, Mr. Ebbers, who had been
an investor and director in the Company, operated a number of motels through another company
known as Master Corporation. Mr. Ebbers had no prior experience in the telecommunications
With Mr. Ebbers at the helm, the Company quickly began acquiring resellers of
telecommunication services in other states. The following transactions or events are among those
that significantly shaped the Company during this period.
LDDS Communications, Inc. In 1987, LDDS Communications, Inc. (“LDDS”), a
Tennessee corporation, was formed as a holding company for the operating entities acquired by
Long Distance Discount Services, Inc. By 1989, subsidiaries of LDDS provided long distance
telecommunications services in eight southern states and Indiana. It reported annual revenues in
1988 of approximately $53 million and long-term debt of approximately $43.4 million. Its board
members included several executives and directors from Mr. Ebbers’ motel concern and executives
of the acquired resellers. One of these directors, Carl J. Aycock, remains on the Board of Directors
of WorldCom today.
Advantage Companies, Inc. In August 1989, LDDS became a public company through a
reverse merger with Advantage Companies, Inc. (“Advantage”), a long distance reseller based in
Atlanta, Georgia, whose common stock was then listed on the Nasdaq National Market System.
LDDS merged into Advantage through a stock conversion with no payment of cash. The surviving
entity changed its name to LDDS. The Chairman of the Board of Advantage, Stiles A. Kellett, Jr.,
became a member of the Board of Directors of LDDS following the merger. Mr. Kellett remained
on the Board of Directors of WorldCom through the time of the bankruptcy filings. He resigned
from the Board on October 27, 2002.
At the time of the merger, with Advantage, LDDS claimed combined pro forma annual
revenues for the merged companies of approximately $116 million.
2. From LDDS to WorldCom (1990 – 1995): Expansion to a National and International Long Distance Provider and Acquisition of Significant Transmission Facilities.
The Company aggressively expanded during the early 1990s. By late 1992, LDDS was one
of the largest regional long distance companies in the United States, providing telecommunication
services to customers in 27 states in the Southeast, Southwest and Midwest. In 1992, the Company
reported annual revenues of $948 million. By the end of 1995, it was an international company and
changed its name to WorldCom to signify its new stature and broader focus. The Company
reported annual revenues of approximately $3.9 billion for 1995. Significant acquisitions in this
phase included the following:
Advanced Telecommunications Corp. In December 1992, LDDS acquired Advanced
Telecommunications Corp. (“ATC”), a Texas-based reseller that provided long distance services to
commercial and residential customers located in 26 states. ATC also was certified to provide long
distance services in 11 other states, and it enabled its customers to call all points in the U. S.,
Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Canada and 176 other foreign countries. ATC had reported
total annual revenues of approximately $354.6 million at the time of the merger. LDDS acquired
ATC by converting each share of ATC common stock into .83 shares of LDDS stock, which
equated to a value of approximately $850 million.
Scott Sullivan, who had been a vice president and the treasurer of ATC, became an assistant
treasurer with LDDS following the merger. He later was promoted to Chief Financial Officer
(“CFO”) of LDDS in 1994, a position he retained after the Company changed its name to
WorldCom. Mr. Sullivan became a member of the Company’s Board of Directors in 1996. His
tenure on the Board and as CFO ended after the Company discovered substantial accounting
irregularities in June of this year.
Metromedia Communications Corp. and Resurgens Communications Group, Inc. In 1993,
LDDS became a national provider of long distance telecommunication services through the three-
way merger of LDDS, Metromedia Communications Corp. (“MCC”) and Resurgens
Communications Group, Inc. (“Resurgens”). MCC was a facilities-based carrier that provided long
distance service throughout the continental United States. Resurgens was a regional non-facilities-
based long distance company that transmitted operator-assisted long distance calls from multi-
telephone facilities such as hotels, hospitals and pay telephones located throughout the United
States. MCC first merged into Resurgens, creating M/R Corp., a Georgia Company. LDDS then
merged into M/R Corp., with the surviving entity being renamed LDDS Metromedia
Communications, Inc. The merger was effected through a complicated series of stock conversions,
and payment of $150 million in cash. The entire set of transactions was reported to involve an
exchange in value of approximately $1.25 billion.
IDB Communications Group, Inc. In 1994, LDDS acquired IDB Communications Group,
Inc. (“IDB”). At that time, IDB was the fourth largest international carrier (based on 1992 revenue)
and operated a substantial domestic and international communications network. Following the
acquisition, IDB became a wholly-owned subsidiary of LDDS. The merger was purely a stock
transaction; that is, the common stock of IDB converted into shares of LDDS, with no cash paid by
either party. The transaction was valued at approximately $936 million.
Williams Technology Group, Inc. In 1995, WorldCom completed a $2.5 billion cash
purchase of Williams Technology Group, Inc. (“WilTel”), by which it acquired WilTel’s
nationwide common carrier network of approximately 11,000 miles of fiber optic cable and digital
microwave facilities. This acquisition gave the Company the capability to serve even the largest
companies with both voice and advanced data capabilities. The acquisition of WilTel also added
$2.6 billion to the Company’s debt.
As of December 31, 1995, the Company’s annual reported revenues had climbed to
approximately $3.9 billion. The reported notes payable and long-term debt of WorldCom was
approximately $3.4 billion on that date.
3. WorldCom (1996): Expansion into Local Markets and Internet Service.
Following enactment of the Telecom Act in 1996, WorldCom swiftly seized the opportunity
to compete in local markets and greatly advanced its capacity to offer Internet services.
MFS Communications Company, Inc. and UUNet Technologies, Inc. In December 1996,
the Company acquired MFS Communications Company, Inc. (“MFS”), which owned and operated
local network access facilities installed in and around major U.S. cities and in several major
European cities. MFS also possessed significant transmission and switching facilities in network
capacity, which it had leased from other carriers in the United States and Western Europe. The
acquisition of MFS enabled WorldCom to offer single source local and long distance services.
UUNet Technologies, Inc. (“UUNet”), a subsidiary of MFS, was a significant component of
the transaction. As a leading provider of many Internet access modalities, applications and
consulting services, UUNet was perceived to provide a foundation for meeting projected high
demand for Internet applications.
The merger with MFS was an all-stock deal, valued at approximately $12 billion, which
involved the conversion of each share of MFS common stock into 2.1 shares of WorldCom
common stock and conversion of various preferred classes of MFS stock into convertible preferred
shares of WorldCom. Following the merger, seven new directors of WorldCom were assigned by
MFS. These included John W. Sidgmore, who was the CEO of UUNet. Today, Mr. Sidgmore is
WorldCom’s CEO and a member of the Company’s Board of Directors.
By the end of 1996, the Company reported annual revenues of approximately $4.8 billion
and notes payable and long-term debt of approximately $4.8 billion.
4. WorldCom (1997 – 1998): Consolidation of Its Leadership Position in Local and Long Distance Telecommunications Services.
In 1997 and 1998, WorldCom completed three major acquisitions. The most significant of
these acquisitions involved MCI Communications Corporation (“MCI”). The MCI transaction
was, at the time it was announced, the largest merger transaction in history, reported to be valued at
approximately $40 billion. This acquisition, which originally was announced in October 1997 but
was not completed until September 1998, consolidated the network capacity, business lines and
services of two large competitors. The companies expected their integration to generate operating
efficiencies through, among other things, reduced leased line costs and the combination of sales
and marketing forces. The merger followed a failed effort to acquire MCI by British
Telecommunications. Pursuant to the terms of the merger, MCI shareholders generally received
1.2439 shares of WorldCom common stock (a market value of approximately $51 per share) for
each share of MCI common stock and British Telecommunications received $51 in cash for each
share of MCI class A common stock which it had acquired in its aborted takeover of MCI.
With the acquisition of MCI, the Company changed its name to MCI WorldCom, Inc. and
increased its local service to over 100 domestic U.S. markets. In addition to the MCI transaction,
the following other transactions and events significantly shaped the Company during this period.
Embratel Participacoes S.A. As part of the merger with MCI, WorldCom acquired MCI’s
51.79% voting interest and 19.26% economic interest in Embratel Participacoes S.A. (“Embratel”),
which is a Brazilian facilities-based national and international communications provider. MCI had
acquired its interest in Embratel for approximately $2.3 billion in cash in August 1998, just before
the closing of its merger with WorldCom. At that time, Embratel provided domestic long distance
and international telecommunications services in Brazil, as well as over 40 other communications
services, including leased high-speed data, internet, frame relay, satellite and packet-switched
services. WorldCom included Embratel’s operating results in the Company’s consolidated
financial statements from the date of the MCI merger.
Avantel, S.A. Also as part of its merger with MCI, WorldCom acquired a significant equity
interest in Avantel, S.A. (“Avantel”), which provided domestic and international
telecommunications services in Mexico. Avantel was formed in the early 1990s by MCI and
Grupo Financiero Banamex-Accival (“Banamex”). MCI owned 44.5%, of Avantel and Banamex
owned the balance of the company. Banamex was expected to provide governmental relations and
management support for Avantel, whereas MCI and, later, WorldCom, was expected to provide
Brooks Fiber Properties, Inc. In January 1998, WorldCom acquired Brooks Fiber
Properties, Inc. (“BFP”), a leading facilities-based provider of competitive local telecommunication
services in selected cities within the U.S. The acquisition of BFP further advanced the Company’s
participation in local markets. BFP became a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Company.
CompuServe Corporation and ANS Communications, Inc. In related transactions in January
1998, WorldCom merged with CompuServe Corporation (“CompuServe”), which through two
divisions, Internet Services and Network Services, offered, respectively: (i) online and Internet
access for consumers, and (ii) worldwide network access, management applications and Internet
services to businesses. Each share of CompuServe was converted in 0.40675 shares of WorldCom
stock. Concurrently with the acquisition of CompuServe, America Online, Inc. (“AOL”) bought
CompuServe’s Interactive Services Division from WorldCom for $175 million. In addition,
WorldCom acquired ANS Communications (“ANS”) from AOL and entered into five-year
contracts with AOL pursuant to which WorldCom and its subsidiaries would provide network
services to AOL.
As of December 31, 1998, WorldCom reported annual revenues of approximately $17.6
billion and notes payable and long-term debt of approximately $21.2 billion, which included
operating results for CompuServe, ANS and MCI.
5. WorldCom (1999 – 2001): Expansion of Wireless and Web Services.
In 1999, WorldCom acquired greater wireless communications capacity through
acquisitions of SkyTel Communications, Inc. (“SkyTel”), CAI Wireless Systems, Inc. and Wireless
One. The following other transactions or events also significantly impacted the Company during
1999 and 2000 as it sought greater penetration of the global market.
Sprint Communications, Inc. In October 1999, WorldCom announced an agreement to
merge with Sprint, one of its chief competitors, in order to become a formidable competitor for
wireless services and to enhance MCI WorldCom’s existing fiber optic network and advanced data
communications services. The proposed combination with Sprint generated considerable
regulatory scrutiny in the United States and Europe. In July 2000, the companies formally
terminated the merger plan after receiving opposition from the U.S. Department of Justice.
Intermedia Communications, Inc. and Digex, Inc. In September 2000, shortly after the
Company abandoned plans for the Sprint merger, WorldCom acquired Intermedia
Communications, Inc. (“Intermedia”) for a reported $5.8 billion in stock and assumed
approximately $2.4 billion of long-term debt. One of the principal attractions to the Company was
the acquisition of Intermedia’s controlling interest in Digex, Inc. (“Digex”), which was perceived
to be a leading provider of managed Web and application host services. WorldCom viewed the
merger as providing it with premier Web hosting products and services, including comprehensive
access, transport and application solutions. The acquisition closed in July 2001, after being
delayed due to litigation commenced by the minority shareholders of Digex, which settled earlier in
By the end of 2000, WorldCom had grown into a telecommunications giant, with
significant operations in all major aspects of the industry. As of December 31, 2000, the Company
reported total annual revenues of over $39 billion and notes payable and long-term debt of $24.9
D. WorldCom 2001: The Downturn for Telecom: Falling Share Prices, Failure of a Tracking Stock Initiative and Signs of Trouble.
In the last half of the 1990s, significant capital flowed to many telecommunications
companies based on a widely held view, spurred by Wall Street analysts, that the sector was poised
for almost unlimited growth. The Dow Jones Telecommunications Index, which is a weighted
index of the common stocks of over 25 telecommunications companies, reflects that share prices
for the industry as a whole rose sharply in the late 1990s. Exceeding even the sector’s impressive
performance, WorldCom’s share price rose from the low $20s in January 1995 to over $90 per
share by mid-1999. It had six stock splits between 1990 and 1999; two were at a ratio of 2 to 1 and
four were 3 to 2 splits.
The industry as a whole, and WorldCom in particular, experienced sharp and continuous
declines in share prices from early 2000 to the present. WorldCom common stock fell from a high
on June 30, 1999 of $96.766 per share to a low of $46 per share by June 30, 2000. As of December
29, 2000, the stock’s high was $18.656. For the next year it generally fluctuated between $24 and
$12 per share. It fell precipitously in 2002 and was delisted from the Nasdaq stock market as of
July 30, 2002.
Following the severe erosion of the Company’s share price in 2000, WorldCom proposed
and its shareholders approved a plan of “recapitalization” in 2001 to create two separately traded
tracking stocks: WorldCom Group and MCI Group. Each tracking stock was a separate class of
the Company’s common stock intended to provide a return to investors based upon the financial
performance of the distinct business units attributed to each stock. The ownership of the targeted
businesses did not change and while each of the classes of stock traded separately, all shareholders
remained shareholders of WorldCom and were subject to all of the risks and potential benefits of an
investment in WorldCom as a whole.
The theory behind this recapitalization was to give investors the opportunity to invest in
distinct lines of the Company’s business. The WorldCom Group tracking stock generally was
perceived as involving growth areas (data, internet, international and commercial voice businesses)
that would be attractive to growth-oriented investors. The MCI Group stock generally was tied to
businesses that were perceived as generating significant cash flow (the Company’s consumer, small
business, wholesale long distance voice and data, wireless messaging and dial up internet access
business), and it was expected to pay a cash dividend. The tracking stock initiative, however, did
not spawn sufficient investor interest to improve share prices. On May 21, 2002, the Company
announced that it was eliminating the tracking stock structure, effective July 12, 2002, apparently
to realize an annual cost savings of $284 million by eliminating the dividend on MCI Group stock.
The elimination of the tracking stock structure was delayed and it was never completed following
the Company’s bankruptcy filings. Nevertheless, it appears that the Company does not intend to
report results according to the tracing stock structure in the future.
As of December 31, 2001, the Company reported total annual revenues of over $35.2
billion and total debt of $30.2 billion.
E. Recent Developments
In 2002, WorldCom has endured months of extraordinary adverse developments, including
reports of substantial accounting and financial reporting improprieties, significant layoffs of
employees, the removal of its CEO and CFO, a public admission of preparing and filing false
financial statements with the SEC, the filing of petitions for reorganization under Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code, an SEC enforcement action, and criminal charges against, and guilty pleas by,
certain former officers and employees. The Company has responded to these developments by,
among other things, making significant changes to its management, Board of Directors and
organization. The following is a brief summary of these recent events and some of the significant
actions taken by the Company.
1. March 2002 – SEC Investigation
In the wake of public reports regarding numerous SEC investigations into the accounting
practices of telecommunications and other companies, WorldCom announced on March 11, 2002
that it had received a confidential request from the SEC for voluntary production of documents and
information. In a press release, WorldCom listed the areas of inquiry by the SEC, which included,
among others, accounting treatment for goodwill, loans to WorldCom’s officers and directors, the
Company’s policies and procedures concerning revenue recognition, accounts receivable-related
reserves, and certain write-offs. The Company’s press release stated affirmatively that WorldCom
believed its policies, practices and procedures had complied, and continued to comply, with all
applicable accounting standards and laws.
2. April 2002
a. Significant Reduction of Workforce
On April 3, 2002, the Company announced that, to better align its costs with its projected
2002 revenue guidance of mid-single digit growth, it was reducing its U.S.-based staff relating to
the WorldCom Group by 3,700 positions, which equaled approximately 6% of that workforce. The
Company reported that the reduction would be realized across the organization. The MCI Group
was not affected by this action.
b. Resignation of Mr. Ebbers
By late April 2002, the combination of the Company’s sagging performance and share
price, Mr. Ebbers’ personal financial difficulties, and complications with respect to the Company’s
loan and guarantee covering a margin loan against Mr. Ebbers’ WorldCom stock holdings,
convinced the independent directors to call for Mr. Ebbers’ resignation. On April 30, 2002, the
Company announced that Mr. Ebbers had resigned as President, CEO and Director and that Mr.
Sidgmore had assumed the position of President and CEO of WorldCom. The same announcement
reflected that Mr. Sullivan had been promoted to Executive Vice President and that Ronald
Beaumont had been promoted to COO of the Company. The announcement quoted Mr. Sidgmore
as stating that the Company’s “low cost structure, [its] are strengths in offering services to every
level of the enterprise market and consumers, and [its] solid financial foundation – built on free
cash flow production – position us to attack the marketplace with exceptional force.”
3. May 2002
a. Change of Auditors
Following the indictment of Arthur Andersen relating to its destruction of documents
concerning Enron Corporation, the Company’s Board of Directors, upon the recommendation of
the Audit Committee, engaged KPMG to replace Arthur Andersen as the Company’s independent
auditor and accountants. KPMG became the Company’s independent auditor and accountants
effective May 14, 2002.
b. Draw Down on Line of Credit
In May 2002, WorldCom drew down a $2.65 billion credit line and ultimately moved the
funds into money market funds sponsored by non-creditor financial institutions or securities firms.
non-creditor banks. The move effectively prevented creditors of the company from freezing the
funds in the event of bankruptcy.
4. June 2002
a. Lowering of Credit Rating
Debt securities issued by WorldCom were downgraded several times in 2002. For example,
On or about June 17, 2002, Standard & Poor’s lowered the corporate credit rating of WorldCom.
In reaction to this downgrade, the Company announced in a press release that it was negotiating
with its banks on a new $5 billion bank credit facility and that “with plenty of cash on hand and no
debt maturing over the next six months, it does not matter whether the new facility is in place today
or at any date later this summer.”
b. Discovery of the Capitalization of Line Costs
The Internal Audit Department’s investigation of the capitalization of line costs is a story
that has already been publicly reported. We will briefly summarize the significant events here. In
May 2002, the Company’s Internal Audit Department began an investigation concerning the
capitalization of line costs. On May 21, 2002, an internal auditor received from another WorldCom
employee, a featured article from the May 16 edition of Fort Worth Weekly Online, entitled
“Accounting for Anguish.” The employee indicated that the issues raised in the article might
warrant investigation by the Internal Audit Department at WorldCom. “Accounting for Anguish”
is based upon interviews with Kim Emigh, a former WorldCom employee who allegedly was fired
for whistle blowing, and details a number of alleged accounting improprieties at the Company,
although none related to the capitalization of line costs.
Members of the Internal Audit Department continued their investigation over the next few
weeks, attempting to gather relevant documents and information. On or about June 12, 2002, the
Internal Audit team contacted Max Bobbitt, the Chairman of the Audit Committee of the Board of
Directors, and informed him of its discoveries regarding the timing and amounts of certain journal
entries. The Internal Audit Department told Mr. Bobbitt that these journal entries included entries
amounting to $743 million for the third quarter of 2001, entries amounting to $941 million for the
fourth quarter of 2001, and entries amounting to $818 million for the first quarter of 2002, for a
total of $2.5 billion in line costs that had been capitalized. Mr. Bobbitt then requested that these
issues be discussed with KPMG prior to a meeting of the Audit Committee on June 14, 2002. This
discussion occurred on June 12.
Between June 12 and June 20, the Internal Audit team continued its investigation. On June
20, the Audit Committee of the Board of Directors met to discuss the issue. In the course of the
meeting, representatives from KPMG summarized the circumstances underlying the capitalization
of line costs from the second quarter of 2001 through the first quarter of 2002. KPMG
representatives told those present at the meeting that, in their view, the capitalization of line costs
did not comply with GAAP and that no documentation supporting such capitalization appeared to
exist. KPMG was asked if the Company needed to restate its financial statements at that time and
KPMG said that it had not reached conclusions with respect to any issue raised. Mr. Sullivan
attempted to explain to those attending the Audit Committee meeting his reasoning behind the
capitalization of line costs and he requested additional time to support and document the transfers
of line costs from the Company’s income statement (where they appeared as expenses) to its
balance sheet (where they appeared as assets, generally subject to depreciation).
Between June 21 and June 24, the Board of Directors engaged various attorneys and other
professionals to review this matter. On June 24, the crisis surrounding the Company’s
capitalization of line costs reached its peak following a series of events.
Another meeting of the Audit Committee was scheduled for June 24, 2002. In preparation
for that meeting, Mr. Sullivan submitted what has come to be known as the “White Paper,” setting
forth his rationale for the line cost capitalizations in light of the economic conditions prevailing at
the time at which the line cost capitalizations occurred. In the White Paper, Mr. Sullivan stated
that, following WorldCom’s merger with MCI in September of 1998, WorldCom had sold MCI’s
SHL Systemhouse business for $1.4 billion and announced that it would use the entire proceeds of
the sale to expand WorldCom’s network. Through the end of 2000, Mr. Sullivan’s White Paper
continued, WorldCom had engaged in an extended capital investment campaign to increase the size
of the Company’s Internet backbone, expand local and data networks, and construct a “Pan
European network.” Mr. Sullivan observed that, at this time, the telecommunications industry was
rapidly developing, WorldCom was facing “increased” and “intense” competition, and it was
important that the Company have the ability to enter the market quickly and provide the “best
network” to its customers with “little provisioning time.” Mr. Sullivan noted that WorldCom’s
decision to increase capital investment significantly was based upon the prevailing belief that
Internet use and data demand would continue at the rate of eight times the annual growth that the
telecommunications industry was experiencing.
According to Mr. Sullivan’s White Paper, it was during this period that WorldCom entered
into long-term, fixed-rate line leases to connect its network with the networks of incumbent local
exchange carriers. Mr. Sullivan noted that WorldCom also entered into various network leases to
complement its data, Internet, and local services, in order to obtain access to large amounts of line
capacity “under the theory that revenue would follow and fully absorb these costs and expedite
‘time to market.’” Mr. Sullivan also stated that WorldCom was willing to absorb the line lease
costs prior to recognizing the revenue to match them, because “it believed that future revenue
would be matched up with these costs.” The White Paper referenced Staff Accounting Bulletin No.
101 (“SAB 101”) and Financial Accounting Standards Board No. 91 (“FASB 91”) to support Mr.
Sullivan’s conclusion that the lease costs thereby incurred should not be expensed until WorldCom
had recognized matching revenue. Mr. Sullivan reasoned that “the cost deferrals for the unutilized
portion” of line leases were “an appropriate inventory of this capacity” that ultimately would be
amortized before the expiration of the contractual commitment. To support this reasoning, Mr.
Sullivan quoted the definition of an asset as “‘probable future economic benefits obtained or
controlled by a particular entity as a result of past transactions or events,’” together with a
description of the essential characteristics of an asset, as set forth in Statement of Financial
Accounting Concepts No. 6.
In the White Paper, Mr. Sullivan went on to observe that the second quarter of 2002 marked
the first time in the Company’s history that WorldCom had experienced quarterly revenue
decreases for two consecutive quarters and that these decreases were the result of challenges posed
by a weak economy and the consequent network downsizing of customers, customer bankruptcies,
foreign exchange losses, and “product migrations.” According to Mr. Sullivan, these events,
together with the resignations of WorldCom’s President and CEO, the junk-status of the
Company’s debt rating, and its liquidity concerns, all contributed to a determination by WorldCom,
in the second quarter of 2002, that the “future economic benefits of the deferred costs” of the
Company’s line leases could not ultimately be realized, necessitating a write-off of the previously
capitalized costs. In concluding the White Paper, Mr. Sullivan observed that the preparation of the
financial statements of WorldCom “requires the Company to make estimates and assumptions that
affect the reported amount of assets and liabilities as well as the reported amount of expenses,
including line costs” and that “[s]ignifcant [sic] management judgments and estimates must be
made and used in connection with establishing these amounts.”
At the Audit Committee meeting on June 24, representatives from Arthur Andersen
informed WorldCom that, in light of the line cost transfers that occurred in 2001 and 2002, the
opinion of Arthur Andersen concerning the Company’s 2001 financial statements no longer could
be relied upon. The Arthur Andersen representatives stated that they did not know about the line
cost transfers, but they would not answer questions as to why their audit had failed to uncover
them. They indicated that they had not seen Mr. Sullivan’s White Paper, but that it had been read
to them and that they could not accept it as compliant with GAAP. Representatives of KPMG
agreed with Arthur Andersen that the capitalization of line costs could not be supported under
GAAP. The Audit Committee rejected Mr. Sullivan’s reasoning in the White Paper and
determined that it would report to the Company’s Board of Directors that a full restatement of the
financial statements of WorldCom for 2001 and the first quarter of 2002 would be necessary. The
Audit Committee advised Messrs. Sullivan and Myers that if they did not resign before the Board
of Directors meeting scheduled for the following day, their employment would be terminated.
The full Board of Directors met on June 25, 2002. At that meeting, the Board determined
that WorldCom would restate its financial statements for 2001 and the first quarter of 2002. The
Board also determined that KPMG would reaudit the Company’s financial statements for 2001 and
it decided to terminate Mr. Sullivan without severance and to accept the resignation of Mr. Myers
without severance. The Board also decided that it would immediately inform the SEC of the
Board’s decisions and that after representatives of WorldCom had informed the SEC regarding
these matters, the Company would inform the public of the Board’s conclusions.
c. June 25 Public Announcement of Restatement of Earnings
Following the Board of Directors meeting, WorldCom representatives met with the SEC
staff. WorldCom then issued a press release on June 25, 2002 regarding its intention to restate its
financial statements for 2001 and the first quarter of 2002.
The Company’s June 25 press release announced that the restatement would cause an
aggregate reduction of $3.8 billion in its earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and
amortization (“EBITDA”) for 2001 and the first quarter of 2002. The announcement further
explained that Arthur Andersen had advised the Company that, in light of the inappropriate
transfers of line costs, Arthur Andersen’s audit report on the Company’s financial statements for
2001, as well as its review of the Company’s financial statements for the first quarter of 2002,
could not be relied upon.
As a reflection of its weakening financial performance, the Company also explained that it
was acting to improve liquidity and operational performance by downsizing its workforce by an
additional 17,000 positions, selling non-core businesses and paying preferred stock dividends in
common stock rather than cash.
d. SEC Enforcement Action Against the Company and Appointment of the Corporate Monitor
On June 26, 2002, the SEC commenced a civil injunctive action against WorldCom in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York alleging violations of the
antifraud and other provisions of the federal securities laws. The SEC complaint sought an
injunction, monetary penalties, and prohibitions on destroying documents and making
extraordinary payments to WorldCom affiliates. That proceeding is still pending
On June 28, 2002, based upon a joint agreement between the SEC and WorldCom, the
District Court ordered, among other things, that WorldCom and its affiliates preserve all items
relating to the Company’s financial reporting obligations, public disclosures required by the federal
securities laws and accounting matters. The District Court further ordered that it would appoint a
Corporate Monitor having oversight responsibility with respect to all compensation paid by
WorldCom. On July 2, 2002, the Court appointed, upon the request of the SEC and with the
Company’s consent, former SEC Chairman Richard C. Breeden to serve as the Corporate Monitor.
5. July 2002 – Chapter 11 Filings
As noted above, on July 21, 2002, WorldCom announced that it and substantially all of its
active U.S. subsidiaries filed voluntary petitions for reorganization under Chapter 11 of the United
States Bankruptcy Code.
6. Further Restatement of EBITDA
On August 8, 2002, WorldCom announced that an internal review of its financial statements
had discovered an additional approximately $3.3 billion in improperly reported EBITDA for 1999,
2000, 2001 and the first quarter of 2002. That amount was in addition to the $3.8 billion
restatement previously announced by the Company with respect to the improper capitalization of
line costs. WorldCom also disclosed that it expected to record further write-offs of assets
previously reported, including the likelihood that it may determine that all existing goodwill and
other intangible assets, then recorded as $50.6 billion, should be written off when restated 2000,
2001 and 2002 financial statements are released.
7. Criminal and SEC Actions Against Former Officers and Employees
Several former finance or accounting officers of WorldCom have been the subject of
criminal or SEC proceedings during the last several months. Specifically, on August 1, 2002,
Mr. Sullivan was arrested on seven criminal counts, including securities fraud, conspiracy to
commmit securities fraud and filing false statements with the SEC. Later, on August 28, 2002,
Mr. Sullivan was indicted for conspiracy to commit securities fraud, filing false statements with the
SEC, and other criminal violations of the federal securities laws. These charges are pending.
On August 1, 2002, Mr. Myers also was arrested and charged with securities fraud,
conspiracy to commit securities fraud and filing false statements with the SEC. On September 26,
2002, Mr. Myers pled guilty to one count each of securities fraud, conspiracy to commit securities
fraud and filing false statements with the SEC. An SEC civil enforcement action against him for
securities fraud, which also was filed on September 26, is still pending.
On October 7, 2002, Buford “Buddy” Yates, Jr., the former Director of General Acounting,
pled guilty to securities fraud, conspiracy to commit securities fraud and filing false statements
with the SEC. An SEC civil enforcement action against him for securities fraud, filed on that same
day, is still pending.
On October 10, 2002, Betty Vinson and Troy Normand, who were employed as accountants
in WorldCom’s General Accounting Department and reported to Mr. Yates, each pled guilty to two
criminal counts of conspiracy and securities fraud. The SEC also filed a civil enforcement action
against both of them for securities fraud, which remains pending.
F. The Company’s Response to Developments in 2002
In response to these developments, the Company has taken certain actions. Among other
actions, the Company has announced a search for a new CEO, it has a new CFO, a Corporate
Restructuring Officer (“CRO”), new outside auditors, additional legal and financial advisors and
three new members of its Board of Directors. WorldCom also is making changes to its internal
audit and financial control functions.
1. New Members of Senior Management
On July 28, 2002, the Company announced that Mr. Sidgmore had appointed Gregory F.
Rayburn as CRO and John S. Dubel as CFO, both of whom are principals in AlixPartners, LLC, a
corporate restructuring firm. Messrs. Rayburn and Dubel report directly to Mr. Sidgmore. Both
men have significant corporate management and restructuring experience. Mr. Rayburn, who has
been the CEO and CRO of other companies, is a Certified Public Accountant (“CPA”) and a
Certified Fraud Examiner. Mr. Dubel has served as CRO and COO of another telecommunications
company and is a Certified Insolvency and Reorganization Accountant. On September 10, 2002,
the Company announced its intention to search for a new CEO to replace Mr. Sidgmore.
2. New Directors
In the wake of the disclosures concerning improper accounting practices, the Board of
Directors added Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, Dennis R. Beresford, and C.B. Rogers, Jr., as directors.
Mr. Katzenbach currently is a private attorney. He previously served as Attorney General of the
United States (1965-66), Under Secretary of State for the United States (1966-69), and as Senior
Vice President and General Counsel of IBM Corporation (1969-86). Mr. Beresford currently is
Professor of Accounting at the Terry College of Business, University of Georgia, and previously
served as Chairman of the Financial Accounting Standards Board from 1987 to 1997. Mr. Rogers
is the former Chairman and CEO of Equifax, Inc., and also has served as a director of Sears,
Roebuck & Co., Dean Witter, Discover & Co., Briggs & Stratton Corporation, Oxford Industries
and Teleport Communications Group. Mr. Rogers previously served on the Board of Directors of
MCI before its merger with WorldCom. Neither Mr. Katzenback nor Mr. Beresford previously
was associated with WorldCom.
3. Enhancements to the Company’s Accounting, Audit and Internal Control Functions
The Company’s new management has advised us that it will implement a number of
organizational changes that are intended to help correct the Company’s past problems, prevent their
reoccurrence and create a system that will permit its independent auditors to opine on the
reasonableness of the financial statements for the years 2000, 2001 and 2002. Among the more
significant of these measures are the following:
a. Permanent Controller and Establishment of SubControllers
The Company soon will hire a permanent Controller and create positions for four new
subcontrollers who will be responsible for, respectively: (1) revenue accounting (accounts
receivable, commissions, and credit and collections); (2) operational accounting (accounts
payable); (3) financial accounting (SEC filings, general accounting and property accounting); and
(4) financial controls, policies and procedures. The Company is seeking to hire highly qualified
and experienced personnel for these new positions. Significantly, the new Subcontroller for
Financial Controls, Policies and Procedures will be responsible for documenting and
communicating to the entire Company controls designed to assure adherence to GAAP, as well as
the prevention of fraud and financial wrongdoing. That subcontroller will report directly to the
CFO with dotted line authority to the Controller and will be expected to work closely with the
Internal Audit Department, which will be responsible for testing the Company’s financial
information and performance. Beneath this platform of the four subcontrollers will be 19 new
positions, organized temporarily to support the Accounting Department, to provide audit assistance
to KPMG and prepare the necessary financial schedules that will permit the Company to proceed
with an independent audit in a timely fashion.
b. Restatements Group
The Company also is creating a Restatements Group, which the Company intends to be
staffed with highly experienced accounting and financial professionals, including at least one
senior executive from an outside restructuring firm. Six professionals will be hired to assist this
effort over a six-to-nine month period and to identify and correct the Company’s accounting
c. New CFO Positions
The Company will create two new CFO positions for its Asia-Pacific business and its
European business. Each CFO will have dotted line authority to the CFO of WorldCom.
d. An Increase of Internal Audit Staffing
The Company intends to at least double the staff of the Internal Audit Department.
G. WorldCom’s Current Business.
Notwithstanding its bankruptcy, WorldCom remains one of the largest global
communications companies in the world. Through the work of over 60,000 employees, WorldCom
delivers communications services to more than 20 million residential and business customers in
over 65 countries throughout North America, Latin America, Europe, Africa, and the Asia-Pacific
region. It provides comprehensive global-to-local communications services via its end-to-end
owned facilities, reportedly carrying more international voice traffic than any other company. It is
the largest competitive local exchange carrier in the United States. It operates an Internet protocol
network that provides connectivity in more than 2,600 cities in over 100 countries, and reportedly
65 to 70 percent of the world’s Internet traffic runs across its network.
WorldCom owns extensive telecommunications assets and offers a wide array of services.
According to its most recently filed Annual Report, it owns domestic long distance, international
and multi-city local service fiber optics networks. It also has secured additional fiber optic
networks through lease agreements with other carriers. Internationally, WorldCom owns and
leases fiber optic capacity on most major international undersea cable systems in the Atlantic and
Pacific oceans and owns fiber optic capacity for services to Eastern Europe, Asia, Central America,
South America and the Caribbean. WorldCom also owns and operates international gateway
satellite earth station antennas, which enable WorldCom to extend public switch and private line
voice and data communications to and from locations throughout the world.
Among the principal services WorldCom provides are data transmissions (through frame
relay, asynchronous transfer mode and Internet protocol networks), Internet services (including
Internet access and value-added options, applications and services), virtual private networks,
managed hosting for business on the Internet, and commercial local and long distance voice
communications. Most of these services are offered both in the continental United States and
internationally. WorldCom provides these services through its own operations and those of a host
of direct or indirect subsidiaries, such as Intermedia, Digex, SkyTel, CompuServe, and BFP.
H. The Management Structure at WorldCom
The full breadth of WorldCom’s complicated management structure, which governed its
diverse telecommunications businesses, separate subsidiaries, international operations, and tens of
thousands of employees, is beyond the scope of this First Interim Report. Our review of
documents, and interviews of Company personnel, however, reflect the following about the
Company’s management structure, which is instructive to our investigation.
At least from the merger of WorldCom with MCI to the present, the Company organized its
businesses in three geographically-based units – United States operations, European operations and
Asia-Pacific operations – with each ultimately reporting to top-tier management in the United
States. While some of the Company’s businesses have been associated with particular subsidiaries,
such as UUNET and BFP, management reporting lines followed business and operational functions
regardless of the legal entity that employed particular personnel. Thus, for example, all employees
involved in network operations and technology generally reported through a chain of command
consisting of persons who performed or oversaw those functions, headed by a senior vice president
for network operations and technology located in the United States, irrespective of the fact that they
may technically be employed by different affiliates.
Significantly, the offices of top tier management were geographically dispersed. Thus, for
example, Mr. Ebbers’ principal office as CEO was in Mississippi; Mr. Sullivan, the CFO, ran
financial operations out of Mississippi but also had a residence and office in Florida; Network
Operations and Public Affairs were run out of Dallas, Texas; Human Resources was overseen from
Boca Raton, Florida, and the Legal Department was headquartered in Washington, D.C.
I. The Board of Directors
WorldCom’s Board of Directors has 10 members -- two inside directors and eight
independent directors. Six of the ten directors have served on the Board since at least the merger of
WorldCom and MCI in 1998. Of those six, four were members of the Company’s Board of
Directors before the merger: Carl J. Aycock, Max E. Bobbitt, Francesco Galesi and John W.
Sidgmore.2 Three directors were members of the former MCI Board: Chairman Bert C. Roberts,
Jr., Judith Areen, and Gordon S. Macklin.
As of July 21, 2002, in response to its financial and accounting crises, the Board elected
two new independent directors, Messrs. Katzenbach and Beresford. These new directors have been
appointed to a Special Investigative Committee of the Board, which is conducting a review of the
Company’s accounting practices and preparation of financial statements. On August 29, 2002, the
Board added another new director, Mr. Rogers, who also is serving on the Special Investigative
Our examination to date indicates that, prior to his resignation from the Board of Directors
on April 30, 2002, Mr. Ebbers exercised substantial influence over the Board’s decision-making
process and actions. It appears from interviews of Board members that his sway was attributable to
the Board’s perception of the Company’s success and growth under his direction, the high esteem
in the Wall Street financial community in which he seemingly was held, his apparently innately
2 An Advisory Director, James Tucker, also served as a full director on WorldCom’s Board before the MCI merger.
forceful personality, and the loyalty of Board members whose companies had been acquired by
WorldCom and whose personal fortunes through ownership of the Company’s stock had, for a long
period of time, been greatly enhanced during his leadership of WorldCom. It further appears that
Mr Sullivan also had significant influence over Board actions and that Board members held him in
2. Board Meetings
During the relevant time period, the Company’s Board of Directors held four regularly
scheduled meetings each year, as well as additional special meetings in connection with approving
major transactions. Typically, several days before each meeting, Board members received a
package of materials, including an agenda, the minutes of the prior Board meeting, financial
information, summaries of analysts’ expectations, a list of institutional investors, a transcript of the
most recent conference calls with analysts and company executives, and draft resolutions that
would be discussed and likely voted upon at the meeting. The financial information typically
compared actual performance against the budget, cash flow, capital expenditures, revenue trends,
line costs, selling, general and administrative expenses, and other financial data.
The minutes of Board of Directors meetings reflect that such meetings included, among
other things, a report from the Chairman of the Audit Committee, a report from the Chairman of
the Compensation and Stock Option Committee, a financial report from Mr. Sullivan, a “CEO
Report” from Mr. Ebbers (which could cover a variety of subjects ranging from diversity issues to
business plans), a Legal and Regulatory report from the General Counsel, a Human Resources
report, and reports on international operations, corporate developments, ventures and alliances, and
operations and technology. Transactions requiring Board approval and ratification would be
specifically discussed and voted upon. The minutes of Board meetings reflect that from at least
1999 to May 2, 2002, all matters that required Board approval were approved unanimously. No
dissents on any vote are noted in the minutes.
The minutes of Board meetings and interviews with directors indicate that often, after
adjournment of the formal meeting, the Company’s directors would meet in executive session
(typically non-Board members would be asked to leave the room) to address sensitive subjects,
such as litigation matters, potential acquisitions and business or financial strategies.
3. Director Compensation and Stock Ownership
Proxy statements for annual meetings disclose that, from 1998 to the present, directors were
paid fees of $35,000 per year and $1,000 per meeting, plus certain expenses. Members of
Committees of the Board of Directors were paid a fee of $750 for each committee meeting attended
on the same day as the Board meeting and $1,000 for any other committee meeting attended. The
Chairman of each Committee received an additional $3,000 per year. Under a program
implemented in May 1999, each director was allowed to elect to receive some or all of his or her
annual fees in the form of WorldCom stock (or later, WorldCom Group stock or MCI Group
stock), based on the respective fair market value of the stock on the election date. In addition,
pursuant to the Company’s 1999 Stock Option Plan, each non-employee director was eligible to
receive an annual grant of options. The timing, terms and number of share purchase rights awarded
to directors through options were matters left to the discretion of the Compensation and Stock
During 2001, for example, each non-employee director received a grant of options to
purchase 10,000 shares of WorldCom Group stock at $15.6265 per share. Such options were
immediately exercisable and expired on the earliest to occur of 10 years following the date of grant,
one year following termination of service due to disability or death, upon cessation of service for
reasons other than death or disability, or the date of consummation of a specified change in control
transaction (e.g., the dissolution or liquidation of WorldCom or a merger in which WorldCom was
not the surviving corporation).
Many Board members had large holdings of WorldCom stock. The proxy statement and
supplemental proxy statement for the Company’s 2002 annual shareholder meeting disclosed the
following beneficial ownership of WorldCom Group stock and MCI Group stock by directors and
Number of Shares Beneficially Owned WorldCom
Group Stock MCI
Name of Beneficial Owner3
James C. Allen 412,749 14,767 Judith Areen 113,849 1,386 Carl J. Aycock 276,375 37,719 Ronald R. Beaumont 2,063,798 0 Max E. Bobbitt 433,749 13,429 Bernard J. Ebbers 23,972,088 576,837 Francesco Galesi 1,202,738 49,759 Stiles A. Kellett, Jr. 1,169,881 79,878 Gordon S. Macklin 224,387 2,863 Bert C. Roberts, Jr. 1,705,968 79,169 John W. Sidgmore 5,534,544 91,648 Scott D. Sullivan 3,264,438 223 All Directors and current executive officers as a group (12 persons)
4. Board Committees
The Company’s Board of Directors had three committees: an Audit Committee, a
Compensation and Stock Option Committee (“Compensation Committee”), and a Nominating
Committee. Based on our interviews of individual directors, it appears that the Nominating
Committee met infrequently and that its sole purpose was to determine committee appointments in 3 Footnotes appearing in the proxy statement have been omitted.
consultation with Mr. Ebbers on an as-needed basis. In contrast, it appears that the Audit
Committee and the Compensation Committee were more active and had broader responsibilities.
a. The Audit Committee
The Audit Committee is comprised of Mr. Bobbitt, as Chairman, Ms. Areen, Mr. Galesi and
Mr. Beresford. Mr. Allen had served on the Audit Committee since 1999, but he left the
Committee in July 2002, when Mr. Beresford joined the Board and the Committee. Each of
Mr. Bobbitt Mr Galesi and Ms. Areen has served on the Audit Committee since 1998. The
Committee’s charter provides that it is to perform the following functions: (a) review of periodic
financial statements, (b) communications with independent auditors, (c) review of the Company’s
internal accounting controls, and (d) recommendation to the Board of Directors as to the selection
of independent auditors. Since 1998, the Committee has held three to five meetings a year.
Typically, these meetings occured the day before each quarterly Board meeting. At each quarterly
Board meeting, the Committee’s Chairman reported to the full Board regarding the work and
actions of the Audit Committee.
b. The Compensation and Stock Option Committee
From 1998 to October 2002, the Compensation Committee consisted of Mr. Kellett,4 as
Chairman, and Messrs. Bobbitt, Macklin and Tucker. As noted above, Mr. Tucker has served only
in a role of an advisory director since November 2000. Based on our interviews of directors, it
appears that appointment to the Committee largely was influenced by Mr. Ebbers, in consultation
with the Nominating Committee. Since 1998, the Committee has held between four and sixteen
meetings a year. The Committee’s Chairman reported to the full Board regarding the work and
actions of the Compensation Committee at each quarterly Board meeting.
4 Mr. Kellett resigned his position with the Board on October 27, 2002.
The duties of the Compensation Committee are: (a) to make determinations regarding the
annual salary, bonus and other benefits of executive officers of the Company; (b) to administer the
stock option or awards plans of the Company, including a determination of the individuals to whom
options or awards are granted and the terms and provisions of option awards under such plan; and
(c) to review and take actions, including submission of recommendations to the Board concerning
compensation, stock option plans and other benefits for the Company’s directors, officers and
employees. As part of this mandate, the Committee is responsible for reviewing and reporting to
the Board with respect to all financial arrangements between the Company and members of senior
management or the Board of Directors. At all relevant times, it appears that the Committee had
jurisdiction to review not only salaries and stock option compensation, but also loans, personal use
of Company property, and any other forms of executive officer or director benefits or obligations.
The Committee traditionally began its annual compensation review in November and acted in the
first quarter of each year to set the compensation of executive officers, with salary increases made
retroactive to January 1 of the year.
The proxy statements for recent annual meetings of WorldCom shareholders explained that
the Executive Compensation Policy implemented by the Committee is designed to provide a
competitive compensation program to attract, motivate, reward and retain executives who have the
skills, experience and talents required to promote the Company’s short- and long-term financial
performance and growth. The Executive Compensation Policy was stated to be based on the
principle that the financial rewards to the executive must be aligned with the financial interest of
shareholders. Executive compensation had three elements: base salary, annual incentive
compensation and long-term incentive compensation. With respect to base salary, the Committee
was to determine the salary ranges for each of the executive officer positions, based on the level
and scope of the responsibilities of the office and the pay levels of similarly positioned executive
officers at comparable companies. The Committee was to consider the base salaries it established
for particular offices to be between the median and high-end range of such salaries at comparable
companies in order to attract and retain the best-qualified team available. The proxy statements for
the 2001 and 2002 annual meetings specifically explained that the recommendation of the CEO “is
of paramount importance in setting base salaries of other executive officers.”
Annual incentive compensation was in the form of cash bonus awards. Interviews of
members of the Committee reflect that the key components in determining such awards included
the Company’s financial performance in the context of the overall industry and economic
environment, as well as the judgment of each member of the Committee and Mr. Ebbers, as to the
impact of the individual on the Company’s financial performance. In 1997, the Company adopted
a performance bonus plan, which predicated bonuses on the achievement of one or more
quantitative performance goals.
Long-term incentive compensation took the form of stock options. Statements by members
of the Compensation Committee reflect that the Committee believed stock options were the most
direct way of making executive compensation dependent upon increases in shareholder value.
V. The Finance and Accounting Process
To facilitate an understanding of subsequent sections of this First Interim Report regarding
the reporting by WorldCom of its financial results, we sought to assess how the finance functions at
WorldCom were organized and operated, as well as the relationship of the Company’s finance
function to the role of its independent auditors, Arthur Andersen. We also obtained information
concerning the Company’s accounting systems. In doing so, we hoped to develop an
understanding of how the information that eventually comprised WorldCom’s financial statements
flowed through the organization and was collected, categorized, adjusted and then reported to the
public in SEC filings.
B. The WorldCom Finance Group
The WorldCom Finance Group, based principally in Clinton, Mississippi, was organized
into several primary groups – investor relations, internal audit, the controller’s group, line cost
management, revenue accounting, financial reporting, and treasury operations. Below is an
organization chart depicting WorldCom’s Finance Group, and the principal reporting relationships
within the Finance Group, as of January 2, 2002.
C. Scott HamiltonVice President
Investor RelationsClinton, MS
Cynthia CooperVice PresidentInternal AuditClinton, MS
David F. MyersSr. Vice President
Ronald LomenzoSr. Vice President
Revenue AccountingAlpharetta, GA
Stephanie Q. ScottVice President
Financial ReportingClinton, MS
Susan MayerSr. Vice President
Treasury OperationsWashington, DC
Scott D. SullivanChief Financial Officer
The Investor Relations function at WorldCom, headed by Scott Hamilton, was involved in
a number of activities, principal among them were: (1) preparation of press/earnings releases;
(2) preparation of the quarterly “earnings book,” which includes scripts, questions and answers,
financial highlights and other relevant documents; (3) preparation of presentations for investor
conferences; (4) preparation of presentations for ratings agencies; and (5) assisting the CFO in
producing presentations to the Board of Directors.
The Internal Audit Department at WorldCom, headed by Cynthia Cooper, reported both to
the CFO and to the Audit Committee of the Board of Directors. As described in greater detail
below, the Internal Audit Department was responsible for developing and executing internal audit
plans and reporting to the Audit Committee findings based upon its audit activities and its
recommendations to improve internal controls and enhance operating efficiencies. During the
period under review, the Internal Audit Department focused its efforts substantially on operational
matters, as opposed to financial accounting matters.
During the relevant period, the Controller function, headed by Mr. Myers, consisted of
several groups, including tax, general accounting, accounts receivable, accounts payable, payroll,
property accounting, budgeting, foreign controllers’ groups and management reporting. The
Controller and his support group were responsible for, among other things, consolidating the
worldwide financial results and providing underlying information to the Financial Reporting
Group. Reporting to Mr. Myers were, among others, Messrs. Yates and Normand and Ms. Vinson.
As would be expected, this was the largest internal financial function at WorldCom.
The Line Cost Management function included both domestic and international Line Cost
Management. Line Cost Management was tasked with monitoring and managing expenses at
WorldCom, as well as the Company’s exposure regarding owned and leased voice and data
transmission capabilities. Subsequent sections of this First Interim Report discuss how reserves
and expenses relating to line costs were adjusted and reclassified on the Company’s financial
records in a manner that accounted for a substantial part of the fraudulent misstatement of
WorldCom’s results of operations.
The Revenue Reporting Group prepared a report, referred to herein as the “MonRev,”
which on a monthly and year-to-date basis summarized revenue data received from the Company’s
operating units. The Revenue Reporting Group also dealt with matters affecting the release of
revenue reserves, principally billing and collection reserves and penalty reserves.
The Financial Reporting function, headed by Stephanie Scott, was responsible for the
preparation of the financial portions of SEC filings by WorldCom. During the annual audit and
quarterly review processes, the Financial Reporting group interacted with Arthur Andersen and
coordinated the Company’s responses to requests by Arthur Andersen for documents or
information. The Financial Reporting Group provided the access that Arthur Andersen had to the
Company’s personnel and records.
The Treasury function at WorldCom was responsible for cash management, insurance and
risk management, commercial banking and bond holder relationships, foreign exchange and other
hedging activities, as well as the management and monitoring of the MCI WorldCom Venture
C. Overview of Revenue Budgeting and Planning
1. Annualized Budget Plans
Our review of documents provided by the Company and others, and the interviews of
certain WorldCom personnel, paint the following picture regarding the Company’s revenue
planning. Each year, generally during the third quarter, WorldCom began to develop an annualized
budget plan for the following year. The first phase of the planning process consisted of gathering
historical revenue and cost data by sales channel and product line. The MonRev was the principal
source of the revenue data. A series of cost and capital expenditure schedules were sources for data
on the cost side.
In or about December of each year, the Company targeted a growth rate for the upcoming
year. This target rate would be for total Company revenue growth. In developing the revenue plan,
the total Company target growth rate would be allocated down to the various sales channels and
product lines. The allocations were based on trends and conditions within each sales channel or
product line. They were not straight “across the board” allocations. For example, if the total
revenue growth target for the Company was 10%, one sales channel might show an increase of
14% while another might show an increase of 8%. However, on a composite basis, the annual plan
would reflect the target growth rate for the Company.
The resulting revenue plan numbers would then be used as the basis for the budget amounts
included on the MonRev reports. Preliminary revenue plan amounts were used at the outset of a
year until the plan was finalized, which may not have been until several months into the year to
which it applied.
2. Monthly Revenue Forecasts, Analyses and Outlooks
About once per month, after the MonRev report for the previous month had been finalized,
discussions would be held among senior management concerning the Company’s monthly
performance as compared to its revenue targets. In addition, a presentation was made to the Board
of Directors concerning the Company’s business operations and financial operations. Monthly
revenue and cost forecasts, analyses and outlooks were presented to the Board of Directors,
although we have no evidence to date that the Mon Rev reports were provided to the Board.
The presentations to the Board of Directors included various comparisons of preliminary
actual revenue amounts to budgeted or forecasted amounts, and year-to-year and month-to-month
revenue trends for various sales channels and products. The budgeted or forecasted revenue
amounts in these monthly presentations were based on the expected revenues reported in current
WorldCom press releases.
3. Process to Meet Projected Revenues
By at least the second quarter of 2001, the Company’s business revenues were decreasing,
which jeopardized its ability to meet the quarterly revenue growth targets that had been announced
to Wall Street and the public. Accordingly, the Company undertook an analysis of ways to boost
the Company’s quarterly revenues. Ultimately, it appears that improper additions to revenue were
later booked in connection with this process.
D. The WorldCom Financial Reporting Process
WorldCom, like many large, complex organizations, had sophisticated and detailed
financial reporting processes that enabled it to report on its quarterly and annual operations and
performance. The quarterly closing process began with closings of the general ledgers maintained
by the Company’s various operating units. On average, this process was completed approximately
ten to twelve days after the close of a quarter. Once all transactions pertinent to a business unit
were processed in the general ledger, the affected field locations were blocked from making any
additional entries to the general ledger. Any missed field-related general ledger entries were made
at the corporate accounting level.
During the field closing process, information flowed from the operating units to groups
within the Company’s finance and accounting functions as follows:
i) Preliminary and final cash balances – Corporate Accounting;
ii) Preliminary and final long-term debt balances – Corporate Accounting;
iii) Preliminary and final capital expenditures – Line Cost Management;
iv) Capital expenditures by segment – Line Cost Management;
v) Preliminary and final MonRev report – Revenue Accounting, Corporate Accounting and Financial Reporting; and
vi) Final public reporting revenues - Financial Reporting.
After all of the normal, recurring field and corporate entries were recorded, the Corporate
Accounting Group undertook the consolidation process. During consolidation, entries were made
to eliminate inter-company activity and balances in order to present an overall view of
WorldCom’s assets, liabilities, revenues and expenses.
Following the initial consolidation, the Corporate Accounting Group recorded post-closing
adjustments and reclassifications. As described in greater detail below, it appears that WorldCom
personnel may have exploited the opportunity to make adjustments in these areas for the purpose of
improperly inflating revenues and reducing expenses.
Upon completion of this consolidation and post-closing adjustment/reclassification process,
the Company prepared its consolidated financial statements. The Financial Reporting group took
the lead in this process and worked with the Controller’s group and the CFO, among others. This
process included preparation of the preliminary and final balance sheet, income statement, and
statement of cash flows.
After completion of all financial statements, various management reports and an investor
relations package (final highlights, earnings press release, and earnings call script) were prepared.
The final step in the financial reporting process was the filing of WorldCom’s quarterly Form 10-Q
or annual Form 10-K.
E. The Role of the Independent Auditors
1. Independent Auditor’s Responsibilities vs. Management’s Responsibilities
The objective of an audit of a company’s financial statements by an independent auditor is
the expression of an opinion on the fairness with which the financial statements present, in all
material respects, the financial position, results of operations, and cash flows of the company in
conformity with GAAP. An independent auditor is required under GAAS to state whether, in its
opinion, the financial statements are presented in conformity with GAAP.
Pursuant to Statement on Auditing Standards No.1, an auditor has a responsibility to plan
and perform the audit to obtain reasonable, but not absolute, assurance about whether the financial
statements are free of material misstatement, whether caused by error or fraud. A proper audit
includes examining, on a test basis, evidence supporting the amounts and disclosures in the
financial statements, assessing the accounting principles used and significant estimates made by
management, and evaluating the overall financial statements presentation. An audit is not intended
to provide a guarantee regarding the accuracy of the financial statements. Accordingly, a material
misstatement may remain undetected.
Ultimately, a company’s financial statements are the responsibility of management.
Management is responsible for adopting sound accounting policies and for establishing and
maintaining internal controls that will, among other things, record, process, summarize, and report
transactions consistently and accurately.
2. WorldCom’s Relationship with Arthur Andersen
We are still in the process of reviewing the relationship between Arthur Andersen and the
Company and the access to financial and other information provided to Arthur Andersen. The
Arthur Andersen work papers that support its audit opinions on the financial statements of the
Company for 1999, 2000 and 2001, reflect that Arthur Andersen concluded that WorldCom was a
“maximum risk” client. In planning the 1999 audit of the Company, Arthur Andersen personnel
noted in workpapers that (1) historical purchase accounting adjustments represented a significant
portion of 1999 budgeted income; (2) WorldCom had misapplied GAAP with respect to certain
investments; and (3) due to WorldCom’s use of multiple billing systems that require significant
human intervention, there was a high degree of risk in the Company’s billing and collection areas.
Moreover, a memo in the 1999 Arthur Andersen workpapers states that, “in the past, we
have noted situations where management has taken aggressive accounting positions, particularly in
the area of purchase accounting.” In addition, in its meetings with WorldCom’s Audit Committee
for the 1999 audit, Arthur Andersen expressed that the items in WorldCom’s financial statements
that represented particularly sensitive accounting estimates were: Purchase Accounting, Evaluation
of Asset Impairment, Line Cost Accrual, Tax Accrual; Litigation, and Depreciation Reserves.
Further, it is noteworthy that Arthur Andersen made the following overall risk assessments
of the Company and its management team in connection with the planning of its audits for the
years ended December 31, 1999 through 2001.
Risk Assessment Accounting and financial reporting risk Significant Adequacy of personnel in key management and employee positions Fair Behavior towards the scope of the audit work Fair Allowing unrestricted access to information and personnel Fair Quality of management’s policies to prevent and detect fraud Fair Ability to manage the financial reporting function Fair Overly aggressive revenue or earnings targets Significant Sound accounting and disclosure practices Fair Commitment to establish and maintain a satisfactory internal control system (including timeliness and quality of response to known control problems) Fair Responsiveness to accounting and reporting advice, including audit adjustments and disclosures Fair
These and other facts appear to raise questions regarding the extent to which Arthur
Andersen should have done more to determine whether the risks of abuses were adequately taken
into account by the Company’s internal control systems, most pointedly its internal audit function.
We are still reviewing matters concerning the Company’s relationship with Arthur Andersen and
issues related to its audits of the Company’s financial statements. We anticipate reporting further
on these subjects in a subsequent report.
3. The Company’s Internal Audit Function
Fundamental to an effective internal control system is a monitoring process whereby
failures are discovered, analyzed and corrected, and remedial policies or procedures are
implemented to ensure that failures do not recur. It is axiomatic that, in the finance and accounting
areas, an internal audit group should be an integral part of a Company’s system of internal controls.
At WorldCom, the Internal Audit Department was the designated group primarily
responsible for the most important aspect of the company’s internal control system, namely, the
periodic review through a formal data-gathering process of information relating to aspects of the
Company’s operational and financial controls. The Internal Audit Department reported its findings
and recommendations directly to the Audit Committee of the Board of Directors, which had overall
responsibility for ensuring that the Company’s system of internal controls operated effectively. We
have conducted a preliminary review of the performance of the Internal Audit Department and its
interaction with the Audit Committee. Although we are continuing to examine these areas, our
preliminary review suggests that, in several respects, the internal audit function at WorldCom
failed to satisfy reasonably its important responsibilities.
The exception - and it is an important one - is that the personnel assigned to the Internal
Audit Department apparently attempted to perform their responsibilities in a diligent and
professional manner. However, the information provided to us suggests that their ability to do so
was limited by two significant factors. First, the efficacy of the Internal Audit Department was
limited because its focus was directed to be operational, as opposed to financial matters. Second,
the Internal Audit Department suffered from a seeming lack of adequate support from WorldCom’s
senior management, its Board of Directors and the Audit Committee. Our preliminary
investigation also suggests that the Internal Audit Department may have been limited by the lack of
adequate staffing and insufficient funding. In this context, the investigation of the fraudulent line
cost reclassifications - the event that led to an unraveling of WorldCom - is a testament to the
personal diligence of those internal auditors involved in this audit. We are continuing our
investigation in this area and will have further information in a subsequent report.
a. The Role of the Internal Audit Department
In its Statement of Accounting Standards (“SAS”) 65, the American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants defined a company’s internal controls as:
a process, effected by an entity’s board of directors, management and other personnel, designed to provide reasonable assurance regarding the achievement of objectives in the following categories:
• Effectiveness and efficiency of operations • Reliability of financial reporting [and] • Compliance with applicable laws and regulations.
In other words, a company’s system of internal controls is the way that management
structures and implements its efforts to assure itself that its procedures are being complied with and
that its most important goals and objectives are being reached and its legal obligations fulfilled.
As articulated in 1987 in the widely circulated and praised “Treadway Report,”5 the
responsibility with respect to a company’s financial statements “resides first and foremost at the
corporate level. Top management--starting with the chief executive officer--sets the tone and
5 The Treadway Report was the final product of the three year effort of the National Commission on Fraudulent Accounting Reporting. James C. Treadway, Jr., a former Commissioner of the SEC, was the Chairman. The Commission was jointly sponsored and funded by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), the American Accounting Association (AAA), the Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA) and the National Association of Accountants (NAA). A complete copy of the report is available on the web at www.coso.org (search Treadway Report). Since the Treadway Report’s publication, the sponsoring organizations formed the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations, commonly referred to in the industry as “COSO,” a national entity for the purpose of promoting professional standards consistent with the Report’s conclusions and policy recommendations.
establishes the financial reporting environment.”6 As noted in the Report: “One key practice [to
reduce the incidence of fraudulent financial reporting] is the board of director’s establishment of an
informed, vigilant and effective audit committee to oversee the company’s financial reporting
process. Another is establishing and maintaining an internal audit function.” Id. Thus, the
Treadway Report concluded that an internal audit department functioning under the informed
supervision of the audit committee of the board is critical to an effective internal control system.
Under GAAS, in planning its annual audit, the independent auditor of a public company is
specifically tasked with assessing the effectiveness of the company’s internal controls as they relate
to the accuracy of the company’s financial reporting. The quality of a company’s internal controls
directly affects the “nature, timing and extent of [the auditor’s] substantive tests for [the
company’s] financial statement assertions.” AICPA SAS 65, AU Section 319.05. Material to such
an assessment is the auditor’s evaluation of the effectiveness of the company’s internal audit
function. AU Section 319.24. And the essence of the internal audit function is its “monitor[ing]
the performance of an entity’s controls.” AICPA SAS 65. AU Section 322.04. To the extent that
the independent auditor is satisfied by evidence of the effectiveness of the internal audit unit’s
testing of the company’s control system, the external auditor may scale back the need to (and
expense of) independently testing the factual basis of the reporting company’s financials. Id. at AU
Section 322.15 and Section 322.24-26.
b. Preliminary Observations Regarding the Company’s Internal Audit Department
As noted above, our early assessment of matters related to the Company’s internal audit
function raises significant questions that warrant further review. Fundamentally, it appears that the
Internal Audit Department was excessively focused on operational auditing – i.e., trying to identify 6 Treadway Report, Part II.
inefficiencies – rather than financial auditing. While in certain companies the internal audit
function is focused on operations, an operational focus is inappropriate for a company with weak
internal controls. With respect to WorldCom, absent diligent attention by the Internal Audit
Department to financial control systems, the risk of financial statement fraud was high due to the
complexity and dispersed nature of the Company’s organization and financial operations.
1. The Absence of a Comprehensive Audit Plan
Significantly, there does not appear to have been an adequate internal audit plan prepared at
the beginning of each fiscal year to identify all auditable units within WorldCom. (Internal audit
professionals refer to this as the “Audit Plan Universe”.) The Audit Plan Universe should have
been risk-rated (i.e., high, medium and low) based upon the importance of each auditable unit to
the Company and the risks associated with each unit. This concept of an Audit Plan Universe and
risk assessment is supported by the Institute of Internal Auditors.
Further, there appears to have been a lack of consistency regarding the internal audits that
were scheduled at the beginning of each audit year and the audits that actually were completed
during the year. For reasons we have not yet determined, other audits, not part of the initial
internal audit plan, were added and audits originally scheduled were not completed. The changes
in the plan, and the reasons therefor, apparently were not presented to the Audit Committee for
2. Audit Committee Oversight
An Audit Plan Universe, or the equivalent, should have been presented to the Audit
Committee annually for its review and approval. WorldCom apparently had no such procedure.
Indeed, we have not identified any effective participation by the Audit Committee in setting the
internal audit plan. Under such circumstances, the ability of senior management to influence the
focus of the Internal Audit Department away from sensitive areas may be left without the control
check which the Audit Committee is expected to provide.
Our investigation to date has shown only perfunctory attention by the Audit Committee to
the audits performed by the Internal Audit Department. Moreover, the Audit Committee minutes
and other records did not include reference to the status of significant and unresolved internal
control weaknesses cited in prior audits. We are still seeking to identify whether such weaknesses
were resolved. If the Audit Committee did not maintain such records, it denied itself a ready
means to determine whether the identified weaknesses were subsequently addressed. There is no
evidence that the Audit Committee requested from the Internal Audit Department updates on the
status of internal control weaknesses. The records of the Audit Committee also appear devoid of
timetables for corrective action and resolution.
3. Reports to Company Management
The Internal Audit Department distributed to management a response matrix which
indicated the current status of internal control weaknesses identified in prior audits. However,
despite its receipt of the response matrix, which clearly disclosed to senior management that
internal control weaknesses were not being corrected, management appears to have done little to
support the Internal Audit Department roup by correcting the internal control issues.
Indeed, prior to 2002, there was little evidence of follow-up audits where significant
weaknesses had been identified in earlier audits. For example, the November 7, 2000 Internal
Audit Department Report on the Credit and Accounts Receivable Management System disclosed
material weaknesses that had remained uncorrected since 1997. A similar finding was noted in the
2001 audit. We did not find, however, any evidence that the senior management or the Audit
Committee expressed any concern regarding this situation or the fact that five years had passed
since these significant internal control weaknesses were discovered.
The Internal Audit Department did not consistently include management’s replies with
reports, as is expected by industry standards. In addition, they did not differentiate major
comments from minor comments in their reports. Thus, it was difficult in many cases for the Audit
Committee to determine if management agreed to the findings, or when, and if, management
intended to implement appropriate corrective action.
4. Staffing and Compensation
The Internal Audit Department appears to have been understaffed and underpaid. A
member of the Internal Audit Department suggested that at a staff level of 27, the Internal Audit
Department at WorldCom was half the size of peer telecom internal audit departments according to
an Institute of Internal Auditors’ peer study that was presented to the Audit Committee. We also
were informed that the Company’s average cost per auditor was $87,000 compared to the peer
group average of $161,000, where such average was calculated by the total cost of the internal
audit departments surveyed divided by the number of professional audit personnel in the subject
internal audit departments. An internal audit function operating with such limited resources
appears particularly inappropriate from an internal controls perspective given the international
breadth and scope of WorldCom’s operations and the challenges posed by the Company’s status as
a conglomeration of recently merged or acquired companies.
5. Dealings with Arthur Andersen
We found little evidence of substantive interaction between Arthur Andersen and the
Internal Audit Department. This would violate a core requirement of GAAS if Arthur Andersen
placed any reliance on the internal audit function for monitoring and testing the status of the
Company’s internal controls. See AICPA SAS 65 and 66, and corresponding AU Sections. We
are still investigating to determine whether Arthur Andersen relied on any reports or activities by
the Internal Audit Department. However, they did have access to internal audit reports distributed
at meetings of the Audit Committee. Despite these reports, Arthur Andersen represented to the
Audit Committee and the Board of Directors that there were no material weaknesses regarding the
Company’s system of internal controls.
VI. ACQUISITIONS AND OTHER TRANSACTIONS
The story of WorldCom’s rise and of its fall into bankruptcy can be written in terms of its
transactions. They epitomize the course of WorldCom’s fortunes for the simple reason that, during
its entire history through mid-2002, one of the most distinguishing characteristics of the Company
was that it was constantly and even feverishly in “deal mode.” Although we are still in the process
of reviewing and analyzing relevant transactions, we do have some preliminary views as to the
impact of those transactions on the subject of our investigation.
The term “transactions” as used here is intended to be all-encompassing. It includes
acquisitions, mergers, issuances of equity and debt securities, outsourcing transactions, exchanges
and repurchases of securities and financing instruments of every kind, and transactions involving
employee retirement plans. An obvious reason for this broad definition is the total strain that is
placed on the multiple systems of an organization and its personnel when the sheer volume of
activity involved reached the extraordinary proportions that it did in this case.
From the viewpoint of the Company’s transactions, we are reviewing a number of major
factors to determine the impact that they had on WorldCom’s operations and financial reporting
processes. We are in a position to report preliminarily regarding some of these factors, while other
factors will be addressed in subsequent reports.
A. Volume of Transactions
The volume of the transactions undertaken by WorldCom during its history was enormous,
whether measured by number of transactions, in dollars, or by some index of complexity. Indeed,
at the time they were undertaken, some of the transactions were the largest ever undertaken by any
company in the world. Further, some of the transactions were notably complex and, due in part to
the advanced technology involved, dealt with issues that were at the frontier of legal and
Viewed from the standpoint of transactional volume, this data may be summarized briefly
as follows. Beginning with the 1992 purchase of ATC, WorldCom made at least one significant
acquisition every year. Following the acquisition of ATC, acquisitions of MCC, IDB and WilTel
quickly followed. Enactment of the Telecom Act in 1996, which was aimed at deregulation of the
telecommunications sector, seemed to have spurred WorldCom’s acquisitions activity.
Immediately following passage of the Telecom Act, WorldCom acquired MFS for approximately
$12 billion. The MFS transaction’s purchase price exceeded the total sum of the Company’s four
prior major acquisitions.
While other acquisitions followed the MFS acquisition, they were relatively insignificant
compared to the 1997-98 acquisition of MCI for approximately $40 billion, an acquisition that
thrust WorldCom to the forefront of the telecommunications industry. Following the MCI merger,
WorldCom promptly began preparations for its biggest transaction yet, a proposed merger with
Sprint, which would have exceeded $100 billion. At that time, the Sprint transaction would have
been the largest merger by any company and, had it not been rejected on antitrust grounds, would
have resulted in the creation of the largest telecom carrier in the country. Following termination of
that merger, WorldCom made other acquisitions, but its pace slowed significantly.
While WorldCom’s series of impressive acquisitions is notable, the Company also executed
numerous other types of transactions. WorldCom issued several large debt offerings, registered
equity securities, entered into long-term outsourcing contracts, became a venturer in international
joint ventures and issued its two tracking stocks. WorldCom’s transactions varied by type and size.
However, an analysis of these varied transactions and related circumstances emphasizes a common
theme – WorldCom was continually embarking on its next “deal.” Major transactions closed
within weeks or months of each other. The number, type and size of these transactions contributed
to WorldCom’s problems and may have placed an unhealthy strain on systems and personnel that is
produced when the sheer volume of activity and associated paperwork involved reaches the
proportions that it did in this case.
B. Apparent Absence of Defined Strategic Plan
Although WorldCom’s most senior executives regularly made speeches and other public
comments about corporate strategy, our inquiries to date have not been able to locate any general
strategic plans or identify any planning process of the type we have described. Admittedly, we
have not had access to all members of senior management due to time constraints and the
governmental investigations, but our interviews and document review to date suggest that while
WorldCom once may have attempted to establish the type of planning process described above, it
never did so and never produced the kind of plan described above. Our review to date suggests that
the higher-level planning processes within WorldCom were focused much more on acquisition
planning or technological and operational planning than on more general strategic planning.
The graphs below chart WorldCom’s stock price and revenue growth from 1997 through
June 2002 and reflect the timing of key acquisitions during this five-year period.
WorldCom, Inc. Closing Stock Price and Key Acquisitions
12/96, MFS Comm, $12B
7/01, Intermedia, $5.8B
7/00, Terminated Sprint Merger
10/99, Proposed Sprint Merger Announced, Est $100B
9/98, MCI/Embratel, $40B
1/98, Brooks Fiber, $2.5B
6/99, E.L. Acq, $0.26B
1/98, CompuServe/ANS, $1.8B
9/00 Proposed Intermedia Acq. Announced
WorldCom, Inc. Quarterly Revenue Growth and Key Acquisitions
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
12/96, MFS Comm
7/01, Intermedia, $5.8B
7/00, Terminated Sprint Merger
10/99, Proposed Sprint Merger Announced, Est $100B
9/98, MCI/Embratel, $40B
1/98, Brooks Fiber, $2.5B
6/99, E.L. Acq, $0.26B
1/98, CompuServe/ANS, $1.8B
It appears that any general strategic planning was in fact done principally by Mr. Ebbers,
and to a somewhat lesser extent by Mr. Sullivan, and that this planning activity was largely
informal, lightly documented and to some extent consisted of oral discussions among a small
number of executives. It appears that general strategic planning processes at WorldCom lacked the
kind of rigor, discipline, detail and integration that characterize strong corporate planning
processes. There are some discussions of general corporate strategy in regulatory filings, but this
discussion is very generalized and legalistically formulaic. It appears, therefore, that the higher-
level planning processes that operated on the staff level were tools for the implementation of a
highly personal and informal strategic process that operated principally among a very small number
of senior executives.
The materials that we have reviewed to date suggest that the Board of Directors played a
relatively small role in general strategy formulation, monitoring and revision. That role seems to
have been played mainly by the Company’s most senior officers and the Board’s periodic
discussions with management seem not to have affected the outcome to any material extent. Our
impression, based on the material we have reviewed to date, is that the Board participated more on
an informational basis than as part of a critical review.
From the various sources we have been able to review to date, we have two overall
impressions as to WorldCom’s general corporate planning process:
The first overall impression is one of the highly personal and ad hoc nature of senior
management’s efforts at strategic planning and execution. It does not appear that the process was a
deeply institutionalized, disciplined, rigorous, cross-departmental process. In a very real sense, it
seems that Mr. Ebbers, with the assistance of Mr. Sullivan, was determining the Company’s
strategic direction without reference to any comprehensive or disciplined staff input.
The second overall impression is that a major criterion in WorldCom’s strategy formulation
and in its choice of transactions was to meet analysts’ expectations as to earnings and stock price.
The materials we have reviewed to date give the overall impression that the financing perspective
and the Wall Street focus predominated in the formulation of general corporate strategy and in the
general management of the Company’s operations.
VII. PERSONAL ENRICHMENT AND RELATED CONTROLS
We are investigating the extent to which a culture of greed may be said to have permeated
top management at WorldCom, apparently without any effective check by the Company's Board of
The compensation and benefits received by members of WorldCom's top management were
extremely generous. For reasons that still need to be investigated, the compensation packages of a
significant number of senior WorldCom employees became more lucrative in the final two years
before the Company declared bankruptcy. As our inquiries continue, we will seek to determine
whether these compensation increases were reasonably intended to meet market demand or serve
some other purposes.
Under basic principles of corporate governance, the Company's Compensation Committee
should have been the first line of defense to check the payment of unreasonable or improper
compensation and benefits. The evidence we have reviewed thus far suggests that the
Compensation Committee may not have been effective in performing that role and that the
Compensation Committee generally accepted the recommendations of Mr. Ebbers without making
an independent determination or seeking expert advice that competitive market forces warranted
the compensation and benefits he was recommending.
Perhaps the Compensation Committee would have been more effective in performing its
assigned role had its members been more independent of Mr. Ebbers. At least two of the three full
members of the Compensation Committee were long-standing business associates of Mr. Ebbers.
The Compensation Committee's chairman, Stiles A. Kellett, Jr., was a director of WorldCom from
1991 until October 27, 2002. In June 2001, Mr. Kellett, with the approval of Mr. Ebbers, entered
into an unusual transaction whereby he leased a WorldCom jet aircraft on terms that some people,
including the Corporate Monitor, have questioned. At a minimum, that lease transaction created
the appearance that Mr. Kellett and Mr. Ebbers may have entered into a "sweetheart" deal
involving a significant WorldCom corporate asset at a time when Mr. Kellett and his Compensation
Committee were charged with the responsibility for making important decisions of great personal
financial consequence to Mr. Ebbers.
The Compensation Committee faced one of their most serious challenges in the fall of 2000
when it began to give Mr. Ebbers authorization to borrow millions of dollars from the Company in
order to help Mr. Ebbers meet massive debt obligations against which he had pledged his shares of
Company stock. It would be premature to express a view at this time about the reasonableness of
the Company's loans to Mr. Ebbers, but it appears that the decision-making processes that led to
those loans were inadequate in several respects.
B. The Compensation Packages Awarded to Mr. Ebbers
The Compensation Committee was responsible for setting Mr. Ebbers’ compensation and
the amounts he received - in salary, bonuses, and other benefits - suggest it had a very generous
attitude. During the three-year period from January 1, 1999, through December 31, 2001,
Mr. Ebbers received more than $77 million in total compensation or an average of roughly $25.7
million per year.7 These amounts include $20.5 million (or an average of $6.8 million per year) in
cash compensation in the form of salary and bonuses. When Mr. Ebbers left WorldCom earlier this
year, the Committee negotiated, and the Company approved, a severance package that included a
cash payment of $1.5 million per year for life, lifetime medical and life insurance, lifetime use of a
corporate jet and conversion of approximately $408 million in demand notes into 5-year non-
callable term notes with a significant annual interest rate subsidy.
We will discuss Mr. Ebbers' loan transactions in more detail below, but even apart from
those transactions, the compensation and benefits he received seem overly generous in light of the
Company's deteriorating financial situation during the last three years of his stewardship. While
Mr. Ebbers received more than $77 million in cash and benefits from the Company, shareholders
lost in excess of $140 billion in value. We are not aware of any analysis by the Compensation
Committee that would justify such high compensation levels.
C. A Compensation System That May Have Been Vulnerable to Abuse by Mr. Ebbers and Others
We have not yet gained access to enough information to reach a complete understanding of
how compensation generally was set at WorldCom. However, our initial inquiries suggest that
Mr. Ebbers and certain other senior officers had a surprising degree of influence over the
compensation of many management employees who did not report directly to them, and that the 7 According to WorldCom’s Form 10-Ks for 1999, 2000 and 2001, Mr. Ebbers’ total compensation during those years was as follows: (1) In 1999 Mr. Ebbers received compensation worth more than $36 million, including a salary of $935,000, a "performance" bonus of $7.5 million, approximately $60,000 in other compensation and benefits, and 1,857,420 stock options worth $27,694,123 on December 31, 1999; (2) In 2000 Mr. Ebbers received compensation worth more than $31.8 million, including a salary of $1 million, a "retention" bonus of $10 million, approximately $50,000 in other compensation and 1,238,280 stock options worth $20,790,721 on December 31, 2000; and (3) In 2001 Mr. Ebbers received compensation worth more than $9.1 million, including a salary of $1 million, approximately $48,000 in other compensation and 1,238,280 stock options worth $8,085,968 on December 31, 2001.
Company's Compensation Committee does not appear to have properly fulfilled its role in
reviewing the compensation recommendations of Mr. Ebbers and those senior officers.
1. The Role Played by Mr. Ebbers in Many Compensation Decisions
Although WorldCom’s disclosure documents state that the Company's Compensation
Committee determined the salary ranges for WorldCom's executive officers, these same documents
also indicate that Mr. Ebbers' recommendations were of “paramount importance in setting base
salaries of other executive officers.” See 2002 Proxy Statement (April 22, 2002). Preliminary
interviews of members of the Compensation Committee and senior executives, and a review of
Compensation Committee documents (including minutes and resolutions in January 1999, January
2000 and January 2001), have confirmed that description of Mr. Ebbers' role. We intend to learn
more about Mr. Ebbers' role in these salary determinations and whether his influence helps explain
why there was such a large range in salaries for employees of the same rank. In 1999, for example,
executive8 base salaries in general ranged from a low of $159,402 to a high of $1,131,923, and
salaries of senior vice presidents in particular ranged from a low of $165,808 to a high of $670,259.
Mr. Ebbers apparently also had significant personal influence over the cash bonuses
awarded to WorldCom's executive officers and other top management employees. These cash
bonuses represented a significant proportion of the compensation packages for many WorldCom
employees. Indeed, according to information provided by WorldCom, as summarized on the
following table, 0employees earning more than $150,000 annually in total compensation during
1999, 2000 and 2001 received more money in performance bonuses than in base salary:
8 For these purposes, we have defined "executive" to include division directors, division CEOs, division CFOs, Treasurers, Chairman, Vice Chairman, Controller and Corporate Counsel.
Base Salaries Performance Bonuses
1999 $151.3 MM $167.3 MM 2000 $170.0 MM $200.2 MM 2001 $166.8 MM $172.8 MM
Performance bonuses represented an even larger portion of the compensation of the
Company's 25 most highly compensated employees. In 1999, these employees received $10.6
million in base salaries and $21.2 million in performance bonuses (including a $7.5 million
performance bonus paid to Mr. Ebbers).
Although WorldCom’s disclosure documents asserted that cash bonuses for top executives
were based on quantitative performance factors, we have reason to believe, based on key
interviews, that Mr. Ebbers and certain senior officers could adjust the performance bonuses
received by individual employees. Information provided by WorldCom shows that the
performance bonuses paid to individuals of the same rank varied tremendously. Some individuals,
even at lower ranks, were paid massive performance bonuses equal to many times their base
salaries, while others received bonuses equal to only a small percentage of their salaries. Among
WorldCom’s vice presidents, for example, performance bonuses in 1999 ranged from a low of
$15,113 to a high of $628,174.9 We intend to inquire whether these bonuses were indeed based on
quantitative performance factors or were used instead for some improper or other purpose.
9 Materials received from the Company reveal a number of interesting anomalies. For example, in 1999 the median performance bonus for WorldCom executives was $120,000, but the average performance bonus was $574,923. In addition, while the highest performance bonus for a senior vice president in 1999 was $125,000, the highest performance bonus among vice presidents (a lower rank) was $628,174. In 2000, one director received a performance bonus of $844,007, while the median bonus for all directors was only $42,616 and the average bonus was $85,271.
2. The May 2000 Retention Bonus Program
As the Company's finances came under more pressure in the first half of 2000 and
WorldCom's stock price deteriorated, the Company recognized that it would continue to face
significant challenges within the telecom market. Consequently, the Company substituted a
generous new program of retention bonuses that had several features that appear unusual.10
In May 2000, the Company authorized retention bonuses to more than 400 executives,
senior vice presidents, vice presidents and directors who agreed to remain with the Company for
approximately two years, i.e., through July 31, 2002. According to members of the Compensation
Committee, these retention bonuses generally were calculated to be equal to approximately three
times an employee’s previous year’s total compensation and were awarded primarily in cash and
stock options that would vest within two years. The total sum of these retention bonuses exceeded
It is not clear why cash compensation of this magnitude was necessary in the spring of 2000
to retain more than 400 senior WorldCom employees. Information provided by the Company
indicates that the retention bonus program included payments of $10 million each to Mr. Ebbers12
and Mr. Sullivan.13 Messrs. Ebbers and Sullivan chose to take their retention bonuses in cash and
we will review the circumstances of these retention bonuses.
10 We understand that in 2002, the Compensation Committee also decided to add a bonus structure based on earnings per share. 11 Of this amount, approximately $238 million was paid in cash and the remainder was stock options. 12 Under the formula for retention bonuses derived by the Company, Mr. Ebbers apparently was eligible to receive a $30 million bonus. However, he reportedly chose to take a $10 million bonus, which was equal to the bonus given to Mr. Sullivan. 13 SEC filings reveal that Mr. Sullivan’s WorldCom holdings at or about the time in question were almost exclusively in the form of unexercised options as opposed to shares held outright. The Examiner is curious why Mr. Sullivan did not exercise his options and received a $10 million cash retention bonus payment as opposed to a combination of cash and stock options.
Given the program’s purpose to retain employees, we are also curious to know why the full
amounts of cash taken under the program were paid to employees in advance, i.e., in mid-2000,
since retention bonuses are typically paid in stages over the retention period or principally at the
end of the period. WorldCom has initiated a number of lawsuits to collect retention bonuses from
employees who did not remain at the Company through July 31, 2002. In any event, employees
who were laid off by WorldCom during 2002 apparently have not been required to repay the
retention bonuses they received in 2000.
3. The Compensation Committee's Role: Theory and Practice
Under WorldCom's corporate structure, the Compensation Committee had final authority
and responsibility for the billions of dollars in salary and bonuses paid to WorldCom's executives
and employees. Our initial view is that the Compensation Committee does not appear to have
exercised its authority effectively.
According to WorldCom’s public disclosures, the Compensation Committee had
responsibility for: (1) making determinations regarding the annual salary, bonuses and other
benefits paid to executive officers, (2) administering WorldCom’s stock option and other equity
plans and (3) reviewing and taking actions, including the submission of recommendations to the
Board of Directors, concerning compensation, stock plans and other benefits for WorldCom’s
directors, officers and employees. See 2002 Proxy Statement (April 22, 2002).
As noted above, from 1998 through the fall of 2002, the Compensation Committee
consisted of Chairman Kellett, Mr. Bobbitt and Gordon Macklin. Lawrence C. Tucker, who was
formerly a full member of the Compensation Committee and of the Board, was made an advisory
member in November 2000.
It appears that the Compensation Committee did not critique or challenge compensation
decisions presented by Mr. Ebbers or other members of the Company's management. The
Compensation Committee's minutes are surprisingly brief, given the importance of its role. In any
event, they do not suggest that the Compensation Committee ever sought the assistance of
independent experts to determine whether the compensation or bonus plans proposed by
Mr. Ebbers were consistent with industry standards or were required to meet competitive demands.
Indeed, we have not found any evidence that the Compensation Committee sought the advice of
independent experts on any issue.
We are also troubled that the Committee's Chairman, Mr. Kellett, engaged in conduct that,
at a minimum, gave the appearance he was indebted to Mr. Ebbers and, therefore, was less likely to
challenge him on matters related to compensation or benefits.
For instance, in early 2001 Mr. Ebbers evidently agreed to give Mr. Kellett a "dry lease" of
a Falcon 2OF-5 corporate jet owned by the Company. Apparently, Mr. Kellett began to use the jet
for his personal use in April 2001, although a lease for the aircraft was not executed until June 15,
2001. Mr. Breeden, the Corporate Monitor, has taken the position that the payments required of
Mr. Kellett under this lease - payments of $1 per month plus operating charges of $400 per flight
hour and certain expenses - were well below the levels that would have been paid in a true arms'
length transaction and that "the lease represented a very significant implicit payment to Kellett by
Ebbers, using the Company's assets." See Letter to WorldCom Board of Directors from Richard C.
Breeden (September 6, 2002) at 4. Mr. Breeden has concluded: "In my judgment, [Mr.] Kellett's
failure to disclose to the board the secret deal from [Mr.] Ebbers, and his failure to recuse himself
from decisions awarding compensation, loans and severance benefits to [Mr.] Ebbers, represent an
egregious breach of his fiduciary duties of care and loyalty to the Company's shareholders." See id.
Mr. Kellett sharply disagreed. We understand that Mr. Kellett and the Company recently reached
an agreement pursuant to which Mr. Kellett will reimburse the Company for costs incurred by
WorldCom with respect to his use of the corporate jet.
Regardless of whether the aircraft lease terms were fair and reasonable from the Company's
perspective, as Mr. Breeden’s letter points out, the lease created the appearance of a "side deal"
between Mr. Ebbers and the chairman of the committee responsible for authorizing millions of
dollars in compensation and benefits to him. These appearance problems were aggravated by the
fact that neither the aircraft lease nor its terms were disclosed in a timely manner to the full Board
of Directors or to investors.
D. The Compensation Committee's Role In Authorizing Over $400 Million in Loans and Guaranty Payments To Mr. Ebbers or His Banks
The Compensation Committee played a critical role in the Company's decision to loan
Mr. Ebbers more than $400 million over a period of approximately 18 months, from September
2000 until April 2002.14
1. Mr. Ebbers' Increasingly Serious Debt Problems
Throughout the 1990s, Mr. Ebbers routinely guaranteed or pledged shares of his WorldCom
stock to secure numerous bank loans made to him or to entities he controlled. Mr. Ebbers appears
to have used the proceeds from those loans to purchase business interests or real estate, apparently
as an alternative to selling his stock to raise funds for those investments. We have not yet
confirmed the precise scope and extent of the indebtedness Mr. Ebbers incurred during the 1990s,
or the extent to which he used his WorldCom stock as collateral to secure this indebtedness. We
14 The issue of the loans to Mr. Ebbers raises additional concerns about the Compensation Committee’s competence and independence. Effective July 30, 2002, Section 402 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 prohibits public companies from making nearly any type of personal loan to their directors and executive officers.
have confirmed, however, that Mr. Ebbers either personally guaranteed or pledged WorldCom
stock as security for in excess of $1 billion in personal and business loans, including personal bank
loans, personal brokerage loans and loans on behalf of Mississippi College, Douglas Lake Land &
Timber Company, Douglas Lake Cattle, BC Yacht Sales, Joshua Timberlands and Master
Under Mr. Ebbers' agreements with his lenders, if the value of his WorldCom stock fell
below certain levels, such that it was insufficient collateral for his loans, Mr. Ebbers was obligated
to make payments to assure that the loan amounts remained sufficiently collateralized. When
WorldCom’s stock price began falling in 2000, from a high of $51.9375 on January 3, 2000 to a
low of $13.875 on December 22, 2000, the value of the collateral for Mr. Ebbers' loans plummeted
and his lenders began to demand repayment of some portions of his debts through margin calls.
Between September 2000 and continuing through April 2002, Mr. Ebbers satisfied many of
those margin calls through a series of loans and a guaranty from WorldCom. The Company's loans
apparently were secured by some of the same stock Mr. Ebbers had used to secure the loans made
to him and the entities he controlled in the 1990s. As the price of WorldCom stock decreased, and
Mr. Ebbers' margin calls increased, so did WorldCom's loans to Mr. Ebbers. The table below
summarizes our current information concerning the disbursements made to Mr. Ebbers during
calendar years 2000, 2001, and 2002 pursuant to his loans from the Company and the Company's
WorldCom Disbursements Calendar Yr. Loans Guaranty Total
2000 $ 76,844,000 $ - $ 76,844,000
2001 18,319,47815 41,608,777 59,928,255 2002 70,211,344 193,620,261 263,831,604
$ 165,374,822 $ 235,229,038 $ 400,603,860
As indicated by the graph that follows, the dollar value of Mr. Ebbers' debt to WorldCom
was closely related to the falling price of his WorldCom shares:
WorldCom, Inc. Ebbers Loan Balance vs Current Stock Price
2. The Compensation Committee's Approval of the WorldCom Loans and Guaranty That Benefited Mr. Ebbers
How the Company came to lend Mr. Ebbers so much money seems to be in dispute.
According to Mr. Kellett, Mr. Ebbers first approached him to ask whether WorldCom would
provide him with a loan to cover his margin debt and Mr. Kellett then presented Mr. Ebbers'
request to the Compensation Committee for its consideration. However, according to the minutes
of the quarterly meeting of WorldCom’s full Board of Directors on November 16, 2000, when the
15 The 2001 loan disbursement figure includes a $5,700,000 loan repayment on June 29, 2001.
loans and guaranty were first disclosed to the Board, Mr. Ebbers stated that the idea for the loans
and the guaranty originated with the Compensation Committee. He also told the Board that he did
not necessarily believe that the loans were in his best interest. Regardless of where the idea for the
Company's loans originated, it appears that a major motivation for those loans was to help
Mr. Ebbers avoid the necessity of selling large blocks of WorldCom stock in order to pay his
outstanding debts. It appears that certain of the Company’s directors believed that large-scale sales
of WorldCom stock by Mr. Ebbers would trigger a further downward slide in the Company's share
Minutes of meetings of the Compensation Committee indicate that it first authorized a loan
of $50 million to Mr. Ebbers on September 6, 2000. On October 27, 2000, the Compensation
Committee authorized an additional $25 million loan to Mr. Ebbers and a $75 million guaranty in
favor of a lender relating to certain of Mr. Ebbers' liabilities to that bank.
A letter agreement, dated November 1, 2000 (the "November 2000 Letter") signed by
Mr. Kellett and Mr. Ebbers memorialized the $50 million and $25 million loans to Mr. Ebbers and
the $75 million guaranty in favor of a lender. The November 2000 Letter confirmed that
Mr. Ebbers would indemnify WorldCom and that he would grant the Company security interests in
all of the shares of WorldCom stock he owned, subordinate to the rights of the lenders. It appears
that WorldCom’s security interest in that stock was not perfected until April 2002. Further, it
appears that on or about November 1, 2000, Mr. Ebbers signed promissory notes to WorldCom for
the first two loans made to him earlier that fall. By November 14, 2000, the Compensation
16 Key witnesses recalled that between September 6, 2000, when the first loan was authorized, and October 27, 2000, when the second loan was authorized, Mr. Ebbers requested that the Compensation Committee authorize an additional loan. Apparently, after this request was denied, Mr. Ebbers entered into a forward sale on September 30, 2000 of 3 million shares of WorldCom stock.
Committee increased the guaranty of Mr. Ebbers' debts to a lender from $75 million to $100
Evidence we have reviewed thus far does not suggest that the full Board knew of, or
approved (at least formally), the Ebbers loans or guaranty before they were made. The minutes for
the two Board meetings between September 6, 2000, when the first loan was made, and
November 14, 2000, when WorldCom publicly disclosed the loans and its guaranty in its third
quarter 2000 Form 10-Q, contain no mention of either the loans or the guaranty. According to
Mr. Kellett, P. Bruce Borghardt, an in-house lawyer at WorldCom who served as counsel to the
Compensation Committee, told the Compensation Committee that Board approval of the loans and
guaranty was not necessary. Mr. Borghardt has stated that he was never asked his opinion
regarding the need for Board approval.
In late 2000, the price of WorldCom stock continued to fall, triggering additional margin
calls. As a result, on December 27, 2000, the Compensation Committee decided to extend an
additional $25 million loan to Mr. Ebbers. Soon thereafter, on January 30, 2001, the Compensation
Committee replaced the existing $100 million guaranty in favor of a lender with a guaranty for
$150 million plus additional payments, including, but not limited to, a letter of credit by a lender
relating to Mr. Ebbers' financial support of Mississippi College, Mr. Ebbers’ alma mater.17 Much
later, on September 10, 2001, Mr. Ebbers signed a promissory note memorializing his agreement to
repay the amounts extended under the guaranty. It appears that, until that date, Mr. Ebbers’
repayment obligations under the guaranty were never memorialized.
17 In the end, WorldCom paid $198.7 million under the guaranty plus a deposit of $36.5 million to collateralize the Mississippi College letter of credit.
On January 25, 2002, the Compensation Committee decided to lend an additional $65
million to Mr. Ebbers.
On April 2, 2002, with the loans and the guaranty payments by WorldCom to Mr. Ebbers
now totaling more than $379 million, Mr. Ebbers and the Company amended and confirmed the
various contractual agreements between them that previously had been memorialized in the
November 2000 Letter. In a letter agreement, dated April 2, 2002 (the "April 2002 Letter"),
Mr. Ebbers again agreed to indemnify WorldCom and also agreed to pledge to the Company all of
the WorldCom shares he currently owned or later acquired pursuant to stock options, other than
those that were the subject of pledges for the benefit of his banks. The Company perfected its
interest in a pledge of 9,287,277 shares of WorldCom Group stock, then worth approximately
$63 million, and a pledge of 575,149 shares of MCI Group stock, then worth approximately
$3 million.18 This appears to be the first time WorldCom perfected its interest in any of
Mr. Ebbers’ assets. Under the April 2002 Letter, the pledge of Mr. Ebbers’ remaining WorldCom
shares was to take effect when the limitations and restrictions under existing lending arrangements
terminated. As of May 20, 2002, Mr. Ebbers’ remaining holdings consisted of an additional
5,091,483 shares of WorldCom Group stock.
In the April 2002 letter, Mr. Ebbers affirmed that his December 31, 2001 financial
statement, which he had previously provided to the Company, was correct,19 and he agreed to
18 As of April 2, 2002, the market value of the perfected shares of Mr. Ebbers' WorldCom Group stock was $62,967,738, based on that day's share price of $6.78, and the market value of the perfected shares of Mr. Ebbers' MCI Group stock was $3,215,083, based on that day's share price of $5.59. 19 It appears that by the time the April 2002 Letter was signed, Mr. Ebbers' financial statement as of December 31, 2001, was, in fact, substantially out of date. That financial statement indicated that the value of Mr. Ebbers' primary asset, his approximately 20 million shares of WorldCom Group stock, was $286.6 million (based upon a share price of $14.08 on December 31, 2001). However, by April 2, 2002, Mr. Ebbers’ holdings of WorldCom stock had decreased to approximately 17 million shares, which was worth only approximately $117.6 million (based upon a share price of $6.78 on April 2, 2002).
provide to the Company, within ten days, information about his interests in Joshua Holdings, BC
Yacht Sales, Savannah Yacht & Ship, BCT Real Estate, Douglas Lake Land & Timber Company
and Douglas Lake Properties.20
Evidence suggests that, on April 18, 2002, Mr. Ebbers for the first time pledged his other
business interests to WorldCom as security for his debts. In that pledge agreement, Mr. Ebbers
granted to WorldCom a security interest21 in all of his holdings in BC Yacht Sales, Douglas Lake
Land & Timber Company, Douglas Lake Properties, and BCT Holdings. He also agreed to grant to
WorldCom a security interest in 35 percent of his 86.25 percent share of Joshua Holdings LLC
until restrictions imposed by another pledge were lifted. The two other minority owners of Joshua
Holdings LLC, James Truett Bourne, Jr. and W. Mark Lewis, also granted WorldCom a perfected
security interest in their shares of that company.
On April 29, 2002, in connection with Mr. Ebbers' resignation, WorldCom consolidated his
various loan and guaranty arrangements into a single promissory note in the principal amount of
approximately $408.2 million, repayable beginning April 2003 over five years at a floating interest
rate, which was 2.32 percent per annum at the time the loans were consolidated. The $408.2
million principal amount includes: (1) approximately $198.7 million the Company had paid to a
lender to satisfy outstanding indebtedness of Mr. Ebbers or certain companies controlled by him
that WorldCom had guaranteed; (2) approximately $36.5 million that WorldCom had deposited to
collateralize a letter of credit used to support Mississippi College; (3) approximately $165.4 million
20 We understand that Mr. Ebbers’ companies were able to secure loans and other financial benefits during the 1990s because of pledges and/or guarantees by Mr. Ebbers. 21 Based upon our review of documents available to date, it is unclear to the Examiner to what extent WorldCom “perfected” these interests.
that WorldCom had loaned to Mr. Ebbers; and (4) approximately $7.6 million in accrued interest
on the foregoing amounts as of April 29, 2002.
3. Matters Relating to the Loans and Guaranty Requiring Further Investigation
The Company's large loans to, and guaranty on behalf of, Mr. Ebbers, and the role of the
Compensation Committee with regard to them, are important subjects. The fact that Mr. Ebbers
leveraged his substantial share holdings in the Company for his own private purposes put the
interests of all of the Company's shareholders at risk, since a forced sale of his WorldCom stock
might have precipitated a rapid downward spiral in the Company's share price. Furthermore, by
using his WorldCom shares to collateralize massive debt obligations, Mr. Ebbers placed himself
under intense pressure to support the Company's share price.
Beyond the questionable behavior of Mr. Ebbers, there are serious questions about the role
of the Compensation Committee and its members in approving the growing debt burden that
Mr. Ebbers transferred from his banks to the Company. The following issues warrant further
investigation and analysis.
a. Due Diligence by the Compensation Committee
On each occasion that a loan was made to Mr. Ebbers, the Compensation Committee's
minutes repeated the statement that such a loan was in the best interests of WorldCom and its
shareholders. The premise for this conclusion was the concern that, if Mr. Ebbers were to sell his
shares to satisfy his margin calls, the price of WorldCom’s stock would fall, as it apparently had
fallen once before when Mr. Ebbers sold some of his shares. Even if that premise were true, it
remains unclear whether the Compensation Committee considered:
(a) Whether Mr. Ebbers had other assets with which to satisfy his margin calls,22 and, if
not, whether he had the financial wherewithal to repay his obligations to WorldCom; and
(b) Whether the Company’s approval of the loans and of the guaranty would breach any
of WorldCom’s own loan covenants. While Mr. Kellett has advised us that Mr. Sullivan has
indicated to him that this was not the case, no documents demonstrating an analysis of this
possibility have yet been located.
We are still in the process of examining these issues.
b. Documentation of the Loans and Guaranty
It appears that loan proceeds were provided to Mr. Ebbers before any loan agreements
between him and the Company were reduced to writing and that some of the loan documentation
may have been backdated. For example, although Mr. Ebbers first received loan payments in early
September 2000, it appears that he did not sign his first promissory note to WorldCom until
November 2000 - even though the promissory note was dated September 8, 2000. In addition, we
are not aware of any pledge of security by Mr. Ebbers to collateralize any of these payments until
November 1, 2000, after WorldCom had already paid out $50 million to him. It also appears that
the Company’s interest in Mr. Ebbers’ WorldCom shares may not have been perfected until April
2002, long after Mr. Ebbers first agreed to pledge those shares. Finally, it appears that payments
were made under the guaranty in favor of a lender before Mr. Ebbers signed a promissory note
agreeing to repay the amounts paid under that guaranty. We intend to inquire further to determine
if loan proceeds were in fact disbursed before appropriate documentation was executed.
c. The Below-Market Interest Rate 22 Mr. Ebbers' financial statement as of December 31, 2001, reflects that Mr. Ebbers' net worth at the end of 2001 was $295 million.
The four loans and the guaranty extended by WorldCom to Mr. Ebbers were payable upon
demand and bore interest at a floating rate equal to the applicable rate under WorldCom’s then-
existing credit facilities. This interest rate was substantially lower than the interest rates
Mr. Ebbers had been charged by commercial banks, resulting in millions of dollars in interest
savings to Mr. Ebbers.23 Mr. Borghardt indicated that several individuals suggested that a below-
market interest rate was justified because Mr. Ebbers was “forced” to pay interest on the amounts
he had borrowed rather than sell his stock for cash. This argument seems suspect given that
Mr. Ebbers or his businesses were already paying interest on the loans collateralized by his
WorldCom stock. We intend to inquire into the basis for this proposition.
d. Use of the Loan Proceeds and Proper Disclosures
According to the documents we have reviewed thus far, the stated purpose of the
Company's loans and guaranty was to help Mr. Ebbers meet his margin calls. However, interviews
with members of the Compensation Committee and others, and a review of WorldCom documents
and Mr. Ebbers’ own records suggest that, during the period when WorldCom was extending
Mr. Ebbers hundreds of millions of dollars in credit, he used more than $27 million for purposes
unrelated to his margin calls, including payments of $1.8 million for the construction of his new
house, $2 million to a family member for personal expenses, approximately $1 million in loans to
23 The interest rate applicable to the $408.2 million consolidated promissory note Mr. Ebbers signed in April 2002 was equal to the “Eurodollar rate applicable to each one-month Interest Period commencing on the date hereof [April 29, 2002] plus the Applicable Margin during the corresponding period applicable to Eurodollar Rate Borrowings by the Lender….” At that time, the applicable interest rate was 2.32 percent. Mr. Ebbers' previous promissory notes, as well as the guaranty, reflected a similar interest rate based on WorldCom’s prior Eurodollar credit facility. Over the course of the time during which WorldCom extended loans and its guaranty on behalf of Mr. Ebbers, Mr. Ebbers’ lenders charged him and his related entities an interest rate that was as much as two percent greater than that charged by WorldCom. While we have not performed a detailed analysis of what interest rates would have been available to a similarly situated borrower, we have confirmed that, as of April 29, 2002, the Prime Rate was 4.75 percent and the interest rate paid on the 5-year Treasury note was 4.56 percent. Thus, WorldCom’s loans and guaranty saved Mr. Ebbers millions of dollars in interest payments.
his family, his friends, and a WorldCom officer, and payments of $22.8 million to his own business
interests. Evidence suggests that Mr. Borghardt learned about at least some of these uses of the
WorldCom loan proceeds from Mr. Ebbers’ personal financial advisor, and that Mr. Borghardt
communicated that information to members of the Board, including Compensation Committee
members, who apparently were surprised.
It is not clear that Mr. Ebbers' use of the Company's loans for purposes other than to reduce
indebtedness was ever properly disclosed. The Company’s amended Form 10-K for FY 2000, filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on April 26, 2001, stated that “Mr. Ebbers has used,
or plans to use, the proceeds of the loans from us to repay certain indebtedness under margin loans
secured by shares of our common stock owned by him and the loans guaranteed by us are also
secured by such stock and the proceeds of such loans were used for private business purposes.”
(Emphasis added.) This language does not make clear whether the reference to loan proceeds
"used for private business purposes" was intended to refer to the Company's loans to Mr. Ebbers or
to the loans from private sources that the Company's loans were intended to retire.
VIII. WorldCom’s Relationships With SSB and Jack Grubman
In the months following WorldCom’s bankruptcy, a great deal of attention has been focused
on the Company’s relationships with Salomon Smith Barney (“SSB”). Public officials and
members of the financial media have strongly suggested that an unhealthy relationship developed
between WorldCom and SSB. They have alleged that SSB used the promise of lucrative IPO
allocations and flattering analyst reports to entice corporate executives, like Mr. Ebbers, to reward
them with highly profitable investment banking assignments.24 In addition, they have suggested
that SSB's chief telecommunications analyst, Jack Grubman, combined forces with corporate
executives, like Mr. Sullivan, to project inflated prospects for WorldCom's fortunes, resulting in
bloated stock valuations.
Although we do not intend to duplicate investigations being undertaken by regulators and
government authorities, we intend to investigate whether Mr. Ebbers and/or other WorldCom
officers and directors exploited their corporate positions for private gain. We will also give
attention to allegations that Mr. Grubman and other analysts may have combined with corporate
insiders to exaggerate WorldCom's current and future financial strength. Although it would be
premature to reach any conclusions on these subjects, the following facts have begun to emerge:
1. In the transactions we have reviewed to date, SSB and its predecessors, Salomon
Brothers and Smith Barney, collectively received more engagements from WorldCom than any
other investment banking firm during the past five years.
2. SSB and its predecessors also allocated millions of dollars of valuable IPOs to a number
of WorldCom directors, including Mr. Ebbers. These directors, in turn, sold their IPO shares for an
aggregate profit of more than $18 million.
24 For example, on September 30, 2002, the New York Attorney General filed a civil suit against several corporate directors and officers, including Mr. Ebbers, to recover profits the defendants realized from the sale of IPOs they purchased from investment banking firms that had been retained by their companies. State of New York v. Philip F. Anschutz, et al., Index No. ________, Supreme Court, N.Y. County. In his complaint, the New York Attorney General alleges that Jack Grubman, the SSB telecommunications analyst who covered WorldCom, issued unduly favorable reports on WorldCom for the express purpose of obtaining the Company’s investment banking business. Relying, in part, on the allegations set forth by the New York Attorney General, H. Carl McCall, the Comptroller of the State of New York, filed a class action suit on or about October 11, 2002 against SSB and other financia l institutions involved in underwriting WorldCom debt issues, as well as against Mr. Grubman, for various alleged violations of securities laws in connection with improper analyst recommendations and IPO allocations. In Re WorldCom Securities Litigation, Master File No. 02 Civ. 3288 (DLC).
3. Until April 2002, Mr. Grubman and SSB repeatedly gave WorldCom's stock its highest
ratings, enthusiastically urging investors to purchase WorldCom shares, even at times when
Mr. Grubman was privately advising WorldCom management on business strategy, acquisitions
and investor relations.
4. Until the third quarter of 2000, WorldCom's reported earnings per share consistently met
or came close to analyst expectations. In subsequent quarters, WorldCom management publicly
attributed its faltering financial performance to a series of allegedly non-recurring causes.
At a minimum, the generous IPO allocations given by SSB to Mr. Ebbers and others created
the appearance that valuable corporate business opportunities were being traded for personal gain.
Mr. Grubman's behavior also created at least an appearance of impropriety. As this investigation
continues, we will try to determine: (1) the full extent to which WorldCom and its key officers did
in fact have an unhealthy relationship with SSB, and (2) whether the Company has grounds to
recover losses incurred by the Company or profits realized by WorldCom executives, SSB, or its
employees as a result of conduct that is determined to be improper.
Given the predominant roles played by SSB and Mr. Grubman in matters related to
WorldCom, this First Interim Report will focus primarily on them. However, we also intend to
review and analyze information about WorldCom's other investment banking relationships and
about other analysts who were covering WorldCom.
B. SSB Was WorldCom's Primary Investment Bank
As described in Chapter VI, WorldCom pursued a fast-paced and aggressive campaign of
acquisitions and stock purchases, which in turn required the Company to issue a great deal of debt
and to extend its credit facilities. Although WorldCom retained several large investment banks to
work on these transactions, the documents that we have reviewed to date indiate that WorldCom
engaged SSB (and Salomon Brothers, Inc. before it) more frequently than any other firm as its lead
We are in the process of gathering information about the fees received by SSB in
connection with its WorldCom engagements, but we note that, in his recently filed Complaint, the
New York Attorney General alleges that between October 1997 and February 2002 SSB earned
more than $107 million from its work for WorldCom on approximately 23 investment banking
C. SSB Allocated Lucrative IPOs to Mr. Ebbers and Other WorldCom Directors
In light of the allegations made by the New York Attorney General, we have examined
evidence that Mr. Ebbers and other WorldCom directors received highly profitable allocations of
IPOs from SSB. This evidence, which consists largely of information provided by SSB to
Congressional investigators, indicates that at various times between April 22, 1996 and March 21,
2002, SSB allocated millions of dollars in IPOs to Mr. Ebbers and certain other officers and
directors who in turn sold them for an aggregate profit in excess of $18 million. The following
chart summarizes the SSB IPOs received by Mr. Ebbers and the profits earned from those IPO
IPO Issue Date Firm Subject IPO Company / Issuer Shares
Total Realized Gain/(Loss)
Value (as of 8/23/02)
6/10/96 Salomon Brothers McLeod Inc. Com. 200,000 $ 2,155,000 9/26/96 Salomon Brothers Tag Heuer Intl Spon ADR 5,000 2,250
6/23/97 Salomon Brothers Qwest Commicns Intl Com 205,000 1,957,475 8/15/97 Salomon Brothers TV Azteca SA Spon ADR 1,000 937 9/16/97 Salomon Brothers Box Hill Sys Com 5,000 23,125
9/26/97 Salomon Brothers Nextlink Communications Inc. 200,000 1,829,869 10/16/97 Salomon Brothers China Telecom Ltd 2,000 (8,000) 10/28/97 Salomon Brothers Metromedia Fiber Net A 10,000 4,558,712
11/21/97 Salomon Brothers Teligent Inc. Com 30,000 76,563 3/23/98 SSB Earthshell Corp. Com. 125,000 (73,945) 4/6/99 SSB Rhythms Netconnections Inc. 10,000 66,900
5/25/99 SSB Juno Online Services Inc. 10,000 (6,662) 6/24/99 SSB Juniper Networks Inc. 5,000 440,125 7/27/99 SSB Focal Communications Corp 5,000 100,700
10/1/99 SSB Williams Communications Group 35,000 (804,405) 10/18/99 SSB Radio Unica Communications Crp 4,000 8,010 10/29/99 SSB Chartered Semiconductor 5,000 291,250
11/9/99 SSB KPNQwest NV CL C 20,000 371,926 11/9/99 SSB United Parcel Services CL B 2,000 17,625 7/26/00 SSB Tycom Ltd 7,500 32,813
8/2/00 SSB Signalsoft Corp 5,000 59,094
Aggregate Gain: $ 11,099,36125
The New York Attorney General has alleged that Mr. Ebbers unjustly enriched himself and
violated New York's Martin Act when he received his lucrative IPO allocations from SSB. In a
complaint he filed on September 30, 2002,26 the New York Attorney General alleged that
Mr. Ebbers participated in a practice called “spinning” whereby SSB allocated to top executives of
corporations from which it sought investment banking business valuable, nearly risk-free shares of
25 We are still in the process of reviewing the facts and circumstances of the IPO allocations to other members of the Board. 26 State of New York v. Philip F. Anschutz, et al.
stock in companies that were about to engage in IPOs.27 According to the Attorney General's
allegations, these IPO shares were distributed to Mr. Ebbers and others in order to influence their
decision to choose SSB as the Company’s investment banking firm.28
The Attorney General's complaint alleges that Mr. Ebbers made a personal profit of more
than $11 million from 21 "hot" IPO allocations he received from SSB between June 10, 1996 and
August 2, 2000.29 The Attorney General also alleges that, in return for these profitable IPO
allocations, Mr. Ebbers used his influence to assure that SSB was awarded much of WorldCom’s
valuable investment banking business.30 According to the Attorney General's complaint, SSB did
not receive its first investment banking assignment from WorldCom until after it began to allocate
valuable IPOs to Mr. Ebbers, and thereafter, between October 1997 and February 2002, WorldCom
employed SSB for 23 investment banking deals that earned SSB investment banking fees in excess
of $107 million.31 The Attorney General seeks restitution from Mr. Ebbers of the profits he
realized from his IPO allocations.
We intend to give close attention to the Attorney General's allegations and to assess whether
Mr. Ebbers and others may have breached fiduciary duties by receiving IPO profits that may have
belonged to the Company. We are also considering "corporate opportunity" and other theories that
might give rise to claims for recoveries on behalf of the WorldCom bankruptcy estate.
We understand that SSB has taken the position that it allocated valuable IPOs to Mr. Ebbers
and other WorldCom directors because of their status as significant private customers of the firm, 27 The Attorney General has alleged that Mr. Ebbers violated New York's Martin Act by failing to disclose: 1) his receipt of IPO shares through the practice of “spinning,” and 2) the nature of WorldCom’s investment banking relationship with SSB. 28 Anschutz at 7. 29 Id. at 23. 30 Id. at 12. 31 Id. at 23.
not because of their ability to direct investment banking business to SSB. We intend to investigate
this subject more thoroughly. But even if SSB's position is correct, these lucrative IPO allocations
created the appearance he was trading corporate business for private gain because Mr. Ebbers
played a primary role in directing investment banking business to SSB.
D. The Enthusiastic Ratings and Reports of SSB Securities Analyst Jack Grubman
As noted previously, the New York Attorney General, among others, has asserted that SSB
secured WorldCom engagements, at least in part, because Mr. Grubman gave WorldCom's stock
unduly favorable ratings.32 An assessment of this allegation requires a basic understanding of the
fundamental role of analysts and their influence over the securities markets.
1. The Role of Securities Analysts
Analysts review and report information provided by regulators, the media and other sources
regarding the companies they follow and their industries. The Supreme Court has recognized that a
securities analyst’s work is “necessary to the preservation of a healthy market.”33 In theory, at
least, analysts promote market efficiency by providing investors with a distillation and
interpretation of all relevant information about the companies they follow, including public filings,
press releases, presentations and conference calls.
Some analysts work for private research services that either provide their reports and
research to widely circulated publications or to a limited group of subscribers. More frequently,
however, analysts are employed by investment firms. Such firms use the research of their analysts 32 The New York Attorney General has alleged that Mr. Ebbers’ choice of SSB as WorldCom’s investment bank helped ensure that the Company received an inflated stock rating by SSB's chief telecommunications analyst, Jack Grubman. The Attorney General has alleged that Mr. Grubman inflated WorldCom’s stock ratings without merit from June 2000 until the company was on the verge of bankruptcy in April 2002, and that these inflated ratings enabled Mr. Ebbers to make at least $23 million by selling his WorldCom shares. State of New York v. Philip F. Anschutz, et al. 33 Dirks v. S.E.C., 463 U.S. 646, 658 (1983).
as a basis for their published lists of recommended securities and research reports and for the
advice they give to their institutional and retail clients.
In recent months there has been a great deal of discussion and debate about the potential
conflicts that arise when securities firms provide analytic, banking and brokerage services. It is
generally accepted that, while investment banking generates substantial profits, research, standing
alone, is at best a loss leader. Some believe that an analyst can only contribute to a firm’s profits if
he or she enhances its investment banking business. Some also believe that analysts may be
encouraged by their transactional colleagues to publish favorable reports to ingratiate their firms
with existing or potential investment banking clients. Indeed, this encouragement may include
financial incentives, if an analyst’s compensation is tied to the brokerage firm’s investment banking
revenues. In the view of some regulators, the objectivity of the analyst's research and conclusions
may be compromised by these incentives.
The use of analyst reports is also complicated by the lack of uniformity among the ratings
systems employed by analysts today. At one firm, “buy” might be the best ranking possible, while
at another firm it may be merely second best. Some firms use a 4 or 5 step scale for their
recommendations. Without a uniform rating system, it is extremely difficult to compare “apples to
Although we do not intend to address general issues relating to the independence of
securities analysts, we do intend to investigate whether an unhealthy relationship developed
between WorldCom and the analysts who covered its stock, particularly Mr. Grubman.
2. WorldCom's General Interactions with Securities Analysts
As a large and rapidly growing public company, WorldCom had frequent interaction with
the many securities analysts who covered its stock. WorldCom executives generally held
teleconferences with securities analysts on a quarterly basis. Each call would normally begin with
prepared statements from Company executives regarding WorldCom's financial position, financial
outlook, and issues of particular importance to the Company. The executives would then answer
analysts' questions regarding their prepared statements and other subjects.
WorldCom's management and directors paid very close attention to the views expressed by
Wall Street's securities analysts and carefully tracked their stated expectations of the Company.
The Company's Investor Relations Department regularly sent memoranda and charts to senior
management describing analysts' expectations regarding the Company's quarterly and annual
financial performance. Even the materials prepared for Board meetings regularly included
transcripts of the most recent teleconference with analysts, a memorandum regarding analysts'
expectations, and a summary of their reactions to WorldCom's quarterly financial announcements.
Clearly, senior management and the Board recognized the significance of maintaining Wall Street’s
3. Mr. Grubman's Extremely Favorable Analyst Reports
Prior to their merger in late 1997, Salomon Brothers and Smith Barney expressed
substantially different views concerning the future performance of and risks associated with
WorldCom stock. In 1997, Smith Barney issued four WorldCom reports by analysts Timothy
Horan and Charles W. Schelke. These reports reflected a relatively restrained assessment of the
In their first report, Messrs. Horan and Schelke rated the stock "neutral" and maintained an
"outperform" rating for the remaining three reports. In 1997 neutral and outperform ratings
represented a mild endorsement at best. Moreover, Messrs. Horan and Schelke consistently
maintained a high risk rating on WorldCom stock.
At the same time, Mr. Grubman, who worked for Salomon, issued a report in which he
rated WorldCom a strong buy and declared that “no telecom company of WorldCom’s market cap
can come close to matching WorldCom’s top-line growth, margin expansion potential or strategic
position, much less having all of these attributes which is why WorldCom remains our favorite
stock.”34 Mr. Grubman’s strong buy rating represented an emphatically higher recommendation
than Smith Barney’s neutral and outperform ratings. Notably, Mr. Grubman said little about the
stock’s risk factors in his report.
In the wake of the Salomon Smith Barney merger, Mr. Grubman emerged as SSB’s chief
telecommunications analyst and the author of all its WorldCom reports from the time of the merger
until March 2002. Consistent with Mr. Grubman’s pre-merger view, each and every SSB report
during this period included a "buy" recommendation (SSB's highest rating) and a "medium"
assessment of risk.35 Mr. Grubman's reports during this period consistently proclaimed ringing
endorsements of WorldCom and its stock.
After the merger of Salomon and Smith Barney, SSB reinitiated coverage of WorldCom on
March 16, 1998, after the completion of the MCI shareholder vote, with a "buy" rating. SSB
disclosed in its report that it was the financial advisor to WorldCom on the MCI transaction. As
the chart below reveals, the first SSB/Grubman report in April 1998 set a target price for
WorldCom stock which represented a 40% increase over the actual price of the stock at the time of
34 See Salomon report, August 1997. 35 SSB’s guide to its investment rankings states that a stock’s rank reflects its expected total return and risk factors over the following 12 to 18 months of the report. The higher the risk, the higher the required return. A buy rating is supposed to be reserved for a total return ranging from 15% or greater for a low-risk stock to 30% or greater for a speculative stock. Estimated returns for other risk categories are to be scaled accordingly. Risk takes into account predictability of earnings and dividends, financial leverage, and stock price volatility.
As WorldCom’s stock price steadily rose in 1998 and 1999, Mr. Grubman gave and
maintained his highest ratings on WorldCom stock and set target prices that were 17% to 60% (and
100% over a 2 year time frame) higher than the current value of the stock. The chart below
summarizes these reports:
SSB REPORTS ON WORLDCOM FROM 4/98-10/99
Date Price of WCOM36 Rating Risk Factor Target Price % Forecasted Increase
04/09/98 $42.75 1-Buy Medium $60.00 40.35%
10/09/98 $45.00 1-Buy Medium $90.00 in 2 yrs. 100% (2 years)
11/16/98 $54.00 1-Buy Medium $80 - $90 57.41%
11/17/98 $55.05 1-Buy Medium
02/23/99 $85.00 1-Buy Medium $100.00 17.6%
05/24/99 $86.75 1-Buy Medium $130.00 49.86%
08/20/99 $75.75 1-Buy Medium
10/08/99 $67.94 1-Buy Medium
Mr. Grubman consistently maintained that WorldCom represented the cheapest S&P large
cap growth stock at the time,37 remained the “must-own” large-cap growth stock in anyone’s
portfolio,38 represented one of the premier large cap growth companies in any industry,39 and
represented the single best idea in telecom.40 Mr. Grubman urged investors to “load up the truck”
with WorldCom stock.41 In fact, he declared that any investor who did not take advantage of
current prices to buy every share of WorldCom should seriously think about another vocation.42
36 “Price of WCOM” stock has not been retroactively adjusted for a 3 for 2 stock split in November 1999. 37 See SSB report 10/9/1998. 38 See SSB report 11/16/1998. 39 See SSB report 2/23/1999. 40 See SSB report 8/20/1999. 41 Id. 42 Id.
Mr. Grubman continued his extremely bullish outlook on WorldCom after a 3-for-2 stock
split distributed on December 31, 1999, and while the Sprint merger was pending.43 He
aggressively reiterated his buy rating and predicted that the Department of Justice would approve
the merger with Sprint in June 2000.44 He also declared that when the Sprint deal closed,
WorldCom stock could easily be trading at prices that were 50-60% higher than existing prices, and
still would appear inexpensive.45 Mr. Grubman attributed WorldCom’s declining stock price
during the early part of the year 2000, to the market’s ignorance in assessing the realities of the
Company’s compelling story and to the fact that the market instead was acting on sentiment.46 Mr.
Grubman stated that “investors who are selling WorldCom in the $40s will be buying WorldCom
in the $60s in six months.”47
From the beginning of 2000 through August 2001, when WorldCom’s stock fell from
$50.06 to $12.44 per share, SSB consistently set target prices that were 90% to 244% higher than
the current stock quote. The following chart summarizes the actual stock prices and Mr.
Grubman’s ratings and target prices from February 2000 until August 2001:
43 SSB disclosed in its 2/15/2000 report that the firm was advising WorldCom on its pending merger with Sprint. 44 See SSB report 2/15/2000. 45 Id. 46 Id. 47 Id.
SSB REPORTS ON WORLDCOM FROM 2/00 UNTIL 8/01
Date Price of WCOM Rating Risk Factor Target Price % Forecasted Increase
02/15/00 $50.06 1-Buy Medium
06/27/00 $37.50 1-Buy Medium $87.00 132.00%
07/12/00 $44.44 1-Buy Medium $87.00 95.77%
07/27/00 $45.25 1-Buy Medium $87.00 92.27%
08/02/00 $38.06 1-Buy Medium $87.00 128.59%
08/11/00 $33.38 1-Buy Medium
09/05/00 $33.75 1-Buy Medium $87.00 157.78%
10/04/00 $29.88 1-Buy Medium $87.00 191.16%
10/26/00 $25.25 1-Buy Medium $87.00 244.55%
11/01/00 $18.94 1-Buy Medium $45.00 137.59%
11/02/00 $18.94 1-Buy Medium $45.00 137.59%
12/05/00 $14.81 1-Buy Medium $45.00 203.85%
01/02/01 $14.06 1-Buy Medium $45.00 220.06%
01/09/01 $18.19 1-Buy Medium
01/26/01 $20.38 1-Buy Medium $45.00 120.80%
02/02/01 $22.19 1-Buy Medium $45.00 102.79%
02/08/01 $20.75 1-Buy Medium $45.00 116.87%
02/15/01 $17.50 1-Buy Medium $45.00 157.14%
02/16/01 $16.19 1-Buy Medium $45.00 177.95%
03/13/01 $15.75 1-Buy Medium $45.00 185.71%
04/26/01 $19.39 1-Buy Medium $45.00 132.08%
06/01/01 $17.84 1-Buy Medium $45.00 152.24%
06/07/01 $18.37 1-Buy Medium $45.00 144.96%
07/03/01 $14.81 1-Buy Medium $45.00 203.85%
07/05/01 $14.47 1-Buy Medium $45.00 210.99%
07/26/01 $13.35 1-Buy Medium $35.00 162.17%
08/30/01 $12.44 1-Buy Medium $35.00 181.35%
In June 2000, Mr. Grubman stated categorically that WorldCom was by far the cheapest
stock in the world of global telecom and that analysts who continued to worry about WorldCom’s
failure to excel in the wireless area would be sorely disappointed that they downgraded the stock.48
As the stock continued to decline, from a high of $49 per share in July to $14 per share in
48 See SSB report 6/27/2000.
December, Mr. Grubman continued to project a tripling of WorldCom’s stock price and labeled the
stock “dirt cheap.”49 In November 2000, Mr. Grubman lowered his price target from $87 to $45 a
share, but held steadfast to his buy-medium risk ratings.
In 2001, WorldCom revised its earnings estimates downward on several occasions. At the
same time, the stock price fell below $20.00 and ultimately to the $12.00 range in September and
October 2001. Yet Mr. Grubman maintained his highest rating on WorldCom and announced that
WorldCom stock continued to be undervalued. He even claimed that if the Company made its
numbers, the stock price could double or triple over the next 12-18 months.50 In his January 9,
2001 report, Mr. Grubman conceded that WorldCom’s line costs would likely be higher, but
depreciation would be lower due to intercompany classifications.51 Mr. Grubman continually
advocated that investors take advantage of misguided analysis by aggressively buying WorldCom’s
shares,52 noting that there were very few sponsors on “the Street” for the stock53
Mr. Grubman lowered his price target to $35 in July 2001, and subsequently lowered it
again in October 2001 to $22 and again in January 2002 to $20. While these downward revisions
appear significant on a relative basis, the revised targets still reflected price targets that were 50%
to 174% more than contemporaneous stock prices. Moreover, Mr. Grubman maintained his buy-
medium risk ratings on the Company.
49 See SSB report 10/26/2000. At this same time, Mr. Grubman lowered his rating of AT& T, WorldCom’s principal competitor. 50 See SSB report 1/2/2001. 51 Assuming that the higher line costs were dollar for dollar offset by lower depreciation costs, EPS would not be affected. However, increased line costs would negatively impact EBITDA, and thus, cash flow from operations. 52 See SSB report 2/15/2001. 53 See SSB report 6/1/2001.
SSB REPORTS ON WORLDCOM FROM 9/01 TO 1/02
Date Price of WCOM Rating Risk Factor Target Price % Forecasted Increase
09/19/01 $12.75 1-Buy Medium $35.00 174.51%
10/25/01 $12.45 1-Buy Medium $22.00 76.71%
01/17/02 $13.15 1-Buy Medium $20.00 52.09%
01/29/02 $12.00 1-Buy Medium $20.00 66.67%
By the first quarter of 2002, even Mr. Grubman acknowledged that widespread rumors were
circulating that: (1) WorldCom was going to be dropped from the S&P 500;54 (2) the Company’s
debt rating was being lowered to junk status;55 (3) the Company’s stock was going to be
downgraded by a competitor;56 (4) UUNET’s business from AOL was going elsewhere;57 (5) the
Company's accounting and balance sheets were under scrutiny;58 and (6) Mr. Ebbers was having
significant financial problems.59 Despite all of these significant concerns, Mr. Grubman
maintained his buy-medium risk ratings on WorldCom's stock and set a stock price target that was
almost 150% of the current price at that time. In fact, Mr. Grubman maintained his buy-medium
risk ratings60 even after the SEC initiated its inquiry into WorldCom’s financial reporting, and did
not change his risk rating to a buy-high risk rating until a week later.61
54 See SSB report 1/29/2002. 55 Id. 56 Id. 57 Id. 58 See SSB report 2/4/2002. 59 Id. 60 See SSB report 3/12/2002. 61 See SSB report 3/18/2002.
SSB REPORTS ON WORLDCOM FROM 2/02 TO 4/02
Date Price of WCOM Rating Risk Factor Target Price % Forecasted Increase
02/04/02 $8.13 1-Buy Medium $20.00 146.00%
02/07/02 $7.52 1-Buy Medium $12.00 59.57%
02/08/02 $7.52 1-Buy Medium $12.00 59.57%
03/12/02 $9.01 1-Buy Medium $12.00 33.19%
03/18/02 $7.06 1-Buy High $12.00 69.97%
04/21/02 $5.98 3-Neutral High $5.00 -16.39%
04/25/02 $3.53 3-Neutral High $5.00 41.64%
As the above table indicates, SSB’s first downgrade of WorldCom stock came in April
2002. In that report, Mr. Grubman set a target price for WorldCom stock that was below
WorldCom’s stock price at the time of the report. Mr. Grubman also lowered his rating from "buy"
to "neutral", and designated WorldCom stock a high risk. In this report, Mr. Grubman admitted
that his previous evaluations of WorldCom were clearly wrong.62 Mr. Grubman stated that he
decided to downgrade the stock even though it “would obviously be easier not to downgrade the
stock, and therefore not to suffer the inevitable and justified slings from various parties."63
In May 2002, Mr. Grubman further downgraded his risk rating to speculative in response to
the deterioration of WorldCom’s debt ratings.64 A final downgrade, to "underperform -
speculative," followed on June 21, 2002,65 a little over a month before WorldCom’s filing for
62 See SSB report 4/21/2002. 63 Id. 64 See SSB report 5/9/2002. 65 See SSB report 6/21/2002.
SSB REPORTS ON WORLDCOM FROM 4/02 TO 8/02
Date Price of WCOM Rating Risk Factor Target Price % Forecasted Increase
04/30/02 $2.48 3-Neutral High $5.00 101.61%
05/09/02 $2.15 3-Neutral Speculative $2.00 -6.98%
05/09/02 $2.01 3-Neutral Speculative $2.00 -0.50%
05/22/02 $1.42 3-Neutral Speculative $2.00 40.85%
06/21/02 $1.22 4-Under perform
Speculative $1.00 -18.03%
By then, WorldCom shareholders had lost more than $180 billion in market capitalization
since 1999. Conversely, from 1998 until 2001, when he consistently encouraged investors to buy
WorldCom's stock, it is alleged that Mr. Grubman reportedly averaged approximately $20 million
per year in compensation. When Mr. Grubman resigned from SSB on August 15, 2002, he stated
in his resignation letter that “the current climate of criticism has made it impossible to perform my
work to the standards I believe the clients of SSB deserve.” SSB reportedly agreed to buy out the
rest of Grubman’s 1998 $32.2 million contract, which included $12 million in stock and options
and forgiveness of a $15 million loan, plus about $4 million in interest. Grubman further
maintained publicly that he and other analysts were simply “wrong” about the future of telecom.
4. Mr. Grubman's Departures From The Role of An Independent Securities Analyst
We intend to investigate whether Mr. Grubman simply “got it wrong” or whether he had
other motivations for enthusiastically recommending WorldCom stock. Although we are not
currently in a position to reach any conclusion on this point, Mr. Grubman's behavior seems to have
departed from the role of an independent securities analyst as described above.
66 NR=Not rated. The August 2, 2002 report was in response to WorldCom’s filing for bankruptcy, after which SSB's coverage of WorldCom was discontinued.
Our review of internal WorldCom and SSB documents has revealed a large number of
meetings, conferences, e-mail messages and other contacts between Mr. Grubman and WorldCom
executives. These include at least four instances in which Mr. Grubman attended WorldCom
Board meetings to discuss major transactions, such as the proposed merger between WorldCom
and MCI in late 1997 and the proposed merger between WorldCom and Sprint in October 1999.
Minutes from these meetings indicate that Mr. Grubman and other SSB representatives were
invited to make extensive presentations to the Board analyzing the financial impacts of these
mergers on WorldCom's operations as well as other transactions involving the merger parties.
These minutes indicate that Mr. Grubman attended the Board's meetings as a "financial
advisor" to the Company and performed roles that seem inconsistent with that of an independent
securities analyst. For example, the minutes of the October 4, 1999 Board meeting, when
WorldCom was considering its merger with Sprint, indicate that Mr. Grubman described the
possible impact of that merger on WorldCom's growth metrics and pro forma earnings.
WorldCom employees also consulted with Mr. Grubman from time to time to obtain
information about the Company's investors, the opinions and actions of other Wall Street analysts
and Mr. Grubman's reactions to negative press reports regarding WorldCom. Moreover, there is
evidence that Mr. Grubman consulted with WorldCom's management in advance of analyst
conference calls to suggest how they should handle certain topics during those calls. Further, we
have seen evidence that Mr. Grubman even suggested a question he might ask during an analyst
conference call that might elicit a favorable response.
There is also some evidence to suggest that Mr. Grubman may have played a role in the
allocation of valuable IPOs to Mr. Ebbers, since he was copied on internal SSB e-mails regarding
those allocations. In March and May 1999, Mr. Grubman received copies of internal SSB e-mails
indicating that Mr. Ebbers was on a list of "private wealth clients" who had requested shares in the
IPOs for Rhythms Net Connections, Inc. and Juno Online Services, Inc., respectively.
As part of our examination, we intend to review the recommendations and behavior of other
securities analysts who covered WorldCom. WorldCom was covered by a broad range of analysts
from every corner of the investment banking community. For the period January 1996 through
July 2002, we have identified 884 reports on WorldCom issued by 61 different investment banking
houses or research firms. As indicated above, it appears that WorldCom closely tracked the reports
of the many analysts who covered it the Company.
E. WorldCom's Record In Meeting Analyst Expectations
Favorable analyst reports and optimistic target prices can lead to higher stock prices, if a
company regularly meets the analysts' stated expectations. For WorldCom, a higher stock price
was extremely important as they often used their stock as currency for acquisitions. For Mr.
Ebbers, maintaining or increasing the Company’s stock price was critical due to the large amounts
of WorldCom stock he had purchased on margin or had pledged as collateral for non-WorldCom
related business ventures. In fact, it was the stock’s decline that exacerbated Mr. Ebbers' distressed
For five consecutive quarters, from the first quarter of 1999 through the first quarter of
2000, WorldCom met analysts' earnings estimates (measured by earnings per share), as the
following table demonstrates.
Qtr Estimated Reported-SEC Estimated Reported-SEC Estimated Reported-SEC Estimated Reported-SECQ1 0.23 0.24 0.43 0.44 0.25 0.20 0.14 0.04 Q2 0.29 0.30 0.46 0.44 0.20 0.03 Q3 0.36 0.37 0.47 0.33 0.16 0.16 Q4 0.41 0.44 0.25 0.25 0.14 0.07 FY 1.31$ 1.35$ 1.62$ 1.43$ 0.72$ 0.48$
Earnings Per Share: Reported SEC vs. Wall Street Expectations1999 2000 2001 2002
Sources/notes: Reported financial performance was taken from SEC 10Q/10K filings. FY totals may not equal quarters as revisions/reallocations were often made for Q1-Q3 at year-end. All EPS numbers reflected fully diluted EPS (GAAP). Subsequent revisions and restatements are not reflected in actual data. Estimated data was taken from “First Call” estimates. First Call, a research organization whose estimates are a culmination of various analysts’ expectations, provided coverage of WorldCom’s stock. FY99 earnings per share have been restated to reflect the November 1999 stock split to allow comparability.
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1
1999 2000 2001 2002
Target EPS Reported - SEC
Viewing this same data in graphical form illustrates how well WorldCom performed at
achieving their estimated earnings until mid-2000. The fact the Company was able to meet or
exceed its estimates lent credibility to the Company’s management, its proposed strategies and
forward looking earnings estimates. As the above graph demonstrates, the Company began to have
difficulty hitting its earning targets starting with the third quarter of 2000. On November 1, 2000, a
few months after the collapse of the Sprint merger, WorldCom held a conference call with analysts
during which management significantly lowered the Company’s earnings estimates for the fourth
quarter of 2000. They attributed their lowered earnings outlook to an increase in WorldCom
investment for growth, lower pricing (both WorldCom and MCI) and a change in their Internet
The significant reduction in earnings estimates for the fourth quarter 2000, coupled with the
Company’s inability to achieve earnings estimates in the third and fourth quarters of 2000
compelled management to explain why. They did so by attributing "missed numbers" to a series of
allegedly non-recurring events. For example, when WorldCom missed its earnings per share target
by $0.16 cents in the third quarter of FY 00, management included in its earnings release the
following description of non-recurring events:
This quarter WorldCom recognized after tax charges of $405 million associated with specific domestic and international wholesale accounts that are no longer deemed collectible due to bankruptcies, litigation, and settlements of contractual disputes that occurred in the third quarter. For comparative purposes, the discussion excludes these charges. In a subsequent conference call with analysts, Mr. Sullivan, in response to a question from
Mr. Grubman, claimed that, when these uncollectable amounts were disregarded, the Company's
earnings per share were $0.47, which was in line with analysts' expectations of $0.49.
Similarly, when the Company's earnings per share in the first quarter of 2001 missed
analysts' expectations by $0.06 per share, WorldCom issued its earnings press release attributing
most of the shortfall to non-recurring expenses associated with work-force reductions and currency
exchange issues. According to the Company, absent these non-recurring charges, the Company
would have missed analysts' expectations by only $0.01 per share. Mr. Grubman congratulated the
Company on its quarterly performance, commenting during the analysts’ conference call “By the
way Bernie, normally these kinds of calls people will congratulate folks on the numbers. I’d like to
say its nice to see someone a) not hiding behind the economy and b) not fantasize [sic] about this
flight to quality stuff.”
The available records suggests that the Company’s explanations for “missed numbers”
would not have had any credibility at all by 2001 if the Company's financial statements had not
been substantially distorted by improper accounting adjustments, relating to the misallocation of
"line costs" from expenses to capital costs and the overstatement of revenues. In June and August
2002, the Company publicly disclosed that its financial statements would be restated, correcting
what was then known about the effects of improper accounting entries. The Company is
continuing its internal financial investigation and may announce further adjustments to previously
released financial results. When the Company’s financial operating results are corrected and
restated on a quarterly basis for the period from 1999 through the first quarter of 2002, and
compared to its previously reported financial results, the disparity between actual performance and
analysts’ expectations becomes dramatic.
The graphs below reflect WorldCom’s publicly reported results (both in terms of earnings
per share (“EPS”) and, “EBITDA”, restated for known adjustments announced by the Company
through August 2002, compared to analyst expectations.67
67 The Company’s publicly announced restatements were on a pre-tax basis. Our EPS analyses incorporates an imputed tax rate of 37.3% to 37.6%, which was derived from the Company’s historical tax rates.
$0.22 $0.30 $0.35 $0.44 $0.31 $0.27 $0.23 $0.20 $0.01
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1
1999 2000 2001 2002
Target EPS Adjusted Reported EPS Accounting Adjustment
Q2 Q3 Q4 Q12000
Q2 Q3 Q4 Q12001
Q2 Q3 Q4 Q12002
Target EBITDA Adjusted Reported EBITDA Improper Acctng Effect
As these graphs demonstrate, the Company’s improper accounting treatment known to date
grossly overstated both EPS and EBITDA. After correction for these improper adjustments,
WorldCom actually missed its earnings targets in eleven out of the thirteen quarters from 1999
through the first quarter of 2002. In fact, upon restatement, WorldCom sustained losses in four out
of the last five quarters ending with the first quarter of 2002. Moreover, as the revenue of
WorldCom’s accounting activities continue, additional restatements to earnings are likely.
IX. ACCOUNTING AND FINANCIAL REPORTING ISSUES
Long before the collapse of Enron Corporation in December 2001 and the recent succession
of highly visible failures of telecommunication companies - many of which were precipitated by
accusations of massive fraudulent misstatements in their financial statements - the SEC had made
its concern for accounting fraud unmistakably known to market participants through a succession
of public pronouncements and enforcement actions focused on accounting abuses designed to
provide investors and Wall Street with the appearance of increased revenues and steady earnings
The accusation that the companies, their officers and in some instances, their external
auditors defrauded the public by intentionally distorting revenues and earnings to enhance the price
of their stock is a common thread in each of the SEC enforcement actions. The fraudulent practices
included: (i) “managing” earnings by manipulating reserve accounts to pump up income in lean
times while storing excess profits during good times in “cookie jars” so that they may be drawn
down on when current performance lagged;68 (ii) capitalizing expenses to remove such expenses
68 See, In re W.R. Grace, File No. 3-9926 (June 30, 1999), In re Thomas J. Scanlon, CPA, File No. 3-9938 (June 30, 1999) and In re Eugene Gaughan, CPA, File No. 3-9927 (June 30, 1999). In re Cendant Corporation, Exchange Act Rel. No. 42933 (June 14, 2000) and SEC v. Cosmo Corigliano, Anne M. Pember, Casper Sabatino, and Kevin Kearney, Lit. Rel. No. 16587 (June 14, 2000; SEC v. Ron Messenger,
from the income statement where they would be charged against current income and instead
repositioning them on the balance sheet as an asset where charges against income would be spread
out over an extended amortization period;69 (iii) engaging in sham sales with related parties
designed for the principal purpose of inflating income to meet market expectations;70 and
(iv) prematurely recognizing revenues and understating expenses.71
It was in this environment that WorldCom’s management prepared, and Arthur Andersen
opined on, the Company’s financial statements in the 1999 to 2001 period. Although we must
qualify our conclusions due to the limitations of time and the complexity of the Company’s
financial operations, we have found that in at least as early as 1999, responding to the pressures on
WorldCom’s earnings, management undertook a succession of measures designed to shore up the
Company’s income statement. These measures deteriorated into a concerted program of
manipulation that gave rise to a smorgasbord of fraudulent journal entries and adjustments — many
of them of the precise kind contemporaneously and publicly prosecuted by the SEC.
In August 2002, WorldCom announced the restatement of approximately $3.3 billion,
which included $2.3 billion of reserve releases principally related to line costs reclassification
adjustments of $718 million, and other adjustments of $265 million that related to periods
beginning in 1999. It appears that once income could no longer be sufficiently enhanced by the
release of reserves, Mr. Sullivan and certain other WorldCom personnel directed a series of James T. Rush, Scott Barton and Gary Hubschman, Lit. Rel. No. 17042 (June 20, 2001); In re Microsoft Corporation, Exchange Act Rel. No. 46017 (June 3, 2002). 69 See e.g., In re Livent, Inc., File No. 3-9806 (January 13, 1999); SEC v. America Online, Inc., Litigation Rel. No. 16552 (May 15, 2000); SEC v. Dean Buntrock, Phillip Rooney, James Koening, Thomas Hau, Herbert Getz and Bruce Tobeckson, Lit. Rel. No. 17435 (March 26, 2002). 70 In re Centennial Technologies, Inc., Exchange Act Rel. No. 43345 (September 26, 2000). 71 See, e.g., In re MicroStrategy, Inc., Exchange Act Rel. No. 43724 (December 14, 2000); In re Boston Scientific Corp., Exchange Act Rel. No. 43183 (August 21, 2000); SEC v. Computone Corp., Thomas J. Anderson, Gregory A. Alba, Donald A. Pierce, Duncan E. Hume, and Brian D. Kretschman, Lit. Rel. 16307 (September 28, 1999).
adjustments to its line costs in successive reporting periods beginning with the first quarter of 2001.
The result was that over $3.8 billion of line costs that would otherwise have been charged against
income were capitalized as assets resulting in an additional $3.8 billion overstatement of
We describe very briefly here how some of this manipulation was accomplished, beginning
with a discussion of the accounting principles applicable to some of the accounts manipulated by
WorldCom. As noted herein, we are not disclosing at this time significant details of the methods
and processes used to manipulate WorldCom’s revenues and income in deference to the ongoing
A. Reserves and their Role in a Company’s Financial Statements
The manipulation of reserve accounts comprises a prominent part of the story of the
irregularities in the WorldCom financials statements. Generally, companies establish reserves to
account for the portions of the realizable value of assets that they are doubtful will be realized.
Companies also record reserves when it is probable that they will incur a liability. Reserves for
assets and liabilities are required to be recorded when the risk to an asset’s realizable value or the
incurrence of a liability is determined to be “probable” and the amount of that risk can be estimated
with reasonable accuracy, as prescribed by Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 5,
Accounting for Contingencies (“SFAS No. 5”). Conversely, it is inappropriate to record reserves
unless a risk is probable and estimable. Although we have not reached any final conclusions,
WorldCom appears to have violated this accounting rule.
Companies generally maintain several types of reserves. Companies record reserves for
probable liabilities, but for which the company has not yet been assessed, such as taxes and
litigation. Companies also maintain reserves that are “contra-asset accounts” or valuation
allowances for assets representing the company’s reduction in the total cost of an asset in order to
arrive at the asset’s net carrying value. The purpose of contra-asset accounts or valuation
allowances is to ensure that assets are recorded at the lower of their cost or their realizable value.
To the extent excess reserves are identified in the company’s assessment of its exposures, they
should be released. It is the inappropriate release of reserves that results in one form of earnings
A company also may establish reserves in connection with the acquisition of another
company, where it has a sound basis for anticipating that the value of some of the assets of the
acquired company has permanently declined. This would be the case, for example, if a company
planned to close a facility owned by the acquired company. An acquisition reserve allows the
Company to record an offsetting accounting entry on its balance sheet in the category of goodwill
instead of making a charge to the income statement.
We will be investigating the appropriateness of the establishment and release of certain
reserves. Some areas that we will review include the following:
1. Revenue reserves
2. Bad debt reserves
3. Tax reserves
5. Purchase acquisition accounting reserves
6. Legal reserves
7. Line Cost Reserves
The chart below summarizes the effect on EBITDA and Minority Interests of the reserves
related restatement entries of $2.3 billion, which were included in the restatement entries
announced in August 2002.
Effect of Reserves Related Restatement Entries on EBITDA and
Minority Interests ($ in Millions)
Period EBITDA Minority Interests as Reported
EBITDA and Minority Interests as Reported After
Reserve Related Restatement Entries
1st Qtr 1999 $2,611 $ 95 $2,516 2nd Qtr 1999 $2,868 $ 5 $2,863
3rd Qtr 1999 $3,278 $ 72 $3,206 4th Qtr 1999 $3,485 $3,485
1st Qtr 2000 $3,571 $519 $3,052 2nd Qtr 2000 $3,573 $661 $2,912 3rd Qtr 2000 $3,089 $518 $2,571
4th Qtr 2000 $2,798 $374 $2,424 1st Qtr 2001 $2,532 $2,532
2nd Qtr 2001 $1,791 $1,791 3rd Qtr 2001 $2,704 $13 $2,691 4th Qtr 2001 $2,367 $65 $2,302
1st Qtr 2002 $2,165 $25 $2,140 TOTAL $36,832 $2,347 $34,485
We will be reviewing these reserves to determine the appropriateness of the accounting
treatment. The release of reserves became one vehicle by which WorldCom’s management
manipulated its publicly reported results of operations. However, the order of magnitude of the
release of reserves was dwarfed by management’s capitalization of line cost expenses. The
capitalization of line cost expenses, among other issues, led to the removal and prosecution of
certain of WorldCom’s financial personnel.
B. Line Cost Capitalization
Our preliminary review has revealed that certain members of WorldCom’s management
grew concerned that customer demand would outpace the Company’s line capacity. We have
identified significant information concerning these matters, but are not providing more details in
deference to the ongoing governmental investigations. To summarize, beginning in the first quarter
of 2001 and ending in the first quarter of 2002, WorldCom’s sizeable line costs were
recharacterized as “Prepaid Capacity” and transferred from the Company’s income statements to its
balance sheets. These recharacterizations resulted in an overstatement of pretax income before
minority interests aggregating more than $3.8 billion as follows:
Effect of Line Cost Capitalization Restatement Entries on Reported Income (in Millions)
Income before Taxes
and Minority Interests, as Reported
Income (Loss) before Taxes and Minority
Interests After Restatement Entries
1st Qtr 2001 $ 988 $ 771 $ 217
2nd Qtr 2001 $ 159 $ 560 ($ 401)
3rd Qtr 2001 $ 845 $ 743 $ 102.3
4th Qtr 2001 $ 401 $ 941 ($ 540)
1st Qtr 2002 $ 240 $ 818 ($ 578)
TOTAL $2,633 $ 3,833 ($1,200)
C. The Preparation of Misleading Reports
Our investigation to date has revealed a number of internal financial reports prepared by
WordCom that were false. These reports were some of the tools employed by WorldCom to
perpetrate and obfuscate a massive accounting fraud. In deference to the governmental
investigations, we will identify and detail the facts and circumstances of these reports at a later
D. Other Accounting Issues Under Investigation
The following additional accounting issues are being reviewed by the Examiner.
1. Intercompany Balances
In a large corporation such as WorldCom, there are many subsidiaries, domestic and
foreign. These subsidiaries engage in transactions with each other and with the corporate parent
company that are known as intercompany transactions. These transactions result in intercompany
balances. These transactions may include, among other things, the following:
• Intercompany revenue and related expenses (e.g., revenue earned by one subsidiary by providing services to another subsidiary)
• Investments in and loans to and from subsidiaries by the corporate parent company. (Results in an investment or receivable/payable on the parent’s books and equity or a payable/receivable on the subsidiary’s books.)
• Management charges from the parent to a subsidiary (results in income and receivable to the parent and expense and liability to the subsidiary).
• Dividends paid by the subsidiary to the parent.
• Disputes between the parties (one entity records the transaction and the other does not).
When the overall entity prepares its consolidated financial statements, the corporate
accounting function makes accounting entries to eliminate the intercompany transactions and
balances between the subsidiaries (with each other and with the parent). The purpose of these
elimination entities is to present consolidated financial statements of the overall entity; in other
words, to show the overall company net of intercompany activity. This elimination or
consolidation process is required under Accounting Research Bulletin No. 51, Consolidated
In theory, all intercompany transactions and balances should be easily identified and
eliminated. However, for various reasons, the transaction or balance recorded on one subsidiary’s
books may not agree with the corresponding or offsetting amount on the other subsidiary’s/parent’s
books. This is known as an “intercompany out-of-balance.”
As noted above, intercompany out-of-balances can be caused by various factors, including,
but not limited to, the following:
• Timing of recording of transactions (for example, parent company ships inventory to subsidiary in December and records the sale and the receivable in December; the subsidiary receives the inventory in January and records the purchase and the payable in January).
• Effects of foreign exchange rate changes; and
Based on our review of Arthur Andersen–U.K.’s management letters, it appears that
WorldCom does not revalue intercompany balances that are denominated in different currencies (as
required by Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 52, Foreign Currency Translation).
The result is that at the dates of financial statements, losses or gains are not being reflected in the
consolidated financial statements. These unrecorded losses or gains and corresponding
intercompany out-of-balances are not currently quantifiable. This foreign intercompany situation
represents one type of intercompany out-of-balance condition. Although our analysis is ongoing,
there are likely other reasons, as noted above, for the WorldCom intercompany out-of-balances.
We have been informed by current management that the out-of-balances date back at least
to 1998 and likely earlier. Our current understanding, is that the unresolved intercompany out-of-
balances aggregate approximately $200 million. This could mean that income was misstated by up
to approximately $200 million. The Company’s current management has represented that they are
considering reserving for the $200 million out-of-balance until the differences can be identified and
2. Goodwill Impairment
Goodwill represents the excess of the purchase price for acquisitions over the fair value of
the net assets acquired. Under Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 121, Accounting
for the Impairment of Long-Lived Assets and for Long-Lived Assets to be Disposed Of (SFAS
121), goodwill is reviewed for impairment whenever events or changes in circumstances indicate
that the carrying amount of goodwill may not be recoverable. Pursuant to SFAS 121, the following
are examples of events or changes in circumstances that indicate that the recoverability of the
carrying amount of an asset should be assessed:
• A significant decrease in the market value of an asset;
• A significant change in the extent or manner in which an asset is used or a significant physical change in an asset;
• A significant adverse change in legal factors or in the business climate that could affect the value of an asset or an adverse action or assessment by a regulator;
• An accumulation of costs significantly in excess of the amount originally expected to acquire or construct an asset; and,
• A current period operating or cash flow loss combined with a history of operating or cash flow losses or a projection or forecast that demonstrates continuing losses associated with an asset used for the purpose of producing revenue.
Under SFAS 121, in performing the review for recoverability, the entity should estimate the
future cash flows expected to result from the use of the asset and its eventual disposition. If the
sum of the expected future cash flows (undiscounted and without interest charges) is less than the
carrying amount of the asset, an impairment loss is recognized.
Under the new goodwill rules, Statement of Financial Standards No. 142, Goodwill and
Other Intangible Assets (SFAS 142), which became effective for WorldCom on January 1, 2002,72
goodwill is no longer amortized. Instead, it is reviewed at least annually for impairment using a
different approach than SFAS 121 employed.
As of December 31, 2001, WorldCom had recorded as an asset an aggregate of $49.8
billion of goodwill on its balance sheet. Goodwill approximated 48 percent of total assets and 86
percent of total shareholders’ investment (equity) as of December 31, 2001. WorldCom, through
December 31, 2001, amortized goodwill over periods ranging from five to forty years, principally
40 years. As of December 31, 2001, goodwill related to the following acquisitions (in billions):
Legacy WorldCom $ 1.9 MCI 28.2 WNS 2.2 Technologies, Telecom, MFSI, MFSCC 8.3 Intermedia, PA 4.7 Other* 4.5 $ 49.8
* Includes more than 12 acquisitions.
Through December 31, 2001, WorldCom did not recognize any impairment losses under
SFAS 121. Based on reported profits, EBITDA, cash flow, etc., it would appear that no write-
down was necessary. However, under the SFAS 142 model, Ernst & Young ( who was originally
engaged in 2002 to perform an impairment valuation) estimated an impairment of $15-$20 billion.
Given the bankruptcy filing in July 2002, WorldCom has announced a potential goodwill write off
of up to approximately $50 billion. The Company has since engaged American Appraisal to
perform an impairment valuation under SFAS 142. The expected completion date of their
72 SFAS 121 as related to goodwill, was effective through December 31, 2001.
valuation report is December, 2002. It should be noted that, conceptually, there could be a large
impairment under SFAS 142 and no impairment under SFAS 121 due to the different
methodologies employed under the different standards.
Consideration needs to be given to potential SFAS 121 impairment in 2001 if the financial
results were accurately reported (i.e., losses rather than profits).
3. Capitalized Labor
Generally, payroll/labor costs are expensed (charged to operations) as incurred, as a
recurring period cost. However, when a company self-constructs a long-lived asset (e.g., a new
plant), capitalization of labor costs is generally appropriate. When internal labor is used to
construct a long-lived asset, that labor, to the extent directly related to the construction, is
considered part of the cost of the asset.
Based on our review of WorldCom documents, including internal audit reports, we have
learned that WorldCom incurred internal labor costs related to installing various lines (phone,
cable, fiber optic, etc.) that have a long useful life. Accordingly, WorldCom capitalized certain
labor costs related to line installation. This accounting treatment is common in the
telecommunications industry and is an appropriate application of relevant accounting principles.
The amount of labor costs capitalized should be determined based on actual hours worked
and based on labor rates in effect for personnel involved in the installation of the lines. The
determination should be supported by appropriate documentation, including labor reports and other
supporting evidence. We are investigating the procedures and support used by WorldCom to
determine the amounts of labor to be capitalized.
4. Accounting for Avantel S.A. and Embratel Participacoes, SA
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 94, Consolidation of All Majority-Owned
Subsidiaries (SFAS 94), requires consolidation in financial statements of all majority-owned
subsidiaries unless control is temporary or does not rest with the majority owner. The usual
condition for a controlling financial interest is ownership of a majority voting interest, and,
therefore, as a general rule ownership by one company, directly or indirectly, of over 50 percent of
the outstanding voting shares of another company is a condition pointing toward consolidation.
Accounting Principles Board Opinion No. 18, The Equity Method of Accounting for Investments
in Common Stock (APB 18) states that the power to control may also exist with a lesser percentage
of ownership, for example, by contract, lease agreement with other stockholders, or by court
decree. Absent these conditions, a 20-50 percent investment is accounted for under the equity
When a subsidiary is consolidated, all of its assets, liabilities, revenues, and expenses are
added to those of the parent and the portion of the subsidiary not owned by the consolidating entity
is reflected as minority interest, a credit on the consolidated balance sheet. Under the equity
method, the assets, liabilities, revenues, and expenses are not added to those of the investor.
Instead, the investor’s share of the investee’s equity and profit/loss is reflected on one line on the
balance sheet and one line on the income statement. According to APB 18, the equity method
tends to be most appropriate if an investment enables the investor to influence the operating or
financial decisions of the investee. APB 18 also indicates that the equity method of accounting for
an investment in common stock should also be followed by an investor whose investment in voting
stock gives it the ability to exercise significant influence over operating and financial policies of an
investee. In addition, APB 18 notes that an investor’s voting stock interest in an investee should be
based in those currently outstanding securities where holders have present voting privileges, and
those which may become available to holders of securities of an investee should be disregarded.
Avantel is a business venture between Banamex , Mexico’s largest financial group, and
WorldCom, in which WorldCom owns a 44.5 percent equity interest. Avantel built Mexico’s first
all-digital fiber long distance network. In 1996, Avantel became the first company to provide
alternative long distance telecommunications services in Mexico in competition with Telefonos de
Mexico (Telmex). Avantel Services Locales, SA (Avantel Local) is another business venture
between Banamex and WorldCom in which WorldCom also owns a 44.5 percent equity interest.
Avantel Local has obtained a license to offer a full range of local telephone services. Telmex, the
former Mexican monopoly telecommunications provider, is the primary competition of both
Avantel and Avantel Local.
Based on the nature of the letter (which purportedly reduces to writing the actions by
WorldCom noted above) and the 44.5 percent voting interest coupled with WorldCom’s day-to-day
involvement in the operations of Avantel, WorldCom determined that consolidation of Avantel was
appropriate as of March 31, 2000. It was Arthur Andersen’s understanding that WorldCom
provided more than 60 percent of the total equity (voting and non-voting) of Avantel and continued
to provide funding for the operations since inception. Based on this understanding, Arthur
Andersen concluded that WorldCom, by managing Avantel’s day-to-day operations was also
73 See Memo to File re Avantel Consolidation by Kenneth U. Avery, dated April 25, 2000.
In 1998, prior to its acquisition by WorldCom, MCI acquired a 51.79 percent voting interest
and a 19.26 percent economic interest in Embratel Participacoes, SA (Embratel), Brazil’s facilities-
based national and international communication provider for approximately R$2.65 billion (US
$2.3 billion). Embratel provides domestic long distance and international long distance and
international telecommunications services in Brazil, as well as over 40 other communications
services, including leased high-speed data Internet, frame relay, satellite, and pocket-switched
The Company has announced that it is restating prior financial statements to deconsolidate
Avantel and to consolidate Embratel. However, we have a number of concerns about the
circumstances surrounding the accounting for these transactions and will investigate further.
Our investigation of matters related to the integrity of the Company's management,
compensation structure, relationship with investment bankers, accounting and financial reporting
systems, and related internal controls is ongoing. This First Interim Report contains only some of
our preliminary observations regarding these matters, and we have not included many of our
detailed observations or factual discoveries with respect to these issues in deference to ongoing
governmental investigations. We will supply further details and conclusions regarding these
matters in subsequent reports to the Court.
Our preliminary observations reflect cause for substantial concern regarding the Company's
past practices, particularly with respect to the reasonableness and integrity of its accounting and
financial reporting functions and related oversight by persons within the Company, the Board of
Directors and the independent auditors of WorldCom. Our investigation strongly suggests that
WorldCom personnel responded to changing business conditions and earnings pressures by taking
extraordinary and illegal steps to mask the discrepancy between the financial reality at the
Company and Wall Street's expectations. It appears clear that some of these steps involved various
manipulations of periodic revenue and income figures. It also appears clear that these efforts
culminated in the brazen and fraudulent capitalization of line costs. We still are investigating to
determine which of the Company's revenue, income or other adjustments were improper, but we
believe our investigation will reveal that there were improper and unsupported adjustments that go
beyond the more than $7 billion in adjustments already restated by the Company.
Respectfully submitted, /s/Dick Thornburgh Dick Thornburgh Examiner KIRKPATRICK & LOCKHART LLP 1800 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W. Second Floor Washington, D.C. 20036 (202) 778-9000 (202) 778-9100 (fax)