UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

Leseman, LLC, Plaintiff, v. Stratasys, Inc., Defendant.

Case No. 14-cv-363 (SRN/SER)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

[FILED UNDER SEAL]

Devan V. Padmanabhan, Sri K. Sankaran, Erin O. Dungan, and Nadeem W. Schwen, Winthrop & Weinstine, P.A., 225 South Sixth Street, Suite 3500, Minneapolis, Minnesota 55402, on behalf of Plaintiff. Kenneth A. Liebman, Timothy E. Grimsrud, Jeya Paul, Lauren M.W. Steinhaeuser, and Linzey A. Erickson, Faegre Baker Daniels LLP, 2200 Wells Fargo Center, 90 South Seventh Street, Minneapolis, Minnesota 55402, on behalf of Defendant. SUSAN RICHARD NELSON, United States District Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

This matter is before the Court on the parties’ requests for claim construction in

their Joint Claim Construction Statement [Doc. No. 57] and supporting briefs (Plaintiff’s

Opening Claim Construction Memorandum [Doc. No. 79], Defendant’s Responsive

Claim Construction Brief [Doc. No. 89], Defendant’s Opening Claim Construction Brief

[Doc. No. 82], and Plaintiff’s Responsive Claim Construction Memorandum [Doc. No.

87]).

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II. BACKGROUND

This patent infringement lawsuit concerns United States Patent No. 7,329,113 (“the

’113 Patent”) for an “Adjustable Extrusion Die.” (Compl. ¶ 7 [Doc. No. 1].) Plaintiff

Leseman alleges that it is the owner by assignment of all rights in the ’113 Patent, (id. ¶ 8),

and that Defendant Stratasys, Inc. (“Stratasys”) has infringed on at least one claim of the

’113 Patent, (id. ¶ 10). Specifically, Leseman accuses Stratasys of using extrusion dies

covered by claim 1 of the ’113 Patent to manufacture extruded filament used in cartridges

for Stratasys 3-D printers. (Id.)

The Abstract of the ’113 Patent reads:

An extrusion die assembly configured to process a flow of extrusion material traveling in a downstream direction includes a first die component, a second die component and a third die component. The first die component includes a first channel that is substantially coaxial to a longitudinal axis. The second die component is received within a downstream side of the first die component and has a position that is adjustable along the longitudinal axis relative to the first die component. The second die component includes a second channel that is substantially coaxial to the longitudinal axis. The third die component is received within a downstream side of the second die component and has a position that is adjustable along the longitudinal axis relative to the second die component. The third die component includes a third channel that is substantially coaxial to the longitudinal axis.

(Id., Ex. A.) Figure 1 shows “a schematic diagram of an extrusion system, in which the

extrusion die of the present invention can be used”:

EXTRUSION MATERIAL

SUBSTRATE

GAS

EXTRUSION DIE

COOLING BATH

SUBSTRATE PULLER

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(Id., Ex. A, at col. 2, ll. 66–67 & Fig. 1.) Figure 2 depicts “a cross-sectional view of an

extrusion die in accordance with embodiments of the invention,” and Figure 3 depicts a

“magnified view[] of assembled and exploded adjustable die components of the extrusion

die of FIG. 2 with a set plate removed”:

(Id., Ex. A at col. 3, ll. 1–5; see Def.’s Resp. Claim Construction Br. [Doc. No. 89] (“Def.’s

Resp.”), at 10 (citing Figures 2 and 3 of the ’113 Patent).)

The parties dispute the meaning of several terms from claim 1 of the ’113 Patent,

which states:

1. An extrusion die assembly configured to process a flow of extrusion material traveling in a downstream direction, the assembly comprising:

a first die component having a first channel substantially coaxial to a longitudinal axis;

a second die component received within a downstream side of the first die component and having a position that is adjustable along the longitudinal axis relative to the first die component, the second die

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component having a second channel that is substantially coaxial to the longitudinal axis; and

a third die component received within a downstream side of the second die component and having a position that is adjustable along the longitudinal axis relative to the second die component, the third die component having a third channel that is substantially coaxial to the longitudinal axis.

(Compl., Ex. A, at col. 8, ll. 4–20.)

III. DISCUSSION

Patent claim construction, i.e., the interpretation of the patent claims that define

the scope of the patent, is a matter of law for the court. Markman v. Westview

Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 970–71 (Fed. Cir. 1995), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996).

Proper claim construction requires an examination of the intrinsic evidence of record,

including the claim language, the specification, and the prosecution history. Vitronics

Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996). The starting point for

claim construction is a review of the words of the claims themselves. Phillips v. AWH

Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc); see also Vitronics, 90 F.3d at

1582 (“First, we look to the words of the claims themselves, both asserted and

unasserted, to define the scope of the patented invention.”). The words of a claim

generally carry “the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the

art in question at the time of the invention.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313.

In addition, “[a] claim construction that gives meaning to all the terms of the claim

is preferred over one that does not do so.” Merck & Co., Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc.,

395 F.3d 1364, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Thus, “the context in which a term is used in the

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asserted claim can be highly instructive,” and “[d]ifferences among claims can also be a

useful guide in understanding the meaning of particular claim terms.” Phillips, 415 F.3d

at 1314. “For example, the presence of a dependent claim that adds a particular

limitation gives rise to a presumption that the limitation in question is not present in the

independent claim.” Id. at 1314–15.

Claims also must be read in view of the specification. Id. at 1315. The

specification is “‘the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.’” Id. (quoting

Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582). The specification may prescribe a special definition given to

a claim term or a disavowal of claim scope by the inventor. Id. at 1316. In such cases,

the inventor’s intention that is expressed in the specification is dispositive. Id. The Court

may not, however, import limitations from the specification into the claims. Id. at 1323.

In addition, the Court should consider the patent’s prosecution history, which provides

evidence of how the USPTO and the inventor understood the patent. Id. at 1317.

Although the Court may, in its discretion, consider extrinsic evidence, id. at 1317–

18, it is improper to do so if intrinsic evidence will resolve any ambiguity in a disputed

term, Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1583. But, the Court may use a dictionary or technical treatise

to “assist in understanding the commonly understood meaning” of a term, so long as any

meaning found in such sources does not contradict the definition that is found in the

patent documents. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1322–23.

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At issue in this case are the following claim terms: “die component,” “channel,”

“received within,” “adjustable,” and “and.” (Joint Claim Construction Statement [Doc.

No. 57] (“Joint Statement”), at 6–8.)1

A. “Die component”

The parties dispute the meaning of the term “die component” as it appears in

claim 1. (Id. at 6.) For its part, Leseman asserts that the Court should construe “die

component” to mean “a part of an extrusion assembly that processes the complete melt

alone or in conjunction with other die components to form the final shape of the extrusion

product.” (Id.) Leseman argues that construction is necessary to aid the jury because the

word “die” is a technical term that needs context, and that its proposed definition tracks the

claim language and aligns with the description of the invention in the specification. (Pl.’s

Opening Claim Construction Mem. [Doc. No. 79] (filed under seal) (“Pl.’s Mem.”), at 9–10,

13.) For example, Leseman points to Figures 1 and 3, and the following language from the

specification, in support of the proposition that the die “is part of an extrusion assembly”

that “processes the complete melt” and “forms the final shape of the extrusion product”:

The system 100 generally includes an extrusion material 102, a substrate 104 that is to be coated with the extrusion material 102, an extrusion die 106, a cooling bath 108, and a substrate puller 110. The extrusion material 102 is typically a polymer (i.e., plastic) that is heated to a molten form. . . . . . . . Both the substrate 104 and the extrusion material 102 travel in a longitudinal direction . . . through the extrusion die 106.

1 The parties also dispute the meaning of the term “substantially coaxial.” (Joint Statement at 8.) However, they agree that the dispute concerns validity arguments and should be addressed at summary judgment. (Id.)

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The extrusion die 106 typically includes a die component having a fixed channel through which the substrate 104 and the extrusion material travel. The channel causes the extrusion material 102 and the substrate 104 to converge such that the extrusion material 102 coats a surface of the substrate 104. An output portion of the channel generally defines a land length that operates to set the final shape of the extrusion material coating on the substrate 104 and complete the coating process.

(Compl., Ex. A, at col. 1, ll. 23–46; see Pl.’s Mem. at 10–12; Pl.’s Responsive Claim

Construction Mem. [Doc. No. 87] (filed under seal) (“Pl.’s Resp.”), at 13–14.) And,

Leseman urges, the fact that the invention of the ’113 Patent has at least three die

components that work together to form the end product, and that dies found in prior art can

be comprised of a single die component, supports the “alone or in conjunction with other die

components” language of Leseman’s proposed definition. (Pl.’s Resp. at 12–13.)

Stratasys, on the other hand, argues that no construction of the term “die component”

is necessary because “it simply means a component of a die,” which will be readily

understood by a jury. (Def.’s Opening Claim Construction Brief [Doc. No. 82] (filed under

seal) (“Def.’s Mem.”), at 31.) According to Stratasys, Leseman’s proposed construction

impermissibly adds several limitations to the claim term and has no relation to the claim

language (which does not refer to a “final extrusion product,” “final shape of the extrusion

product,” or “complete melt”) or the specification language (which does not refer to

“complete melt” or require the die component to “form the shape of the final extrusion

product”). (Id. at 32–33.) Moreover, Stratasys argues, Leseman’s proposed construction

would improperly exclude the specification’s embodiments as depicted in Figures 2 through

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4 because only the third die component in those Figures—and not the first or second—

“forms the final shape of the extrusion product.” (Def.’s Resp. at 20–21.)

The Court agrees with Stratasys that construction of the term “die component” is

unwarranted. First, although Leseman argues that construction is necessary because the

word “die” is a technical term, Leseman’s proposed construction instead pertains to the term

“die component.” Second, as Stratasys points out, Leseman’s proposed construction adds

several limitations to the claim term, many of which have no basis in the claim language.

For example, neither the claim language nor specification language refers to “complete

melt” or requires the die component to “form the shape of the final extrusion product.” The

Court may not import such limitations into the claim language. Third, “[a] claim

construction that excludes the preferred embodiment is rarely, if ever, correct,” SynQor, Inc.

v. Artesyn Techs., Inc., 709 F.3d 1365, 1378–79 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted), and, as Stratasys notes, Leseman’s proposed construction

excludes the embodiments of the invention depicted in Figures 2 through 4 because only the

third die component in those Figures arguably “forms the final shape of the extrusion

product.” In other words, contrary to Leseman’s contentions, its proposed definition neither

tracks the claim language nor aligns with the description of the invention in the specification

and must be rejected. For these reasons, the Court declines to construe the term “die

component.”

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B. “Channel”

The parties also dispute the meaning of the term “channel” as it is used in the

terms “first channel,” “second channel,” and “third channel” in claim 1. (Joint Statement

at 7.) Leseman proposes that the Court construe the term to mean “a passageway defined by

the [first/second/third] die component through which the melt passes.” (Id.) According to

Leseman, this construction is necessary in order to prevent juror confusion and provide

context in light of the technology of the invention, which includes many different

“channels” in various components—an “annular inlet channel” in the die holder, “lumen

channels” in the lumen tube, and a “mandrel channel” in the mandrel. (Pl.’s Mem. at 13–

14.) Leseman argues that the following statement in the specification supports its

construction: “[T]hose skilled in the art understand that various cross-sectional shapes of

the channels of the extrusion die through which the molten extrusion material travels can

also be employed.” (Compl., Ex. A, at col. 7, ll. 58–61; see Pl.’s Mem. at 15–16.)

Stratasys argues that no construction of the claim term is necessary because it agrees

that the accused dies have a channel. (Def.’s Mem. at 33.) Moreover, according to

Stratasys, it is clear that the first, second, and third die components each have a channel and

that the term “channel” simply means “passageway” whether it refers to one of those

channels or, for example, a “mandrel channel.” (Def.’s Resp. at 22.) Stratasys argues that

Leseman’s proposed construction would improperly exclude dies, like the one depicted in

Figure 3, in which the channel is defined by multiple components of the die assembly (i.e.,

the die component, die holder, and mandrel):

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(Id. at 23.)

The Court agrees with Stratasys that no construction of the term “channel” is

necessary. First, the language of claim 1 itself resolves the purported ambiguity among

the different types of channels by claiming an extrusion die assembly comprising a

“[first/second/third] die component having a [first/second/third] channel.” (Compl., Ex.

A, at col. 8, ll. 7–19 (emphasis added).) Accordingly, there is no need to state that the

channels are passageways “defined by the [first/second/third] die component.” Second, as

Stratasys points out, Leseman’s proposed construction could exclude dies in which the

channel is defined by multiple components of the die assembly. Such a construction, which

would exclude the preferred embodiment in Figure 3, is improper. See SynQor, Inc., 709

F.3d at 1378–79. Finally, there is no dispute among the parties that “channel” means

“passageway,” and the Court finds that the terms are equally understandable. Thus, the

Court declines to substitute a synonym for the inventor’s already-understandable claim

language. For these reasons, the Court declines to construe the term “channel.”

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C. The Remaining Terms

Finally, the parties dispute the meaning of the claim terms “received within,”

“adjustable,” and “and,” as they appear in the following clauses of claim 1: “a second die

component received within a downstream side of the first die component and having a

position that is adjustable along the longitudinal axis relative to the first die component”;

and “a third die component received within a downstream side of the second die

component and having a position that is adjustable along the longitudinal axis relative to

the second die component.” (Joint Statement at 7–8 (emphases added).)

1. “Received within”

Stratasys argues that the phrase “received within” as used in the clauses “a second

die component received within a downstream side of the first die component” and “a

third die component received within a downstream side of the second die component,”

should be construed to mean “at least a portion of the second die component is contained

inside at least a downstream portion of the channel of the first die component” and “at least

a portion of the third die component is contained inside at least a downstream portion of the

channel of the second die component,” respectively. (Id. at 7 (emphases added).) Stratasys

asserts that this definition is consistent with the language of the claims because “received

within” indicates a structural relationship in which a portion of one component is contained

inside of some portion of the other component. (Def.’s Mem. at 25.) According to

Stratasys, the only portion of a component that is able to “receive” a portion of another

component “within” it is the channel. (Id.) Stratasys also argues that this definition is

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consistent with the specification because every embodiment of the invention depicted in the

specification shows a portion of the second and third die component contained inside a

portion of the downstream channel of the first and second die components, respectively.

(Id. at 26–28.)

According to Leseman, Stratasys is attempting to narrow the definition of “received

within” to require the die component to be received within the “channel” of the previous die

component solely in an attempt to avoid a finding of infringement because Stratasys’s

accused die components have pins that fit into holes in the downstream side of the previous

die component. (Pl.’s Resp. at 10–11.) However, Leseman argues, the phrase “received

within’ does not need construction because the words “received,” “within,”

“downstream,” and “side” are common words that are readily understandable by a jury.

(Pl.’s Mem. at 18.)

Moreover, Leseman insists that Stratasys’s proposed construction is inconsistent

with the specification and claim language. In particular, Leseman points to language in the

specification stating that “[t]he first die component 201 includes a flange 224 that is

received within the recess 204 of the die holder 206 and is secured by the set plate 208,”

(Compl., Ex. A, at col. 3, ll. 40–42; see Pl.’s Mem. at 19), for the proposition that the first

die component is “received within” the die holder even though it is not within a channel of

the die holder. (Pl.’s Mem. at 19.) Leseman also argues that because the limitation

proposed by Stratasys is found in the “Detailed Description of the Preferred Embodiments”

(describing one embodiment as including a first die component with “threaded” channel

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walls that is configured to receive a second die component with a “threaded” exterior) and

in dependent claim 4 (stating that “the [second/third] die component includes a threaded

exterior surface received within [a] threaded section of the [first/second] annular channel”),

it cannot be read to limit the invention or claim 1. (Compl., Ex. A, at col. 8, ll. 29–34; see

id., Ex. A, at col. 4, ll. 5–20; Pl.’s Mem. at 21–25.)

Based on the ordinary meaning of “received within,” as well as the description of

the invention in the specification, the Court finds that a construction requiring a die

component to be “received within a downstream side of the channel” of the previous die

component improperly narrows the claim. First, although the Court agrees that “received

within” indicates a structural relationship in which a portion of one component goes inside

the other component, it is not clear that the only portion of a die component that could be

able to “receive” a portion of another die component “within” it is the channel. While that

may be the relationship that is depicted in Figures 2 through 4, the Court is reluctant to

narrow the claim to the preferred embodiment without further support for doing so. See

Texas Instruments, Inc. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 805 F.2d 1558, 1563 (Fed. Cir.

1986) (“caution[ing] against limiting the claimed invention to preferred embodiments or

specific examples in the specification”); see also Curtiss-Wright Flow Control Corp. v.

Velan, Inc., 438 F.3d 1374, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“commend[ing] the district court’s

reluctance to narrow the claims to the preferred embodiment,” but finding such

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reluctance “misplaced” where the specification provided “substantial guidance” in

support of narrowing the claim).2

Second, as discussed above, claims must be read in light of the specification,

Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315, and the proposed clarification is inconsistent with the

specification of the ’113 Patent. Notably, the specification language relied upon by

Leseman, and the depictions in Figures 2 through 4, demonstrate that a die component can

be “received within” another part of the die assembly even though it is not received within

the “channel” of that other part.

For these reasons, the Court declines to require that “received within a

downstream side of the [first/second] die component” means “received within a

downstream side of the channel of the [first/second] die component.” The Court also

declines to adopt the remaining portions of Stratasys’s proposed construction. As is

evident from the parties’ arguments, the dispute over the term “received within” is

centered on where the second or third die component must be received within the

previous die component—i.e, whether it must be received within the “channel” of the

previous die component—but there is no disagreement about the meaning of the words

“received within” themselves. Because “received within” is a phrase that will be readily

understood by a jury, the Court will not simply substitute the words “contained inside.”

2 Contrary to Leseman’s contentions, however, the doctrine of claim differentiation would not bar Stratasys’s proposed construction. The limitation added by dependent claim 4 is that the surfaces of the areas used for receiving are “threaded.” Accordingly, the presence of the word “channel” in dependent claim 4 does not give rise to a presumption that claim 1 does not refer to the channel.

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In addition, it is unnecessary to incorporate the words “at least a portion of” to describe

the amount of the second or third die component that must be received within the

previous die component. If one die component is “received within” another die

component, then—by definition—at least a portion of the die component must be

received within the other die component. The Court declines to add words to this

already-understandable language.

Accordingly, the Court declines to adopt Stratasys’s proposed construction of the

phrase “a [second/third] die component received within a downstream side of the

[first/second] die component.” And, because the claim language is readily

understandable by a jury, the Court finds that no construction is necessary.

2. “Adjustable”

Stratasys also argues that the term “adjustable,” as used in the clauses “a second die

component . . . having a position that is adjustable along the longitudinal axis relative to

the first die component” and “a third die component . . . having a position that is

adjustable along the longitudinal axis relative to the second die component,” should be

construed to mean “a second die component has a position that is movable, without removal

of the second die component, along the longitudinal axis relative to the first die

component,” and “a third die component has a position that is movable, without removal of

the third die component, along the longitudinal axis relative to the second die component,”

respectively. (Joint Statement at 8 (emphases added).) In other words, Stratasys advocates

for a definition of “adjustable” that does not include disassembling a die. (Def.’s Mem. at

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17.) Stratasys argues that its proposed construction is warranted by both the claim language

and the specification, as well as the Federal Circuit’s holding in Curtiss-Wright Flow

Control Corp. v. Velan, Inc., 438 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2006). (Id. at 18, 22–23.)

As for the claim language, Stratasys points to claim 1’s requirements that: (1) the

second and third die components are “along the longitudinal axis”; (2) the second and third

die components are part of “[a]n extrusion die assembly” that is “configured to process a

flow of extrusion material”; and (3) the second and third die components are “received

within a downstream side” of the previous die component. (Id. at 18–19.) According to

Stratasys, if a component must be removed in order to adjust its position, then these three

requirements cannot be satisfied. Likewise, Stratasys insists that the following statements in

the specification demonstrate that components must be adjustable without being removable:

(1) the die components are adjustable along a longitudinal axis “in which the material being

extruded travels,” (Compl., Ex. A, at col. 1, ll. 12–13); (2) the velocity of the extrusion

material can be changed by “moving the position of the second die component 202 in the

downstream direction 222 along the longitudinal axis,” (e.g., id., Ex. A, at col. 7, ll. 11–13);

and (3) “[t]he ability to adjust the relative positions of the die components . . . along the

longitudinal axis 214 allows the extrusion die to make changes to the flow of the extrusion

material without having to re-tool the die, [or] replace the die,” (e.g., id., col. 6, ll. 49–53).

(Def.’s Mem. at 20–22.)

Leseman, on the other hand, asserts that the claim term “adjustable” does not need

construction and should be given its plain and ordinary meaning. (Joint Statement at 8.)

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According to Leseman, the words in the clause at issue—i.e., “position,” “adjustable,”

“along,” “longitudinal,” “axis,” and “relative”—all are common terms that will be readily

understandable to a jury, and any further construction would cause confusion. (Pl.’s

Mem. at 26.) Moreover, Leseman argues, Stratasys’s proposed definition violates the

doctrine of claim differentiation by importing limitations from dependent claim 4 into

independent claim 1. (Id. at 27–28.) In particular, Leseman asserts that claim 4 describes

an embodiment that would permit adjustment without removal because it includes a

limitation in which die components are “threaded” together, and so “adjustment without

removal” cannot be read into claim 1. (See id.)

In addition to its arguments based on claim differentiation, Leseman contends that

Stratasys’s proposed definition impermissibly imports limitations from, and is

inconsistent with, the specification. (See id. at 28–29.) For example, Leseman argues

that the discussion of a “threading engagement” between die components is merely one

embodiment of the invention and cannot be read to limit the claims. (Id. at 29.) And,

Leseman asserts, the discussion of the benefits of adjustability (e.g., avoiding having to

re-tool the die) “does not suggest that removing a die component would constitute . . . a

complication.” (Id. at 29–30.) Finally, Leseman argues that the problems the invention

serves to avoid are problems caused by a “fixed” die channel and that die components

that are adjustable by removal can be used to avoid a fixed die channel. (Id. at 30–31.)

The Court finds that there is a clear dispute in this case about the scope of the term

“adjustable.” Because resolution of this dispute will affect the outcome of the case and

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would be helpful to a jury, construction is necessary. See Every Penny Counts, Inc. v. Am.

Express Co., 563 F.3d 1378, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (citation omitted) (stating that,

because “the court’s obligation is to ensure that questions of the scope of the patent

claims are not left to the jury,” it must “assign ‘a fixed, unambiguous, legally operative

meaning to the claim[s]’”). And, the Court finds that Stratasys’s proposed construction is

appropriate.

First, construing “adjustable” to mean “movable, without removal,” is consistent

with the claim language of the ’113 Patent and does not violate the doctrine of claim

differentiation. As Stratasys points out, claim 1 requires that the second and third die

components be adjustable “along the longitudinal axis,” and removing a die component in

order to adjust it would remove the die component from the longitudinal axis. And, the die

components must be adjustable along the longitudinal axis at any given point in time while

the extrusion die assembly is configured to process the extrusion material. But, when a die

component is removed, the extrusion die assembly is no longer configured to process

extrusion material.

Moreover, Stratasys’ construction does not import any limitation from claim 4 into

claim 1. The limitation added by claim 4 is that the surfaces of the areas used for receiving

die components are “threaded,” not that the die components are “movable, without

removal.” Accordingly, the presence of the word “threaded” in dependent claim 4 does not

give rise to a presumption that claim 1 does not require die components to be “movable,

without removal.”

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Second, construing “adjustable” to mean “movable, without removal,” is consistent

with the specification and does not import limitations from the specification into the

claims. Most notably, the specification repeatedly describes one of the benefits of the

claimed invention as eliminating the need to “re-tool” a die in order to adapt to new

extrusion materials or change configurations:

The ability to adjust the relative positions of the die components 201, 202 and 203 along the longitudinal axis 214 allows the extrusion die to make changes to the flow of the extrusion material without having to re-tool the die, replace the die, adjust the temperature of the extrusion material, or the volumetric flow (i.e., pressure) of the extrusion die. As a result, the extrusion die 200 of the present invention is capable of reducing the time required to develop a suitable extrusion die to form a new product and to adapt to changing extrusion materials. . . . . Thus, the ability to adjust the relative positions of the die components of the extrusion die 200 of the present invention can be used to control properties of the flow of the extrusion material through the die 200. As a result, time-consuming adjustments to the temperature of the extrusion material, the volumetric flow rate of the extrusion material, or the retooling or replacement of the extrusion die itself, can be avoided.

(Compl., Ex. A, at col.6, ll. 49–58 & col. 7, ll. 47–53.) Contrary to Leseman’s assertions,

this discussion does suggest that having to disassemble a die to remove a die component,

and then reassemble the die, would constitute the type of complication the claimed

invention intends to avoid.

Third, the Federal Circuit’s ruling in Curtiss-Wright supports reliance on the

specification in this instance. In that case, the plaintiff alleged infringement of its patent,

which claimed a “coke drum bottom de-heading system” that included “an adjustable

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dynamic, live loaded seat.” 438 F.3d at 1377. The live loaded seat was used to exert force

on another component of the invention and, in the preferred embodiment of the invention,

the amount of force was controlled by an adjustment mechanism. Id. The accused product

also included live loaded seats, but those seats contained internal biasing springs that

modulated the force exerted on the seats. Id. In order to change the amount of force

exerted, the internal biasing springs had to be replaced. Id. In ruling on the plaintiff’s

motion for a preliminary injunction, the district court adopted the ordinary meaning of the

term “adjustable” and construed it to mean that “the bias force on the live loaded seat can be

changed in a manner that is ‘not limited by any time, place, manner, or means of

adjustment.’” Id. at 1378. Because the accused product could “adjust” the bias force by

replacing the internal biasing springs, the court determined there was a likelihood of

infringement. Id.

On appeal, the Federal Circuit determined that the district court “place[d] too

much emphasis on the ordinary meaning of ‘adjustable’ without adequate grounding of

that term within the context of the specification of the . . . patent.” Id. The specification

of the patent-in-suit described the deficiencies of the prior art as including a requirement

that components of the de-heading system be removed during de-heading, “creat[ing] an

extreme hazard to workers and provid[ing] an inefficient and time consuming procedure,”

and then commended the invention for overcoming those deficiencies. Id. at 1378–79.

Based on this discussion in the specification, the Federal Circuit concluded:

[T]he specification of the ‘714 patent consistently, and without exception, describes adjustment that occurs during operation of the de-

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header system. The district[] court’s construction of “adjustable,” which includes a structure that requires dismantling of the valve to perform the adjustment, finds no support in the overall context of the ‘714 patent specification. Moreover, the district court’s construction of “adjustable” renders that limitation nearly meaningless. This court finds it difficult, if not impossible, to imagine any mechanical device that is not “adjustable,” under the ordinary meaning of that term adopted by the district court. Almost any mechanical device undergoes change (for instance, when dismantled to replace worn parts) when no consideration is given to the “time, place, manner, or means of adjustment.” This court commends the district court’s reluctance to narrow the claims to the preferred embodiment. In this instance, however, that care is admirable but misplaced. This case does not evince a situation where a party is attempting to import a limitation from the specification into the claims. [The claim] contains the “adjustable” limitation. Thus, the claim construction task requires this court to discern the meaning of that term in the context of this invention and field of art. The specification provides that context and substantial guidance on the meaning of “adjustable.” In light of the specification, the term “adjustable” means that the dynamic, live loaded seat can be adjusted while the de-heading system of claim 14 is in use.

Id. at 1379–80.

Similarly, Leseman urges this Court to place too much emphasis on the ordinary

meaning of “adjustable” without adequate grounding in the specification. As noted above,

the specification repeatedly describes one of the benefits of the claimed invention as

eliminating the need to “re-tool” a die, as was required in the prior art. Accordingly,

consideration must be given to this guidance regarding the manner and means of

adjustment claimed by the invention. For these reasons, the Court finds that the clause “a

[second/third] die component . . . having a position that is adjustable along the

longitudinal axis relative to the [first/second] die component” is properly construed to

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mean “a [second/third] die component having a position that is movable, without removal of

the [second/third] die component, along the longitudinal axis relative to the [first/second]

die component.”

3. “And”

Lastly, Stratasys argues that the claim term “and,” which is used to connect the

clauses discussed above (i.e., “a [second/third] die component received within a

downstream side of the [first/second] die component and having a position that is adjustable

along the longitudinal axis relative to the [first/second] die component”), should be

construed to mean: “the first die component and a second die component arranged such that

the second die component (a) is ‘received within a downstream side of the first die

component,’ and (b) has ‘a position that is adjustable along the longitudinal axis relative to

the first die component’”; and “the second die component and a third die component

arranged such that the third die component (a) is ‘received within a downstream side of the

second die component,’ and (b) has ‘a position that is adjustable along the longitudinal axis

relative to the second die component.’” (Joint Statement at 7 (emphasis added).) In other

words, Stratasys seeks a construction under which it is clear that “the second and third die

components have the capability of being ‘adjustable along the longitudinal axis’ at the same

time that they are ‘received within a downstream side’ of the preceding die component.”

(Def.’s Resp. at 19; see Def.’s Mem. at 29.) According to Stratasys, if the two things need

not occur simultaneously, then the word “and” would be superfluous. (Def.’s Mem. at 30.)

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In addition, Stratasys contends that the specification describes the “received within” and

“adjustable” limitations as being satisfied at the same time. (Id.)

Leseman, on the other hand, argues that the term does not need construction and

should be given its plain and ordinary meaning. (Joint Statement at 7.) Leseman contends

that Stratasys’s proposed construction is based on the preferred embodiment that requires a

threaded relationship between die components, as described in dependent claim 4, and,

therefore, is an improper attempt to import the preferred embodiment into independent

claim 1. (Pl.’s Mem. at 33.) Leseman also asserts that Stratasys’s proposed construction

requires that the die components be “adjusted,” while the plain language of the claim simply

requires that the die components have a position that “can be adjusted.” (See id. at 32–34.)

There is a clear dispute about the scope of the term “and”—i.e., whether the die

components must be capable of being adjusted along the longitudinal axis “at the same

time” that they are received within a downstream side of the preceding die component.

Because resolution of this dispute will affect the outcome of the case and would be helpful

to a jury, construction is necessary. And, the Court finds that Stratasys’s proposed

construction is appropriate.

First, the Court sees no support for the proposition that Stratasys’s proposed

construction requires a die component to be “adjusted.” In any event, Stratasys has

clarified that it does not seek a construction that would require the die components to be

“adjusted,” but rather a construction that requires the die components to have the

“capability” of being adjusted. Nor does the Court see any support for the proposition that

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Stratasys’s proposed construction imports a limitation from claim 4 into claim 1. As

discussed above, the limitation added by claim 4 is that the surfaces of the areas used for

receiving die components are “threaded,” not that the die components have the capability of

being adjustable along the longitudinal axis at the same time that they are received within

the preceding die component. Accordingly, the presence of the word “threaded” in

dependent claim 4 does not give rise to a presumption that claim 1 does not require the

timing limitation proposed by Stratasys.

Second, the Court finds that the claim language itself resolves this issue. Claim 1

requires “[a]n extrusion die assembly configured to process a flow of extrusion material,”

with “the assembly comprising3 . . . a [second/third] die component received within a

downstream side of the [first/second] die component and having a position that is adjustable

along the longitudinal axis relative to the [first/second] die component.” (Compl., Ex. A, at

col. 8, ll. 4–17 (emphasis added).) Thus, both conditions must be met at the same time—

i.e., when the extrusion die “assembly” is “configured.”

For these reasons, the Court finds that the term “and” as used in the phrase “a

[second/third] die component received within a downstream side of the [first/second] die

component and having a position that is adjustable along the longitudinal axis relative to the

[first/second] die component,” should be construed to mean “the [first/second] die

component and a [second/third] die component arranged such that the [second/third] die

component (a) is received within a downstream side of the [first/second] die component,

3 The parties agree that the preamble of claim 1 is limiting and that its plain and ordinary meaning applies. (Joint Statement at 5.)

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and (b) has a position that is adjustable along the longitudinal axis relative to the

[first/second] die component.”

IV. ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

Various submissions of the parties were filed under seal. If the parties believe that

any portion of this Order warrants redaction, the Court orders the parties to show cause

ten days from the date of this Order, stating why the Order should not be unsealed and

specifying any portion of the order warranting redaction.

V. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, and all the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS

HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

1. The claims at issue are construed as set forth in this Memorandum Opinion and Order; and

2. The parties must show cause ten days from the date of this Order why the

Order should not be unsealed, and to specify any portion warranting redaction.

Dated: May 17, 2016 s/Susan Richard Nelson SUSAN RICHARD NELSON United States District Judge