UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DIVISION KEVIN...

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION

KEVIN GRAY : CASE NO. __________________

c/o Kircher Law Office, LLC

4824 Socialville-Foster Road :

Mason, Ohio 45040 JUDGE _____________________

:

Plaintiff,

:

v.

:

JASEN HATFIELD COMPLAINT; JURY DEMAND

Butler County Sheriff’s Department : ENDORSED HEREON

705 Hanover Street

Hamilton, Ohio 45011 :

Individually and in his Official Capacity

as an employee of the Butler County :

Sheriff’s Department

:

and

:

RICHARD K. JONES

Butler County Sheriff’s Department :

705 Hanover Street

Hamilton, Ohio 45011 :

In his Official Capacity as Sheriff of the

Butler County Sheriff’s Department :

and :

MIKE BROCKMAN :

Butler County Sheriff’s Department

705 Hanover Street :

Hamilton, Ohio 45011

Individually and in his Official Capacity :

as an employee of the Butler County

Sheriff’s Department :

and :

JOHN DOES 1-10 :

Butler County Sheriff’s Department

705 Hanover Street :

Hamilton, Ohio 45011

Case: 1:16-cv-00999-SJD Doc #: 1 Filed: 10/12/16 Page: 1 of 15 PAGEID #: 1

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:

Defendants.

Now comes Plaintiff, Kevin Gray (“Plaintiff”), by and through counsel, and for his

Complaint states as follows:

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

1. This suit is filed in order to vindicate the rights of Plaintiff to engage in activity

protected by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States of

America without fear of reprisal and to seek economic redress for losses suffered by the Plaintiff

at the hands of Defendants.

PARTIES

2. Plaintiff is an individual residing in Butler County, Ohio.

3. Defendant Jasen Hatfield (“Hatfield”) was at all times relevant to this action

employed by the Butler County Sheriff’s Department (“BCSD”) as a deputy and acting under color

of law. Hatfield is a “person” as defined by 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and at all times relevant to this action

acted under color of law. Hatfield is being sued in both his individual and official capacities.

3. Defendant Richard K. Jones (“Jones”) is the current Sheriff of the BCSD. As the

Sheriff, Jones is a policy maker for the BCSD and is being sued in his official capacity.

4. Defendant Mike Brockman (“Brockman”) was at all times relevant to this action

employed by the BCSD as a deputy and acting under color of law. Brockman is a “person” as

defined by 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and at all times relevant to this action acted under color of law.

Brockman is being sued in both his individual and official capacities.

5. John Does 1-10 are employees or agents of the BCSD also working as deputies

and/or supervisors. John Does 1-10 condoned, conducted, and/or facilitated the illegal conduct


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described in this action. John Does 1-10 are “persons” as defined 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and at all times

relevant to this action acted under color of law. John Does 1-10 cannot currently be identified.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

4. This Court has jurisdiction over the dispute between the parties pursuant to 28

U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343(3) and (4) because Plaintiff’s civil causes of action arise under the

Constitution and laws of the United States, including but not limited to, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the

Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.

5. This Court also has supplemental jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff’s related state law

causes of action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

6. Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) because this Court

sits in the district where all of the Defendants reside and is also the district where the substantial

part of the events or omissions in connection with Plaintiff’s claims arose.

FACTS

7. This action arises out of an unlawful traffic stop, seizure, and arrest effectuated by

Hatfield on Plaintiff on or about December 12, 2014.

8. On or about December 12, 2014, Plaintiff, accompanied by a friend, Chris Ebbing

(“Ebbing”), was lawfully operating his motor vehicle going southbound on S.R. 128 in the City of

Hamilton.

9. Desiring to proceed northbound to return to his home, Plaintiff made a legal U-

Turn onto northbound S.R. 128 in the City of Hamilton at or near Major Leagues Sports Bar

(“Major Leagues”).


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10. Hatfield was assigned to road patrol in the City of Hamilton and was traveling

northbound on S.R. 128 to be available backup for a fire scene when he observed Plaintiff make

the aforementioned legal U-Turn.

11. At the time Hatfield observed Plaintiff make the legal U-Turn, he was a minimum

of 528 feet from Plaintiff near either Columbia Road or New London Road, depending upon when

he was asked.

12. Despite being a minimum of 528 feet from Plaintiff at the time he made the legal

U-Turn, Hatfield falsely claimed in his Narrative Report of the incident, attached as Exhibit 1, that

he needed to “apply his brakes to avoid hitting [Plaintiff’s] vehicle.”

13. Apparently lacking basic knowledge of the application of traffic laws in Butler

County, Hatfield concluded that Plaintiff’s U-Turn was illegal and proceeded to initiate a traffic

stop.

14. In his Narrative Report, Hatfield claimed that the U-Turn served as the basis for

initiating the traffic stop.

15. Hatfield would later claim at Plaintiff’s preliminary hearing that Plaintiff also

committed several marked lane violations which also served as a basis for initiating the traffic

stop, but these alleged marked lane violations are not mentioned or referenced in his Narrative

Report and are not supported by Hatfield’s sworn statements and/or testimony.

16. Upon the initiation of Hatfield’s emergency lights, Plaintiff immediately pulled his

vehicle over in the closest safe location, the parking lot of Zip’s Auto Repair.

17. Hatfield thereafter approached Plaintiff’s vehicle on the passenger’s side.


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18. Within 10-15 seconds of arriving at the vehicle, according to Hatfield, he was able

to ask Plaintiff and Ebbing for their identification, allegedly observe Plaintiff fumble for his, and

allegedly smell the odor of alcohol and marijuana emanating from the car.

19. According to Hatfield, after observing the aforementioned actions, his attention was

then drawn to Ebbing because Ebbing allegedly responded negatively to Hatfield’s request for his

identification.

20. Roughly twenty seconds after approaching Plaintiff’s vehicle, Hatfield went around

to the passenger’s side of the vehicle and forcibly removed Ebbing because any further discussion

with him, according to Hatfield, would have been an “act of futility.”

21. According to Hatfield, a “struggle and fight” then ensued between him and Ebbing.

22. During this “struggle and fight,” though, according to Hatfield, he was able to keep

an eye on Plaintiff, who remained in his vehicle, and claimed to observe him move something

from the console area to the rear of the car.

23. During this “struggle and fight,” in addition to observing Plaintiff’s actions,

Hatfield also was able to radio for additional officers to respond to the scene.

24. Within seven seconds of Hatfield’s request for additional officers, a Deputy Bill

Brown (“Brown”) of the BCSD responded to the scene, and contrary to Hatfield’s representations,

found Plaintiff with his hands “still on the steering wheel.”

25. At the time Brown arrived, Ebbing was handcuffed and in custody.

26. Shortly thereafter, Brockman also arrived on scene.

27. Plaintiff was then taken into custody and advised the deputies that he had a CCW

licensed and that a firearm registered to him was in the vehicle.


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28. Plaintiff’s unloaded firearm was thereafter discovered during a search of the

vehicle.

29. No marijuana was discovered in the vehicle.

30. As a result of the unlawful traffic stop, seizure, search, and arrest, Plaintiff was then

arrested and charged with Operating a Motor Vehicle Under the Influence of Alcohol/Drug of

Abuse, a Marked Lanes violation, and an Improper Turn.

31. Plaintiff was later indicted on five counts including two for the Improper Handling

of Firearms in a Motor Vehicle, along with Operating a Motor Vehicle Under the Influence of

Alcohol/Drug of Abuse, a Marked Lanes violation, and an Improper Turn.

32. The indictment was based largely on false information contained in Hatfield’s

Narrative Report of the incident as well as his false testimony at Plaintiff’s preliminary and

suppression hearings.

33. On or about December 13, 2015, while Plaintiff and Ebbing were still under

indictment, they went back to Major Leagues.

34. Hatfield also happened to be at Major Leagues at the same time with a group of

friends.

35. While at Major Leagues, an obviously intoxicated Hatfield, caused and/or

instructed a family member, later discovered to be his brother, to confront Plaintiff and Ebbing.

36. During this confrontation, Hatfield’s brother spoke openly about Plaintiff’s and

Ebbing’s arrest, the charges they were facing, and his desire to see them convicted and imprisoned.

37. Hatfield’s brother could only have learned the details about the arrest and charges

from Hatfield and would have otherwise had no need or reason to approach Plaintiff and Ebbing

other than to try and intimidate them for Hatfield.


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38. As a result of the confrontation, Plaintiff and Ebbing both levied complaints against

Hatfield with the Hamilton Police Department.

39. As a result of the complaints, Jones and Does gave Hatfield little more than a slap

on the wrist.

40. Plaintiff’s case eventually proceeded to trial.

41. During discovery, Plaintiff’s attorney repeatedly demanded cruiser camera video

from any of the deputies at the scene of the unlawful stop, seizure, search, detention, and arrest.

42. Plaintiff’s attorney was repeatedly told that no such video existed. Letters

evidencing this fact are attached as Exhibits 2 and 3 to this Complaint.

43. On the morning of trial, however, it was revealed that Brockman’s vehicle did in

fact have a cruiser camera and that it was recording on the night of the unlawful stop, seizure,

search, detention, and arrest.

44. Rather than preserve the evidence as required by BCSD policy and provide it to

Plaintiff as required by Brady v. Maryland, Brockman conspired with Hatfield to keep the video

from Plaintiff and prevent its use at the preliminary hearing, suppression hearing, and in

preparation for trial.

45. Brockman, in fact, kept the video in the basement of his home until the morning of

trial.

46. When the video’s existence was revealed, it was determined that at least six minutes

from the video were mysteriously deleted.

47. Despite this last minute revelation concerning the video, Plaintiff went forward

with trial and was acquitted on all but one minor misdemeanor for purportedly failing to tell


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deputies soon enough during the illegal stop, seizure, search, detention, and arrest that he had a

CCW license and that a firearm was in the vehicle.

48. Plaintiff’s acquittal on all charges related to the initial stop of his vehicle confirms

that it was an illegal stop.

49. Hatfield’s illegal stop, seizure, search, detention, and arrest of Plaintiff was

unfortunately not the first time he engaged in illegal police activity.

50. As indicated by the attached Exhibit 4, Hatfield actually has a long history of

engaging in illegal police activity.

51. As further indicated by the attached Exhibit 4, Jones, as Sheriff and policy maker

for the BCSD, and Does 1-10 were fully aware of issues surrounding Hatfield and his propensity

to conduct impermissible searches and make pretextual arrests.

52. Despite knowledge of Hatfield’s illegal conduct, Jones and Does 1-10 failed to take

any corrective measures, train, and/or supervise him appropriately.

53. In fact, as the attached Exhibit 4 makes clear, Jones and Does 1-10 actually

condoned and encouraged Hatfield’s illegal conduct.

54. The actions of Hatifield, Brockman, Jones, and Does 1-10, along with the failures

to train and/or supervise Hatfield, have caused Plaintiff to suffer serious and permanent injuries

and damages including but not limited to sleep disturbance, nightmares, depression, posttraumatic

stress disorder, fatigue, social anxiety, anger, panic attacks and as a result thereof he has and will

continue to experience: (a) physical and mental pain and suffering; (b) emotional distress; (c) loss

of a normal life.

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

(42 U.S.C. § 1983 – Unlawful seizure, arrest, and detention - Hatfield)

55. Plaintiff incorporates his previous allegations as if fully rewritten herein.


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56. At all relevant times herein, Hatfield was acting under color of law as an agent,

servant, and employee of Jones and the BCSD.

57. On or about December 12, 2014, Hatfield intentionally restrained Plaintiff against

his will in a deliberate and conscious decision to restrain and confine his movement.

58. As a result of Hatfield’s intentional acts, Plaintiff was subjected to a seizure as he

was unable to leave and terminate the encounter with Hatfield.

59. The intentional conduct of Hatfield described herein constituted a stop and/or arrest

of Plaintiff amounting to an unlawful seizure within the meaning of the law.

60. The intentional conduct of Hatfield described herein was unnecessary and

completely unreasonable under the circumstances, not justified according to law, including but

not limited to the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, and deprived Plaintiff of his

federally protected right to be free from unlawful seizure, false arrest, and false imprisonment.

61. As a direct and proximate result of the aforementioned violations of Plaintiff’s

civil and constitutional rights actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff suffered serious and

permanent injuries and damages described herein.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION (42 U.S.C. § 1983 – Supervisory Liability - Jones)


63. As evidenced by the attached Exhibit 4, Jones established, through both action and

inaction, a widespread policy, practice or custom of allowing unlawful searches, seizures, arrests,

detentions, and misconduct to continue to occur without corrective action despite having the

opportunity and means to prevent the harm from happening.

64. Such policy, practice or custom includes, but is not limited to: (a) initiating traffic

stops without probable cause or reasonable articulable suspicion that an offense had occurred; (b)


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failing to cure or even attempt to cure obvious and known risks caused by the unlawful conduct of

BCSD deputies, including but not limited to Hatfield; (c) allowing Hatfield to continue in his role

as a road patrol deputy despite a history and track record of initiating illegal stops, searches, and

pretextual arrests.

65. Jones established such policy, practice or custom which fostered a climate in which

illegal activity by BCSD deputies was not corrected and evidenced a reckless disregard and/or a

deliberate indifference to the consequence that such action or inaction may and did have on Butler

County residents, including Plaintiff.

66. Jones had final policymaking authority of the BCSD and exercised that granted

authority in making decisions that perpetuated and/or allowed the illegal activities of deputies such

as Hatfield to occur and/or continue.

67. Plaintiff was deprived of his constitutional liberty interest and equal protection

under the Fourteenth Amendment by Jones’s creation and promotion of policies, customs, or

practices that fostered a climate to flourish where initiating traffic stops without probable cause or

reasonable articulable suspicion that an offense had occurred, conducting impermissible searches,

and making pretextual arrests was permitted and encouraged.

68. Jones’s conduct was arbitrary and offensive, shocking the conscience and

interfering with Plaintiff’s rights and liberties granted by the Constitution and protected by law.

69. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 affords Plaintiff a civil cause of action for damages.

70. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 identifies damages, court costs, litigation expenses and attorney's

fees as within the remedies available in an action brought pursuant to 42 USC § 1983.

71. As a direct and proximate result of the conduct of Jones as described herein,

Plaintiff has sustained severe and permanent injuries described herein.


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72. The conduct of Jones constituted a violation of trust or confidence, showing

complete indifference to or conscious disregard for the safety and well-being of Plaintiff.

73. Justice and the public good require an award of punitive or exemplary damages in

such sum which will serve to punish Jones and to deter like conduct.

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION

(42 U.S.C. § 1983 – Failure to Train – Jones)


75. At all times relevant to this action, Jones was responsible for making government

policy and for oversight of the functions and duties of the BCSD.

76. Jones failed to establish adequate training programs in order to properly train his

deputies and employees to carry out their official duties in effectuating lawful seizures, searches,

arrests, and detentions of its citizens.

77. Jones’ failure to adequately train his deputies amounted to deliberate indifference

to the fact that inaction would obviously result in the violation of its citizens’ Fourth Amendment

rights to be free from unlawful searches, seizures, arrests, and detentions at the hands of the BCSD.

78. Jones’ failure to adequately train the BCSD deputies, including Hatfield,

proximately caused the violation of Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from unlawful

searches, seizures, arrests, and detentions at the hands of the BCSD.

79. As a direct and proximate result of the aforementioned violations of Plaintiff’s civil

and constitutional rights actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff has sustained severe and

permanent injuries described herein.

FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION

(42 U.S.C. § 1983 – Inadequate Supervision – Jones, Does 1-10)



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policy and for oversight of the functions of the BCSD.

82. At all times relevant to this action, Does 1-10 were afforded supervisory oversight

of deputies of the BCSD, including Hatfield, by Jones.

83. Jones and Does 1-10 failed to adequately supervise the BCSD deputies and

employees, including but not limited to Hatfield and Brockman, in carrying out their official duties

when effectuating lawful searches, seizures, arrests, detentions of its citizens, as well as during the

collection and preservation of evidence.

84. The failure on behalf of these Defendants to adequately supervise its police deputies

and employees amounted to deliberate indifference to the fact that inaction would obviously result

in the violation of Plaintiff’s and other citizens’ Fourth Amendment rights to be free from unlawful

searches, seizures, arrests, and detentions of its citizens at the hands of the police.

85. The failure on behalf of these Defendants to adequately supervise the BCSD

deputies, including Hatfield and Brockman, proximately caused the violation of Plaintiff’s Fourth

Amendment right to be free from unlawful seizures, arrest, and detention.




FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION (42 U.S.C. § 1983 – Ratification – Jones)



policy and for oversight of the functions of the BCSD.


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89. Pursuant to the attached Exhibit 4, Jones was placed on notice of during the

pendency of Gray’s criminal case that there were significant concerns regarding Hatfield’s conduct

as it related to unlawful searches and pretextual arrests.

90. Despite this notice, Jones permitted Gray’s criminal case to go forward, ratifying

Hatfield’s illegal actions.




SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION

(False Arrest – Hatfield)


93. Hatfield intentionally and unlawfully seized and detained Plaintiff against his

consent.

94. As a direct and proximate result of Hatfield’s actions, Plaintiff has sustained severe

and permanent injuries described herein.

SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION (Spoliation of Evidence- All Defendants)


96. At the time the cruiser camera footage was deleted, litigation involving the Plaintiff

was pending.

97. Defendants were fully aware of the litigation involving Plaintiff.

98. Defendants willfully destroyed and/or conspired with one another to destroy the

cruiser camera footage to disrupt Plaintiff’s case.

99. Plaintiff’s case was in fact disrupted.


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100. As a direct and proximate result of the destruction of the cruiser camera footage,

Plaintiff has sustained the severe and permanent damages described herein.

EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION (Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress – All Defendants)


102. Defendants intended to cause, or knew or should have known that their actions

would result in serious emotional distress to Plaintiff.

103. Defendants’ conduct was so extreme and outrageous that it went beyond all

possible bounds of decency and can be considered completely intolerable in a civilized

community.

104. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ actions, Plaintiff has suffered

severe and permanent injuries described herein.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully demands judgment against Defendants in excess of

$75,000, jointly and severally, for compensatory damages to be proved at trial, punitive damages

because the actions of Defendants were malicious and intended to cause Plaintiff severe harm,

reasonable attorney’s fees, costs and all other relief to which he may be lawfully entitled.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Konrad Kircher

_____________________________

Konrad Kircher (0059249)

Ryan J. McGraw (0089436)

KIRCHER LAW OFFICE, LLC

4824 Socialville-Foster Road

Mason, Ohio 45040

Tel.: 513/229-7996

Fax: 513/229-7995

[email protected]

[email protected]

Attorneys for Plaintiff


mailto:[email protected]

mailto:[email protected]

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JURY DEMAND

Plaintiff hereby demands trial by a jury of his peers as to all issues so triable herein.

/s/ Konrad Kircher

_____________________________

Konrad Kircher (0059249)


Case: 1:16-cv-00999-SJD Doc #: 1-1 Filed: 10/12/16 Page: 1 of 6 PAGEID #: 16











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