UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE …...Appeal2015-006133 Reexamination Control...

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD

APPLE, INC., BUENA VISTA HOME ENTERTAINMENT INC., LIONS GATE ENTERTAINMENT INC., PARAMOUNT HOME

ENTERTAINMENT INC., SONY PICTURES HOME ENTERTAINMENT INC., SONY ELECTRONICS INC., SONY COMPUTER

ENTERTAINMENT AMERICA LLC, TWENTIETH CENTURY FOX HOME ENTERTAINMENT LLC, UNIVERSAL STUDIOS HOME

ENTERTAINMENT LLC, and WARNER BROS. HOME ENTERTAINMENT INC.,

Requester,

v.

MONKEYMEDIA, INC., Patent Owner.

Appeal2015-006133 Reexamination Control95/002,256

Patent 8,122,143 B2 Technology Center 3900

Before STEPHEN C. SIU, DENISE M. POTHIER, and ANDREW J. DILLON, Administrative Patent Judges.

SIU, Administrative Patent Judge

DECISION ON APPEAL

Case: 16-1558 Document: 1-2 Page: 11 Filed: 02/04/2016 (12 of 32)

Appeal2015-006133 Reexamination Control 95/002,256 Patent 8,122,143 B2

MONKEY media, Inc. ("Patent Owner") appeals under 35 U.S.C.

§§ 134 and 315 the Examiner's rejection of claims 1-80 over various

references. 1 PO App. Br. 6---7. Apple, Inc., et. al. ("Requester") appeals

under 35 U.S.C. §§ 134 and 315 the Examiner's non-adoption of the

rejections of claims 1-80 over various references. 2 3PR App. Br. 5-6. We

have jurisdiction under 35 U.S. C. §§ 134 and 315. An oral hearing was

conducted on September 17, 2015.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This proceeding arose from a September 13, 2012 request for an inter

partes reexamination of claims of U.S. Patent 8, 122,143 B2, titled "System

and Method for Transmission of Telescopic Advertising," filed November 8,

2010 and issued to Eric Justin Gould and Rachel M. Strickland, on February

21, 2012 ("the '143 patent").

The '143 patent describes a method and system for interactive

multimedia content. Spec. 1:9.

Claim 1 reads as follows:

1 Brief on Appeal, filed November 12, 2014 ("PO App. Br."). Patent Owner indicates that only claims 9---11, 19, 29---31, 39, 49-51, 69-71, and 79 are being appealed. PO App. Br. 2. However, Patent Owner also argues patentability of claims 1-80 (e.g., Issues 13-16- PO App. Br. 6; RAN 14-16 (citing "Detailed Request for Inter Partes Reexamination," filed September 13,2012, 37-38; Exhibit 27 1-20)). Therefore, we assume Patent Owner appeals the Examiner's rejection of all claims 1-80. 2 Corrected Appellants' Brief in Cross Appeal, filed December 12, 2014 ("3PR App. Br.").

2



1. A method of transmitting a promotional expansion comprising expansion content, one or more interactive elements and machine-executable expansion instructions to an audio and/or video player playing a main content continuous play media stream compnsmg:

a. transmitting to a player an expansion cue that invites a user to elect presentation of a promotional expansion during playing of a main content continuous play media stream, that changes in appearance when a user has elected presentation of said promotional expansion, and that triggers the player to:

i. interrupt play of the main content stream at a main content stream decision point that is at most a small amount of time after the user has elected presentation of the promotional expansion;

ii. present the promotional expansion in temporal continuity with the main content stream, wherein said triggering the player to present the promotional expansion comprises triggering the player to (x) present for display expansion content, (y) execute expansion instructions and (z) present for display a transition during the passage of time from playing the main content stream to presenting for display the expansion content; and

iii. prepare to play a continuing portion of the main content stream after the promotional expansion with temporal continuity, wherein the player is prepared to start playing a continuing portion of the main content stream at a main content stream time point offset by at most a small amount of time from the main content stream decision point; and b. transmitting to the player the expansion content comprising

audio, video, still images and/or text and the expansion instructions comprising machine-executable instructions relating to one or more interactive elements allowing for user input.

The cited references are as follows:

Davenport us 5,101,364 Mar. 31, 1992

3


Appeal2015-006133 Reexamination Control 95/002,256 Patent 8,I22,I43 B2

Lavallee us 5,737,552

Sposato us 5,78I,228

Hudson US 2002/0078456 AI

Wistendahl US 6,496,98I B I

Lev enter US 2005/0246737 AI

Weeks US 2007/0I68884 AI

(filed Feb. 9, I990) Apr. 7, I998

(filed July 28, I995) July I4, I998

(filed Sept. 7, I995)

June 20, 2002 (filed July 3I, 200 I) Dec. I7, 2002

(filed Sept. I9, I997) Nov. 3, 2005

(filed Apr. I3, 2005) July I9, 2007

(filed Jan. I3, 2006)

Jeffrey C. Jackson and Renate J. Roske-Hofstrand, Circling: A Method of Mouse-Based Selection Without Button Presses, CHI'89 Proceedings, I6I---66 (May I989) (hereinafter "Jackson").

David Backer, One-of-a-Kind Video Programs, Instructional Innovator 26---28 (February I982) (hereinafter "Backer").

Jim Taylor, DVD Demystifzed (1998) (hereinafter "DVD Demystified").

Patent Owner appeals the Examiner's rejection of claims I-80 under

35 U.S.C. § I03(a) as unpatentable over the combination of Lavallee,

Davenport, and DVD Demystified or the combination of Sposato and

Davenport; claims I-3, 5-23, 25-80 under 35 U.S.C. § I03(a) as

unpatentable over Wistendahl and Davenport; and claims 20, 40, 60, and 80

under 35 U.S. C. § I03(a) as unpatentable over Davenport, one of either

Wistendahl, Sposato, or the combination of Lavallee and DVD Demystified,

and one of either Backer or Jackson. RAN II-I6.

4



Requester appeals the Examiner's non-adoption of the rejection of

claims 1-80 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Hudson,

Leventer, and DVD Demystified; claims 1-19, 21-39, 41-59, and 61-79

under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Weeks, Leventer, and DVD

Demystified; and claims 20, 40, 60, and 80 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as

unpatentable over Leventer, DVD Demystified, one of either Backer or

Jackson, and one of either Hudson or Weeks. 3PR App. Br. 5-6.

ISSUES

Did the Examiner err in rejecting claims 1-80 under certain grounds

and not adopting the proposed rejections of claims 1-80 under certain other

grounds?

PRINCIPLES OF LAW

The question of obviousness is resolved on the basis of underlying

factual determinations including ( 1) the scope and content of the prior art,

(2) any differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art, and

(3) the level of skill in the art. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17-

18 (1966).

"The combination of familiar elements according to known methods

is likely to be obvious when it does no more than yield predictable results."

KSR!nt'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398,416 (2007).

ANALYSIS

Sposato (Patent Owner's Appeal) Diligence

5



Sposato was filed September 7, 1995. To antedate this reference,

Patent Owner must show conception of the invention prior to this date

coupled with due diligence from prior to this date to (1) a subsequent

reduction to practice or (2) the filing date of the application. 37 C.P.R.

§ 1.131(b ).

Patent Owner argues that "the inventors ... worked diligently from at

least September 6, 1995 ... [until] February 25, 1996" and that under "a

flexible test," the "specific kind of activity in determining whether the

applicant was reasonably diligent" is allegedly of little importance. PO App.

Br. 13 (citing Bear§ 131 Dec. ,-r,-r 6---20, Exs. B-1- B-9, B-11). We note that

of the paragraphs in the Bear§ 131 Declaration cited by Patent Owner (i.e.,

paragraphs 6---20), only paragraphs 12-15 appear to pertain in some way to

the issue of diligence. Nor does Patent Owner explain sufficiently how the

remaining cited paragraphs of the Bear§ 131 Declaration (i.e., Bear§ 131

Dec. ,-r,-r 6---11, 16---20) relate to or support Patent Owner's arguments with

respect to the issue of diligence. Therefore, we do not further consider the

remaining cited paragraphs of the Bear§ 131 Declaration with respect to this

ISSUe.

Patent Owner's expert (Mr. Bear) testifies that the inventors

"exercised reasonable due diligence to reduce the inventions to practice"

"during the time period from September 6, 1995 [which is prior to the

priority date ofthe Sposato reference] through February 25, 1996 [the date

of the alleged actual reduction to practice];" that "[a]s shown on page 10 of

Exhibit B-6, on September 1, 1995, [the inventors] began an important

6



phase of the Portable Effects project;" and "[t]he program documentation for

the BAGuette prototype specifications is attached as Exhibit B-8." Bear

§ 131 Dec. ,-r,-r 12-15 (citing Ex. B----6, B---7, B---8).

Diligence can be shown by evidence of activity aimed at reducing the

invention to practice, either actually or constructively, and/or by legally

adequate excuses for inactivity. Griffith v. Kanamaru, 816 F .2d 624, 626

(Fed. Cir. 1987). It is necessary to account for the entire critical period (id.

at 626) with evidence that is specific as to facts and dates. Gould v.

Schawlow, 363 F.2d 908, 920 (CCPA 1966). Patent Owner's Exhibits B-7

and B---8 contain invoices that include entries for at least some time periods

within the September 6, 1995- February 25, 1996 time frame (the critical

period). According to Patent Owner's evidence, between the dates of"Sept.

2- Sept. 15," 8.77 hours was billed at a rate of"81.25/hr" and 760 miles

was billed at a rate of 30 cents per mile, for example. Ex. B-8 "Inv#

PFX015." Similar entries are noted during the time periods of October 24,

1995- October 26, 1995 ("Inv# PFX016") and January 1, 1996- March 14,

1996. Ex. B-8 Inv# PFXO 16 and PFXO 19.

Page 10 of Exhibit B----6, also cited by Patent Owner's expert (Mr.

Bear), indicates that a "contractor agreement" was signed on September 14,

1995 and September 18, 1995 that refers to "additional work to be

performed over and above the current work" that was "detailed in the

contract extensions for the period of January 1, 1995 through October 1,

1995" and that the "[c]ompany will pay Contractor a flat fee." Ex. B-6 10.

We are not persuaded that Patent Owner's evidence is sufficient to

demonstrate diligence as alleged by Patent Owner. The invoices relied upon

7



by Patent Owner generally indicate fees that were charged, including amount

charged per unit of reported time, and travel expenses, including the amount

charged per mile travelled. Also, the "Contractor Agreement" (Ex. B-6 10)

relied upon by Patent Owner appears to state no more than generally

described activities agreed upon by parties signing the agreement to be

performed possibly at some future date.

Patent Owner does not indicate what activities were performed during

the reported hours billed or specific dates and facts the activities were

supposedly performed. Without such a showing, the evidence is tantamount

to a mere assertion, without more, that the inventors exercised diligence to

reduce the invention to practice, which is insufficient to demonstrate

diligence during the critical period. In re Harry, 333 F.2d 920, 923 (CCP A

1964 ). Also, without evidence demonstrating the specific activities

throughout the entire critical period, it is not possible to ascertain whether

the activities performed, if any, were related to the alleged reduction to

practice. Evidence that is not specific as to dates and facts is insufficient to

establish diligence during the critical period. Gould, 363 F.2d at 920.

We are not persuaded by Patent Owner's argument for the additional

reason that the evidence does not account for the entire critical period of

September 6, 1995- February 25, 1996. Even if an invoice showing

charges billed and hourly rates is considered to be a sufficient showing, the

invoices do not indicate activities (or hours billed) during the period of

September 30, 1995- October 23, 1995 or October 27, 1995- December

31, 1996. As previously discussed, it is necessary to account for the entire

critical period. Griffith, 816 F .2d at 626. Also, the "Contractor Agreement"

8



(Ex. B-6 1 0) does not specify any specific dates that any activity was

actually performed and what any alleged activity might have been. Hence,

the "Contractor Agreement" does not account for any additional time within

the critical period.

Patent Owner argues that under an alleged "flexible test in evaluating

if an inventor is diligent," the alleged "reasonably continuing activity"

performed need not be "specific" and "can take a diversity of forms" and,

therefore, the evidence of record is sufficient to "show[] reasonable

diligence." PO App. Br. 13 (citing Brown v. Barbacid, 436 F.3d 1376, 1380

(Fed. Cir. 2006)). We are not persuaded by Patent Owner's argument. Even

if such a "flexible test" exists and, as indicated above, based on evidence

reflected in Exhibit B7 and B8 and the lack of evidence of Exhibit B6,

Patent Owner does not demonstrate sufficiently "reasonably continuing

activity," particularly in view of Patent Owner's lack of continuity in

activities for the periods of September 30, 1995- October 23, 1995 and

October 27, 1995- December 31, 1995.

In any event, we are not persuaded by Patent Owner of the existence

of a new "flexible test" with respect to diligence. In Brown v. Barbacid, the

inventor:

[W]orked on the famesyl transferase project 'on a daily basis.

[P]erformed studies to assess the metal dependency of FT, evaluated gels with various affinity chromatography eluates, conducted a freeze-thaw study ... , performed cyanide bromide cleavage of various FT fractions and examined the products of that cleavage, studied the effect of guanosine triphosphate binding on famesylation, and studied the effect of peptide saturation on FT activity.

9



Also of importance, the inventor "provided laboratory notebook pages

recording this work." Brown, 436 F.3d at 1380.

In addition, another scientist who "worked on the FT assay ...

performed experiments designed by Dr. Reiss ... screen[ ed] various

peptides for possible inhibitory effect on famesyl transferase," performed

"various famesyl transferase inhibition studies with reference to the specific

study numbers on the notebook pages, and the dates the work was done,"

performed "a comparative study, with reference to study number and date, in

which 'a biotin conjugated substrate is used rather than ras as a target for

famesylation,' as well as a study in which famesyl transferase reaction

samples were prepared for analysis by thin layer chromatography." Also of

importance, "[ e ]ach of the thirty-eight notebook pages was associated with

tests specified in her declaration." These activities "filled all but six days of

the critical period, and ... each of the six remaining days was a single-day

gap." Brown, 436 F.3d at 1380---81.

Rather than illustrating a new "flexible test" in which diligence is

supposedly demonstrated by non-specified activities that are not continuous

during the critical period, as Patent Owner appears to argue, Brown v.

Barbacid actually confirms that a showing of diligence requires continuous

activity during the critical period and the alleged activities must be

specifically enumerated and described, as was the case in Brown v.

Barbacid. In the present case, Patent Owner does not account for significant

periods of time within the critical period, e.g., the periods of time of

September 30, 1995- October 23, 1995 and October 27, 1995- December

31, 1995 and merely specifies a billing rate for hours billed during the

10



remaining time periods, rather than any specific activities. We disagree with

Patent Owner that this is sufficient to demonstrate diligence.

Hence, we agree with the Examiner and Requester that Patent Owner

has not demonstrated sufficiently that the inventors were diligent in reducing

to practice the invention during the critical period. Therefore, we agree with

the Examiner and Requester that Sposato qualifies as prior art.

Claims 9-11, 29---31, 49---51, and 69-71- Sposato and Davenport

Claim 9 depends indirectly from claim 1. Claims 9-11, 29---31, 49---

51, and 69-71 recite a transition that comprises playing a portion of the main

content simultaneously with playing a portion of the expansion content. Patent

Owner argues that "novel cross-fade transitions are not taught or even

suggested by Davenport." PO App. Br. 19. Presumably, Patent Owner

argues that the combination of Sposato and Davenport fails to disclose or

suggest playing a portion of the main content simultaneously with playing a

portion of the expansion content. We are not persuaded by Patent Owner's

argument for at least the reasons set forth by the Examiner and Requester.

RAN 14; "Detailed Request for Inter Partes Reexamination," filed September

13, 2012 ("Orig. Req.") 37-38; Orig. Req. Ex. 27, filed September 13, 2012

("Ex. 27") 7; 3PR Resp. Br. 17-19. For example, Davenport discloses

"[t]ransition effects [that] represent a variety of visual progressions" that

"include dissolve, chunky dissolve, circle zoom, diamond zoom, box zoom,

spiral zoom, venetian blind, vertical blind, checkerboard and wipes."

Davenport 9:37-38, 64----67. One of ordinary skill in the art would have

understood that a "checkerboard" transition effect, at least, would have

resembled a checkerboard given the explicit naming of the effect. One of

11



ordinary skill in the art would also have understood that a checkerboard

contains at least two rectangular alternating images or patterns in an array.

Given that at least two rectangular portions of different images would be

displayed in the checkerboard transition effect, we agree with the Examiner and

Requester that in such a transition effect, a portion of one image (i.e., the main

content) would be displayed simultaneously with playing a portion of another

image (i.e., the expansion content) in an alternating "checkerboard" pattern.

We also agree with the Examiner and Requester that one of skill in the art

would have understood that many of the other transition effects disclosed by

Davenport would likewise display a portion of one image simultaneously with

playing a portion of another image in corresponding patterns (e.g., dissolve,

zoom, venetian blind, etc.).

Patent Owner argues that Davenport testifies that "[m]ypatent does not

teach or even suggest using cross-fade transitions" and "[t]his cross-fade

transition is not something my patent contemplated or suggested." PO App. Br.

20, 22. Patent Owner further argues that "the claimed cross-fade transitions is

strong evidence of non-obviousness, because the testimony [of Davenport] is

clearly relevant to the subject matter as claimed, and [Patent Owner] has

established a specific nexus between the features of the claims at issue and this

evidence." PO App. Br. 22. We are not persuaded by Patent Owner's

arguments for at least the reasons set forth by Requester. 3PR Resp. Br. 17-19.

For example, Patent Owner asserts that Davenport testifies that "[m]ypatent

does not teach or suggest" displaying a portion of one image simultaneously

with playing a portion of another image but does not explain how any of the

disclosed transition effects of Davenport (e.g., "checkerboard" as discussed

above) differ from this claim feature. Moreover, claim 9 does not recite the

12



disputed cross-fading transition. We are also not persuaded by Patent Owner's

implied argument of secondary considerations at least because Patent Owner

does not assert a specific basis for secondary considerations. For example,

even if the Davenport testimony "is clearly relevant to the subject matter as

claimed," (PO App. Br. 22) as Patent Owner contends, Patent Owner does not

demonstrate sufficiently that, even assuming that the relevance of the testimony

is "clear," the clarity of the relevance of testimony constitutes a secondary

consideration with respect to refuting a prima facie showing of obviousness.

Patent Owner argues that Dr. Loy testifies that "[t]hese types ofe((ects

[o(Davenportl are very di((erent than having . .. transitions [that! are

dynamically created byplaying a portion o(main content simultaneously with a

portion of the expansion content." PO App. Br. 20 (citing Loy Dec. ,-r 54).

However, Patent Owner does not demonstrate sufficiently how Dr. Loy's

explanation related to the effects not being dependent on the content type or the

content-access timing describes a difference between the transitions as

disclosed by Davenport, for example, and the claimed transition. For reasons

previously stated, we are not persuaded by Patent Owner's argument.

Claims 19, 39, 59, and 79- Sposato and Davenport

Claim 19 recites the expansion cue is one of a plurality of expansion

cues in an expansion cue container. Claims 39, 59, and 79 recite a similar

feature. Patent Owner states that the Examiner found that, under a broadest

reasonable standard in light of the Specification, one of skill in the art would

have understood that a "cue container" would have included "any window

that includes visual cue" but that this construction is "vastly overbroad" and

13



"conflicts with the limitations of an expansion cue in the claims." PO App.

Br. 24.

We disagree with Patent Owner that the Examiner's broad, but

reasonable construction of the term "cue container" is "vastly overbroad" or

that such a construction conflicts with limitations in the claims. Claims are

to be given their broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the

specification, and the language should be read in light of the specification as

it would be interpreted by one of ordinary skill in the art. In reAm. Acad. of

Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citations omitted).

"To begin with, the context in which a term is used in the asserted claim can

be highly instructive." "[T]he claims themselves provide substantial

guidance as to the meaning of particular claim terms." Phillips v. AWH

Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2005), citing Vitronics Corp. v.

Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir 1996). Claim 19, for

example, recites expansion cues "in an expansion cue container." Patent

Owner does not indicate that the claims recite any other specific limitations

of the "cue container" other than an expansion cue being "in an expansion

cue container." Hence, based on the context of the claims, one of skill in the

art would have understood, under a broadest reasonable construction, that a

"cue container" is any component that contains an expansion cue, which is

consistent with the Examiner's purported broadest reasonable construction

of "any window that includes visual cue."

The Specification "is always highly relevant to the claim construction

analysis. Usually, it is dispositive; it is the single best guide to the meaning

of a disputed term." Vitronics Corp., 90 F.3d at 1582. In the present case,

14



the Specification discloses an expansion cue (e.g., 152, 156) "contained in

an expansion cue container 150." Spec. 13:26---30, 41--45, Figs. 5A-B.

Hence, based on the Specification, one of skill in the art would have

understood, under a broadest reasonable construction in light of the

Specification, that a "cue container" is any component that contains an

expansion cue. This is also consistent with the Examiner's purported

broadest reasonable construction of "any window that includes visual cue."

Even though extrinsic evidence has been considered "less significant

than the intrinsic record," the court has also stated that "extrinsic evidence

'can shed useful light on the relevant art" and that "dictionaries and treatises

can be useful in claim construction." Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317-18 (citing

Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa 'per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1250 (Fed.

Cir. 1998) and Rexnord Corp. v. Laitram Corp., 274 F.3d 1336, 1344 (Fed.

Cir. 2001) ). Requester argues that one of skill in the art would have

understood the plain and customary meaning of a "cue container" to be any

"bounded area that contains cues." 3PR Resp. Br. 20. We agree with

Requester that one of skill in the art would have understood that the plain

and customary meaning of a "container" would have included any "bounded

area." This is also consistent with the Examiner's purported broadest

reasonable construction of "any window that includes visual cue."

Patent Owner argues that this construction is "vastly overbroad" and

"conflicts with the limitations of an expansion cue in the claims." PO App.

Br. 24. However, Patent Owner does not demonstrate sufficiently that the

broadest reasonable construction of the term "cue container" as being any

bounded area containing a cue (or "any window that includes visual cue")

15



would, in fact, conflict with the sole limitation recited in the claims of the

cue container containing an expansion cue (as recited in claim 19, for

example). We are not persuaded by Patent Owner's argument that a "cue

container," as recited in claim 19, for example, must be "displayed while

playing the main content in a portion of the screen that otherwise would

contain main content if the cue container was not displayed" (PO App. Br.

27), at least because, contrary to Patent Owner's contention, we do not

observe that any of the disputed claims recite that a cue container must be

displayed at any particular time, much less "while playing the main content

in a portion of the screen that otherwise would contain main content if the

cue container was not displayed." Thus, we need not consider whether or

not Sposato discloses displaying a "cue container" "while playing the main

content in a portion of the screen that otherwise would contain main content

if the cue container was not displayed."

Patent Owner does not provide additional arguments in support of

claims 1-80 over Sposato or Davenport or additional arguments with respect

to Backer or Jackson. The Examiner did not err in rejecting claims 1-80

over Sposato and Davenport or claims 20, 40, 60, and 80 over Sposato,

Davenport, and one of either Backer or Jackson.

In view of the above, we need not consider the propriety of the

Examiner's rejections or non-adoption of rejections of claims 1-80 based on

other grounds (i.e., grounds based on Lavallee, Wistendahl, Hudson,

Leventer, Weeks, or DVD). Cf In re Gleave, 560 F.3d 1331, 1338 (Fed.

Cir. 2009).

16



DECISION

We affirm the Examiner's rejection of claims 1-80 under 35 U.S. C.

§ 103(a) as unpatentable over Sposato and Davenport and claims 20, 40, 60,

and 80 over Sposato, Davenport, and one of either Backer or Jackson.

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with

this appeal may be extended under 3 7 C.F .R. § 1.13 6( a)( 1 )(iv ).

Requests for extensions of time in this inter partes reexamination

proceeding are governed by 37 C.P.R.§ 1.956. See 37 C.P.R.§ 41.79.

In the event neither party files a request for rehearing within the time

provided in 37 C.P.R. § 41.79, and this decision becomes final and

appealable under 37 C.P.R.§ 41.81, a party seeking judicial review must

timely serve notice on the Director of the United States Patent and

Trademark Office. See 37 C.P.R.§§ 90.1 and 1.983.

AFFIRMED

17



Patent Owner: HEINZ GRETHER PC G2 TECHNOLOGY LAW P.O.BOX 202858 AUSTIN, TX 78720

Third Party Requester: MORRISON & FOERSTER, LLP 707 WILSHIRE BOULEY ARD LOS ANGELES, CA 90017

kis

18


Date post:	13-Jan-2020
Category:	Documents
Upload:	others
View:	1 times
Download:	0 times

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE …...Appeal2015-006133 Reexamination Control...

Documents