UNU March2016

Introduction Data Democracy and migration Robustness Destination Conclusion

The Return of the Prodigy Son: Do Return

Migrants make Better Leaders?

Marion Mercier (IRES � Université Catholique de Louvain;IRD � DIAL; IZA)

Joint UNU-MERIT MGSoG seminar, March 2016


Research question

Research question: Investigate the impact of political leaders'migration experience on the quality of the institutions of theircountry during their period in power.

Political leaders (elites) as one of the channels through whichmigration may a�ect development in the origin country.


Related literature

Impact of migration on politics:

Macro side:- foreign students & democracy (Spilimbergo, AER 2009);- emigration & the quality of institutions (Docquier et al.,2011);- emigration & women political representation (Lodigiani &Salomone, 2012).

Micro side:- migration intensity & demand for political accountability inCape Verde (Batista & Vicente, WBER 2012);- migration intensity & voting behaviours in Mexico (Pfutze,JCE 2012) and Moldova (Omar Mahmoud et al., 2012);- return migration & voting behaviours in Mali (Chauvet &Mercier, JCE 2014).


Related literature

Impact of individual leaders on aggregate outcomes:

Literature on �rms and central banks (e.g. Bertrand & Schoar,QJE 2003, Gohlmann & Vaubel, EER 2007).

Literature on political leaders:- Individual leaders a�ect growth (Jones & Olken, QJE 2005)...- ... Di�erently depending on their level of education (Besley,Montalvo & Reynal-Querol, EJ 2011).- Leaders' profession a�ect their propensity to implementreforms (Dreher et al., JCE 2009).- Leaders' gender a�ect local policy choices in India(Chattopadhyay & Du�o, Econometrica 2004).- Leaders' career background a�ect local democracy in China(Persson & Zhuravskaya, 2011).


Data

Collection of information on the personal characteristics of 932individuals who have been leaders of the executive power intheir country, in all the developing world over the 1960-2004period (1,042 leadership periods).

Identi�cation of the leaders: Archigos database (University ofRochester).

Sources for data collection: all possible web sources,uppermost Encyclopedia Universalis and Cidob (BarcelonaCenter for International A�airs).


Data

Coded characteristics:

Migration experiences: dates/duration, destination, objective(exile, studies, diplomacy, military reasons).

Personal background: education, occupation, militaryexperience, familial characteristics.


Descriptive statistics

Empirical analysis: sub-sample of the 932.1 Focus on leaders who stayed at least one year in power (679

so-called �long-term� leaders), because:(i) leader-level data matched with country-level data recordedon a yearly basis, and(ii) reasonable to believe that leaders who spend a very shorttime span in power do not have enough time to implementstructural reforms that a�ect the quality of institutions.

2 We do not have information on migration experience for 69 ofthese 679, and the country-level control variables included inthe benchmark speci�cation are simultaneously available for467 of these 610.

Countries in the sample

Desc. stat. both on the complete sample and on thebenchmark sample.


Descriptive statistics

All Benchmark Di�. All Benchmark Di�.Characteristics of the leader: Migration background:Woman 0.028 0.028 -6.17e-06 Migration 0.687 0.715 -0.028

1,042 467 (0.009) 883 467 (0.026)Age 52.00 51.70 0.297 Mig � Study 0.421 0.454 -0.033

1,036 467 (0.614) 883 467 (0.028)Tenure dur. 5.304 6.816 -1.512*** Mig � Exile 0.149 0.156 -0.007

1,042 467 (0.389) 883 467 (0.021)High educ. 0.514 0.544 -0.030 Mig � Dipl. 0.135 0.105 0.030

871 467 (0.029) 883 467 (0.019)Law 0.192 0.216 -0.024 Mig � Milit. 0.177 0.218 -0.042*

890 467 (0.023) 883 467 (0.022)Eco 0.081 0.086 -0.005 Mig. dur. 6.956 6.776 0.180

890 467 (0.016) 434 246 (0.612)Health 0.045 0.047 -0.002 Mig � Europe 0.424 0.426 -0.003

890 467 (0.012) 883 467 (0.028)Military 0.279 0.246 0.032 Mig � Asia 0.110 0.084 0.026

890 467 (0.025) 883 467 (0.017)Business 0.044 0.056 -0.012 Mig � Africa 0.135 0.143 -0.009

890 467 (0.012) 883 467 (0.020)Admin 0.088 0.090 -0.002 Mig � N.-Am. 0.237 0.276 -0.040

890 467 (0.016) 883 467 (0.025)Acad. 0.134 0.133 0.001 Mig � S.-Am. 0.099 0.126 -0.028

890 467 (0.019) 883 467 (0.018)Worker 0.035 0.030 0.005 Mig � Oc. 0.011 0.011 0.0006

890 467 (0.010) 883 467 (0.006)Scientist 0.094 0.101 -0.006 Political outcomes during the tenure:

890 467 (0.017) Polity score 0.966 2.181 -1.214***Religious 0.015 0.015 -0.0004 712 467 (0.380)

890 467 (0.007) Delta Polity 0.256 0.454 -0.198712 467 (0.232)


Benchmark speci�cation

Correlation between→ the fact that the leader migrated (and the type of migrationexperience(s) he had), and→ the evolution of democracy during his tenure?

Is the arrival in power of a new leader who happens to have a givenmigration experience correlated with a subsequent speci�c trend inthe evolution of democracy?- variables related to the migration experiences: constant,- mechanism we are interested in: political change.

⇒ Speci�cation at the level of the tenures (also allows to give thesame weight to each leader), with the evolution of the level ofdemocracy during the tenure as dependent variable.



DeltaPolityi ,j ,l = α+ δ1MigStudyl + δ2MigExilel + δ3MigDipll

+ δ4MigMilitl + γXl + τj + ηi + λCi ,j + εi ,j ,l (1)

DeltaPolityi ,j ,l : change in the Polity score (index of democracy,between -10 to 10) in country i during the tenure j of leader l .

MigStudyl , MigExilel , MigDipll , MigMilitl : dummies forstudies abroad, exile, migration for diplomacy and for militaryreasons.

Xl : vector of leader-level controls

Time dummies τj .

Country �xed e�ects ηi .

Ci ,j : vector of country-level variables averaged over tenure j .

εi ,j ,t : error term. SE clustered at the country level.



Leader-level controls:

Dummy women,

Dummy high education (1 if at least a master's degree),

Duration (in years) of the tenure,

Ten dummies for the profession of leader l (Law, Economics,Health, Military, Business, Administration, Academics, Worker,Scientist and Religious).

Time-varying country-level controls (averaged over the tenure):

GDP per capita level and yearly growth rate (PWT),

Population (WDI),

Emigration rate (built from Ozden et al. 2011),

Students abroad (data from Spilimbergo 2009).

Additionally:

Polity score at the arrival in power of leader l ,

Change in the Polity score observed during the predecessor's tenure.


Main endogeneity concerns

→ Potential reverse causality: relationship going from politicaloutcomes to the propensity that the leader is a returnee rather thanthe opposite.

1 We investigate the determinants (and notably, whetherdemocratization is a determinant) of the likelihood that areturn migrant reaches power;

2 We investigate the correlation between the leader's migrationexperience and democratization before his arrival;

3 We introduce in the benchmark speci�cation additionalcontrols to capture the political trends before the leader'sarrival.


Main endogeneity concerns

→ Potential omitted variables: spurious correlation if a third factor,both a�ecting political outcomes during the tenure and thelikelihood that the leader is a return migrant, is not controlled for.

Aside from the political context prior to the arrival in power:

1 Time-varying regional shocks;

2 Individual selection into migration;

3 Nepotism/dynastic political systems;

4 Possible intervention of foreign countries in the choice of theleader.


Benchmark results

Dependent: Delta Polity (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

Initial Polity score -0.410*** -0.317*** -0.283*** -0.233**(0.0835) (0.0879) (0.0981) (0.0945)

Delta Polity - Predecessor -0.225*** -0.110* -0.143** -0.115*(0.0627) (0.0653) (0.0651) (0.0667)

Initially autocratic 0.0579 1.567 -0.621(1.497) (1.311) (1.441)

Mig - Study 0.655 0.633 0.721 -0.199 -0.168 -0.210(0.484) (0.484) (0.462) (0.540) (0.509) (0.516)

Initially autocratic 2.349** 2.449** 2.735**x Mig - Study (1.042) (1.179) (1.182)

Mig - Exile -0.109 -0.352 -0.0654 0.186 0.448 0.417(0.639) (0.639) (0.614) (0.753) (0.688) (0.699)

Initially autocratic -0.355 -1.400 -1.019x Mig - Exile (1.307) (1.166) (1.134)

Mig - Diplomacy 0.115 0.250 0.0990 -1.782 -1.856 -1.786(0.869) (0.867) (0.874) (1.140) (1.214) (1.219)

Initially autocratic 3.426** 3.589** 3.357**x Mig - Diplomacy (1.601) (1.598) (1.600)

Mig - Military -0.190 -0.194 -0.270 -1.025 -1.219 -1.145(1.035) (1.088) (1.127) (1.016) (1.198) (1.186)

Initially autocratic 1.261 1.447 1.434x Mig - Military (1.189) (1.274) (1.241)

Profession dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes YesCountry & year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes YesObservations 467 437 437 467 437 437R-squared 0.427 0.402 0.451 0.453 0.471 0.479Number of countries 110 107 107 110 107 107


Benchmark results

Tenures of leaders who studied abroad are characterized by anaverage increase of the Polity score around 2.5 points largerwhen they reached power in an autocratic country.

Correlation between leaders' foreign studies and change indemocracy signi�cant only in relatively autocratic settings,where leaders presumably face a broader room for manoeuvre.

Same for leaders who migrated for diplomatic reasons.Less robust ⇒ main focus on studies abroad.


Potential reverse causality

What drives the arrival in power of a foreign-educated leader?

Individuals who reach the head of the executive power are notpicked up at random → Are speci�c political characteristicsfavorable to the selection of a foreign-educated leader inautocratic countries?

Estimation of the determinants of the dummy indicatingwhether the leader studied abroad:

level and growth rate of the GDP pc, emigration rate, pop andstudents abroad during the previous tenure;average level of the Polity score OR change in the Polity scoreduring the predecessor's tenure;control for the gender, education and profession of the leaderand for year dummies.



(1) (2) (3) (4)Dependent: ProbitMig - Study Whole sample Initially autocratic

Control variables measured during the predecessor's tenure:GDP pc 0.121* 0.111* 0.341* 0.281growth (0.0689) (0.0654) (0.200) (0.198)GDP pc -0.000156*** -0.000151*** 0.000311 0.000360

(4.16e-05) (3.93e-05) (0.000253) (0.000232)Population -0.000197*** -0.000198*** -0.00483** -0.00408**

(5.62e-05) (5.64e-05) (0.00210) (0.00195)Emig -2.537 -2.531 10.47* 10.21*

(1.602) (1.603) (6.080) (6.200)Students 2.008 1.959 -8.385** -7.617*abroad (1.431) (1.432) (4.103) (4.020)Polity score 0.00915 -0.0919

(0.0169) (0.0560)Delta -0.00854 0.0262Polity score (0.0218) (0.0484)

Characteristics of the leader:Gender Yes Yes Yes YesEducation Yes Yes Yes YesProfession Yes Yes Yes Yes

Year dummies Yes Yes Yes YesObservations 359 359 86 86R-squared 0.318 0.318 0.508 0.491Number of

98 98 54 54countries



Conditional on leader-level controls (gender, education andoccupation), the arrival in power of a foreign-educated leaderis not signi�cantly correlated with the prevailing level norevolution of democracy.→ The prevailing political context does not signi�cantlydetermine the probability of arrival in power of aforeign-educated leader. Also true when focusing on initiallyautocratic settings.

Symmetric results for leaders who migrated for diplomaticreasons.

Table dipl

⇒ Suggestive evidence that speci�c pre-arrival-in-power politicalcircumstances are not driving the benchmark results.



Falsi�cation test: benchmark speci�cations using as dependentvariable the change in the Polity score observed during theprevious leader's tenure (Delta Polity - Predecessor).

Coe�cients associated with foreign studies, migration fordiplomatic or military reasons, and exile, never signi�cant,neither in initially democratic nor in initially autocraticsettings.

Falsi�cation test


Confounding mechanisms

Future leaders who come back from migration when theircountry starts democratizing?→ Additional control: Polity score - Predecessor.Remark: introduces an asymmetry in the measure of the past

level of democracy. Alternatively, average level OR change in

the Polity score during the 5 years preceding the arrival in

power



(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)Dependent: Delta Polity Political trend before Regional

the arrival in power trends

Initially autocratic -0.624 0.421 0.303 -0.723 -0.500(1.526) (1.527) (1.543) (1.948) (2.132)

Mig - Study -0.209 -0.299 -0.327 -0.665 -0.714(0.514) (0.546) (0.556) (0.597) (0.585)

Initially autocratic 2.734** 2.758** 2.807** 3.184** 3.168**x Mig - Study (1.181) (1.267) (1.309) (1.289) (1.287)

Mig - Exile 0.417 0.650 0.696 -0.468 -0.521(0.702) (0.642) (0.624) (0.784) (0.794)

Initially autocratic -1.017 -1.091 -1.038 -2.064 -2.245x Mig - Exile (1.159) (1.158) (1.179) (1.503) (1.647)

Mig - Diplomacy -1.786 -1.555 -1.531 -1.413 -1.400(1.223) (1.227) (1.222) (1.354) (1.374)

Initially autocratic 3.356** 2.590* 2.537* 3.354* 3.413*x Mig - Diplomacy (1.589) (1.529) (1.512) (1.838) (1.848)

Mig - Military -1.143 -1.128 -1.026 -0.763 -0.858(1.151) (1.209) (1.190) (1.734) (1.622)

Initially autocratic 1.433 1.532 1.408 0.183 0.180x Mig - Military (1.231) (1.179) (1.174) (1.391) (1.386)

Polity score - Predecessor 0.000989 -0.0486(0.0790) (0.0917)

Polity score average - 5 years -0.0516(0.0679)

Polity score delta - 5 years -0.0640(0.0669)

Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes YesCountry & year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes YesRegional trends No No No Yes YesObservations 437 428 423 437 437R-squared 0.479 0.493 0.495 0.629 0.630Number of countries 107 107 105 107 107



Future leaders who come back from migration when theircountry starts democratizing?→ Additional control: Polity score - Predecessor.Remark: introduces an asymmetry in the measure of the past

level of democracy. Alternatively, average level OR change in

the Polity score during the 5 years preceding the arrival in

power.

Time-varying shocks at the regional level a�ecting the patternof democratization in entire regions of the world and thelikelihood that the leader is a returnee?→ Additional controls: set of interactions between (13)regional dummies and time trends.



(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)Dependent: Delta Polity Political trend before Regional

the arrival in power trends

Initially autocratic -0.624 0.421 0.303 -0.723 -0.500(1.526) (1.527) (1.543) (1.948) (2.132)

Mig - Study -0.209 -0.299 -0.327 -0.665 -0.714(0.514) (0.546) (0.556) (0.597) (0.585)

Initially autocratic 2.734** 2.758** 2.807** 3.184** 3.168**x Mig - Study (1.181) (1.267) (1.309) (1.289) (1.287)

Mig - Exile 0.417 0.650 0.696 -0.468 -0.521(0.702) (0.642) (0.624) (0.784) (0.794)


Mig - Diplomacy -1.786 -1.555 -1.531 -1.413 -1.400(1.223) (1.227) (1.222) (1.354) (1.374)

Initially autocratic 3.356** 2.590* 2.537* 3.354* 3.413*x Mig - Diplomacy (1.589) (1.529) (1.512) (1.838) (1.848)

Mig - Military -1.143 -1.128 -1.026 -0.763 -0.858(1.151) (1.209) (1.190) (1.734) (1.622)

Initially autocratic 1.433 1.532 1.408 0.183 0.180x Mig - Military (1.231) (1.179) (1.174) (1.391) (1.386)

Polity score - Predecessor 0.000989 -0.0486(0.0790) (0.0917)

Polity score average - 5 years -0.0516(0.0679)

Polity score delta - 5 years -0.0640(0.0669)

Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes YesCountry & year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes YesRegional trends No No No Yes YesObservations 437 428 423 437 437R-squared 0.479 0.493 0.495 0.629 0.630Number of countries 107 107 105 107 107



Selection into migration: individuals who decide to migratemay have speci�c characteristics that make them more proneto migrate AND to be democrat, and that would also havemade them more prone to be democrat had they not migrated.→ Two empirical exercises attempting to isolate the migrationdecision, which may be correlated with individualcharacteristics also a�ecting the taste for democracy, and theimpact of migration.

1 Control for the occupation of the leader's father (12dummies). Obj: capture unobserved characteristics inheritedfrom the family, that may determine both the likelihood tomigrate and the taste for democracy.

2 Exclude leaders who migrated for studies after the age of 15.Arguably, leaders who migrated for studies before 15 did notdecide it themselves, but rather followed their parents' decision.



(6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)Dependent: Delta Polity Selection into migration

Initially autocratic -0.453 -0.488 -0.739 1.840 1.372 0.848(1.232) (1.291) (1.835) (2.163) (2.464) (3.522)

Mig - Study -0.0890 -0.0790 -0.789 -0.0683 -0.0249 -0.628(0.528) (0.531) (0.629) (2.326) (2.331) (2.681)

Initially autocratic 2.538** 2.533** 3.005** 12.41** 12.23** 20.57***x Mig - Study (1.190) (1.187) (1.270) (4.788) (4.884) (6.420)

Mig - Exile 0.622 0.628 -0.246 1.181 1.104 2.169*(0.659) (0.662) (0.726) (1.542) (1.528) (1.286)

Initially autocratic -1.035 -1.014 -1.395 1.850 2.444 -0.818x Mig - Exile (1.102) (1.110) (1.462) (2.292) (2.460) (3.258)

Mig - Diplomacy -1.921 -1.926 -1.722 -0.685 -0.634 -1.809(1.164) (1.166) (1.233) (1.753) (1.681) (1.742)

Initially autocratic 2.816* 2.800* 2.861* 0.895 0.507 1.508x Mig - Diplomacy (1.530) (1.515) (1.609) (1.799) (1.769) (2.632)

Mig - Military -0.987 -0.964 -1.473 -0.818 -0.353 1.361(1.208) (1.185) (1.729) (1.777) (1.771) (2.465)

Initially autocratic 1.242 1.225 -0.230 -0.0336 -0.276 -1.379x Mig - Military (1.238) (1.237) (1.414) (2.256) (2.239) (3.029)

Polity score - Predecessor 0.0107 -0.0331 0.104 0.156(0.0723) (0.0834) (0.131) (0.161)

Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes YesCountry & year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes YesRegional trends No No Yes No No YesFather's profession dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes YesStudies abroad before 15 No No No Yes Yes YesObservations 437 437 437 252 252 252R-squared 0.525 0.525 0.679 0.671 0.674 0.914Number of countries 107 107 107 86 86 86



Dynastic political systems: if nepotism is widespread, plausiblethat individuals who have access to the political networksmake their migration decisions while they already know thatthey have a high probability to reach power.→ Additional control: dummy equaling one if the leader has afamilial link with one of the previous leaders of the country (≈17.5%).



Dependent: (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)Delta Polity Family link

Initially autocratic -0.693 -0.735 -0.609 -0.672 0.182(1.414) (1.501) (2.089) (1.797) (3.289)

Mig - Study -0.203 -0.196 -0.714 -0.778 -2.416(0.510) (0.509) (0.585) (0.631) (2.899)

Initially autocratic 2.769** 2.768** 3.184** 3.005** 23.41***x Mig - Study (1.188) (1.190) (1.298) (1.269) (6.436)

Mig - Exile 0.493 0.497 -0.435 -0.276 4.506**(0.698) (0.699) (0.820) (0.730) (1.888)


Mig - Diplomacy -1.858 -1.861 -1.446 -1.700 -1.982(1.185) (1.185) (1.365) (1.248) (1.775)

Initially autocratic 3.280** 3.263** 3.400* 2.848* 1.055x Mig - Diplomacy (1.552) (1.534) (1.825) (1.622) (2.566)

Mig - Military -1.072 -1.049 -0.802 -1.517 4.454(1.170) (1.139) (1.636) (1.757) (3.160)

Initially autocratic 1.306 1.289 0.143 -0.213 -5.654x Mig - Military (1.235) (1.221) (1.405) (1.413) (4.240)

Family link -0.864 -0.877 -0.527 0.311 -3.692*(0.605) (0.603) (0.530) (0.689) (2.158)

Polity score - Predecessor 0.0115 -0.0400 -0.0368 0.237(0.0773) (0.0906) (0.0821) (0.161)

Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes YesCountry & year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes YesRegional trends No No Yes Yes YesFather's prof. dummies No No No Yes YesStudies abroad before 15 No No No No YesObservations 437 437 437 437 252R-squared 0.484 0.484 0.631 0.679 0.921Number of countries 107 107 107 107 86



Dynastic political systems: if nepotism is widespread, plausiblethat individuals who have access to the political networksmake their migration decisions while they already know thatthey have a high probability to reach power.→ Additional control: dummy equaling one if the leader has afamilial link with one of the previous leaders of the country (≈17.5%).

Geopolitical relationships between countries: around 1.5% ofthe leaders reached power thanks to external countries.→ Additional control: dummy equaling one if the leader hasbeen imposed by a foreign country.



Dependent: (17) (18) (19) (20) (21)Delta Polity Foreign imposition

Initially autocratic -0.653 -0.656 -0.502 -0.683 0.848(1.462) (1.550) (2.134) (1.839) (3.522)

Mig - Study -0.208 -0.207 -0.714 -0.787 -0.628(0.517) (0.514) (0.586) (0.631) (2.681)

Initially autocratic 2.741** 2.741** 3.167** 3.025** 20.57***x Mig - Study (1.190) (1.189) (1.290) (1.263) (6.420)

Mig - Exile 0.388 0.388 -0.522 -0.220 2.169*(0.714) (0.717) (0.823) (0.754) (1.286)


Mig - Diplomacy -1.784 -1.784 -1.400 -1.723 -1.809(1.219) (1.223) (1.378) (1.234) (1.742)

Initially autocratic 3.358** 3.357** 3.415* 2.825* 1.508x Mig - Diplomacy (1.603) (1.592) (1.850) (1.602) (2.632)

Mig - Military -1.155 -1.154 -0.858 -1.483 1.361(1.188) (1.152) (1.627) (1.724) (2.465)

Initially autocratic 1.457 1.456 0.181 -0.239 -1.379x Mig - Military (1.245) (1.234) (1.388) (1.418) (3.029)

Foreign imposition 0.592 0.591 0.0344 -0.742(1.351) (1.351) (2.092) (2.243)

Polity score - Predecessor 0.000878 -0.0487 -0.0317 0.156(0.0791) (0.0916) (0.0830) (0.161)

Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes YesCountry & year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes YesRegional trends No No Yes Yes YesFather's prof. dummies No No No Yes YesStudies abroad before 15 No No No No YesObservations 437 437 437 437 252R-squared 0.480 0.480 0.630 0.679 0.914Number of countries 107 107 107 107 86


Alternative outcomes

Two di�erent measures of democracy: indexes of CivilLiberties and of Political Rights (Freedom House).Compared to the Polity score (based on institutional criterion),more de facto indicators (built from public perceptionmeasures).Remark: range from 0 to 7, a higher score indicating less

freedom.

Three indexes used as dependent variables both in changeduring the tenure, and in average during the tenure


Alternative outcomes

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)Dependent: Delta Delta Delta Average Average Average

Polity CL PR Polity CL PR

Initially autocratic -0.621 0.239 1.088*** -8.799*** 1.729*** 2.305***(1.441) (0.255) (0.308) (0.784) (0.201) (0.221)

Mig - Study -0.210 0.203* 0.512*** -0.00196 0.276** 0.0910(0.516) (0.120) (0.189) (0.412) (0.133) (0.148)

Initially autocratic 2.735** -0.137 -0.780** 1.792*** -0.448** -0.503*x Mig - Study (1.182) (0.205) (0.325) (0.644) (0.190) (0.271)

Mig - Exile 0.417 -0.295* -0.284 -0.0921 -0.281 0.185(0.699) (0.168) (0.242) (0.572) (0.199) (0.224)

Initially autocratic -1.019 0.506 0.567 0.853 -0.0334 -0.676**x Mig - Exile (1.134) (0.334) (0.426) (0.984) (0.235) (0.296)

Mig - Diplomacy -1.786 0.421 0.518 -0.778 0.211 -0.0325(1.219) (0.291) (0.492) (0.616) (0.186) (0.270)

Initially autocratic 3.357** -0.490 -1.058* 0.723 -0.399 -0.348x Mig - Diplomacy (1.600) (0.386) (0.546) (0.994) (0.276) (0.358)

Mig - Military -1.145 -0.504** -0.341 -0.441 -0.360 -0.779***(1.186) (0.237) (0.284) (0.742) (0.224) (0.251)

Initially autocratic 1.434 0.0947 -0.0278 0.450 0.173 0.798***x Mig - Military (1.241) (0.235) (0.457) (0.652) (0.263) (0.271)

Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes YesCountry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes YesYear dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes YesObservations 437 302 302 467 415 415R-squared 0.479 0.515 0.611 0.821 0.652 0.701Number of countries 107 97 97 110 113 113


Destination

Is foreign education di�erently correlated to the change indemocracy depending on the country where it was acquired?

→ Split the sample of foreign-educated leaders between those whostudied in a high-income OECD country and the others.


Destination

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)

Initially autocratic -0.726 -0.708 -0.566 -0.794 -0.720 -0.730 0.848(1.433) (1.513) (2.116) (1.821) (1.788) (1.824) (3.522)

Mig - Study, HIOECD -0.240 -0.243 -0.664 -0.672 -0.653 -0.671 -0.628(0.512) (0.509) (0.599) (0.654) (0.659) (0.657) (2.681)

Init. autoc. 3.460*** 3.463*** 3.844*** 3.368** 3.368** 3.424** 20.57***x Mig - Study, HIOECD (1.314) (1.306) (1.411) (1.385) (1.381) (1.384) (6.420)Mig - Study, other 1.011 1.011 -0.455 -1.337 -1.381 -1.294

(1.072) (1.071) (1.014) (1.266) (1.239) (1.284)Init. Autoc. 0.355 0.349 1.558 2.677 2.723 2.598x Mig - Study, other (1.463) (1.478) (1.626) (1.715) (1.724) (1.729)Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes YesCountry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes YesYear dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes YesPolity score - Pred. No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes YesRegional trends No No Yes Yes Yes Yes YesFather's prof. No No No Yes Yes Yes YesFamily link No No No No Yes No NoForeign imposition No No No No No Yes NoBefore 15 No No No No No No YesObservations 437 437 437 437 437 437 252R-squared 0.485 0.485 0.633 0.680 0.680 0.680 0.914Nb of countries 107 107 107 107 107 107 86


Destination

Correlation driven by leaders who studied in high-income OECDcountries → consistent with the idea that foreign education has apositive impact on leaders' propensity to democratize.

Two di�erent mechanisms, potentially simultaneously at play:

the quality of education: leaders who studied abroad may havebene�ted from higher quality training and developed higherskills, and better educated leaders may be more prone todemocracy.

a �preference shock� that would make leader who study abroadbecome more favorable to democracy (`transfers of politicalnorms').


Conclusion

New data on the characteristics of political leaders in thedeveloping world over the 1960-2004 period.

Positive correlation between the leader having studied abroadand the evolution of democracy during his leadership.

Robust to various tests for potential reverse causality (e.g.political selection process) and potential omitted factors (e.g.individual selection into migration).

Driven by studies in high-income OECD countries.

→ The emergence of political elites as a new channel throughwhich emigration may a�ect politics in developing countries.


Thank you!


Afghanistan Croatia Lebanon PhilippinesAlbania Czech Republic Lesotho PolandAlgeria Djibouti Liberia RomaniaAngola Dominican Republic Lithuania RussiaArgentina Ecuador Macedonia RwandaArmenia Egypt Madagascar El SalvadorAzerbaijan Equatorial Guinea Malawi SenegalBahrain Estonia Malaysia Sierra LeoneBangladesh Ethiopia Mali Slovak RepublicBelarus Fiji Mauritania SomaliaBenin Gabon Mauritius South AfricaBhutan Gambia Mexico Sri LankaBolivia Ghana Moldova SudanBotswana Guatemala Mongolia SyriaBrazil Guinea Morocco TajikistanBulgaria Guinea-Bissau Mozambique TanzaniaBurkina Faso Guyana Namibia ThailandBurundi Haiti Nepal TogoCambodia Honduras Nicaragua TunisiaCameroon Hungary Niger TurkeyCape Verde India Nigeria UgandaCentral African Republic Indonesia Oman UkraineChile Iran Pakistan UruguayChina Jamaica Panama UzbekistanColombia Jordan Papua New Guinea VenezuelaComoros Kenya Paraguay ZambiaDemocratic Republic of Congo Republic of Korea Peru ZimbabweCosta Rica Latvia

Sample


(1) (2) (3) (4)Dependent: ProbitMig - Diplomacy Whole sample Initially autocratic

Control variables measured during the predecessor's tenure:GDP pc -0.643*** -0.673*** 0.387 0.743growth (0.223) (0.226) (0.685) (0.692)GDP pc 2.86e-05 4.46e-05 9.85e-05 0.000139

(5.11e-05) (4.76e-05) (0.000292) (0.000302)Population -6.50e-05 -6.50e-05 0.000204 0.000107

(0.000134) (0.000138) (0.000798) (0.000758)Emig -12.17*** -11.97*** -9.750 -8.312

(4.223) (4.297) (6.735) (6.838)Students 0.615 0.447 -2.025 -2.879abroad (1.680) (1.614) (3.942) (4.508)Polity score 0.0271 -0.0200

(0.0236) (0.0594)Delta -0.00501 -0.0618Polity score (0.0370) (0.0577)

Characteristics of the leader:Gender Yes Yes Yes YesEducation Yes Yes Yes YesProfession Yes Yes Yes Yes

Year dummies Yes Yes Yes YesObservations 222 222 46 46R-squared 0.297 0.292 0.140 0.154Number of

88 88 36 36countries

What drives...


Dependent: Delta Polity - Predecessor (1) (2)

Initially Autocratic -4.921***(1.135)

Mig - Study -0.352 -0.328(0.578) (0.581)

Initially Autocratic x Mig - Study -0.306(1.041)

Mig - Exile -0.0868 -0.286(0.824) (0.954)

Initially Autocratic x Mig - Exile -0.0381(1.538)

Mig - Diplomacy -0.495 -1.041(0.731) (0.637)

Initially Autocratic x Mig - Diplomacy 1.518(1.138)

Mig - Military -0.267 -0.783(1.680) (1.412)

Initially Autocratic x Mig - Military 1.683(1.341)

Leader-level controls Yes YesCountry-level controls Yes YesProfession dummies Yes YesCountry & year dummies Yes YesObservations 437 437R-squared 0.276 0.375Number of countries 107 107

Falsi�cation

Date post:	13-Jul-2016
Category:	Documents
Upload:	unu-merit
View:	47 times
Download:	1 times

UNU March2016

Documents