UofT POL 224 Final Exam notes

LEGISLATURES (01/10/2012)

Readings: Jennifer Smith, “Canada’s Minority Parliament”, in James Bickerton and Alain Gagnon, eds., Canadian Politics, 5th ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009), pp. 133-‐154.

1. Legislatures have a. strong roles and b. weak roles.

2. A: makes laws, pass statutes 3. B: represent voters, deliberate on

legislation, audit the executive 4. Q: Has the strong role been lost

endangering the weak roles? This is different between nations

5. Power of the legislature depends on a. the relationship between the leg and the ex, is the power fused or separates; b. how strong/weak is the party discipline

6. Q: How strong should the legislature be? There is a trade off between efficiency and inclusiveness

7. How is the Congress inclusive and how is the PR efficient?

8. Is the Congress inclusive, 500 people represent 300+ million, they have veto points and the govt is removed from the people

Strong parties Weak parties Fusion of power Parliament

UK/Canada St. Parliament Italy/Poland

Separation of power Weak Congress S. Korea/Argentina

Congress USA

CANADA

1. In the CDN PR, party discipline today is very high; US < UK < Canada

2. CDN from 1840 to 1870 – before disciplined parties

1. HOW DOES THE CABINET CONTROL THE PR?

There are two sets of tools: 1. Govt caucus; 2. Control of the opposition

GOVT CAUCUS

1. Rely on the ambition of the back bench MP to move up in the party hierarchy

2. PM and his CAB control the ability of the MPs to more up in the party

3. PR and his CAB use sticks and carrots to control MPs

4. Sticks: dismissal form caucus, withhold election funds, don’t sign nomination papers (PM), assign new candidates

5. Carrots: promotion to committee chairs, parl. secretary, secretary of the state and cabinet

6. MPs want to move up in the party for power, status and money

7. Party whip oversees discipline, there is also one for the opposition

CONTROL OF THE OPPOSITION

1. Convention: the govt must govern, while the opposition might delay and object

2. If there is a conflict, the govt prevails, has tools to stop opposition: a. closure; b. time allocation

3. Closure – allows government to restrict debate severely – 24 h notice of vote on motion

4. Time allocation – is less severe: fixed schedule, in advance, for passing bills

5. These tools are now used commonly, minority PR might constrain the use of those tools

2. REMAINING ROLES OF THE PARLIAMENT

1. The strong role might be on the decline, but what about the weak roles?

2. Media politics – opposition does not even use the tools available to it?

3. Throne speech debates – beginning of session; much debate; confidence votes

4. Budget debate – after debate tabling; same as above

5. Opposition days – 20/session; opposition motions have precedents and lose

6. Oral question period – major media even, circus? 45 min/day; limited policy content

7. Standing committees – chaired by govt MP (majority govt) except public accounts

a. Proportionate membership

b. Conduct policy review; but the agenda is set by the govt (majority govt)

c. Standing committees also do clause by clause review of bills

8. Constituency service – this is done by individual MPs for their electros – policy relevance is limited

SMITH ON HARPER MINORITY AND MAJORITY

• His rhetoric and reality differed widely • More controlling than any before him? • Still must return to efficient and inclusion

trade off, US comparison • But even if efficiency is good, we might

have too much of a good thing

FROM JOSH’S REVIEW SESSION

• Strong and weak legislatures • Separation of powers and party discipline • If you have greater SOP, then the

legislature will be more powerful because it will not be dominated by the executive

• Disciplined parties weaken the legislature because they strengthen the executive

• How and why did CDN parties develop into disciplined parties? Money & PM uses this knowledge to mold parties

• Has the legislative power in Canada weakened or strengthened? Weakened because the parties have become more disciplined and will only be so, the executive power in Canada is strong

• The cabinet controls the legislature because they have the ability to control the movements of MPs in the parties and they have the ability to control the opposition

• Counter example US: separation of powers and relatively weak parties, but due to political polarization, this might be changing

• In CDN govt closure is used more than before, closure of debate, the strong role is to make policy, the weak role is to represent and debate

• FEDERAL STATES AND FEDERAL SOCIETIES (01/17/2012)

Readings: Reeta Tremblay, et al., Mapping the Political Landscape, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Thomson Nelson, 2007), 217-‐239

COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE ON FEDERALISM

1. Federation: state institutions that divide the sovereignty between two or more levels of the govt

2. Federalism: principle of reconciling unity and diversity via autonomy [reading]

3. * Most states are unitary states

1. FEDERALISM AS AN IDEA

Federalism is a modern idea, the age of liberalism and nationalism

a.) Liberal view: need to divide the govt in order to restrain the power – US federalism started here – also in post-‐war Germany

Key: protect the individual

Federalism cannot exist if the states are not lib democratic – examples: formed USSR, Yugoslavia, and Russia today

b.) Autonomy for nations and ethnicities

Examples of this: Switzerland [1847] classics case, after 500 years of a confederation, Canada [1867], Belgium [1993]

Key: protecting the community

c.) Other factors: size? Australia [1901]

2. FEDERATION AS A VARIABLE INSTITUTION

Not all federal societies are created equally; there are differences in how power is divided between the national and the states, the difference of powers between different states, etc

a.) Centralization/decentralization

• difficult to measure

• Do you look at the formal divisions of power? These might not be the same in practice

• What about own-‐source revenues? • What about transfer payments? … these

also vary in the degree of conditionally

AREND LIJPHART TRIES TO MEASURE CENTRALIZATION

• Only (d) and (e) are on the federal continuum

• (a) unitary centralized states: UK, France, 13 others

• (b) unitary but decentralized: Japan and 4 Nordic nations

• (c) semi-‐federal: Spain, Netherlands, 2 others

• (d) Federal/centralized: Australia, India, Venezuela

• (e) Federal/decentralized: Canada, US, Germany, Australia, Belgium, Switzerland

• Is Canada the most decentralized among the (e)?

In Federal states, how much spending do lower govt control?

• USA: 35% • Australia: 39% • Germany: 43% • Switzerland: 57% • Canada: 58% • The above are only approx and money is

not everything • Canada and Switz may be the most

decentralized: majority of spending is lower controlled

b.) Symmetry/asymmetry

• Most federal system are symmetrical, meaning all subunits get the same powers: this includes US, Germany

• Belgium: cultural communities and regions don’t coincide; need to accommodate Brussels

• Canada? BNA: distinctive features for QC: civil law, French language … but not asymmetrical powers

• Meech Lack and Charlottetown accords proposed to make QC a distinct society

• Was rejected by eh English Canada • Is this because there is a conflict between

individualist communitarian images of federalism?

• Asymmetry is more often in non-‐fed cases: Spain, UK; may be Italy

• A step toward federalism?

c.) Classical v coordinative federalism

• Also called inter-‐state and intra-‐state federalism

• Former divides power between levels to create less interaction: US, Canada, etc

• But much interaction may happen anyways

• In latter, federal may have most powers, but lower level has power at center: Germany and the role of the Lander in Bunderstat

• Encourages collaborative decision making between levels

3. WHAT ABOUT LOCAL GOVERNMENTS?

• Usually delegates powers: federal or unitary

• Exceptions: Switz, India (1992) • Some in Canada also want municipal 3rd

order of the govt • Are cities: creative incubators or are they

dysfunctional? • In federations, delegation usually from the

lower level to the municipal level, but the municipal role varies between countries

a.) Anglo-‐Saxon model: informal, muddling though (US, UK, Canada) ex. Who will pay for social services in Ontario?

b.) Germanic model: formal, collaborative decision making (Germany, Austria, Spain, Belgium)

c.) French: formal, top-‐down, technocratic (France, Italy, Portugal, Greece, and Quebec)

d.) Scandinavian model: formal: much admin devolution, based on consensus

4. GLOBALIZATION AND MULTILEVEL GOVERNANCE

Is globalization pushing power both up and down from once sovereign states? Some argue that Ottawa is loosing power to the provinces who are loosing power to the municipal governments

Some also argue that Ottawa is loosing power in the upward direction to regional and global levels; regional: NAFTA, global: WTO/UN

Result of this might be weakened capacity of the state to solve problems and the triumph of the market or may be not.. may be multilevel governance is how we adapt to globalization, the nation state might be too small for big problems and too big for small problems

Example: The European Union – the EU level – moving toward federalism, but still is a confederation – nation states are not going away – regions are expanding [UK, Spain, Belgium] – based on the principle of subsidiary

Democratic legitimacy argument for more global and local governance

Many issues today are global: envi, financial regulation, development, but there is no democratic forum to decide on those issues

Even the EU suffers form a democratic deficit – so we need regional and global democratic governances

Think of a realist response to this


• Division of sovereignty • What is different about a federal system

from a unitary system? There is a constitutional division of power; the lower level is mandated (has a constitutional right) by the constitution to do its job; in unitary govt the power of to

the lower level is delegated by the central govt

• Canadian federalism started out centralized; initially it became decentralized in the beginning of the 20th century because of the JCPC rulings

• Constrained the power of the central govt, turned highly centralized federalism more into classical federalism, this prevented CDN govt from passing a ‘ND’

• During WWII there was centralization of power because the fed centralized the power of taxation and money leads to political power

• Centralization began to unravel in the 1960s and on, form the QR, differential economic growth between provinces, the nature of the state and what it does expanded making it harder to centralize, the Welfare state expands

• While initially the fed had all the powers, the provinces began to take it back

FEDERALISM AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

• Globalization is causing power to move above and below the state

• ‘Glocalization’ – globalization and localizations

• Do federal models provide guidance as to how we should move forward with GG?

• Does the EU represent a potential model for the future?

• Integration of financial and social polices, as well as of national cultural identity

• As the world become more integrated there is a need for some over reaching authority, overarching legislative structure

• Political decisions begin to affect each other – need for coordination at a supranational level

• Europe is similar, but is it not similar enough to be successful in the EU project?

• Why would anyone want to give up their power to a supranational organizations? This is the realist argument

EVOLUTION OF CANADIAN FEDERALISM (01/24/2012)

Reading: Richard Simeon and Ian Robinson, “The Dynamics of Canadian Federalism”, in James Bickerton and Alain Gagnon, eds., Canadian Politics, 5th ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009), pp. 155-‐178.

Now Canada is decentralized, but it was not this way in the begging

1. BRITISH NORTH AMERICAN ACT (1867)

In this act Ottawa was more powerful than the provinces because it had 1. More powers 2. Had the right to invade 3. Left the provinces with modest powers

1. More powers: sec 91 starts with residual power (peace, order and good govt; POGG) had main economic and security powers – in the spheres of agriculture and immigration the powers were concurrent but the feds have paramountcy

2. The right to invade: LG may use reservation to block prov leg, Ottawa may disallow such legislation and Ottawa can use declaratory power in prov areas

3. Modest provincial powers, sec 92 gives provinces fewer fiscal means (direct taxation and natural resources); soc inst: hospitals & charities, education and municipal and local

2. DECLINE OF FEDERAL DOMINANCE 1867 TO 1930S

1. Provinces rose in the 20th century, their fiscal means rose in importance (income, sales, and property taxes) and social policy also rose in importance, like building the welfare state

2. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council converted centralism into classical federalism

3. Key: how it treated POGG; POGG was the basis for fed claims in disputed areas

4. Local Prohibition Case (1896) JCPC drastically restricted POGG, the power in disputed areas was confined to 1. If the power is not on the prov list in sec 92 and

2. If the disputed area had a national dimension

5. Snyder Case (1925) went further: POGG only gave power to Ottawa in disputed areas in times of emergency – most disputed powers now under prov control

6. Social Insurance Act Reference (1937) blocked Bennett’s New Deal – depression not an emergency – no New Deal in Canada

3. WAR TIME CENTRALIZATION, 1939 -‐45

1. JCPC allows Ottawa to use War Measures Act to take prov taxes and powers needed in war time

2. This is based on the emergency view of POGG

3. After the war, Ottawa still has all that money

4. COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM, 1945-‐65

1. After WWII CDN builds a welfare state under federal leadership

2. Sometime Ottawa administer is after a constitutional amendments: EI (1940); pensions (1951, 1965)

3. Sometimes in prov jurisdiction with Ottawa handing back some of that money to cover the costs 1. Health insurance (1958, 1968), 2. Universities (1960), 3. Social Assistance (1956, 1966)

4. Money handed back are conditional grants, preserving power of the federal govt

5. Poor provs also get equalization grants 6. If this was cooperative it was because the

provinces were weak, this later changed 7. Initially in Quebec, the Quite Revolution 8. Then in the West with the natural

resources boom 9. And then everywhere with province

building 10. Today the right to invade powers are

virtually extinct, by convention

5. COMPETITIVE FEDERALISM, 1965 TO 95

1. Substantial decentralization – prov challenge yields conflict

2. 1977 Ottawa replaces conditional grants with block grants for health and universities

3. Block grants are unconditional for universities and modestly conditional for health

4. 1995 extension of block grants to social assistance, these were also unconditional

5. Today there are almost no fully conditional grants

6. 1995 Ottawa drastically cut total transfers to provinces, the provinces then cut health care, social assistance and university funding

7. Post war Ottawa lead creation of the welfare state and also its dismantling

8. Constitutional negotiations were also a part of this era 1. Meech Lake; 2. Charlottetown – would have restricted the federal powers limiting the spending power of the fed government and may be via Distinct Society clause, but the accords failed

6. CONTEMPORARY ERA, SINCE 1995 TO PRESENT

1. Collaborative? Haddow prefers ‘disengaging’ between the two levels of the govt

2. Agreements on economic union in 1994 and social union in 1999 were collaborative

3. Economic union – reduced inter-‐prov trade barriers; social union included fed promise to use spending powers less

4. Ottawa introduced new child benefits in 1999 and 2006 which go directly to the people, bypassing provinces

5. Ottawa cut EI unilaterally in 1994, pushing more people onto provincial social assistance

6. Health accords restored 1995 transfer cuts; modest collaboration, but in 2012 Ottawa offers new formula of health funding with no prov input and promising no oversight of prov health care

7. May be they are disengaging, ending post 1045 overlap

ELECTORAL SYSTEMS AND DEMOCRATIC REFORM (01/31/2012)

Readings: 1) A. Brian Tanguay, “Reforming Representative Democracy,” in James Bickerton and Alain Gagnon, eds., Canadian Politics, 5th ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009), pp. 221-‐248. 2) Lisa Young, “Women (Not) in Politics”, in James Bickerton and Alain Gagnon, eds., Canadian Politics, 5th ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009), pp. 283-‐300.

1. WHY DO ELECTORAL SYSTEMS MATTER?

1. Electoral systems affect the expression of the popular will

2. Compare SMP and PR systems; SMP: single member plurality; PR: proportional representation

3. PR: seats = % votes 4. SMP: over rewards the 1st party 5. Fed. Liberal from 1993 to 2000 and Tories

in 2011 – most votes yields much higher % of seats than votes

6. Even if the party gets minority of votes, they can form a majority govt

7. Contrast how SMP treats 3rd parties (NDP then, Liberal now) for smaller parties the % of the vote exceed the number of seats they get

8. Who supports PR systems? Not governing parties

9. SMP – does it distort democracy or is it a source of stable govt & does it mean adversarial politics?

2. CAIRNS THESIS AND CANADA

1. SMP: rewards divisive regional parties and punishes weak national parties, weakening national unity

2. Evidence: Separatist BQ: always larger % of seats than votes until 2011

3. SMP: exaggerates regional voting variation 4. Evidence: Liberals win few AB seats but

get ¼ of the vote, same with Cons, even though they get 1/5 of the vote

5. NDP is much less a QC party in votes than seats, 2011

6. Voters are more balances than caucuses and this too weakens national unity

3. ALTERNATIVES

1. Two stage majoritarian a. France b. 1st and 2nd candidates run off

2. Preferential ballot/ alternative vote a. Australia b. Voters rank candidates in a district c. Drop candidates with fewest 1st

choices; distribute their votes to their 2nd choice

d. Still no majority? Repeat for candidates 2nd fewest 1st choices, etc

e. Winner is the least disliked 3. Single transferable vote STV

a. Ireland b. Uses multi-‐member districts (5) c. Voters rank their preference d. CNDDT needs 20% to win seat e. If the top cnddt gets 26%, the 6%

are transferred to the 2nd choice f. Repeat for others with surplus g. Got to 3rd or lower choices until 5

seats are filled 4. Mixed member proportional MMP

a. German Bundestag b. Modified PR system: PR for overall

party balance, but with individual districts

c. 2 ballots: 1 for SMP member and ! for party list

d. parties with lower % SMP seats than votes are compensated with extra seats from the list

e. Germany: 5% threshold for fringe parties

4. CANADIAN DEBATE

1. There is much debate, but no action; in BC the assembly recommended STV in 2004 and in Ontario there was a proposition for MMP system in 2006, both initiatives were rejected in election referenda; QC suggested a form of PR, but …

2. No province has changes and thee is no federal discussion on the matter

3. Is this because of 1. Vested interests of the politicians? 2. What about the voters? May be the arguments for change are not convincing

REFORMERS

• More diverse leg in terms of gender and ethnicity

• Might enhance participation, reduce cynicism and end wasted votes

• More accurate reflection of popular will and better for national unity

OPPONENTS

• Parties address diversity via brokerage • PR systems also suffer from declining

voting • Is participation such a good thing? • Aren’t all list based systems elitist and

what about stability?

POLITICAL PARTIES AND PARTY SYSTEMS (02/07/2012)

Reading: Daniele Caramini, “Party Systems”, in Caramani, ed., Comparative Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 316-‐345 [Course pack]

PARTIES: non-‐state organization that seek to control or/ and influence state executive, the govt

PARTY SYSTEMS: effective number of parties, power of each party, and the relations among them

1. TYPES OF PARTIES

CADRE V MASS

• Cadre parties are controlled by a small elite, they tend to emerge in legs and most are early parties from 19th century

• Mass are rank and file control, these parties tend to have non-‐leg origins, they are usually originate in union, farmers, NGOs, etc

• R. Michels Iron Law of Oligarchy • Parties want to win, and cadre parties are

better at winning, so mass parties tend to turn into cadre parties or die

• Parties also need members and money to win

• Cadre parties have broadened … for policies?

BROKERAGE V IDEOLOGICAL

• Brokerage: aggregate existing interest in order to win, often have cadre origins

• Ideological: articulate ideas and interests, cause, often mass origin

• Same fate?

DO SUCCESSFUL PARTIES FROM CARTELS?

2. PARTY SYSTEMS HAVE SOCIAL ORIGINS

• Parties act positionally, in systems & reflect broader social cleavages

• NATIONAL REVOLUTION in the 19th century created parties

• Liberals (capitalist, urban, free trade) v Conservatives (aristocratic, rural, protection)

• If the conservative parties do not challenge the secular state, then Catholic parties form

• Industrial revolution yields broader suffrage, new parties by the early 20th century

• Agrarian parties challenge urban dominance

• Key: socialist parties to rep workers, challenge upper classes

• After 1917, Communist parties split off from latter challenge reformism

• Fascist parties emerge to challenge those

• Lipset and Rokkan 1967 cleavage structure frozen after 1920s

• But post materialism cause partial thaw • New left parties celebrate this and new

right challenges this

3. INSTITUTIONS AFFECT THE PARTY SYSTEM

1. Not all social cleavages yield party divisions – some cleavages might die out and sometimes they overlap within a party

2. Some die out, like some agrarian, religious, communist, fascist

3. In the US, Reps = classical liberalism and the new right and the Dems = reformed liberalism and post material

4. Is there similar over laps in Canada? 5. Institutions influence is cleavages yield

party divisions and the number of parties

ELECTORAL SYSTEMS ARE KEY

• We know that SMP favors big parties and punishes small ones, contrast this with PR

• Duverger’s Law 1954: SMP favors a 2 party system while PR favors a multiparty system

• SMP: more soc cleavages overlap and more parties die out

• How do you count effective parties? • What is SMP combines with regionalized

voting?

FEDERALISM ALSO MATTERS

• Decentralize federalism means more regional parties and weaker federal and provincial party links, like CDN

4. CAN THE PARTIES INFLUENCE THE INSTITUTIONS?

• Yes; Boix 1999 • In the early 20th almost all states had SMP

systems, but then most moved to a PR system, why did this happen?

• Socialist parties threatened the dominance of liberal and conservative ounces

• Not in US or CDN and is not a problem if an old party dies out like in the UK

• Otherwise, PR, etc., prevents socialists form winning v divided right

• Once CDN example BC 1952

5. DO PARTIES DIFFER?

• Downs 1957 – not if voters are normally distributed on the left-‐right spectrum

• Parties want to win, so they move to center to capture marginal voted, beating opponent

• But what is distribution is bi-‐model? • Temptation to move to the center is less

and in a multiparty system, moving to the center opens space for extreme parties

CANADA’S PARTY SYSTEM (02/14/2012)

Reading: William Cross, “Representation and Political Parties,” in James Bickerton and Alain Gagnon, eds., Canadian Politics, 5th ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009), pp. 249-‐264. 2) Anthony Sayers, “The End of Brokerage?” in M. Whittington & Glen Williams, eds., Canadian Politics in the 21st Century, 7th ed., (Toronto: Thomson Nelson, 2008), pp. 137-‐152 [Course pack]

1. THE CANADIAN ANOMALIES

UNTIL 2011, THE LIBS AND THE CONS WERE MAIN PARTIES

• Did not divide along social (class) cleavages

• Much more brokerage than ideological

THESE PARTIES HAD A FRANCHISE STRUCTURE

• Hyper cadre on policy • But were decentralized when it came to

candidates, local campaigns

THE MAIN PARTIES WERE ONLY CONTESTED BY MINOR PARTIES, WHICH FAILED TO BREAK THE MOULD

2. WHY

• Frank Underhill 1930s: back to the beginning

• Province of Canada form 1840 to 67 was diverse, fissured: lang, religions, region, urban/ rural, class

• Double majority convention • So governing meant deal making by the

liberal-‐conservative party, later became conservatives, later progressive conservatives

• This extended to the new federation after 1867

• Liberals were more ideological and lost until Laurier’s 1096 brokerage breakthrough

• Winning elections requires money so that one party principle was getting money, links to business

• This provides an opening for smaller parties 1. Progressives, 1920s; farmers, some workers; 2. CCF/NDP on the left and Social credit on the right

• When CCF/NDP threatened, brokerage parties accommodated

3. PARTY SYSTEMS FROM 1867 TO 1993

PERIODIC CRISIS DID RECONFIGURE THE SYSTEM

Par sys.

Period Style Level Crisis at outset

# of parties

1 1867 to 1917

Brokerage

Local 1837 Lord Durham

1 party dom; 2 parties

2 1921 to 1957

Brokerage

Regional

WW1; conscript.

1 party dom; 2 p +

3 1963 to 1999

Brokerage

National

Govt party collapse

Competitive 2 p +

4 1993 -‐ Ideological?

National and regional

Mulroney coalition collapse

Competitive multi-‐party/unstable

• 1st and 2nd systems: when brokerage works it is conducive to 1 part dominance

• Conservative dominance form 1840 to 90s • Succeeded by liberals from 1896 to 1984 • Rise in ‘level’ of brokerage • WW! Crisis loosened broker’s influence

and permitted farmers and workers to mobilize

• Post war Liberal hegemony and welfare state; alienation of the west

• 1984 to 93 Mulroney coalition and demise, alienation of Ontario, then everybody

• End of an era?

4. SINCE 1993, THERE IS A FOURTH SYSTEM, BUT WHAT IS IT?

• End of Progressive Conservative Party • Rise of Reform then Canadian Alliance in

the west on the right and of BC in QC • 2003: PC and CA merge: Conservative

Party: brokerage again or a right party? • 2011: Liberal party in the 3rd place, ‘left’

NDP is 2nd; BQ collapse; for how long? • Will NDP replace the Liberals as the

majority party? • Has ideological cleavage replaced

brokerage? Does ideological conflict displace regional conflict

• Or is it the new regional politics? • A ‘right’ west v ‘left’ QC and maybe AC

with ON divided between urban and rural • Implications for the future, national unity?


• Electoral systems in terms of Canadian party systems, how can we explain the Canadian system with the reference to the electoral system?

• Party system: a number of viable parties within a system, for most of the system before WWII we had a two party system

• Challenges which weakened the two party system were the Social Credit party in the West in the 1920s and the CCF

• Now Canada has a two and a half party system

• The messy system began in 1994 when the Conservatives lost the election and the Reform Party became a large oppositional group in the West, BQ made large strides and became the official opposition, NDP was also there

• Why did this happen? Political and economic dynamics, the Quite Revolution increased Quebec nationalism, the Ch accords tried to satisfy Quebec’s distinctiveness – party which lead the movement were the PC, so many people in Quebec voted for the PC because they thought they will able to do this

• After people in QC realized, no, went to BQ, BQ: wanted recognition for distinctiveness, the West/Reform party tried to address the issues of Western alienation and growing economic wealth in the West

• Cleavages: economic often match up with regions/ ethnic/ cultural/religious

• How do parties replicate social cleavages • What kind of a system are we headed

towards? A two party system? What are the major fault lines of CDN politics today? (1) development of the oil sands, resources in the west (2) manufacturing in the center – interests do not always match up, there are differences within the systems

• QC nationalism as a future fault line? • Distinction between mass parties and

cadre parties, in CDN there is an amalgamation of both

• Post M and the NSM – how do they relate to the Charter and how has the Charter interacted with the new movements, envoi, fem, LGBTQ, rights wing

INTEREST GROUPS AND NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENTS (02/28/2012)

Reading: Eric Montpetit, “Are Interest Groups Useful or Harmful?” in James Bickerton and Alain Gagnon, eds., Canadian Politics, 5th ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009), pp. 265-‐282. 2) Charles Lindblom, “The Market as Prison,” The Journal of Politics, vol. 44, no. 2 (1982), pp. 324-‐336. [On-‐line reading]

[Access on-‐line from UTL, starting with journal title; then select JSTOR]

1. INTEREST GROUPS IN CANADA AND THE US

• Non-‐govt organizations with common interests

• Influence the state form the outside the govt and the legislature

• Contrast interest groups with political parties

NORTH AMERICA: A PLURALIST SETTING

• Pluralist: mostly competitive and unregulated policy environment

• Groups may evolve from issues oriented to institutionalized … if they master selective incentives

POLICY NETWORKS/COMMUNITIES

• Key interest groups and state agencies differ among sectors… pluralism again

• These form different policy communities • With changeable links and networks • Distinguish sub-‐govt and attentive public • Can result in dirigisme, pluralist free-‐for-‐

all, quasi-‐corporatism (but sectoral), clientelism

SUCCESSFUL IGS ADAPT TO INSTITUTIONS

• Result: CDN and US IGs differ • Canada: exec dominated – IGs in Canada

mostly target the cabinet and senior bureaucracy and avoid the Parliament, confrontation

• In CDN, IGs use inside strategy • But Charter modified institutions and

therefore IGs and how they behave • Institutionalized groups now may be

louder • In the US – IGs were always

confrontational, they lobby the congress and executive agency, forming iron triangles and there are also the courts

• On the US the IGs are more outside, more visible also more influential?

PRIVILEGED POSITION OF BUSINESS

• Lindblom ‘Market as Prison’ • Govs respond to well-‐resourced IGs • But business is special, structural power • Govs need votes; economic growth helps

this and investment helps economic growth

• So govs want to induce investments by anticipating business needs and not just responding to its views

• CND Council of Chief Executives: small big business organization

• Big business influence more than CCCEs • Post 2008 bank bailout: how much IG

pressure was used or needed?

2. NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

• Social movements are non-‐governmental networks, including interest groups and others

• These are more fluid and informal, than single IGs

• The goal of social movements is to influence the state

• Not all are new: Chartists 1840s ; Maritime Rights 1920s

• Not all are left, pro-‐free trade 1988

NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

• New social movements add post materialism and identity – this relates to equality seeking or difference promoting

• Anti-‐elitist ethos • Transnationalized with globalization • Environmentalists, alter-‐globalists, anti-‐

landmines, feminists • Possibility of mainstreaming • May result from govt funding, cooptation • Another iron law? But think of variations:

NAACP v NAC v Greenpeace as IGs that are a part of NSMs

• Evolution of NSMs is fluid and variable • Contrast with parties: institutionalizations

may not = mainstreaming

VARIETIES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY IN LIBERAL DEMOCRACY (03/07/2012)

Reading: 1) Rodney Haddow, “States and Markets: Studying Political Economy in Political Science”, in R. Dyck, ed., Studying Politics, 3rd ed. (Toronto: Nelson, in press) [On-‐line reading] [Will be available on course web site] 2) Lane Kenworthy, Egalitarian Capitalism (New York: Russell Sage, 2004), pp. 1-‐10, 125-‐145 [Course pack]

• State has a variable relation to the economy, society – this is macro-‐level analysis not sector/ meso

STATE DIRECTION: STRONG AND WEAK STATES

• Some lib dems needs more state than others, the later to industrialize

• UK 1st, US early and was sheltered • Needed only a weak state • Weak: embedded with non government

interests, fragmented laissez-‐faire • France, Germany late; East Asia later still • Required a strong state • Strong: autonomous from eco interests;

internally cohesive; direct intervention • Bigger engine for bigger tasks • Important variation over time and space • Strong state tends to weaken over time • Globalization theory: weak will beat strong

may be leading to convergence on the weak model

COORDINATION: CORPORATISM AND PLURALISM

• Some economies are more coordinated than others

• More coordinated = corporatism • Business cooperation on research and

development, finance • May be with unions on skills, social

benefits • Variations in continental Europe, east Asia • Less cooperation = pluralism • Business fight each other, weaker unions • Examples: US, UK, Canada • Reflected in the interest groups life • Different emphases on equity/ inclusions v

liberty

• Is pluralism more efficient? If so globalization again may lead to convergence

A FOUR CELL MODEL

WELFARE STATE VARIATION

• Variations in Marshall’s social rights parallel above variations

(I) WHAT IS IN A WELFARE STATE?

• There are three main program types • 1. Selective: for most needy, ex: social

assistance, this is inexpensive but stigmatized

• Must be modest because otherwise will create disincentives

• 2. Contributory; benefits are related to contributions, examples: contributory pensions, EI

• Higher benefits for many, but excludes unemployed, is gendered, regressive taxes

• Less affordable with an aging population • 3. Universal: all get the same benefits,

examples: health insurance in Canada, and K to 12 educations, higher benefits for all, solidarity, is expensive

(II) WELFARE STATE TYPES

• Esping-‐Andersen: Different program mixes, different regimes

Corporatism Pluralism

Strong

Weak USA

UK, Australia, NZ, Ireland

Sweden Norway, Denmark, Finland

Japan, S.Korea Taiwan

Canada

Germany, Netherlands Belgium Austria

B C

A

E Singapore

Switzerland

Varieties of Political Economy

France, Italy, Spain, Portugal

D

LIBERAL

• Anglo states, group A • Cheapest, lowest taxes • Features: most selectivity and modest

social insurance • Reinforces market: workfare • Middle class relies on private benefits • Result: highest poverty and inequality

SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC

• Scandinavian states, group B • Biggest welfare state, highest taxes • Mostly universal • The middle class gets public benefits;

‘solidarity’ with poor follows • Result: lowest poverty and inequality

CONSERVATIVE

• Continental Europe, groups C and D • Middling, payroll deduction based • Mostly social insurance • Middle class and men get public benefits • Better than those for poor and women • Groups C and D create status stratification

instead of market reinforcement A or solidarity B

• Difference? C: stronger unions, broader distribution of benefits, middling poverty and inequality

• D weaker private unions, civil servant focused benefits, highest poverty and inequality

• Group E (East Asia) does not fit theories well – low but rising inequality and poverty, despite weak unions

• Japan: welfare is company based

GLOBALIZATION THEORY

• A will triumph over all comers because of lowers taxes, more competitive workers so convergence may happen again


• Strong v weak states and the relationship between the state and the society

• Is the control of the economy coming from the bottom up, meaning the state is weak or is it controlled by the state from the top down

• To what extend does the state monopolize the policy space? To what extend does it say that we are going to monopolize this space and we are going to decided what happened in economic terms and social policy

• Canada is largely a weak state, a classic example of a weak states is the US, we have a less of a weak state tradition because we are action on American influence and size

• Corp and plur – plur economy looks likes CDN economy because there are many diff IGs (competing against one another in the public sphere), another good example is the US, AU, NZ

• In corp states, IGs are institutionalized within the govt where they are guaranteed a policy role, there are two main IGs 1. The business 2. Labour, in corp states they have permanent inst representation in the state, this includes countries like Germany, Scandinavia, France, Italy, Spain, Portugal – there seem to be more problems with this model; strong corp – east Asian; moderate corp – Scandinavia

• Canada weak model laissez-‐fair model less regulation as a whole in plur, the welfare states are weaker

• Plur weaker welfare states because labour is weaker the business IGs are not opposed in the competition for public policy

• CND economy is resource based, meaning there is less need to govt intervention, in large party govts intervene in other states because they have to compete in technologically advances envi’s in manufacturing industries

CANADA’S POLITICAL ECONOMY 1 (03/14/2012)

Reading: Michael Atkinson and William Coleman, The State, Business, and Industrial Change in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989), pp. 32-‐76 [Course pack]

Themes: 1. Weak state, qualified by protection 2. Pluralism, unqualified 3. Quebec ‘anomaly’

1. STAPLES ECONOMY AND NATIONAL POLICY

1. Harold Innis: Canada’s staples ‘path’ 2. Political and economic metropoles: France

and UK succeeded by another economic and political metropole US

3. Exports: fish, fur, wood, minerals, hydro, oil and gas

4. State’s limited role: protect property and build infrastructure

5. National policy 1978 challenges path, but only partly and with limited success

6. National policy 1. Railway to the West 2. Immigration 3. Tariffs to protect manufacture (1 + 2 markets for 3, so ISI)

7. Result? Industry develops but only in central Canada for the domestic market and highly expensive & CDN still exported staples

8. Foreign ownership extensive – was and is 9. Overall: weak state + tariffs &

infrastructure 10. IS this bad? According to some yes,

according to others no 11. Innis: Yes: mature economy diversify from

primary to secondary production, exports 12. Mackintosh: No: let comparative

advantage determine exports and ours is primary

2. POST WWII ERA, 1945 TO 1984

1. CDN wartime economy was state lead because specific things had to be produced for the war, like munitions for example

2. But the state-‐lead war time economy was quickly dismantled after the war

3. From then to 1985: 1. US trade becomes crucial 2. US direct investment replaces UK

4. 1965 ‘Auto Pact’ = CDN consumption and production of the big 3 cars

1960s/1980s ECONOMIC DEBATE

1. Alternative course: Lib and NDP 2. Industrial policy: strategic investment in

leading CDN industries

3. FTA, NAFTA, WTO: CONTINENTALIZATION/GLOBALIZATION

1. Mulroney Conservatives: comprehensive free trade agreements with US 1989

2. Eliminates almost all tariffs, most subsidies & most interventions: FIRA, NEP, Petro-‐Canada, IRAP, Auto Pact, etc

3. Cultural, banking and farming exceptions persist

4. Followed by NAFTA with US & Mexico 1993 & multilateral WTO 1994

5. Many non-‐tariff barriers ended

More…

1. Trade agreements permit R and d assistance with out national discrimination

2. Chretien Liberals promote high tech: Canadian Foundation for Innovation 1997, Sustainable Dev. Technologies Can 2001

3. Harper Conservatives less ambitious but persists

4. 2011: 53% of CDN merch exports are primary; 28% of these are food, energy, forestry, mining/minterals

5. Overall: Ottawa still practices some intervention but we are cloased to pure weak state than any time before

4. PLURALISM NOT COLLABORATION

1. Limited efforts: 1970s wage and price controls; aborted

2. Labour too weak: organizationally and politically – even more so today

3. Business culture is competitive and firm centered

5. QUEBEC: A DISTINCT POLITICAL ECONOMY?

Quiet Revolution: dramatic changes 1. Quebec state intervened to create Franco economic opportunities 2. 1980s: starts building cooperation with business and labour on economic goals

STATE INTERVENTION

1. To create Franco eco opportunities 2. Nationalized the hydro system: Hydro

Quebec 3. Uses state agencies to finance private

Quebec firms, such as Bombardier, SNC-‐Lavelin, Videotron, biotech, film, etc

4. By 1980s more mature firms resisted intervention

5. Overall: Qc still mixed: strong & weak state

COOPERATION WITH B & L ON ECONOMIC GOALS

1. 1996 summit agreed on deficit and poverty reduction

2. in Qc unions are stronger, but B is mostly competitive, firm-‐centered

3. Overall: still mixed both plural and corporatism

CANADA’S POLITICAL ECONOMY 2 (03/21/2012)

Reading: Keith Banting, “Dis-‐embedding Liberalism? The New Social Policy Paradigm in Canada,” in D. Green and J. Kesselman, Dimensions of Inequality in Canada (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2006), pp. 417-‐452 [Course pack] 2) Rodney Haddow, “Federalism & Adjustment”, in G. Skogstad and H. Bakvis, eds., Canadian Federalism, 3rd ed., (Toronto: Oxford University Press, in press) [On-‐line reading] [Will be available on course web site]

CANADA’S WELFARE STATE

From production to reproduction

THEME: liberal welfare state but variably, liberal = selective, private, smallish, cheaper, higher inequality and poverty

1. ORIGINS AND HISTORY

• BNA Act 1867: social programs are provincial (section 92 of the constitution)

• But Ottawa has unlimited spending powers

• Pre WWII almost purely liberal, selective social assistance form the provinces

• V. limited cost sharing in 1930s • 1930s depression: we need change • 1940: Federal UI; was a constitutional

amendment; v. limited • WWII political climate; strong unions and

strong CCF (left); Esping-‐Andersen says… • 1944 social policy Green Book & 1945

white paper on employment signify a change

• 1944 universal family allowance, spending power

• 1951 universal pension (OAS); constitutional amendment

• 1960s Federal post secondary education cost-‐sharing; spending power of the fed

• 1958/1968 universal health insurance; fed cost sharing; spending power

• 1965 Contributory pension (CPP/QPP) • 1971 Major expansion of federal UI

PAUSE: STILL A LIBERAL STATE?

• Mostly but with significant universalist features, and some generous social insurance

• Contrast US: little universality; social insurance only in pensions; much private PSE

• Why the difference between Canada and the US? Stronger unions and the left party; but also institutionally fewer veto points

2. CRISIS, GLOBALIZATION, RETRENCHMENT

• 1970s oil crisis, stagflation, deficits • 1980s globalization, reality and/or

ideology • 1989 universal OAS pension ‘claw back’ • 1992 universal family allowance ends • Successive UI cuts, culminating in 1993

creation of EI • Ottawa reduces cost-‐sharing, culminating

gin 1995 budget: • Affects: health insurance, PSE, social

assistance • Mid-‐1990s: major provincial social

assistance cuts

• Anything positive? • Fed child tax credits • Selective • Liberals intro universal child care, 2006 • But Tories cancel, replace with child

allowance – universal

ANOTHER PAUSE: RETURN TO A PURER LIBERAL MODEL? OR ARMAGEDDON?

3. WHERE ARE WE NOW?

• Impact of social service change is hard to measure but

• Universal health insurance remains with delisting, waiting lists and cost pressures

• PSE: remains public, but with much higher tuition, less financial aid and larger classes

• Do we need universal child care? May be , but that would be new

• There has been buckling, but has there been breaking?

• On income transfers we can use surveys to be more precise:

• But this data is not definitive: SLID data is better over time

• Social transfer programs reduce inequality starting from the market

• Income taxes too, but other taxes?

OVERALL PATTERN

• Market inequality has increased since 1980s, in Canada and almost everywhere

• Why? Globalization: outsourcing., technological change: blue collar jobs are gone, etc

• Under this constraint, after transfer/tax inequality has risen, but no more

• Transfers are doing as much or as little as before

• Elderly? Very low poverty in Canada • Contrast US data on inequality and

change, is the glass half full or half empty? • Either way: less mercerization for welfare

state than economy (production) in Canada, this is because of greater internal social and institutional barriers (inc parties, unions, federalism)

• And the enxernal pressures are less powerful (trade deals, WTO, capital flows)

GLOBALIZATION AND LIBERAL DEMOCRACIES (04/03/2012)

David Held & Anthony McGrew, Globalization/Anti-‐Globalization (Oxford: Polity, 2002), pp. 1-‐8, 38-‐57 [Course pack] Mark Brawley, “Globalization and Canada”, in James Bickerton and Alain Gagnon, eds., Canadian Politics, 5th ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009), pp. 323-‐338.

Question: will globalization undermine variety?

1. ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION

• More trade, more FDI, MNC outsourcing, and capital flows

POST-‐WAR BRETTON WOODS SYSTEM

• Freeing up of trade, gradually though GATT

• Due to the experience with depression and comparative advantages

• This system allows exchange controls to regulate capital flows

• Speculative pressures are base, esp for week post war economies

• So currency pegs needed against gold secured US$; this system was regulated and was adjustable

• Prevent short term currency runs • Will permit order FDI, MNC activity, and

was state-‐regulated

RESULT OF THE SYSTEM: EMBEDDED LIBERALISM

• Strong post-‐war growth; affluence in western Europe, north American and east Asia

• Combined with variable economic systems: strong and weak states, pluralism and corporatism, also with different welfare states

• Domestic interest who lost in this system, had limited options to exist the system

• Trade openness and markets combined with variable domestic choices

• Contrast CDN debate in FTA era

THE 1970S AND 1980S TRANSITION

• USA: Viet Nam: downward pressure on money

• Result : trade and budget deficits • Nixon abandons pegs, allows money to

float, restoration of competitiveness (for a while)

• Currencies now float • Exchange controls are difficult, so they end • Eurodollar market: offshore unregulated

money • Massive growth of capital flows • Think of mutual funds • When the markets are unhappy, the

money runs

IMPLICATION FOR GLOBALIZATION THEORIES

• Short term logic favors low taxes, spending intervention, cooperation and redistribution

• Why? (1) because the above lead to better short term results (v. patient capitalism)

• (2) They are perceived to lead to better outcomes

• (3) this is what capital managers want ideologically

• Example: Capital flights, French nationalizations (1981), Swedish tax increases (1994)

• Which theory is favored by the short term logic? The liberal, Anglo-‐Saxon one

What might happen?

• Option (1) inferior performance for B, C, and D will convince the elites to change

• (2) Or may be the rigidities in the systems will prevent change and they will decline

• (3) May be 1 or 2 are not correct, but the elites in B, C, D will think that it is

• Can test 1 and 2, need case studies for 3

2. IS THE LIBERAL STATE WINNING?

• Efficiency measures focus on the growth of the pie

• Equity ones on the division of the pie

OVERALL PATTERNS

• Nordic and Germanic rival Liberal on GDP/ per capital, close on growth

• Latin Europe (D) very weak on both, per capita and growth

• Equity: Nordic groups wins in female employment rate

• Latin Europe trails again • What are these poverty and inequality

scored? Nordic wins on both, followed by Germanic’ Liberal loses, followed by Latin/Med

OVERALL ASSESSMENT

• Liberal is moderately ahead of Nordic and Germanic on efficiency and by more if we count population growth

• But is this enough to make up for weak equity?

• Responses to the above will reflect social choices, not measurable performance and social choice is affected by social power

• Latin/med models do not work, because there is excess clientism, corruption, limited regulation, will it change?

VARIATIONS ON PATTERNS

• USA is the richest, also has the most poverty and inequality

• Cause and effect/ Other factors? • Nordic: Norway is the richest? Oil? • Germanic: Germany is poorest and most

unequal • Latin/Med is bas all around, but look at

Italy

ASSESSMENT OF VARIATIONS

• Avoid excess generalizations • Change may equal adjustment within a

model • Germany became a bit more liberal • Quebec became a bit more Nordic • But globalization seems to determined

nothing, depended on social choices


• Who benefits and who loses from glob, what does glob mean for political economy and the welfare state?

• Glob might lead to a race to the bottom, this relates to how well different models of pol-‐eco’s have done

• If glob weakening or strengthening of the welfare state?

• Weakening because taxes are being lowered this relates to the ides of where for the business is the most beneficial to set up operations govts are trying to shirt the tax burden unto the less mobile factors

• Increasing consumption taxes more resistance to the welfare state because people do not want for their taxes to go up

• What about having an effective state which invests in its people, this might be good? Nordic: invest a lot in the population, high taxes and they are doing generally well

• Globalization increases economic insecurity: may increase pressures to strengthen the welfare state – create a sense of security in insecure times

CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES I (10/25/2011)

Written and unwritten constitutions; Parliamentary and Presidential Government; federal and unitary states; the rule of law and judicial power. W. Phillips Shively, Power and Choice, 10th ed. (New York: McGraw Hill, 2007), pp. 311-‐322, 331-‐347 [Course pack]

WHAT ARE THEY?

Constitutions answer two questions (1) what are the state institutions (2) and the relationship between the institutions – where is the power?

• Questions 1 and 2 can be answered in a written doc, govt by a SOP – USA

• Or can be answered by unwritten conventions, lead by a Parliamentary Sovereignty (PS) – UK

• Canada is a mix of the two

LEGISLATURES AND EXECUTIVES

• (A) Legislatures – makes laws (statutes) • (B) Executive – executes the law, forms the

govt, sponsors most laws

COUNTRIES IN COMP P: UK

• 1: What are the institutions (A) PR (commons/lords) (B) cabinet (political executive) and crown which is a forms executive

• 2: Where is the power? • PS means that the legislature trumps the

executive • Dem means that the commons dominate

lords in the leg • Almost unicameral • Cabinet dominates the crown in the exec • Fusion of the cab to Commons • Responsible govt and confidence

conventions result from the domination of the house and the ex of their respective branches

• Disciplines parties reverse the relation, creating a friendly dictatorship, where by the PR is no longer sovereignty in the a PS system, but the executive dominates the leg by controlling individual MPs and how they vote

• Except in cases of minority govts

COUNTRIES IN COMP P: USA

• 1: What are the insts? (A) the two houses of the congress (B) the president

• 2: Where is the power? SOP precludes fusion

• Written constitution balances the exec and the legislature, they cannot fuse like they did in PS system

• The ex and the leg are independent branches of the govt

• The written constitution maintains a balance within the leg, there is real bicameralism, both the house and the senate are important

FEDERALISM

• 1: What are the inst? Legislatures and executives

• 2: Where is the power? What is the relationship like in a federal state? Divide the power

• Are there two sets of the leg and exec insts that divide sovereignty and power?

US: Yes: Federalism

• SOP means division of power between the fed and the states, local govts are the creature of the states

UK: No: Unitary

• PS means that the London ex and the leg overrides all local govts, but the EU is changing this…

ENTRENCHED RIGHTS

• 1: What are the inst? Written constitution guarantees rights

• 2: where is the power? The constitution protects the citizens

USA: Yes

• SOP extend to the Bill of Rights in the written constitution

• Individual is protected from the fed or the state action by entrenched rights (in the constitution)

UK: No

• PS precludes written entrenchment • But there is common law, but EU is

changing this

UK v US constitution

Constitution Relationships Ex/leg Rights Fed/un UK U ex

centered U common law only

U unitary

US W ex and leg are balanced

W entrenched

W federal

WHO HAS THE POWER?

W: separation of powers, diffuses power

U: PS concentrates power in ex and leg (esp the ex if the parties are disciplined)

CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES 2 (11/01/2011)

Canada’s complex constitution, in light of its British and American antecedents. Samuel LaSelva, “Understanding Canada’s Origins,” in James Bickerton and Alain Gagnon, eds., Canadian Politics, 5th ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009), pp. 3-‐22. Roger Gibbins, “Constitutional Politics,” in James Bickerton and Alain Gagnon, eds., Canadian Politics, 5th ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009), pp. 97-‐114.

JUDICIARY AND THE RULE OF LAW

• Courts authoritatively interpret law • Stare decisis (precedent) basis • Courts make common law in the process • The rule of law works differently in US/UK

UK (Unwritten constitution)

• Courts (a) interpret common law and thereby re-‐make it, embellishing the common law

• Courts (b) interpret statutes form the Parl, this too leads to embellishment

• But Parl Supremacy means that statute law is ‘trump’, so the courts must yield to new statutes from the Parl.. except for the EU

US (Written constitution)

• As in UK, courts interpret and embellish both (a) the common and (b) the statute law

• But they also do more… • Written constitution in above statutes and

courts can interpret and embellish the written constitution, too

• Rules can be rules ultra vires if they are against the written constitution

• Courts are only trumped by constitution amendment

• Courts evolve by new appointments, which are done by the ex and approved by the senate

• Court systems is a political process with political results

• In UK, the leg is supreme; in US the leg is not, in CDN it depends

CANADA

• Responsible govt in 1840s

BNA ACT (1867)

1. Leg and ex relation is left unwritten like in the UK

2. Federalism, BNA written constitution here Ottawa v provinces, like UK

3. There was no bill of rights (UK) 4. Jud could only trump the leg on

federalism, not ex/leg relation or rights

…some qualifications (1) JCPC to 1949, after SCC (2) Canada close to UK on the constitution, the leg/ex relation, entrenched rights and more like US when it came to federalism

CONSTITUTION ACT (1982)

• Entrenched the Charter of rights and freedoms

• Moved entrenched rights form UK to US model expansion of the role of the SCC

• CONST ACT also includes an amending formula, fed parl +7 prov/50% of people for many amend

CND constitution in US/UK comp

Constitution Relationship Ex/leg rights Fed/unit UK U – ex

centered U – com law only

U unitary

US W – balanced

W – the bill

W fed

Canada to 1982

U ex centered

U – com law

W fed

Canada from 1882

U ex centered

W -‐ charter

W fed

W= written, jud enforcement, subject to amend

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