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Update on the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative’s Spent Fuel Project with Emphasis on Differential Die-Away Research T. Martinik 1, 2 , S.J. Tobin 1,2, 3 , S. Grape 1 , A. Håkansson 1 , P. Jansson 1 , S. Jacobsson-Svärd 1 1 Uppsala University, 2 Los Alamos National Laboratory, 3 Representing the Research of 7 U.S. National Laboratories, 11 Universities and 3 Spent Fuel Assembly Measurement Collaborators
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Page 1: Update on the Next Generation Safeguards - DiVA portal666497/FULLTEXT01.pdf · Update on the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative’s Spent Fuel Project with Emphasis on Differential

Update on the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative’s Spent Fuel Project with Emphasis

on Differential Die-Away Research

T. Martinik1, 2, S.J. Tobin1,2, 3, S. Grape1, A. Håkansson1, P. Jansson1, S. Jacobsson-Svärd1

1Uppsala University, 2Los Alamos National Laboratory, 3Representing the Research of 7 U.S. National Laboratories, 11

Universities and 3 Spent Fuel Assembly Measurement Collaborators

Page 2: Update on the Next Generation Safeguards - DiVA portal666497/FULLTEXT01.pdf · Update on the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative’s Spent Fuel Project with Emphasis on Differential

Purpose/Goals of this NGSI Spent Fuel Project?

General purpose: strengthening the technical toolkit of safeguard inspectors

Technical goals have evolved:

1. Determine heat emitted from assembly

2. Improve the capability to detect diversion or replacement of pins

3. Estimate initial enrichment, burn-up and cooling time

4. Estimate Pu mass in spent fuel

Page 3: Update on the Next Generation Safeguards - DiVA portal666497/FULLTEXT01.pdf · Update on the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative’s Spent Fuel Project with Emphasis on Differential

Time-line of NGSI Spent Fuel Project

Phase I: Primarily Simulations

• Libraries of spent fuel assemblies

• Monte-Carlo (MCNP) simulation of response from 14 NDA technique with wide range of spent fuel libraries

Phase II: Prioritization for Development

• Down-select for promising, near-term (5 yrs) deployable systems

Phase III: Measurements

• Integrate complementary techniques into a few systems

• Deploy a few proof-of-principle/prototype instruments

Page 4: Update on the Next Generation Safeguards - DiVA portal666497/FULLTEXT01.pdf · Update on the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative’s Spent Fuel Project with Emphasis on Differential

Before entering a reactor:

• Only three isotopes of note: 235U, 238U and 16O

In the reactor, in a very high neutron flux:

• Many reactions take place creating many isotopes in a relatively short period of time: • Induced fission creating many fission products (gamma sources

and neutron absorbers)

• Neutron capture and beta decay create many actinides (strong neutron sources and neutron absorbers)

After reactor, complex “isotopic soup” decays, each isotope with its own characteristic time dependence and isotopic chains

High level description of commercial fuel assembles

Theme: the isotopic composition is complex but it is driven by a few parameters: IE, BU and CT

Page 5: Update on the Next Generation Safeguards - DiVA portal666497/FULLTEXT01.pdf · Update on the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative’s Spent Fuel Project with Emphasis on Differential

General thoughts on the utility of NDA signal integration, Swedish context

Passive Gamma (primarily from the outer two rows)

• 137Cs, f(BU, CT) but not of IE, indicative of heat, t1/2= 30. y

• 154Eu, f(BU, IE, CT), t1/2= 8.6 y

Total Neutron (somewhat uniform sensitivity to each pin)

• For most spent fuel of interest to safeguards, 244Cm (t1/2= 18. y) dominant origin of neutrons, but recall M ~2 for SFA

• Very strong function of BU, (BU3 or 4)

These signals used by Fork, Enhanced Fork and SMOPY detectors … with useful, but limited utility

Page 6: Update on the Next Generation Safeguards - DiVA portal666497/FULLTEXT01.pdf · Update on the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative’s Spent Fuel Project with Emphasis on Differential

General thoughts on the utility of NDA signal integration, Swedish context

Differential Die-Away Self-Interrogation (DDSI)

• Signal of interest is the time-correlated neutrons relative to every detected neutron (as much as 1 G byte/s of data)

• Spatial sensitivity is rather uniform, signal is propagated through neutron chain reactions

• The time behavior of correlated neutrons depend on all the factors that impact multiplication (fissile material, neutron absorbers, moderation, geometry, etc.). Hence the DDSI signal is sensitive to the cumulative effect of a range of isotopes in the fuel.

Differential Die-Away (DDA)

• Tomas Martinik of Uppsala University will explain in more detail • Introduction: rich data obtained by measuring how a burst of

neutrons changes in time and space in the assembly

Page 7: Update on the Next Generation Safeguards - DiVA portal666497/FULLTEXT01.pdf · Update on the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative’s Spent Fuel Project with Emphasis on Differential

Conceptual depiction of how we are performing integration

Page 8: Update on the Next Generation Safeguards - DiVA portal666497/FULLTEXT01.pdf · Update on the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative’s Spent Fuel Project with Emphasis on Differential

• To verify parameters of SFA: Initial enrichment (IE), Burn-up (BU), Cooling time (CT), fissile content , total Plutonium mass;

• External neutron pulse -> induce fission in SFA -> fission neutrons detected in 3He Differential Die-Away (DDA):

• Based on difference between 2 main groups of neutrons: BURST: 14.1 MeV external source, detected with die away time = 45us; FISSION: induced by thermalized burst neutrons, die away time = 100-200 us;

By V. Henzl

DDA method + instrument

H2O

Stainless steal

Tungsten

Neutron generator

Lead

Cd lined polyethylene with 3He tubes

By P. Blanc

Front Detectors

Back Detectors

Page 9: Update on the Next Generation Safeguards - DiVA portal666497/FULLTEXT01.pdf · Update on the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative’s Spent Fuel Project with Emphasis on Differential

15 GWd/tU

30 GWd/tU

45 GWd/tU

60 GWd/tU

2% 3% 4% 5% Cooling time

• 1 year • 5 years • 20 years • 80 years

By V. Henzl

Initial Enrichment, Burn-up and Cooling time measurement

possibility

Page 10: Update on the Next Generation Safeguards - DiVA portal666497/FULLTEXT01.pdf · Update on the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative’s Spent Fuel Project with Emphasis on Differential

Recent goals of investigation: • To see if asymmetric BU effects

detector count rate when measured for different orientation of SFA => effect on IE, BU,CT, total Pu,… ?

• Crucial question: Do we need to measure from all 4 sides ?

Various different SFA:

• # SFA: 34 assemblies • IE: 2,3,4 [%] • BU: 15,30,45 [GWd/tU] • CT: 1,5,20,80 [y]

Various types of asymmetry : • ”STANDARD” • ” EXTREME”

Asymmetric Burn-up

Page 11: Update on the Next Generation Safeguards - DiVA portal666497/FULLTEXT01.pdf · Update on the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative’s Spent Fuel Project with Emphasis on Differential

Signal change for different fuel assembly orientation

• Front detectors: Signal dependent on orientation (higher/lower burn-up), neutrons penetrate mostly through the corner of SFA: Different multiplication -> thus signal changes +/- 4 %

• Back Detectors: No significant changes –> independent on orientation • Total Signal: Sum of Front and Back; within the range of +/- 1.5 %

Page 12: Update on the Next Generation Safeguards - DiVA portal666497/FULLTEXT01.pdf · Update on the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative’s Spent Fuel Project with Emphasis on Differential

• Investigate in detail how the signal change effects IE, BU, CT, fissile content, total

Plutonium determination • Instrument Simplification: effect of removing heavy parts: Lead, Stainless steel;

using Cd liner, different detectors(fission chambers),… • Design this Instrument to be applicable for testing measurement campaigns in

CLAB and in future inside the encapsulation facility

By N. Lundkvist

H2O

Stainless steal

Tungsten

Neutron generator

Lead

Cd lined polyethylene with fission chamber tubes

Cd lined polyethylene with 3He tubes

Nearest Future plans:

Page 13: Update on the Next Generation Safeguards - DiVA portal666497/FULLTEXT01.pdf · Update on the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative’s Spent Fuel Project with Emphasis on Differential

Questions? Comments?

Page 14: Update on the Next Generation Safeguards - DiVA portal666497/FULLTEXT01.pdf · Update on the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative’s Spent Fuel Project with Emphasis on Differential

Detected Passive Active

Neutron Total Neutron 252Cf Interrogation with Prompt Neutron

Passive Neutron Albedo Reactivity Differential Die-Away

Self-integration Neutron Resonance Densitometry

Delayed Neutrons

Differential Die-Away Self-Interrogation Lead Slowing Down Spectrometer

Neutron Coincidence Neutron Resonance Transmission Analysis

Gamma Passive Gamma Delayed Gamma

Nuclear Resonance Fluorescence

X-Ray X-Ray Fluorescence

The response of 14 NDA Techniques Were Simulated for 64 Assemblies

Page 15: Update on the Next Generation Safeguards - DiVA portal666497/FULLTEXT01.pdf · Update on the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative’s Spent Fuel Project with Emphasis on Differential

What is the State-of-the-Practice in Spent Fuel NDA?

– Cerenkov Viewing Device (ICVD, DCVD) – Detects Cerenkov glow from water around assembly

– Spent Fuel Attribute Tester (SFAT)

– 137Cs is present

– FORK

– Fission chambers → total neutron (driven by 244Cm)

– Ion chambers and CdTe → fission fragment gammas

FORK Detector

PWR Assembly

Channel System LLC

SFAT IAEA

DCVD Cerenkov Image

The ease of use of these instruments was an important feature in their selection by inspectorates. Yet,


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