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Cognizant Reports cognizant reports | september 2011 U.S. Lending Industry Meets Mortgage Process as a Service Executive Summary The U.S. subprime mortgage crisis ended a prolonged period of growth and prosperity within the housing industry. Rapidly increasing home prices and residential mortgage backed securi- ties (RMBS) increased home lending. The housing bubble burst, and with it, many private investors and originators exited the housing finance market. Government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs), oper- ating as government conservatorships, increased their position within the housing finance market in an effort to stabilize the housing industry. The GSEs have become the dominant players in the mortgage market in the absence of pri- vate investment. Investors have been waiting for direction from the U.S. Department of the Trea- sury regarding the future of the GSEs. In Febru- ary 2011, a report to Congress from the Treasury Department was released, which discussed a plan to “responsibly reduce the role of the Federal National Mortgage Association (“Fannie Mae”) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corpora- tion (“Freddie Mac”) in the mortgage market and, ultimately, wind down both institutions.” 1 Industry players speculate that the gradual and measured reduction of the GSEs’ mar- ket dominance will provide opportunities for private investors to re-enter the housing finance market. Although the Treasury’s plan lacks the specific details that would draw a clear incen- tive for private investors to re-enter the market during ongoing challenging economic times, the plan to wind down the GSEs and support the private sector’s efforts to become the dominant provider of mortgage credit is a positive sign. In addition to the government’s proposed role, it is clear that private investment will rely heavily upon improved risk management and clearer visibility and understanding of the risks within an investment pool prior to ramping up private investment efforts. The shift to a primarily private investor-driven market with clearer management and under- standing of risk is one of three primary factors affecting the revitalization of the housing finance market. The role of government regulation in the housing market is the second factor affecting the revitalization of the housing finance market. The February Treasury report provided insights into the gradual change within the GSEs. Moreover, The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Con- sumer Protection Act has given broad directives regarding what constitutes a qualified residential mortgage, reasonable lending practices and risk retention requirements for loan originators and mortgage securitizers. A lender’s and/or inves- tor’s ability to effectively and efficiently address and manage regulatory change is a critical component to successful growth within the new RMBS space. The stabilization of the housing market is the final factor. There are emerging signs that the housing market is beginning to stabilize, including
Transcript

• Cognizant Reports

cognizant reports | september 2011

U.S. Lending Industry Meets Mortgage Process as a Service

Executive SummaryThe U.S. subprime mortgage crisis ended a prolonged period of growth and prosperity within the housing industry. Rapidly increasing home prices and residential mortgage backed securi-ties (RMBS) increased home lending. The housing bubble burst, and with it, many private investors and originators exited the housing finance market. Government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs), oper-ating as government conservatorships, increased their position within the housing finance market in an effort to stabilize the housing industry.

The GSEs have become the dominant players in the mortgage market in the absence of pri-vate investment. Investors have been waiting for direction from the U.S. Department of the Trea-sury regarding the future of the GSEs. In Febru-ary 2011, a report to Congress from the Treasury Department was released, which discussed a plan to “responsibly reduce the role of the Federal National Mortgage Association (“Fannie Mae”) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corpora-tion (“Freddie Mac”) in the mortgage market and, ultimately, wind down both institutions.”1

Industry players speculate that the gradual and measured reduction of the GSEs’ mar-ket dominance will provide opportunities for private investors to re-enter the housing finance market. Although the Treasury’s plan lacks the specific details that would draw a clear incen-tive for private investors to re-enter the market during ongoing challenging economic times, the

plan to wind down the GSEs and support the private sector’s efforts to become the dominant provider of mortgage credit is a positive sign.

In addition to the government’s proposed role, it is clear that private investment will rely heavily upon improved risk management and clearer visibility and understanding of the risks within an investment pool prior to ramping up private investment efforts.

The shift to a primarily private investor-driven market with clearer management and under-standing of risk is one of three primary factors affecting the revitalization of the housing finance market. The role of government regulation in the housing market is the second factor affecting the revitalization of the housing finance market. The February Treasury report provided insights into the gradual change within the GSEs. Moreover, The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Con-sumer Protection Act has given broad directives regarding what constitutes a qualified residential mortgage, reasonable lending practices and risk retention requirements for loan originators and mortgage securitizers. A lender’s and/or inves-tor’s ability to effectively and efficiently address and manage regulatory change is a critical component to successful growth within the new RMBS space.

The stabilization of the housing market is the final factor. There are emerging signs that the housing market is beginning to stabilize, including

cognizant reports 2

a decline in foreclosures, increasing household formations, increasing corporate profits, increas-ing consumer confidence and home affordability. These factors point to a gradual positive turn in the mortgage industry. Mortgage banks will need to gear up proactively in order to capitalize on market opportunities as they begin to emerge.

The emerging suite of services referred to as “mortgage process as a service” (MPaaS) offers several solutions to revitalize the housing finance market. Ensuring loan quality and providing data transparency will help reduce risk and increase private investment. Loan origination data will be collected, verified and presented in a standard-ized manner, which will improve credit under-writing decisions for the originator and deliver improved due diligence services to private inves-tors. Enhanced loan information quality will result in fewer mortgage repurchases and poten-tially reduce early loan default rates by provid-ing deeper, more accurate and more meaningful information during the loan origination process.

By removing the cost of ownership of technol-ogy infrastructure, applications, platforms and people, as well as adopting a pay-per-use model, MPaaS enables banks to save money. They can then focus on increasing market share, while rely-ing on their MPaaS partners to streamline pro-cesses, manage and extend systems capabilities and provide meaningful loan information to help them make better business decisions that comply with government regulations.

How We Got HereThere are many opinions as to whom and what is responsible for the exit of private investors from the secondary mortgage and housing finance markets. Key contributors include the easing of lending standards (such as Fair Isaac Corporation (FICO) scores, loan-to-value (LTV) ratios, debt-to-income (DTI) ratios, etc.); exotic mortgages (such as adjustable rate mortgages, interest-only loans, stated income loans, etc.); the government’s desire to increase home ownership; shareholder pressure on companies to stay competitive and increase revenue; heightened speculation in the housing market; appraisal fraud; broker fraud; and borrower fraud.

As delinquencies spiked due to borrower defaults, demands for mortgage repurchases from investors (mortgage securitizers) to originators

increased. In most cases, subprime originators provided a guarantee to investors (private-label mortgage securitizers) to repurchase a loan if it went into early default or if there was a mis-representation in the terms of the loan when it was purchased.

Subprime mortgage originators became insolvent due to improper forecasting of defaults and were unable to repurchase their mortgage loans. Many of the subprime lenders went bankrupt or closed lending operations. Heavily leveraged private-label mortgage securitizing companies suffered large losses and exited the secondary mortgage market, defaulted on RMBS payments to their investors or filed for bankruptcy. This led to a dra-matic decline of private investment in the housing finance market.

The decline of the housing finance market caused many to question existing regulatory oversight. Banking regulators reassessed the secondary mortgage market and housing finance to deter-mine what oversight and rules could be imple-mented to avoid the mistakes of the past. Con-gress and other regulators (Federal Housing Finance Agency, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, etc.) have provided guidance and regula-tory requirements to banks and private investors.

A major directive came from the Dodd-Frank Act, whose extensive consumer banking provisions added stringency to existing lending requirements (e.g., defining a qualified residential mortgage), detailed acceptable lending practices and man-dated 5% credit risk retention requirements for originators and mortgage securitizers. The intent of the legislation is to promote a safer housing finance market by spreading the share of risk in securities for originators and mortgage securitiz-ers and improving lending standards and practices.

As banks and private investors work to implement and comply with these new regulations, change is occurring within another department of the U.S. government. The exit of many private investors in the RMBS issuance business resulted in the GSEs emerging as dominant players in the secondary mortgage market. The U.S. Treasury directed the GSEs to stabilize the housing market by provid-ing liquidity. Private investment has remained on the sidelines, waiting for business conditions to improve.

cognizant reports 3

The February Treasury report to Congress pro-vides the Treasury’s plans to significantly reduce the GSE’s presence in the mortgage market. It is evident that the reduction in the GSEs’ market share will be gradual and measured. The report states, “Our plan presents several proposals for structuring the government’s long-term role in a housing finance system in which the private sec-tor is the dominant provider of mortgage credit.”

Private investors anticipating a return to the sec-ondary mortgage market are interpreting this release as a positive signal for developing plans to re-enter the market. As the conditions of the housing market begin to improve, private invest-ment will increase (see Figure 1).

Area Drivers Impact Implication

Economic Environment

Unemployment rate estimated to stabilize at 5% after 2013

Increased demand for housing

Early signs of gradual revival

for housing and mortgage

borrowing

Household formation to average 1.2 million/year over the next decade

Increased demand for housing

Improving credit scores, deleveraging, declining delinquencies

Improving credit quality of borrowers

Declining price-to-income ratio Increased affordability

Low mortgage interest rate scenario Increased affordability

Rising rental incomes Improved attactiveness of ownership

Slow rise in consumer confidence Improved willingness to borrow

Industry Drivers

Lower net interest margins scenario

Lower profitability levels

Revival of lending and

RMBS business

Declining foreclosure filings Demand and prices for homes will stabilize

Increase in all-cash deals Traction in housing market

Jumbo deals activity in RMBS market

Revival of investor risk appetite

Uptick in ABX index Improving prospects of secondary RMBS market

Regulations Prospect of significant reduction of the role of GSEs

Revival of private players' interest

Increase in cost of compliance

Heightened regulatory oversight Increased compliance and reporting

Risk retention norm Capital adequacy implications and enhanced safety for RMBS investors

Enhanced consumer protection measures

Creation of a safer market

Technology Siloed structure of banking IT systems

Challenges on the compliance front

IT challenges and opportunities

Regulation-induced need to reinvent IT systems and processes

Increase in IT spending

Competition-induced need to build new competencies

Opportunity to marry competitive-ness goals with compliance-driven investments into systems

Source: Cognizant Research Center

Figure 1

Forces Driving the U.S. Mortgage Industry

cognizant reports 4

Market ConditionsThe U.S. mortgage market is navigating its way out of the subprime crisis. Home sales fell from 7.53 million units in 2006 to 5.23 million units

in 2010 (see Figure 2). Loan originations peaked at $3.8 trillion in originations in 2003. This year, the U.S. mortgage industry forecasts approximately $1 trillion in originations (see Figure 3).

Home Sales in Units

Figure 2

* Forecasts for 2011 and 2012 are from National Association of Realtors, July 2011

7.26

7.988.36

7.53

6.43

5.40 5.33 5.23 5.105.36

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011* 2012*

Sources: Fannie Mae Annual Reports, Federal Reserve Board, Bureau of Census, HUD, National Association of Realtors, Mortgage Bankers Association and FHFA

Mill

ion

s

Mortgage Origination Estimates One- to four-family homes

Figure 3

* Estimates

Source: Mortgage Bankers Association

905 960 1,0971,280 1,309

1,512 1,399

1,140

731 664473 531

234

1,283

1,757

2,532

1,4631,514

1,326

1,166

777

1,331

1,099

400

412

697

0

500

1,000

1,500

2,000

2,500

3,000

3,500

4,000

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011* 2012*

$ B

illio

ns

Purchase Refinance

RMBS issuance, which rose to around $724 billion in 2005–2006, has dropped to $39 million in 2010 (see Figure 4, next page). The steep fall in home prices and rising job losses pushed foreclosures higher. Foreclosures went from less than 1 million in

2005, to their peak in 2010 of over 3.82 million (see Figure 5, next page). As a result of the downturn in the economy, studies indicate that consumers became more averse to debt and began saving more (see Figure 6, next page).

cognizant reports 5

RMBS Issuance

Source: Federal Reserve

$ B

illio

ns

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Figure 4

Foreclosure Trends

Source: Realty Trac

Mill

ion

s

* Foreclosure filings for 2011 are for the first six months only.

0.89

1.26

2.20

3.16

3.75 3.83

1.17

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

3.5

4.0

4.5

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011*

Figure 5

Post Crisis: Higher Savings, Lower Debt

Source: Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco

Figure 6

0%

2%

4%

6%

8%

10%

12%

14%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

110%

120%

130%

140%

60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 00 05 10

Personal saving rate (left scale) Household debt/disposable income (right scale)

cognizant reports 6

There are emerging signs of a market revival. Mortgage servicers are working through their defaulting loan portfolios, and housing prices are nearing a bottom. Low interest rates, reduced home prices, increasing credit availability, improv-ing job prospects, rising consumer confidence and the opportunity for buyers to rent out properties at profitable rates are among the key factors that could stimulate the demand for mortgage loans and, in turn, increase the supply of loans to RMBS investors. The historical data representing these factors and their estimated trends point to a slow and steady revival.

Corporate profits, a key determinant of business growth prospects, point to the likelihood of job creation. The St. Louis Federal Reserve’s research indicates that corporate profits as a percentage of GDP hit a low of 5% in 2008 and rose to 8% in 2010 (see Figure 7). The industry considers this favorable employment scenario as a strong influ-encer that increases borrower confidence in buy-ing homes. The Wall Street Journal reports that household formations, which declined to 578,000 in 2008, rose to 950,000 in 2010.2 This figure is expected to rise gradually, which is expected to increase housing demand.

The unemployment rate, presently around 9%, is expected to gradually decline and settle at around 5% after 2013 (see Figure 8).

A slow but steady drop in the unemployment rate should improve upon already increasing consumer confidence numbers. Additionally,

Corporate Profits

Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

Figure 7

Percent of GDP

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

‘86 ‘87 ‘88 ‘89 ‘90 ‘91 ‘92 ‘93 ‘94 ‘95 ‘96 ‘97 ‘98 ‘99 ‘00 ‘01 ‘02 ‘03 ‘04 ‘05 ‘06 ‘07 ‘08 ‘09 ‘10 ‘11

Profits (before tax) Profits (after tax) U.S. recessions

Unemployment Rate (Q4)

Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Loius

* Projections

Figure 8

Percent

3

5

7

9

11

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011* 2012* 2013* Long Run*

cognizant reports 7

Delinquencies and foreclosures that surged in the aftermath of the subprime crisis peaked in Q2 2010 at 11.59% and are now on a declining path (see Figure 10). Estimates of foreclosure filings for 2011 are one-fourth of the filings of 2010. All these factors signal a positive turn for the mortgage industry. The Wall Street Journal

article provides some insight into what the next five years might look like: “Once the foreclosure mess begins to clear up, say housing economists, the traditional drivers of the housing market — demographics, affordability, loan availability, employment and psychology — should take over.”

The Economist concurs that “the best news of all may be the ongoing improvement in credit con-ditions. Delinquencies have trended downward since late 2009. Consumer-debt payments rela-tive to incomes are at a 17-year low, and house-hold credit scores are rising. Banks are still being

stingy with credit, but households are better positioned than they were to take advantage of cheaper homes.”3 There has also been a marked shift in originations, from a low LTV scenario, to rapidly rising LTV since 2007 (see Figure 11, next page).

the Conference Board notes that the Con-sumer Confidence Index has risen from 25 in

February 2009, the lowest since its inception in 1967, to 45.4 in September 2011 (see Figure 9).

Source: Conference Board

Figure 9

Consumer Confidence Index

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

55

60

65

70

75

Jan-09 Mar-09 May-09 Jul-09 Sep-09 Nov-09 Jan-10 Mar-10 May-10 Jul-10 Sep-10 Nov-10 Jan-11 Mar-11 May-11 Jul-11 Sep-11

Delinquency Rate On Loans Secured By Real Estate Top 100 Banks Ranked By Assets

Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

Figure 10

Per

cen

t

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

March '05 March '06 March '07 March '08 March '09 March '10 March '11

cognizant reports 8

The present conditions in the U.S. housing market have significantly improved home affordability. The price-to-income ratio (an indicator of afford-ability) fell from 2.7 in 2007 to 1.8 in 2010 (see Figure 12). The Freddie Mac 30-year fixed-rate mortgage at 4.27% in August 2011 is the lowest in the last 50 years. Additionally, the oversupply of homes and rising rental incomes (see Figure 13, next page) should increase the attractiveness of

buying property. The scenario has already led to considerable growth in all-cash deals, with bargain-seeking investors attempting to cash in on low property values. The Mortgage Bank-ers Association (MBA) estimates that purchase originations for one- to four-family homes may decrease by 12.71% in 2011, to $412 billion, and rise by 29% in 2012, to $531 billion.

Shift in Originations From Low LTV to High LTV

Source: CoreLogic

Figure 11

Per

cen

tag

e of

To

tal O

wn

er O

ccu

pie

d O

rig

inat

ion

s

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

40%

45%

50%

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

75% to 80% Originations 95% to 100% LTV Originations

Homes are More Affordable NowPrice-to-income ratio, national average

Source: Fiserve Inc.; Federal Housing Finance Agency; Moody's Analytics

Figure 12

15-year average4Q 1995 – 4Q 2010

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

'90 '95 '00 '10'05

15-year average1Q 1989 – 4Q 2003

cognizant reports 9

The market for RMBS, which nearly evaporated, is beginning to show signs of a likely revival. There have been two private-label RMBSs offered in the last two years: Redwood Trust 2010 and Red-wood Trust 2011 ($290 million issue). The securi-ties comprise loans with high unpaid principal balances (average under $1 million), high credit scores (average 775) and low LTVs (average 63%). Private market players are taking proactive steps to set up conduits in anticipation of the reduction in GSE loan-buying limits in October 2011.

The Wall Street Journal reports that “subprime and other residential mortgage bonds are back in vogue with long-term investors, in the latest sign that American credit markets are healing after the worst downturn in a generation.”4 This is reflected in the substantial improvement in the ABX index from 30 in 2009, to around 60 in 2011 (see Figure 14).

Rent Changes in Realtors' Local Area, Year-Over-Year

Source: National Association of Realtors

Figure 13

39%42%

44%46%

48%

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

40%

45%

50%

Dec 2010 Jan 2011 Feb 2011 March 2011 April 2011

Increase Constant Decrease

Growing AttractionThe ABX index, which tracks prices of subprime mortgage bonds, has recovered since the crisis.

Source: The Wall Street Journal

Note: ABX.HE.AAA.06-2 sub-index

Figure 14

Pri

ce

0

20

40

60

80

100

2008 2009 2010 2011

cognizant reports 10

Gearing up for a New Mortgage Industry The prospect of increasing regulatory oversight makes compliance key to the survival of mort-gage banks and securitizers. There are many signs pointing to the emergence of a different mortgage industry, including the increased focus on customer protection, the creation of credit risk retention requirements for mortgage origi-nators and securitizers, the curbing of predatory lending practices, the rise of the spend-thrift and debt-averse customer, and the increased capital adequacy demands.

Given the present state of the banking landscape and the prospect of a gradual recovery for the mortgage banking industry, originators would be wise to take proactive steps to position their busi-nesses for success in the new mortgage industry.

The banking industry’s business processes and IT systems need to undergo considerable change in order to meet the unfolding regulatory require-ments, as well as build new competencies to be successful. These investment decisions pose sig-nificant challenges to banks that are presently operating in a business environment of weaken-ing demand, declining spreads (see Figure 15) and intensifying competition.

Increasing regulatory focus on banking is driving up the cost of compliance (see Figure 16), while spreads are falling. The net interest margin of U.S. banks began falling at the end of the first quarter of 2010. MBA research indicates the cost

of originating a loan rose approximately 375% in 2011 from 2003, 53% in 2011 from 2008, and going forward it is likely to increase significantly (see Figure 17, next page).

U.S. Banks: Falling Net Interest Margins

Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

Figure 15

Rat

io

4.08

3.773.69

3.54

3.46

3.343.31

3.25

3.84

3.57

3.77

3.10

3.20

3.30

3.40

3.50

3.60

3.70

3.80

3.90

4.00

4.10

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

Rising Cost of ComplianceIT spending by financial services firms on governance, operational risk and compliance

Source: Celent

* Estimate

Figure 16

$ B

illio

ns

1.351.41 1.40

1.60

1.681.72

1.0

1.1

1.2

1.3

1.4

1.5

1.6

1.7

1.8

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011*

cognizant reports 11

The profitability of the industry is driven by vol-umes, spread and efficiency of operations. Indus-try origination volumes and interest margins are generally driven by the market. Mortgage banks will need to leverage their operational efficiencies to increase profits and differentiate themselves from the competition.

Many banks are challenged by the existence of silos within their organizational structure. Tra-ditionally, compliance and business needs are separately addressed, a gulf that has widened over time as systems have evolved. Legacy sys-tems are traditionally inflexible and incapable of adjusting to rapid changes within the banking industry. These older, hard-coded systems rely on manual intervention to provide workarounds and overcome process limitations.

Enter Mortgage Process as a Service The emerging business processes as a service (BPaaS) delivery model offers a viable option to mortgage banks in need of a technology refresh and process makeover. This approach enables banks to rely on service providers with expertise in mortgage processing services to shoulder the cost of ownership of technologies, infrastructure and people. One flavor of BPaaS — mortgage process as a service (MPaaS) — provides banks with the talent and systems wherewithal to handle essen-tial lending services, enabling them to solely focus on rebuilding their businesses to the needs of the changing industry and capture market share.

The conditions and challenges that lenders face require a significant end-to-end process overhaul. With unfolding regulatory changes, investor scru-tiny and a heightened focus on loan quality, lend-ers will be required to move quickly and deploy more flexible business and technology solutions.

MPaaS providers can be a critical ally during sig-nificant times of change. Their pointed emphasis on mortgage services and ability to readily adapt to changing business needs can help banks get more bang from limited IT budgets — by shift-ing Cap-Ex to Op-Ex, through pay-per-use or outcomes-based models — while accessing new and more automated service capabilities. Cou-pled with a lender’s ability to manage business processes via MPaaS, banks have a tremendous opportunity to manage the challenges in the new landscape more effectively.

Traditional mortgage business process outsourc-ing (BPO) services providers already provide skilled domain resources and a scalable organization with appropriate infrastructure to manage criti-cal mortgage functions, such as loan processing. In this existing model, lenders essentially leverage a service provider’s resources and infrastructure capabilities, while retaining their own technology and defined processes. The perceived value of this arrangement is cost, timeliness and quality.

Today’s mortgage market requires significant change in this value proposition. As such, BPO services companies must transform into MPaaS providers. Beyond cost, timeliness and quality,

Increasing Net Cost to Originate

Source: Mortgage Bankers Association

Figure 17

Note: The "net cost to originate" includes all production operating expenses and commissions, minus all fee income, but excludes secondary marketing gains, capitalized servicing, servicing released premiums and warehouse interest spread.

$0

$500

$1,000

$1,500

$2,000

$2,500

$3,000

$3,500

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 4Q 2010 2Q 2011

cognizant reports 12

the MPaaS provider will need to offer pointed solu-tions to the lender’s and investor’s business objec-tives, risks and processes. The expectation can no longer be focused on executing a lender’s inter-nal process while leveraging the lender’s tools. The value proposition and expectations need to be extended to align the service output with the goals and objectives of the lender and investor.

Consider loan processing, for example. The admin-istrative aspects of loan processing have been outsourced to third-party specialists for many years. In many cases, the BPO process is a reflec-tion of the process requirements of the lender rather than the business and risk objectives of the lender and investor. While some may contend that there should be no difference between the two (lender processes should address business and risk objectives), the flood of repurchase requests should point to the likelihood that a majority of loan origination processes do not provide the process output that meets or exceeds the risks or objectives of the business.

In short, many lenders’ processes lack the needed depth of analysis, trust, accuracy and credibility with respect to investor requirements. Thus, the traditional mortgage BPO provider is measured on how well it executes a lender’s process rather

than more strategic aspects, such as accuracy, loss severity, repurchase risk, compliance, down-stream efficiencies and customer experience, to name a few.

To evolve, the mortgage BPO provider must offer solutions rather than capable bodies. The solutions must address the critical aspects of the business. Loan processing solutions, for instance, need to provide outputs that provide clear visibility into loan data at a document and field level, in addition to deeper analysis that will enable effective and compliant decisions. Critical loan origination values such as “Total Monthly Income” need to be encap-sulated with the specific documents, document areas, document meta data (values extracted from the document) and calculations utilized to arrive at the critical value. The information collected should be compared with other available information and analytics to provide a more trusted understanding of the accuracy of the information.

In the loan processing example, the provider must move beyond the checklist-prepared file to the risk-and-objective-prepared file that clearly and methodically provides trust and transparency, in addition to analysis that allows downstream consumers of the service to extract more value (see Figure 18).

• Rising origination costs • Increased regulatory and

investor requirements• Significant repurchase risk• Significant default risk

• Labor Cost • Capacity/Timeliness • Domain• Quality

Future Dimensions of Mortgage BPO: Driving The Solution Needs

Source: Cognizant

Figure 18

Future Dimensions of Mortgage BPO

Traditional Dimensions of Mortgage BPO• Focused on labor cost savings and staff

augmentation for scale and capacity.

Market Drivers• Increased focus on portfolio and repurchase risk.• Need for greater process transparency, improved

data integrity and increased loan due diligence.

Mortgage Market Needs• Need for great scrutiny and due diligence during

loan origination.• Provide increased visibility into potential loan risk.• Reduce overall origination, processing and servicing

costs while increasing process quality.• Increased process control and consistency to increase

loan quality and reduce repurchase risk.

Traditional Dimensions of Mortgage BPO Market Drivers

Mortgage Process as a Service(Sourced as utilities on

pay-per-use basis)

Process Consistency and Control

(Process accuracy & intelligence)

Process/Solution Benefit

(Cost benefit of solution vs.

pure labor cost)

Traditional Dimensions

(Capacity, domain and quality)

Risk Mitigation(Data accuracy & intelligence)

cognizant reports 13

A New Strategic Services EraThe time for more strategic services has arrived. Mortgage processes need to be retooled to address the need for enhanced regulatory scru-tiny, process transparency and risk mitigation.

The absence of transparency and data integrity was one of several root causes of the industry’s problems that led to increases in repurchase claims (see Figure 19).

Several factors undermined the quality of mort-gage loans, including the origination of exotic mortgage types, predatory lending practices, eas-ing of underwriting guidelines, increasing prop-erty prices and the ability of financial interme-diaries to leverage their relationships to bypass underwriting guidelines. Ensuring data quality during the loan application and credit underwrit-ing process would have removed some of the risk associated with purchasing mortgages.

The importance of data quality is also evident in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s joint effort in the Uniform Mortgage Data Program (UMDP) as part of their Loan Quality Initiative (LQI). The UMDP establishes uniform requirements and file formats for appraisal and loan delivery data. Improved data quality throughout the loan application and underwriting process will help revive the housing finance market. Increased loan transparency provided by MPaaS solutions will enhance the quality of loan originations and reduce repurchase risk. Higher quality loan infor-mation and originations will result in increased mortgage performance. This will gradually

produce a stronger mortgage market and increase borrower and investor confidence in the housing finance market.

The rise of software as a service (SaaS), platform as a service (PaaS), virtualization and cloud-based sourcing of servers, storage, desktops and data centers have created an environment that is conducive for innovations such as MPaaS that optimize efficiencies by reorganizing the industry services chain. Under MPaaS, vendors provide all four key elements: people (BPO/KPO), applica-tions, platforms and cloud-sourced infrastructure, which can be used like utilities on a pay-per-use basis, obviating the need for banks to lock in their capital in these four areas.

By variabilizing fixed costs, MPaaS offers a com-pelling case for significantly enhancing capabili-ties at a time when banks are facing significant transformational challenges. Banks and financial services industry players are already ahead of other industries in embracing cloud computing (see Figure 20, next page). This places them in an advantageous position to embrace MPaaS.

Reserves for Repurchase Claims (in millions)

Year BoA JP Morgan Chase Wells Fargo Citigroup Total

2008 2,271 1,093 620 75 4,059

2009 3,507 1,705 1,033 482 6,727

2010 5,438 3,285 1,289 969 10,981

2011 Q1 6,220 3,474 1,207 944 11,845

2011 Q2 17,780 3,631 1,188 1,001 23,600

Total 35,216 13,188 5,337 3,471 57,212

Source: Company Annual Reports and Natoma Partners

Figure 19

Residential Mortgage Loans

cognizant reports 14

Originators’ systems need to handle high volumes of originations and defaults. Even during the pro-longed period of prosperity that preceded the U.S. financial downturn, banks did not prioritize the need to invest in rebuilding their systems and processes to reap sustainable efficiencies.

The case for sustainable efficiencies is now stron-ger, coupled with the need to invest in systems to gear banks for greater levels of regulatory scru-tiny. An MPaaS partner can lend consulting ser-vices that will provide guidance and solutions to regulatory challenges and opportunities. A part-ner with the resources and capacity to assist in navigating regulatory hurdles can make perceived barriers to market re-entry less challenging.

Moving ForwardThe mortgage BPO industry, which is projected to reach $3.56 billion in 2013, is embracing MPaaS because it enables mortgage bankers to access applications and processes built to serve the demands of the emerging industry order. By leveraging an MPaaS partner, mortgage banks will be better positioned with critical information to make better loan decisions.

MPaaS providers can act as infomediaries to pro-vide independent and unbiased information about the mortgage transaction to enable originators to make sound lending decisions and underwrite quality loans. In addition, such information will

also help originators present quality information about their loans to mortgage purchasers.

The MPaaS partner will be able to offer and pack-age information that is specific to the vintage of the loans, the demographics, the overall credit quality, etc. The infomediaries will ensure trans-parency in loan sales by offering flexible platforms that will maintain compliance with underwriting criteria, as requested by the user. The information available to the user will foster trust and build sustainable business foundations. The mortgage purchasers will have greater knowledge regard-ing the pools of loans that they are buying, which will remove the mortgage purchase risk that was prevalent in the past. Better loan information will lead to better loan originations, informed loan purchases, increased loan performance, reduced risk, reduced repurchases and a stronger housing finance market.

The reformed mortgage market places huge demands on employee and IT resources that are tied up in attempting to comply with current rules and regulations. Lenders are hard-pressed to focus on product innovation and future busi-ness planning. The MPaaS partner can help banks be more flexible and respond to regulatory change. Banks and other lenders can leverage the strength of partnerships with MPaaS providers that double as infomediaries. In addition, working with MPaaS solutions providers (see sidebar) can help them gain market share and reduce risk in origination and purchase decisions.

Financial Services a Leader in Cloud Adoption

Source: Mimecast

Base: 565 respondents

Figure 20

Per

cen

t

53%

41%

37%35%

32% 32%29%

24%

19%

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

Technology Financial Services

Legal/Professional

Services

Retail Healthcare Manufac-turing

Education Energy Government

cognizant reports 15

What to Look for in Your MPaaS Partner

The emergence of MPaaS is accompanied by the rise of potential partners that can enable loan origina-tors of all types to better navigate the unfolding industry transformation. We believe they should seek the following in a partner to ensure they are on the right course:

• Capable of rolling out utilities in the MPaaS model, providing variabilization of fixed costs.

• Offers consulting services and possesses strong domain expertise rather than acting as a pure-play provider that lacks the ability to offer business advice or consulting in the transition to global sourcing.

• Provides best-of-breed workflows, data products, analytics and process controls that are aligned to the needs of a changing mortgage business.

• Delivers a solution that can process mortgage application documentation and critical underwriting data that empowers the originator and loan purchaser to make better investment decisions.

Footnotes

1 “Reforming America’s Housing Finance Market: A Report to Congress,” The U.S. Department of the Treasury and U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, February 2011, http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/documents/huddoc?id=housingfinmarketreform.pdf

2 Ruth Simon and Jessica Silver-Greenberg, “Why It's Time To Buy,” The Wall Street Journal, June 4, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304563104576361522020024248.html#printMode

3 “Delinquency Rate On Loans Secured By Real Estate, Top 100 Banks Ranked By Assets,” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 2011, http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/graph/?id=DRSRET100S

4 Matt Wirz and Serena Ng, “Subprime Bonds Are Back,” The Wall Street Journal, April 1, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704530204576235010413833114.html

References

Federal Register, Vol. 76, No. 83, April 29, 2011, http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2011/pdf/2011-8364.pdf

“Implications of Dodd-Frank for U.S. Banking and Financial Services Industry,” Reflections Journal, Cognizant Technology Solutions, May 2011, http://www.cognizant.com/InsightsWhitepapers/Reflections-May-2011.pdf

“Table 1193, Mortgage Originations and Delinquency and Foreclosure Rates: 1990 to 2009,” U.S. Census Bureau, 2011, http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2011/tables/11s1193.pdf

“MBA Sees Growth in Purchase Originations, Drop in Refinancing, and Weak Overall Economic Growth in 2011,” Mortgage Bankers Association, October 2010, http://www.mbaa.org/NewsandMedia/PressCenter/74457.htm

“Profiles of GSE Mortgage Purchases,” U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, July 2011, http://www.huduser.org/portal/datasets/gse/profiles.html

“Report to the Congress on Risk Retention,” The Federal Reserve Board, 2010, http://www.federalre-serve.gov/BoardDocs/RptCongress/securitization/risk_d_links.html

cognizant reports 16

“U.S. Foreclosure Activity Increases 7 Percent in August, Defaults Surge 33 Percent,” Realty Trac, Sept. 13, 2011, http://www.realtytrac.com/content/foreclosure-market-report

“The Gender Wage Gap,” National Economic Trends, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, July 2011, http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/net/20110701/net_20110725.pdf

“U.S. Economic Outlook September 2011,” National Association of Realtors, July 2011, http://www.realtor.org/research/research/reportsstatistics

John McCrank, “U.S. Housing Market Attracting Bargain-Hunters,” Reuters, April 4, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/04/04/us-wealthmanager-ushousing-idUSTRE72U6YW20110404

“U.S. Housing and Mortgage Trends,” CoreLogic, February 2011, http://cl.cvic.com/assets/CoreLogic_US_Housing_Mortgage_Trends.pdf

“United States Consumer Confidence,” Trading Economics, July 2011, http://www.tradingeconomics.com/united-states/consumer-confidence

John Gittelsohn, “Cash-Paying Vultures Pick Bones of U.S. Housing Market as Mortgages Dry Up,” Bloomberg, March 29, 2011, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-03-29/cash-paying-vultures-feast-on-u-s-housing-as-mortgages-dry-up.html

“Redwood Files for Second Jumbo MBS Deal in 10 Months,” American Banker, February 2011, http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/176_32/redwood-mortgage-backed-security-1033085-1.html

Tim Cave, “Broker-Dealers Count the Cost of Compliance,” Financial News, November 22, 2010, http://www.efinancialnews.com/story/2010-11-22/broker-dealers-count-cost-of-compliance

“Net Interest Margin for all U.S. Banks,” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, July 2011, http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/USNIM

Prashant Gopal and Jody Shenn, “Banks May Soften Blow of Jumbo Loan Limits,” Bloomberg, June 28, 2011, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-06-28/banks-appetite-for-jumbos-may-soften-blow-of-new-loan-limits.html

“Goldman Sprints Ahead with Conduit Plans,” Asset-Backed Alert, May 20, 2011, http://www.abalert.com/headlines.php?hid=151643

“Orchestrating Mortgage Lending Using Business Process Management,” PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, November 2010, http://www.pwc.com/us/en/financial-services/publications/viewpoints/viewpoint-busi-ness-process-management.jhtml

Lawrence Yun, “Housing Market and Economic Outlook: July 2011,” National Association of Real-tors, July 21, 2011, http://www.realtor.org/wps/wcm/connect/2753558047abfcff9436d593a9f011da/Chicago_Chase_Event_July+2011.ppt?MOD=AJPERES&CACHEID=2753558047abfcff9436d593a9f011da

About Cognizant

Cognizant (NASDAQ: CTSH) is a leading provider of information technology, consulting, and business process out-sourcing services, dedicated to helping the world’s leading companies build stronger businesses. Headquartered in Teaneck, New Jersey (U.S.), Cognizant combines a passion for client satisfaction, technology innovation, deep industry and business process expertise, and a global, collaborative workforce that embodies the future of work. With over 50 delivery centers worldwide and over 118,000 employees as of June 30, 2011, Cognizant is a member of the NASDAQ-100, the S&P 500, the Forbes Global 2000, and the Fortune 500 and is ranked among the top-performing and fastest growing companies in the world.

Visit us online at www.cognizant.com for more information.

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© Copyright 2011, Cognizant. All rights reserved. No part of this document may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the express written permission from Cognizant. The information contained herein is subject to change without notice. All other trademarks mentioned herein are the property of their respective owners.

AuthorsRajeshwer Chigullapalli Cognizant Research Center

Aala Santhosh ReddyCognizant Research Center

Nathan LongfellowDirector, Cognizant Banking and Financial Services Consulting Practice

John Geertsema Manager, Cognizant Banking and Financial Services Consulting Practice

AnalystSvetlana MaluCognizant Research Center


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