U.S. Nuclear Weapons Complex: Y-12 and Oak Ridge National Laboratory at High Risk

8/14/2019 U.S. Nuclear Weapons Complex: Y-12 and Oak Ridge National Laboratory at High Risk

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Project On Government Oversight

U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS COMPLEX:Y-12 AND OAK RIDGE NATIONAL LABORATORY

AT HIGH RISKOctober 16, 2006

666 11th Street, NW, Suite 500 Washington, DC 20001-4542 (202) 347-1122Fax: (202) 347-1116 E-mail: [email protected] www.pogo.orgPOGO is a 501(c)3 organization


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Acknowledgments

This report was made p ossible the by generous support of Citizens' Monitoring &Technical Assessment Fund, Richard and Rhoda G oldman Fund, John D . and Catherine T.MacArthur Foundation, and Ploughshares Fund.POG O would like to thank Peter Brand, Mandy S mithberger, and Jessie Pittrizzi, whosetireless efforts were indispensable to the succe ssful completion of this project.


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TABLE OF CONTENTSEXECUTIVE SUMMARYRecommendationsINTRODUCTIONTHE IMPACTS OF A NUCLEAR ATTACKFigure 1. 10 Kiloton Fallout Calculation: Improvised Nuclear Dev iceDetonation at Y-12Figure 2. Consequence Analysis of Improvised Nuclear Device Detonation at Y-12 .. 10THE DESIGN BASIS THREAT: A MOVING TARGET1TWO SITES AT HIGH RISK: Y-12 AND ORNL5Y-12 NATIONAL SECURITY COMPLEX5Figure 3. Aerial Photo of Y-12 National Security Complex17Ineffective Security18Combat Effectiveness2

Y-12's Strategy and A rmaments2The Problematic Highly Enriched Uranium Materials Facility23Figure 4. Y-12's Schedule for Consolidating the Material Access Areas4The Proposed Uranium Processing Facility7Recommendations8OAK RIDGE NATIONAL LABORATORY0POGO's Visit to Oak Ridge National Lab1Recommendations3GLOSSARY4LIST OF APPENDICES


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EXECUTIVE SUMMARYInvestigators from the Project On Gov ernment O versight conducted a site visit of the OakRidge National Laboratory (ORNL) in the fall of 2005.' POGO investigators drove to the WorldWar T hera building at ORN L Building 3019 which holds 1,000 cans of uranium-233, easilyparked in front of the building wh ich is "protected" by a single chain link fence, walked aroundfor about 15 minutes, and were leaving before guards finally approached them and escorted themfrom the area.If the investigators had intended to do harm, they could have quickly detonated a deviceto blow up the building. In fact, it would have taken very little time or effort to detonate animprovised nuclear device (IND ). Unfortunately, creating an IND is extraordinarily simple andcould cause a deton ation yielding as much as 10 kilotons, approximately the size of theHiroshima explosion.ORN L is the most poorly protected site in the U.S. nuclear weapons comp lex. In fact,when P OG O's investigators visited the site, there were no se tback barriers to protect against

truck bomb s despite the number of trucks going in and out of the facility because of majorconstruction projects; there appeared to be no fence behind the building along the truck ramp,although a truck w ith a bomb co uld park within ten feet of the building; and the bu ilding itselfappears to have bee n constructed with corrugated steel over reinforced concrete, which attackerscould easily breach.ORNL is located near the Y-12 National Security Complex, which houses the majority ofthe nation's highly enriched uranium (HEU). Y-12 stores between 400 to 500 metric tons ofHEU eno ugh for about 14,000 nuclear warheads. The configuration of Y-12 make s itparticularly difficult to protect. The site is three m iles long, approximately one-half m ile wide,

and lies between two ridge lines. There are currently five target buildings at Y-12, with multipletargets within each building.Y-12 and O RNL employ 13,000 people and are both located very close to the cities ofKnoxv ille and Oa k Ridge in Tennessee . The impact on the site and surrounding areas of anuclear detonation would be catastrophic. The fallout from a 10 kiloton IND detonation at Y -12could result in an estima ted 60,000 ca sualties, including 18,000 fatalities, and harmful radiationsickness for over 40 m iles.In 2003, two years after 9/11, DO E finally increased the design basis threat (DBT), thestandard that determines the level of threat a facility's protective force must be a ble to defendagainst. The 2003 DB T required that facilities protect against 1.5 times the pre-9 /11 level butthis increased level is still less than ha lf the numb er of terrorists involved in 9/11. A ll nuclearweapon s sites had to implem ent defensive strategies to comply with that increased threat level byOctober 2006.

On the site visit to Y-12 w ere POG O's Executive Director Danielle Brian, Senior Investigator PeterStockton, and unpaid con sultant Ron Timm. Ms. Brian did not attend the site visit to ORN L.1


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Rather than requiring Y-12 to meet these requirements, the DOE's approach can only becomp ared to lowering a hurdle to allow a sprinter to easily jump over it: Because Y-12 can notmeet the already-inadequate 2003 DB T, Energy Secretary Samuel Bodman has waived therequirement for the facility to do so.In order to bolster security, Y-12 has begun a long-overdue plan to b uild a storage facility

called the Highly Enriched Uranium M aterials Facility (HEUM F) to store the majority of theweapons-q uantities of highly enriched uranium currently housed in the five above-ground storagebuildings. A facility called the Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) is planned to hou se theremainder of the HEU . The UPF, currently in the design phase, will also be an above-groundstructure. The DOE Inspector General and PO GO hav e both been critical of the above-grounddesign on both cost and security grounds.There have been seve ral cost increases and schedule slippages during the construction ofthe HEU MF. Initially estimated to cost $9 7 m illion and open in 200 8, the current cost estimate ismore than $ 500 m illion and, after the most recent co nstruction debacle, it is not scheduled to be

completed until at least 2010. Furthermore, the proposed UPF , which will be adjacent to theHEUMF, is not scheduled to be constructed until 2013. Secretary Bodman's security waivermeans Y-12 w ill not hire the additional guards required to protect the m ultiple aging buildings.Therefore, there will be nearly 300 fewer guards protecting the HEU at Y -12 than is required tomeet the governm ent's standards, leaving the site at high risk for at least the next seve n years.RECOMMENDATIONSAccelerate the sche dule for downblending the excess highly enriched uranium. This willreduce storage needs at Y -12 and allow the num ber of buildings that could be targeted inan attack to be reduce d from five to three in less than a year. Reduc ing targets at Y-12will significantly decrease the site's security costs w hile simultaneously increasing theeffectiveness of its security.Declare an ad ditional 100 metric tons of highly enriched uranium surplus, and downblendit. This would leave at least 100 me tric of highly enriched uranium available for use bynaval reactors.Imme diately increase the size and composition of Y-12's protective force so that the sitewould no longer need a waiver from mee ting the 2003 DBT.Upgrade arm ame nts. The protective force needs high-caliber machine guns in order to laydown suppressive fire. They also need explosive breaching ca pability in the event thatadversaries gain access to and barricade them selves in one or more of the target buildings.Revise tactics. The security officers trained in defensive tactics (SPO 2s) should bedeployed on the targe ts (at the vaults or with the HEU that is being processed) in adefensive position, and the offensively-trained security officers (SRTs) should be freed torespond to an attack and ne utralize the adversary.

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Increase training and provide more realistic training, as recom mend ed by both the M eisreport and the DOE Inspector General. If high-tech weapons, detection systems, and delay m echanisms are found to be e ffectivein rigorous performanc e tests, they should be deployed at Y -12.. Make arrangements to bring in the Army's Special Operations Unit known as GrizzlyHitch to run m ore realistic tests against the protective force, as suggested in the M eisreport.

Impleme nt a realistic retirement system for the protective force. The Y-12 sec urity forceis aging and there is no retirement system for security officers who have worked 20 y earson the force: Federal law enforcement has a retirement policy, and nuclear weaponsfacilities should have one as well.Base award fees to BWXT and Wackenhut on pre-established baselines, requirements, orstandards. Award the fees only after the desired outcomes are tested to ensure thatperformance is equal to or exceeds the contract. For example, W ackenhut's award feesshould depend on its ability to protect the facility rather than on the numb er of guards,man h ours, or other criteria that ma y be spec ified in the contract.

.he most secure design for the HEUMF would have been an underground design.Howe ver, because the facility is currently under construction as an above-ground design,POG O recom mends that this facility be bermed. The current design and constructionneeds to be altered so that the HEU MF w ill be able to withstand being bermed w ith thetons of dirt necessary to ma ke the facility adequately secure.If DOE down blends the excess HEU, mo ve the mission for the Uranium Proce ssingFacility to the HEUM F. If DOE does not downblend the excess HE U, alter the design ofthe UPF to that of an unde rground or bermed facility.

De-inventory OR NL's Building 3019 of all special nuclear materials on an acceleratedbasis because it cannot be adequately secured..ownblend the uranium -233 onsite at ORN L. If a decision is made not to do so, theuranium-233 should imm ediately be moved to Y-12 or Idaho National Laboratory, which

already houses significant quantities of uranium-233, so that it all can be downb lended.Imme diately increase the size of the security force, including creating a Special Re sponseTeam , in order to protect the special nuclear ma terials until they are rem oved fromORNL.

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INTRODUCTION"The gravest danger ... and the one requiring the most urgent attention is the possibilitythat terrorists could obtain highly enriched uranium or plutonium for use in animprovised nuclear device." Senator Richard Lugar (R-IN) and former Senator Sam N unn (D-GA),2004. 2

In 2004, an a uthoritative report on nuclear terrorism by the Mon terey Institute 3 concludedthat a variety of U.S. policies "need revision based on the rec ognition that non-state actorsseeking to cause nuclear mayhe m represent the paramo unt threat facing the United States today."Am ong the policies that need reexamination, according to the study, are those in the U.S. nuclearmaterials security program s "that do not g ive priority to the fissile material of greatest interest toterrorists that is, highly enriched uranium."'The report concu rs with the findings of a variety of governme nt agencies including theGovernm ent Accoun tability Office; intelligence reviews by the C IA and other intelligence

agencies; and the D epartmen t of Energy's (DOE) own internal reviews. In fact, over the years,dozens of reviews both inside and outside the governm ent have found that D OE's efforts toprotect the nation's nuclear weapo ns materials leaves much to b e desired.' For instance, in thesumm er of 2003, in preparation for a hearing before Cong ress, National Nuclear SecurityAdministration (NNSA ) 6 head Linton Brooks asked Admiral Richard Mies' to conduct a review

2 Ferguson, Ch arles. The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism. Mon terey Institute of International StudiesCenter for Nonpro liferation Studies, CA, 2004. Foreword.3 The M onterey Institute of International Policy Studies' Center for Nonpro liferation Studies is an affiliateinstitution of Middlebury College. It contains four graduate schools, multiple research centers, and num erous specialprogram s. The Center for Nonp roliferation Studies is the largest non-governmental organization in the world devotedto curbing the spread of wea pons of mass destruction, and is the only organization dedicated exclusively to graduateeducation and research on n onproliferation issues.4 Four Faces, pp 321-322.5 "Over 50 Reports, Hearings, Testimonies and Com missions in the Past Five YearsConcluding that DOE h as Serious Security Problems." Project On Governm ent Oversight, January 22, 2002.

http://www.pogo.org/p/environment/eo-020114-nuclear.html .6 Two dep artments in the Department of Energy have responsibility for nuclear weapons facilities: NNSA ,which oversees seven nuclear weapo ns sites, including Y-12; and the Office of Energy, Science and the Environment(ESE), which o versees five sites containing weapons-grade nuclear material, including ORNL .7 Adm iral Mies is a former Co mma nder in Chief of the United States Strategic Command , the unifiedcomm and responsible for comm and and con trol of all U.S. strategic nuclear forces supporting the national securityobjective of strategic deterrence.

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of security at NNS A sites.8 The report is highly critical of every aspec t of security at NNS A sites,including vulnerability assessments, security plans, tactics, training, and testing of the protectiveforce. Although the report was n ot site specific on the failures, a num ber of the key findingsclearly concern the Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12) and the Oak Ridge NationalLaboratory (ORNL).9The risk of nuclear terrorism has been an issue of concern in other coun tries as well, suchas the former Soviet Union wh ere nuclear materials are poorly secured. The U.S. has been at theforefront of the na scent efforts to a ddress these vulnerabilities, spending billions of dollarsattempting to secure these materials. However, Harvard University's Matthew Bunn, an experton the security of nuclear m aterials in the international arena, has argued that the U.S. shouldalso lead by exam ple: "Bush needs to lead a fast-paced global effort to remove the poten tialbomb m aterial from the wo rld's most vulnerable sites and mak e sure that every remaining cachehas security sufficient to defeat terrorist threats. To credibly lead that effort, the United S tates has

to get its own house in order."'There are three m ain terrorism scenarios that are considered wh en assessing securityagainst a terrorist attack at nuclear weap ons sites:

1) The creation of an improvised nuclear device on site by suicidal terrorists, which onlytakes minutes to accomp lish."2) The use o f conventional explosives on site to create a rad iological dispersal device, alsoknown as a dirty bomb.3) The theft of nuclear materials in order to create a crude nuclear weap on off-site that could

be used to devastate a highly-populated U.S. city.8 Meis, Admiral Richard W. NN SA SECURITY : A n Independent Rev iew. April 2005.http://www.nnsa.doe.gov/docs/reports/2005-05-02_Mies_Executive_Summary_and_Report.pdf. Downloaded

October 16, 2006.9 The Me is Report was so critical that it was withheld from the public for over a year. On June 29 , 2005,POG O requested the report under the Freedom of Inform ation Act. Days prior to releasing the report to POGO ,NNS A put out a press release claiming it had implemen ted 70 percent of Mies' recomm endations. The claim wasbizarre given that basic security problems cited in the Mies Report would take years to rem edy. "Controversial

Nuclear Security Report Released." Project On Governm ent Oversight, September 2, 2005.http://pogo.org/p/homeland/ha-050901-doe.html/.10Bunn, Matthew. "The Nuclear Campus." Boston Globe op-ed, October 20, 2005.1 An impro vised nuclear device (IND) explosion is qualitatively different from a "dirty bomb." W hileexploding plutonium or highly enriched uranium with a bomb w ould cause a major dispersion of highly radioactivematerials, as occurred at the Chernob yl Reactor in the Ukraine, an IND exp losion could cause a chain reaction on parwith the devastation of Hiroshima and Nag asaki, Japan. An IND can be created at a number of DOE sites because ofthe presence of nuclear weapo ns or special nuclear materials in bomb-grad e quality and quantity. This can causenuclear detonations of varying sizes. Little time is requ ired to accom plish this act.

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Since POGO's original report in 2001, U.S. N uclear W eapons Complex: S ecurity at Risk,the organization's continuing investigations' have documented how a variety of U.S. nuclearfacilities have not implemented ad equate protections against these threats, even when thefacilities have large stashes of weapons-grade a nd weap ons-quantity nuclear materials whichparticularly merit protection. As the nation learned on Septem ber 11, 2001, terrorists can besuicidal. The potential impact of a terrorist attack using nuclear w eapons on U .S. soil is toosignificant to pe rmit the kind o f inefficient and ineffective security at nuclear w eapons fac ilitieswhich has persisted.

There are some proven technologies DOE could implement to improve the currentsecurity situation. For instance, the U.S. government has simple delay mech anisms wh ich wouldsignificantly slow terrorist access to sensitive materials. At least two of these me chanisms w eredeveloped by D OE and a re currently deployed at Departm ent of Defense facilities, as well as atDOE's Idaho National Laboratory and Office of Safeguard Transportation trailers, whichtransport nuclear warheads and nuclear material throughout the U.S.'This report more specifically documents the shortcomings of efforts to secure Y-12 andORNL. An initial examination of these sites was reported in POGO's May 2005 study, U.S.N uclear W eapons Com plex: Homeland Security Op portunities. That report presented the findingsof POG O's investigation into security at facilities throughout the nuclear weapon s complex, andconcluded that consolidating weapons-grade nuclear materials from 13 sites to seven sites woulddramatically increase security, as well as save the D OE a n estimated $3 billion in security costsover three years. 1 4For this investigation, POGO drew upon m ultiple sources including DOE a nalysts;current and filmier DOE officials; the Scowcroft Com mission staff; 1 5 the Nuclear Command and

Control Staff at the Pentagon; the Sec retary of Energy's Advisory Board; 1 6 current and former12 For more inform ation about POG O's investigations into the security of the nuclear weapons comp lex,visit POGO's website at http://wwvv.pogo.org/p/x/2004nuclearweapons.html.13 Ron Timm , an unpaid consultant to POG O who h as contributed to this report, owns the patent on thesetechnologies.14 U.S . Nuclear W eapons Complex : Hom eland Security Opportunities. Project On Government Oversight,

May 2005. http://www.pogo.org/p/homeland/ho-050301-consolidation.html.15 In 2001, Secretary of Defense Do nald Rumsfeld established the Scowcroft Comm ission, headed byGeneral Brent Scow croft, to review security of nuclear weapons facilities. The Comm ission's report was com pletedin March 2 002 and classified as a top secret docum ent. Despite requests, an unclassified version of the report hasnever been released to the public. See "Testimony of Dan ielle Brian, POG O Execu tive Director." Hearing before theHouse Su bcomm ittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations, September 24 , 2002.http://www.pogo.org/p/environment/et-020903-nukepower.html.16 The Secretary of Energy Advisory Board (SEAB) was chartered in January 1990 to provide the Secretarywith timely, balanced, external advice on issues of importance to the S ecretary. Shortly after completion of its reporton consolidating the nuclear weapon s complex, the Secretary disbanded the Board as of May 20, 2006.http://www.seab.energy.gov/publications/NWCITFRept-7-11-05.pdf. Downloaded October 16, 2006.

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Wackenhut management and security officers; the Mies Commission;" the Natural ResourcesDefense Council; congressional staff; the Defense Threat Reduction Agency; and members ofGrizzly Hitch, a section of the Army Spec ial Operations Comm and at Fort Bragg, N.C., that teststhe security of nuclear wea pons facilities.

T H E I MP A C T S O F A N U C L E A R A T T A C KThe Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12) and the Oak Ridge National Laboratory(ORNL) are both located in Tennessee near Knoxville (population 173,890) and Oak Ridge(population 28,000). The com bined workforce for the two sites is approximately 13,000 people.If a terrorist group attacked either one of the facilities and created a detonation using animprovised nuclear device (IND), it would result in an unmitigated disaster, causing untoldnumbe rs of deaths, radiation sickness, and property damage.The explosion from the nuclear bomb dropped on Hiroshima w as created using a "guntype" method (firing a piece of highly enriched uranium at another piece to create a chainreaction). Using the same theory, terrorists could create a crude IND by taking two pieces of thehighly enriched uranium (HEU ) and slamm ing them together with conven tional explosives, or bysimply dropping one plate of HE U from a certain height onto another. 8 This nearly happenedaccidentally at Y-12 several years ago. 1 9 As Nobel Prize-winning physicist Luis Alvarezexplained:W ith modern weapons-grade u ranium, the background neutron rate is so low thatterrorists, if they had suc h ma terial, would have a good cha nce of setting off a high-yieldexplosion simply by dropping one half of the material onto the other half. Most pe opleseem u naware that if separated U-235 [highly enriched uranium ] is at hand, it's a trivialjob to set off a nuclear explosion. ... Given a sup ply of U-235 ... even a high schoo l kidcould make a bomb in short order.'

17 Then-DOE Secretary Spencer Abraham appointed the Mies Commission, headed by Admiral RichardMies, to conduct an independent assessmen t of security at nuclear weapons facilities. DOE's National NuclearSecurity Adm inistration kept the report secret until forced to release it in response to a Freedo m of Info rmation Actrequest from POGO in 2005. http://www.pogo.org/p/homeland/ha-050901-doe.html.18 Bun n, Matthew and John P. H oldren. " A Tutorial on Nuclear Weapons and N uclear-ExplosiveMaterials: Nuclear Weapons Design and M aterials." Securing the B omb 2006. Managing the Atom Project, HarvardUniversity. September 6, 2006. http://www.nti.org/e_research/cnwm/overview/technical2.asp. Downloaded October16, 2006.19 The HE U was no t dropped from a significant height, and the scientist was able to kick away the piece thatwas dropp ed before a reaction could take place.20 Alvarez, Luis W. A lvarez: A dventures of a Physicist. Basic Books: New York, 1987. p 125.

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According to Princeton University physicist Frank von Hippel, "a 100-pound mass ofuranium dropp ed on a second 100-p ound m ass, from a height of about 6 feet, could produce ablast of 5 to 10 kilotons."' By compa rison, the blast from the Hiroshima bo mb w as 13 kilotons. Itkilled over 200,000 people.'

The effects on the population surrounding Y-12 and O RNL would be devastating. TheNatural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) performed a simulation of the effects of a 10kiloton nuclear explosion at the approxim ate location of the highly enriched uranium storag e siteat Y-12. 2 3 (See Figure 1.) NRDC's calculation concluded that the detonation of an IND at Y-12could cause over 60,000 c asualties, including nearly 5,000 fatalities, if the detonation occurredduring the day for an un sheltered population.' (See Figure 2.) Casualties were calculated basedon the residential population only, and did not include the worker popu lation 13,000 betweenY-12 and ORNL which would be killed immediately.' The fatalities would likely total around18,000 people.

21Wald, Matthew L. "Suicidal Nuclear Threat Is Seen at Weapon's Plants." The New York Times, January23, 2002.22 WMD 411. Center for N onproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, 2004.http://www.nti.org/f_wmd4 11/f1a4_1.html. Downloaded October 16, 2006; and "The Destructive Power of NuclearWeapo ns: Hiroshima and N agasaki." Nuclear Terrorism Tutorial: Center for Nonproliferation Studies at theMonterey Institute of International Studies, 2005. Chapter 2.http://www.nti.org/h_learnmore/nuctutorial/chapter02_08.html. Downloaded October 16, 2006.23 Matthew M cKinzie, Ph.D., Scientific Consultant, Natural Resources Defense Council (NRD C) performed

the simulation using the U.S. Department of Defense com puter code HPA C (Hazard Prediction and Assessmen tCapability, version 3.2.2).24 The calculation assumed that the explosion was caused by a fission reaction, and was at ground level atY-12 on a clear Novem ber day with winds blowing eastward at four meters per second (13.12 feet per second). Inthis scenario, the mo st intensely radioactive zone in the fallout plume is calculated to extend n o more than 10 m ilesfrom the ex plosion site.25 "Oak Ridge N ational Laboratory Fact Sheet." UT-B atelle, 2006. http://www.ornl.gov/ornlhom e/fact.pdf;and "Y-12 National Security Complex: Fact Sheet." BWXT Y-12, 2006.http://www.y12.doe.gov/about/factsheet.php. Downloaded October 16, 2006.

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Site of Explosion: HEU Storage at Y-12

10 Kiloton Fallout Calculation:IND at Y-12

Exposure over 12 hoursRadiation Dose Contour

0.5 REM (gen pop exp)5 REM (occup exp)50 REM (rad sick)150 REM (death poss)450 REM (LD50)600 REM (combat imp)

06 MilesFigure 1. 10 Kiloton Fallout Calculation: Improvised Nuclear Dev ice Detonation at Y-12

Source: Natural Resources Defense CouncilKey: REM roentgen equivalent man: A m easure of radiation exposure in terms of the health effectsgen pop exp general population exposureoccup exp occupant exposurerad sick radiation sicknessdeath poss death possible, depending on age and health at time of incidentLD50 50% o f people exposed experience a lethal dose, depending on age and healthat the time of exposurecombat imp combat impaired, such a high level of radiation that those exposed wouldhave difficulty performing functions of a soldier (primarily for on -site personnel)


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Figure 2. Consequence Analysis of Improvised Nuclear Device Detonation at Y-12

Fatal i ti e s and Casu al ti e sfrom Nu clear Explos ionPrompt Effects' inResident ia l Po pulat ion(not including work erpopulat ion)

Fata l i ti e s and Casua l ti e sfrom Nu clear Explos ionProm pt and Fal loutEffects to Res ident ia lPopulation (notinc luding work erpopulat ion)

Total Fatal i t ies andCasu al t ie s in R es ident ia lPopulation (notinc luding work erpopula t ion)

C alculation assum ing people are out in t he openFatal i t ies 358 4,453 4,811Injuries (mostly fromradia t ion s ickness ) 178 57,396 57,574Tota l Casu a lt ies 536 61,849 62,385

Fatalities and Casualties assuming p eople are sheltered but in nuclear effects zonesFatalit ies 254 477 731Injuries (mostly fromradia t ion s ickness ) 419 2,766 3,185Tota l Casu a lt ies 673 3,243 3,916

Source: Natural Resources Defense Council

26 The Nu clear Explosion Prompt Effects include the initial blast wave, high winds, heat radiation, thermalradiation, and initial pulse radiation.10


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THE DESIGN BASIS THREAT: A MOVING TARGETThe D esign Basis Threat (DB T) describes the level of threat the number of outsideattackers, the number of active and passive inside conspirators, and the kinds of weapo ns andsize of truck bom bs that wo uld be available to terrorists a facility's protective force is requiredto defend against. (Appendix A) Since the 9 /11 terrorist attacks, DOE has closely examined itsDBT for facilities with assembled nuclear warheads, and weapons-grade and weapons-quantitiesof nuclear materials that can be used to quickly construct an IND or radiological dispersal device.

2003 Design B asis ThreatIn 2003, almost two years after the 9/11 attack s, DOE finally announced a new DB T andthat the DBT w ould be fully implemented by October 2006. The previous DBT had beencriticized as being unrealistically low, even before 9 /11: the number of predicted adve rsaries wasabout one quarter the number that was actually involved in the 9 /11 attacks.The 2003 D BT w as only slightly more realistic, but did not come close to the Postulated

Threat' developed by the intelligence commu nity. It was still less than half the number of 9 /11adversaries. Even so, for facilities with assembled nuclear w eapons,' the new DB T doubled thenumbe r of predicted outside attackers. But for sites containing special nuclear materials, whichcan be used to create an improvised nuclear device, DOE only increased the DB T by 1.5 times.This minor increase for these sites was surprising because most security expe rts believe that it ismore likely for terrorists to attempt to ga in access to special nuclear m aterials in order to createan IND than it is for them to try to gain access to a nuclear wea pon: it is extraordinarily difficult,if not impossible, for a terrorist group to detonate a relatively-modern U .S. nuclear warhead,which has such safeguards as Permissive Action Links (PAL s) 2 9 and locks. As noted before, anIND can be created much m ore easily.In early 2004, both the Government Acc ountability Office (GAO) and the D OE InspectorGeneral (IG) concluded that a num ber of nuclear weapon s facilities will not be able to mee t theOctober 2006 deadline for implementing the 2003 DB T. The GAO c oncluded that, "... DOE hasnot developed any official long-range cost estimates or developed any integrated, long-rangeimplementation plans for the May 2003 DBT."30

27 The Postulated Threat is the intelligence com munity's best estimate of the threat faced by n uclearfacilities. This includes the num ber of adversaries, lethality of their weapon s, and the size of a truck bo mb thatterrorists might use.28Pantex, where nuclear weapons are assemb led; Nevada Test Site (which has no nuclear weapons, but wasmistakenly included); and the Transportation Division, which transports nuclear weapons.29Since the 196 0s, nearly all U.S. nuclear warheads have be en equipped w ith safety locks or "PA Ls"(Permissive Action Links). If a w arhead is stolen, it would be virtually impossible to detonate without a top-secretcode.3 0 N uclear Security: DOE M ust A ddress Significant Issues to M eet the Requiremen ts of the New DesignBasis T hreat. Government Accountability Office (GAO-04-701T), April 27, 2004. p 12.http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04701t.pdf#search=%22gao-04-701T%22. Downloaded October 16, 2006.

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In 2003 and 2004, several hearings were held on this issue by the House GovernmentReform Subcomm ittee on National Security and the House Energy and C ommerce Subcom mitteeon Ove rsight and Investigations. At one of the hearings, the GAO reported its findings toNational Security Subcommittee Chairman Christopher Shays (R-CT), who had requested awide-ranging review of security throughout the nuclear weapons complex. The Congressionalinvestigators' testimony was unu sually critical of the feeble 2003 D BT, as w ell as of security atthe sites being managed by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). They werealso critical of the 2003 D BT, reporting that som e officials believed it was a "funding basisthreat," or Dollar Basis Threat, suggesting that the DO E simply did not want to spend the m oneyit would need to implemen t more realistic protections.31In October 20 05, the DO E IG also issued a highly critical report about the inability ofNNSA sites to meet the 2003 D BT. According to the report:NNSA sites will now have to implement, in one year, approximately 87 percent of theupgrades scheduled to be co mpleted by the end o f FY2006 . Since several sites reportedthat the FY 200 6 budget request does not cove r their implem entation needs nor fully fundmaintaining the measures already in place, it is questionable whether the remainingupgrades can be implemented by the end of FY 2006.32

The IG's Office has also told POGO that it currently has a draft report questioning whetherDOE 's Energy, Science, and Environment (ESE) office, which oversees ORNL , can meet the2003 DBT.2004 D esign Basis Threat

On Septem ber 14, 2004, DO E Headq uarters sent a directive to all sites in the nuclearweapo ns comp lex ordering a significant increase in their security posture. The intent was torequire better protection for sites containing weapons qua ntities of plutonium and highlyenriched uranium (also know n as special nuclear materials). This move was codified in October2004 when then-Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham officially announced the increase inrequirements, the second increase since 9/11. Under the new req uirements, security forces wouldhave to be prepared to repel m ore than three to four times the number of attacke rs they wererequired to protect against prior to 9/11, doubling the DB T at assembled w eapons sites and morethan doubling it at special nuclear materials (SNM ) sites. Furthermore, the new DB T wouldassume that adversaries would be using far more lethal weapons and much larger truck bombsthan had previously been considered, even by the 2003 DBT.

31 Ibid. p 8 .32 "The National Nuclear Security Administration's Implementation of the 2003 Design Basis Threat"Department of Energy Office of Inspector General (DOE/IG-0705), October 2005. pp 1-2.

http://www.ig.energy.gov/documents/CalendarYear2005/ig-0705.pdf. Downloaded October 16, 2006.12


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Yet, these new standards w ould not be fully implemented until at least 2008 seven y earsafter 9/11. Represen tative Shays was highly critical of the time lag for implementation: "Thedesign basis threat, if it isn't met until 2008, we are basically stating that we are vu lnerable. ... Inother words, we can't meet w hat we believe is the threat." 3 3 The NNSA estimated that the newsecurity requirements for its seven sites would cost $500 m illion annually in manpo wer alone.That estimate does not include further technological upgrades such as m ore secure storagefacilities, activated barriers,' high-tech sensors, cameras, or o ther infrastructure improvem entsthat would be needed to meet the 2004 D BT.2005 Design B asis Threat

In 2005, new DOE Secretary Samuel B odman directed another review of the DBTbecause the Dep artment had concluded that implem enting the 2004 security rules just cost toomuch m oney. On Novem ber 30, 2005, the Secretary lowered the security requirements, revertingto a security posture closer to the 2003 DB T. An exce ption was that Pantex, which house sassembled nuclear wa rheads and SNM , and the Office of Security Transportation, whichtransports assembled nuclear weapons and SN M, would stay at the far more robust 2004 DBTlevel. For the other sites, including the sites with a high IND risk, the number of adve rsaries werereduced by approxim ately 25%. The sites are supposed to implem ent the new 2005 requiremen tsby 2008 a gain, almost seven yea rs after 9/11. It is important to note that, according togovernme nt investigators interviewed by POG O, the Russian DBT standards to protect theirnuclear materials are more robust than even the m ost robust U.S. 2004 DB T.35

The DOE's Office of Independent Oversight (OA) is responsible for determining whethera site can meet the requirements of the DBT by con ducting performance (force-on-force) tests.How ever, as of fall 2005, OA had on ly tested three of the seven NNSA Category I sites,' and"two of the sites that had comprehensive inspections were not tested against the full 2003 DBTrequirements, but only against progress made at the time of the inspection."' POGO has learnedfrom governm ent officials familiar with the tests that Y-12 w as tested both in 2004 and ag ain in2005 because of W ackenhu t's poor performance on the previous test.

33 "DOE/ESE Security: How Ready is the Protective Force?" Hearing before the House GovernmentReform Subcommittee on National Security, July 26, 2005. p 99.http://www.pogo.org/m/hsp/Y12/DOEHearing-072605.pdf.3 4 Activated barriers, such as cold smoke and sticky foam, are delay mech anisms that are activated upon any

unauthorized entry into areas equipped with them.35POG O mak es no judgement as to whether Russian nuclear sites can meet their DBT.36Category I sites are those that h ave weapon s quantities of weapons-grade nuclear m aterials.3 7 S pecial R eport on The N ational N uclear Se curity A dm inistration's Im plem entation of the 2003 Design

Basis Threat.' Department of Energy Office of Inspector General (DOE/IG-0705), October 7, 2005. p 4.http://www.ig.energy.gov/documents/CalendarYear2005/ig-0705.pdf. Downloaded October 16, 2006.1 3


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Possible 2006 Design Basis ThreatPOG O has learned from D OE officials and congressional staff that there is pressure fromNNSA and ESE program offices to further reduce the 2005 DBT because of the cost toimplement it.

Dollar Basis Threat or Design Basis Threat?In June 2006, NNSA was required to report to the House Armed S ervices Comm ittee onits status and cost of meeting the 2005 DBT. POG O has learned from the Com mittee that thereport was subm itted, but it is classified. POG O obtained internal D OE e mails that reveal thestruggles over how to resolve the growing tension that exists between budget constraints andsecurity requirements as long as the materials remain spread across the com plex. The Office ofManagement and Budget reduced the FY2007 DOE security budget by $200 million, mostlybecause they we re disappointed in the lack of progress in DO E's consolidation efforts. NN SAhead Linton Brook s writes that he cannot reveal the cut in security funding because h e has todefend the President's budget:The obvious prob lem is that we will be providing a repot [sic] that indicates that we havenot chosen to seek funding in the FY07 budget to implement the 2005 DBT by the end of2008. We all know that is because OM B denied funding, but since we w ill be defendingthe Adm inistration's position, we won't be able to say that. I assume that our argume ntwill be competing priorities. That will work pretty well on the NNSA side where I havetaken m ajor reductions in outyear projection in the interest of deficit reduction. It maywork less we ll for the rest of the department if we a ctually have significant plus ups forscience and nuclear ene rgy. We w ill be telling the Congress that complying with the DB Tis less important than either of those. (Appendix B)DOE's Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance Director Glenn Podonskypointed out that the way out of this morass is to consolidate the SNM and reduce the secu ritycosts:I believe that if we vigorously pursue the strategies and initiatives we have previouslyidentified, such as m aterial consolidation and the rev ised approach to protective forceemploym ent envisioned in the elite force initiative and further facilitated by the increasedand more effective use of security technologies, we can mee t our DBT-relatedcommitments in a timely manner. (Appendix B)If DOE implem ents a plan presented by POGO in its 2005 report, U. S. Nuclear Weapons

Complex: Homeland Security Opportunities, to consolidate the special nuclear ma terialscurrently spread across the country at 13 sites down to seven, the Departm ent would save$3 billion over a three-year period while increasing security, thereby reducing the financialpressure to decrease the DBT.

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T W O S I T E S A T H I G H R I S K : Y -1 2 A N D O R N LAt Y -12, the plan is to replace the five aging buildings currently storing HEU w ith two: theHighly Enriched Uranium Materials Facility (HEUMF), into which the majority of Y-12's SNMwill be consolidated, and a Uranium Processing Facility (UPF), which is currently only in thedesign phase and is not scheduled to be built until 2013. According to a Y-12 secu rity briefing forPOG O investigators, DOE has decided not to spend the money to increase the size of the

protective force to the 800 officers necessary to p rotect the site. As a result, Y-12 will not have aguard force necessary to meet the governm ent's security standards until the facility's HEU hasbeen consolidated into the HEUM F and the U PF. Energy Secretary Samuel Bodman has issued awaiver for Y-12, exem pting the facility from DO E's security standards because it cannot meetthem. In other words, Y-12 w ill remain at high risk for the next seven years. (Appen dix C) Thisraises the question: what is the point of a standard if it is simply waived w hen it cannot be m et?ORN L also will remain at high risk until the uranium-233 stored there has been remov edfrom the lab entirely. It is physically impossible to protect that material at OR NL b ecause of thelocation of Building 3019 , where the material is stored. With labs and other buildings within

50-100 feet of Building 3019 , there is not enough space for double-alarm sensors that providedetection and som e delay. In addition, with no stand-off distance, there is no room for vehiclebarriers to handle the design-basis blast.38

Y -1 2 N A T I O N A L S E C U R I T Y C O M P L E XMy concerns about Los Alamos ... pale in comparison to the Y -12 facility at Oak Ridge,Tennessee. ... That is a very vulnerable site. [It has] too many structures and not enoughbuffer zone [around it] . By the time the defenders knew that a security threat existed, itwould be too late to respond I know that they're working on it, but it has to be fixedtoday. Representative Christopher Shays (R-CT), Chairman of the House Government Reform NationalSecurity Subcommittee39I know that security at the Y -12 facilities at Oak Ridge, Tennessee, is of particular concernto this Subcommittee. These facilities do represent some of the most difficult securityproblems we face in some parts of the complex aging, outdated facilities built in the earlydays of the Cold W ar or earlier when no threat of the current nature was envisioned.

38 The design-basis blast is the size of explosive the protective force has to be prep ared to protect against.39Hertsgaard, Mark. "Nuclear Insecurity." Vanity Fair, November 2003. p 190.40 "Testimony of Linton F. Brooks, Undersecretary for Nu clear Security and NNSA A dministrator."Hearing before the House Gov ernment Reform Sub committee on National Security, Emerging Threats, andInternational Relations, April 27, 2004. p 9. http://reform.house.gov/UploadedFiles/BrooksAprilTestimony.pdf.Downloaded October 16, 2006.

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The Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12) dates from the W orld War II ManhattanProject and is currently where DOE manufactures nuclear weapons components. The facility isoverseen by D OE's National Nuclear Security A dministration (NN SA) and operated bycontractor BW X Technologies Y-12 (B WX T), and W ackenhut Corporation is contracted toprovide security. Y-12 contains the world's largest repository of highly enriched uranium (HE U)in metal form, storing approximately 400 m etric tons of the material enough for about 14 ,000nuclear warheads. It only takes about 45 kilograms (approximately 100 pounds) of HEU toconstruct a crude nuclear bomb.' HEU is the material of choice for terrorists because it is easyand quick to create a crud e nuclear weapo n either on location at one of the nation's nuclearfacilities or, if stolen from a facility, in a highly-populated city.

Y-12 is in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, about 15 miles from Knoxville.' Roughly 700,000people live within a 100 mile radius of the facility.' The 811-acre compound over three mileslong and half a mile wide' is nestled in a valley between two ridges. (See Figure 3.) Because ofits location, Y-12 is a difficult site to defend: attackers could use the surrounding h igh ground tohelp gain control of the facility.There have b een long-standing security problems at Y-12. The problem s first cam e tolight in the early 198 0s when co ngressional investigators discovered that the facility's HEU andnuclear weapons parts were being stored in WW II-era wooden buildings, all above ground. Thestorage buildings which are still above ground and one is even still wooden are prime targetsfor a terrorist attack, and sec urity at Y-12 is precarious at best. The w ooden building, Building97 20-5, is the primary H EU storage location, although HEU is also stored in four other buildingsat Y-12. Storing H EU in a w ooden building is not only concerning for security reasons, but forsafety reasons as well. According to a 19 96 D OE report, "Fire dominates all Y-12 Plant HE Uaccident scenarios. Building 97 20-5, the primary HEU storage facility, is a warehou se of timber

frame construction." (Appendix D)

41 Allison, Graham. "The Ongoing Failure of Imagination." Bulletin of Atomic Scientists,September/October 2006. http://www.thebulletin.org/article.php?art_ofn=so06allison. Downloaded October 16,2006.

42 "Y-12 Fact S heet." Y-12 National Security Com plex, Department of Energy, 2006.http://www.y12.doe.gov/about/factsheet.php. Downloaded October 16, 2006.

4 3 "Census 2000 PHC-T-3 Ranking Tables for Metropolitan Areas: 1990 and 2000." U.S. Census Bureau,April 2, 2001. p 3. http://www.census.gov/population/cen2000/phc-t3/tab03.pdf. Downloaded October 16, 2006.4 4 "Y-12 Fact Sheet." Y-12 National Security Complex, Department of Energy, 2006.

http://www.y12.doe.gov/about/factsheet.php. Downloaded October 16, 2006.

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Inventories of nuclear materials are supposed to be conducted by DOE's weaponsfacilities every few years, or even mo re frequently, to ensure that none of the materials have beenstolen. However, it is unclear how a credible inventory could or wo uld be conducted at Y -12because huge num bers of containers of highly enriched uranium have not been opened for 20 to40 yea rs. Counting containers alone would not wo rk because, in a theft situation, the containerscould be emptied and an other material substituted. (Appen dix E)In 2000, a DOE tea m w as dispatched to Y-12 w hen it was discovered that the facility hadnot taken an inven tory of its highly enriched uranium in five or six years. Y-12 w as ultimatelygiven an unsatisfactory rating. In 2004 , another team was dispatched to Y -12 because ofquestions about its inventory, and sources tell POG O Y -12 was given a rating of only "marginal."Much of the ma terial being stored at Y-12 remains there needlessly. Over 174 m etric tonswere declared exc ess and not necessary for the nuclear weapons program in 199 6. As of 2005,only 34 m etric tons had been downblended.' DOE claims that by the end of 2006, 91 metric tonswill have been down blended. The rest of the downblend ing is not scheduled to be completed aslate as 2030. (Appendix F)INEFFECTIVE SECURITYDOE periodically conducts tests of its nuclear facilities' security by staging mock"terrorist" attacks. These force-on-force exercises ma ke it possible for the Depa rtment tosimulate what m ight happen during a real terrorist attack, and to assess whether security forcescan adeq uately defend aga inst the attacks. As Y-1 2's infrastructure is currently configured, thesite's ability to protect its nuclear stockpile against even the inadequate 2003 DB T is highlyquestionable.Recen t force-on-force tests at Y-12 have ex posed the ineffectiveness of security at thefacility. Timeline tests have show n that, during an attack, intruders can get from o utside Y-12'sdouble-fence line to inside one of the five storage buildings in about 4 5 seconds. In fact, the"adversaries" were able to ga in access to the nuclear m aterials so quickly that, in order to createsome sort of delay, trailers were lined end-to-end around the w ooden storage building where themajority of our nation's HEU is stored. Security expe rts advise POG O that this defensive strategyis of q uestionable e ffectiveness.In addition, there have been a series of security debacles at Y-12 over the past two yearsthat are also indicative of the systemic security problems. These security failures should not beconstrued as being the fault of individual protective force guards who, in POGO 's experience,are dedicated to protecting the site and to improving security. Instead, the fault lies squarely withthe security contractor: The problem stems from poor training, excessive work h ours, lack ofcritical weapo ns, and an infrastructure that is almost impossible to defend. POGO rec eived a fax

45Down blending is the process of converting highly enriched uranium into low enriched uranium, whichdoes not pose an IND or theft threat.18


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in summ er 2005 from a m embe r of the Y-12 guard force that outlines their primary con cerns. Itreads:Issues with Depa rtmen t of Ener gy's Securi ty

Limited man power and resou rces to deal with a terrorist attack No sniper teams No breaching teams The dog and do ghandlers are subcontracted and qu alifications are limited andquestionable.

We ha ve no n ight vis ion devices , no scope-mou nted wea pons, no arm ored vehic les ,"no equipment or suits for biological warfare' and very little training in dealingwith bio log ical warfare .Outer perimeter of facility has virtually non-existent patrols.' [Nam e redacted] is head of the tactical response over Oak R idge, Tennessee. Althoughhe has w orked at his [sic] facility for a num ber of years, he has no background in militaryor law enforcem ent training. We take no oath of allegiance in nuclear security, while law enforcem ent and militaryhave an oath of allegiance.The me n and wom en who protect our nations [sic] nuclear stockpile could be a vitalresource by ma king us federalized officers. [Empha sis in original] (Appendix G)Overtime For Profit

Throughout POGO 's investigation, we have been informed by num erous sources thatW ackenhu t security guards are forced to work excessive overtime at Y-12. In some cases, guardsworked m ore than 70 or 80 hours per week, resulting in extreme fatigue. POG O also learned thatW ackenhu t had refused to hire additional guards. In February 2006, the DOE IG issued a reportconcluding that the W ackenhu t contract included an incentive to increase overtime. In 2005alone, the overtime w orked by the guards resulted in an additional profit of $1.8 million forWackenhut.'

46At the time that this report went to print, POG O understood that there were at least five armored vehicles(although how w ell-armored is in question).

47POG O und erstands that, in the last year, the SW AT-capable guard s have been outfitted with some of thisequipment.48 Y-12 claims that it now has outer-perimeter patrols.49 Protective Force Contracts at the Oak R idge R eservation. Department of Energy O ffice of Inspector

General (DOE/IG-0719), February 2006. p 2. http://www.ig.energy.gov/documents/CalendarYear2006/IG-0719.pdf.Downloaded October 16, 2006.

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Two D ecades of CheatingIn June 2003, Y-12 con ducted a force-on-force ex ercise, but the results were too good tobe true. Computer simulations conducted p rior to the exercises indicated that the guard forcewould lose two of the attacks decisively. However, W ackenhu t had received advanced

information on the scen arios enabling its guard force to cheat on the test. In January 2004 , theDO E IG investigated the incident, and foun d that the test was "tainted and un reliable." The IGalso found that Wac kenhut and its predecessors had bee n cheating in force-on-force drills atY-12 for over two d ecades. According to the IG report, the force-on-force tests at Y-12 wereestimated to cost $50,000 to $85,000 each taxpayer dollars that were wasted because the testsreflected what Wa ckenhut wa nted DOE to see rather than the actual state of security."Failed Security Tests

In late 2003, Y-12 failed a force-on-force test in a performance that was de scribed bysources as "ugly."' In the test, Y-12 could not protect the site or its HEU . The failure was soemba rrassing, DO E needed a scapeg oat and replaced the federal assistant manage r in charge ofsecurity at Y-12. However, no action was taken against W ackenhut, the security contractorresponsible for security.In March 2005, DOE Director of Security and Safety Performance Assurance GlennPodonsky testified before Congress that,Our three most recent Independent Ov ersight inspections at NNSA sites (Sandia NationalLaboratories-New Mexico, Y-12, and Nevada Test Site) identified some commonimpleme ntation problems, including insufficient frequency of large scale force-on-force

performance testing/exercises and inadequate weapons and equipment to fully deal withtoday's threat (e.g., armored vehicles, anti-armor w eapons, weapo ns with high rates offire) ... . Y-12 exhibited significant deficiencies in most ma jor protection programelements."Also in 2005, DOE Head quarters tested security at Y-12 again. Both the governm ent andthe security contractor claimed that the force-on-force was a great success. Howeve r, POGO later

50 Protective Force Performance Test Improprieties." Department of Energy O ffice of Inspector General(DOE IG/IG-0636), January 2004. p 1. http://www.ig.energy.gov/documents/CalendarYear2004/ig-0636.pdf.Downloaded October 16, 2006.51 "Y-12 b ombs security exercise: nuclear weapons plant vulnerable to terrorists, oversight group says."Knoxville News Sentinel, January 16, 2004.5 Testimony of Glenn S. P odonsky, Director, Office of Security and Safety Performance A ssurance, U.S.

Departmentf Energy. Hearing before the House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Oversight andInvestigations, March 18 , 2005.http://energycommerce.house.gov/108/Hearings/03182005hearing1457/Podonsky.pdf. Downloaded October 16,2006.

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found that the protective force lost at least one attack decisively a theft scenario during whichthe "adversaries" successfully entered a building and stole the mock H EU. One D OE o fficial toldPOG O that they were "disappo inted" in the results.A Near-Miss

In Septembe r 2004, during a force-on-force exercise, an alarm w ent off during the drill,causing W ackenhut to believe a real attack was taking place. In response, Wac kenhut releasedarmed guards with loaded machine guns who came within seconds of firing upon the unarmedguards involved in the security test.' The potential "friendly-fire" incident was averted justseconds before it occurred.' As described in an anonymou s letter slipped under the door of theguard force union, "In closin[g] this was as close to a near fatal situation as Y-12 has ever seen.[In] Wacken hut's rush to prepare for upcom ing audits, it placed its own po lice officers in harmsway, and narrowly escaped what could have been a deadly mistake." POGO wrote an op-ed inThe Oak R idger describing the efforts by Wacke nhut to cover up the incident and to retaliateagainst the security officers who had disclosed it. (Appendix H )Refrigerator Shooting

Also in September 2004 , a Wack enhut guard fired a weapon accidentally loaded withsome live amm unition (instead of the dummy rounds that were supposed to be used) during atraining exercise in Y-12's cafeteria. The bullet went through a refrigerator and a wall, and endedup hitting a filing cabinet in the next room . Luckily, nobody w as hit by the bullet.'These security debacles have c alled into question the capacity of security contractorW ackenhut to pro tect the site. Despite an unusually bad track record, it appears that little or

nothing has been done to hold Wack enhut accountable for these failures. In fact, Wack enhut gotan "outstanding" performance rating from the NNSA a nd a $3.26 million award fee. 5 6 Currently,the DOE is considering whether to grant this contract to another contractor.

53 "Wackenhut Guards Almost Shot During Nuclear Security Test." POGO Alert, October 23, 2004.http://www.pogo.org/p/homeland/ha-041003-Y12.html; and "Security Drill at Weapons Plant Raises SafetyQuestions." The New Y ork T imes , Decembe r 21, 2004. p 14. ht-tp://www.pogo.org/m/hsp/hsp-nytimes-12212004.pdf.Downloaded October 16, 2006.

54 Stockton, Peter and Danielle Brian. "Wackenhut's Witch Hunt Tale." The Oak Ridger op-ed, November12, 2004. http://www.pogo.org/m/hsp/hsp-OakRidger-11122004.pdf. Downloaded October 16, 2006.55 "Live Ammo Round Sparks Investigation." K noxvi lle N ews S ent inel, September 22, 2004.56 Brumley, William J., Manager of the Y-12 Site Office. "Contract number DE-ACO5000R22928,Wack enhut Services, Inc. Performan ce Evaluation Report for the Period January 1, 2005, through June 30, 2005 ."August 30, 2005. pp 1.http://seiu23.advocateoffice.com/vertical/Sites/{2FDADO6E-E7D3-4DEO-AEF2-0C787424C292}/uploads/{FBA11

3EB-4DB 9-402E-A7 87-08E0DC12005A }.PDF. Downloaded October 16, 2006.21


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C O M B A T E F F E C T IV E N E S SThe security debac les and the force-on-force failures raise concerns bec ause, if guards failto keep terrorists from en tering the facility during a real attack, it would be d ifficult if notimpossible to regain co ntrol of the facility. Military doctrine states that w hen casualties exceed20%, forces become combat ineffective due to loss of command and communications, andbecause of basic squad-sized tactical deficiencies. An Army Special Forces Commander wrote:As a unit sustains casualties (dead or wou nded) elements of the fire and maneuve rscheme s or "close qua rter battle" drills begin to com e apart. ... [I]f casualties are high (inexcess of 10%) qualified replacements become increasingly problematic and commandand control begins to be lost. Units are normally considered "com bat ineffective" and arerotated off the line whe n they have sustained 15-20% casualties. At this point maneuver,fire rates, comm unications and comm and and control can no longer be relied on tosupport the mission. Continuation wou ld be expected to result in unnecessary andincreasingly high casualties with little ex pectation of success. (Ap pendix I)Under the current security posture, an unacceptable percen tage of guards would be killedin the initial surprise attack and fire fight. In fact, Y-12's security plan estima tes that at least 50%of the facility's guard force would be killed during a terrorist attack.' At that point, according tocomb at veterans, it is unlikely that any further offensive action to recapture the facility by theprotective force would be possible.It is important to unde rstand that performance (force-on-force) tests do not reflect thethree ma jor advantages held by terrorists: surprise, speed, and violence of ac tion. Furthermore, inforce-on-force tests using Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System (MILES) weaponslaser-simulation equipment, protective force guards exh ibit unrealistic bravery. In one test,

14 protective force m embe rs were "killed" at the entrance of a building, yet the others continuedto enter despite the danger. This phenomenon is known as "MILES bravery." With liveamm unition flying, combat veterans have told PO GO, this is totally unrealistic. POGO is notquestioning the bravery of the protective force g uards, but believes that the false sense of securityshould be taken into account w hen evaluating security test performances.Y -1 2's ST R A T E G Y A N D A R M A M E N T SStrategyDuring PO GO 's visit to Y-12, its investigators were briefed about the facility's strategy todeny terrorists access to the targets containing HEU . The investigators were told that this strategywas to deploy Special Response Tea ms (SRTs) on the targets containing HEU, such as vaults andcages, in order to delay the terrorists from gaining access to those targets, and to utilize SecurityPolice Officers-II (SPO 2s) to move quick ly in a hunt-and-destroy mission. Because SPO 2s are

57 DO E officials confirmed this fact during POG O's site visit to Y-12. In a number of fo rce-on-forcescenarios tested by DOE , even when the protective force is successful in repelling an attack, they lose up to 80-95%of the force. In fact, in early spring 2006, a facility with large amounts of HEU lost 80% o f its protective force in aforce-on-force test.22


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not trained or armed to the degree as the SRTs, w ho are equipped and trained with SW ATcapabilities, Y-12's delay strategy is clearly backw ards. The SPO 2 s should be deployed on thestationery targets to delay the attackers, and the better-armed and better-trained SRTs should beable to move from target to target in the mission to kill the terrorists. (Appendix J)POGO hopes that the current strategy has been changed.ArmamentsThe intelligence com munity has concluded that, if terrorists attack nuclear facilities, theywould do so using the m ost advanced and lethal weap ons available. Yet, Y-12 guards are notequipped w ith the essential weapo ns they need to counter the tactics and we apons of thepostulated adversaries. Y-12 displayed the weapons de ployed at the plant during a visit by POG Oin September 2005. These we apons were m ostly semiautomatic rather than automatic rifles,and did not include sniper rifles or 50-caliber machine guns. In addition, the protective force hadno explosive breaching c apability. In a suicidal attack, it is expected that terrorists might attemptto barricade themse lves inside a critical facility with nuclear m aterials. In order to root them out,

the protective force would ne ed to be ab le to blow off the doors of the facility or breach the sideof the building, something they are currently not equipped to do.Another defensive system is the remotely operated weapons system (R OW S). Officials atY-12 claim to have deployed tw o ROW S inside a target building at Y-12, which we be lieve to bethe woode n building storing the majority of the site's highly enriched uranium. How ever, ArmySpecial Operations personnel advised POGO that ROW S are of limited value. If they aredeployed outside, they can be destroyed with a 50-c aliber sniper rifle. If they are dep loyed inside,"they are just another target." Y-12 ad mits that, when deployed inside, the ROW S can beneutralized with grenades or even flash-bangs' which can blind the weapons' sensors

mean ing that when the visuals come ba ck up, operators would not be able to distinguish betweenthe protective force and the attackers. Special Respon se Teams (SR T) at Y-12 are particularlyconcerned a bout this potential friendly-fire problem. Furthermore, the reliability of ROW S is alsoof concern. When Y -12 demon strated the ROW S for POGO at their training center, itmalfunctioned twice: once it wou ld not fire, the second time the mo nitors went dead.THE PROBLEMATIC HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM MATERIALS FACILITYIn order to bolster its security, Y-12 ha s begun a long-ov erdue plan to build a storagefacility, known a s the Highly Enriched U ranium M aterials Facility (HEUM F). The facility will beused to consolidate the majority of nuclear materials from the Ma terial Access Areas (MAA s),the five' buildings storing we apons-quantities of highly enriched uranium . Below is a list of thesix original target buildings, the HEUM F, a proposed new U ranium Proce ssing Facility (UPF),and DO E's schedule to consolidate the Y-12 m aterial into the HEUM F and UPF . (See Figure 4.)58Flash-bangs are low-grade exp losives meant to disorient without causing serious harm.59 There were originally six storage and p rocessing buildings, but DOE states that it de-inventoried one ofthese buildings in 2006. "Major Relocation of Highly Enriched Uran ium Com pleted at Y-12 National SecurityComplex." Y-12 Office News Release, October 2, 2006.http://www.nnsa.doe.gov/docs/newsreleases/2006/PR2006-10-02_NR-07 -06.pdf. Downloaded October 16, 2006.

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Figure 4. Y -12's Schedule for C onsolidating the Material Access AreasC u r r e n t M A A s Purpose 2 0 0 6 M A A s 2 0 0 8 M A A s 2013 MAAs9 720-5 (W est) Storage of 80% of Y-12'sHEU, Shipping & Receiving CAT I nuclearmaterials Deinventoried(behind schedule) Deinventoried

9 212 (East) Processing & Storage CAT I nuclearmaterials CAT I nuclearmaterials Deinventoried9215 (East) Processing & Storage CAT I nuclearmaterials CAT I nuclearmaterials Deinventoried9 204-2 (East) Processing & Storage CAT I nuclearmaterials CAT I nuclearmaterials Deinventoried9 204-2E (East) Processing & Storage CAT I nuclearmaterials CAT I nuclearmaterials Deinventoried

HEUMF Storage, Shipping &Receiving Underconstruction CAT I nuclearmaterials (behindschedule)CAT I nuclearmaterials

Uranium ProcessingFacility Processing Planning Underconstruction CAT I nuclearmaterials9 204 -4 (East End) Processing & S torage Deinventoried Deinventoried Deinventoried

Until five years ago, when Lockhe ed Ma rtin still managed Y -12, the plan had called for apartially underground or "be rmed" storage facility. Virtually all modern nuc lear weapons andnuclear ma terial storage facilities are underground, including the Device A ssembly Fac ility at theNevada T est Site and the KUMS C nuclear storage facility at Kirtland Air Force Base . U.S.Special Operations Com mand personne l have told POGO that an underground design is the onlycredible one because an a bove-ground facility is substantially more vulnerable to many m ore andsimpler attack scenarios. An underground facility would be much ha rder to penetrate and wouldserve as a greater deterrent to terrorists. Yet in 2001, BW XT the c urrent contractor changedthe plan for an underground or bermed facility to that of an abo ve-ground facility. In the spring of2005, BWXT's then-president, Dennis Ruddy, told POGO that the above-ground design is farmore secure than a ny proposed underground or berm ed facility. He claimed that the specificswere classified, so could not defend his position.'The DO E IG criticized the design and cost of the new plan for the building, concluding

that it would be m ore expensive a nd less secure than the o riginal plan. Originally, the berme d

60 On October 15, 2005, and October 28, 2005, POGO sent a Freedom of Information Act request forinternal DOE analyses to determine how the decision was made to abandon the undergro und or berm design inexchange for the above-ground design. POGO has yet to receive any documents responsive to this request. In M ay2006, the DOE Oak Ridge Office informed POGO that "the documents you have requested are now under thejurisdiction of the National Nuclear Security Adm inistration (NNSA ). By copy of this letter, we will forward you rrequest to the NNSA [in Albuquerqu e, NM] for processing."24


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facility was estimated to cost $9 7 m illion. 6 1 The cost of the new , less secure design increased to$144 million, then to $313 million,' with the contractor now estimating that the cost of theHEUMF is up to $500 million.' In his report, DOE Inspector General Gregory H. Friedmanwrote that the new design w ill have:Higher life-cycle costs than the original design. Personnel security requirements thatwould be greater than the berm design. More complex construction requirements that mayadd cost and time to the project schedule. (Appendix K )In 2004, Sandia National Laboratory was asked by the N NSA to eva luate the new design.It was ultimately Sandia's approval of the above-ground design that persuaded DOE Headquartersto give it the green light. POGO has learned, however, that the Sandia study did not comp are thenew design to the undergrou nd or bermed de sign, explaining in the small print they did not wantto have to c onsider an entire redesign for the building. Ironically, it was an earlier Sand ia studythat had recommended using existing designs from two other government-owned undergroundfacilities to solve the Y-12 storage problem the Device Assembly Facility and KUMSC. DOEleaders, including former Deputy Secretary K yle McSlarrow, were assured by NN SA that the

Sandia review addressed the concerns raised by both the DOE IG and the D irector of Safeguardsand Security Performanc e Assurance. How ever, neither the Inspector General nor the Director ofSafeguards and Sec urity were contacted about the review.The new d esign for the storage facility leaves much to be desired for the purposes ofsecurity. Because the HE UM F will be above-ground, there will be five surfaces four walls anda roof vulnerable to attack. A bermed fac ility only has one. The walls are being made of steel-reinforced concrete, but are only about 18 inches thick the walls at the Device Assem blyFacility, on the other hand, are three feet thick and cov ered with 1 4 to 15 feet of dirt.' It is likelythat a large platter charge' could blow through all of the HEUMF's walls and out the other side

(40 poun ds traveling at 6,000 ft/sec). A platter charge would have been far less effective againstthe previously-planned bermed facility because it only has one exposed surface. Furtherm ore, theabove-ground d esign requires fighting positions in four towers, rather than the two towe rsrequired by a berme d facility. These two additional towers will require twice the manpowe r asthat needed to d efend a berm ed facility. Finally, the current design uses standard fixed barriers asdelay mec hanisms rather than activated barriers or other proven technologies that can provide

61 This number was determ ined through a POG O interview with a White House official.62 "Y-12 Awards New HEU Storage Facility Contract." NNSA News: D e p a r t m e n tf E n e r g y , O c t o b e r2004. p 4.http://www.nnsa.doe.gov/docs/newsletters/2004/nl_2004Oct_NNSA_N ews.pdf#search=%22HEUMF% 20%24500%22. Downloaded October 16, 2006.63 Mung er, Frank. "Lots of Changes Occurring at Y-12: Cost of Biggest Project has increased about $150Million." Knoxville News Sentinel, September 18, 2006. p Al 1.64 Facts determined during PO GO site visits to Y-12 and the Nevad a Test Site.65A platter charge is created by p lacing explosives on the concave side of a metal plate. The detonationsends the plate through the target.

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Senate Appropriations Committees also registered equal levels of frustration with the HEUMFconstruction problems."Adding to th e dire situation is that Y-12's defensive strategy is predicated on the timelycompletion of the HEUMF and the subsequent de-inventorying of the wooden storage building97 20-5. The HEU from Building 97 20-5 is not scheduled to be moved into the HEUM F until2010, and the HE U from the other four buildings is not scheduled to move into the UPF u ntil2013. Energy Secretary Bodm an granted a waiver to Y-12 that releases it from com plying withthe IND d enial requirement for m ultiple processing facilities until the end of 2008. How ever,Y-12 w ill still be unable to ade quately protect its HEU when the waiver expires, and w ill requireadditional waivers.This extended inability of Y-12 to meet required security standards for the next sevenyears is causing some con cern at DOE H eadquarters. In fact, NNS A Security Director WilliamDesmond wrote to the Y-12 Site Office Manager in a June 14, 2005, memo stating, "I considerthis [the original] extension to be in the be st interests of the Department an d the Public, but willnot consider any reque st for further extension." This standoff appears unresolvable. As a result,

Y-12 will continue to be u nable to defend itself against suicidal terrorists intent on crea ting anIND. There is no possible way that Y-12 c an me et either the 2003 or the 2005 DB T until both theHEU MF and the U PF are built and the materials are moved into them in 2013. As a result,there is at least a seven yea r gap where the highly enriched uranium a t Y-12 w ill continue to bevulnerable to terrorist attack.THE PROPOSED URANIUM PROCESSING FACILITYBW XT is also in the design phase for a new Uranium Proce ssing Facility (UPF) whichwill fabricate seconda ries the highly enriched uranium p arts of all nuclear weapons. The c urrent

design is for an above-ground facility to be built next to the HEUM F, with an estimated cost of$1 billion. Based on past DO E performa nce on m ajor construction projects, that cost is likely torise to $2 billion. In operation, this facility would contain huge amoun ts of HEU in process.As with HEU MF, UP F is an above-ground design and therefore far more vulnerable andexpensive than an u nderground or berme d facility would be. If DOE w ill be downblending amajor portion of the excess HE U, as POGO and several DOE officials have previouslyrecomm ended, it may be possible to move the m ission currently proposed for UPF to HEUM F,eliminating the need for a sec ond m ulti-billion yet unsecure building. If, howeve r, DOE d oesnot downblend the excess HE U, the above-ground design for the UPF must be change d to that ofan underground or berm ed facility. Not only is an underground or berme d facility far moresecure, but it w ill save potentially billions of d ollars.

70 FY 07 National Def ense A uthorization A ct Comm ittee R eport. House Arm ed Services Committee, May 5,2006. p 463. http://www.house.gov/hasc/NDAA 2007Comm iteeReport.pdf. Downloaded O ctober 16, 2006.http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc. cgi?dbnam e = 109_cong_reports&docid=f: sr274.109.pdf.Downloaded October 16, 2006; and FY 07 Energy and W ater A ppropriat ions Bil l Comm ittee R eport (109-274).Senate Energy and Water Appropriations Committee, June 29, 2006. pp 155-156.http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_cong_reports&docid=fsr274.109.pdf.Downloaded October 16, 2006.

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RECOMMENDATIONSAccelerate the schedule for down blending the excess highly enriched uranium. This willreduce storage needs at Y-12 a nd allow the numb er of buildings that could be targeted inan attack to be reduc ed from five to three in less than a year. Redu cing targets at Y-12will significantly decrease the site's security costs w hile simultaneously increasing theeffectiveness of its secu rity.Declare an additional 100 metric tons of highly enriched uranium surplus, and dow nblendit. This would leave at least 100 metric of highly enriched uranium available for use bynaval reactors.Imm ediately increase the size and compo sition of Y-12's protective force so that the sitewould no longer need a waiver from meeting the 2003 DBT.Upgrade arm amen ts. The protective force needs high-caliber machine guns in order to laydown su ppressive fire. They also need explosive breaching cap ability in the event thatadversaries gain access to and barricade them selves in one or more of the target buildings.Revise tactics. The security officers trained in defensive tactics (SPO 2s) should bedeployed on the targets (at the vaults or with the HEU that is being processed) in adefensive position, and the offensively-trained security officers (SRTs) should be freed torespond to an attack and n eutralize the adversary.Increase training and provide more realistic training, as recommen ded by both the M eisreport and the DOE Inspector Gene ral.If high-tech weapons, detection systems, and delay m echanisms are found to be effectivein rigorous performanc e tests, they should be deployed at Y-12.Make arrangements to bring in the Army's Special Operations Unit known as GrizzlyHitch to run m ore realistic tests against the protective force, as suggested in the M eisreport.Impleme nt a realistic retirement system for the protective force. The Y-12 se curity forceis aging and there is no retirement system for security officers who have w orked 20 yea rson the force: Federal law enforcement has a retirement policy, and nuclear weaponsfacilities should have one a s well.Base award fees to BWXT and Wackenhut on pre-established baselines, requirements, orstandards. Award the fees only after the desired outcomes are tested to ensure thatperformance is equal to or exceeds the contract. For example, W ackenh ut's award feesshould depend on its ability to protect the facility rather than on the numb er of guards,man hours, or other criteria that ma y be specified in the contract.

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The most secure design for the HEU MF w ould have been an underground design.How ever, because the facility is currently under construction as an above-ground design,POGO recommends that this facility be bermed. The current design and constructionneeds to be altered so that the HEUM F will be able to withstand being bermed with thetons of dirt necessary to make the facility adequately secure.If DOE downblends the excess HEU, m ove the mission for the Uranium ProcessingFacility to the HEUM F. If DOE does not downblend the excess HE U, alter the design ofthe UPF to that of an unde rground or bermed facility.

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OAK RIDGE NATIONAL LABORATORYBefore the first nuclear bomb had even bee n built, senior governm ent leaders knew thatthe nuclear weapons infrastructure, while meant to provide the ultimate weapo n, posed a risk toAmericans. For example, General Leslie Groves, the military commander of the ManhattanProject, decided against locating plutonium production which w as perceived to be moredangerous than the enrichm ent of uranium at Oak R idge in favor of the more remotely-locatedHanford site in Wash ington state. Richard Rhodes, author of The Making of the Atomic Bomb,wrote:Twelve days after Enrico Fermi proved the chain reaction in Chicago on Decem ber 2,19 42, Groves ha d assembled a list of criteria for a plutonium production area anddefinitely and finally ruled out Tenn essee. "The Clinton site [where the current O akRidge National Laboratory and Y-12 National Security Complex, which in the beginningwas part of Oak Ridge, are located]...was not far from Knoxville. ... If because of someunknow n and unanticipated factor a reactor were to explode and throw great qua ntities ofhighly radioactive materials into the atmosphere when the wind was blowing towardKnoxville, the loss of life and the damage to health in the area might be catastrophic."'Oak R idge National Laboratory (ORNL ) is about eight miles from Y-12 and is overseenby the Energy, Science, and E nvironment Division (ESE) of the DO E. The site is operated bycontractor University of Tennessee/B attelle, and security is provided by Wa ckenhut. ORN L datesback to the Man hattan Project and pe rforms basic scientific research for a variety of disciplines.ORN L stores 1,000 cans of uranium-233 in a storage building called Building 3019. 7 2 Althoughthe facility does not yet acknow ledge the risk, senior nuclear engineers advise POG O that thismaterial is as potent and dangerous as highly enriched uranium in terms of ma king an improvisednuclear bom b or a radiological dispersal device.Given the danger of uranium -233, it is extraordinary that the ORNL does not have thesecurity systems required for housing weapons-grade m aterials. In fact, ORNL is the least securesite in the DOE's nuclear weapons complex. Lab managers have not had an approved securityplan (known as a Site Specific Security Plan) since 199 7. Furthermore, ORNL is missingfundam ental aspects of a basic security system: a double fence line with sensors and camerasbetween them; an adequate number of guards; and a Special Response Team (SRT), an on-sitesecurity team with SW AT capa bilities. In fact, ORN L's defensive strategy depends on theprotective force (particularly the Special Response Te am) from Y -12 to respond to a securityeme rgency. This strategy is seriously flawed: it ma kes the already-vulnerable Y-1 2 even m oreso, especially if an attack on OR NL is actually a diversion and the real target is Y-12. Eve n more

troubling is that the response time wou ld be too long in the event of a real terrorist attack. Thereis one road that runs between the two sites that could be easily mined or rendered imp assable bya sniper.

71 Rhodes, Richard. The M aking of the Atomic Bom b. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986. p 496.7 2 In addition, ORN L stores some stockpiles of neptunium-237, which is a byproduct from plutoniumproduction and is a p otential IND material.

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In March 2005, The DO E Director of the Office of Security and Safety Performanc eAssurance testified before Congress that he was concerned that ORN L security was inadequate,"...at Oak Ridge N ational Laboratory (an ESE site) portions of the protection system lacked thedefense-in-depth that we req uire, and the site relies on an agreem ent with a neighbo ring site forspecial response team (i.e., offensive combative) capabilities."' Later, in June 2005, the DOE'sInspector General Grego ry Friedman reported that Oak R idge's security officers, on average,trained 40 percent less for combat readiness than dictated by the federal governmen trequirements."

In addition to security problems at OR NL a re long-standing safety issues. The safetyproblems posed by the facility's Building 3019, which is where ORNL's uranium-233 is stored,have been recognized for years. In 19 96, the DO E Highly Enriched Uranium Working Groupconcluded that Bu ilding 3019 w as one of the four facilities in the entire nuclear weaponscomplex "that warrant special mana gemen t action plans to assure safe interim nuclear materialsmanagement." (Appendix D )POGO's VISIT TO OAK RIDGE NATIONAL LAB"But in m any w ays ESE [Energy, Science, and Environment D ivision of DOE] seemsstuck in denial about organizational and fiscal dem ands of D B T -com pliant strategy.Tactical training on assault scenarios lack vigor or realism." Representative Michael Turner(R-OH) before the House Government Reform Subcommittee on National Security, July 26, 2005.On September 27, 2005, POGO Senior Investigator Peter Stockton and unpaid consultantRon Tim m visited ORN L for a previously-scheduled meeting with security officials to discussthe security of the facility. How ever, the itinerary was limited to a tour of science sites. ORN Lofficials claimed that no secu rity officials from the D OE site office, contractor Battelle, orWac kenhut were available.After leaving the DOE p ublic affairs office, POGO investigators drove to Building 3019 ,which contains ORNL's uranium-233. POGO's investigators were able to find the buildingwithin 15 minutes, after an ORNL employee gave them directions. The investigators parked theircar in front of the building within sight of two arm ed security officers who we re standing next totheir vehicle talking to each other. The guards said nothing to P OG O's investigators, got intotheir vehicle, and drove off. POG O's two investigators then wand ered around the building forabout 15 minutes observing the security (or lack thereof). The two POG O investigators havesignificant security backgrounds and w ere shocked by what they observed.7 Testimony of Glenn S . Podonsky, Director, Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance, U.S.Department of Energy, H earing before the H ouse Energy and Commerce Subcomm ittee on Oversight andInvestigations, March 18, 2 005.74Protective Force Training at the De partm ent of E nergy's Oak R idge R eservation. Department of Energy

Office of the Inspector General (DOE/IG-069 4), June 2005, L etter to the Secretary. p l.http://ig.energy.gov/documents/CalendarYear2005/ig-0694.pdf. Downloaded October 16, 2006.

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Eventually, a security officer drove up and asked the investigators if the blue truck in theparking lot down the hill was theirs. It was not. When the tw o investigators were walking back totheir own car, they were told to stop as two more W ackenhut vehicles arrived. A Battelle securityofficial soon arrived and stood nearby talking on h is cell phone for about 10 to 15 m inutes asmore armed guards arrived and stood around. Another vehicle then pulled up with top Wackenhutand Battelle security officials. They attempted to claim that the POG O investigators had been toldto leave the site immediately. In fact, POGO 's investigators had not been told to leave the site atall. At this point, the POG O investigators were esco rted off the site by two security patrolvehicles.'

DOE has claimed that the two POGO investigators broke away from their escort. Thisaccusations is false: there w as no e scort. In fact, the public affairs officers had the investigators'cell phone numbe rs and could have called them to determine w here they were. Despite this, ittook the officers at least 25 minutes to locate the POG O investigators and inform them that theymust leave the site.'

This incident demonstrates that once an individual gains access to ORN L, he or she hasunimpeded a ccess to the exterior of Building 3019. For exam ple, there were no setback ba rriersto protect against truck bombs, yet a numb er of trucks were observed going in and out of thefacility because of major construction projects. There was only a single chain link fence aroundpart of Building 3019 , within less than 10 feet of the building. That fence, of course, wouldprovide no warning or delay in case of an attack. There appe ared to be no fence in the back of thebuilding along the truck ramp, even though a truck w ith a bomb could park w ithin ten feet of thebuilding and level it. The building itself appears to have bee n constructed w ith corrugated steelover reinforced concrete, which attackers could easily breach w ithout warning.

POG O has learned that ORN L security officers failed a self-assessment force-on-forcetest in 2004. Special Response Te am m embe rs from Y-12 acted as attackers, successfullybreaching securi

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U.S. Nuclear Weapons Complex: Y-12 and Oak Ridge National Laboratory at High Risk

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