Valeria Kopeykina The maternity capital's impact on birth intervals in Russia1138660/... ·...

The maternity capital’s impact

on birth intervals in Russia Survival analysis of the transition from the 1st to 2nd child

Valeria Kopeykina

Department of Sociology, Demography Unit (SUDA)

Master’s Thesis 30 HE credits

Subject: Demography

Multidisciplinary Master’s Programme in Demography (120 credits)

Spring term 2017

Supervisor: Sunnee Billingsley

The maternity capital’s impact on

birth intervals in Russia

Event-history analysis of the transition to second births in Russia

Valeria Kopeykina

Abstract

From 2007 up until now, Russia’s period fertility rate (TFR) increased at a relative constant pace.

This increase coincided with the implementation and execution of pronatalist measures, most

notably the maternity capital program. In this study, two distinct time periods (pre- and post-

policy) were compared in order to discover the effect of this program on fertility. This study is

based on data from the Russian Generations and Gender Survey (GGS), conducted in 2011.

Employing event-history analysis for the transition to a second childbirth, this study assesses

whether the maternity capital policy has had an impact on the interval between the 1st and 2nd birth

and the overall 2nd birth risk. Moreover in this study I aimed to determine whether the 2nd birth

risk was different according to woman’s educational level and ages at the time of 1st birth (entry

into the 1st motherhood) in the policy period. The analysis pointed out that the transition to the 2nd

birth event did not precipitate due to the introduction of maternity capital. Moreover my research

indicated that the introduced policy did not increase the overall risk of having a 2nd child. The

analysis of the interaction between the post-policy period and woman’s education or age at the 1st

birth also did not reveal any significant difference.

Keywords

Fertility, Family policy, Maternity capital, Event history, Generations and Gender Survey, Russia

Contents

1. Introduction .................................................................................... 1

2. Russian fertility context .................................................................. 2

3. An evolution of Russian family policies ........................................... 4

3.1 Post-revolutionary model of family policy (1917 – 1930s)............................... 5

3.2 Stalin’s model of family policy (1930s – 1940s) ............................................. 5

3.3 Soviet family policy (1950s – 1980s) ........................................................... 6

3.4 Contemporary family policy (1990s – 2000s) ................................................ 7

4. Debate and theory ........................................................................ 10

5. Empirical strategy and data .......................................................... 14

5.1 Research questions ...................................................................................14

5.2 Data and sample selection .........................................................................15

5.3 Methods and variables ..............................................................................17

6. RESULTS ....................................................................................... 19

6.1 Main effects .............................................................................................19

6.2 Interaction effects ....................................................................................21

7. Conclusion and discussions ........................................................... 23

8. Acknowledgements ....................................................................... 25

9. References .................................................................................... 27

10. Appendix ....................................................................................... 31

1

1. Introduction

To date, a substantial amount of social scientific research on the effectiveness of social family policies

is done in the OECD member countries1 or in the “old” member states of the European Union

(Thévenon 2011). At the same time very little research on this topic is done in Russia, whereas Russia

is an interesting subject of study.

In the past decade, Russia has undergone profound changes in its demographic profile, such as

declining fertility rates, which are examined in this paper. In Russia a zigzag-shaped period fertility

curve reflects a turbulent time. The main societal cataclysms occurred in the periods 1915-1922, 1928-

1934 and 1941-19472. The government has also repeatedly intervened in the demographic sphere, for

example, when in 1936 it banned abortions or when it created additional incentives for future mothers

to overcome the falling birth rate of the late 1970s and the early 2000s (Zakharov 2008; Bondarskaja

1999).

As of the end of the 19th century, Russia has moved from a traditional type of reproduction, with the

total fertility rate (TFR) of more than seven children per lifetime, to a modern type with the TFR

dropping to 1.7 in 2013 (Zakharov 2002). Within just three to four generations, Russia joined the

ranks of other European countries with fertility rates below replacement level.

When in 2000 the TFR in Russia fell to a critically low level, less than 1.2 children per woman, the

country’s demographic situation demanded the attention of the government (Demoscope Weekly

2015). Driven by a fear of depopulation, the government started to think about increasing its support

for families with children.

The efforts of the Russian state to boost the fertility rate resulted in a wide-ranging set of family policy

measures. They included a substantial increase in pregnancy, birth, and child benefits; a generously

remunerated parental leave; compensation for the costs of children’s preschool education. The novelty

of 2007 was the introduction of the maternity (family) capital program. The essence of this subsidy

comes down to a one-time financial hand out from the Russian government to women who gave birth

to or adopted a second or consecutive child.

1 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development is an organization of industrial countries that

encourages trade and economic growth.

2 World War I and II, the 1918-1920 civil war, massive repressions during 1930s, famines in 1932-1933

and in 1947.

2

After the implementation of these measures, Russia observed an increase in the TFR. The rate began

to rise gradually and peaked at about 1.78 children per woman in 2015. The obvious question in this

regard is whether Russia’s new upturn in fertility was a result of the 2007 family policy changes,

specifically maternity capital?

The fact that the state simultaneously introduced a package of family policy measures makes it more

difficult to disentangle the effect attributable to maternity capital. However, since maternity capital is

the largest financial incentive introduced in 2007 and attached to childbirth, I will assume that any

significant changes in women’s fertility behavior are driven by this particular policy measure.

Recent studies acknowledge the increase in fertility rates at higher order births since 2007 in Russia

(Biryukova et al. 2016; Frejka and Zakharov 2013; Slonimczyk and Yurko 2013). However, Frejka

and Zakharov (2013) argue that the effect of 2007 measures is wearing off from one year to the next

(see Table 1 in Appendix). This might imply that the current increase in the TFR is actually generated

by an accelerated timing of second and subsequent births. Thus, to answer the question of the

maternity capital’s effects I will assess whether the interval between the 1st and 2nd birth differs

between the periods before and after the introduction of the policy. I am also going to look at whether

the overall risk of the transition to a 2nd child changed in the time period following the introduction of

the maternity capital program. In addition I will assess whether the policy influenced women

differently depending on their age at 1st birth or education.

The paper begins with a brief description of fertility dynamics in Russia from the late 19th century to

the second decade of the 21st century. Section 3 gives a brief overview of Russian family policy with a

special emphasis on contemporary family policy measures. Section 4 presents the theoretical

background and related empirical research. The empirical section 5 describes the research questions,

the data and the methods used in the analysis. Section 6 presents the main results, and the final section

discusses the findings, limitations and it provides a basis for future discussions.

2. Russian fertility context

A literature review on Russia’s fertility transition revealed that, unlike in other European countries,

there was no steady decline in fertility in Russia up until the very end of the 19th century. Researchers

note that the fertility decline in Russia started from a higher level3 and that it decreased comparatively

3 In Russia the average number of children per woman was 7.5 compared to five children per woman in

Europe (see Popov and David 1999; Vishnevskij 2006).

3

fast. By the end of the 1960s, Russia had reached the same fertility level as many Western countries as

it adopted a 2-child family as the norm.

According to Vishnevskij (1977) and Mironov (1977), women born before the 1870s had not yet

started practicing birth control. Centuries-old social and cultural norms, supported by customs and

religion, did not allow that. Early marriages, a rejection of contraceptive practices and the church’s

ban on abortion created the prerequisites for the conservation of high fertility rates in Russia up until

the end of the 19th century.

After investigating potential causes of the transition to a low fertility, Vishnevskij (2006) and

Zakharov (2008) claimed that changes in the conditions of the Russian peasantry had played a part.

The abolition of serfdom in 1861 and the separation of church and state in 1918 eased the pressure to

have a larger family. The changes in the reproductive behavioural patterns, at first, had very little

effect on overall fertility. At the beginning of the 20th century, the differences in birth rates dependent

on types of residence and religion became more evident. Birth control worked through abstinence,

interrupted intercourse, and occasional abortions.

The sequence of historical events that took place in the first decade of the 20th century – World War I,

the Russian Revolutions of 1917 and the Civil War that followed – contributed to the acceleration of

the demographic transition. Russian birth rates started to steadily decline in between 1915 and 1920

(Vishnevskij 2006; Bondarskaja 1999). To a substantial degree, the decline was a reaction to

temporary changes in people’s living conditions, because by the mid-1920s, when the period of

extensive revolts against Soviet power had ended, the birth rate restored itself to its pre-World War I

level.

However, as of the late 1920s, the downward trend resumed. This time, the decline was driven by a

rapid process of industrialization, the collectivization of peasantry, and the famines of 1932-1933. In

1934, the TFR was 3.6 children per woman, whereas only 7 years earlier the TFR in Russia had been

equal to 6.7 children per woman (Andreev et al. 1998, 166).

The Great Patriotic War4 struck the next heavy blow to Russia’s birth rate. In 1946, the TFR was 2.8

children per woman, which was 1.5 times lower than in 1940 (Andreev et al. 1998:166). Similarly to

after the last war period the TFR slightly recovered itself. The compensating rise in the birth rate

lasted until 1949, when the TFR was brought back to a value of 3.2 children per woman. That was the

4 The term Great Patriotic War is used in Russia and other former republics of the Soviet Union to describe

the war from the 22nd of June, 1941 to the 9th of May, 1945on which was fought many fronts of the

eastern campaign of World War II between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany with its allies.

4

last time the TFR in Russia came so close to its pre-World War II value of 4.3 live born children per

woman (Andreev et al. 1998, 166).

By the end of the 1960s, the practice of birth control became common for many Russian families. As a

result, the average number of children born to a woman during her lifetime was less than 1.9 – 2.0

between 1969 and 1970 (Zaharova et al. 2002:96). Zakharov (2008) pointed out that it was one of the

lowest reported fertility rates, including the rates for Western Europe.

To summarize, by the late 1960s, Russia completed the demographic transition from traditional

reproductive behaviour, characterised by a high fertility rate and no regulation of family size, to a

contemporary model of low fertility with widespread birth control.

In the late 1970s, fertility in Russia began to decline anew, which induced the government to introduce

a number of family policy measures5. The collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991 and the

ensuing economic instability prompted a decade-long decline in fertility rates. The TFR plummeted to

1.2 between 1999 and 2001, which put Russia on a par with “lowest-low” fertility countries6. Period

figures reflect effects caused by external shocks and the direct impact of family policy measures (see

Figure 2 in Appendix).

The persistence of very low birth rates in the first half of the 2000s forced the government to resort

again to family policy reforms in order to prevent the ongoing fertility decline. The TFR came to a

standstill at about 1.6 children per woman in more recent years, which makes it possible to speculate

about the success of the 2007 pronatalist measures. This thesis will assess whether the government

interventions had indeed a positive impact on fertility.

3. An evolution of Russian family

policies

From the 20th to beginning of the 21st century the Russian state has changed several socio-political and

socio-economical systems (Hasbulatova and Smirnova 2008, 4). In addition to those structural

changes, the government attempted to influence fertility to ensure the country’s labour force and

5 An increase of the job-protected parental leave time and introduction of flexible working hours for

mothers with children were some of the 1980s policy measures. For more details see Section 3.3 of this

paper.

6 The term “lowest-low” fertility was introduced by Kohler, Billari and Ortega (2002) to indicate countries

with a period TFR below 1.3.

5

military. Historically, there have been several periods of government policy interventions. These

interventions intended to reverse fertility declines. The current system of family policy has inherited

that pronatalist stance, which is why it is important to focus on the evolution of family policy in

Russia, rather than just on contemporary policies.

3.1 Post-revolutionary model of family policy (1917 –

1930s)

Before the October revolution of 1917, only religious marriages had legal validity in Russia. Divorces

and unauthorised marriage dissolutions were forbidden. Family relations were built according to the

patriarchal gender roles and hierarchical family structure. Almost all vital issues, such as matters of

residence, employment, education, issuing bills etc. were subordinated to the husband. Laws from the

post-revolutionary period, in contrast, declared a commitment to equal opportunities for men and

women in all spheres of life, especially in family life (Tchouikina 2002, 112). The government

abolished the church’s control over marriage, ratified a uniform procedure of civil marriage and

simplified the divorce procedure7. Women were also granted sexual equality and abortion was

legalised for the first time in Europe.

3.2 Stalin’s model of family policy (1930s – 1940s)

Until the 1930s, the government policy interventions were not aimed at fertility and subsequent

demographic behavior. The first pronatalist policy measures were taken under Stalin’s leadership in

the 1930s.

In 1934 the Soviet Union conducted an extensive demographic study. The study revealed that the birth

rate throughout the whole Soviet Union had fallen from 45.6 births per thousand people in 1913 to

31.0 in 1932 (Hoffmann 2000, 37). Accordingly, the focus of the family policy shifted to the

promotion of high fertility (or in other words, large families).

The first pronatalist initiative introduced in 1936 was the ban on abortion (except when the mother’s

health was threatened). In addition, the 1936 decree increased government spending for facilities that

mothers might require, such as maternity homes, nursery beds, milk kitchens, paediatric clinics and

7 The 1917 decree that was issued by the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People’s

Commissars of the USSR made divorce obtainable at the request of either spouse and ensured a proper

alimony.

6

kindergarten facilities (Hoffman 2000, 11). Another policy output implemented during this period was

the introduction of financial relief for mothers with seven or more children8.

The pronatalist orientation of Soviet welfare programs became more explicit after the enormous

population losses during World War II. The 1944 law subjected singles and childless couples to

additional taxes (Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Soviet Union)9. In the same year single

mothers of children under 16 years became entitled to additional monthly payments. Additionally,

maternity leave was increased from 9 to 11 weeks and annual family allowances were extended to

cover each 3rd and subsequent child.

In order to encourage large families the state also introduced a series of six medals. They ranged from

the “Medals of Maternity” and the “Orders of Maternal Glory” (for bearing and raising 4-5 and 7-9

children) to the honorary title of “Mother Heroine” (10 or more children, all living at the last child’s

first birthday). Holders of medals were entitled to a number of privileges, such as higher pensions,

preferential positions on waiting lists for kindergartens and housing, as well as priority in shop queues

(Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Soviet Union 1944).

3.3 Soviet family policy (1950s – 1980s)

In contrast to the previous period, the Soviet family policy between 1950s and 1970s was

characterized by a standstill in the development of new measures aimed at increasing the birth rates.

Perhaps the only evidence of the legislation’s pronatalist intent was the increase of paid maternity

leave to 112 days in 195610.

The 1960s witnessed a progressive decline in fertility. The TFR dropped well below the replacement

level. The fertility decline was especially noticeable in the Slavic-populated areas of the Soviet Union.

The government tried to avoid drawing attention to the demographic problem. However, the 24th

Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (1971) was forced to confirm the unfavourable

8 An annual allowance for 2000 roubles was paid for five years for seventh and subsequent children. A

5000 rouble bonus was granted to women with 10 children during the first year. For the next four years

mothers received annually 3000 roubles

9 The tax affected childless men and women aged 25-50 and 20-45 respectively. It was 6% of the

childless person’s wages, but it provided certain exceptions. People who were medically ineligible to give

birth, lost children during World War II or were war heroes with certain awards were exempt from the

tax. Also, many students and people who earned less than 70 roubles a month were able to obtain en

exemption from the tax.

10 All working women were granted a fully paid maternity leave of 56 days before and 56 days after the

birth (with 14 days of extra leave for births with complications or for multiple births). Far East, Siberia

and Northern regions received a slightly higher leave pay.

7

demographic situation. By 1976, the Soviet leadership acknowledged the need for an accurate

pronatalist welfare policy to counteract adverse demographic trends (Zakharov 2008: 921).

As a result, the 26th Communist Party Congress (1981) outlined the main spheres of pronatalist policy

interventions. The government introduced a lump-sum benefit at the birth of a child and a monthly

benefit for childcare11. An additional financial assistance of the amount of 20 roubles per child per

month was provided to single mothers (Kosyak 2012)12. Special attention was given to reducing the

tension between maternal and worker roles. For instance, a parent looking after a child received the

right to part-time employment or the ability to work from home. Moreover, working women with two

or more children under the age of 12 were guaranteed an additional three days’ paid leave during the

summer or at any other convenient time (Central Committee of the Communist Party and Council of

Ministers of the Soviet Union 1981).

In addition to the improvement of measures introduced earlier, the government instituted some

innovative measures in family policy. The 1981 policy introduced a partly paid leave to look after

small children, it entitled young families with a child to an apartment, and it reduced the pension age

for mothers with five or more children.

3.4 Contemporary family policy (1990s – 2000s)

In 1991-1992, the Soviet Union collapsed and the state’s pronatalist policy in fact ended. One of the

main reasons behind this was the faltering economy. The economic reforms of the 1990s13, aimed to

ensure the transition from a controlled economy to a market economy, led to a galloping inflation and

further deterioration of the Soviet economy. Restricted by strong budget limitations, the government

directed all efforts to ameliorate the most burning issues, which were poverty, unemployment and the

lack of pensions. Consequently, the government spending on pronatalist measures was sidelined. The

expenditure on family allowances as a percentage of the GDP dropped from 2.1% in 1991 to 0.4% in

2002 (Statistical Yearbook of Russia 2003).

During the 1990s, the government did not take any new pronatalist measures. Instead it cut back on

the amount of social guarantees and benefits that were already in place. In addition, the number of

recipients of social assistance was sharply reduced. All benefits were focussed exclusively on low-

income families in order to help them overcome the difficult economic times (Chernova 2011).

11 Working or studying mothers received a 50 rouble bonus for their first child and 100 roubles for their 2nd

and 3rd child.

12 A monthly maintenance and education allowance was paid until a child reached the age of 16.

13 Such as price liberalization, liberalization of foreign trade and the privatization of the former Soviet state

enterprises.

8

By the late 1990s, the government’s concern for demography became again acute, as fertility rates

plummeted to around 1.2 births per woman (Federal State Statistics Service, 2016). In 2001, the

Russian government adopted the “Concept of Demographic Development of the Russian Federation

until 2015” which set a long-term goal for demographic policy. The goal was to stabilize Russia’s

population and to create conditions for population growth. The priorities were to reduce the mortality

rate, to optimize migration incentives and to increase the birth rate (Zakharov 2008). Unfortunately,

the country had no resources to implement new policies.

In the early 2000’s came a period of economic stability and with it a new family agenda. On the 10th of

May, 2006, the president set the vector of the governmental strategy for the following years in his

annual address to the Federal Assembly. The new family policy, aiming to increase the total number of

children per family, was announced as the fundamental principal of Putin’s state policy. It included a

package of measures designed to change a calculus of costs and benefits of having a child. These

measures included lump-sum payments in connection with an early registration in a hospital in the

beginning stages of pregnancy (before 12 weeks) and lump-sum grants for a birth or an adoption.

Moreover, a monthly childcare allowance for children under 1.5 years old was increased progressively

with the number of children. In addition, the government introduced family benefits to compensate for

the expenses for preschool education (Presidential Address, 2006). The government also carried out a

pronatalist campaign with the aim to raise the prestige of large families. These family-related measures

bear a close resemblance to the Soviet family policies, which also offered services and child-rearing

allowances during maternity and parental leave. The only measure of the 2007 family policy that has

no analogues in the history of the Soviet family policy is the maternity (family) capital program. For

the first time ever, the state implemented a policy advocating a two-or-more-children norm and put

forward a generous financial incentive aimed at stimulating birth rates in Russia. Therefore, the

maternity capital program was interpreted as a core of the state’s pronatalist agenda (Chernova 2011).

The maternity (family) capital program was originally adopted for the period of 2007-2016, but this

period was extended several times. To date, the program is set to expire in December 201814. To

qualify for maternity capital, a mother should have a 2nd or subsequent child born or adopted between

January 1st, 2007, and December 31st, 2018. In addition, all recipients of maternity capital are required

to have Russian citizenship.

The regulations define maternity (family) capital as a form of state support for families. However, the

term family, which is in parentheses, is usually dropped in an ordinary use. According to the original

14 The future of the maternity capital program is still unclear. If the program will be extended again, the

most possible scenarios are the following. According to the first scenario, only low- or middle-income

families will be able to receive payments. Based on the second one, only women who gave birth to a 3rd

or subsequent child will be eligible for this program. It is also very likely that payments may be directed

exclusively to housing. The remaining two options (i.e. children education and investment in mother’s

pension fund) will be excluded because they were rarely chosen.

9

design the right to dispense the means of maternity capital belongs to a mother. A father (or in some

cases another caretaker) receives the right to maternity capital in exceptional cases, such as the

mother’s death, deprivation of her parental rights or her being convicted of a crime against the child.

The maternity capital program is administrated by the Russian Pension Fund in the form of a

certificate. The period for claiming the maternity capital certificate after the birth (adoption) of a

second or subsequent child is unlimited. In order to receive maternity capital an applicant must fill out

a certificate claim form and submit it to the Pension Fund branch closest to the place of residence

together with a full package of documents. All information about the required documents is available

on the website of the Russian Pension Fund. The claim may be submitted by mail, or in the service

box of the local branch. After the submission of all necessary documents, the decision to issue a

certificate is taken by the claims officer within one month. The certificate is issued or sent by mail

within 5 days following a satisfactory decision on the matter.

The maternity capital certificate entitles its holder to a one-time cashless benefit. Maternity capital is

not taxable. The amount of maternity capital is revised annually to adjust for inflation. In 2007 the

monetary value of the certificate was 250 000 roubles15. Currently, the indexed annual maternity

capital amounts to 453 026 roubles16. This is a substantial sum by the standards of income of an

average Russian. To give a sense of scale, the average nominal monthly wages amounted to 35 650

roubles in January 2017 (Federal State Statistics Service, 2017).

According to the program, maternity capital as a subsidy to encourage fertility can be spent for one of

the following purposes: children’s education (including college education and training), housing, and

pension funds for mothers17. Yet the money cannot be used until three years after the birth or adoption

of the child. By design, this may help to limit early withdrawals of funds by dysfunctional families or

scammers for their own needs, and not for the benefit of a child or an entire family. The first payments

were thus only issued in 2010. In response to the financial and economic crisis of 2008-2010 some

amendments were made. Families were allowed to use maternity capital for repayment of housing

loans immediately after the birth of a second or subsequent child. In addition, starting from 2016,

parents of children with disabilities can immediately spend maternity capital on goods and services

supporting social adaptation and integration of their children. Moreover, mothers were entitled four

times to the lump sum from maternity capital for current needs: 12 000 roubles in 2009 and 2010

respectively, 20 000 roubles in 2015 and 25 000 roubles in 2016. These amendments did not alter the

overall design of the program. Maternity capital is a one-time benefit at birth or adoption of a second

15 It was equivalent to 9500 USD or 7200 EUR at the exchange rate of January 2007.

16 The maternity capital subsidy was equal to slightly more than 7530 USD or 7200 EUR at the exchange

rate of January 2017.

17 The use of maternity capital is regulated by the Federal law No 256 “On supplementary measures of

state support of families with children” as of 29th of December, 2006.

10

or subsequent child. This is the befit with a pre-specified usage that can be received as a bank transfer.

A mother still remains the main recipient of the capital. Appendix Table 2 provides an overview of the

main indicators of the maternity capital subsidy for the period of 2007-2016.

Maternity capital is one of the state’s largest social commitments besides the pension system. In 2016,

the program costs amounted to 10 billion roubles, which is slightly more than 7% of all Russian

Pension Fund expenditures in that year.

According to the Russian Federal Pension Fund statistics (2016), about 7.6 million families have

received maternity capital certificates since the program came into effect in 2007. The most common

way to spend the maternity capital payments has been on housing. In 2016, the Russian Pension Fund

issued 924 800 certificates. Of these, only 18% (51 100 certificates) have been claimed so far. One

might question public awareness about this program, but the state carried out a broad social marketing

campaign of maternity capital.

Following its introduction in 2007, the maternity capital program has been criticized in a number of

respects. First of all, the concept of the program itself was questioned. Feminists claimed that the state

strengthens stigma for women. By directing maternity capital to mothers, Russian women are seen as

main providers of childcare. In addition, the amount of payment cannot compensate for the social and

economic autonomy that paid work provides. The specified directions of use of maternity capital are

also a question still hotly debated. According to many experts, housing, children’s education, and

pension funds for mothers are necessary but not sufficient areas for the capital’s investment. The State

Duma (lower house of the Russian parliament) regularly receives proposals to expand the use of

maternity capital, but most of them are rejected. Moreover, liberal-minded experts were concerned

about the monetary value of the certificate. They claimed that the monetary payment would not be

sufficient to encourage middle-class families to give more births (Borozdina et al. 2014:63).

Especially if you take into account the price level for real estate and education in large cities of Russia.

Economists warned that the benefit would be attractive only to low-income families. The effectiveness

of the program in increasing fertility was also questioned. This latter aspect will be addressed in the

following chapter.

4. Debate and theory

The view that family policies, especially financial incentives, can affect fertility is supported by the

economic theories of fertility. Becker (1960) examined fertility as a result of economically rational

decisions made by couples. He considers children as goods. Similar to other goods, the demand for

11

children is affected by the benefits and costs (the expenditures of raising a child) facing parents. When

deciding on the number of children and the timing of births, parents take into account utilities

(benefits) they will receive from the birth of a child at some point in time. Becker distinguished

between three different types of benefits associated with having a child. Parents can expect monetary

income, old-age security and psychological benefits. On the other hand, having children entails the

opportunity costs of the parents’ time spent with their children instead of being active on the labour

market. It also includes the depreciation of the value of the parents’ education and work experience

while caring for their children. On top of that there is a direct net cost to having children (purchased

goods and services for raising children)18. Thus, the decision to have a child is a function of the

economic costs and benefits of children, and is subject to an income constraint. According to this

model, any reduction in the costs of children (as a result of family subsidies) or any increase in income

(as a result of fiscal transfers to families) is expected to increase the demand for children. In a later

study, in collaboration with Lewis (1973), Becker introduced a quality component. He argued that any

increase in income is expected to result in either a higher number of children, or in children of higher

quality (i.e. higher cost).While the static model of Becker is better suited for understanding the

relationship between income and demand for children, dynamic (life-cycle) models provide a

framework that is more suitable to incorporating timing of births (Hotz et al. 1997). As noted earlier,

parents aim to maximize their utility when making choices about childbirths. Under the assumptions

of no uncertainties and existence of perfect capital markets, parents tend to choose early childbearing

and no (or minimal) spacing between births (Hotz et al. 1997:320). The implication is that parents will

prefer to have their children early in the life cycle in order to enjoy them for longer. When the

assumptions are not satisfied, postponing motherhood may help to reduce the “maintenance” costs of

children (foregone wages and human capital investments and increased household expenditures).

Thus, policies that affect the costs of children and income are expected to affect the timing decisions

of fertility.

Taking into account all considerations discussed above, the study of the maternity capital program

provide an excellent example of family policies that may affect birth spacing due to income changes

and reduction in the costs of children. The introduced maternity capital is inherently equivalent to a

lump-sum of benefits – baby bonuses – with a pre-specified agenda, paid as a result of a birth with a 3-

year delay. Numerous countries have recently introduced financial incentives to stimulate women’s

fertility intentions. Despite the compelling theoretical rationales discussed above, the empirical

findings on the relationship between family policy measures and fertility are ambiguous (see Gauthier

2007). Incorrect conclusions about policy effects are partly due to the fact that there are two different

approaches to the interpretation of fertility in the literature. One branch of research regards the total

18 See Becker (1960), Cigno and Ermisch (1989), Walker (1995) for detailed information.

12

number of children as the ultimate goal of pronatalist policies and therefore tries to find evidence that

the TFR responds to policy measures (D’Addio and Mira d’Ercole 2005; Luci and Thévenon 2012;

Milligan 2005; Boccuzzo et al. 2008). Another branch of research focuses on the changes in the timing

(precipitation or postponement) and spacing (shorter or longer intervals between births) of births

rather than on long-term fertility changes (Ermisch 1988; Barnby and Cigno 1990; Aassve and

Lappegard 2009).

The literature on the timing of childbearing is of particular interest, because it addresses the tempo

(timing) component in fertility rates. Changes in the TFR might give misleading conclusions about the

trends in cohort fertility over a long period of time (quantum effects). They might thereby bias the

analysis of the impact of government policies on fertility. In fact, tempo changes in fertility may also

distort the TFR. The precipitation of subsequent children could falsely be interpreted as an increase in

the TFR. Many studies did not adjust for the distortions induced by changes in timing. Summarizing

the international literature on family policy effects, Gauthier (2007) revealed that there is a small

positive relationship between policies and fertility. Studies of D’Addio and Mira d’Ercole (2005), and

Luci and Thévenon (2011) converged on the same assessment; cash transfers have a positive effect on

the TFR. When considering family policies from 18 OECD countries between 1982 and 2007, Luci

and Thévenon (2012) confirmed that policy regulations (i.e. paid leave, childcare services and

financial transfers) do influence the TFR. They also identified that the effect of cash benefits is greater

one year after childbirth.

A number of previous studies stressed that there is substantial heterogeneity in the effect of family

policies on the TFR (Bocuzzo et al. 2008; Laroque and Salanié 2008). In particular, many researchers

found TFR responses to vary with birth order. Considering the impact of the overall financial

incentives (including tax breaks and benefits) on fertility in France, Laroque and Salanié (2008)

estimated a stronger impact of financial support on the likelihood of a 1st and 3rd childbirth. Milligan

(2005) evaluated the fertility effect of a childbirth grant, introduced in the Canadian province of

Quebec between 1987 and 199719. According to his estimates, the probability of having a 1st child

increased by 12% during the existence of the allowance. The probability increased by 25% in the case

of a 3rd child or any subsequent children.

In addition to heterogeneity by parity of birth20, family policy effects on fertility may also differ

depending on income and education. For example, Boccuzzo et al. (2008) studied the effect of a birth

19 The Allowance for Newborn Children (ANC) was paid to parents starting from the birth of their first child.

The Quebec ANC was worth 500 USD for the 1st child, 1000 USD for the 2nd child, and up to 8000 USD

for the 3rd and higher order children (see more Milligan 2005).

20 Woman’s parity at a given point in time is the number of live births of babies to the female so far. A

woman who has given birth to two children is referred to as a two-parity woman.

13

bonus which was introduced in the Italian region Friuli-Venezia Giulia in 2000. They found that the

effect of the bonus on fertility was particularly strong for low-income and low-educated women. The

effect increased with higher birth order.

Unlike studies that address the quantum effects of family-related policies, much less attention has been

devoted to the tempo effects. The existing empirical literature focuses on how the timing of births are

affected by changes in states’ expenditures on family allowances, maternity- and parental-leave

benefits, and childcare subsidies, but none of these studies capture the effect of lump-sum benefits. For

example, Ermisch (1988) found that generous child allowances increased the likelihood of higher-

parity births. He also showed that the size of child benefits in the United Kingdom precipitated

fertility, as it speeded up women’s entry into motherhood. Studies based on Norwegian data conclude

that benefits, such as maternity or parental leave and childcare subsidies, have a positive impact on

fertility. For example, Aassve and Lappegård (2009) concluded that childcare benefits are positively

related to the timing of the birth of a second and third child in Norway. The authors argue that couples

receiving the cash benefit progress more quickly onto subsequent childbearing. For Norway, the

availability of formal childcare was also estimated to have a positive effect on first-birth timing

Rindfuss et al. (2007).

Similar to international literature, Russian literature debates the effect of maternity capital on fertility.

Russian politicians attributed the recent increase in childbirth to the success of a pronatalist set of

measures introduced in 2007. Demographers, on the other hand, remained skeptical about the

acclaimed positive effects of maternity capital on fertility. As Antonov et al. (2002) pointed out, the

impact of financial incentives on fertility tend to be overestimated. Economic stimulation may remove

existing financial constraints and result in a reduction of birth intervals without increasing the actual

number of children (Frejka and Zakharov 2014; Ovcharova 2010). However, existing studies have not

demonstrated this point of view yet. This will be one of the assumptions researched in this study.

The Russian literature on child benefit effects on fertility entails two closely related studies. Both

studied the effect of family policy measures on the overall intended number of children (Biryukova et

al. 2016; Slonimczyk and Yurko 2013). Using the Russian household panel data (RLMS), Slonimczyk

and Yurko (2013) introduced a structural dynamic model of fertility and female labor force

participation to estimate the effect of the maternity capital program. They found a small positive effect

on fertility that persisted in the long-run. The estimated increase in the TFR in response to the

introduction of the maternity capital program was about 0.15 births per woman. The authors

emphasized that there is heterogeneity in policy impacts on fertility. In particular, they argued that the

maternity capital program had a stronger impact on married or cohabiting women. Though, there was

no impact differentiation for different types of residence or employment status.

14

The recent study by Biryukova et al. (2016) confirmed the positive impact of the maternity capital

program on the subsequent births. Their estimation model is based on the same data that I used in this

study. The authors used the full 3-wave Russian GGS panel. To assess the effect of 2007 family policy

changes on the probability of a 2nd and any subsequent births in Russia, the entire observation period

was divided into two intervals. The 1st interval covers the period from the time of the survey in 2004 to

August 2007, and the 2nd interval lasts from September 2007 until the date of the 2011 survey. All

births which occurred in the 1st interval could not be provoked by these measures, whereas birth in the

2nd interval might have been. The authors used a simple logistic regression, where a binary dependent

variable is set to 1 if a woman a 2nd or any subsequent births and to 0 if she had not. The list of

independent variables covered various demographic characteristics, including the number of children

born per woman at the start of each observation interval. They claimed that the chances that parents

with two children had a 3rd or a subsequent child were larger than the probability of 1st time parents

having a 2nd child in the 2007-2011 interval. This however does not prove a positive effect on the

fertility rate. It only points out that larger families were more prone to increase the family size than

smaller families. The authors’ conclusion about the positive effect of the 2007 policy is therefore

faulty. In addition, their finding is inconclusive because the authors do not take timing into account. It

might be just that women are having their next child more quickly than in the pre-reform period. For

their estimation results see Table 3 in the Appendix.

While addressing the question of whether the maternity capital program, introduced in 2007, led to

changes in the timing and spacing of births in Russia this research makes a number of contributions to

the existing literature. First, I contribute to the Russian literature by adding evidence on the response

of fertility timing to this reform along with the TFR’s response. This will help to build a clearer

picture of the effectiveness of this policy on fertility. In particular, I will take up the question of which

women were the most affected by the policy. It might be that financial incentives do not influence

women in the same way. For example, the effect of financial incentives might depend on woman’s

earning capacity, which can be looked at through her educational level or when she interrupted her

career for a 1st birth.

5. Empirical strategy and data

5.1 Research questions

Appealing to the theoretical knowledge and empirical evidence described above, I will address the

following research questions in this study. Foremost I would like to research whether the maternity

15

capital policy has changed the interval between the birth of a 1st and 2nd child. Whether the maternity

capital policy has changed the overall risk of transition to a 2nd childbirth is also of interest. In other

words, has the risk increased in the post-reform period? Besides that I will assess whether the risk of a

2nd birth differed for women with different educational levels and ages at the time of 1st birth (entry

into the 1st motherhood) during the policy period.

5.2 Data and sample selection

The empirical analysis is based on data from the Russian part of the "Generation and Gender Survey”

(GGS)21. It is a part of the international program “Generations and Gender” (GGP). The aim of the

whole program is to provide information on the dynamics of family relations in UNECE countries

(UNECE, 2006)22. Russian GGS is a 3-wave panel study conducted at 3-year time intervals (GGS-

panel: 2004, 2007, and 2011). Surveys were conducted in 32 regions of Russia23. All three waves are

representative at the national level.

The Russian GGS used a multistage probability sample. A list of administrative-territorial areas of

Russia was created to serve as primary sampling units (PSUs). These were allocated into 38 strata.

Moscow city, Moscow oblast, and Saint-Petersburg constituted three self-representing strata. The

remaining non-self-representing areas were allocated to 35 equal-sized strata. Depending on whether a

PSU was selected from a self-representing area or not, secondary sampling units (SSUs) are either

polling districts or settlements (towns or rural areas). This approach yielded 177 SSUs. By compiling a

list of all addresses in SSUs, dwelling lists were developed. Finally, at each selected dwelling unit the

Kish selection method was used to choose one household member to interview24.

The data used in this study is from the last wave of Russian GGS, conducted in 2011. This database

contains rich and complete knowledge about life course events, including childbirth and therefore it

suits the purpose of this study. The GGS-2011 data is of a nationally representative sample of resident

people aged 18-86. The sample includes both panel and new respondents. The total sample of the

GGS-2011 is 11 184 respondents, including 7 419 panel respondents (balanced panel sample – 5 640

21 In the Russia literature this survey is also referred to as “Parents and children, men and women in

family and society”.

22 http://www.ggp-i.org/

23 The Russian GGS covers the following 32 regions: Altai krai, Amur oblast, Chelyabinsk oblast, Chuvash

republic, Kabardino-Balkan republic, Kaluga oblast, Komi republic, Krasnodar krai, Krasnojarsk krai,

Kurgan oblast, Leningrad oblast, Lipetsk oblast, Moscow city, Moscow oblast, Nizhny Novgorod oblast,

Novosibirsk oblast, Orenburg oblast, Perm krai, Penza oblast, Primorsky krai, Rostov oblast, Saint-

Petersburg city, Saratov oblast, Smolensk oblast, Stavropol krai, Tambov oblast, Tatarstan republic,

Tomsk oblast, Tula oblast, Tver oblast, Udmurt republic, Volgograd oblast.

24 Further information on the sampling procedure and is available from http://ggpsurvey.ined.fr/webview/

16

observations)25. The response rate for the last wave of the Russian GGS is not specified26. To study the

effect of maternity capital on birth interval, I reduced the original sample to female respondents only.

The maternity capital is a measure of state support for families with two and more children born or

adopted between 2007 and 2018. Therefore, I restricted the sample to women who already had at least

one child and were therefore at risk of having a 2nd child. Due to contemporary fertility trends in

Russia (see Zakharov 2008); I excluded women who had their 1st child before the age of 16. I also

excluded cases where the woman’s birthdate was missing.

In order to assess shifts in the timing of 2nd births and changes in the rates before and after the

introduction of maternity capital, I juxtaposed two distinct intervals. The first time interval covers the

pre-policy period. Women who gave birth to a 2nd child between January 2004 and January 2007

(enactment of maternity capital) were included in the 1st time period. The post-policy period ranges

from January 2007 up to the date of the 2011 GGS survey. Thus, all births in the 2nd time period

occurred at the time the maternity capital program was in action. Table 4 summarises the number of

cases excluded from the analysis.

Table 4: Number of cases included and excluded from the analysis

Number of female respondents 7 314

Excluded cases: Women’s date of birth missing 3 Childless women 1 161 1st child born before age 16 33 Women with multiple first births 184 2nd child born before January 2004 3 969

Absolute number of excluded cases 5 350

Number of respondents 1 964 Number of second births 330

Source: author’s estimations based on the Russian GGS

Due to the specific configuration of the GGS-2011 questionnaires for panel respondents, I could not

address the differences between biological or adopted/fostered children. As of now I will only refer to

the number of births. Moreover, since the focus of my study is on second births, respondents who had

multiple first births instead of a single first child were excluded from the sample.

After these manipulations the corresponding working sample included 1 964 women with at least one

child and who are likely to have another child. Of these respondents, 330 gave birth to a 2nd child

before the time of interview.

25 For a detailed description of the Russian GGS-2011 visit http://www.socpol.ru/gender/3_w.shtml

26 The initial response rate for the first wave of the Russian GGS and variation of attrition in the Russian

GGS panel are presented in Table 5, Appendix.

17

5.3 Methods and variables

The central focus of this study is the duration of the interval between the birth of the 1st and 2nd child.

Aside from that, I will also estimate the risk of 2nd births. I will not study subsequent birth

occurrences, because only 1.2% of the respondents in my working sample have more than two

children (see Table 6 in Appendix). The analysis was carried out with the Stata software.

To analyse the transition to a 2nd child I used event-history modelling. A significant advantage of an

event history model over a logistic regression is that it allows you to deal with time-varying covariates

and censored observations.

The event under study is a 2nd birth and the intensity of its occurrence is analysed as a dependent

variable. I set the event variable as 1 if a woman gave birth to a 2nd child within the observation period,

and as 0 if she did not. The birth of a 2nd child is backdated by 9 months to obtain an approximate date

of conception. This is because I assume that maternity capital influenced the time of conception. The

respondents were “followed” until the birth of a 2nd child. If the respondents did not have a 2nd child,

they were censored at the age of 49 years.

In this study I used a piecewise constant exponential model. The entire process time is categorically

split into smaller pieces. These categories are intervals of 0 to <1 years, 1 to < 2 years, 2 to <3 years, 3

to <4 years, 4 to <5 years and more than 5 years since the birth of 1st child. I assume that the transition

rate is constant under preselected intervals. However, the transition rate can vary between intervals.

The independent variable, period, is dichotomized into the categories “before January 2007” and “after

January 2007” 27. To obtain separate observations for the pre- and post-reform person-time, I split the

follow-up at the time when the maternity capital was launched in Russia. Each resulting record

contains the follow-up on one subject through one time band.

In line with earlier studies (Billingsley 2011; Biryukova et al. 2016), my main control variables

include woman’s age at first childbirth, woman’s highest education level and household’s income

level. All these variables are constant through time. The relation between the age at 1st birth and

fertility is common across many contexts, and is there important to include. The age of women at the

time of the 1st birth was grouped into the following four groups: 16-19, 20-24, 25-29, and older than

30. To account for socioeconomic fertility differentials, I controlled for the respondent’s highest

27 I also included the period of May 2006 in our trial regression. This is the date, when the maternity

capital program was first introduced in president’s annual address to Russia’s Federal Assembly.

However, the 2007 period fit the data best.

18

educational level. It is a categorical variable, constructed using the ISCED 2011 classification28. “Low

education” applies to women who had a primary education or less or incomplete secondary education

(ISCED 2011 Levels 0-2). “Middle education” corresponds to an upper secondary education with state

school-leaving exam (ISCED 2011 Levels 3-4). “High education” applies to women with a university

degree (ISCED 2011 Levels 5/6 or higher). Another socioeconomic factor that should be influential to

fertility decisions is income. It is a categorical variable, measuring household monthly income in

roubles. I grouped it into five categories: less 10 000 roubles (minimum cost of living in Russia),

10 000 – 20 000 roubles, 20 000 – 30 000 roubles, 30 000 – 50 000 roubles, and more 50 000 roubles.

All time-varying covariates are recorded on a monthly basis, which means that person-months were

used as the unit of analysis. For the distribution of person-months and the number of 2nd births see

Table 7 in the Appendix.

The modelling strategy is straightforward. I start with examining the main effects. The initial model

includes only the time period and time since 1st birth occurred. I proceeded stepwise by inclusion of

demographic and socioeconomic covariates, monitoring the changes in the effects of my main

variables of interest.

At the stage of explanatory analysis, I experimented with a broader range of background

characteristics. Mostly these were time-constant variables, like woman’s type of residence

(rural/urban). However, the inclusion of such additional characteristics did not affect the gradients of

the main independent variable. I also did not include the union status, since there is no theoretical

reason one should expect partnership status to confound the relationship between period and second

births.

To account for the possible differences between the pre- and post-reform periods, I proceed with

interactions between the time period variable and time passed since the 1st child born. I also employ

interactions between a time period and control variables.

28 The ISCED 2011 (levels of education) is the reference international classification for organizing

information on education maintained by the UNESCO.

19

6. RESULTS

6.1 Main effects

Figure 1 displays the Kaplan-Meier failure estimates for the transition to 2nd births for Russian women

across two different time periods: 2004 to 2007 (pre-policy) and 2007 to 2011 (post-policy). The

reference point of time is the introduction of maternity capital in January 2007. The vertical axis on

the figure represents the estimated probabilities of the occurrence of 2nd birth events. The horizontal

axis measures the time in months passed since the birth of the 1st child. Two separate curves describe

the failure29 pattern for transitions in pre- and post-reform periods.

Figure 1 quite conclusively demonstrates minor changes in the intervals between 1st and 2nd births after

the introduction of maternity capital in January 2007. Based on the Kaplan-Meier failure estimates,

Russian women who recently became mothers had their 2nd child slightly earlier in the post-reform

period than in the preceding period. A gap between the failure curves appears already in the early

years following the 1st birth. The gap reaches its peak at about two years (25 months) after the 1st birth,

and then it becomes constant. During the 2007-2011 period, 7% more women had their 2nd child five

years (60 months) after the birth of their 1st child.

Figure 1: Second-birth estimates for women in Russia before and after the introduction of maternity

capital (January 2007), Kaplan-Meier failure estimates

29 Failure is considered as the event of a 2nd birth

0.0

00.2

50.5

00.7

51.0

0

0 50 100 150 200Duration since 1st birth (months)

2004-2007 2007-2011

By time period

Kaplan-Meier Second Birth Estimates

20

Similarly to Frejka and Zakharov (2013), my Kaplan-Meyer estimates suggest that the effect of

maternity capital wears off over time. The difference completely disappears after a lapse of 7-8 years

(90 months) from the birth of the 1st child. A faster transition to 2nd births in the beginning of the 2007-

2011 period explains a slower increase in 2nd birth events in later years.

Table 8 summarizes the results from a series of hierarchical models. The initial model includes two

main variables of interest, which are time passed since the 1st birth occurred and a period variable. The

latter should reflect the effects of the introduction of maternity capital. Forward selection starts at the

initial model, to which I then stepwise add other covariates. A woman’s age at 1st birth, her highest

educational level and household monthly income are included in the model to account for the

heterogeneity among the respondents. A statistically significant relative risk above 1 indicates a factor

which has an increased 2nd birth risk with respect to the reference category (relative risk 1). A relative

risk below 1 indicates a lower risk compared to the reference category.

Table 8: Hazard models of second birth rates for women, Russian GGS-2011

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4

Relative risk

S.E. Relative risk

S.E. Relative risk

S.E. Relative risk

S.E.

Time since 1st

child born

0-1 years 1 1 1 1 1-2 years 0.863 (0.229) 0.866 (0.230) 0.860 (0.233) 0.863 (0.234) 2-3 years 1.146 (0.287) 1.155 (0.289) 1.087 (0.281) 1.091 (0.282) 3-4 years 0.868 (0.233) 0.880 (0.237) 0.910 (0.247) 0.921 (0.250) 4-5 years 0.933 (0.248) 0.951 (0.253) 0.976 (0.262) 0.998 (0.268) 5+ years 0.432*** (0.084) 0.436*** (0.084) 0.447*** (0.088) 0.466*** (0.092)

Occurrence

of a 2nd

birth

Before January 2007

1 1 1 1

After January 2007

1.021 (0.114) 1.008 (0.113) 0.997 (0.113) 0.991 (0.113)

Age at 1st

birth

16-19 years 1 1 1 20-24 years 0.620*** (0.079) 0.670*** (0.089) 0.643*** (0.086) 25-29 years 0.475*** (0.079) 0.517*** (0.089) 0.507*** (0.088) 30+ years 0.147*** (0.054) 0.162*** (0.060) 0.165*** (0.061)

Educational

level

Low 1 1 Medium 0.526** (0.125) 0.518** (0.125)

High 0.567* (0.139) 0.509** (0.126)

21

Table 8: (Continued)

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4

Relative risk

S.E. Relative risk

S.E. Relative risk

S.E. Relative risk

S.E.

Household monthly

income (rub)

Less 10 000 1 10000 – 20000 0.966 (0.224) 20000 – 30000 1.600* (0.352) 30000 – 50000 1.507& (0.339) More 50 000 1.855* (0.446)

Log Likelihood (ll) -932.2 -906.4 -885.0 -876.0

Note: Statistical significance: *** =0.1%, ** =1%, * =5%

Turning to the two variables of interest in my analysis; I did not capture any significant differences of

overall risk of 2nd births between 2004-2007 and 2007-2011 periods. This is what I observed in

Kaplan-Meyer estimates. The figure 1 demonstrates that although the initial risk of transitioning to a

2nd child was slightly higher during the 2007-2011 period, the overall share that transitioned by the end

of observation did not vary across time periods.

Another strong factor that was expected to influence the 2nd birth risk was time since the 1st child born.

The 2nd birth transition rate decreased if five years had passed since the 1st child was born. Women,

who had their 2nd child five years after the 1st birth, had a 55% lower risk than women who had the 2nd

child within the first year. Besides this outcome there were no statistically significant differences in

the transition rates to a 2nd birth occasioned by time passed since the 1st birth.

The relative risks for other covariates demonstrated expected relationships. Women with secondary

and higher education had a lower risk to transition to 2nd birth relative to women with incomplete

secondary education. Interestingly, women whose household income is equal to or above the average

nominal monthly wages in Russia had higher transition rates than those with income below the

subsistence level. Regarding the effect of a woman’s age at the time of the 1st birth, the risk of a 2nd

birth decreased as mother’s age at the 1st birth increased. Women who gave birth to their 1st child aged

20-24 had a 36% lower 2nd birth risk than women aged 19 or younger. First-time mothers aged 25-29

had a 49% lower risk and women who postponed the 1st birth until they were 30 years and over had a

84% lower 2nd birth risk.

6.2 Interaction effects

In order to gain insights whether the interval between the 1st and 2nd child differs between the time

periods, I employ an interaction between the time periods and the time passed since the 1st child born.

22

My assumption was that the birth interval shortened in the post-policy period. I found that the

interaction term was statistically insignificant, which may be due to the small number of observations.

This means that the timing of 2nd births did not change substantially after the maternity capital policy

was implemented. Besides that the inclusion of the interaction term in the last model (Model 4) results

in a significance level of 0.3918. Thus, the likelihood ratio test suggests it will be better off with the

model that excludes the interaction term. The values of relative risks can be seen in Table 9.

Table 9: Interaction of the time periods and time passed since the 1st child born

Pre-reform period (before

January 2007)

Post-reform period (after January

2007)

0-1 years since 1st child born

1 1.628 (0.208)


0.819 (0.673) 1.447 (0.354)


1.369 (0.455) 1.556 (0.268)


1.425 (0.409) 1.108 (0.807)


1.296 (0.562) 1.374 (0.431)

5+ years since 1st child born

0.689 (0.267) 0.586 (0.108)

Note: p-values in parentheses. Control variables as in Model 4 in Table 8.

In this study I also wanted to see whether the risk of a 2nd birth was different according to woman’s

educational level and the timing of entry into the 1st motherhood in the policy period. I investigated

this by including interaction terms in the Model 4.

Table 10: Truncated results for hazard models of second birth rates interaction of educational levels

and the time periods

Model 6A Model 6B Model 6C

Post-reform period

0.988 (0.114) 0.934 (0.674) 1.100 (0.505)

Low education 1.569 (0.221) Low education*Post-reform period

1.365 (0.509)

Medium education 0.830 (0.283) Medium education*Post-reform period

1.132 (0.578)

High education 1.055 (0.764) High education*Post-reform period 0.786 (0.294)


23

Neither of interactions between the post-reform period (after January 2007) and educational levels was

statistically significant or improved the model. Thus, it can be concluded that women did not react to

the policy differently depending on their educational level.

Table 11 presents the values of relative risks for the model with the interaction between the time

period and woman’s age at 1st birth. The difference between the pre- and post-reform periods reveals

that young women are associated with elevated second birth risk, while women in old age are more

inclined to postpone or forego second births.

Table 11: Interaction of the time periods and woman’s age at 1st birth

Pre-reform period (before January

2007)

Post-reform period (after January

2007)

16-19 years at 1st birth

1 1.091 (0.687)


0.702 (0.809) 0.659 (0.038)


0.566 (0.029) 0.510 (0.007)

30+ years at 1st birth

0.101 (0.002) 0.228 (0.001)


However, adding a term for the interaction of time periods and woman’s age at 1st birth did not

significantly the model’s fit to the data. This time, the likelihood ratio test reports a significance level

of 0.6644.

7. Conclusion and discussions

The recent increase in the Russian TFR, which coincided with the period of the maternity capital

program, generated speculations about the policy’s success. Although there are studies assessing the

effect of this policy on increasing fertility rates, all of them are focused on quantum rather than tempo

effects (Biryukova et al. 2016; Slonimczyk and Yurko 2013). In contrast to those studies, my research

presents some new evidence on the impact of the maternity capital policy introduced in Russia in

January 2007.

The central focus of this study was to capture a short-term policy effect. This study assess whether the

maternity capital policy influenced a shift in the timing of the 2nd births in Russia. My assumption was

that the interval between the 1st and 2nd birth shortened in the post-policy period. The comparison of

Kaplan-Meyer failure curves in the 2004-2007 and 2007-2011 periods revealed that the difference in

24

2nd birth transitions between these two periods. The observed difference seems to be related to a slight

speeding up effect in the post-policy period. The model estimates did not corroborate the pattern

revealed by descriptive measures. It appears that the timing of a 2nd birth did not change substantially

in the post-policy time period.

Such a discrepancy between the results can be explained by the following two reasons. The first

reason might be the size of the effect, as the effect is relatively small it does not register as significant.

The second reason might be the limited sample size, meaning it is not large enough to detect a change.

The latter indeed constitutes a serious limitation to my study. There are 1 964 women in my sample

who had one child and who were at the risk of having a 2nd child. Only 330 of these respondents went

on to having a 2nd child before the end of the observation. I believe that a larger sample might provide

more precise estimates of the effect of the maternity capital policy on 2nd birth intervals.

Assessing the effect of the maternity capital policy was also challenging for other reasons. First, I

could not single out one policy and attribute all observed effects to it. In 2007, the Russian

government introduced a number of family policies aimed at increasing fertility. As part of the 2007

family policy reforms, the government added a lump-sum birth grant to the system of family benefits.

It also increased the amount of pregnancy and childbirth benefits and it introduced the maternity

capital program. Neyer and Andersson (2008) argued that a single policy, like a lump-sum payment, is

unlikely to influence fertility. According to them the interaction of a particular policy with other

policies and the general orientation of the welfare state were important. Therefore, I cannot interpret

the effects of the maternity capital policy alone. I need to consider the effect of all policy measures

introduced in 2007.

Despite the research limitations, I attempted to assess the change in the overall risk of having a 2nd

child. The regression estimates agreed with what I observed in the Kaplan-Meyer estimates. In

contrast to the previous research by Biryukova et al. (2016) I did not reveal any significant differences

of overall risk of 2nd births between 2004/2007 and 2007-2011 periods. Differently to my study,

Biryukova et al. (2016) combined women of different parities in their analysis. This could explain the

difference in outcome, as there might be a heterogeneous response to the policy across parities. The

effect of the maternity capital policy might be significantly different across time periods only for

higher-order births, but not for 2nd births. The reasons for women to have a 2nd or a 3rd/subsequent

child are very different (see more in Billingsley 2011). Combining these women in one sample

therefore does not render a homogeneous sample. In addition, their main finding is inconclusive since

their models do not include any factor reflecting the possible timing effects. It might be just that in the

period following the introduction of maternity capital women progress more quickly onto subsequent

childbirth than in the pre-reform period.

25

Among other factors considered in my model, mother’s education level and age at the time of the 1st

birth had a significant impact on the transition to a 2nd child. Women with secondary or university

education had the highest transition rate relative to women with incomplete secondary education. I

also found significant differences concerning the timing of woman’s entry into the 1st motherhood.

The 2nd birth rates decreased as the mother’s age at the 1st birth increased. With regard to the effect of

the time since 1st birth, the study revealed that the 2nd birth transition rate decreased if five years had

passed since the 1st child was born. Other differences in the time since 1st birth remained insignificant.

The last finding concerns results of models with interactions between socio-demographic variables and

the period variable. I did not capture any valid differences in the risk of a 2nd child birth among women

of different educational levels or the timing of entry into the 1st motherhood during the policy period.

To summarize the main findings, I have found some evidence that the policy may have disrupted the

normal interval pattern by encouraging women to complete their fertility plans earlier. However, the

comparison of relative risks revealed that there were no statistically significant differences in the

timing of 2nd births between the pre- and post-reform periods. I also did not capture the differences in

the overall risk of 2nd births between periods. This does not allow us to judge the effectiveness of the

policy as a whole, as the policy might have a positive effect on 3rd and subsequent transition rates.

Nevertheless, this research provides a relevant assessment of the effectiveness of maternity capital on

the interval between the 1st and 2nd birth and the overall 2nd birth risk. The effect of maternity capital

on 3rd and subsequent births could be of interest for further research.

8. Acknowledgements

Looking back, reflecting on my approach, I realise how challenging it was. I had changed departments,

supervisors and thesis topics before I realized what I would like to write and with whose guidance.

Now the time has come to express my gratitude to everyone who in one way or another helped and

supported me on the long way towards finishing this Master thesis.

I would like to begin by expressing my sincere gratitude to my supervisor, Sunnee Billingsley, for her

patience and kindness throughout the Master Program. I am very lucky to have had a supervisor who

never turned her back on me and who cared so much about my work.

Next, I would like to thank Svetlana Biryukova from the Independent Institute for Social Policy, who

provided me with access to the Russian part of the Generation and Gender Survey (GGS) “Parents and

Children, Men and Women in Family and in Society”.

26

The completion of this work would have been more difficult without the constant encouragement of

my friend and relatives. I am very thankful to my friend Janet van den Eijnde for her generous and

valuable help, revising and proofreading my thesis.

Finally, I am eternally grateful to my amazing family, including my husband, parents and brother, as

they have helped me through the ups and downs of my research. Without all of you I would not have

made it through all these years.

27

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10. Appendix

Table 1: Absolute change in period fertility rates, Russian Federation, 2006-2011

2006-2007 2007-2008 2008-2009 2009-2010 2010-2011

All births 0.11 0.09 0.04 0.03 0.02

Age 15-25 0.02 0.02 -0.01 -0.02 0.01

Age 26-49 0.10 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.01

Source: Frejka and Zakharov (2013)

Figure 2: Period total fertility indicators, Russia, 1958-2012

Note: Data further back in time is not available.

Source: Demoscope Weekly (2015)

Table 2: Indicators of the federal maternity capital subsidy, by year

Year The amount of payments,

roubles

Inflation indexing,

%

The number of issued

certificates

2007 250 000 - 314 000 2008 276 250 +10.5 569 000

2009 312 162 +13 940 000 2010 343 378 +10 789 000

2011 365 698 +6.5 701 000

2012 387 640 +6 724 000 2013 408 960 +5.5 786 000

2014 429 408 +5 823 000 2015 453 026 +5.5 940 000

2016 453 026 No indexation 924 800

Source: Pension Fund of the Russian Federation (2016)

32

Table 3: Truncated results for odds ratios for 2nd

and subsequent births’ occurrence

2004-2007 sample (Interval 1) 2007-2011 sample (Interval 2)

Model A Model B Model A Model B

Odds

ratios

S.E. Odds

ratios

S.E. Odds

ratios

S.E. Odds

ratios

S.E.

Number of children

a woman already

had at the start of

observation

1

(REF)

1** 1** 1** 1**

2 0.13** (0.06) 0.15** (0.06) 0.28** (0.08) 0.30** (0.09)

3 or

more

0.95 (0.41) 1.20 (0.55) 1.24 (0.54) 1.47 (0.67)

Note: Binary logistic regression model A includes demographic factors; Model B covers demographic and socio-economic factors.

Statistical significance: *** =0.1%, ** =1%, * =5%

Source: Biryukova et al. (2016)

Table 5: Variation of response and attrition rates of the Russian GGS panel

Response rate for GGS-

2004

Kept by

2007

Kept by 2011 (all 3

waves)

Moscow, Saint-Petersburg 14.4% 45.7% 25.4%

Vladivostok (Primorsky

krai)

29.5% 13.8% 6.7%

Other large cities 48.9%* 65.2% 42.4%

Towns 59.8% 70.2% 49.1%

Urban-type residence 70.3% 77.1% 65.6%

Rural 89.4% 84.6% 70.0%

Total 44.1% 69.1% 50.1%

*Includes Primorsky krai

Source: Sinyavskaya O. (2013)

33

Table 6: Proportion of women with one, two, and more children in the working sample

Number of children Number of respondents (%)

Only child 1 634 83.20

Two children 313 15.94

Three children 13 0.66

Four children 4 0.20

Total 1 964 100.00

Source: author’s estimations based on the Russian GGS-2011

Table 7: Person-months (exposure) and 2nd

births (occurrences) of women according to the two time

spans analysed: 2004-2007 and 2007-2011

Person-months Occurrences

Occurrence of a 2nd

birth Before January 2007 50 877 137 After January 2007 71 935 193 Total 122 812 330

Time since 1st child born

0-1 years 6 519 31 1-2 years 6 334 26 2-3 years 6 057 33 3-4 years 6 055 25 4-5 years 5 858 26 5+ years 91 989 189 Total 122 812 330

Age at 1st birth

16-19 years 21 659 97 20-24 years 61 605 167 25-29 years 27 420 58 30+ years 12 128 8 Total 122 812 330

Educational level Low 3 327 20 Medium 69 794 173 High 48 304 127 Missing 1 387 10 Total 122 812 330

Household monthly income (rub) Less 10 000 13 563 28 10 000 – 20 000 34 845 65 20 000 – 30 000 30 036 96 30 000 – 50 000 28 888 85 More 50 000 15 480 56 Total 122 812 330

Source: author’s estimations based on the Russian GGS-2011

34

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