Validation of Niger Report on initial data collection and … · DGTCP Direction Générale du...

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ValidationofNiger

Reportoninitialdatacollectionandstakeholderconsultation

EITIInternationalSecretariat 1June2017

2ValidationofNiger:Reportoninitialdatacollectionandstakeholderconsultation


Abbreviations

AfDB AfricanDevelopmentBankANLC-TI NigerienAssociationfortheFightagainstCorruption-TransparencyInternationalARMP AgencedeRégulationdesMarchésPublicsBCEAO BanqueCentraledesEtatsdeL'Afriquedel'OuestBO BeneficialownershipBpd BarrelsPerDayCCAIA ChambredeCommerce,d’Agriculture,d’Industrieetd’ArtisanatCCOAD NGOandDevelopmentAssociations’ChamberofConcertation(CCOAD)CEQCVC CoalitionforEquity,QualityAgainstcostlylivingCdC CourdesComptes(CourtofAccounts)CIT CorporateIncomeTaxCMEN CompagnieMinièreetEnergétiqueduNigerCNPCIT ChinaNationalPetroleumCorporationInternationalCNPCNP ChinaNationalPetroleumCorporationNigerPetroleumCNTPS CompagnieNationaledeTransportdesProduitsStratégiquesCENTIF CelluleNationaledeTraitementdesInformationsFinancièresCSO CivilSocietyOrganisationDGD DirectionGénéraledesDouanesDGI DirectionGénéraledesImpôtsDGTCP DirectionGénéraleduTrésoretdelaComptabilitéPubliqueECOWAS EconomicCommunityofWestAfricanStatesEU EuropeanUnionEITI ExtractiveIndustriesTransparencyInitiativeGDP GrossDomesticProductGFS GovernmentFinanceStatisticsGiZ DeutscheGesellschaftfürInternationaleZusammenarbeitGoN TheGovernmentofNigerGREN GroupforReflectionandActiononExtractiveIndustriesinNigerHALCIA HauteAutoritédeLuttecontrelaCorruptionetlesInfractionsassimiléesIMC Inter-MinisterialCommitteeIMF InternationalMonetaryFundMDTF TheWorldBank'sMulti-DonorTrustFundMIPSDRA MinistryofInterior,PublicSecurity,DecentralisationandReligiousAffairsMMID MinistryofMinesandIndustrialDevelopmentMoF MinistryofFinanceMPE MinistryofPetroleumandEnergyMSG Multi-StakeholderGroupNGO Non-GovernmentalOrganisationOIREN NetworkofInternationalNGOsinNigerPEP PoliticallyExposedPersonPSC Production-SharingContractPWYP PublishWhatYouPayRODADDHD NigerienNetworkofNGOsandDevelopmentAssociationsfortheDefenceof

HumanRightsandDemocracyROTAB OrganizationforTransparencyandBudgetaryAnalysisScf Standardcubicfeet



SML SociétédesMinesduLiptakoSONICHAR SociétéNigérienneduCharbonSOPAMIN SociétédesPatrimoinesdesMinesduNigerSORAZ SociétédeRaffinagedeZinderUNDP UnitedNationsDevelopmentProgrammeTFP TechnicalandFinancialPartnersToR TermsofReferenceUEMOA/WAEMU WestAfricanEconomicandMonetaryUnionUSD UnitedStatesDollarVAT ValueAddedTaxXOF WestAfricanFranc



TableofContents

Abbreviations.........................................................................................................................................2

TableofContents...................................................................................................................................4

ExecutiveSummary................................................................................................................................6

Introduction.........................................................................................................................................15

PartI–MSGOversight.........................................................................................................................231.OversightoftheEITIprocess....................................................................................................................23GovernmentengagementintheEITIprocess(#1.1)....................................................................................23IndustryengagementintheEITIprocess(#1.2)...........................................................................................26CivilsocietyengagementintheEITIprocess(#1.3).....................................................................................28MSGgovernanceandfunctioning(#1.4)......................................................................................................35Workplan(#1.5)...........................................................................................................................................45

PartII–EITIDisclosures........................................................................................................................532. Awardofcontractsandlicenses...........................................................................................................53Legalframework(#2.1)................................................................................................................................53Licenseallocations(#2.2).............................................................................................................................55Licenseregisters(#2.3).................................................................................................................................57Contractdisclosures(#2.4)...........................................................................................................................59Beneficialownershipdisclosure(#2.5).........................................................................................................60Stateparticipation(#2.6).............................................................................................................................613. Monitoringandproduction..................................................................................................................67Overviewoftheextractivesector,includingexplorationactivities(#3.1)...................................................67Productiondata(#3.2).................................................................................................................................68Exportdata(#3.3).........................................................................................................................................694. Revenuecollection...............................................................................................................................71Materiality(#4.1)..........................................................................................................................................71In-kindrevenues(#4.2)................................................................................................................................74Barterandinfrastructuretransactions(#4.3)..............................................................................................75Transportrevenues(#4.4)............................................................................................................................77TransactionsbetweenSOEsandgovernment(#4.5)...................................................................................77Subnationaldirectpayments(#4.6).............................................................................................................79Levelofdisaggregation(#4.7)......................................................................................................................80Datatimeliness(#4.8)..................................................................................................................................80Dataquality(#4.9)........................................................................................................................................816. Revenuemanagementanddistribution...............................................................................................90Distributionofrevenues(#5.1)....................................................................................................................90Sub-nationaltransfers(#5.2)........................................................................................................................90Additionalinformationonrevenuemanagementandexpenditures(#5.3)................................................927. Socialandeconomicspending.................................................................Error!Bookmarknotdefined.Socialexpenditures(#6.1)............................................................................................................................95SOEquasifiscalexpenditures(#6.2)............................................................................................................96


TableofContents


Contributionoftheextractivesectortotheeconomy(#6.3)......................................................................97

PartIII–OutcomesandImpact..........................................................................................................1018. OutcomesandImpact........................................................................................................................101Publicdebate(#7.1)...................................................................................................................................101DataAccessibility(#7.2).............................................................................................................................106LessonsLearnedandfollow-uponrecommendations(#7.3)....................................................................107Outcomesandimpactofimplementation(#7.4).......................................................................................1089. Impactanalysis(nottobeconsideredinassessingcompliancewiththeEITIprovisions).................114

Annexes.............................................................................................................................................117

Bibliography.......................................................................................................................................123

Indexoffiguresandtables

Figure1–initialassessmentcard.................................................................................................................13

Table3-Summaryinitialassessmenttable:Monitoringandproduction....................................................70

Table4-Summaryinitialassessmenttable:Revenuecollection..................................................................87

Table5-Summaryinitialassessmenttable:Revenuemanagementanddistribution.................................94

Table6-Summaryinitialassessmenttable:Socialandeconomicspending................................................99

Table7-Summaryinitialassessmenttable:Outcomesandimpact..........................................................112

6

ValidationofNiger:ReportoninitialdatacollectionandstakeholderconsultationExecutiveSummary


ExecutiveSummary

TheGovernmentofNigerannounceditscommitmenttoimplementtheEITIinMarch2005andofficiallylaunchedEITIimplementationinSeptember2006.NigerwasdesignatedanEITIcandidatecountryinSeptember2007andcompliantwiththeEITIRulesinMarch2011.Sincethen,Nigerhasexpandedthescopeofreportingtoitsoilrefinerystartingwhenoilproductionbeganin2011andcontributedtoshapingthedevelopmentoftheEITIStandardthroughitsactivepresenceontheEITIBoard.TheinitialfindingsofthisValidationexercisesuggeststrongcountryownershipoftheEITIprocessyetaslowtransitionfromtheEITIRulestotheEITIStandard.Despitethemultiplechallengesfacingthislandlockedandpoornationof17millionpeople,withoneoftheworldlowestincomepercapita($US359in2015),theGovernmentofNigerhasallocatedsignificantresourcestoEITIimplementation.

Morethan80%ofNiger’slandareaof1.27millionkm2isintheSaharaDesert.TheextractiveindustriesgovernancechallengesfacingNigerincludearecentgolddiscoveryintheDjadoplateaualongtheAlgerianandLibyanborder,growinginsecurityintheregionduetoIslamistgroups,andthecollapseofuraniumpricesintheaftermathoftheFukushimanuclearaccident.Arenewedcommitmentfromallstakeholdersandstrongleadershipfromthegovernmentwillbeneededtohelpaddressthesechallenges,includingimprovingthebusinessenvironmenttohelpattractinvestment.ThisreportoutlinesanumberofrecommendationsandcorrectiveactionstostrengthentheEITIprocessandmakeitmoremeaningfulandeffective.

NigercommenceditsValidationundertheEITIStandardon1November2016.1ThisreportdetailsthefindingsandaninitialassessmentoftheInternationalSecretariat’sdatagatheringandstakeholderconsultations.TheInternationalSecretariathasfollowedtheValidationProcedures2andappliedtheValidationGuide3inassessingNiger’sprogresstowardsmeetingtheEITIStandard.

WhiletheassessmenthasnotyetbeenreviewedbytheValidator,theInternationalSecretariat’spreliminaryassessmentisthatsevenEITIRequirements(1.1,3.1,3.3,4.7,4.8,5.1and7.3)havebeenfullyimplementedwithsatisfactoryprogress.Thereare21Requirementswerefurtherworkisrequired.Sevenrequirementsareassessedas“unmetwithmeaningfulprogress”,twelveofthese21outstandingrequirementsareassessedas“unmetwithinadequateprogress”,andthreeareassessedas“noprogress”.ThecorrectiveactionsidentifiedthroughthisprocessrelateinparticulartothecomprehensivenessandreliabilityofEITIreportingbybothcompaniesandthegovernment,includingstate-ownedenterprisesandpetroleumandminingcadastres.ThereisalsoanurgentneedtorevisittheinstitutionalbasisforEITIimplementationbothinregulationandinpracticetoensurecompliancewiththegovernancerequirementsoftheEITIStandard.

1ThecommencementdateofNiger’sValidationwasdelayedfrom1July2016to1November2016bytheEITIBoard.SeeBoarddecisionhere:https://eiti.org/BD/2016-212https://eiti.org/document/eiti-validation-procedures.3https://eiti.org/document/eiti-validation-guide.


ExecutiveSummary


Overallconclusions

NigerpresentsacomplexcasefortheEITI,giventhesignificantphysical,institutionalandstrategicchallengesfacedbythisland-lockedcountryrankedatthebottomoftheUnitedNations’HumanDevelopmentIndex.IthaslongexporteduraniumunderagreementswithFrance’sstate-ownedAreva.Thedealswerelastrenegotiatedin2014togivethegovernmentagreatershareofroyaltiesinlinewithotherprojects.China’sstate-ownedCNPCstartedproducingcrudeoilin2011tofeedadomesticrefineryforlocalconsumptionofpetroleumproducts.Asoilproductionisexpectedtotripleto60,000bpdby2019,Niger’soptionsincludebuildingapipelinetotheexistingChad-Cameroonpipeline,exportviaBenin,orexporttotheKadunarefineryinNigeria.

AkeystrengthofEITIimplementationinNigerhasbeenthelevelofinvolvementofMSGmembersfromallthreeconstituenciesinEITIreporting.DrivenbythePermanentSecretariat,AdvisortothePresidentoftheRepublicAbdoulAzizAskia,theMSGhasdraftedover90%ofNiger’sEITIReports,includingcollectingfinancialinformationfromreportingentitiesandundertakinganinitialreconciliation.ThisMSG-ledreporting,whilepositiveforin-countryownershipalsopresentsachallengeintermsofaccordancetotheEITIStandardandthequalityofoverallEITIreporting.

WhileEITIreportinghassuccessfullybeenexpandedtotheoilandgassector,includingmidstreamrefining,theEITI’scontributiontopublicdebateislimited.Themosttangibleimpactsofimplementationappeartohavecomeasaresultofcrises,ratherthanthroughreformofnationalsystems,anddonotappearcoordinated.TheCourtofCountslaunchedauditsofgovernment’sextractivesrevenuesforthefirsttimeasaresultofcorrectiveactionsrequiredbytheEITIBoardduringitsfirstValidation,undertheEITIRules.TheEITIhasalsohelpedensurespaceforcivilsocietytodemandinformationonextractivesgovernance,withtheEITIBoardinterveningtohelpsecurethereleaseofcivilsocietymembersoftheMSGin2014aftertheirarrest.Yetcivilsociety,companiesanddonorshavetendedtocommissionresearchintohot-topicissuessuchassubnationaltransfers,productionfiguresandenvironmentalimpactsindependentlyfromtheEITI.

Despitesignificantlogisticalchallenges,Niger’sactivecivilsocietyhasgeneratedarobustnationaldebateonpublicmanagementofthecountry’sresources,fromuraniumtooil.WhilstlimitedandcombinedwithbroaderCSOoutreach,disseminationandoutreachhavehighlightedsignificantpopulardemandforinformationrequiredundertheEITIStandard,suchassubnationaltransfers,productionfiguresandenvironmentalprovisioning.ThechallengeforEITINigeristoestablishrobustmechanismstochannelvoicesnotdirectlyrepresentedontheMSGintothenationaldebate,fromlocalcommunitiestoparliamentariansandanti-corruptionwatch-dogs,toensureEITIimplementationmeetsdomesticchallenges.TheEITIhastendedtoremaininasiloinNigerasaparallelprocessmorefocusedoncompliancethanonaddressinglocally-importantchallenges.

MSGmembersrepresenttheirrespectiveorganisationsandarenotheldaccountabletotheirconstituencies.DisseminationandoutreachtoareasoutsideNiameythathostextractivesactivitiestendtobeone-waychannelswheretheEITIReportsaredistributed,withoutcontentadequatelytailoredtomeetlocaldemandsforinformation.Outreachanddisseminationeventshaveprovidedoutletsforpopulardebateaboutextractiveindustrymanagement,andastrongfeedbackmechanismtoMSGdiscussionscouldhelpimprovethedraftingofkeyEITIdocumentsthatwouldrespondtostakeholder’s


ExecutiveSummary


needs.Bydiversifyingitsrepresentativeness,theMSGcanalsoensurethattheinformationitworkstodiscloseispertinenttonationalpriorities.

TheMSGhasusedonlylocalIndependentAdministrators,whohaveplayedasupportingroleintheproductionofEITIReportstoensurequalityassuranceandreconciliationoffinancialdata.ThequalityofEITIreportinghasunfortunatelysufferedfromMSG-ledEITIreporting,duetoweakcapacities,lackofexpertiseonauditingpracticesandshortdeadlines.TheMSGcouldaddresssomeofthereportingweaknessesidentifiedinthisreportbyseekingtechnically-proficientinputtokeyscopingandmaterialitydecisionsinatimelymannerandhiringmoreexperiencedIndependentAdministrators.

Lookingahead,thereareopportunitiesforembeddingEITIreportingingovernmentandcompanysystems.WhileEITINiger’sdatacollectionautomationprojectismeanttoimprovetheefficiencyofdatacollectionbymovingitonline,thereisroomformoredirectsolutionstoensurerobustqualityassuranceproceduresarefollowedinthenormalproductionofgovernmentextractiveindustriesdata.Moreimportantly,improvementofrecordkeepingsystemsingovernmentagenciesthataretheprimarysourceofthedatadisclosedinEITIreportingcouldimprovethemanagementofthesectorasawhole.ThereisalsoscopeforindustrytoconsidermeansofproducingEITIinformationonaregularbasis,aspartofregularreporting,andtointegratecertificationofEITIdisclosuresinregularauditingcycles.Tocapitaliseonitspotential,EITINigershouldgobeyondlistinglawsandregulationsanddocumentwhethertheselawshavebeenimplemented.EITIimplementationcouldthereforeactasanannualdiagnosticontheimplementationofNiger’slawsandregulationswhilealsoprovidingasourceofpertinentrecommendationsforfurtherreforms.

Recommendations

ThefollowingrecommendationsarealignedwithcorrectiveactionsfortheimplementationofEITIRequirementsandmayrequirespecificreformstheMSGandtheGovernmentmaywishtoconsiderimplementing.TheserecommendationscouldalsohelpNigermakegreateruseoftheEITIasaninstrumenttosupportreforms.

• Togetherwiththegovernment,theMSGisstronglyencouragedtorevisittheinstitutionalarrangementsforEITIimplementationinNigerandagreeitsToRtoensurethatallaspectsofRequirement1.4areaddressed.TheMSGshouldtaskeachstakeholdergrouptoclarifytheirinternalnominationsandrepresentationprocedurestoimprovethetransparencyandparticipationintheprocess.TheMSGshouldalsoagreeaprocesstoensuregreateraccountabilityofMSGrepresentativestotheconstituencies.ThisshouldincludeestablishingmechanismsofconsultationandreportingbetweenMSGrepresentativesandtheirwiderconstituencies.Finally,theMSGandgovernmentstakeholdersareencouragedtoconsiderstrengtheningthenationalsecretariatthroughfocusedandspecificcapacitybuildingand/orfurtherrecruitmentsasappropriate.

• TheGovernmentofNigershouldconsidereitherreviewingthelegalframeworkforregistrationofNGOsanddevelopmentassociationsorestablishingaone-stopforCSOregistration.

• Asamatterofpriority,theMSGshouldagreeaworkplanthatislinkedtonationalprioritiesand


ExecutiveSummary


thatistheproductofwideconsultationwithstakeholders.TheMSGinencouragedtoconsiderhowmoremeaningfuldiscussionsthroughtheEITI,linkingtonationaldiscussionsandpriorities,couldencouragemoreactiveparticipationbyallstakeholdergroups.TheMSGshouldalsoensurethatitsworkplanisupdatedonanannualbasisandincludesarealisticsetofactivitieslinkedtoEITIreporting,disseminationandoutreach,addressingcapacityconstraintsanddetailedfollowuponspecificEITIrecommendations.

• Extractivescompaniesshouldagreemechanismsforcommunicationandcoordinationwiththeentireconstituency,includingoilandgasaswellasminingexplorationcompanies.IndustryMSGmembersshouldalsoensurethattheirengagementinscoping,disseminationandoutreachisonparwiththeirinvolvementindatacollectionforEITIreporting.

• InaccordancewithEITIRequirement2.1,itisarequirementthattheMSGdiscloseadescriptionofthelegalframeworkandfiscalregimegoverningtheextractiveindustries.Thisinformationmustincludeasummarydescriptionofthefiscalregime,includingtheleveloffiscaldevolution,anoverviewoftherelevantlawsandregulations,andinformationontherolesandresponsibilitiesoftherelevantgovernmentagencies,includingDGI,DGTCP,MMIDandMPE.

• ItisrecommendedthattheMSGconsideradescriptionofthefiscalregimeinpracticeandexplainanydeviationfromthelegalandregulatoryframeworkasitrelatestorevenuesearmarkedforlocalcommunities.

• TheMSGisrequiredtodiscloseinformationrelatedtotheawardortransferoflicensespertainingtothecompanies,inaccordancewithEITIRequirement2.2.a.Inaddressingthisrequirement,theMSGisencouragedtofollowthestep-by-stepapproachoutlinedinEITIGuidanceNoteN°44,issuedbytheEITIInternationalSecretariat.Transparencyintheawardandtransferoflicencesandareviewoftheefficiencyandeffectivenessoflicensingallocationsystemcouldalsohelpimprovethebusinessenvironmentandsupportthegovernment’seffortinattractingFDI.

• Itisarequirementthatimplementingcountriesmaintainapubliclyavailableregisterorcadastresystem(s),inaccordancewithRequirement2.3.Inaddressingthisrequirement,theMSGisencouragedtofollowthestep-by-stepapproachoutlinedinEITIGuidanceNoteN°35,issuedbytheEITIInternationalSecretariat.

• ItisrecommendedthattheMSGagreeadefinitionofwhatconstitutesanSOEinNigerinaccordancewiththeStandarddefinitioninEITIRequirement2.6.a.ItisarequirementthattheMSGexplaintheprevailingrulesandpracticesregardingthefinancialrelationshipbetweenthegovernmentandtheseSOEs,including:therulesandpracticesgoverningtransfersoffundsbetweentheSOE(s)andthestate,retainedearnings,reinvestmentandthird-partyfinancing.InaccordancewithEITIRequirement2.6.b,SOEsmustdisclosetheirlevelofownershipinmining,oilandgascompaniesoperatinginNiger,includingthoseheldbySOEsubsidiariesandjointventures,andanychangesinthelevelofownershipduringthereportingperiod.Itisrecommendedthat

4GuidanceNote4,LicenseAllocation,EITIInternationalSecretariat,June2016,https://eiti.org/document/guidance-note-on-license-allocations5GuidanceNote3,LicenseRegister,EITIInternationalSecretariat,June2016,https://eiti.org/document/guidance-note-on-license-registers.


ExecutiveSummary


theMSGworkscloselywithSOPAMIN,toprovidemoreup-to-dateinformationonexplorationactivitiesandhelpinformtheaveragecitizenaboutopportunitiesandchallengesfacingtheextractiveindustry.

• TheMSGshouldensurethatfutureEITIReportsdisclosethevalueoftotalproductionbycommodity,alongsideproductionvolumes.

• TheMSGshouldensurethatallrevenueflowslistedunderRequirement4.1.bareincludedinthescopeofreconciliationandthatthematerialitythresholdforselectingcompaniesensuresthatallpaymentsthatcouldaffectthecomprehensivenessofEITIreportingbeincludedinthescopeofreconciliation.Thelistofmaterialcompaniesshouldalsoclearlybedefined.TheMSGisinvitedtoconsiderwhethersettingaquantitativematerialitythresholdforselectingcompanieswouldensuretheseaimsaremet.TheMSGshouldensurethatNiger’snextEITIReportincludestheIA’sassessmentofthematerialityofomissions,itsstatementonthecomprehensivenessoftheEITIReportandthatfullunilateralgovernmentdisclosureofmaterialrevenuesfromnon-materialcompaniesisincluded.

• TheMSGisencouragedtoreviewtheinvolvementofSOEsinthecommercialisationofmineralproductsandimprovetransparencyofthevariouspricingmechanismsofmineralproductsinlinewithEITIRequirement4.2.

• TheMSGisencouragedtoconductareviewofexistingcontractsinfutureEITIreportingtoestablishthematerialityofbartertypeagreements.Inparticular,theMSGisencouragedtoreviewthestrategicagreementbetweentheGovernmentofNigerandAreva,signedinMay2014andconsideraddressingitinaccordancewithEITIRequirement4.3.

• InaccordancewithEITIRequirement4.4,theMSGisencouragedtoconsideradefinitionofmaterialitywithregardstorevenuesfromtransport.Inparticular,theMSGmaywishtoconsiderincludingCNTPSthattransporturaniumconcentratefromArlittoCotonou,Benin,andsimilarSOEsinEITIreporting.

• ItisrecommendedthattheMSGincludesallmaterialpaymentscollectedbySOEsonbehalfofthestateandallpaymentsbyallSOEstothestateinfutureEITIreporting,inlinewithrequirement4.5.

• InaccordancewithEITIRequirement4.6,theMSGshouldassessthematerialityofdirectsubnationalpaymentsandincludeareconciliationofanymaterialdirectsubnationalpaymentsinfutureEITIReports.

• InpreparingthenextEITIReports,theMSGshouldfindaworkablesolutiontotheprovisionofqualityassurancecertificationforEITIdisclosuresfrombothgovernmentandcompaniestoensurethatreconciledpaymentsandrevenuesaresubjecttocredible,independentaudit,applyinginternationalauditingstandards.TheMSGshouldagreewiththeIAarobustapproachforensuringcredibilityofdatadisclosedinEITIReportinaccordancewithEITIRequirement4.9.TheMSGmaywishtoassessthefeasibilityofmainstreamingEITIreportingingovernmentsystemsinlinewithEITIRequirement4.9.c.


ExecutiveSummary


• InaccordancewithEITIRequirement5.1,theMSGshouldindicatewhichextractiveindustryrevenuesarerecordedinthenationalbudgetandprovideanexplanationoftheallocationofanyoff-budgetextractivesrevenues.

• InaccordancewithEITIRequirement5.2,theMSGisrequiredtoensurethatmaterialsubnationaltransfersaredisclosed.TheMSGshoulddisclosetherevenuesharingformula,aswellasanydiscrepanciesbetweenthetransferamountcalculatedinaccordancewiththerelevantrevenuesharingformulaandtheactualamountthatwastransferredbetweenthecentralgovernmentandeachrelevantsubnationalentity.TheMSGisencouragedtoreconcilethesetransfers.

• TheMSGisrequiredtodisclosesocialexpendituresbycompaniesmandatedbylaworbytheircontractswiththegovernment.Wherepossible,theMSGisencouragedtoreconcilethesetransactions.TheMSGshouldestablishwhethersuchpaymentsareprovidedinkind,andconsiderdisclosingthenatureofthepaymentandthedeemedvalueofthein-kindtransactioninaccordancewithEITIRequirement6.1.

• TheMSGisrequiredtodevelopareportingprocessforSOEstodisclosetheirquasi-fiscalexpenditureswithaviewtoachievingaleveloftransparencycommensuratewithotherpaymentsandrevenuestreams,andshouldincludeSOEsubsidiariesandjointventuresinaccordancewithEITIRequirement6.2

• TheMSGmustdisclosecomprehensiveinformationaboutthecontributionoftheextractiveindustriestotheeconomyforthefiscalyearcoveredbytheEITIReport,inaccordancewithEITIRequirement6.3,includingtotalsectoremploymentfiguresandestimatesoftheinformalsector.

• TheMSGshouldconsiderwaystoensurethatotherstakeholdersareencouragedtoparticipatemoreactivelyintheupstreamdevelopmentofcommunicationsstrategiesinsteadofonlydownstreamdisseminationactivities.TheMSGandcivilsocietyshouldreturntoreachingouttolocalcommunities,especiallythosewherethereareextractiveactivities,inlinewithEITIRequirement7.1.e.Inlightofsignificantlogisticalchallenges,theMSGmaywishtoconsiderdevelopingmoreformalisedconsultationmechanismswithmine-affectedcommunities,perhapsbydevelopingregionalfocalpoints,toprovidethemwithameaningfulvoiceontheMSG.

• TheMSGshouldconsiderdiscussingtheroletheEITIcouldplayinachievingnationalprioritiesinreformsoftheextractiveindustriesaspartofitsannualreviewoftheworkplan,inlinewithEITIRequirement7.4.a.iv.TheMSGmayalsowishtoconsiderundertakinganimpactassessment,withaviewtoidentifyingtangibleimpactstolocalcommunitiesandotherstakeholdersinordertodeterminetheextenttowhichtheEITIhascontributedtoimprovingpublicfinancialmanagementandgovernanceofthemining,oilandgassectors.

• TheMSGandthegovernmentshouldcontinuefollowinguponEITIrecommendationsandensurethatfuturerecommendationsandfindingsfromEITIReportsareevaluatedandacteduponinatimelymanner,inlinewithEITIRequirement7.3.AspartofitsreformoftheinstitutionalframeworkforEITIimplementationinNiger,thegovernmentisencouragedtoconsiderformalisingastructureforfollowinguponEITIrecommendationstoreplacetheInter-Ministerial


ExecutiveSummary


CommitteeandlinkEITIrecommendationstoongoingnationalreforms.


ExecutiveSummary


Figure1–initialassessmentcard

EITIRequirements LEVELOFPROGRESS

No

Ina

dequ

ate

Meaning

ful

Satisfactory

Beyon

d

Categories Requirements

MSGoversight

Governmentengagement(#1.1) Industryengagement(#1.2) Civilsocietyengagement(#1.3) MSGgovernance(#1.4) Workplan(#1.5)

Licensesandcontracts

Legalframework(#2.1) Licenseallocations(#2.2) Licenseregister(#2.3) Policyoncontractdisclosure(#2.4) Beneficialownership(#2.5) Stateparticipation(#2.6)

Monitoringproduction

Explorationdata(#3.1) Productiondata(#3.2) Exportdata(#3.3)

Revenuecollection

Comprehensiveness(#4.1) In-kindrevenues(#4.2) Barteragreements(#4.3) Transportationrevenues(#4.4) SOEtransactions(#4.5) Directsubnationalpayments(#4.6) Disaggregation(#4.7) Datatimeliness(#4.8) Dataquality(#4.9)

RevenueallocationRevenuemanagementandexpenditures(#5.1) Subnationaltransfers(#5.2) Distributionofrevenues(#5.3)

Socio-economiccontribution

Mandatorysocialexpenditures(#6.1) SOEquasi-fiscalexpenditures(#6.2) Economiccontribution(#6.3)

Outcomesandimpact

Publicdebate(#7.1) Dataaccessibility(#7.2) Followuponrecommendations(#7.3) Outcomesandimpactofimplementation(#7.4)


ExecutiveSummary


Legendtotheassessmentcard

Noprogress.Thecountryhasmadenoprogressinaddressingtherequirement.Thebroaderobjectiveoftherequirementisinnowayfulfilled.

Inadequateprogress.Thecountryhasmadeinadequateprogressinmeetingtherequirement.Significantelementsoftherequirementareoutstandingandthebroaderobjectiveoftherequirementisfarfrombeingfulfilled.

Meaningfulprogress.Thecountryhasmadeprogressinmeetingtherequirement.Significantelementsoftherequirementarebeingimplementedandthebroaderobjectiveoftherequirementisbeingfulfilled.

Satisfactoryprogress.ThecountryiscompliantwiththeEITIrequirement.

Beyond.Thecountryhasgonebeyondtherequirement.

Thisrequirementisonlyencouragedorrecommendedandshouldnotbetakenintoaccountinassessingcompliance.

TheMSGhasdemonstratedthatthisrequirementisnotapplicableinthecountry.

15

ValidationofNiger:Reportoninitialdatacollectionandstakeholderconsultation


Introduction

Briefrecapofthesign-upphase

On11March2005,theCouncilofMinistersoftheRepublicofNiger,chairedbyPresidentMamadouTandja,decidedtosignuptotheEITIandannouncedthedecisionattheLancasterHouseConferenceonEITIinLondonon17March2005(HartNurseLtd,2010).Thedecisionwasmotivatedbyarealisationoftheweaknessesinthemanagementoftheminingsector,duetopoorcoordinationbetweenvariousgovernmentdepartmentsinvolvedinthesector(IMF,2013).PrimeMinisterHamaAmadouissuedDecree0073/PMon4July2005,creatingthelegalbasisforEITIimplementation.ThiscontinuestoprovidethebasisfortheTermsofReference(ToR)forthemulti-stakeholdergroup.ItestablishedagovernmentInter-MinisterialCommitteetosetthestrategicdirectionofEITIimplementationandatripartiteNationalEITIConsultationCommittee,supportedbyapermanentsecretariat,theCelluledeGestionetdePilotage(ManagementandSteeringCell).Thegovernmenthostedanofficiallaunchworkshopon6-7September2006,attendedbyrepresentativesfromcompanies,civilsocietyandinternationalorganisations.

Followinggeneralelectionsin2007,thenewgovernmentsubsequentlyamendedtheoriginaldecreetwice,inDecree00192/PMon10August2007andDecree0069/PMon5May2008.NigerwasacceptedasanEITIcandidatecountryon27September2007.Followingacoupd’étaton18February2010,thetransitionalgovernmentannounceditssupportforEITI,aheadofaninitialValidationdeadlineof9March2010.ThenewgovernmenttooksignificantstepstostrengthenimplementationbyincludingprovisionsonrevenuetransparencyinNiger’snewconstitution,approvedbynationwidereferendumon31October2010.FollowinganextensionandsubsequentSecretariatreview,NigerbecameEITIcompliantwiththeEITIRuleson2March2011.

Objectivesforimplementationandoverallprogressinimplementingtheworkplan

TheobjectivesofNiger’ssuccessiveEITIworkplanshaveremainedrelativelyconsistentsince2011,withhalfofthesixspecificobjectivesofthe2016-2018workplanfocusedonEITIreportingandimplementationinitself(ITIENiger,2016).Whiletheobjectivesofthe2014-2016workplanincludedensuringthestatecollectsitsdues,identifyingconflictsofinterest,preventingconflictandimprovingthebusinessclimate,theobjectivesofthe2016-2018workplanevolvedtoincludeintegratingEITIintonationalsystems,supportingaresponsiblepublicdebateontheextractiveindustriesandidentifyingthebeneficialownershipofextractivescompaniesandtheirsub-contractors(ITIENiger,2014)(ITIENiger,2016).

HistoryofEITIReporting

NigerpublisheditsfirstEITIReport,producedbylocalaccountancyfirmCabinetd’ExpertiseComptableIbrahimIssoufou(CCII)andcovering2005and2006,inAugust2009.Niger’sfirstValidationfoundthatthecountrytobe“closetocompliant”withtheEITIRuleson13December2010,andrecommendedcorrectiveactionstoreachcompliantstatus.Followingpublicationofits2007-2009EITIReportprepared


Introduction


byGuilbertandAssociates(G&A)inJanuary2011andanInternationalSecretariatreviewinFebruary,NigerwasdeclaredcompliantwiththeEITIRuleson1March2011.

AsofJanuary2017,NigerhaspublishedEITIReportscoveringninefiscalyears.Thecountry’sthirdEITIReport,covering2010,preparedbyG&AandpublishedinJune2012,extendedcoveragetotheoilsectorforthefirsttime.Publicationsbecamemoreregularthereafter,withonepublicationayearcovering2011(CCII),2012(CCII)and2013(CECAFORConsult)respectivelyinearlyDecember2013,2014and2015.Thelatestreport,covering2014,waspreparedbyG&AandpublishedinNovember2016.ReportedrevenuesincreasedfromUSD15.8millionfromninereportingcompaniesin2005toUSD260millionfrom37companiesin2014.

Summaryofengagementbygovernment,civilsocietyandindustry

ThecurrentMSG,theEITINationalConsultationCommittee(CNC-ComitéNationaldeConcertation)operatesunderthePrimeMinisterialDecree0073/PMof4July2005,subsequentlymodifiedbyDecree00192/PMon10August2007andDecree0069/PMon5May2008.Implementationisstructuredinathree-tierstructure.AnInter-MinisterialCommitteechairedbythePrimeMinisterisresponsibleforimplementationstrategyandmonitoring,whiletheNationalConsultationCommitteechairedbytheMinisterofMinesandEnergymanagesEITIimplementation,supportedbyapermanentsecretariat.MembersoftheMSGarerequiredtomeetatleastonceaquarter,butinpracticeusuallyatunevenintervals–fourtimesin2013,2014and2015,andfivetimesin2016.MinutesofthesemeetingsarepublishedontheEITINigerwebsite.6TheMSGhasconstitutedthreesubcommitteesforimportanttaskslikestatisticsandaudit,capacitybuildingandcommunications,butthesedonothaveToRandminutesoftheirmeetingsarenotrecorded.AnattendancelistofMSGmeetingsisincludedinAnnexA.

UnderArticle150ofNiger’s2010Constitution,itisobligatoryforcontractsrelatedtotheexplorationandexploitationofnaturalresourcesandpaymentstothegovernmenttobepublishedintheOfficialJournaloftheRepublic,evenifthishasnotyetbeenfullyimplemented.AnalysisofmeetingminutesindicatesthatrepresentativesfromthethreestakeholdergroupshavebeenactivelyengagedinoverseeingEITIimplementation,activelycontributingtodebateontheMSGandoccasionallychairingMSGmeetingsinturn.Whilebothgovernmentandcivilsocietyhavecontributedtodisseminationandoutreach,companiesdoappeartohavefocusedonprovidinginformationanddeliveringpresentationsinthecapitalNiamey.

Keyfeaturesoftheextractiveindustry

UraniumdepositswerediscoveredbytheFrenchpriortoNiger’sindependencein1960.Whilesearchingforcopper,France’sAtomicEnergyCommissiondiscovereduraniuminthenorthernareaofAzelikin1957.Nigerisnowaleadingproducerofuranium,rankedastheworld’sfourthlargestproducerin2016behindKazakhstan,CanadaandAustralia.Thecountryhasproduceduraniumsincethe1970s,coalsince1975,goldsince2004andcrudeoilsince2011(OpenSocietyInitiativeforWestAfrica,2014).Twoof

6http://www.itieniger.ne/index.php/fr/pv-reunions


Introduction


Niger’sminesaloneaccountedfor7.5%oftheworld’suraniumoutputin2015(WorldNuclearAssociation,2016).

Asof2017,Nigerhasfourmainuraniumoperations.TheMiningCompanyoftheAir(SOMAIR)hasminedseveralnortherndepositsaroundArlitsince1968ina63.4%/36.6%splitbetweenArevaandtheGovernmentofNiger,throughitsstate-ownedSOPAMIN(SociétéduPatrimoinedesMinesduNiger).TheMiningCompanyofAkouta(COMINAK)hasmineduraniumdepositsinnorthwesternareassinceitscreationin1974,withownershipsplitbetweenAreva(34%),SOPAMIN(31%),OURD(Japan’sOverseasUraniumResourcesDevelopmentCompanyLtd)(25%)andENUSA(Spain’sEmpresaNacionaldelUranioSA)(10%).Ineffortstodiversifythesourceofforeigninvestmentintheuraniumindustry,thegovernmentawardednewuraniumlicensestogroupsotherthanAreva,withthenumberofmininglicensesgrowingswiftlyfromsixin2000to158in2009(OpenSocietyInitiativeforWestAfrica,2014).Afourthmajoruraniumventurewaslaunchedin2007,theMiningCompanyofAzelik(SOMINA).BackedbyChinaNationalNuclearCorp.(37.2%),SOPAMIN(33%),China’sZXJOYInvest(24.8%)andKoreaResourcesCorp.(0.5%),SOMINArampedupproductionfromaninitial100tonnesofuraniumin2011toaplateauof700tonnesin2015(EnergyCharter,2015).Aspecial-purposejoint-venturewasestablishedin2009betweenArevaNCExpansion(66.65%),itselfajoint-ventureofArevaandKEPCO(KoreaElectricPowerCo.)inan86.5%/13.5%split,theGovernmentofNiger(33.3%)andSOPAMIN(23.35%),althoughtheplanned5000tonnesperyearcapacityminewasdelayedfromitsoriginal2012startdateduetotheimpactoflowcommodityprices(Areva,2016).Uraniumexportsgrew35%involumesand400%invaluebetween2006and2012,whilebudgeteduraniumrevenuesgrewsix-fold(PartnershipforEconomicPolicy,2015).

FollowingtensionsbetweenthegovernmentandAreva,alandmarkdealwasstruckin2014toraiseroyaltyratesonthetwomainuraniumproducers,COMINAKandSOMAIR,andtodeferdevelopmentoftheImarourenmine,duetounfavourablemarketconditions(ITIENiger,2016).ThedealfollowedtheexpiryofAreva’smininglicensesinDecember2013andapprovedtheapplicationofthe2006MiningLawtoAreva’stwouraniumproducers(COMINAKandSOMAIR)expectedtogenerateanadditionalEUR20million–EUR30millionfortheNigerienTreasury,theestablishmentofa‘Nigerprice’foruraniumconcentratecommonlyknownas“yellowcake”andtheappointmentofaNigeriennationalstothemanagementofCOMINAKandSOMAIR(PrésidencedelaRépubliquedeFrance,2014).

Niger’sproventhermalcoalreservesofover90millionmetrictonsarelocatedinthecountry’snorth,althoughcurrentproductionfromtheAnouArarendepositof18millionmetrictonscatersexclusivelytothethermalpowerplantintheAgadezregion.Aprojectforthedevelopmentofa70millioncoaldepositinSalkadamnaintheTahouaregionandanassociatedthermalpowerplantwaslaunchedin2014.Since2004theMiningCompanyofLiptakohasoperatedthecountry’ssoleindustrialgoldmineinSamira,whichholds0.731metrictondepositsoftheore.Artisanalandsmall-scalemining(ASM)hasbeenfarmoreprevalent,withtotaloutputof63.91kgin2014(ITIENiger,2016).Aminoroilproducersince2011,whenfirstoutputfromoilfieldsintheeasternAgademblockoperatedbyChinaNationalPetroleumCorp.(CNPC)cameonline,Nigernowboastsover1billionbarrelsofprovenoilreserves.Alightsweettypeofcrude,withdensityhigherthan30API,oilproductionistransportedviaa420km-pipelinetoanewUSD800millionrefineryinZinder,operatedbySORAZ(SociétéderaffinagedeZinder)60%-ownedbyCNPCinjoint-venturewiththeGovernmentofNiger.Roughlyathirdoftherefinery’sdailycapacityof20,000barrelsofdieseland120tonsofLPGisearmarkedforthedomesticmarket,boughtbythestate-owned


Introduction


SONIDEP(SociétéNigériennedesProduitsPétroliers)thatholdsamonopolyonthesupplyofoilandgasdomesticallyandregulatestariffs,withtheremainderdestinedforexportmarkets(EnergyCharter,2015).Intotal,CNPCmadeatotalof77discoveriesin99explorationwellsintheAgademblockinthe2009-2013period,withaveragecostsoflessthanUSD5millionawell(Platts,2015).

WithplanstoexpandproductionwellbeyondthedomesticrefiningcapacityatZinder,CNPChasproposedplanstolinktheAgademoilblocktotheexistingChad-Cameroonoilpipeline,linkingtoCNPC’soilprojectinChad’sBongorbasinandprovidingaccesstoseaborneexportcapacity.However,NigerienauthoritieshavesoughttodiversifythepoolofinvestorsinitsoilandgassectoramidstdisagreementswithCNPC.TheGovernmentofNigerawardedlicensestoindependentoilcompaniesfromtheUnitedKingdom(SavannahPetroleum,2014),Australia(InternationalPetroleum)andNigeria(Platts,2015).WhileNigeralsoholdsnaturalgasreserves,estimatedtototal18.6billioncubicmeters,gasproductionhasnotyetbeendeveloped(EnergyCharter,2015)(USGeologicalService,2014).Oilproductionreachedaround20,000bpdin2013,beforefallingbacktoaround16,000bpdin2014(ITIENiger,2016).Therefinery’soutputgrewmorethantenfoldbetween2011and2013,beforeits9%dropinvolumesin2014.Theloweroutputaffectedexports,withamorethan95%dropinrefinedproductsexports.TherefineryrecordedlossesofUSD21millionin2014andUSD94millionin2015(MENASAssociates,2015)(Niamey.com,2016).Therefinery’smarginswereaffectedbyathree-monthtechnicalshut-downfromJuly2015(IMF,2016).Withtherefineryaccountingforover20%ofthegovernment’sextractivesrevenuesin2014,theimpactonpublicfinanceshasbeenstark(ITIENiger,2016).

Followingtwoyearsofdouble-digitgrowth,thegovernment’sextractivesrevenuesslumpedby28%in2014,toUSD315million.Theshareofextractiveindustriesintotalgovernmentrevenuescontractedfrom36%in2013toonly23%in2014.Sinceuraniumaccountsforoverhalfofitsexports,thesharp23%dropinitspricesbetween2013and2014certainlyplayedarole.Domesticfactorscompoundedthechallenges,withtheoutputoftheminingandoilandgassectorscontractingby2%and4%involumesrespectivelyduringthisperiod(ITIENiger,2016).

PresidentMahamadouIssoufouwonre-electioninFebruary2016followingtworoundsofvotingonapledgeofcurbingpoverty(FinancialTimes,2016).Withapopulationofsome17millioncitizens,Nigerboastsoneoftheworld’slowesthumandevelopmentindex,rankinglastof188countriesin2014,andper-capitaincomeofUSD359in2015(FinancialTimes,2016)(UNDevelopmentProgram,2016)(WorldBank,2017).Morethan60%ofNiger’spopulationsubsistedonlessthanUSD1adayin2013(Reuters,2014).OngoingsecuritychallengeshaveunderminedNiger’sextractiveindustriesdevelopment.SevenArevaemployeesandsubcontractors,includingfiveFrenchnationals,werekidnappedfromtheArlitminebyIslamistmilitantsin2010,al-QaedaintheIslamicMaghreb(AQIM)(Liberation,2010).FourofthesevenhostageswerereleasedafterthreeyearsincaptivityinnorthernMali.InMay2013,ArevatemporarilysuspendeditsoperationsafteracarbombwasdetonatedatanarmybaseinAgadezandanattackontheArlituraniummineskilledatotalof20soldiersandonemine-worker(FinancialTimes,2013).RepeatedattacksbyBokoHaramhavealsocausedwidespreaddisplacement,includinginareashostingextractivesactivities(AlJazeera,2016)(BBC,2016)(RFI,2017).

WhileNiger’srankinginTransparencyInternational’sCorruptionPerceptionIndexhasimprovedmarkedlyfollowingreformsundertheIssoufouadministration,from134thin2011to103rdin2014and99thin


Introduction


2015,itdeclinedslightlyto101stin2016,althoughthenumberofcountriesrankedrosefrom168to176(TransparencyInternational,2016)(ITIENiger,2016).AccordingtotheInternationalBudgetPartnership’s2015OpenBudgetranking,Nigerwasrankedonly17outof100forthetransparencyofitsnationalbudget,4of100forpublicparticipationinthebudget,50of100fortheCourtofCounts’limitedoversightandmonitoringofbudgetexecution,but73of100intermsoftheParliament’s“adequate”oversightofthebudget(InternationalBudgetPartnership,2016).Since2012theGovernmentofNigerhasachievedimprovementsinpublishingthedraftbudgetaheadofapproval,butontheotherhandrestrictedpublicationoftheapprovedbudgetandinterimbudgetexecutionreportsfor(parliamentaryandgovernment)internalpurposesonly.WhiletheUSDepartmentofState’s2014FiscalTransparencyReportfoundthatNigerstillpublishedincompletenationalbudgets,whichexcludedrevenuesfromlargeSOEsaswellasthedebtsassociatedwithitsoilandgasproduction,ithighlightedimprovementsin2013includingpublicationofoilandgasreceiptsandauditoftheoilandgassectorforthefirsttime(USDepartmentofState,2014).In2014thegovernmentpublisheditsannualbudgetandbudgetexecutionreportsonlineforthefirsttime(USDepartmentofState,2015)

ExplanationoftheValidationprocess

InJune2016,theBoardagreedtheValidationscheduleof16EITIimplementingcountries,includingNigertocommenceon1stJuly2016.TheMSGsubmittedarequestforpostponingtheValidationuntilJanuary2017.On25October2016atitsmeetinginAstana,theBoardconcludedthat“NigerisnoteligibleforanextensionofitsValidation”.TheEITIInternationalBoardagreedatits35thBoardmeetinginAstana,KazakhstanthatNiger’sValidationwouldcommenceon1November20167,takingintoaccountprogressmadesince1July2016.Thekeyfeaturesareasfollows:

1.ValidationobjectivesValidationisintendedtoprovideallstakeholderswithanimpartialassessmentofwhetherEITIimplementationinacountryisconsistentwiththeprovisionsoftheEITIStandard.TheValidationreportwill,inaddition,addresstheimpactoftheEITIinthecountrybeingvalidated,theimplementationofactivitiesencouragedbytheEITIStandard,lessonslearntinEITIimplementation,aswellasanyconcernsstakeholdershaveexpressedandrecommendationsforfutureimplementationoftheEITI.TheValidationprocessisoutlinedinchapter4oftheEITIStandard.82.Validationprocedure.1.ValidationisanessentialfeatureoftheEITIprocess.ItisintendedtoprovideallstakeholderswithanimpartialassessmentofwhetherEITIimplementationinacountryisconsistentwiththeprovisionsoftheEITIStandard.TheValidationreportwill,inaddition,addresstheimpactoftheEITIinthecountrybeingvalidated,theimplementationofactivitiesencouragedbytheEITIStandard,lessonslearntinEITIimplementation,aswellasanyconcernsstakeholdershaveexpressedandrecommendationsforfutureimplementationoftheEITI.

7https://eiti.org/BD/2016-218Seealsohttps://eiti.org/validation.


Introduction


TheValidationprocessisoutlinedinchapter4oftheEITIStandard.9

2.Validationprocedure.InFebruary2016,theEITIBoardapprovedarevisedValidationsystem.Thenewsystemhasthreephases:

1. DatacollectionundertakenbytheInternationalSecretariat2. IndependentqualityassurancebyanindependentValidatorwhoreportsdirectlytheEITIBoard3. Boardreview.

InMay2016,theBoardagreedtheValidationGuide,whichprovidesdetailedguidanceonassessingEITIRequirements,andmoredetailedValidationprocedures,includingastandardisedprocedurefordatacollectionandstakeholderconsultationbytheEITIInternationalSecretariatandstandardisedtermsofreferencefortheValidator.Aspreviously,thereareextensiveopportunitiesforstakeholderparticipation,assetoutbelow.

TheValidationGuideincludesaprovisionthat:“WheretheMSGwishesthatValidationpaysparticularattentiontoassessingcertainobjectivesoractivitiesinaccordancewiththeMSGworkplan,theseshouldbeoutlinedupontherequestoftheMSG”.TheNigerEITIMSGdidnotrequestanyissuesforparticularconsideration.

3.DatacollectionbytheInternationalSecretariat.TheInternationalSecretariat’sworkwillbeconductedinthreephases:

1.DeskReview.Priortovisitingthecountry,theSecretariatwillconductadetaileddeskreviewoftheavailabledocumentationrelatingtothecountry’scompliancewiththeEITIStandard,includingbutnotlimitedto:

• TheEITIworkplanandotherplanningdocumentssuchasbudgetsandcommunicationplans;

• Themulti-stakeholdergroup’sTermsofReference,andminutesfrommulti-stakeholdergroupmeetings;

• EITIReports,andsupplementaryinformationsuchassummaryreportsandscopingstudies;

• Communicationmaterials;• Annualprogressreports;and• AnyotherinformationofrelevancetoValidation.

Thisworkwillincludeinitialconsultationswithstakeholders,whoareinvitedtosubmitanyotherdocumentationtheyconsiderrelevant.WithoutprejudicetotheabilityoftheBoardtoexercisetheirdiscretiontoconsiderallavailableevidence,theSecretariatwillnottakeintoaccountactionsundertakenafterthecommencementofValidation.Thedeskreviewwasconductedinthe

9Seealsohttps://eiti.org/validation.


Introduction


1–22January2017andincludeddocumentsprovidedbyNigerEITI.

2.Countryvisit.Thecountryvisittookplaceon23-28January2017.AllmeetingstookplaceinNiamey.Thesecretariatmetwiththemulti-stakeholdergroupanditsmembers,theIAandotherkeystakeholders,includingstakeholdergroupsthatarerepresentedon,butnotdirectlyparticipatingin,themulti-stakeholdergroup.

InadditiontomeetingwiththeMSGasagroup,theSecretariatmetwithitsconstituentparts(government,companiesandcivilsociety)eitherindividuallyorinconstituencygroups,withappropriateprotocolstoensurethatstakeholdersareabletofreelyexpresstheirviewsandthatrequestsforconfidentiallyarerespected.

ThelistofstakeholderstoconsultwaspreparedbytheNigerEITISecretariatandMSG,withinputsandsuggestionsfromtheInternationalSecretariat.ItistheInternationalSecretariat’sviewthatthereportcoversviewsofthekeystakeholdersengagedintheEITIprocess.

3.Reportingonprogressagainstrequirements.Basedontheseconsultations,theInternationalSecretariatwillprepareareportmakinganinitialassessmentofprogressagainstrequirementsinaccordancewiththeValidationGuide.Theinitialassessmentwillnotincludeanoverallassessmentofcompliance.ThereportissubmittedtotheValidator(seebelow).TheNationalCoordinator(NC)receivesacopy.CommentsonthefactsarewelcomebutNCandtheMSGareencouragedtodeferanymajorcommentaryuntiltheyreceivetheValidator’sreport.

TheInternationalSecretariat’steamcomprisedBadyBaldé,AlexGordy,EddieRichandSamBartlett.

4.IndependentValidation.TheEITIBoardwillappointanIndependentValidatorthroughanopen,competitivetenderingprocess.TheValidatorwillreporttotheBoardviatheValidationCommittee.

TheValidatorassesseswhethertheSecretariat'sinitialassessmentbeencarriedoutinaccordancewiththeValidationGuide.Thiswillinclude:adetaileddeskreviewoftherelevantdocumentationforeachrequirementandtheSecretariat’sinitialassessmentofeachrequirement,arisk-basedapproachforspotchecks,andfurtherconsultationswithstakeholders.TheBoardmayrequestthattheValidatorundertakespotchecksonspecificrequirements.

TheValidatorcommentsontheSecretariat’sinitialassessmentandpreparesaDraftValidationReport.TheMSGisinvitedtocommentontheDraftValidationReport.HavingconsideredtheMSG’scomments,theValidatorcompilesaFinalValidationReport.TheValidatorwritestotheMSGtoexplainhowithasconsideredtheircomments.TheMSGreceivesacopyoftheFinalValidationReport.

TheFinalValidationReportwillincludetheValidator’sassessmentofcompliancewitheachprovision,butnotanoverallassessmentofcompliance.TheValidatorwillbeinvitedtopresenttheirfindingstotheValidationCommittee.


Introduction


5.BoardReview.TheValidationCommitteewillreviewtheFinalValidationReportandthesupportingdocumentation(includingtheMSG’scomments).TheValidationCommitteewillmakearecommendationtotheEITIBoardonthecountry’scompliancewiththeEITIRequirementsand,whereapplicable,anycorrectiveactionsrequired.

TheEITIBoardwillmakethefinaldeterminationofwhethertherequirementsaremetorunmet,andonthecountry’soverallcomplianceinaccordancewithprovision8.3.a.iioftheEITIStandard.

Theinitialassessment,ValidationReportandassociatedMSGcommentsareconsideredconfidentialuntiltheBoardhasreachedadecision.


PartI–MSGOversight



1.OversightoftheEITIprocess

1.1Overview

ThissectionrelatestostakeholderengagementandtheenvironmentforimplementationofEITIincountry,thegovernanceandfunctioningofthemulti-stakeholdergroup(MSG),andtheEITIworkplan.

1.2Assessment

GovernmentengagementintheEITIprocess(#1.1)

Documentationofprogress

Publicstatement:TheGovernmentofNigeragreedtosignuptotheEITIatacabinetmeetingon11March2005,publiclyannouncingitsintentionattheLancasterHouseConferenceonEITIinLondonon17March2005(HartNurseLtd,2010).PresidentMahamadouIssoufouhasreiteratedthemessagethattheEITIwaskeytoeffortstodiversifytheeconomyforthebenefitofNigeriencitizensonseveraloccasions,includingattheUnitedNations’sessionson23September2011and23January2012andatHarvardUniversity’sAfricaDevelopmentConferenceon3April2015(PrésidentdelaRépubliqueduNiger,2011)(PrésidentdelaRépubliqueduNiger,2012)(PrésidentdelaRépubliqueduNiger,2015).

SuccessivegovernmentshavepubliclyreiteratedtheirsupportforEITIimplementationonseveraloccasions.PrimeMinisterSeyniOumaroudeclaredthegovernment’ssupportinspeecheson28August2007and30March2009,whileinterimPrimeMinisterAboubaAlbadéstatedthissupportduringhisbrieftenureinSeptember2007(Nigerdiaspora,2007).PrimeMinisterMahamadouDandadeliveredakeynoteaddressatthe5thEITIGlobalConferenceinParisin2011(PremierMinistredelaRépubliqueduNiger,2011).FollowingNiger’ssuccessfulValidationundertheEITIRules,PrimeMinisterDandacommittedthegovernmenttosustainingreformsandEITIimplementationatameetingoftheMSGon22March2011(Nigerdiaspora,2011).PrimeMinisterBrigiRafinihasstatedthatEITIimplementationisapriorityforthegovernmentonseveraloccasions,includingon26November2013and10January2014(GouvernementduNiger,2013)(GouvernementduNiger,2014).

Seniorlead:TheinstitutionalandlegalframeworkforEITIimplementationweresetinPrimeMinisterialDecree000073/PMof4July2005,amendedbyDecrees000192/PMof10August2007and000069/PMof5May2008(PremierMinistredelaRépubliqueduNiger,2005)(PremierMinistredelaRépubliqueduNiger,2007)(RépubliqueduNiger,2008).Thedocumentscreateathree-tierstructure,includinganInter-MinisterialCommittee(IMC)chairedbythePrimeMinisterdefiningthebroadstrategicandpoliticaldirectionsofEITI,amulti-stakeholderNationalConsultationCommittee(MSG)chairedbytheMinisterofMinesandEnergy,supportedbyaPermanentSecretariat,andaSteeringCommittee(“CelluledeGestionetdePilotage”),transformedintoaPermanentSecretariatbyDecree0000192/PMof2007.InpracticetheIMCdidnotmeetandtheMinisterofMinesandEnergyhasnotchairedanyMSGmeeting.PermanentSecretaryAbdoulAzizAskiahaseffectivelybeentheChairoftheMSG.Hehasactedasthe




seniorgovernmentleadonEITIimplementationinhisroleasSeniorAdvisortothePrimeMinisterand,morerecently,tothePresident.PermanentSecretaryAskiahasconsistentlyreiteratedthegovernment’ssupportforEITI,linkingimplementationtoachievingthegovernment’sgoalsofpovertyreductionandsustainabledevelopment,includingatEITIReportlaunchconferencesinSeptember2012andDecember2013,2014and2015(Nigerdiaspora,2012)(ITIENiger,2014)(ITIENiger,2015).

Activeengagement:Thegovernmentincludedtransparencyprovisionsinthe2010Constitutionofthe7thRepublicofNiger.Article149stipulatesthattheexploitationandmanagementofnaturalandsubsoilresourcesbedonetransparently.Article150requiresallnaturalresourceexplorationandproductioncontractsaswellasthepaymentstogovernment,disaggregatedbycompany,tobecomprehensivelypublishedintheJournalOfficieldelaRépubliqueduNiger(RépubliqueduNiger,2010).Thegovernmenthasalsostartedworkonagoodgovernancecharterfortheextractiveindustriesin2011andalawonpublicfinancetransparencyin2015(ITIENiger,2016).WhiletheMSGreferredtotheextractivesgovernancecharterinthecontextofECOWASdirectives,theAfricanMiningVisionandEITIatits9February2016meeting,thecharterisstillindevelopmentasofJanuary2017(ITIENiger,2016).

MSGmeetingminutesshowthatthegovernmentisgenerallywellrepresentedatahighlevelontheMSG.Decree000073/PMappointedhigh-levelrepresentativesfromthePresidencyandPrimeMinister’sOfficeaswellasMinistriesofMinesandEnergy(CommitteeChair),EconomyandFinance,Trade,Justice,CommunityDevelopment,HealthandPrimaryEducationandLiteracyandothers,whodidnotattendMSGmeetings,butthemorelimitedactualgovernmentmembershipoftheMSGalsoincludesseniorgovernmentofficials.TheseincludetheDirectorofPetroleumTaxattheMinistryofPetroleumandEnergy,theDirectorofStatisticsattheMinistryofMinesandIndustrialDevelopmentandtheInformationTechnologyDirectorattheMinistryofFinanceaswellasPermanentSecretaryAskia,representingtheofficeofthePrimeMinister,andmorerecentlytheofficeofthePresident.AnalysisofMSGmeetingminutesindicatesthatgovernmentattendancehasbeenamongstthemostconsistent(seeAnnexBforMSGmeetingattendance).MeanwhilethegovernmenthascoveredcorefundingforEITIimplementationsinceinception.

Stakeholderviews

MoststakeholdersconsultedhighlightedmorerecentstatementsofgovernmentsupportforEITIimplementationthanthoseaccessibleonline,includingstatementsfromPresidentIssoufouonnationaltelevision.AnindustryrepresentativeontheMSGexpressedprideathearingPresidentIssoufoureiteratingthegovernment’ssupportforEITIonarecenttelevisionbroadcast.SeveralseniorgovernmentrepresentativesconsultedhighlightedtheroleoftheEITIasadiagnostictooltosupportreformsandnotedtheongoingdevelopmentoftheCharteronGoodGovernanceintheExtractiveIndustriessince2011asameansofentrenchingEITIprinciplesandgoingbeyondminimumEITIrequirementsinareasofenvironmentalsustainabilityandlocalcontentdevelopment.

OnegovernmentrepresentativenotedtheimportanceofEITIimplementationinrelationswithdevelopmentpartners,notingthatthishadbeenoneofthekeyreasonsforNiger’sEITIcandidatureevenifithadneverformedaconditionalityindonors’supportforNiger.SeveraldevelopmentpartnershighlightedthattheinstitutionalisationoftheEITIunderthePrimeMinister’sOfficereflectedthestronggovernmentsupportandconsideredthatoccasionalchallengesinreachinggovernmentofficials




engagedinEITIrevealedtheirsignificantworkloadsratherthanalackofengagement.Whiletherewasconsensusamongstseniorgovernmentofficialsabouthigh-levelgovernmentcommitmenttoEITI,onerepresentativeexpresseddoubtaboutthelevelofpoliticalwillatthetechnicallevelforrecoveringunpaidextractiveindustryrevenuesduetothegovernmentgiventhelowlevelofimplementationofrecommendationsfrompastextractiveindustryauditsbytheCourtofCounts.OnlygovernmentMSGmembershadeverheardoftheexistenceoftheIMC,whilemostindustryandcivilsocietymembershadnot.

AllMSGmembersconsultedconfirmedthattheMinisterofMinesandEnergyhadnotchairedtheMSGsince2007,notingthattheMinistryhadbeensplitintotheMinistryofMinesandIndustrialDevelopment(MMID)andtheMinistryofPetroleumandEnergy(MPE)followingelectionsin2011.SeveralMSGmembersfromallthreestakeholdergroupshighlightedtheMSG’sintentiontorefreshitsmembershipandexpandittoincludeotherrelevantgovernmentrepresentatives,includingfromtheMoF’sDepartmentofTreasuryandPublicAccountingandtheCustomsDepartment.TherewasconsensusthatthateffectiveseniorgovernmentleadonEITIimplementationwastheEITINigerPermanentSecretary,ondelegationfromthePrimeMinister’sOfficerDirector.WhilecertaingovernmentandindustryrepresentativesconsideredthatthishadbeencodifiedinaformalletterfromthePrimeMinister’sOffice,noneofthestakeholdersconsultedhadseenthisformalletter.

TherewerecontrastingviewsregardingthelevelofgovernmentengagementinEITIimplementation.AllMSGmembersconsultedagreedthatthethreemaingovernmentrepresentativesontheMSG,fromtheMinistriesofFinance,MinesandIndustrialDevelopmentandPetroleumandEnergy,consistentlyattendedMSGmeetings.TherewasalsoagreementthatgovernmentrepresentativesdesignatedtotheMSGhadsufficientcapacity,expertiseandsenioritytospeakonbehalfofgovernmentontheMSG.However,whiletherewasconsensusthatgovernmentengagementinMSGmeetingsandinpreparationofEITIReportswassignificant,someCSOMSGmembersconsideredthatgovernmentparticipatedinonlycertaindisseminationandoutreacheventsandhadnotbeenactiveinfollowinguponEITIrecommendations.OtherCSOmembersdisagreedhowever,notingtheparticipationofaMMIDrepresentativeattheMay2016disseminationeventforthe2013EITIReportinTillabéryasanexample.AllMSGmembersagreedthatthepaceofdisseminationactivitieshadslowedconsiderablysince2015duetofundingconstraints,withthe2013EITIReportlessactivelycommunicatedthanpreviousEITIReports,onlyaselectfewCSOrepresentativesconsideredthatthisreflectedalowerlevelofgovernmentcommitmenttoimplementation.OtherMSGmembersfromallthreestakeholdergroupshighlightedthatsecurityspendinghadsqueezedallotherformsofgovernmentexpenditureincludingEITIinrecentyears.Secretariatstaffandgovernmentrepresentativeshighlightedthat,despitesecuritypriorities,thegovernmenthadcoveredthecostoftheEITINigerSecretariat’snewofficebuildingin2015.

InitialassessmentTheInternationalSecretariat’sinitialassessmentisthatNigerhasmadesatisfactoryprogressinmeetingthisrequirement.Thereareregular,publicstatementsofsupportfromthegovernment,aseniorindividualhasbeenappointedtoleadontheimplementationoftheEITIandseniorgovernmentofficialsarerepresentedontheMSG.Stakeholdersnotedthatalthoughthegovernment’shigh-levelEITIInter-MinisterialCommitteehadeffectivelynotmetsince2008,thecurrentrepresentationontheMSGshowedthatthegovernmentwastakingtheprocessseriously.WhilesomeCSOshighlightedinconsistentgovernmentengagementindisseminationofEITIfindings,thereisevidenceofrecentgovernment




participationindisseminationandoutreachevents.TheGovernmenthasprovidedcorefundingforEITIimplementation,includingEITIreporting,staffingofthePermanentSecretariatandofficespace.

Tocontinuemakingprogressinthisrequirement,theGovernmentofNigermaywishtoconsiderrevisitingthelegalframeworkestablishingtheEITIinNigertoensurecurrenthigh-levelgovernmentsupportforandengagementinEITIiscodified.Thegovernmentshouldalsoensurethatitsparticipationindisseminationandoutreacheventsisconsistentwiththatofotherstakeholdergroups.

IndustryengagementintheEITIprocess(#1.2)


Activeengagement:IndustryrepresentativesparticipateinMSGdiscussionsandmostcompaniesreportregularly.ThethreecompaniesnamedinDecree000073/PMestablishingtheMSG,namelyCOMINAK,SOMAIRandSML(thethreeproducingminingcompaniesin2005),havesupportedtheEITIfromtheoutsetandhaveactivelyengagedinEITIimplementation.However,neitherpetroleumcompaniesnorminingexplorationcompaniesarerepresentedontheMSG.

Withspecificcompaniesnamedintheinitialdecree,thereisnoevidenceofthesethreeindustryMSGrepresentativesliaisingwiththeirwiderconstituency.Niger’s2010Validationhighlightedtheneedforongoingeffortstosecurethefullinvolvementofothercompaniesinthesector,giventheexpansionintheextractiveindustries(HartNurseLtd,2010).ThereisevidenceofpastoutreachtocompaniesnotsittingontheMSGin2010,butnoneofrecentoutreach(Nigerdiaspora,2010).RepresentativesfromthethreecompaniesontheMSGappeartoconsistentlyattendMSGmeetings,attendingmorethanthreequartersofmeetingsin2015and2016eitherinpersonorbydelegationtoadhocproxies(seeMSGmeetingattendanceinAnnexB).However,thereisnoevidenceofindustryparticipationinEITIdisseminationandoutreacheventsin2013,2014and2016,includinginreportsfromtheseevents.

CompaniesattheproductionphasehaveconsistentlyreportedtotheEITI,withthenumberofreportingcompaniesgrowingfrom13inthe2005EITIReportto54inthe2013EITIReport,whiletotalreconciledextractivesrevenuesrosefromXOF6,513,305,743(USD10.6million)toXOF226,297,717,882(USD366.8million)inthesameperiod.However,thenumberofreportingcompaniesfellsharplyto21inthe2014EITIReport,whilereconciledrevenuedeclinedtoXOF161,200,890,326(USD261.3million).The16companiesthatdidnotparticipateinthe2014EITIReport,outofatotalof37materialcompanies,accountedforacombined0.52%ofextractiveindustryrevenuesreportedbygovernment(ITIENiger,2016).ThereisnoevidenceofindustryMSGmembers’outreachtonon-reportingcompaniesinpreparingthe2013and2014EITIReports.Rather,itappearsfromofficiallettersfromPrimeMinister’sOfficeDirectorMahamadouGadototheMinistersofMMIDandMPEthatitwastheresponsibilityofgovernmentlineministriestofollowupwithnon-reportingcompanies(ITIENiger,2013-2016).

Enablingenvironment:The7thConstitutionoftheRepublicofNigerenactedin2010providesanenablingenvironmentforEITIreportingwithrequirementsforfullreportingofallextractivespaymentstogovernment,disaggregatedbycompany,underArticle150(RépubliqueduNiger,2010).Article149requiresthemanagementanddevelopmentofnaturalandsub-soilresourcestobeundertakeninfulltransparency(RépubliqueduNiger,2010).Article4ofthePetroleumCode(Law2007-01)enactedon31




January2007requiresoilandgascompaniestoreportalloilandgasdatatothelineMinistrychargedwithregulatingthesector.However,italsonotesthatthisdatacannotbedisclosedbycompanieswithouttheMinistry’sexplicitconsent(RépubliqueduNiger,2007).Article123oftheMiningCode(Ordonnance93-16),enactedon2March1993,requiresminingcompaniestoprovideallmining-relatedinformation,includingfinancialandeconomicdata,tothelineMinistryuponrequest.ItalsonotesthattheMinistrycannotdisclosethisinformationtothirdpartieswithouttheexpresspermissionoftheoperatorduringtheperiodofvalidityofacompany’slicense(RépubliqueduNiger,1993).Finally,Article7ofDecree000073/PMestablishingEITINigerrequirestheMSGtoensurethatallstakeholdersparticipateinEITIreportingandactivelyengageinpublicdebateaboutEITIfindings.

StakeholderviewsIndustryMSGmembersconsultednotedthattheycommunicatedandcoordinatedonEITIimplementationonlyinformally,viaad-hocbutinfrequentmeetings.ThiswasfacilitatedbythefactthatthemajorityofminingcompanieshadofficesinthesamebuildinginNiamey,meaningthattheymaintainedclosecontactonallissuesincludingEITI.WhileminingcompanieshadworkedonestablishingaChamberofMinesinthepast,inlinewiththeUEMOArecommendationtoestablishindustryassociations,thishadnotyetbeencompletedgiventhesharpslow-downinminingactivityinrecentyears.TheMSGrepresentativesreferredtotheintroductionofasingletypeofEITIreportingtemplateforallcompaniesasanexampleofindustryMSGmemberssuccessfullycollaboratinginrelationtoEITI.However,theseMSGmembersnotedthelackofcommunicationwithanyoilandgascompaniesabouttheEITI,notingthattheyhadneverseenanoilandgascompanyrepresentativeattendaMSGmeeting.AllMSGmembersconsultedconsideredthatindustryrepresentativesontheMSGhadsufficientcapacitytofulfiltheirduties.IndustryMSGmembersconfirmedthattheyplayednopartinfollowingupwithcompaniesthatrefusedtoparticipateinEITIreporting.SeveralindustryMSGmembersalsonotedthattheywerenotcontactedaheadofdisseminationandoutreacheventsanddidnottendtoparticipateinthese.

AllstakeholdersagreedthattherewasanenablingenvironmentforindustryparticipationinEITIimplementation.AgovernmentMSGmembernotedthatdespiteconfidentialityprovisionsinNiger’staxcode,thegovernmenthadimplicitlyallowedtheTaxDepartmenttodisclosetaxinformationdisaggregatedbyindividualcompanyforEITIreportinggiventhatitfullysupportedEITIimplementation.Whilethiswasnotmadeexplicitbyaformalgovernmentannouncement,theTaxDepartmentfeltfreetodisclosesuchtaxinformationgivensupportforEITIbybothgovernmentandcompanies.Anotherseniorgovernmentofficialhighlightedthegovernment’songoingeffortstodevelopaCharteronGoodGovernanceintheExtractiveIndustries,whichwouldentrenchtransparencyprovisionsforcompanyconduct.AdifferentseniorgovernmentofficialexplainedtheMMID’sworkonreformingtheMiningCode,throughwhichthegovernmentplannedtointroducerequirementsforthedisclosureofallminingcompanies’beneficialownership.Whileallstakeholdersconsultedagreedthatallextractivescontractshadnotbeenpublishedinlinewiththe2010Constitution,aseniorgovernmentofficialexplainedthattheConstitutionrequiredpublicationofallsuchcontractsbutdidnotspecifythetimeframeforpublication.

InitialassessmentTheInternationalSecretariat’sinitialassessmentisthatNigerhasmademeaningfulprogressinmeetingthisrequirement.ThePrimeMinisterialdecreeestablishingtheEITIinNigerandthe2010Constitutionofthe7thRepublicprovidesanenablinglegalenvironmentforEITIreportingandtheredonotappearto




belegalbarrierstocompanydisclosure.Onthecontrary,companiescanbeliableundertheConstitutionfornotreportinginformationasrequired.Stakeholdershavenotexpressedconcernsaboutcompaniesbeingunabletoreportto,orengagewith,theMSG.ProducingcompaniesintheminingsectorareactivelyandeffectivelyengagedintheEITIprocess,includingparticipationintheworkinggroupthatpreparestheEITIReport.ItappearsthatotherthanthosenamedinthedecreesassittingontheMSG,mostcompaniesdonotengageinEITIimplementationotherthanbyprovidingfinancialinformationforannualEITIreconciliations.Thereisnoevidenceofeveninformalconsultationswithoilandgascompaniesandtheindustryconstituencyappearstoplaynoroleinensuringthecomprehensivenessofreportingorindisseminationandoutreach.ThislackofengagementhasnotpreventedtheoilindustryfromparticipatinginEITIreporting,butitispossiblethatsomegapsinEITIreportingcouldhavebeenaddressedbyastrongerindustryparticipation.

Tocontinuemakingprogresstowardsfulfillingthisrequirement,extractivescompaniesshouldagreemechanismsforcommunicationandcoordinationwiththeentireconstituency,includingoilandgasaswellasminingexplorationcompanies.IndustryMSGmembersshouldalsoensurethattheirengagementinscoping,disseminationandoutreachisonparwiththeirinvolvementindatacollectionforEITIreporting.

CivilsocietyengagementintheEITIprocess(#1.3)


AccordingtounpublishedestimatesbythelocalchapterofTransparencyInternational,thereareatotalof2635NGOs,associationsandnon-profitorganisationsinNiger.Thereisavibrantandactivenetworkofcivilsocietyorganisations(CSOs)andnetworksworkingonoil,gas,miningandgovernanceissuesinNiger,including:

- TheOrganizationforTransparencyandBudgetaryAnalysis(ROTAB)10,anetworkofNGOs,associationsandtradeunionsthatisthelocalchapterofPublishWhatYouPay;

- TheGroupforReflectionandActiononExtractiveIndustriesinNiger(GREN),anetworkofNGOs,associationsandtradeunionsworkingonextractivesissues;

- TheNGOandDevelopmentAssociations’ChamberofConcertation(CCOAD),anetworkofNGOsanddevelopmentassociationsfocusingoncommunitydevelopmentissues;

- TheNigerienNetworkofNGOsandDevelopmentAssociationsfortheDefenceofHumanRightsandDemocracy(RODADDHD)11,adecentralisednetworkofNGOsanddevelopmentassociationsfocusedongovernanceandhumanrights;

- TheNigerienAssociationfortheFightagainstCorruption(ANLC-TI),thelocalchapterofTransparencyInternational;

- TheNetworkofInternationalNGOsinNiger(OIREN)12,anetworkof21internationalNGOsactiveinNiger.

10https://www.facebook.com/PCQVPNigerROTAB11http://www.rodaddhd.net/12http://www.oiren.org/




- CoalitionforEquity,QualityAgainstCostlyLiving(CEQCVC),agrassrootssocialmovementbringingtogetherworkers’unionsandassociations.

Expression:The7thConstitutionoftheRepublicofNigerof25November2010guaranteesfreedomofassociationandexpressionforallincludingnon-governmentalorganisations(NGOs)andassociationsunderArticle9(RépubliqueduNiger,2010).

ThereareseveralexamplesofcivilsocietyrepresentativesspeakinginpublicabouttheEITIprocess,includingstatementscriticalofbothgovernmentandcompanies(ROTAB,2015)(ROTABNigerandOxfamFrance,2015).TherearealsonumerousexamplesofcivilsocietyrepresentativesspeakinginpublicaboutbroaderissuesofnaturalresourcegovernancewithoutexplicitlymentioningEITI.TheROTABinparticularhasbeenthemostvocalininternationalforums,supportedbyinternationalnetworkofPublishWhatYouPay(PWYP)anddevelopmentpartnerslikeSwissaid(ROTABNiger,2013)andOxfamFrance(ROTABNigerandOxfamFrance,2015)(DanishInstituteforInternationalStudies,2013).ROTABalsopublishessomewhatintermittentlyaquarterlynewsletter(ROTAB,2007)(ROTAB,2009)(ROTAB,2011)(ROTAB,2012)(ROTAB,2013)(ROTAB,2013)(ROTAB,2014)(ROTAB,2015).TherenegotiationsbetweenArevaandNigerin2013-2014garneredsignificantattentionfrombothnationalandinternationalcivilsociety(ROTABNigeretOxfamFrance,2013)(OpenSocietyInitiativeforWestAfrica,2014).Civilsociety’spublicpronouncementsonextractiveindustrieshavealsoincludedacademicarticlessuchasonbusinessandhumanrightsin2014(ROTABNiger,2014)(ROTABNigerandPWYP,2014).Thereisampleevidenceofcivilsociety’scriticalstatementsaboutthegovernment,includingabouttheMay2014agreementbetweenNigerandAreva(ObservatoiredesMultinationales,2015)andtheconductoftheFebruary2016elections(FinancialTimes,2016)(FinancialTimes,2016).

MinutesofMSGmeetingsshowthatcivilsocietyMSGmembershavebeenopenlycriticalofgovernmentmanagementoftheextractiveindustriesonseveraloccasions,includingaboutthelackofpublicationofallextractivescontractsinlinewiththe2010Constitutionandaboutthedetentionofcivilsocietyactivistsin2015.Morebroadly,FreedomHousecategorisedNigeras“partlyfree”initsFreedomintheWorldrankingwitharatingof3.5outof7inboth2015and2016(FreedomHouse,2015)(FreedomHouse,2016).Thecountry’srankinginReporterswithoutBorders’WorldPressFreedomimprovedfrom139thof175in2009to43rdof179in2013,beforefallingbackto52ndof180in2016(ReporterswithoutBoarders,2016)(GroupedeRechercheetd’InformationsurlaPaixetlaSécurité,2013).

Operation:WhiletherewerenoindicationsoflegalbarrierspreventingcivilsocietyfromparticipatingintheEITI,asmallnumberofnetworksofnon-profitorganisationsappeartohavefacedexceptionaldelaysintheirformalregistrationthatcouldamounttoadministrativebarriers.Forinstance,severalCSOsdescribedhowtheGRENcoalitionofNGOshadstillnotreceivedgovernmentregistrationdespiteformallyapplyingin2010.TheseadministrativebarriersarenotwidespreadandappeartobetargetedatasmallgroupofNGOs.RepresentativesofcertainnetworksofNGOsandassociations,suchasGRENandCEQLVC,reporthavingappliedforregistrationwithoutreceivingaresponseforoverfiveyears.Giventhatthetwocoalitionsneverreceivedanofficialresponsetotheirregistrationapplication,theywerenotprovidedanyreasonforthepotentialrefusaloftheirapplication.AlthoughbothcoalitionswerecomposedexclusivelyofregisteredNGOs,thereweredifferentviewsamongstCSOsconsultedastowhetherformalregistrationofNGOcoalitionswasformallyrequired,althoughagovernmentofficialstatedthatregistrationwasrequiredforallNGOsincludingcoalitions.However,thesecoalitionsofNGOsareabletoparticipate




activelyintheEITIprocess.WhileunregisteredNGOscanbeforcedtoceaseactivitiesifidentifiedbyauthorities,thisdoesnotappeartohavebeenappliedtounregisteredcoalitionsofregisteredNGOs.WhilelargerNGOsbasedinNiameyhavehadaccesstointernationalfundingandsupport,NGOreportsindicatethatCSOsbasedinoroperatinginareashostingminingactivitiesoftenfaced“considerabledifficulty”inaccessinginternationalfunding(DanishInstituteforInternationalStudies,2013).Inaddition,weunderstandthatCSOnetworksthathavenotreceivedformalauthorisationtooperatefromthegovernmentarenotabletosecureinternationalfunding.Whilelackofregistrationhasconstrainedthesecoalitions’abilitytosecureinternationalfundingfromsomedonors,whorequirecorporatebankaccountstodisbursefunds,ithasnotstoppedrepresentativesfromthesecoalitionsfromparticipatinginMSGmeetingsandotherEITINigeractivitiessuchasdisseminationandoutreach.

Undercurrentgovernmentregulations,registrationofNGOsanddevelopmentassociationsistheresponsibilityoftheMinistryofPlanning,RegionalandCommunityDevelopment(MPRCD),underitsDepartmentofNGOsandDevelopmentAssociations.Ordonnance84-49/PCMS/MIof1March1984,passedunderamilitarygovernment,regulatestheestablishmentofNGOsandestablishedanauthorisationframeworkforCSOsregistration(RépubliqueduNiger,1984).Art3ofthe1984lawsaysthat“thedeclarationofthefoundationofanAssociationwillbemadetotheSub-PrefectureortotheCityCouncil”anda“Provisionalreceiptwillbegiven.”Article4saystheMinisteroftheInteriorwillissue“adecreeontheauthorizationoranotificationofrefusalofauthorization”.TheordonnancewasmodifiedandcompletedbyLaw91-006enactedon20may1991,whichprohibitedNGOswithanexplicitregionalandethniccharacter(Ministeredel'Interieur,delaSecuritePubliqueetdelaDecentralisation,2008).AnyNGOisrequiredtosignaTemplateAgreementProtocol(Protocoled'accordtype)withthegovernmenttoqualifyfortaxexemptstatus(PROFORMAR,2006).UnderDecree92-292/PM/MF/Pof25September1992,whichregulatesthefunctioningofNGOsandtheregistrationofforeignNGOsinNiger,aNGOcanhaveitsregistrationwithdrawnforanyactivitiesbeyondthescopeofitsstatutesorforanyotherreasonwithathree-monthwarningfromtheMinistryofInterior(PremierMinistredelaRépubliqueduNiger,1992).Ordonnance84-49/PCMS/MIsetstheproceduresforregisteringnationalNGOsandassociations.Promotersmustsubmitanapplicationtothetownhallorprefecturewheretheirheadquartersisbased,includingtheentity’sstatutes,codeofconduct,minutesofannualgeneralmeetings,listofmembersandfoundersaswellastheentity’saddress.Applicantsreceiveatemporaryreceiptuponsubmission.Dependingontheentity’sproposedareaoffocus,theMPRCDconsultsrelevantlineMinistriessuchasMMIDorMPEtoassesswhetherproposedactivitiesareinlinewithnationalpriorities.TheapplicationisforwardedtotheMinistryofInterior,PublicSecurity,DecentralisationandReligiousAffairs(MIPSDRA),whichisrequiredtoissueaformalnotificationallowinganentitytooperate.

Article9ofthe2010ConstitutionreaffirmsfreedomofassociationforNGOs,associationsandtradeunionswithinthecontextofexistinglawsandregulations,whilethepreambleproclaimsNiger’sadherencetothe1948UniversalHumanRightsDeclarationandthe1981AfricanCharterofHumanRights,amongotherinternationalobligations(RépubliqueduNiger,2010).Divergingviewsemergedfromthestakeholders’consultationastowhichrequirementsshouldapplyintheregistrationprocessofanNGO.SomearguedthatthenewConstitutionguaranteesfreedomofassociationandthereforeadeclarativeregimeshouldapply.OthersarguedthatgiventheexistinglawsregulatingthefunctioningofNGOstheauthorisationregimeisstillineffect.TheConstitutiondoesnotexplicitlyestablishadeclarativeorauthorisationbasedproceduresforNGOs.InadeclarativeregimeNGOswouldonlyberequiredtodeclaretheirestablishmentofanNGOinordertooperate,whereasinanauthorisationbasedsystem,NGOswouldneedtoapplyfortheirregistrationandwaitforapprovalfromtherelevantauthorities.NGOshavetherighttofilecomplaintstothecourt,buttherewasnoexampleofalawsuitfiledtoclarifythisissue.




Despiteconstitutionally-guaranteedfreedomofassociation,theUSDepartmentofStatehasreportedthatthegovernmentretainsauthoritytoprohibitgatheringsduringperiodsofsocialtensionorwithout48-houradvancenoticefromorganisersandhasforciblydispersedprotestersonoccasion(USDepartmentofState,2015).WhileNGOCIVICUS’ratingofcivilsocietyspaceinNigerisunderreviewin2017,theorganisationhasraisedconcernsoverallegationsofjudicialpersecution,harassmentandintimidationofhumanrightsactivistsin2015(CIVICUS,2015).Publicassemblyrequires48-hoursadvanceapprovalfromtheMinistryofInterior,withapplyingNGOsrequiredtosubmitthepurposeofthedemonstration(demonstrationsbasedonethnicity,religionorregionarebanned)andthedesignatedrouteforapproval(USDepartmentofState,2015).

Therehavebeenexamplesofcivilsocietyorganisationsworkingwithextractivesnotbeingabletooperatefreely,althoughsuchaltercationsappeartohavebeenrelatedtoindividuals’advocacyinareasnotrelatedtoextractiveindustrygovernanceorEITI-relatedissues.SeveralCSOmembersoftheMSGhavebeentemporarilydetainedinconnectionwiththeirprotestsoverAreva’soperationsinNigerduringFrenchPresidentFrancoisHollande’sofficialvisitinJuly2014(NGOCoalition,2014)(ROTAB,2015)(ObservatoiredesMultinationales,2015)Inbothcases,theywerereleasedwithoutformalcharges.TheSecretariatdidnotfindevidenceofcurbsonCSOs’abilitytospeakfreelyinrelationtoissuesrelatedtotheEITI.

Association:CivilsocietygroupsengagedintheEITIprocessareabletocommunicateandcooperatewitheachotherregardingtheEITIprocess.WhilethereisnoformalmechanismforCSOs’coordinationonEITIimplementationandcommunicationwiththeirbroaderconstituency,thereisnoevidenceofbarrierstosuchcoordination.CivilsocietyorganisationsinNigerappeartofreelycollaboratewithinternationalNGOsandcoalitions,suchasROTAB’sregularcollaborationwithOxfamFrance,SwissAid,andPWYPInternational(ROTABNigeretOxfamFrance,2013)(ROTABNigerandOxfamFrance,2015).ThekeyinformalmechanismsforfacilitatinginteractionofCSOsonissuesrelatedtoEITIimplementationaread-hocmeetingsofkeyCSOsandnetworksengagedonextractivesissuessuchasROTAB,GREN,CCOADandANLC-TI.PublishWhatYouPayNigerhasplayedanimportantroleinorganisingcivilsocietyandincludesthefourorganisationswithrepresentationontheMSGasmembers,includingCCOAD,ROTAB,GRENandANLC-TI.Therearenoindicationsthatcivilsocietyhasbeenrestrictedfromengaginginoutreachtobroadercivilsociety,includingrelatedtodiscussionsaboutMSGrepresentationandtheEITIprocess.

Engagement:AnalysisofmeetingminutesshowsthatCSOsareactivelyengagedinthedesign,implementation,monitoringandevaluationofEITIinNiger.CivilsocietymembersparticipateactivelyinmeetingsoftheMSGandpubliceventsorganisedbyEITINiger.Forinstance,CSOmembersoftheMSGparticipatedindiscussionsaboutthedraft2014EITIReportatthelevelofMSGsub-committeesinOctober2016andattheMSG’s28October2016meeting.TheyalsoparticipatedinMSGconsultationsonthedraftingofthebeneficialownershiproadmapattheMSG’s29December2016meetingandinthepreparationofthe2016-2016EITIworkplaninJune2016.ThereisalsoevidenceofactiveCSOparticipationindisseminationandoutreacheventsin2013,2014and2016,includingparticipatingintheMSG’sdisseminationofthe2013EITIReportinTillabéryinMay2016(seeRequirement7.1).WhileCSOsengagedindisseminationandoutreachwerecontractedbytheMSGtodisseminateEITIReportsin2013,2014and2015,fundingconstraintsin2016slowedthepaceofdissemination.ThereisalsoevidenceofCSOoutreacharoundEITIissues,includingPWYPpresentationsoncivilsocietyorganisationandengagementonEITI(ROTAB-PWYPNiger,2012).




Accesstopublicdecision-making:Civilsocietyrepresentativesareabletospeakfreelyontransparencyandnaturalresourcegovernanceissues.WhilethereislittleevidencethatEITINigerReportshaveplayedasignificantroleincontributingtocivilsociety’sanalysis,researchandadvocacy,CSOsappeartoinfluencepublicdecision-makingtosomeextent.NetworksofCSOsthatparticipateinEITIappeartohavesomeaccesstopoliticaldecision-makers.Forinstance,PrimeMinisterBrigiRafinireceivedadelegationfromOSIWAandROTABin2013(OfficeNationald'EditionetdePresse,2013).Thegovernmentalsoappearstohaveconsultedextensivelywithcivilsocietygroupsinestablishingacorruptionwatch-dog,theHauteAutoritédeLuttecontrelaCorruptionetlesInfractionsassimilées(HALCIA),bydecreein2011andbylawin201713.

StakeholderviewsExpression:Therewasconsensusamongstallstakeholdersconsulted,includingCSOsnotdirectlyrepresentedontheMSG,thattherewerenocurbsonfreedomofexpressioninNiger.However,severalCSOsdescribedarrestsofactivistsforpeacefulprotests,forwhichNGOshadsoughtadvancepermissionfromtheMayorandMinistryofInterior,duringFrenchPresidentHollande’svisitin2014,inthecontextoftherenegotiationsofAreva’scontractsinNiger.TheseCSOsconsideredthattheirconstitutionallyguaranteedfreedomofexpressionwasnotrespectedinpractice,emphasisingthattheHollandeprotestshadconsistedonlyofprotestorswearingyellowarmbandsorshirts.OtherCSOsnotedsucharrestswerenormalforanyillegalactinademocracy,notingthattheremayhavebeensecurityconcernsduringthestatevisit.SeveralCSOsandgovernmentrepresentativesnotedthatcivilsocietyspacehadwidenedsincethe2009-2010periodofturbulence.TherewasconsensusamongstCSOsconsultedthattherewasfreedomofexpressioninsofarasactivistswerenotjailedforspeakingoutcriticallyofthegovernmentonTVorradio.OneCSOnotedthattherecouldbereprisals,suchasthreatsinthepress,criticismsandgeneralthreatsinpublicandprivate,forcertainpublicpronouncements,butthathecontinuedtospeakoutinpractice.WhileCSOsdidnothighlightanyparticular“no-go”issuesnorspecificinstancesofself-censorship,severalCSOsstatedthatissuesrelatedtouraniumminingcontracts(particularlyAreva)andCNPC’soilandgascontractswere“sensitive”,insofarasCSOs’callsformoreinformationontheseagreementswereleftunfulfilled.CompanyrepresentativesconsideredthatcivilsocietywasparticularlyvocalinNiger,notingthattheytriedtodiscloseinformationtoavoidcriticismfromNGOs.

Operation:ThemajorityofCSOsconsultedemphasisedtheapparentdiscrepancybetweentheOrdonnancefrom1984andthe2010Constitution:anauthorisationordeclarativesystem.AllCSOsandarepresentativefromtheMPRCDconfirmedthatanauthorisationsystemwasfollowedinpractice.WhileseveralCSOscriticisedthisinconsistency,allstakeholdersagreedthatthishadneverbeentestedintheConstitutionalCourt.AMPRCDrepresentativestatedthatthetemporaryreceiptissuedtoNGOfoundersbylocalauthoritiesuponapplicationwasnotsufficientforthemtooperate,pendingfinaldecisionbyherministry.CivilsocietyrepresentativesarguedthattheirinterpretationofNiger’sConstitutionisthatNGOsdonotneedanexpressauthorisationandthedeclarationshouldbesufficient.TherepresentativedidnotseeanylegaloradministrativeobstaclestoregisteringanNGOorassociationandthattheMinistrytypicallyrespondedwithinmonthstotheapplicationwitheitherapositiveornegativeresponse,althoughtherewasnofixedtimeframeforreplies.However,theMPRCDrepresentativerecommendedthat

13https://www.unodc.org/documents/westandcentralafrica//PROJET_DE_LOI_HALCIA-Texte_consensuel.pdf




applicantsactivelyfollowupontheirapplicationtoensureitisprocessedbetweenministries.

InpracticeCSOsreportedtwoinstancesofsignificantdelaysingovernmentregistration,withNGOsoperatingonthebasisoftemporaryreceiptsissuedbythemunicipalityinwhichtheapplicationwasfirstsubmitted.SeveralCSOsconsideredthatapplicationsforregistrationshouldbeapprovedonano-objectionbasisbasedonthe2010constitution,butthisinterpretationhadnotbeenvalidatedbyaCourt.Inpractice,registrationofanNGOisstillbasedonthe1984lawandapprovalcantakeonetofiveyearsandsometimesevenlonger.TheROTABforexamplehadinitiallyappliedinJune2006beforereceivingtheirauthorisationinJune2010.Intheinterimperiod,ROTABwasnonethelessabletooperateonaprovisionalreceiptissuedbylocalauthorities.TheGRENisanetworkofNGOsfoundedin2005.GiventhatalloftheirmemberNGOswereregisteredtheydidnotconsiderregisteringuntil2011.ThisapplicationwasstillpendingatthetimeofthemissioninJanuary2017.WhiletheNationalCoordinatorhadcirculatedaletterrequestingtherenewalofCSOMSGmemberswithregisteredNGOrepresentativesonlyinOctober2016,thisrequestwasneverimplementedandlaterwithdrawnaccordingtoCSOsconsultedandthePermanentSecretary.SeveralCSOsliketheCEQCVCandCCOADoperatedontemporaryreceipts,oftenhavingstoppedfollowingupontheirapplications.OtherCSOsreportedthattheirregistrationhadonlytakenayear.Onecivilsocietyrepresentativesaidapplicationswereapprovedbasedonthelookoftheapplicantratherthanthemeritsoftheproject,withNGOsclosetothegovernmentgivenswiftregistration.OtherCSOsconsideredthatthepaceofapplicationsfornewNGOswasthecauseforanydelaysinapprovalorrejectionofanapplication.AgovernmentrepresentativeexplainedthattheprocessforregisteringNGOswassimpleandstraightforwardandthatthereshouldnotbeanydelaysinregisteringNGOsprovidedtheycompliedwithstatutorybansonreligion,ethnicityandregion).SeveralCSOsnoteddifficultiesintheiroperatingenvironmentinthe2008-2010periodbutadmittedthiswaslikelyduetopoliticalinstabilityratherthanalackofformalrecognition.RepresentativesfromtheunregisteredCSOsexplainedthattheywerenotgivenanyreasonbyofficialsforthedelaysinregistrationandhadceasedfollowingupafterseveralyearswithdifferentgovernmententities(includingtheMinistryofInteriorandtheMPRCD.

TherewasconsensusamongstallCSOsconsultedthatrecommendingasuspensionofNigerbasedonanassessmentofadministrativebarrierstocivilsociety’soperationswouldbeexcessiveandtherewasnosupportfromanystakeholdersconsultedforsuchamove.OnlyahandfulofCSOsconsultedknewoftheCivilSocietyProtocolpriortoconsultations.EvenrepresentativesfromthoseCSOsaffectedbyadministrativedelaysconsideredthattheircaseswereaminorityamongstthe2635NGOsoperatinginNiger.OneCSOemphasisedtheneedtoclearlyseparatewhatwasEITI-relatedfrommoregeneralNGOactivitiesinNiger.CertainCSOsconsideredthatapplicantssharedresponsibilityforapplicationsnotbeingprocessed,sincemanygaveuponfollowingupontheirapplications.Therewashoweveraconsensusthatunregisteredentitiesfacedchallengesinsecuringinternationalfunding.SeveralCSOsrecommendedthecreationofaone-stopshop(“guichetunique”)tostreamlineregistrationofNGOsandassociations.OtherCSOsrecommendedtheapplicationoftheirinterpretationofthe2010Constitution,adeclarativesystem,althoughtheyrecognisedtheneedtotesttheissueinthecourts.

Association:SeveralCSOsconsultedconfirmedthatwhiletheycoordinatedaboutEITIamongstthemselvesprimarilyviaemail,theycommunicatedwiththeirconstituenciesinmoreadhocandinformalways.SeveralCSOsalsoconfirmedthattheyreceivedfundingfromforeignentitieswithoutrestriction.OneCSOMSGmemberreportedhavingheldclassestostudentsaboutEITIeverytimeanewreportcameout.ThereweresharpdifferencesofopinionbetweenCSOMSGmembersabouttheattempttorefresh




civilsocietyrepresentationontheMSGinOctober2016.OnesetofCSOsconsideredthattheletterfromthePermanentSecretarysolicitingthenamesofnewCSOMSGmembersrepresentedanexplicitattemptatdisenfranchisingtwoofthesevenCSOrepresentativesontheMSGgivenitsrequirementforeachofthenominatedorganisations’legalstatutes.OtherCSOsnotedthattheletter’sselectioncriteriahadnotyetbeenimplementedandthattheCSOMSGmembershadmettoagreetheirownselectionproceduresinOctober2016.ThePermanentSecretaryexplainedthattheletterhadnotmeanttodictateselectioncriteriaforCSOMSGmembersandthathehadlaterwithdrawntheletter(seeRequirement1.4).AllstakeholdersconfirmedthatMSGrepresentativesfromCSOsthatdidnothaveformalregistrationcontinuedtofullyengageinEITIimplementation.

Engagement:AllCSOmembersoftheMSGconsideredthattheycouldengageinMSGmeetingsandexpresstheirviewsfrankly.Therewerecriticismsofmeetingslogistics(advancenotice,etc.),whicharecoveredunderRequirement1.4below.GovernmentandindustryrepresentativesontheMSGconfirmedtherobustnessofdebates,albeitadmittingthatthesedebateswerenotreflectedinthemeetingminutes.CSOmembersoftheMSGexpressedprideattakingaleadingroleindisseminationofEITIReports.

Access:Developmentpartnersconsideredthatthespaceforcivilsocietyhadbroadenedsincethe2009-2010period,notingthatCSOswereassociatedwithagrowingnumberofgovernmentcommittees.Whendiscussingdisclosureofinformation,severalindustryMSGmemberssaidtheywouldratherdiscloseinformationtoCSOsthanstudentstoavoidpubliccampaigning.CSOshavealsousedEITIdataintheiradvocacyontherenegotiationoftheArevamines(ROTAB,2015).

InitialassessmentTheInternationalSecretariat’sinitialassessmentisthatNigerhasmadesatisfactoryprogressinmeetingthisrequirement.Withregardstotheabilityofcivilsocietytooperate(civilsocietyprotocol#2.2),theonlydifficultyappearstorelatetoregistrationofNGOs.However,thereisnoevidencethatdelaysinprocessingapplicationshaveeffectivelyhinderedallCSOs’participationinEITIandallstakeholdersconfirmedthatMSGrepresentativesfromCSOsthatdidnothaveformalregistrationcontinuedtofullyengageinEITIimplementation.Withregardstotheabilityofcivilsocietytoassociate(civilsocietyprotocol#2.3),engage((civilsocietyprotocol#2.4)andinfluencepublicpolicymaking(civilsocietyprotocol#2.5),theInternationalSecretariatdidnotfindevidenceofanyrestrictionsandconcludesthatcivilsocietyorganisationsarefully,activelyandeffectivelyengagedinthedesign,implementation,monitoringandevaluationoftheEITIprocess.

Themainissueofconcernrelatestotheabilityofcivilsocietyto“engageinpublicdebaterelatedtotheEITIprocessandexpressopinionsabouttheEITIprocesswithoutrestraint,coercionorreprisal”(civilsocietyprotocol#2.1),especiallygiventhecaseswherecivilsocietyactivistshavebeendetainedinrelationtoexpressingviewsonnaturalresourcegovernance.Therewasconsensusamongstmoststakeholdersconsulted,includingCSOsnotdirectlyrepresentedontheMSG,thattherewerenocurbsonfreedomofexpressioninNiger.However,ahandfulofCSOsconsideredthatalthoughtherecouldbereprisalsforcertainpublicpronouncements,thisdidnotcurbtheirspeakingoutinpractice.Whilethepotentialfearofreprisalsdoesnotseemtohavedeclinedinrecentyears,itdoesnotappeartohaveeffectivelycurbedtheexpressionofkeyCSOscriticalofthegovernment.Moreover,apartfromthearrestsin2014and2015,nootherexamplesofrepressionwerecitedduringstakeholderconsultations.AllCSOmembersoftheMSGconsideredthattheycouldengageinMSGmeetingsandexpresstheirviewsfrankly.TheInternationalSecretariatthereforeconcludesthatdespitesomeadhocattemptsatrestrictingcivilsocietyfromexpressingopinions,thishasnotaffectedtheoverallabilityofcivilsocietyto




engageinpublicdebaterelatedtotheEITIprocess.

MSGgovernanceandfunctioning(#1.4)

DocumentationofprogressMSGcompositionandmembership:TheEITINigerMSG,theNationalConsultationCommittee(MSG),wasestablishedinDecember2006andcomprised18membersasofJanuary2017(ITIENiger,2016).InpracticethecompositionoftheMSGhaschangedsignificantlysinceitsestablishment,althoughitisunclearfromNiger’s2010ValidationreportandfromanyofficialletterswhentherestructuringoftheMSGtookplace(HartNurseLtd,2010).AsofJanuary2017,theMSGappearedtocounteightrepresentativesfromcivilsociety,sixfromgovernmentandfourfromindustry(ITIENiger,2016).Despitethelackofevidenceinformaldocuments,itappearsfrommembers’nominationslettersthatgovernmentandCSOmembersoftheMSGhavealternates,whileindustrymembersdonot(ITIENiger,2013-2016).

Representation:ThecompositionandTermsofReference(ToR)oftheMSGissetoutinPrimeMinisterialDecree000073/PMof4July2005,modifiedbyDecree000192/PMof10August2007andDecree000069/PMof5May2008(PremierMinistredelaRépubliqueduNiger,2005)(PremierMinistredelaRépubliqueduNiger,2007)(RépubliqueduNiger,2008).TheMSGalsoagreeditsownInternalGuidelines(“Règlementinterieur”)inOctober2013coveringsomeaspectsofitsinternalgovernance(ITIENiger,2013).TherearesignificantdiscrepanciesbetweenactualpracticeandthecompositionoftheMSGdefinedinDecree000073/PMandtheMSG’sownOctober2013guidelines,whichlisted33MSGmembers,including20fromgovernment14,sevenfromcivilsociety15,threefromtheminingindustry16andthreeindependents.17ThereisnoevidenceinMSGmeetingminutesorotherofficialdocumentsoftheMSG’sapprovalofthechangeinrepresentationandthecurrentstructureoftheMSGdoesnotappeartobecodified.Inaddition,whileDecree000073/PMnamedtheMinisterofMinesandEnergyasChairoftheMSG,thisministrywassplitintotwo18followingthe2011electionsandMSGmeetingminutesshowthatmeetingsarechairedbytheEITINigerPermanentSecretary.Inhisabsence,MSGmembershaveappointedalternatechairsinthreemeetingssincethestartof2016.ThereisnoevidenceofaMinisterchairingaMSGmeetingsince2008.WhilethethreedecreesalsoestablishedanInter-MinisterialCommittee(IMC),bringingtogetherministerial-levelgovernmentrepresentativesanddonors,thereisnoevidenceofthecommitteemeetingsince2008.

TherearenoprovisionsdescribingtheMSGmembers’selectionprocess,alternatesorthedurationof

14TheMinisterofMinesandEnergy(CommitteeChair),arepresentativefromthePresidency,theSeniorAdvisortothePrimeMinisterinchargeoftheEconomyandFinanceDepartment,theTechnicalAdvisortothePrimeMinisterinchargeofminesandenergy,theCommissionerforInternalResourcesattheMinistryofEconomyandFinance,theSecretaryGeneraloftheMinistryofMinesandEnergy,theDirectorofMines,theDirectorofHydrocarbons,tworepresentativesfromtheCommissiononEconomyandFinanceattheNationalAssembly,arepresentativefromtheCourdesComptes,threerepresentativesfromtheEconomicandSocialCouncil,arepresentativefromtheMinistryofTrade,arepresentativefromtheHighCouncilofLocalGovernments,arepresentativefromtheMinistryofJustice,arepresentativefromtheMinistryofCommunityDevelopment,arepresentativefromtheMinistryofHealthandarepresentativefromtheMinistryofPrimaryEducationandLiteracy.15RepresentativesfromnationalNGOs,internationalNGOs,SYNTRAMIN,theprivatemediaandthreerepresentativesfromtheNationalCouncilonHumanRightsandPublicLiberties.16RepresentativesfromCOMINAK,SOMAIRandSML.17TheseincludedtheBarAssociation,theChamberofCommerce,IndustryandCrafts(CCAIAN)andthepublicmedia.18TheMinistryofMinesandEnergywassplitintotheMinistryofMinesandIndustrialDevelopmentandtheMinistryofPetroleumandEnergyin2011.




theirmandateinanyofthethreedecrees,whichonlylistthetypesofMSGmembersbytypeoforganisation.TheOctober2013InternalGuidelinesonlystatethattheMSGmemberslistedinthedecreesestablishingtheEITImustbedesignatedbytheirown“structures”,butnottheirownconstituencies(ITIENiger,2013).ThereisnoevidenceofanyofthethreestakeholdergroupshavingagreedontheselectionprocesspriortonominatingrepresentativestotheMSG.ThereisrepeatedreferencetotheMSG’sdiscussionsofarenewalofMSGmembershipandexpansiontootherextractiveindustrystakeholdersinsuccessiveworkplans,includingfor2014-2016and2016-2018,andannualactivity/progressreports,includingthosecovering2013and2015(ITIENiger,2014)(ITIENiger,2016)(ITIENiger,2014)(ITIENiger,2016).Thelatestworkplancovering2016-2018plansforreformoftheinstitutionalstructureofEITIimplementationandrevisionoftheToRoftheMSGin2016underitsfifthobjective(improvingthegovernanceofEITINiger),althoughthereisnoevidencesuchreformswereimplementedasofJanuary2017(ITIENiger,2016).

ThereisnoindicationofanycomprehensiverenewalofMSGmembersinthe2010-2016periodasidefromadhocreplacementswithineachconstituencyduetoturnoverinspecificorganisations.InOctober2016however,PrimeMinister’sOfficeDirectorMahamadouGadowroteformallytothethreeministriesdirectlyrepresentedontheMSG,theMoF,MMIDandMPE,aswellastoeachofthethreecompaniesnamedinDecree000073/PMrequestingthenominationofMSGrepresentatives.TheEITINigerPermanentSecretaryalsowrotetoCSOsrepresentedontheMSGon12October2016requestingthenominationoffiveCSOrepresentativestotheMSGinsteadofeightcurrentmembers.TheMSGdidnotagreeinadvancetoreducethenumberofcivilsocietyrepresentativesfromeighttofive.TheletteralsorequiredCSOMSGmemberstosubmittheirorganisations’legalregistrationdocumentsandcopiesofthetwolatestannualactivitiesreports.ThisrequirementifimplementedwouldautomaticallyexcludethecoalitionofNGOsthatarestillwaitingtoreceivetheirformalregistrations.WhilethereisevidenceinofficialnominationslettersthatgovernmentandindustryrepresentativeswerenominatedinOctober2016,theselectionofCSOrepresentativesdoesnotappeartohavebeenfinalised.

Therearenoreferencesinthedecreesrequiringorencouragingstakeholdergroupstoconsiderdiversityofcommoditiesproducedinthecountrywhenselectingrepresentatives,norgeographicdiversity.TherearealsonorequirementsforgenderdiversityinMSGrepresentation,withfourwomenMSGmembersasofJanuary2017.AlistofthegroupsgrantedrepresentationontheMSGispubliclyavailableontheEITINigerwebsite,butthereisnolistofMSGmemberswhoarecurrentlyinvolved.AlthoughthedecreesdonotexplicitlyrequireMSGmemberstoliaisewiththeirconstituenciesaheadofmeetingsanddecisions,thereareprovisionsforoutreachanddisseminationofinformation.Article7ofDecree0073/PMof2005requirestheMSGtoundertakeoutreachanddisseminationofinformationtostakeholdersonthegoalsofEITIimplementation,theimportanceofpreparation,implementationandoversightandmonitoringofEITI.

Civilsocietyrepresentation:TheprocessbywhichthecurrentcivilsocietyrepresentativewasappointeddoesnotappeartobecodifiedinanydocumentsprovidedbytheMSGorCSOs.TherightofcivilsocietytoindependentlyelecttheirrepresentativesatalllevelsintheEITIprocessanddesigntheirownprogrammesisnotexplicitlyrecognisedinanyofthethreedecrees.Article8ofDecree0073/PMof2005providesfortheappointmentofrepresentativesfromnationalandforeignNGOs,media,organisedlabour,theorderoflawyersandthecollectiveofcommunitygroupsasMSGmembers.Whiletherearenoprovisionsdescribingthenominationprocessinanyofthethreedecrees,internationalNGOssuchas




MSIIntegrityhavestatedthatthenominationsofspecificCSOrepresentativesontheMSGwere“withinthecontrolofthegroupswhoaregrantedrepresentationontheMSG”(MSIIntegrity,2015).

Civilsocietyappearsoperationallyandinpolicytermsindependentofcompaniesandgovernment(seeRequirement1.3).WhiletheprocessthroughwhichtheeightcurrentCSOrepresentativesontheMSGwereappointedisunclear,atleastthreeCSOMSGmembers19appeartohavebeeninplacesince2007.Mostoftheotherfivemembersappeartohavebeenappointedin2013followinginternalchangeswithintheirorganisations.WhiletheEITINigerPermanentSecretary’sOctober2016renewalletterrequiredCSOMSGmemberstosubmittheirorganisations’legalregistrationdocumentsandcopiesofthetwolatestannualactivitiesreports,weunderstandthatCSOsrepresentedontheMSGmetinOctober2016toagreetheirownnominationsprocedures,althoughnominutesofthemeetingwereprovided.TherenewalofCSOrepresentationappearedtostillbependingasofJanuary2017andtherewasnoevidenceofpublicoutreachconcerningthesenominations.

Industryrepresentation:Aswithcivilsociety,therearenoprovisionsinanyofthethreedecreesrelatedtothespecificnumberofMSGseatsallocatedtoindustryrepresentation.Article8ofDecree000073/PMlistsrepresentativesfromCOMINAK,SML,SOMAIRasMSGmembers.WhiletheCCAIANisconsideredanindependentrepresentativeontheMSG,itistheonlybodystatutorilyresponsibleforrepresentingtheinterestsofindustryasaconstituency,ratherthanthenarrowerinterestsofproducingcompanies.ThedecreesdonotrequireindustryrepresentativesontheMSGtohaveaspecifiedlevelofseniority,expertiseorexperience,nortocomefromarepresentativecross-sampleoftheextractiveindustryvaluechain.ThethreecompaniesnamedinthedecreeswerethesoleindustrialminingcompaniesinNigeratthetime.

TheMSGagreedplanstoincludeoneortwoadditionalindustryrepresentativesfromminingandpetroleumexplorationcompaniesatameetingon4thMay2010anddiscussedthematteratseveralsubsequentMSGmeetingssince2014(HartNurseLtd,2010).ThereishoweveronlyevidenceofexplorationcompaniesattendingcertainMSGmeetingsasobservers,notmembers,includingon20November2015(ITIENiger,2015).Rather,changesinindustryrepresentationontheMSGseemtohavebeenautomaticreplacementsfollowingchangeswithineachcompanyinthe2006-2016period.AfourthindustryMSGmembersappearstohavebeenaddedin2014basedonanalysisofmeetingminutes,withMrsToureGaladimamovingfromSOMAIRtoArevaNCbutkeepingherMSGseatwhileAbdoulayeHamidouwasappointedtoSOMAIR’sseat.FollowingindustrynominationsinOctober2016andbasedonlettersofappointment,industryrepresentationontheMSGwasbroadenedtoincluderepresentativesfromtheSORAZrefineryandSIPEX,theoilandgasexplorationsubsidiaryofSONATRACH,althoughthereisnoevidencefrommeetingminutesthattheserepresentativesattendedanyEITI-relatedeventssincetheirappointment.TherepresentativefromSIPEXistheonlymemberwithanalternate.TheproceduresfornominatingindustryMSGmembersremainsunclearanddoesnotappeartohavebeencodified,giventhatthePrimeMinister’sOfficeDirectorwrotedirectlytospecificcompaniesrequestingMSGnominationsinOctober2016.Thereisnoevidenceofoutreachtothebroaderindustryconstituencyas

19AliIdrissaofROTAB,WadaMamaneofANLC-TIandAdamouAbbaofSwissaid/OIREN.




partoftheMSGselectionprocess.

Governmentrepresentation:Decree000073/PMof2005stipulatesthenumberofMSGrepresentativesfromeachgovernmentagency,includingrepresentativesfromthePresidency,thePrimeMinisterandseveralrelevantministriesaswellasspecialisedbodiesliketheNationalHumanRightsCommissionandtheCourtofCounts.Thenominationsproceduresforgovernmentrepresentativesappeartohavebeendecidedbytherespectivegovernmententities,althoughthisisnotcodified.ThefivegovernmentMSGmemberswhoconsistentlyengageinEITIimplementationarerepresentativesfromtheMoF,MMID,MPE,MinistryofJusticeandpublic(government-owned)media.Aswithindustry,itseemsthatgovernmentrepresentationchangedonlyonanadhocbasisinthe2006-2016periodduetochangesinministrypositionsratherthanthroughaconcertedreshuffle.FollowingtheMSGrefreshinOctober2016representativesfromMoF,MMIDandMPEandalternatesforeachappeartohavebeendesignatedthroughformalletterstothePrimeMinister’sOfficeDirector,althoughthesameMSGmemberswerereappointed.

Termsofreference:TheToRfortheMSG,intheformofDecrees000073/PM,000192/PMand000069/PM(in2005,2007and2008),waslastrevisedon5May2008(PremierMinistredelaRépubliqueduNiger,2005)(PremierMinistredelaRépubliqueduNiger,2007)(RépubliqueduNiger,2008).TheToRcanbeconsideredtobepublic,giventherequirementinArticle17ofDecree000073/PMforitspublicationintheOfficialGazetteanditsavailabilityontheEITINigerwebsite.However,thereisnoevidencethattheMSG’sOctober2013InternalGuidelinesareaccessibletothepublicandtheydonotappearaccessibleontheEITINigerwebsite.ThereisnoevidencethedecreesformingtheToRfortheMSGwereagreedbymembersofallthreestakeholdergroups,withthegovernmentdecreeingthebasicparametersofEITIimplementationthroughpublicorders.

Article7ofDecree000073/PMrequiresthattheMSGconductoutreachforallstakeholdersandtoencourageactivepublicdebatefromtheresultsoftheEITIprocessandtowidelydisseminateEITIinformation.TheToRdonotoutlineanyspecificrolesandresponsibilitiesofMSGmembersbeyondthoseincludedintheoverallobjectivesoftheMSG,whichcoversprovisions1.4.boftheEITIStandard.Article7ofDecree000073/PMoutlinestheresponsibilitiesoftheMSG,whichincludedevelopment,revisionsandapprovalofannualEITIworkplans;oversightoftheEITIReportingprocess,includingagreeingonthescopeoftheEITIReport,addressingweaknessesandcapacityconstraintsamongandraisepublicawarenessofextractiveindustrytransparency.TherearenospecificreferencestotheannualprogressreportorapprovingtheToRfororappointingtheIndependentAdministratorintheToR,buttheToRveststheMSGwithresponsibilityformonitoringandevaluationoftheEITIprocessandinpracticeannualactivityandprogressreportsaredevelopedandapprovedbytheMSG.ThedecreesalsodevolveoperationalmanagementofEITIimplementationtothePermanentSecretariat,includingproductionofEITIReports.

ThetransitionfromtheEITIRulestothe2013EITIStandardwasnotmatchedbyarevisionofthecoregovernancedocumentsofEITIimplementationinNiger,asidefromtheMSGagreeingitsownInternalGuidelinesinOctober2013(ITIENiger,2013).ThereisonlyevidenceofasummaryofthemainchangesundertheEITIStandardbeingcirculatedtostakeholdersbeyondtheMSGbytheEITINigerSecretariatin2013(ITIENiger,2013).Whiletherearenoprovisionsinanyofthedecreesfortheperiodicreviewofthe




MSG’sgovernancearrangements,thefifthobjectiveofthe2016-2018EITIworkplanconsistsofreformingthegovernanceofEITINigerbyreformingtheinstitutionalframeworkandrevisingthedecreeestablishingtheEITI(ITIENiger,2016).

WhilenotcodifiedintheMSG’sToR,threesub-committeeswereestablishedattheMSG’s14August2007meeting,coveringdatacollection,communicationsandcapacitybuildingrespectively(HartNurseLtd,2010).Thesethreecommitteesappeartohavebeenre-establishedattheMSG’s13August2015meeting(ITIENiger,2016).However,thethreesub-committeeswereinstitutionalisedintheMSG’sInternalGuidelines,whichdefinedtheirmembershipasbeingcomposedofrelevantMSGmembersaccordingtospecialty(ITIENiger,2013).

Internalgovernanceandprocedures:TheToRincludeonlylimiteddetailoninternalgovernancerulesandprocedures.Thedecreesdonotincludeprovisionsforestablishingcodesofconductforstakeholdergroupmembers,onconflictofinterestnorforproceduresformanaginggrievancesallegingabreachofinternalgovernancerules.Article10ofDecree000073/PMdefinesthefrequencyofMSGmeetingsasatleastoneaquarterbyconvocationoftheCommitteeChair.InpracticetheMSGappearstohavemetatleastfourtimesayearsince201220,althoughithasnotcompliedwiththerequirementofoneMSGmeetingperquarterin2014,2015and2016.Section6(p.10)ofthe2016-2018workplanhighlightsthelackofregularityinMSGmeetingsasakeyconstraintonimplementingtheworkplan(ITIENiger,2016).TheToRdonotincludeprovisionsrelatedtoadvancewarningofmeetingsandtimelycirculationofdocumentspriortodebate,norrequiringMSGmemberstoparticipateandcontributeeffectivelytomeetings.Inpractice,basedoninvitationemailsprovidedbytheEITINigerSecretariat,MSGmembersareinvitedtomeetingswithbetweentwoandsevendaysadvancenotice,withsupportingdocumentsprovidedclosertothetime.Aspartofdiscussionsaroundthe2016-2018workplanatits16March2016meeting,theMSGnotedrecommendationstocirculatedocumentsatleasttendaysbeforeMSGmeetings(ITIENiger,2016).TherearenoprovisionsinDecree000073/PMforMSGmemberstotableanissuefordiscussionbutthereisevidencefrommeetingminutesofMSGmembersproposingchangestotheagendaatthestartofmeetings.ThereisalsoevidencethattheMSGhasundertakendiscussionsanddecisionsviacircular(email)on20and27June2016,particularlylinkedtoapprovalofthe2015annualprogressreport(ITIENiger,2016).

Decision-making:TheToRdonotrefertothemodalitiesforquorumordecision-making,nordotheyensureaninclusivedecision-makingprocess.WhiletheMSG’sInternalGuidelinesdefinequorumasbeingasimplemajorityofMSGmembers,thereisnoevidencethisisfollowedinpracticeasseveralMSGmeetingshavestartedwithoutasimplemajorityofmembersattending(ITIENiger,2013).TheMSG’sInternalGuidelinesalsodefinedecision-makingasbeingthroughconsensus,withdecisionstakenbysimplemajorityvoteifconsensusisnotpossible.Inpractice,analysisofMSGmeetingminutesshowsthatvirtuallyalldecisionsweretakenbyconsensusalthoughtherewasevidenceofoneinstanceofvotingforapprovalofthedraft2014EITIReporton28October2016(ITIENiger,2016).TherehavealsobeenseveralinstancesofapprovalsofkeyEITIdocumentsbeinggrantedbytheMSGinprinciple,subjecttorevisionsandfinalizationofthedocuments.Thus,theMSGapprovedinprinciplethe2013EITIReportatits20and28November2015meetingsandthe2014EITIReportatits28October2016meeting(ITIE

20TheMSGappearstohavemetfourtimesin2013,sixtimesin2014,fourtimesin2015andsixtimesin2016.




Niger,2015)(ITIENiger,2016).

Record-keeping:ThePermanentSecretariatisrequiredtokeeprecordsofMSGmeetingsasthecommitteesecretaryunderArticle9ofDecree000073/PMandtheMSG’sInternalGuidelines.TherearehowevernoprovisionsinanyofthethreedecreesforcirculatingandverifyingMSGmeetingminuteswithmemberspriortotheirfinalisation,norformeetingminutestobemadepublic.However,minutesofMSGmeetingsareavailableontheEITINigerwebsite,albeitforonlyfourmeetingsin2016(ITIENiger,2017).AnalysisofmeetingminutesshowsthattheMSGapprovesminutesofthepreviousmeetingatthestartofeachmeeting.ItappearsthatrecordsofthethreeMSGsub-committees’meetingshavebeenkeptbutthesearenotavailableontheEITINigerwebsite.TherearenoprovisionsinthethreedecreesformingtheMSG’sToRforthetreatmentofconfidentialinformation,particularlyoffinancialinformationpre-reconciliation.MSGmeetingminutesdonotreflectdisagreementwithintheMSG,withonlyacursoryoverviewofgeneraltopicsdiscussedanditappearsthatmeetingsareheldaccordingtoChathamHouserules(althoughthisisnotstatedintheToR).

MSGCapacity:ThethreedecreesdonotincludeprovisionsforensuringMSGmembershaveadequatecapacitytofulfiltheirresponsibilitiesnorforrepresentativestohaveexpertiseinissuesrelatedtoEITI.WhileArticles8and12ofDecree000073/PMdescribethecompositionoftheMSGandPermanentSecretariatrespectively,theydonotrefertomembers’capacitiesbeyondtheirofficialfunctions.ThedecreedoesdefinesomeofthecapacityofthePermanentSecretariatunderArticle13,empoweringittoseeksupportfromthePrimeMinister’sOfficeaswellasthetechnicalstructuresindifferentministriesonaneedsbasis.TheMSGhasnotedcapacityconstraintsamongstmanyMSGmembersatseveralmeetings,includingon16March2016whereitrecommendedholdingatrainingworkshopontheEITIStandardgiventhelackoffamiliarityofMSGmembers(ITIENiger,2016).WhiletheAfDB’sPAMOGEFhasplannedsupportforcapacitybuildingofthePermanentSecretariatandMSGmembersinits2013-2016workplan,theseactivities,includinganinstitutionalreviewofEITIimplementationinNiger,werepostponedto2017.

Perdiems:NoneofthethreedecreesrefertoperdiemsoranyotherformoffinancialcompensationforparticipationinEITIimplementation.TheMSGwasinformedofperdiemsofXOF50,000(USD83)permemberforMSGmeetingsandXOF10,000(USD16)forsub-committeemeetingsatits14October2015meeting(ITIENiger,2015).PrimeMinisterialNote02527/CAB/PM/ITIE/SPof1December2015formalisedthisperdiempolicy,settingaceilingofsixMSGmeetingsperyear(PremierMinistredelaRépubliqueduNiger,2015).ThisnotewasnotpublishedontheEITINigerwebsiteasofJanuary2017anditremainsunclearwhentheperdiempolicystartedinpractice.TheMSGnoteddelaysinpaymentof“participationcosts”forMSGmeetingsatits31March2016meeting(ITIENiger,2016).

Attendance:MSGmembersregularlyattendmeetings,whichhavebeenquoratein2014,2015and2016accordingtosuccessiveannualprogressreports(ITIENiger,2014)(ITIENiger,2015)(ITIENiger,2016).TheMSG’sInternalGuidelinesrequireallMSGmemberstoattendallmeetingsontime,withtheobligationtoprovidewrittenapologiesifunabletoattend(ITIENiger,2013).AverageparticipationinMSGmeetingsincludesaroundtenmembers.AnalysisofMSGmeetingminutesshowsthattherewereatleastthreerepresentativeseachfromgovernmentandcivilsocietyandtwofromindustryateveryMSGmeetinginthe2013-2016period(seeMSGmeetingattendancechartinAnnexB).Successiveannualactivityand




progressreportspublishedbyEITINigerhaveemphasisedthestrongparticipationontheMSGbycivilsocietyrepresentatives,buthavealsohighlightedtheneedforparticulareffortstoimprovethevoluntaristapproachofcompanies(ITIENiger,2014)(ITIENiger,2016).The2013annualactivityreportalsonotedimprovementsinthegovernment’smoreparticipativeapproachtoEITIimplementationin2013(ITIENiger,2014).ThereisnospecificpolicycoveringattendanceofMSGmeetingsbyobservers.However,Article15ofDecree000073/PMgrantstheorgansofEITINigertheauthoritytocalluponanyphysicalormoralpersonstoparticipateinthepreparation,implementationorfollow-upactivities.ThereisevidencefrommeetingminutesofobserversattendingMSGmeetings.

Translations:TheMSG’sworkinglanguageisFrenchinlinewithNiger’sofficiallanguageandthereisnoevidenceofanydocumentsincludingEITIReportsandtheirsummariesbeingtranslatedintoanyoftheeightlocallanguages.

Permanentsecretariat:ThePermanentSecretariatplaysakeyroleinsupportingEITIimplementation,inlinewithDecrees000073/PMand000069/PM.Article1ofDecree000073/PMestablishedaSteeringGroupundertheauthorityofthePrimeMinister’sOfficeandfundedbythegovernment,whileDecree000069/PMtransformeditintoaPermanentSecretariat.Articles5and9ofDecree000073/PMestablishedthestructureasthesecretarytotheIMCandMSGrespectively.TherolesandresponsibilitiesofthePermanentSecretariatdefinedinArticle11includeallmajoroperationalresponsibilitiesnormallyheldbytheMSG.TheseincludeestablishingtheinstitutionalandlegalframeworkforEITIimplementation;coordinatingandharmonizingEITIimplementationactivities;ensuringthequalityofinterventions;managingallactivitiesrelatedtoEITIimplementation;participatingininternationaleventsrelatedtoEITI;proposecorrectiveactionslinkedtoEITIimplementation;definingandmanagingtechnicalandfinancialassistancenecessaryforEITIimplementation;ensuringdisclosuresofrevenuesbygovernmentandcompanies;ensurethepublicationandwidespreaddisseminationofdifferentreportsrelatedtoEITIimplementation;publishingandsendingtheEITIReporttotheInternationalSecretariat(inLondon);andmonitoringandevaluatingEITIimplementation.Article12definestheminimumstaffingneedsofthesecretariat21andthestrongroleofthePermanentSecretary,whohassoleresponsibilityformanagingEITIfundsunderArticle14(HartNurseLtd,2010).

InpracticethePermanentSecretariattakesaleadingroleinimplementation,arolefacilitatedbythePermanentSecretary’sdualroleassenioradvisortoPresidentIssoufouonminingandpetroleum.DespitethesuccessiveEITIworkplansincludingactivitiesrelatedtorevisingtheinstitutionalstructureandgovernancedocumentsofEITINiger,itdoesnotappearfrommeetingminutesthattheMSGhasconsideredanddefineditsresponsibilitiesvis-à-visthePermanentSecretariat’ssincethelastrevisionoftheEITIDecreeon5May2008(ITIENiger,2014)(ITIENiger,2016).

Stakeholderviews

AllMSGmembersconsultedconfirmedthatthattheDecreeinstitutionalisingtheEITIinNigerwaslastupdatedin2008butnotedtheexistenceoftheMSG’sowninternalguidelines,originallyagreedin2013andrevisedinDecember2016.However,theMSGonlyprovidedacopyoftheirinternalguidelinesafter

21Includingaspecialistintheminesandenergysector,alawyer,acommunicationsexpertandsupportstaff.




theconclusionofthestakeholderconsultationsmissionandcouldnotdescribethemainlinesoftheinternalguidelinesduringconsultations.StakeholdersalsoagreedthattherewasnoevidenceoftheInter-MinisterialCommitteemeetingsince2008.SeveralrepresentativesfromallthreestakeholdergroupsconsideredthattheInter-MinisterialCommitteeshouldbereactivateddespitethelackofCSOandindustryrepresentationonit,inordertoimprovethetimelinessandqualityofEITIreporting,resolvebottlenecksandtofollowuponEITIrecommendations.AseniorgovernmentofficialexplainedthattheCommitteehadheldonlytwomeetingssinceitscreation,inAugust2007andMay2008,buthadsincebeendisbanded(dateunclear)giventhattheMSGhadtakenchargeofimplementation.

TherewasagreementamongstMSGmembersconsultedthattheinvitationtoparticipateintheMSGwasnotwidelypublicisedaheadofnominations,whichwerenotconsideredtohavebeenopentothepublic.StakeholdersalsoagreedthattheselectionproceduresforMSGmembershadnotbeensetinadvancebyeachconstituency,althoughCSOsnotedthataselectgroupofCSOsfocusedonextractiveshadmettoagreetheirownnominationsproceduresinOctober2016,althoughthishadnotyetledtoarenewalofmembers.Industryrepresentativesconfirmedthattherewaslittleeffectiveoutreachwithmembersoftheirbroaderconstituency.Governmentrepresentativesnotedthattheyweresimplydesignatedbytheirministryandchangedinlinewithturnoverinfunctions,butnotedthatregularofficiallettersfromthePrimeMinister’sOfficeDirectortotheirministriesensuredthattherewassomelevelofcommunicationwithinthegovernmentconstituency.SeveralCSOsnotedthatwhiletherehadbeennoeffectiveoutreachpriortonominations,theytriedtokeeptheirmembersupdatedonEITI-relatedissuesthroughoccasionalemailsandinformalmeetings.

AllMSGmembersconfirmedthattheMSG’sstructuredefinedinthedecreeswasnotfollowedinpracticeandthatthecompositionoftheMSGhadbeenreducedatsomepointbetween2006and2010.AseniorgovernmentofficialnotedthatwhiletheindustryandgovernmentrepresentationontheMSGhadchangedseveraltimes,inlinewithchangesinfunctionswithineachdesignatedentity,therepresentationfromsomeCSOshadremainedthesamesinceinception.However,severalCSOsclarifiedthatsomeindividualCSOrepresentativesontheMSGhadchanged,althoughreplacementshadbeennominatedwithinthesameorganisations.Anindustryrepresentativeexplainedthatafourthindustryseathadbeencreatedin2014whentherepresentativefromSOMAIRmovedtoArevaNCtoensurehercontinuedparticipationintheMSGandthatthishadbeendecidedbythePermanentSecretary.TheseniorgovernmentofficialnotedthattheMSGhaddiscussedrefreshingitsmembershipandrevisingitsinstitutionalstructureforthepastthreeyears.TheintentionhadbeentoproceedwitharenewalofMSGmembersinOctober2016beforerevisingtheEITIDecreetoconfirmthenewstructure.TheofficialnotedthattherenewalofMSGmembershiphadbeendelayedduetopreparationsforValidation,butthattheMSGintendedtoproceedwithitin2017.TherewasconsensusthatthethreedecreesestablishingtheEITIdidnotcoverallaspectsofRequirement1.4andthatMSGmembers’mandateswerenotlimitedinpractice,withnomechanismsforreplacingrepresentatives.StakeholdersalsoconfirmedthatCSOandgovernmentMSGmembershadalternates,whileindustrydidnot.TherewasconsensusontheMSGthatthedecreesestablishingEITIrequiredrevisions.

TherewassharpdisagreementamongstCSOsandgovernmentofficialsconsultedabouttheattemptedrefreshofCSOs’MSGmembershipinOctober2016.GovernmentandindustryMSGmembersconfirmedthatthePrimeMinister’sOfficeDirectorhadwrittentoindividualministriesandcompaniessolicitingtheirselectedMSGrepresentativesandthattheyhadcomplied,withoutconsultationswiththeirrespective




constituencies.However,severalCSOsconsideredthatthePermanentSecretary’slettertoCSOsrequestingnewmembersrepresentedanattempttodisenfranchiseCSOsthathadnotreceivedformalregistrationfromgovernment,givenitsrequirementforeachorganisationtoprovidecopiesoftheirlegalstatutes,puttinginperiltwoofthesevenorganisationsrepresentedontheMSG.OtherCSOsdisagreed,notingthataselectgroupofCSOshadmetinOctober2016toagreetheirownnominationsproceduresandthatrepresentativesfromthetwoCSOsinquestioncontinuedtoattendEITIactivities.ThePermanentSecretaryexplainedthattheOctober2016letterwasnotaneffortatdisenfranchisinganyCSOsbutrepresentedonlysuggestionsofsupportingdocuments,highlightingtheletter’sstatementthatselectionwastheprerogativeofCSOsthemselves.Healsonoted,inlinewithseveralotherCSOs,theimportanceofMSGmemberscomingfromorganisationsthatoperatedwithinthelaw.HeexplainedthatthechallengewastoreconciletheimperativeofgoodgovernancewiththefactthatcertainCSOsrepresentedontheMSGoperatedwithoutlegalbasisorofficialrecognition.SeveralCSOsconsideredthatsomeCSOrepresentativesontheMSGwere“tooclose”togovernmentandquestionedtheirintegrity,allegingthattheOctober2016refreshrepresentedanattemptbygovernmenttoreplacecurrentCSOrepresentativeswithgeneraliststhatwouldbelessthreatening.TherewasalsoconcernamongstcertainCSOsthatsomecivilsocietymemberswerewaitingforappointmenttogovernmentpositions,whichcurbedtheirindependence.TheseCSOsalsonotedthattheywerenotawareofotherconstituenciesrenewingtheirMSGrepresentationatthetime,whichcontributedtotheirimpressionthatspecificCSOswerebeingsingledout.OtherCSOsconsideredthat,with2635NGOsinNiger,therewouldalwaysbeacertaindiscriminationinselectionofMSGrepresentativesandthatitwasnotpossibletoholdnominationsthatwereopentoallCSOs.SeveralgovernmentofficialsstatedthatnominationsofMSGmemberswereentirelyfreeandthatthegovernmentdidnotseektointerveneintheprocess.

TherewerealsocontrastingviewsaboutwhetherconstituencieswereadequatelyrepresentedontheMSG.TherewasconsensusamongstindustryMSGmembersthatindustryrepresentationwasnotadequate,giventhatexplorationandpetroleumcompanieswerenotrepresentedontheMSGdespiteoilandgasrevenuesaccountingforroughlytwothirdsofgovernment’sextractivesrevenues.However,MSGmembersconsideredthattheyhadtherequiredcapacitytocarryouttheirduties.SecretariatstaffnotedtheprovisionsforcapacitybuildinginsuccessiveEITIworkplans.AllMSGmembersconfirmedtheyweresatisfiedwithEIIproceedingsbeingconductedentirelyinFrench.NoneoftheMSGmemberswereawarethatSORAZhadbeenaMSGmembersince2013northatSIPEXhadtakenaMSGseatinOctober2016,giventhattheyhadneverattendedaMSGmeeting.GovernmentrepresentativesdescribedtheMSG’sdiscussionsaboutexpandingMSGrepresentationtoincludemorerelevantentitiessuchastheTreasuryandCustomsdepartments,butnotedthatwhiletheMSGhaddecidedagainstincludingSONIDEPtheyhadincludedSOPAMINintheOctober2016refresh.AllCSOsconsultedconsideredthattheywereadequatelyrepresentedontheMSGbutrecognisedtheneedforarenewalofMSGmembers,albeitinanorganisedwayfreeofoutsideinterference.SeveralCSOandindustryrepresentativesconsideredthatonlyNiamey-basedorganisationswererepresentedontheMSGandthatthiswasnotrepresentativeoforganisationsoutsidethecapital.Bothgovernmentandindustryrepresentativesconsideredthattheyrepresentedtheirowninstitutionsratherthanabroaderconstituency,whilecertainCSOsnotedtheirresponsibilitytorepresentbroaderinterests.Forinstance,MSGmembersconfirmedthattherehadbeennooutreachtorelevantinstitutionssuchastheCourtofCountsorSOPAMINinpreparingthe2014EITIReport.Likewise,industryMSGmemberssaidtheyplayednoroleinfollowingupwithcompaniesrefusingtoparticipateinEITIreporting,consideringthatitwasthegovernment’sjobtodoso.TherewasalsoconsensusthattherepresentativesfrombothSOPAMINandtheCCIANwerepartofthegovernment




constituencyratherthanindustry.

TherewerealsodiverseviewsabouttheplanningofMSGmeetings.WhilegovernmentandindustryrepresentativesconsideredthattheywerealwaysinvitedtoMSGmeetings,withtheexceptionofentitiesnotbasedinNiameylikeSORAZ,roughlyhalfofCSOrepresentativesconsultedsaidthattheyweresometimesomittedfromtheinvitations.OneCSOrepresentativecomplainedthathehadneverbeeninvitedtoattendMSGmeetingssincetakingoverfromhispredecessorin2013,althoughasecretariatstaffexplainedthiswasonlyduetooccasionalchallengesintheaccuracyoftheMSGmailinglists.TherewasconsensusthatMSGmemberswerenotsystematicallyalertedofmeetingswithsufficientnoticeandthatcirculationofrelevantdocumentswasnotalwaysdoneaheadofmeetings.Secretariatstaffexplainedthattheywereconsciousofthesechallengesandwereworkingtoimproveadvancenoticeandcirculationofdocuments.

WhileMSGmembersagreedthatthemodeofdecision-makingwasnotdefinedinthedecreesformingtheMSG’sToR,theyconsideredtheproceduresasclearinpractice.Therewasconsensusthatquorumwasreachedinpracticewhenonerepresentativefromeachstakeholdergroupwaspresent.Therewasalsoconsensusthatanymemberhadtherighttotableatopicfordiscussion,eitheraheadofMSGmeetingsor,moreoften,onthedayofthemeeting.Representativesalsoagreedthatdecisionswerealmostalwaystakenbyconsensus.Intherareinstancesofvoting,decisionsweretakenbysimple(unqualified)majority.WhilemostMSGmembersconsideredthatdecisionswerealwaystakeninaninclusivemanner,twoCSOsconsideredthatcertainkeydecisionsweresometimestakenbyover-rulingobjectionsfromonestakeholdergroup.Forinstance,theyreferredtotheMSG’sapprovalofthedraft2014EITIReporton28October2016,whentheyrecalledthatoneCSOabstainedfromthevotewhiletheotherCSOrepresentativewasoutsideoftheroom.OtherMSGmembersrecalledthatotherCSOshadbeenpresentatthevoteandhadvotedfortheapproval.

SeveralMSGmembersfromallthreeconstituenciesexpressedconcernthatmeetingminutesdidnotsystematicallyreflectthecontentofdebatesanddecisionpoints.SeveralCSOsinparticularwerecriticalthatminutesdidnotreflectstrongdissentingvoices,particularlyfortheapprovalofkeydocumentssuchasthedraft2014EITIReportinOctober2016.SecretariatstaffexplainedthatminuteswerepreparedaccordingtoChathamHouserules.Representativesexplainedthatmeetingminutesweretypicallycirculatedwithinaweekofthemeetingwith48-72hoursforapprovalbynoobjection,althoughtheMSGalsoreviewedtheminutesatthestartofeverymeeting.AllMSGmembersconsideredthattheyhadtheopportunitytomakechangestodraftminutespriortoapproval.AllMSGmembersconsideredthattheperdiempolicywasapublicpolicysinceDecember2015,butaseniorgovernmentofficialnotedthattheissueofperdiemshadbeencontentioussince2006.Itwasunclearfromstakeholderconsultationswhentheperdiempolicybeganinpractice.

RepresentativesontheMSGconsideredthatthePermanentSecretariatplayedakeyrolebothinfacilitatingday-to-dayimplementationbutalsoasan“orchestraconductor”directingthedifferentstakeholdergroups.Aseniorgovernmentofficialnotedthatsecretariatstaffwereonlycontractors,notpermanentgovernmentemployees,andthattherewasaneedforcapacitybuildingforstaff.MSGmembersconsultedconsideredthatthesecretariat’sactiverolewaswarrantedgiventheMSG’ssignificantinvolvementinthetechnicalaspectsofEITIimplementation,notingthattheMSGwas




responsibleforcollectingandanalysingsome90%ofthecontentofanaverageEITIReport.

InitialassessmentTheInternationalSecretariat’sinitialassessmentisthatNigerhasmadeinadequateprogresstowardsmeetingthisrequirement.TheMSGmembershiphasbeenformedandincludesrelevantactorsfromeachconstituency,althoughstakeholdersagreedthattheMSG’sstructureshouldberevisedtoensurerelevantgovernmentandindustrystakeholdersareadequatelyrepresented.ThereishowevernoevidenceofconstituencyoutreachaheadofMSGmemberselectionandthenominationsprocesshasnotbeencodifiedforanyofthethreeconstituencies.TheMSGdoesnotappeartohaveagreeditsownToRandtheexistingToRapprovedin2008isnotinlinewiththeEITIStandardandfollowedinpractice.ThelackofrevisionofEITINiger’sinstitutionalstructureandgovernancesince2008isaconcern,notleastgiventhesignificantdeviationsinpracticeandthedecrees’lackofdetailonnominationsandinternalgovernance.Whiledecision-makingappearstobebasedonconsensusinmostinstances,stakeholdersagreethattherearenosafeguardsensuringtheinclusivenessofdecision-making.DiscussionsatMSGmeetingsappearpoorlydocumentedinmeetingminutes.WhilethereisevidenceofMSGinputtokeydecisionsrelatedtoEITIimplementation,suchastheToRfortheIA,EITIReportsandworkplans,thereisnoevidenceofconsultationswiththebroaderconstituenciesaboutthesedecisions.Inlightofthis,theInternationalSecretariatconcludesthatsignificantaspectsofthisrequirementhavenotbeenimplementedandtheunderliningobjectiveshavenotbeenachieved.

Togetherwiththegovernment,theMSGshouldrevisittheinstitutionalarrangementsforEITIimplementationinNigerandagreeitsToRtoensurethatallaspectsofRequirement1.4areaddressed.TheMSGshouldtaskeachstakeholdergrouptoclarifytheirinternalnominationsandrepresentationprocedurestoimprovethetransparencyandparticipationintheprocess.TheMSGshouldalsoagreeaprocesstoensuregreateraccountabilityofMSGrepresentativestotheconstituencies.ThisshouldincludeestablishingmechanismsofconsultationandreportingbetweenMSGrepresentativesandtheirwiderconstituencies.Finally,theMSGandgovernmentstakeholdersareencouragedtoconsiderstrengtheningthenationalsecretariatthroughfocusedandspecificcapacitybuildingand/orfurtherrecruitmentsasappropriate.

Workplan(#1.5)


Niger’sEITIworkplanninghasoperatedonathree-yearrollingbasisoverthepastdecadeofimplementation.TheMSGapprovedthree-yearworkplansfor2008-2010,2010-2012,2012-2014,2014-2016and2016-2018(HartNurseLtd,2010)(ITIENiger,2010)(ITIENiger,2010)(ITIENiger,2014)(ITIENiger,2016).

Publiclyaccessibleworkplan:Niger’sEITIworkplansareusuallyupdatedeverytwoyears,inthefourthquarterofthesecondyear,andarepublishedontheEITINigerwebsite.The2014-2016EITIworkplanwasapprovedbytheMSGatits17December2013meeting(ITIENiger,2013).The2016-2018workplanwasapprovedon31March2016,followingfourmeetingsoftheMSG’sworkplansub-committeeon17,18,19and23March2016anddiscussionsattheMSG’s9Februaryand16March2016meeting(ITIENiger,2016)(ITIENiger,2016)(ITIENiger,2016)(ITIENiger,2016).Theworkplanwaspublishedonthe




EITINigerwebsiteduringthethirdquarterof2016.TheMSG’sworkplansub-committee,establishedon16March2016,wascomposedofeightmembersfromthethreestakeholdergroups22(ITIENiger,2016)(ITIENiger,2016).Itappearsthatdevelopmentoftheworkplanstartedfollowingtheallocationofatotalbudgetforthethreeyearsofimplementation,withXOF550millionallocatedtothe2016-2018workplanattheMSG’s9February2016meeting(ITIENiger,2016).Section11(p.21)ofthe2016-2018workplanprovidesforannualupdatesofthethree-yearworkplan,butthereisnoevidencethatthe2016-2018workplanwasupdatedfollowingthefirstyearofitsimplementationin2016.AllsuccessiveEITIworkplanswerepublishedontheEITINigerwebsite,inthestate-ownedandprivatenationalpress,inselectCSOs’newslettersaswellasonbillboardsaccordingtotheworkplansthemselvesandsuccessiveannualactivityandprogressreports(ITIENiger,2014)(ITIENiger,2016)(ITIENiger,n.d.)(ITIENiger,2014)(ITIENiger,2015).

Objectivesforimplementation:Boththe2014-2016and2016-2018EITIworkplansincludesomeobjectivesalignedwithboththeEITIPrinciplesandnationalpriorities,althoughnotall.Threeofthesixobjectivesinthe2014-2016EITIworkplanwerelinkedtobroaderobjectivesofensuringthestatecollectswhatitisowed,identifyingconflictsofinterest,preventingconflictandimprovingthebusinessclimate.Thesethreebroaderobjectiveswererevisedinthe2016-2018EITIworkplantoincludeintegratingEITIintonationalsystems,supportresponsibledebateontheextractiveindustriesandidentifythebeneficialownershipofmining,oilandgascompaniesaswellastheirsubcontractors.Theotherobjectivesofthe2016-2018workplanaremorenarrowlyfocusedonEITIimplementation,includingtimelycompletionofvariousEITIReports,improvingthegovernanceofEITINigerandpreparingforValidation.ThereisevidenceofsomeoppositionontheMSGtotheinclusionoftheterm“responsible”inrelationtopublicdebateabouttheextractiveindustries,buttheminutesoftheMSG’s31March2016meetingreflecttheMSG’sover-rulingoftheseobjections(ITIENiger,2016).ItappearsfromanalysisofmeetingminutesthattheMSGhasconsistentlydiscussedtheEITIworkplaninthecontextofcompliancewithRequirement1.5oftheEITIStandard,ratherthaninresponsetospecificnationalconsultations(ITIENiger,2016).

WhileSection4(p.7)ofthe2016-2018workplanstatesthattheworkplanistheproductofconsultationswithrepresentativesofthemainstakeholdergroupsinvolvedinEITIimplementation,therearenowrittenrecordsofconsultationsonthelatestEITIworkplanwithstakeholdersbeyondMSGmembersthemselves.ThePermanentSecretaryinitiallydelayeddiscussionsofthe2016-2018workplanattheMSG’s17February2016meeting,notingthatthedocumentrequiredmoreclearly-definedpoliciesandcosts(ITIENiger,2016).TheMSGdiscussedthemethodologyfordevelopingthe2016-2018workplanatits31March2016meeting(ITIENiger,2016).Theworkplansub-committeereviewedeachobjectiveofthepreviousworkplan,delineatedactivitiesandcostedthem,beforedraftingtheworkplan’snarrativewithinputfromtheMinistriesofMinesandPetroleum.

ThereisalsoevidenceoftheMSGconsideringongoinggovernmentreforms,forinstanceatits9February2016meetingwhereitlistedreformsincludingcapacitybuildingfortheGovernmentofNiger’scontractnegotiations,taxauditsofminingandpetroleumcompanies,thedevelopmentofoversighttoolsincluding

22ThemembersoftheMSG’s2016workplansub-committeewereWadaMamanfromcivilsociety,MahamanBalarabeIbrahimoftheMinistryofFinance,BoubacarNaladooftheMinistryofEnergyandPetroleum,ToureMariamaGaladimaofArevaNCNiger,AlfaryZarraMamadouoftheMinistryofMinesandIndustrialDevelopment,OusmaneDjiboofcivilsociety,andOusmaneNajadaandDourahamaneIssaDjermakoyeoftheEITIPermanentSecretariat.




digitisedminingandpetroleumcadastresandthecreationofafundtosupportartisanalmining(ITIENiger,2016).

Measurableandtime-boundactivities:WhileSection9(pp.14-19)ofthe2016-2018workplanprovidesatableofobjectivesandactivitiesundereach,onlyaroundhalfoftheactivitiesappeartobemeasurableandtime-bound.Examplesofactivitiestoobroadtobetime-boundandmeasurableincludegeneralfollow-uponEITIrecommendations,advocacyforlegal,regulatoryandinstitutionalchanges,organisationofanunspecifiednumberofpublicdebatesandidentificationofweaknessesintheNigerEITIprocess.Thetimeframesassociatedwitheachactivityinthethree-yearworkplanareannualratherthanmonthlyorquarterly,withseveralactivitiesplannedtolastforthefullthreeyearscoveredbytheworkplan.However,Table12.2(pp.23-28)oftheworkplanprovidestheoutlineofactivitiesplannedfor2016,withthetimeframesdisaggregatedbyquarterandcostingsandsourcesoffundingclearlyindicatedforeachactivity.ThetimetableforactivitiesunderObjective1(p.23),relatedtoEITIreportingin2016,werealignedwiththeBoard-agreedEITIreportingdeadlines,butnotfortheValidationoriginallyscheduledtobeginon1July2016.

Activitiesaimedataddressinganycapacityconstraints:Activity4ofObjective3(p.25)ofthe2016-2018workplanincludesthedevelopmentandimplementationofacapacitybuildingstrategyforstakeholdersintheEITINigerprocess,althoughitdoesnotprovidedetailedplansforidentifyingandaddressingspecificcapacityconstraints.Activity4ofObjective5(p.27)ofthe2016-2018workplanincludescapacitybuildingfortheMSGandPermanentSecretariat,althoughitonlyrefersbacktoObjective3forthedetailoftheseactivities.

ActivitiesrelatedtothescopeofEITIreporting:ActivitiesunderObjective4inSection9(p.17)ofthe2016-2018workplanrelatetoextendingEITIreportingtobeneficialownershipinformation,althoughnoneoftheotheractivitiesoftheworkplanarelinkedtoexpandingthescopeofEITIreporting.Activity1undertheworkplan’sObjective1(p.23)consistsofproducingEITIReports,althoughtheworkplandoesnotincludespecificdetailslinkedtoaddressingtechnicalaspectsofreporting.

Activitiesaimedataddressinganylegalorregulatoryobstaclesidentified:Section6(pp.10-11)ofthe2016-2018workplandescribesconstraintsandrisksfortheworkplanrelatedtofunding,thelackofregularmeetings,politicalbacking,securityconstraintsonmovementsnationwideandslowadministrativeprocesses.TherewasalsoalengthydiscussionoftheserisksandconstraintsattheMSG’s31March2016meeting(ITIENiger,2016).However,theworkplandoesnotformulateanyplanforovercomingtheseconstraints.

Plansfollow-uponEITIrecommendations:Activity3underObjective2(p.24)ofthe2016-2018workplanincludesfollow-uponandimplementationofpastEITIrecommendations,althoughitdoesnotdisaggregateactivitiesforspecificrecommendations.

Costingsandfundingsources:Section7(p.11)ofthe2016-2018workplandescribesthecostofimplementationofeachofthesixobjectives,butdoesnotincludingcostingsforeachactivity,statingonlythat“most”activitieswouldbefinancedfromthenationalbudget.Table12.2(pp.23-28),Section9(pp.13-19)andAnnex2(pp.33-34)oftheworkplanprovidetheoutlineofactivitiesplannedfor2016,




withthecosts,fundingandtimeframesdisaggregatedbyquarterandforeachactivity.Annex1(pp.31-33)providesthemethodologyforcalculatingcostsforeachactivity.Section8(p.12)ofthe2016-2018workplannotesthatgovernmentfinancialsupportforEITIimplementationhasnotincreasedsignificantlyovertime,butthatthefundingfromtechnicalandfinancialpartnershasincreased“regularly”inrecentyears(ITIENiger,2016).However,thenamesofgeneric“technicalandfinancialpartners”arenotlistedforspecificactivitiesintheworkplanalongsidethenationalbudget.Section8(p.12)providesageneraloverviewofsourcesoffinancing–governmentandinternationalfinancialpartners–butitdoesnotprovideclearsourcesoffundingforeachactivityintheworkplan.The2016-2018workplanalsonotestheclosureoftheAfDB’sPAMOGEF,oneofthemainsourcesoffinancialsupport,on31December2016.AlthoughNigerEITIhadfinancingavailablefromtheAfDBforproductionofEITIReports,theGovernmentofNigerhasfundeditsowncostsofreportproductioninthepastfourreportingcyclesaswellasanewbuildingforofficespaceandvehicles.SupportfromtheAfDBfocusedoncapacitybuildingandITsystemsandofficeequipmentforthesecretariat(ITIENiger,2016).The2016-2018workplannotesthattheEITINigerPermanentSecretaryhadapproachedtheWorldBank,GiZ,theEuropeanUnion,theFrenchDevelopmentAgencyandmining,oilandgascompaniesforfundingofspecificactivities(ITIENiger,2016).TheMSGdecidedtoprepareanotetothePrimeMinisterproposingtoallocateashareofthegovernment’sextractiveindustryrevenuestoEITINigeratits16March2016meeting(ITIENiger,2016).However,thereisnoindicationthisnotewassent.ThecostofimplementationreachedFCFA555millionin2015,ofwhichFCFA285millioncamefromthenationalbudget,FCFA100millionfromtheAfDB’sPAMOGEF,FCFA150millionfromWorldBank’sMDTFandFCFA20millionfromtheFrenchEmbassy(ITIENiger,2016).

The2010Validationreportnotedseveralsimilarconcerns,includinginsufficientfundingforspecificworkplanactivities,amismatchbetweenquarterlyactivityplanningandannualbudgetingaswellastheabsenceofproceduresfortheregularupdatingofworkplans(HartNurseLtd,2010).

Stakeholderviews

TherewasconsensusamongstMSGmembersthattheyhadplayedanactiveroleindevelopingthe2016-2018EITIworkplan,althoughrepresentativesfromallthreegroupsnotedthattheyhadnotconsultedtheirbroaderconstituenciestocanvassopinionsonobjectivesandactivitiesplanned.Keystakeholdersincludingdevelopmentpartners,parliamentariansandgovernmententitiesliketheCourtofCountswerenotconsultedindraftingtheworkplanaccordingtorepresentativesconsulted.OnedevelopmentpartnernotedthecapacitybuildingactivitiesplannedforEITI-relatedentitiesintheirworkplan,buttheseactivitieswerenotreflectedintheEITIworkplan.

Inits2016pre-Validationself-assessment,theMSGconsideredithadonlymademeaningfulratherthansatisfactoryprogressinensuringithadanupdatedandpublicworkplan,thatEITIworkplanprioritieswerealignedwithnationalobjectives,thatitcontainedactivitiestoaddresscapacityconstraints,identifiedclearcostsandsourceoffundsaswellascleartimeframesforimplementation.Inconsultations,governmentrepresentativesidentifiedkeygovernmentreformstowhichEITIworkplanobjectivescouldhavebeenaligned,suchasrevisionstotheMiningCode.Industryrepresentativesstatedthattheydidnotconsiderittobepartoftheirmandatetomakesubstantialchangestothedraftworkplan.SeveralCSOsraisedconcernsoverthelackofimplementationofcertainworkplanactivitiesin2016duetofundingconstraints.




Initialassessment

TheInternationalSecretariat’sinitialassessmentisthatNigerhasmademeaningfulprogresstowardsmeetingthisrequirement.Publiclyaccessibleandupdatedinatimelymanner,Niger’sthree-yearEITIworkplanincludesroughlyhalfofitsobjectivesalignedwiththeEITIPrinciplesandnationalpriorities,measurableandtime-boundactivities,activitiesaimedataddressingcapacityconstraintsandsomeactivitiesrelatedtothescopeofEITIreporting.However,theworkplandoesnotincludeactivitiesaimedataddressinganylegalorregulatoryobstaclesidentifiednordetailedplansforimplementingrecommendationsfromEITIreportingandValidation,whileseveralactivitiesappeartonotbeclearlytime-boundormeasurable.Meanwhilethesourcesoffundingforactivitiesintheworkplanremaingeneral,withoutaclearidentificationofthetechnicalandfinancialpartnersexpectedtoco-fundEITIimplementation.ThereisalsolittleevidenceofconsultationofstakeholdersbeyondthosedirectlyrepresentedontheMSGduringthepreparationofthe2016-2018workplan.

Asamatterofpriority,theMSGshouldagreeaworkplanthatislinkedtonationalprioritiesandthatistheproductofwideconsultationwithstakeholders.TheMSGisencouragedtoconsiderhowmoremeaningfuldiscussionsthroughtheEITI,linkingtonationaldiscussionsandpriorities,couldencouragemoreactiveparticipationbyallstakeholdergroups.TheMSGshouldalsoensurethatitsworkplanisupdatedonanannualbasisandincludesarealisticsetofactivitieslinkedtoEITIreporting,disseminationandoutreach,addressingcapacityconstraintsanddetailedfollowuponspecificEITIrecommendations.

Table1–Summaryinitialassessmenttable:MSGoversight

EITIprovisions Summaryofmainfindings

InternationalSecretariat’sinitialassessmentofprogresswiththeEITIprovisions(tobecompletedfor‘required’provisions)

GovernmentoversightoftheEITIprocess(#1.1)

Thereareregular,publicstatementsofsupportfromthegovernment,aseniorindividualhasbeenappointedtoleadontheimplementationoftheEITIandseniorgovernmentofficialsarerepresentedontheMSG.ThereisevidenceofgovernmentparticipationinEITIreporting,disseminationandoutreach.ThegovernmenthascoveredcorefundingforEITIimplementationdespitebudgetconstraints.

Satisfactoryprogress

Companyengagement(#1.2)

ThereisanenablinglegalenvironmentforEITIreportingandtheredonotappeartobelegalbarrierstocompanydisclosure.Producingcompaniesintheminingsectorareactivelyandeffectivelyengagedinthe

Meaningfulprogress




EITIprocess.Thereisnoevidenceofeveninformalconsultationswithoilandgasandexplorationcompanies.

Civilsocietyengagement(#1.3)

ThereisadynamiccivilsocietyworkingonextractivesissuesinNiger.TherearenolegalorregulatorybarrierstocivilsocietyparticipationintheEITIprocessinNigerastheConstitutionguaranteefreedomofexpressionandassociation.WhilenotdirectlyrelatedtoEITI,anumberoftemporarydetentionsofMSGmembershavetakenplacesinceNiger’slastValidation.MeanwhileadministrativedelaysinregistrationofNGOsanddevelopmentassociationshinderstheircapacitytoraiseforeignfunds.ThelackoflegalclarityontheregistrationprocessforNGOsanddevelopmentassociationscreatesscopefordisenfranchisingCSOsthatoperatewithoutformalgovernmentrecognition.


MSGgovernanceandfunctioning(#1.4)

TheMSGmembershiphasbeenformedandincludesrelevantactorsfromeachconstituency,althoughstakeholdersagreedthattheMSG’sstructureshouldberevisedtoensurerelevantgovernmentandindustrystakeholdersareadequatelyrepresented.ThereishowevernoevidenceofconstituencyoutreachaheadofMSGmemberselectionandthenominationsprocesshasnotbeencodifiedforanyofthethreeconstituencies.TheMSGdoesnotappeartohaveagreeditsownToRandthelackofrevisionofEITINiger’sinstitutionalstructureandgovernancesince2008isaconcern,notleastgiventhesignificantdeviationsinpracticeandthedecrees’lackofdetailonnominationsandinternalgovernance.Whiledecision-makingappearstobebasedonconsensusinmostinstances,stakeholdersagreethattherearenosafeguardsensuringtheinclusivenessofdecision-making.DiscussionsatMSGmeetingsappearpoorlydocumentedinmeetingminutes.WhilethereisevidenceofMSGinputtokeydecisionsrelatedtoEITIimplementation,

Inadequateprogress




suchastheToRfortheIA,EITIReportsandworkplans,thereisnoevidenceofconsultationswiththebroaderconstituenciesaboutthesedecisions.

Workplan(#1.5)

Publiclyaccessibleandupdatedinatimelymanner,Niger’sthree-yearEITIworkplanincludessomeobjectivesalignedwiththeEITIPrinciplesandnationalpriorities,measurableandtime-boundactivities,activitiesaimedataddressingcapacityconstraintsandsomeactivitiesrelatedtothescopeofEITIreporting.Yetitdoesnotincludeactivitiesaimedataddressinganylegalorregulatoryobstacles,detailedplansforimplementingrecommendationsfromEITIreportingandValidation,whileseveralactivitiesappeartonotbeclearlytime-boundormeasurable.MeanwhilethesourcesoffundingforactivitiesintheworkplanremaingeneralandthereislittleevidenceofstakeholderconsultationsinpreparingtheworkplanbeyondthosedirectlyrepresentedontheMSG.

Meaningfulprogress

Secretariat’srecommendations:

1. Togetherwiththegovernment,theMSGisstronglyencouragedtorevisittheinstitutionalarrangementsforEITIimplementationinNigerandagreeitsToRtoensurethatallaspectsofRequirement1.4areaddressed.TheMSGshouldtaskeachstakeholdergrouptoclarifytheirinternalnominationsandrepresentationprocedurestoimprovethetransparencyandparticipationintheprocess.TheMSGshouldalsoagreeaprocesstoensuregreateraccountabilityofMSGrepresentativestotheconstituencies.ThisshouldincludeestablishingmechanismsofconsultationandreportingbetweenMSGrepresentativesandtheirwiderconstituencies.Finally,theMSGandgovernmentstakeholdersareencouragedtoconsiderstrengtheningthenationalsecretariatthroughfocusedandspecificcapacitybuildingand/orfurtherrecruitmentsasappropriate.

2. TheGovernmentofNigershouldconsidereitherreviewingthelegalframeworkforregistrationofNGOsanddevelopmentassociationsorestablishingaone-stopforCSOregistration.

3. Asamatterofpriority,theMSGshouldagreeaworkplanthatislinkedtonationalprioritiesandthatistheproductofwideconsultationwithstakeholders.TheMSGinencouragedtoconsiderhowmoremeaningfuldiscussionsthroughtheEITI,linkingtonationaldiscussionsandpriorities,couldencouragemoreactiveparticipationbyallstakeholdergroups.TheMSGshouldalsoensurethatitsworkplanisupdatedonanannualbasisandincludesarealisticsetofactivitieslinkedtoEITIreporting,disseminationandoutreach,addressingcapacity




constraintsanddetailedfollowuponspecificEITIrecommendations.4. Extractivescompaniesshouldagreemechanismsforcommunicationandcoordinationwith

theentireconstituency,includingoilandgasaswellasminingexplorationcompanies.IndustryMSGmembersshouldalsoensurethattheirengagementinscoping,disseminationandoutreachisonparwiththeirinvolvementindatacollectionforEITIreporting.

5. TheGovernmentofNigermaywishtoconsiderrevisitingthelegalframeworkestablishingtheEITIinNigertoensurecurrenthigh-levelgovernmentsupportforandengagementinEITIiscodified.Thegovernmentshouldalsoensurethatitsparticipationindisseminationandoutreacheventsisconsistentwiththatofotherstakeholdergroups.


PartII–EITIDisclosures



2. Awardofcontractsandlicenses

2.1Overview

ThissectionprovidesdetailsontheimplementationoftheEITIrequirementsrelatedtothelegalframeworkfortheextractivesector,licensingactivities,contracts,beneficialownershipandstateparticipation.

2.2Assessment

Legalframework(#2.1)

DocumentationofprogressLegalframework:Inthe2014ReporttheMSGprovidesalistoflawsandregulationsapplicabletotheextractiveindustries(pp.12-13).Thislistincludesthemainlaws(Constitution,MiningCode,PetroleumCode,GeneralTaxCode)andsupranationalcommonpoliciesapplicabletotheminingandhydrocarbonsector(OHADA,UEMOAandECOWAS).TheReportalsoprovidesalistandadescriptionofall35materialrevenueflowsinAnnex4(pp.69-72).TheReportdidnotspecificallydescribetheleveloffiscaldevolution,butitshowsrevenueflowscollectedbythecentralgovernmentthatshouldbetransferredtolocalcommunities.

The2014Reportalsoincludeslinktothefollowingdocuments(pp.12-13):2010Constitution23,Niger’staxcode24.Relevantdocumentsfoundonlineinclude:updatedminingcode25,petroleumcode26,andinvestmentcode27.

Governmentagencies’roles:TheMSGdidnotdescribetheroleandresponsibilitiesoftherelevantgovernmentagenciesthathavethemandatetomanagetheextractivesector.Thetaxoffice(DGI)andthetreasury(DGTCP)arethemainbodiesresponsibleforcollectingandmanagingtaxespaidtothecentralgovernment,whiletheMinistryofEnergyandPetroleumandMinistryofMinesandIndustrialDevelopmentareresponsibleforsector-specificlevies.

Fiscalregime:Whilethe2014Reportincludealistofapplicablelawsandgovernmentregulations(pp.12-13),itdoesnotprovideanoverviewoftheselaws.Thefiscalregimeapplicabletotheextractiveindustrieswasnotdescribedinthereport.Forexample,provisionsonstabilityclausesfoundintheminingcodeandtaxexemptionslistedinthecustomcodewerenotdescribedinthereport.Thethreemaintaxesandfeesimposedonextractiveindustrycompaniesarecapitalgainstax,profittaxandroyalties.Contractsandconventionsbetweenthegovernmentandoil,gasandminingcompaniesincludeimportantfiscal

232010Constitutionhttp://www.assemblee.ne/index.php/les-textes/la-constitution-de-la-7eme-republique24http://www.impots.gouv.ne/media/telech/CGI%202013%20Version%20MAJ1.pdf25Updatedminingcodehttp://www.howwemadeitinafrica.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/05/Niger_-Mining-Code.pdf26Petroleumcodehttp://faolex.fao.org/docs/pdf/ner65165.pdf27Investmentcodehttp://www.droit-afrique.com/upload/doc/niger/Niger-Code-2014-investissements.pdf




provisionsapplicabletoeachcompany,whichwerenotclearlyexplainedinthereport.

Degreeoffiscaldevolution:Accordingtotheminingcode,municipalgovernmentareresponsibleforlevyingextractiontax,butthereportdidnotspecifywhetherthiswasdoneinpractice.TheReportnotesthatsubnationaltransfersexist,butitdoesnotdescribetherulesandproceduresgoverningsuchtransfers.

Reforms:The2014Reportprovidesabriefoverviewofongoingreforms(p.13),includingreformoftheMiningCodeandthePetroleumCode,andtheenactmentofanewCustomsCodeon17August2016.However,thedetailsofreformproposalsarenotdescribedandthereportonlymakesgeneralstatementssuchas“expandingbeneficiariesofminingandpetroleumrevenuestotheproducingregions”.

Recommendations:TheReportincludesnewrecommendationsandfollow-uponpreviousrecommendations.MostrecommendationsrelatetotheprocessoftheEITIreporting.Revenuetraceabilityremainsamajorconcernasgovernmentagenciesdidnotsystematicallyusecompanies’uniqueidentifierwhenrecordingtaxrevenues.ImportantrecommendationsofreformsmadebytheCourtdesComptesaspartofpreviousEITIreportingwerenotincludedinthereport.

Stakeholderviews

StakeholdersstatedthattheapplicablelawsandregulationsrelatedtotheextractiveindustriesinNigerareclearandavailableonline.Therewasageneralagreementamongstakeholdersconsulted,however,thatkeyprovisionsintheselawswerenotclearlydescribedintheEITIReport,intheoryandinpractice.Civilsocietyrepresentativesexpressedfrustrationsforthelackofdetailsinthereport,especiallyontherulesgoverningtaxexemptionsandsubnationaltransferstolocalcommunities.AnindustryrepresentativeraisedconcernsthatadetaileddescriptionofthefiscalregimewouldmakeEITIReport“extremelylong”anddifficulttoread.Governmentrepresentativesagreedthatfuturereportsshouldincludeasummaryofthefiscalregimeinpractice.

InitialassessmentTheInternationalSecretariat’sinitialassessmentisthatNigerhasmadeinadequateprogressinmeetingthisrequirement.TheEITIReportdidnotprovideasummaryofthefiscalregimeapplicabletotheoil,gasandminingsector,includingtheleveloffiscaldevolution.Whilethereportprovidesalistofapplicablelaws,itdoesnotdescribewhichprovisionsoftheminingcodeandpetroleumcodearerelevanttothefiscalregime.Fiscalprovisionsincludedincontractsandconventionsarenotdescribedinthereport.Thereportdidnotexplaintheroleandresponsibilitiesoftherelevantgovernmentagenciesthathavethemandatetomanagetheextractivesector.TheInternationalSecretariatthereforeconcludesthatsignificantaspectsofthisrequirementhavenotbeenimplementedandtheunderliningobjectiveofbringingtransparencytothelegal,regulatoryframeworkhasnotbeenachieved.

InaccordancewithEITIRequirement2.1,itisarequirementthattheMSGdiscloseadescriptionofthelegalframeworkandfiscalregimegoverningtheextractiveindustries.Thisinformationmustincludeasummarydescriptionofthefiscalregime,includingtheleveloffiscaldevolution,anoverviewoftherelevantlawsandregulations,andinformationontherolesandresponsibilitiesoftherelevantgovernmentagencies,includingDGI,DGTCP,MMIDandMPE.ItisrecommendedthattheMSGconsider




adescriptionofthefiscalregimeinpracticeandexplainanydeviationfromthelegalandregulatoryframeworkasitrelatestorevenuesearmarkedforlocalcommunities.

Licenseallocations(#2.2)

DocumentationofprogressAwards/transfers:Fortheminingsector,the2014Reportstatesthatsevenexplorationmininglicenses(nolicensenumbersprovided)wereawardedin2014toasinglecompany(TAURIANRESSOURCESPVT/LTD)forthreeyears(p.14).Itisstatedthattherenewaloftheselicenseswasdoneinlinewithstatutoryprocedures(underArticles12-21ofDecreen°2006-265/PRN/MMEof18August2006)albeitwithadministrativedelays.TheEITIReportdescribesingeneraltermstherolesoftheauthorityinchargeofawardinglicenses.AccordingtotheEITIReport,theDirectorofMinesisresponsibleforawardingexplorationlicenses,andtheMinisterofMinesisresponsibleforawardingproductionlicensesbyMinisterialdecision(ArreteMinisteriel),basedontheassessmentofapplicationsbytheDirectorofMines.Thecriteriaforassessingtechnicalcapacitiesofapplicantsarenotlistedinthereport.TheReportmakesageneralstatementthatlicensesaregrantedinlinewiththedispositionsoftheMiningCodeandwithsufficienttechnicalandfinancialcriteria.Nofurtherdetailsweregivenonthetechnicalandfinancialcriteria.TheMinisterofMinesalsoawardssmall-scaleproductionlicenses,basedonassessmentmadebytheDirectorofMines.TheCouncilofMinistersawardslarge-scaleproductionlicensesbyPresidentialDecreebasedonproposalsmadebytheMinisterofMines.Thedetailedstatutoryprocessforawardinglicensesisnotdescribedinthereport(onlythefinalissuingauthority),norarethetechnicalandfinancialcriteriaassessedinawardinglicenses.TheReportdidnotdescribethestatutoryprocessfortransferringmininglicenses.TheReportprovidesageneraloverviewofdocumentsrequiredfromapplicantsformininglicensesforbothphysicalandlegalpersons(p.62).Fortheoilandgassector,theReportstates(p.14)thatalicensewasawardedtoSAVANNAHforthreeyearsinlinewithstatutoryprocedures.ItwasunclearfromthereporthowtheMSGascertainedthatalllicenseswereawardedinlinewithstatutoryproceduresastheMSG’smethodologyinreachingthisconclusionisnotdescribedinthereport.TheReportdescribes(p.14)thelicenseapplicationprocessintheoilandgassectorinmoredetail,includingthefollowingsteps:

• submissionofanapplicationtotheMinisterofHydrocarbonsinlinewithArticles102,103and122oftheimplementingdecreeforthePetroleumCode.

• Iftheapplicationisjudgedasreceivable,theMinisterofHydrocarbonsmustnotifytheapplicantwithin15daysofreceiptofapplication.

• Directnegotiationbetweenthetwoparties.• AwardofthelicensebydecreefollowingapprovalintheCouncilofMinisters.• SigningofthecontractbyMinisterofHydrocarbonswithinthreemonthsofnotificationofthe

deceivabilityoftheapplication.

ThestatutoryprocessfortransferringlicensesisnotdescribedanditisunclearfromtheReportwhetheroilandgaslicensesweretransferredin2014.TheReportprovidesageneraloverviewofdocumentsrequiredfromapplicantsforoilandgaslicensesforbothphysicalandlegalpersons(p.63).




d)TheEITIReportdoesnotincludeanyadditionalcommentaryontheefficiencyofthelicenseallocationprocess.Technicalandfinancialcriteria:TheReportdidnotdisclosetechnicalandfinancialcriteriausedtoevaluateapplicationssubmittedin2014.Regardingtheevaluationoffinancialcapacitiesofapplicants,theReportstatesthatasystemofbankguaranteeshasbeeninstitutedtohelpevaluatethefinancialcapacityoftheapplicant(p.14).Nofurtherdetailsweregivenontechnicalandfinancialcriteriausedinassessingapplications.AlthoughtheReportreferstoarticle101to108inthepetroleumcodefortheexplorationpermitissuedtoSAVANNAH,itdoesnotinformthereaderonthecontentoftheseprovisions.

Licenseawardeeinformation:TheReportdidnotdisclosenamesofapplicants,butitincludesnamesof48licenceholdersaslistedincadastre(Annex1,pp.48-52).

Non-trivialdeviations:TheReportstatesthatalllicenses(unclearwhetherthisreferstobothminingandoilandgasoronlytooilandgas)awardedpriorto2014wereawardedinlinewithstatutoryprocedures(p.14).TheReportmentioned“administrativedelays”intheprocessofissuinglicense.Areviewofthecadastrerecordsshowsthatapplicationscantakeupto15months,whichisfivetimeslongerthanthestatutorythree-monthperiodforissuingalicense.Theminingcodealsostatesthatthemaximumareaofalicenceiscappedat500squarekilometres,butthecadastreshowslicensesthatareover1800squarekilometres.TheReportdidnotflagthesedeviations.GovernmentofficialsnotedthattheMinistersofMinesandtheMinisterofPetroleumhavefulldiscretionontheprocessofissuinglicenses.

Comprehensiveness:The2014Reportdidnotincludefulldisclosureofalllicensesissuedinthefiscalperiodcoveredbythereport.

Biddingprocess:The2014EITIReportstatedthatnolicensewasissuedthroughcompetitivebiddingin2014(p.14).ItalsoclarifiedfurtherthatonlytheAgademlicense(petroleumbloc)wasawardedthroughcompetitivebiddingin2008.Thereportdidnotprovidefurtherdetailsonthebiddingprocess.

Commentaryonefficiency:TheEITIReportdidnotcommentonefficiencyofthelicenseallocationsystem.

Stakeholderviews

DuringthestakeholderconsultationforValidation,theInternationalSecretariatfoundlicensesissuedtothestate-owned-companySOPAMINthatwerenotdisclosedinthereport.Forexample,thereportdidnotmentionminingpermitsEMILULU58andTAFASSASSET4thatwerebothissuedtoSOPAMINinDecember2014.

GovernmentrepresentativesconfirmedthattheEITIReport’slistofmininglicensesawardedin2014wasnotcomprehensive.RepresentativesfromSOPAMINnotedthattheSOEhadreceivedseveralnewgoldmininglicensesinDecember2014.Governmentrepresentativesexplainedthatifthecadastredepartmentreceivesonlyoneapplicationforalicense,thenitisassessedonafirstcomefirstservedbasis.Ifthereareseveralapplicationsforthesamelicensewithinthethree-monthassessmentperiod,thenthedepartmentevaluatesthefinancialcapacitiesofallapplicants.Allstakeholdersconsulted




acknowledgedthelackofdetaileddescriptionofthelicenseallocationprocessintheEITIReport,butnotedthatthiswasduetotheshorttimeperiodforthepreparationofthereportandalackofclearunderstandingoftheEITIRequirement.AcompanyrepresentativenotedthateventhoughallstepsintheawardoflicenseswerenotclearlystatedintheEITIReport,MSGmembershadaccesstothisinformationuponrequestintherelevantgovernmentagencies.Governmentrepresentativesalsonotedthatlackoffulldisclosureofmininglicenseswasnotmotivatedbyintentionstomisleadthepublic,butratherduetotheMSG’sownlackofunderstandingofthelicensingprocess.However,severalCSOsraisedconcernsoverthetransparencyofthelicenseallocationprocessinboththeminingandpetroleumsectors,consideringthattherewasscopefordiscretion.

Initialassessment

TheInternationalSecretariat’sinitialassessmentisthatNigerhasmadeinadequateprogresstowardsmeetingthisrequirement.InformationontheprocessforawardingortransferringlicensessetoutinRequirement2.2.ahasnotbeencomprehensivelydisclosedforthefiscalperiodcoveredbyNiger’sEITIReports.The2014EITIReportlistedsomebutnotallextractiveslicensesallocatedin2014.TheReportdidnotrefertoanylicensetransfers,andomittedadescriptionofthetechnicalandfinancialcriteriausedinassessingapplicationsforlicenseallocationsandtransfers.TheReportdidnothighlightanysignificantdeviationsinpracticeforlicensesawardedortransferredin2014.InaccordancewithEITIRequirement2.2.a,theMSGisrequiredtodisclosethefollowinginformationrelatedtotheawardortransferoflicensespertainingtothecompaniescoveredintheReportduringthefinancialyearcovered:

• adescriptionoftheprocessfortransferringorawardingthelicense;• thetechnicalandfinancialcriteriaused;• informationabouttherecipient(s)ofthelicensethathasbeentransferredorawarded,including

consortiummemberswhereapplicable;and• anynon-trivialdeviationsfromtheapplicablelegalandregulatoryframeworkgoverninglicense

transfersandawards.

Inaddressingthisrequirement,theMSGisencouragedtofollowthestep-by-stepapproachoutlinedinEITIGuidanceNoteN°428.TheMSGisencouragedtocommentontheefficiencyandeffectivenessoflicensingallocationsystem.

Licenseregisters(#2.3)

DocumentationofprogressLicencesheldbymaterialcompanies:The2014EITIReportprovidesadescriptionoflicensesawardedorrenewedin2014(p.14)andadetailedlistof72activepermitsintheminingsectorin2014and18blocksinthepetroleumsectorinannex1ofthereport(pp.47-53).The2014EITIReportrefersvaguelytoacancelationofpermitsinaccordancewithapplicablelaws,butdoesnotprovideanyspecificinformation

28GuidanceNote4,LicenseAllocation,EITIInternationalSecretariat,June2016,https://eiti.org/document/guidance-note-on-license-allocations.




ofhowmanypermitswerecancelledandforwhatreason.License-holdernames:The2014Reportprovidesdetailedinformationonactivelicensesintheminingsector(pp.48-52)including:nameoflicenseholders,datesofapplication,datesofaward,validityperiodandthecommodityunderexplorationorexploitation.Informationonthe18petroleumblocsisnotasdetailed,butincludethenameofthelicenseholderandtheyearinwhichthelicencewasgranted.Itdidnotincludethedateofapplication,northeexpirydate(p.53).

Licensecoordinates:The2014Reportdoesnotincludecoordinateoflicensesawardedinthefiscalperiodcovered.Alow-definitionmapoftheminingcadastreisprovided,althoughitisnotpossibletodistinguishindividualblocksandlicenseareasonthemap.Duringthefact-findingmissions,governmentofficialsexplainedthecolourcodesonthemap.Thecolourredonthemapmeansthattheareaisunderavalidlicenseforexplorationorproduction,andthecolourgreensmeansthattheareaisnotoccupied,i.e.itisopenforlicensing.Whenanapplicationforalicenceinaparticulararea,issubmittedtotheminingcadastre,thezoneiscolouredblueuntilalicenceisissuedandthecolouronthemapchangestoread,ordenied,inwhichcasethecolourcodechangestogreen.ThisexplanationwasnotprovidedintheEITIReport.Itisunclearhowoftenthismapisupdatedandwhetheritispubliclyaccessible.

Dates:TheReportincludesinformationaboutapplicationdate,yearinwhichtheapplicationwasgranted,thevalidityperiod,andexpirationdateofeachlicense(pp.48-52).Thisinformationwasnotprovidedforthe18permitsinthepetroleumsectorthatwerevalidinDecember2014(p.53).

Commodity:TheReportincludesinformationaboutthesubstancebutdoesnotdistinguishbetweenexplorationandexploitationlicenses(pp.48-53).

Licensesheldbynon-materialcompanies:TheMSGdidnotsetamaterialitythreshold,whichledtotheconclusionthatalllicenseholdersareliabletomakematerialpayments.TheEITIReportstatesthatannex1includesallactivelicenses,butthiswasclearlynotthecaseasexplainedunderRequirement2.2above,licensesissuedtoSOPAMINwerenotincludedintheminingcadastre.

Publiccadastre/register:TheEITIReportdidnotincludealinktopublicregister.TheReportstates(p.18)thattheMinistryofMineshasjustestablishedaMiningCadastreDepartmentandisimplementingreformssupportedbytheWorldBankthroughitsProjetd’AppuiàlaCompetitivitéetàlacroissance(PRAAC).

Stakeholderviews

Stakeholdersfromallthreeconstituenciesexplainedthatthelackofanupdatedminingcadastrehashinderedtheirabilitytobringtransparencytothemanagementofmininglicenses.GovernmentrepresentativesnotedthatthelistofactivelicensesinthereportwasnotcompleteandpointedouttoexamplesoflicensesheldbySOPAMINthatwerenotincludedinthereport.MSGmembersalsonotedthatcompaniesarerequiredtonotifythegovernmentcasesofabandonmentofalicense,butthiswasnotfollowedinpractice.Therehadbeencases,wherealicenseholderwouldstopexplorationactivitiesandabandonthelicensewithoutnotifyingthegovernment.Thus,thereliabilityofthelistofactive




permitsprovidedbytheminingcadastrewasindoubt.Stakeholdersfromallconstituenciesagreedthatmoreworkwasneededtoaddressthisissue,andexpressedhopethatthecurrentongoingreformssupportedbytheWorldBankwouldhelpmodernisetheminingcadastre.

Initialassessment

TheInternationalSecretariat’sinitialassessmentisthatNigerhasmadeinadequateprogresstowardsmeetingthisrequirement.The2014EITIReportprovidedthenamesofmostlicense-holdersinthemining,oilandgassector,althoughthelistofmininglicensesdoesnotappeartocoveralllicensesheldbymaterialcompanies.WhiletheEITIReportprovidedsomeinformationmandatedunderRequirement2.3.b,therearesignificantgapsincludingmissingdatesofapplicationandcoordinatesformininglicensesaswellasdatesofapplicationandexpiry,commoditycoveredandcoordinatesofalloilandgaslicenses.AlthoughtheinformationsetoutinEITIRequirements2.3.a-bhasnotbeenfullydisclosedforallactivelicenses,especiallyinthepetroleumsector,significantprogresshasbeenmadetobringtransparencyintheexistingminingcadastreandeffortsareunderwaytohelpmodernisethecadastresystem.Itisarequirementthatimplementingcountriesmaintainapubliclyavailableregisterorcadastresystem(s).Inaddressingthisrequirement,theMSGisencouragedtofollowthestep-by-stepapproachoutlinedinEITIGuidanceNoteN°329,issuedbytheEITIInternationalSecretariat.

Contractdisclosures(#2.4)


Governmentpolicy:The2014EITIReport(p.15)statesthatarticle150oftheConstitutionrequiresthepublicationofallcontractsconcerningproductionandexplorationofnaturalresource,aswellastherevenuespaidtotheState,intheGovernment’sofficialjournal,

Actualpractice:TheReport(p.15)notesthattheMinisterofMineshasalsoinstructedgovernmentagenciestopublishallcontractsintheOfficialgovernmentjournal,butitisunclearfromtheReportwhetherthisdecisionhasbeenimplementedinpractice.TheReportdoesnotprovideanoverviewofcontractsthatarepubliclyavailable,norinformationonhowthesecanbeaccessedbeyondreferencetotheOfficialGovernmentJournal,whichisnotavailableonline.

Accessibility:The2014EITIReportdidnotprovideanyguidanceonhowtoaccessanypublishedcontracts,beyondgeneralreferencetothepublicationofcontractsintheofficialgazette(p.15).

Stakeholderviews

Civilsocietyrepresentativesreferredtocontracttransparencyadoptedintheconstitutionin2010asamajorachievement.Allstakeholdersconsultedwereawareoftheobligationtopublishcontracts,butlittleattentionhadbeengiventotheactualpractice.Commentsonaccessibilitytocontractsvariedbyconstituency.Governmentofficialsandcompanies’representativesstatedthattheyknewhowtoaccesscontracts,iftheyneededto.Civilsocietyrepresentativesexplainedthataccesstocontractswasnotas

29GuidanceNote3,LicenseRegister,EITIInternationalSecretariat,June2016,https://eiti.org/document/guidance-note-on-license-registers.




straightforward.Iftheywereawareofacontractbeingsignedbetweenthegovernmentandacompany,theyneededtotrackdowntherelevantofficial(JournalOfficiel),inwhichthecontractwaspublished,keepinginmindthattherearedelaysbetweenthesigningofacontractanditspublicationintheofficialjournal.AseniorgovernmentofficialexplainedthatwhiletheConstitutionrequiredpublicationofextractivescontracts,itdidnotspecifythetimeframeforpublication,whichexplainedwhycontractswerepublishedaccordingtopriorityanddependingonspaceconstraintsintheofficialgazette.

Stakeholdersnotedthattheofficialjournalhadexperiencedabacklogonthepublicationofcontracts.Itremainsunclearhowmanycontractshaveactuallybeenpublished.ThemajorityofMSGmembersdidnothavesubscriptionstotheofficialjournalandaccesstocontractsalreadypublishedremainedlimitedtoasmallgroup.

Initialassessment

TheInternationalSecretariat’sinitialassessmentisthatNigerhasmadeinadequateprogresstowardsmeetingthisrequirement.Ascontracttransparencyismandatedbytheconstitution,thegovernmentpolicyisclearlytopublishallcontracts.However,thisisnotalwaysthecaseinpracticeandaccessibilitytocontractsremainslimited.TheEITIReportdidnotdocumenttheimplementationofthegovernmentpolicyinpractice.TheInternationalSecretariatconcludesthatsignificantaspectofthisrequirementhavenotbeenimplemented.

Beneficialownershipdisclosure(#2.5)

DocumentationofprogressGovernmentpolicy:EITINigerparticipatedinthepilotprojectforthedisclosureofbeneficialownershipin2014and2015.Throughthiseffort,theMSGestablishedaworkinggrouponbeneficialownershipin2014,whichhasproducedanoverviewofexistinglegalandregulatoryframeworksofcommercialactivityinNiger.The2014Report(Annex2,pp.54-66)describestheMSG’sreviewofthelegalownershipanddisclosuremechanismsinNiger.TheReportstates(p.64)thatdisclosureofthebeneficialownersofacompanyisrequiredtoincorporateacommercialcompanyinNiger.Thisincludeseithercivilidentificationforforeignersorcopyofbirthcertificatefornationals.Howeverthereappearstobesomeconfusionbetweenlegal(shareholding)andtheactualbeneficialownership.TheReportstatesthatminingandpetroleumcadastreswillsoonbeonline,whichwillpartlyaddressestablishingapublicbeneficialownershipregister,butitdoesnotspecifywhichinformationwillbepublishedinthisonlineregister.TheReportalsostatesthatbeneficialownershipofArevaandCNPCisknownthroughpubliclistingandgovernmentownershipandthatthesetwocompaniesaccountfor98%ofEIrevenues(disclosedfiguresinthe2014Reportdonotsupportthisstatement).TheReportmentionedthatthe2006MiningCode(Articles2,10,11and123)andthe2007PetroleumCode(Articles4to15)referstothesupranationaldirectives,UEMOACommercialCode,whichrequiresthedisclosureofthe“identity”ofcompanies.Finally,theMSGadmitsthatthepilotprojectonbeneficialownershiphasnotbeencomprehensivenortechnicallyprofessional.




Actualpractice:Eightcompaniesdisclosedlegalownershipalongsidethelevelofownershipofitspartnersforeachoftheeightcompanies(pp.67-68).Thisappearstoconflatelegalandbeneficialownership.

Legalownersofmaterialcompanies:TheMSGdidnotsetamaterialitythreshold,whichledtotheconclusionthatalllicenseholdersareliabletomakematerialpayments.Legalownershipofallmaterialcompaniesisnotdisclosedinthereport.

StakeholderviewsGovernmentagencies,andparliamentariansappearedmoreconcernedbytheissuesofbeneficialownershipthanMSGmembers,whohavebeenmainlyfocusedonEITIreportingrequirements.SeveralMSGmembersfromgovernmentandindustryhighlightedthechallengesofdisclosingallcompanies’beneficialownershipandemphasisedtheneedtoadoptagradualapproach.MSGmembersfromallconstituencieshighlightedtheactivitiesinthe2016-2018EITIworkplanrelatedtobeneficialownership,aswellasNiger’sthree-yearroadmap.PoliceofficersattheCelluleNationaledeTraitementdesInformationsFinancières(CENTIF),whichfightsagainstmoneylaunderingexpressedinterestinlearningmoreabouttheEITIrequirementonBeneficialownership.High-levelgovernmentofficialstaskedwithaspecialmandatetofightagainstcorruption(HALCIA)alsoexpressedinterestinfutureEITIpublicationthatwouldincludebeneficialownership.Stakeholdersnotedthatpoliticallyexposedpersons,includingthePrimeMinisterandMinistersarerequiredtodisclosetheirassetstothePresidentofthecourtofaccountwithinsevendaysofassumingtheirfunctionsandonanannualbasisduringtheirtenure30.ThereportsarethenmadepublicontheCourt’swebsite31.

Initialassessment

Implementingcountriesarenotyetrequiredtoaddressbeneficialownershipandprogresswiththisrequirementdoesnotyethaveanyimplicationsforacountry’sEITIstatus.InpreparationforenforcementofRequirement2.5ofthe2016EITIStandard,thegovernmentisencouragedtoclarifygovernmentpolicyonBOdisclosure.

Stateparticipation(#2.6)


Materiality:Accordingtothe2014EITIReport,stateparticipationintheextractivesectorarematerial,througha10%“freecarry”sharesinminingcompaniesand20%stateparticipationinoilandgascompanies(p.22).Thegovernmenthastheoptiontoacquireadditionalsharesupto40%inminingcompaniesattheproductionphase.TheReportprovidesanoverviewofgovernmentparticipationinminingcompanies(annex3p.68),butdidnotprovideafulllistofSOEsandtheirsubsidiaries.

The2014ReportstatesthattheonlySOEintheminingsector(p.22)wasSOPAMIN(SociétédePatrimoine

30http://www.courdescomptes.ne/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=87&Itemid=9231http://www.courdescomptes.ne/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=53&Itemid=62




desMinesduNiger),whichwascreatedin2007andis100%state-owned.ThemandateofSOPAMINistomanagethestate’sinterestsinminingcompanies.SOPAMINalsoparticipateinthetransportandcommercialisationofmineralproducts,mainlyuraniumandgold.Thecompanyhasthemandatetocarryoutstudiesandworkrelatedtosocialactivities(p.22).

Financialrelationshipwithgovernment:TheReportstatesthatthetransferoffundsbetweenSOPAMINandthestate,includingretainedearnings,reinvestmentandthird-partyfinancingareallregulatedby“regulatorytextspassedtothiseffect”(p.22).TheReportdidnotprovideanexplanationofrulesandpracticesrelatedtofinancialrelationsbetweenSOEsandthestate.

Governmentownership:TheReportincorrectlystatedthatthereis“onlyone”SOEoperatingintheminingsectorinNiger(p.22).Thestateholdsmajorityshares(69.32%)inSONICHAR(SociétéNigérienneduCharbon),whichoperatesacoalmineinAnouArarentoproduceelectricityusedintherefiningofuraniumore32.ThereportdidnotspecifywhetherSONICHARisasubsidiaryofSOPAMINoranindependentstateownedcompany.PWYPNigerclassifiedthesetwocompaniesasstate-ownedorstate-controlledinastudypublishedinDecember201433.InadditiontoSOPAMINandSONICHAR,SML(SociétédesMinesduLiptako),whichoperatesagoldminewas100%ownedbythestatein2014.TheEITIReportdidnotspecifythatSMLwasstateowned.TheStatealsoholdsmajorityshares(70%)ofCNEM(CompagnieMinièreetEnergétiqueduNiger),whichoperatestheSalkadamnacoalmine,inthesouthwestandproducesanddistributeelectricityfordomesticconsumption.AtleasttwoothersubsidiariesofSOPAMIN(NCKandCNTPS)werenotincludedinthereport.CNTPS(CompagnieNationaledeTransportdesProduitsStratégiques)isaJVCwithArevathattransportsrefineduranium,alsoknownas“yellowcake”fromtheArlitdistrictinthenorthofthecountry,totheportofCotonouinBenin.TheGovernmentofNigerholdsmajorityshares(55%)inCNTPSthroughSOPAMIN.CNTPSwasnotincludedinEITIreporting.PublicrecordsshowthatSOPAMINSAhasatleastonesubsidiaryintheartisanalminingsectorComptoiredel’oretdesmetauxprecieuxduNiger(COMPN),whichwascreatedin201434.Informationaboutthiscompanywasnotincludedinthereport.Intheoilandgassector,theReportshowsthatthegovernmentowned40%oftheZinderrefinerymanagedbySORAZ,aJVCbetweenthestateandCNPC.

Ownershipchanges:TheReportdidnotprovideinformationaboutchangesinownershipforthefiscalperiodcovered.AccordingtotheCOMPN’swebsite35,followingthediscoveryofsignificantdepositsofgoldintheDjadoplateau,about200kmfromtheborderswithAlgeria,LibyaandChad,theGovernmentofNigerentrustedSOPAMINwiththeresponsibilitiesofdevelopingthisnew-foundresource.Tofightagainstmineralsmugglingandpreventislamistsandotherarmedgroupsfromcontrollingartisanalminingofgold,SOPAMINcreatedasubsidiary(COMPN)inMay2014,withthemandatetopurchase,transport,storeandexportgoldproduction.ThecreationofthissubsidiaryandanyeventualchangeinownershipwasnotdisclosedintheEITIReport.

Loansandguarantees:TheEITIReportdoesnotrefertoanyloansorloanguaranteesfromthe

32http://sonichar.com/33EtudedeReferencesurlesEntreprisesetlesDroitsdeL’Homme,CasdesIndustriesExtractivesduNiger,PWYPNiger,December2014http://www.publishwhatyoupay.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/Rapport-Niger-basse-def.pdf34COMPNwebsitehttp://comptoir.sopamin.com/35http://comptoir.sopamin.com/




governmentorSOEstoextractivescompanies.

StakeholderviewsGovernmentofficialsexplainedthatSOPAMINisregulatedasacommercialcompanyunderOHADAlaw.Assuch,thecompanycanraisethirdpartyfundinganditsBoardisresponsibleforapprovingthecompany’sfinancialstatementincludingsocialexpendituresandinvestmentsinaccordancewithapreapprovedbudget.CompaniesrepresentativesclarifiedthatSOPAMINisheldbytheGovernmentofNiger(98%),SONICHAR(1%)andCNEM(1%).SOPAMINalsoholdssharesinthelattertwocompanies.SOPAMINrepresentativesexplainedthatthefinancialrelationshipbetweentheSOEandthestateshouldbeclearasthecompany’sfinancialstatementareapprovedbytheBoardanddepositedattheTribunaldeGrandeInstanceHorsClassedeNiamey.GovernmentofficialsexplainedthatSOPAMIN’ssubsidiary,NCK(cementproductionproject)isoneprojectwithinabilateralagreementbetweentheGovernmentofNigerrepresentedbySOPAMINandtheGovernmentofChinarepresentedbyChinaEximBank.Undersucharrangement,theStateofNigercontractsloanandmakesfundsavailabletoSOPAMIN.MSGmembersconfirmedthattheydidnotrequireSOPAMINtodisclosedetailsontheseagreements.

Initialassessment

TheInternationalSecretariat’sinitialassessmentisthatNigerhasmadeinadequateprogressinmeetingthisrequirement,althoughthereisacaseforconcludingthattherehasbeennoprogress.AreviewofpubliclyavailableMSGmeetingminutesconfirmsthatthisissuewasnotdiscussedintheMSG.The2014EITIReportdidnotcomprehensivelydisclosethestate’slevelofownershipwithinthecountry’soil,gasandminingsector.ThedisclosedinformationaboutSOEsandtheirsubsidiariesandjointventures,wasincompleteandsometimesinaccurate.TheEITIReportincorrectlystatedthatSOPAMINwastheonlySOEoperatingintheextractivesector,whereasCNEM,CNTPS,SMLandSONICHARareallmajorityownedbythestate.ThereportdoesnotexplainthefinancialrelationshipbetweentheseSOEsandthestates,especiallytherulesandpracticesgoverningtransfersoffundsbetweentheSOEsandthestate,retainedearnings,reinvestmentandthird-partyfinancing.TheEITIReportdidnotdisclosechangesinthelevelofownershipduringthereportingperiodinaccordancewithprovision2.6.c.TheInternationalSecretariatconcludesthatsignificantaspectsoftherequirementhavenotbeenimplementedandthatthebroaderobjectiveoftherequirementisfarfromfulfilled.

ItisrecommendedthattheMSGagreeadefinitionofwhatconstitutesanSOEinNigerinaccordancewiththedefinitioninEITIRequirement2.6.a.ItisarequirementthattheMSGexplaintheprevailingrulesandpracticesregardingthefinancialrelationshipbetweenthegovernmentandtheseSOEs,including:therulesandpracticesgoverningtransfersoffundsbetweentheSOE(s)andthestate,retainedearnings,reinvestmentandthird-partyfinancing.InaccordancewithEITIRequirement2.6.b,SOEsmustdisclosetheirlevelofownershipinmining,oilandgascompaniesoperatinginNiger,includingthoseheldbySOEsubsidiariesandjointventures,andanychangesinthelevelofownershipduringthereportingperiod.




Table2-Summaryinitialassessmenttable:Awardofcontractsandlicenses



Legalframework(#2.1)

TheMSGdidnotprovideasummaryofthefiscalregimeapplicabletotheoil,gasandminingsector,includingtheleveloffiscaldevolution.FiscalprovisionsincludedincontractsandconventionsarenotdescribedintheReport.TheReportdidnotexplaintheroleandresponsibilitiesoftherelevantgovernmentagenciesthathavethemandatetomanagetheextractivesector.

Inadequateprogress

Licenseallocations(#2.2)

The2014EITIReportdidnotprovideacomprehensivelistofextractiveslicensesawardedortransferredin2014,noradescriptionoftheprocessfortransferringorawardinglicenses,includingthetechnicalandfinancialcriteriausedassetoutinRequirement2.2.a.Non-trivialdeviationsfromtheapplicablelawswerenothighlighted.

Inadequateprogress

Licenseregisters(#2.3)

TheexcerptoftheminingcadastreincludedintheEITIReportwasneithercompletenorup-to-date.LicensesissuedtoSOPAMINinDecember2014,forexample,werenotincludedintheEITIReport.ThelistofvalidpermitsinthepetroleumsectorintheEITIReportdidnotspecifythedatesofapplication,datesofaward,northevalidityperiodofthelicense.Despitetheseweaknesses,significantprogresshasbeenmadeinbringtransparencytotheexistingminingcadastreandeffortsareunderwaytohelpmodernisethecadastresystem.

Inadequateprogress

Contractdisclosures(#2.4)

Ascontracttransparencyismandatedbytheconstitution,thegovernmentpolicyisclear,buttheEITIReportdidnotdocumenttheactualpracticeofcontractdisclosure.Contractsarenotautomaticallypublishedintheofficialjournalanditremainsunclearhowmanycontractshaveactuallybeenpublished.

Inadequateprogress

Beneficialownership




disclosure(#2.5)

State-participation(#2.6)

TheEITIReportdidnotprovideacomprehensivelistofSOEsoperatingintheextractivesector,omittingCNEM,CNTPS,SMLandSONICHARthatwereallmajorityownedbythestatein2014.TheEITIReportdidnotexplainthefinancialrelationshipbetweentheseSOEsandthestates,especiallytherulesandpracticesgoverningtransfersoffundsbetweentheSOEsandthestate,retainedearnings,reinvestmentandthird-partyfinancing.

Inadequateprogress


• InaccordancewithEITIRequirement2.1,itisarequirementthatimplementingcountriesdiscloseadescriptionofthelegalframeworkandfiscalregimegoverningtheextractiveindustries.Thisinformationmustincludeasummarydescriptionofthefiscalregime,includingtheleveloffiscaldevolution,anoverviewoftherelevantlawsandregulations,andinformationontherolesandresponsibilitiesoftherelevantgovernmentagencies.ItisrecommendedthattheMSGconsideradescriptionofthefiscalregimeinpracticeandexplainanydeviationfromthelegalandregulatoryframeworkasitrelatestorevenuesearmarkedforlocalcommunities.

• TheMSGisrequiredtodiscloseinformationrelatedtotheawardortransferoflicensespertainingtothecompanies,inaccordancewithEITIRequirement2.2.a.Inaddressingthisrequirement,theMSGisencouragedtofollowthestep-by-stepapproachoutlinedinEITIGuidanceNoteN°436,issuedbytheEITIInternationalSecretariat.Transparencyintheawardandtransferoflicencesandareviewoftheefficiencyandeffectivenessoflicensingallocationsystemcouldalsohelpimprovethebusinessenvironmentandsupportthegovernment’seffortinattractingFDI.

• Itisarequirementthatimplementingcountriesmaintainapubliclyavailableregisterorcadastresystem(s),inaccordancewithRequirement2.3.Inaddressingthisrequirement,theMSGisencouragedtofollowthestep-by-stepapproachoutlinedinEITIGuidanceNoteN°337,issuedbytheEITIInternationalSecretariat.

• InpreparingfutureEITIReports,theMSGshouldclarifyanydeviationsfromthegovernment’scontractdisclosurepolicyinpractice.

• ItisrecommendedthattheMSGagreeadefinitionofwhatconstituteanSOEinNigerinaccordancewiththeStandarddefinitioninEITIRequirement2.6.a.ItisarequirementthattheMSGexplaintheprevailingrulesandpracticesregardingthefinancialrelationshipbetweenthegovernmentandtheseSOEs,including:therulesandpracticesgoverningtransfersoffundsbetweentheSOE(s)andthestate,retainedearnings,reinvestmentandthird-party

36GuidanceNote4,LicenseAllocation,EITIInternationalSecretariat,June2016,https://eiti.org/document/guidance-note-on-license-allocations37GuidanceNote3,LicenseRegister,EITIInternationalSecretariat,June2016,https://eiti.org/document/guidance-note-on-license-registers.




financing.




3. Monitoringandproduction

3.1Overview

ThissectionprovidesdetailsontheimplementationoftheEITIrequirementsrelatedtoexploration,productionandexports.

3.2Assessment

Overviewoftheextractivesector,includingexplorationactivities(#3.1)


SectionI.3.1ofthe2014EITIReport(pp.15-18)providesanoverviewofthepotentialoftheminingsectorincludingthegeologicalcontext(sectiona),miningsectorpotentialincludingsomeestimatesofreserves(sectionb)disaggregatedbyregion.Section1.3.1.c(pp.18-19)providesanoverviewofoilandgasdeposits,numberofcontractsawardedperyear(nofurtherdetails),thenumberofactivelicensesend-2014andalowdefinitionmapofoilandgaslicenses,althoughitistoosmalltoclearlydelineateoilandgasblocks.

Exploration:Fortheminingsector,theEITIReportprovidesanoverviewofexplorationactivitiesinNigerin2014(pp.15to18),includingbasicsgeologicalinformationforthepotentialofthemining,estimatesofreservesofcoal,goldanduranium,disaggregatedbyregion.Fortheoilandgassector,theEITIReportstatesthat20outof40blocsinthepetroleumcadastrewerelicencedforexplorationactivitiesinDecember2014.ItisstatedthatexplorationactivitiesintensifiedfollowingthePSCwithCNPCsignedin2008,butnofurtherdetailsofexplorationactivitiesareprovided.

StakeholderviewsGovernmentofficialsnotedthatexplorationactivitiesslowedconsiderablyfollowingtherapidfallofuraniumpricesintheaftermathofthenuclearaccidentinFukushima,Japan,in2011.InMay2014,ArevaandtheGovernmentofNigeragreedtohaltthedevelopmentoftheIMOURARENprojectthatwasduetoboosturaniumproductionby5000tonnesperyear,intheshorttomediumterm38.Pursuanttothisagreement,developmentactivitieswillresumedependingonimprovementofmarketconditionsthatwouldmaketheprojectprofitable.Thedeterioratingsecuritysituation,duetoBokoHaramattacksin2015and2016havealsohamperedexplorationactivities.

NewdiscoveriesofgoldinApril2014intheDjadoplateauinthenortheastimprovedsomewhattheoutlookoftheminingsector.AcquisitionsoflicensesinthisinhospitableSaharaDesert,whereartisanalminershaverecentlyfoundgoldappeartobespeculative.Insteadofinvestingintheirownexplorationactivities,licenseholdersareoftenfollowingtheleadofartisanalminerstogainvaluableinformationaboutthesurroundingareasforthepurposeofflippingthoseassetsoncetheyhaveevidenceofexisting

38http://www.areva.com/FR/activites-6948/le-projet-imouraren.html




reserves.

Initialassessment

TheInternationalSecretariat’sinitialassessmentisthatNigerhasmadesatisfactoryprogresstowardsmeetingthisrequirement.ThedescriptionofexplorationactivitiesinfutureEITIReportscouldbemoreforwardlooking,soastoprovidemorevisibilityinthesector’spotentialandemerginggovernancechallenges.ItisrecommendedthattheMSGworkscloselywithSOPAMIN,toprovidemoreup-to-dateinformationonexplorationactivitiesandhelpinformtheaveragecitizenaboutopportunitiesandchallengesfacingtheextractiveindustry.

Productiondata(#3.2)


Productionvolumes:The2014Reportprovidesthenamesofproducingminesforeachofthecommoditiesmined(uranium,gold,coal),includingeachmine’sproductionvolumesfor2014(p.19).TheReportdidnotdiscloseproductionvalues.Therewerefiveproducingminesin2014,aswellasASMgoldproduction.

Accordingtothereportproductionofgold,includingfromartisanalminingtotalled63,91kgofgold.Coalproductionbythemajoritystate-ownedSONICHARattheAnou-Ararenminewas241.792tonnes.Totaloutputofuraniumwas4277tonnes.TheEITIReportdoesnotdiscloseadditionalinformationonsourcesofproductiondataoronhowproductionfigureshavebeencalculated.

Fortheoilandgassector,theReportstatedthattheplannedoilandgasproductionsince2011was20,000bpd(pp.19-20).ItisstatedthatalloilandgasproductionwassoldtotheZinderrefineryandthevolumesofrefinedfuelproductionsareprovided,disaggregatedbythethreetypesoffuelproduced(diesel,gasolineandGPL).ThevolumeofcrudeoilrefinedattheZinderrefineryisalsodisclosedintheReport(p.20)fortheperiod2011-2015(6,064,665barrelsin2014).Thus,theEITIReportonlyprovidesthevolumesofcrudeoilprocessedattheZinderrefinery(itisunclearwhetherthereareanytechnicallosses,andthuswhethervolumesrefinedareequivalenttovolumesproduced)andthevalueofcrudeoilandnaturalgas(disaggregated)productionisnotprovided.ThisinformationwasclearlysourcedfromtheMinistryofEnergyandPetroleum.

Productionvalues:Thereportdidnotincludethevalueofproduction.

Location:Productionfigureswerelistedforeachminingsiteinthereport.AccordingtotheReport(p.19),Nigerproduced4277tonnesofuraniumfromthreeminesasfollows:SOMAIRinArlit,annualproduction2730tonnes;COMINAKinAkouta,annualproduction1508tonnes;andSOMINAinAzelik,annualproduction39tonnes.

Stakeholderviews

Stakeholdersfromallthreeconstituenciesrecognisedthatproductiondatawasnotclearlysourcedin




theEITIReport.AgovernmentofficialexplainedthatinspectorsfromtheMMIDmonitorproductioninindustrialminingsitesandfilemonthlyreportsofproduction.TheseconsolidatedproductionfiguresaretechnicallyavailableuponrequestfromtheMMID,buttheministryitselfdoesnotpublishproductionfiguresonaregularbasis.Itwasnotclearwhetherathirdpartycouldreproduceandpublishproductionfiguresobtainedfromtheministry.

InitialassessmentTheInternationalSecretariat’sinitialassessmentisthatNigerhasmademeaningfulprogresstowardsmeetingthisrequirement.Althoughdisaggregatedproductionvolumesbycommodityandbyminingsitehavebeendisclosed,thevaluesofcommoditiesproducedwasnotdisclosedintheReport.TheMSGdidnotdisclosealltherelevantsourcesofproductiondataandinformationonhowproductiondatawascalculatedwasnotdisclosedintheReport.TheinternationalSecretariatconcludesthatsignificantaspectofthisrequirementhavebeenimplemented,buttheunderliningobjectivesoftransparencyofproductionhasnotbeenachieved.Tostrengthenimplementation,theMSGshouldensurethatfutureEITIReportsdisclosethevalueoftotalproductionbycommodity,alongsideproductionvolumes.

Exportdata(#3.3)


Exportvolumes:The2014EITIReportshowsexportdataforeachmineralproductdisaggregatedbycompanyovertheperiod2005to2014(pp.20-21).AccordingtotheEITIReport,Niger’sannualexportofuraniumdecreasedby6%in2014to4099tonnesofuranium.TheEITIReportstatesthatNigerdoesnotcurrentlyexportoilandgasandthatallcrudeoilisrefinedfordomesticconsumption,althoughasurplusofrefinedoilproductsisexported.Thevolumesofrefinedproductexportedisdisaggregatedbythethreetypesofproduct(diesel,gasolineandGPL).Thisinformationwasclearlysourced.

Exportvalues:TheEITIReportincludesinformationonthevalueofexportedmineralsfortheperiod2005to2014foruraniumandgoldand2012to2014foroilexport(pp.20-21).Thedatawasclearlysourcedanddisaggregatedbycompany.ThevalueofcoalproductionwasnotdisclosedintheReport,butallcoalproductionwasusedfordomesticconsumption.AdditionalinformationonthetermsoftradeandstructureofexportsisdisclosedintheEITIReport(p.27).

Stakeholderviews

MSGmembersweresatisfiedwiththecoverageofexportdatainthereport.Governmentrepresentativesappearedmoreinterestedandknowledgeableabouttheissueofexportedminerals.Civilsocietyrepresentativesdidnotexpressaparticularinterestinthedisclosedfigures.

InitialassessmentTheInternationalSecretariat’sinitialassessmentisthatNigerhasmadesatisfactoryprogressinmeetingthisrequirement.Totalexportvolumesandthevalueofexportsbycommodityhavebeendisclosed.TheMSGhasdisclosedthesourcesofexportdata,butdidnotprovideinformationonhowexportdatawascalculated.




Table3-Summaryinitialassessmenttable:Monitoringandproduction



Overviewoftheextractivesector,includingexplorationactivities(#3.1)

TheEITIReportprovidesanoverviewoftheextractiveindustries,includingexplorationactivities.ThisdescriptioncouldbemoreforwardlookinginfutureEITIreports,soastoprovidemorevisibilityinthesector’spotentialandemerginggovernancechallenges.


Productiondata(#3.2)

Productionvolumes,disaggregatedbycommodityandbyminingsitehavebeendisclosed,butnotthevaluesofcommoditiesproduced.ThedisclosedinformationwasnotclearlysourcedandinformationonhowproductiondatawascalculatedwasnotdisclosedintheReport.

Meaningfulprogress

Exportdata(#3.3)

Totalexportvolumesandthevalueofexportsbycommodityhavebeendisclosed.TheMSGhasdisclosedthesourcesofexportdata,butdidnotprovideinformationonhowexportdatawascalculated.



• TheMSGshouldensurethatfutureEITIReportsdisclosethevalueoftotalproductionbycommodity,alongsideproductionvolumes.




4. Revenuecollection

4.1Overview

ThissectionprovidesdetailsontheimplementationoftheEITIrequirementsrelatedtorevenuetransparency,includingthecomprehensiveness,qualityandlevelofdetaildisclosed.ItalsoconsiderscompliancewiththeEITIRequirementsrelatedtoproceduresforproducingEITIReports.

4.2Assessment

Materiality(#4.1)


Materialitythresholdforrevenuestreams:TheEITIReportstatedthattheMSGdidnotagreeanymaterialitythreshold(p.21),effectivelysettingthematerialitythresholdatzero.Thismeansthatanypaymentmadebyoil,gasandminingcompaniesareconsideredmaterial.TheEITIReportexplainsthatsince2010theMSGhasdecidednottosetamaterialitythresholdforreconciliation,soastoincludeallpaymentsintheReport.ThisdecisionpredatestheadoptionoftheEITIRulesin2011andtheEITIStandardin2013andithasnotbeenupdatedsince2010.However,theEITIReportalsonotesthattheMSGdecidednottoincludeartisanalminingpaymentstogovernmentinthe2014EITIReport,giventhattheseaccountedforonly0.2%oftotalrevenuesin2013(p.29).Thelackofaclearlydefinedmaterialitythresholdmakesitdifficulttoascertainthecomprehensivenessofthereport.

Descriptionsofmaterialrevenuestreams:TheReportstatesthattheMSGagreedthescopeofpaymentstoincludeinthescopeofreconciliationbasedonthedifferenttaxesandfeesstipulatedintheMiningCodeandPetroleumCode,thevariousactivecontracts,applicablecodes(CodeGeneraldesImpots,theCodeGeneraldelaDouane).TheReportprovideabriefdescriptionof34materialrevenuestreamsinannex4(pp.70to72),whichincludesallrevenuestreamslistedinRequirement4.1.boftheEITIStandard.

Materialitythresholdforcompanies:TheMSGdecidednotsetanymaterialitythreshold.Therefore,allcompanies’paymentsareconsideredmaterial.However,thelackofanup-to-datecadastremakesitdifficulttoidentifyallcompaniesoperatingintheoil,gasandminingsectorinthecountry.

Materialcompanies:Allcompaniesoperatinginthecountrywouldberequiredtoreportbasedonamaterialitythresholdsetatzero.ThereportstatesthattheMSGhasagreedtoexcludetheartisanalminingsectorfromthereconciliationprocessduetoitsinformalnature.ReportingtemplateswerepreparedbythedatacollectioncommitteeonbehalfoftheMSG.ThePermanentSecretariatdistributedthereportingtemplatestoreportingentitiesandcollecteddatathatwasthentransferredtotheIndependentAdministrator.TheIAcollectedadditionalinformationfromreportingentitiesaspartofthereconciliationprocess.

Materialcompanyreporting:TheReportstatedthattheapprovedlistofreportingcompanieswasbasedonthepetroleumandminingcadastres(p.29),butitdidnotprovidethefulllistofreportingentitiesas




approvedbytheMSG.

However,Annex1lists36licenseholdersintheminingsectorand10licenseholdersintheoilandgassectorbringingthetotalnumberoflicenseholdersto46.Inadditiontothislist,thestate-ownedcompanySOPAMINandrefinery(SORAZ)werenotlistedaslicenseholders.Basedonthisandthematerialitythresholdsetatzero,itcanbeinferredthat48companieswouldberequiredtoreport.

Theresultofthereconciliationshowsthatonly19companiesprovideddataforreconciliation(p.32).TheIAstatesthatthisaccountsfor99.46%oftotalrevenuesreportedbythegovernment(page33).

TheIAstatesthatonlyfiveoutof21companiesattheexplorationphasereported,leaving16companiesattheexplorationphasethatdidnotreport(p.30).TableXVinSectionII.3(p.31)providestheresultsofreconciliation,disaggregatedbycompany,whichhighlightsthecompaniesforwhichtherewerediscrepancies.However,paymentsfromnon-reportingcompaniesaremarkedas‘0’ratherthan‘N/A’,exacerbatingthevalueofunreconcileddiscrepancies.

Materialgovernmententities:TheEITIReportdidnotprovideanexplanationfortheselectionofgovernmentagenciesthatwererequiredtoreport.

Governmentreporting:Thefollowinggovernmentagencieswererequiredtoreport:ARMP(AgencedeRégulationdesMarchésPublics),DGD(DirectionGénéraledesDouanes),DGI(DirectionGénéraledesImpôts),DGTCP(DirectionGénéraleduTrésoretdelacomptabilitéPublique),MEP(Ministèredel’EnergieetduPétrole),MMDI(MinistèredesMinesetduDéveloppementIndustriel),localcommunitiesandSOPAMIN.TheReportdoesnotexplainhowthesegovernmentagencieswereselected.

Discrepancies:Outstandingdiscrepanciesafterreconciliationrepresent0.52%(XOF843,371,067)oftotalrevenuesaccordingtotheIA(p.7).TheMSGdidnotsetathresholdforinvestigatingdiscrepancies.SectionII.2.7(p.30)explainsthatdiscrepancieswereprimarilyduetoaccrual-basedratherthancash-basedreporting,errorsinimputationofinternationalpayments,non-reportingofcertainrevenuestreamsbysomecompanies,andnon-reportingbysomecompanies.

Fullgovernmentdisclosure:TheIAnotedthatgovernmentagenciesdisclosedinformationfor37companies.Paymentsfor11licenseholdershavethereforenotbeendisclosed.Thegovernmenthadprovidedpartialunilateraldisclosureofrevenuesfor19companiesthatdidnotreport(pp.73-113).However,giventhatallcompaniesintheminingandpetroleumcadastreswerenotincludedinthescopeofreporting,andallrelevantgovernmentagenciesdidnotexhaustivelydiscloseallrevenuesreceived,itwouldappearthatthegovernmentprovidedunilateraldisclosureonsomerevenuesfromsomecompanies.Itisunclearwhetherallgovernmentagenciesdisclosedallrequiredinformation.

StakeholderviewsAnindustryrepresentativenotedthatthebiggesthandicapisthattheMSGdecidednottohaveamaterialitythresholdforselectingcompanies.Civilsocietyrepresentativesarguedthatthedecisionwasmadein2010tonotsetanymaterialitythresholds,becausefromtheirperspective“everypaymentissignificant”.StakeholdersagreedthattheMSGhasnotrevisitedtheissueofmaterialitythresholdsince




2010.Anyonewhoappliesforlicensespaysafixedfee,andtechnicallymadematerialpaymentstogovernment,eventhoughsomelicenseapplicationsaredeniedandlicenseapplicantsarenotalwaysbasedinNiger.ThelackofclarityonthenumberofreportingentitywasinpartduetoCNPCInternational,whichhastwolegalentitiesinNiger(oneforTénéréandoneforBilma).Thesetwoentitiesreportedseparately,sothenumberof37or38materialcompaniesarebothcorrectaccordingtotheIA.Severalgovernmentandindustrystakeholdersalsonotedthatalotofmininglicensesareuraniumlicenses,whichareprimarilyinthenorth,andin2014therewasinsecurityintheregionsoit’spossiblethatsomeexplorationcompaniesjustleft.

TheIAincorrectlyreportedzeroundercompanies’disclosureforcompaniesthatdidnotreturntheirreportingtemplates,whereinfactgovernmentagenciesreportedpaymentsabovezeroforthesamecompany.Thispracticewasmisleadingandexacerbatedtheunreconcileddiscrepancies.TheexclusionofASMfromgovernmentunilateraldisclosurewasnotclearlyagreedtobytheMSG.Lackofdisclosurebylocalcommunitieswasduetoalackofclearmethodologyforthepreparationofthereportandalsodifficultiesinaccessingpublicrecordsfromtheregions.TheTaxDepartment(DGI)isintheprocessofdigitallylinkingalldecentralisedDGIoffices.Civilsocietyrepresentativeswereparticularlyinterestedintheissueofstatutorysubnationaltransfers.Itwasnotclearfromthereportonwhichbasis15%subnationaltransferswerecalculated.

InitialassessmentTheInternationalSecretariat’sassessmentisthatNigerhasmadeinadequateprogresstowardsmeetingthisrequirement.TheMSGdidnotupdateitsapproachtodefiningmaterialitythresholdssince2010.Thethresholdforselectingrevenuestreamswaseffectivelysetatzerotoensure“allpaymentsareincludedinthereport”,butthismadeEITIreportingoverlyburdensomewithoutanybasistoverifythecomprehensivenessofthereport.TheMSGdidnotidentifythecompaniesmakingmaterialpaymentsanddidnotexplainwhetherthesecompaniesfullyreportedallpaymentsinaccordancewiththematerialitythresholdofzeroforselectingreportingcompanies.Similarly,theMSGdidnotidentifyallgovernmententitiesreceivingmaterialrevenuesandwhetherthesegovernmententitiesfullyreportedallreceiptsinaccordancewiththematerialitythresholdsetatzero.Allrevenueswerematerial,butgovernmentagenciesdidnotdiscloseallmaterialrevenues.Atleast10outofthe48licenseholderslistedintheminingandpetroleumcadastresfor2014didnotreceiveanyreportingtemplates.Itisimportanttonotethattheminingandpetroleumcadastresareneitherup-to-date,norcomplete,asexplainedaboveunderRequirements2.2and2.3.Ofthe38companiesthatwererequiredtoreport,accordingtothelistofreportingtemplatessenttocompaniesforthepurposeofdisclosure,halfparticipatedinreporting,andhalfdidnotreturnanyreportingtemplate.TheIAclaimswithoutanyevidencethat21companies,whichcollectivelypaid99.46%oftotalrevenues,provideddataforreconciliation(page33).Inreality,only19companiesdisclosedinformationforEITIreconciliationandgovernmentagenciesdisclosedadditionalinformationfor19companiesthatdidnotdiscloseanydata,basedoninformationinthe2014Report(p.32).TheReportdidnotincludeanassessmentofthecomprehensivenessofthedisclosedfiguresandthelackofacleardefinitionofamaterialitythresholdmadeitdifficulttoestimatetheimpactofnon-reportingentities.TheInternationalSecretariatconcludesthatnearlyallaspectsofthisrequirementhavenotbeenimplementedandtheunderliningobjectiveoffulldisclosureofallpaymentsandcomprehensivereconciliationofmaterialpaymentshavenotbeenachieved.ThesechallengesareexacerbatedbythedeviationsfromthetemplatetermsofreferenceforIndependentAdministratorasdiscussedat4.9,below.




TheMSGshouldensurethatallrevenueflowslistedunderRequirement4.1.bareincludedinthescopeofreconciliationandthatthematerialitythresholdforselectingcompaniesensuresthatallpaymentsthatcouldaffectthecomprehensivenessofEITIreportingbeincludedinthescopeofreconciliation.Thelistofmaterialcompaniesshouldalsoclearlybedefined.TheMSGisinvitedtoconsiderwhethersettingaquantitativematerialitythresholdforselectingcompanieswouldensuretheseaimsaremet.TheMSGshouldensurethatNiger’snextEITIReportincludestheIA’sassessmentofthematerialityofomissions,itsstatementonthecomprehensivenessoftheEITIReportandthatfullunilateralgovernmentdisclosureofmaterialrevenuesfromnon-materialcompaniesisincluded.

In-kindrevenues(#4.2)


Materiality:TheReportstatesthattherewerenoin-kindrevenuesin2014(p.22),butitdoesnotexplainhowtheMSGconcludedthatin-kindrevenueswerenotmaterial.AreviewofpubliclyavailableMSGmeetingminutesconfirmsthattheissueofmaterialityofin-kindrevenueswasnotdiscussedintheMSG.ProductionsharingagreementsbetweenthegovernmentofNigerandCNPCaremanagedthroughthenationalrefinery,SORAZ,whichisaJVCbetweentheGovernmentofNiger(40%)andChina’sCNPC(60%).CrudeoilistransportedfromtheAgademoilfieldthroughapipelineanddeliveredtothenationalrefinerynearZinderatafixedprice(prixduNiger).ThepartnerstothenationalrefinerywhoarealsopartnersintheAgademoilfieldagreeapriceatwhichcrudeoildeliveredtothenationalrefinerywillbeboughtbytheoilrefineryandtheretailpriceofpetroleumproductsfromtherefineryisalsoagreedinadvanced.

TheReportdidnotexplainthepricingmechanismofmineralsproduced,butitstatedthatSOPAMINboughtandsold458tonsofuraniumaspartofitscommercialactivitiesin2014.PressreportssuggestthatSOPAMINwasalsoinvolvedininternationaltradeofuranium39duringthereportingperiod.

ThecoalproductionisusedbySONICHARtoproduceelectricityfordomesticconsumptioninitscoal-firedpowerplantinTchirozérine.TheEITIReportdoesnotexplainthepricingmechanismofcoalproduction.Thesepricingmechanismswerenotdisclosedinthereport,butbasedoninterviewswithstakeholdersduringthefact-findingmission,theInternationalSecretariatconcludesthatin-kindrevenuesofoil,uraniumandgoldwerenotmaterial.Thematerialityofin-kindrevenuesforcoalremainsunclearbutthequantitiesproducedremainrelativelysmallandexclusivelyusedfordomesticconsumption.

Stakeholderviews

Industryrepresentativesconfirmedthatcompanies’paymentstogovernmentareonlyincash,notin-kind.Stakeholdersfromallthreeconstituenciesdidnotremembertheissueofthematerialityofin-kindrevenuesbeingdiscussedbytheMSG.Anindustryrepresentativeexplainedthatintheminingsector,thestateholdssharesinallproducinglicensesthroughSOPAMINandSONICHAR.Foruraniumproducts,SOPAMINanditspartnersagreeafixedprice(prixduNiger)atwhichthetwojointventuresproducinguranium(SOMAIRandCOMINAK)willselltherefineduranium“uranate”or“yellowcake”toitsparent

39http://www.marianne.net/parquet-financier-saisi-nouvelle-affaire-areva-100235632.html




companies.Eachshareholdingcompany,i.eArevaandSOPAMIN,hastherighttobuyitsshareofproductionproratedtoitsshare.Theseshareholdingcompaniesthenselltheuraniumproductsontheinternationalmarket.

Anindustryrepresentativeexplained,furtherthatfollowingincreaseingoldsmugglingtoneighbouringcountriesin2014,SOPAMINdecidedtoestablishabuyinghouse.TheSOEsetupaComptoird’Achat,COMPN(Comptoirdel'OretdesMétauxPrecieuxduNiger),firstasaspecialproject,thenasadepartmentofSOPAMIN.Giventhelargesizeofareaweregoldisbeingproduced,fromtheLiptakoregionneartheborderswithBurkinoFasoandMaliinthesouthwesttotheDjadoplateauneartheLibyanborderinthenortheast,SOPAMINdecidedtosetupamobilestructuretobuygoldfromartisanalminers,usingarmouredtrucks.SOPAMINnegotiatedaninterestfreeloanofUSD600000fromaprivatecompanyintheUStobuytwoarmouredtrucksequippedwithaminilabforweightingandassessingthequalityofgoldandabiometricidentificationsystemtoissueIDcardstoartisanalminers.Inexchangefortheinterestfreeloan,thelendingcompanyhasthemonopolytobuygoldfromSOPAMINatadiscount.ThepriceatwhichCOMPNbuysgoldfromsmall-scaleminersonbehalfofSOPAMINispublishedontheCOMPN’swebsite40.GovernmentrepresentativesexplainedthatthegovernmentwantstoestablishastructurelikePMMCinGhana,whichhasthemonopolyforexportsofgoldproducedbyartisanalminers.

Initialassessment

TheInternationalSecretariat’sinitialassessmentisthatthisrequirementisnotyetapplicableinNiger.ThiscaseissimilartothatofMongolia,wheretheBoardconsideredthatRequirement4.2wasnotapplicabletoarrangementswherethestatereceivesitsshareofin-kindrevenueincashorforsalesofthird-partyminerals.TheMSGdidnotagreeadefinitionofmaterialitywithregardstoin-kindrevenues.Basedonareviewofthepricingmechanismandstakeholderconsultations,theInternationalSecretariatconcludesthatin-kindrevenuesofoil,uraniumandgoldwerenotmaterial.Thematerialityofin-kindrevenuesforcoalremainsunclearbutthequantitiesproducedremainrelativelysmallandexclusivelyusedfordomesticconsumption.Weunderstandthatthereisnoevidenceofinkindrevenuesincoalduringthereportingperiod.ItisrecommendedthatallSOEs,involvedintheextractivesector,includingSOPAMIN,SONICHARandSORAZdisclosethepricingmechanismofmineralsproducedandsoldonbehalfofthestate.

Barterandinfrastructuretransactions(#4.3)


Barter:TheReportstatedthattheMSGdidnothaveknowledgeofanybarteragreements(includingloans,subsidiesorinfrastructureprovisions)intheextractiveindustries(p.22),butitdoesnotexplainwhethertheMSGdiscussedthematerialityofbarteragreements,beforeconcludingthatin-kindrevenueswerenotmaterial.AreviewoftheTORfortheIA,whichincludesadeclarationofmaterialityputsthe

40http://comptoir.sopamin.com/page-pricing.php




MSG’spositionontheissueindoubt.TheTORfortheIAidentifieda90-million-europrojectfortheroadIrhazeretobebuiltbyArevathatcouldpotentiallybeclassifiedasaninfrastructureproject(page20).Publicrecords41showthataspartofthestrategicpartnershipagreementsignedinMay2014betweenArevaandtheGovernmentofNiger,Arevacommittedtoprovidefinancialsupportforlocaldevelopmentandinfrastructureprojects,including:

• fundingfortheTahoua-Arlitrouteamountingto90millioneuros(approx.60billionCFAfrancs);• theconstructionofabuildingworth10millioneuros(6.5billionCFAfrancs)tohousethemining

companies,andwhichshallbethepropertyofNiger;• measurestoacceleratethedevelopmentoftheIrhazervalleyworth17millioneuros(11billion

CFAfrancs).

Infrastructure:TheMSGdidnotdiscloseinformationrelatedtotheArevaagreementintheReport.

StakeholderviewsStakeholdersfromallthreeconstituenciesconfirmedthattheydiscussedtheissueofbarteragreementsinthepreparationoftheEITIReportandconcludedthatbarteragreementswereimmaterial.However,allMSGmembersconsultednotedthattheyhadnotbasedthisassessmentonanactualreviewofexistingcontracts.Somesuggestedthattheydidnothavetoreviewcontracts,becausegovernmentofficialswhoarepartytoallcontractswererepresentedintheMSGandparticipatedinthisassessment.However,giventhatrepresentativesfromSOPAMINonlystartedparticipatinginMSGmeetingsinDecember2016,itappearsthatthegovernmententityholdingstateequityintheminingsectordidnotprovideinputtotheMSG’sdiscussionofthematerialityofbarteragreements.

InitialassessmentTheInternationalSecretariat’sassessmentisthatNigerhasmadenoprogresstowardsmeetingthisrequirement.TheofficialpositionpresentedbytheMSGisthattheMSGconsideredinfrastructureprovisionsandbarterarrangementsduringthepreparationoftheReportandconcludedthatthesewerenotmaterial.However,neitherthenationalSecretariatnortheMSGhasconductedareviewofexistingcontractstoconfirmthis.GovernmentofficialsconsultedconfirmedtheMSG’spositionthattheywerenotawareofinfrastructureprovisionsandbarter-typeagreementsinNiger.Thisisaconcerningfinding,becausepressreports42confirmthatthecontractbetweenArevaandtheGoNwasindeedpublished,however“discreetly”,intheOfficialJournalof12June2014.Moreover,theTORfortheIAadoptedbytheMSGitselfon24June2016alsoreferredtoa90-million-europrojectfortheroadIrhazeretobebuiltbyArevathatcouldpotentiallybeclassifiedasaninfrastructureproject(page20).ItisconceivablethatareviewofthisissuewilldemonstratethatthisprovisionisnotapplicableinNiger,atleastintheyearcoveredbythelastEITIReport.However,giventhelackofclarityontheseissues,andthelackofMSGdiscussion,thispositioncannotbesubstantiated.TheInternationalSecretariatthereforeconcludesthatnearlyallaspectofthisrequirementhavenotbeenimplementedandtheunderlyingobjectiveoftransparencyofinfrastructureprovisionsandbartertypeagreementshavenotbeenachieved.

41http://india.areva.com/EN/home-1276/signature-of-a-strategic-partnership-agreement-between-the-state-of-niger-and-areva.html42http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20140704-areva-niger-jo-journal-officiel-accord-partenariat-strategique-exploitation-mines-uranium-france




TheMSGshouldconductofreviewofexistingmining,oilandgascontractsinfutureEITIreportingtoestablishtheapplicabilityandmaterialityofinfrastructureandbarter-typeagreements.

Transportrevenues(#4.4)


Materiality:TheReportstatedthattransportrevenuesintheextractiveindustrieswerenotmaterialin2014(p.22),butitdoesnotexplainwhethertheMSGdiscussedthematerialityoftransportrevenues,beforeconcludingthatrevenuesfromtransportwerenotmaterial.TheReportdidnotdocumentthevarioustransportationagreementsintheminingindustryeither.

Stakeholderviews

Severalstakeholdersconsultedfromgovernmentandindustryexplainedthatthe463km-longoilpipelineconnectingtheAgademoilfieldtotheoilrefinerynearZinderwaspartofanupstream-downstreamintegratedprojectconstructedundertheSino-Nigeroilandgascooperationprogram.ThepipelinebecameoperationalinOctober2011.ItsoperatingcostispartofproductioncostofoildeliveredattheZinderrefinery.StakeholderconfirmedthattheMSGdidnotreviewthisagreementbeforedecidingthattransportfeeswereimmaterial.

Anindustryrepresentative,explainedthatNiger,beingalandlockedcountry,uraniumconcentrateor“yellowcake”istransportedbyroadwithmilitaryescortonamorethan2000kmjourneyfromArlitintheNorthtotheportofCotonouinBenin,fromwhereitisshippedtoAreva'sconversionplantinsouthernFrance.

Thetruckscarryinguraniumconcentrate,areownedandoperatedbyasubsidiaryofSOPAMIN(CNTPS).CNTPS(CompagnieNationaledeTransportdesProduitsStratégiques)isaJVCwithArevathatis55%ownedbySOPAMIN.Accordingtocompany’sofficialsCNTPShasnotmadeanyprofitsrecentlyanditsequipment’sareold.CNTPS’lossesarerecordedaspartofSOPAMINproductioncost.AnindustryrepresentativealsonotedthatitiscommonpracticethattheGoNappointsapoliticiantorunSOEs.

InitialassessmentTheInternationalSecretariat’sinitialassessmentisthatthisrequirementisnotapplicableinNiger.TheMSGdidnotagreeadefinitionofmaterialitywithregardstorevenuesfromtransportationofextractivesproducts,butbasedonstakeholderconsultations,theInternationalSecretariatconcludesthattransportrevenueswereimmaterialduringthereportingperiod.ItisrecommendedthattheMSGconsiderthematerialityoftransportrevenuesaheadoffutureEITIReports.

TransactionsbetweenSOEsandgovernment(#4.5)


TheReportstatedthatSOPAMINholdsgovernmentequityincompaniesintheminingsector,receivingdividendsonbehalfofthestateandtransferringtheseproceedstotheTreasury(p.22).TheReport




showsthatSOPAMINpaidFCFA2,654,446,838,or1.64%oftotalEIrevenuesdisclosedbygovernment(p.7).paymentsbySOPAMINwerereconciledwithgovernmentagencies.However,theReportincorrectlystatedthatSOPAMINwastheonlySOEoperatingintheextractivesector,whereasCNEM,CNTPS,SMLandSONICHARareallmajorityownedbythestate.Inaddition,theEITIReportalsoshowthattheoilrefinerySORAZ,whichis40%ownedbythestate,collectsataxondomesticconsumptionofpetroleumproducts(TIPP)andprofitoilthatistransferredtothetreasury(pp.37-45).

ThereportalsoprovidesanoverviewofSOPAMIN’smandateasstatedinthecompany’sbylawsandnotesthatSOPAMINreceivesdividendsandmakestransferstothetreasury(p.22).DividendspaidtoSOPAMINandthensenttothetreasuryaredisclosedinthe2014EITIReport(pp.37-45).ThereportdoesnotexplaintowhatextentthesepaymentswerereconciledbetweencompaniesandSOPAMINandthenbetweenSOPAMINandthetreasury.TheEITIReportshowsthatSOPAMINwasthebeneficiaryofXOF780279159of“expenditureincurredbytheState”(p.8).ItisunclearwheretheseexpendituresoriginatedfromandhowSOPAMINbecamethebeneficiary.

StakeholderviewsAllMSGmembersconsultedconfirmedthattheMSGdidnotspecificallydiscussthematerialityofpaymentsreceivedbySOEsonbehalfofthestate.Company’srepresentativesconfirmedthatSOPAMINcollectsdividendsthatitthentransferstothetreasury.Allminingcompanies,inwhichthestateholdsinterests,aresupposedtopaydividendtoSOPAMIN,whichthenmakethetransfertothetreasury.SincetheincorporationofSOMAIRandCOMINAKpredatesthecreationofSOPAMIN,thesetwocompaniesstillpaydividenddirectlytothetreasury.ThelawcreatingSOPAMINalsotransferredthegovernmentstakesintheminingsectortoSOPAMIN,butthegovernmentsharesinSOMAIRandCOMINAKarestillnotonthebalancesheetofthecompany.

Anindustryrepresentativeexplainedthatincasesofurgentneedforcash,itiscommonforSOPAMINtosignamemorandumofunderstandingwiththeMinistryofFinanceandforSOPAMINtopaycashinadvanceandthenoffsetondividendsandtaxesowedattheendoftheyear.TheseadvancepaymentsaresubjecttoapprovalbytheSOPAMIN’sBoardofdirectors,whichcouldexplaintheabovementioned“expenditureincurredbytheState”fromSOPAMIN.

InitialassessmentTheInternationalSecretariat’sinitialassessmentisthatNigerhasmadeinadequateprogressinmeetingthisrequirement.TheEITIReportdidnotincludeallthetransactionsbetweenSOEsoperatingintheextractiveindustryandthetreasury.OnlySOPAMINandSORAZreportedtransactionsbetweenSOEsandthestates.CNEM,SMLandSONICHARareallmajorityownedbythestatebutwerenotclassifiedasSOEs.Thesecompanies’EITIreportingwerelimitedtogeneraldisclosuresbynon-stateownedcompanies.Moreover,CNTPS,whichismajorityownedbythestate(55%)andspecialisedinthetransportofuraniumconcentratedidnotparticipateinEITIreporting.TheseSOEsmadematerialpaymentstothegovernment,butthereportdidnotexplainwhethertheycollectedmaterialrevenuesonbehalfofthestate.TransactionsinvolvingSOEshavenotbeenfullydisclosedinaccordancewithRequirement4.5.TheInternationalSecretariatconcludesthatthesignificantaspectsofthisrequirementshavenotbeenimplementedandtheunderliningobjectiveshavenotbeenachieved.ItisrecommendedthattheMSGincludesallmaterialpaymentscollectedbySOEsonbehalfofthestate




andallpaymentsbySOEstothestateinfutureEITIreporting,soastoimprovetransparencyofthefinancialrelationshipbetweenSOEsandthegovernment.

Subnationaldirectpayments(#4.6)

DocumentationofprogressAccordingtothereport,inadditiontolocaldevelopmentcontributionsbycompanies,i.e.socialpayments,therewerefourdirectsubnationalpayments:realestatetax,VATwithheldatsource,withheldcorporateincometaxandextractiontax(p.22).ThetotalofthesefourrevenuestreamswasFCFA409million,or0.25%oftotalgovernmentextractiverevenues(p.22).Thereportdidnotclarifywhichlocalentitiescollecttheserevenues.Thesepaymentswerenotreconciled.Thereportdidnotmakeacleardistinctionbetweendirectsubnationalpaymentsandsubnationaltransfers,i.e.taxescollectedatthecentrallevelandtransferredtolocalcommunitiesaccordingtoarepartitionformula.SubnationaltransfersarecoveredunderEITIRequirement5.2.

Atleastonerevenuestreamwascollectedatthelocallevel.Inthedescriptionofmaterialrevenuestreams,theEITIReportshowedthatanextractiontaxonmineralsclassifiedasquarryingiscollected“bytheconcernedlocalandregionalauthorities”fortheirownbenefit(p.70).TheEITIReportshowsthatpaymentsofthisextractiontaxamountedtoXOF130557100(p.31).TheIAalsostatedthatdiscrepancieswereinpartdueto“thepublicauthorities(prefecturesandmunicipalities)failurestodisclosetaxpayments”madebyreportingcompanies(p.34).Itisunclearhowmanylocalpublicauthoritiesfailedtodisclosedrevenues.

StakeholderviewsMSGmembersappearedtoconfusedirectsubnationalpaymentsandsubnationaltransfers.Thisconfusionwasnotlimitedtooneconstituencyandneitheroneofthethreeconstituencieshadaconsistentviewontheissue.Somecompanies’representativesandgovernmentofficialsarguedthattherearenodirectsubnationalpaymentsandthefour“directsubnationalpayments”describedintheReport(p.22)areinfactpaymentstoDGIanditsregionaloffices.AgovernmentofficialexplainedthatsmallcompaniespaytoDGI’sregionalbranches,whilelargecompaniespaydirectlytothedepartmentoflargetaxpayers.DGIregionalofficesdonotcommunicateregularlyitsrecordstocentralofficeinNiamey,whichmeansthattoassessmaterialityofsubnationalpaymentstheMSGwouldneedtoconsultlocaltaxcomptrollersintherelevantregions.Informationfromboththecentraltaxpayerdatabaseandtheregionaltaxofficesoneachtaxpayerwouldbeneeded.TherewasnoagreementwithintheMSGwhetherlocalauthorities(prefecturesandmunicipalities)alsocollecttaxesdirectlyfromtheminingcompanies.

InitialassessmentTheInternationalSecretariat’sinitialassessmentisthatNigerhasmadeinadequateprogresstowardsmeetingthisrequirement.ThiscaseillustratesthechallengesposedbythelackofamaterialitydefinitionfromtheMSGwithregardstodirectsubnationalpayments.TheInternationalSecretariatreceivedcontradictoryinformationthatdirectsubnationalpaymentsexistandareconsideredmaterial.YetdirectpaymentstolocalcommunitiesandthemechanismthroughwhichsuchpaymentsaremadehavenotbeendisclosedintheEITIReport.Stakeholdersappearedconfusedbetweendirectsubnationalpaymentsandsubnationaltransfers.Thisconfusionhashinderedtransparencyonbothissuesinsteadofimprovingit.Itisconceivablethatareviewofthisissuewilldemonstratethatthisprovisionisnotapplicablein




Niger.However,giventhelackofclarityontheseissues,andthelackofMSGdiscussion,thispositioncannotbesubstantiated.TheInternationalSecretariatconcludesthatsignificantaspectsofthisrequirementhavenotbeenimplementedandtheunderliningobjectiveshavenotbeenachieved.

InaccordancewithRequirement4.6,theMSGshouldassessthematerialityofdirectsubnationalpaymentsandincludeareconciliationofanymaterialdirectsubnationalpaymentsinfutureEITIReports.

Levelofdisaggregation(#4.7)

DocumentationofprogressTheReportprovidesthedetailedreconciliationtablesforeachoil,gasandminingcompanythatdiscloseddataaspartofthereconciliationexercise(p.31).Reconciledfiguresaredisaggregatedbycompany,revenuestreamandreceivinggovernmentagencyforall19companiesthatreported(annex5,pp.73-93).TheReportstatesthattheMSGagreedtopresentthereconciledEITIdatabyrevenueflow,companyandreceivinggovernmententity(p.23).TheReportprovidesdesegregatedfiguresbyrevenuestreamandbycompany(pp.31-37).FoursubsidiariesofCNPC(CNPCInternationalBilma,CNPCInternationalTenere,CNPCNigerPetroleumandSoraz)reportedseparatelyintheEITI2014Report.Intheminingsector,foursubsidiariesofAreva(ArevaMinesNiger,Cominak,ImourarenandSOMAIR)alsoreportedseparately,givingpartialdisaggregationbyproject.

Stakeholderviews

Stakeholdersnotedthattheyweresatisfiedbythelevelofdisaggregationprovidedinthereport.SeveralindustrystakeholdersnotedthatCNPCoperatedinNigerthroughtwosubsidiaries,includingseparatevehiclesforTénéréandBilma,andhadreportedinEITIassuch.Stakeholdersfromallthreeconstituenciesnotedthatmostcompaniesreportedataprojectlevelforpaymentstreamssuchasroyaltiesorprofitshare,butatcompany-levelforcommontaxeslikecorporateincometax.

InitialassessmentTheInternationalSecretariat’sinitialassessmentisthatNigerhasmadesatisfactoryprogressinmeetingthisrequirement.

Datatimeliness(#4.8)

DocumentationofprogressTheReportstatesthattheMSGagreedtopresentthecontextualinformationoftheyearassociatedwith2014EITIReports,clearlysourcingcontextualinformation(p.23).TheMSGsetsthefiscalperiodforreportingfrom1January–31December2014,onacashaccountingbasis(p.29).TheMSG’sapprovalofthereportingperiodisimplicit.TheReportwaspublishedinNovember2016,withinthetwo-yeardeadlinefortimelinessinaccordancewithEITIRequirement4.8.

StakeholderviewsSomestakeholdersnotedtimelierfutureEITIreportingwouldbehelpfultomaketherepotsmoreuseful




ontheissuesofsubnationaltransfersforlocalcommunities.

InitialassessmentTheInternationalSecretariat’sinitialassessmentisthatNigerhasmadesatisfactoryprogresstowardsmeetingthisrequirement.The2014ReportwaspublishedinNovember2016,whichmeetsthetimelinessrequirement.Insomecases,thereportincludesinformationabout2015.

Dataquality(#4.9)


AppointmentoftheIndependentAdministrator(IA):TheIAwasselectedthroughshortlisting,inaccordancewiththepublicprocurementproceduresapplicabletocontractsoflessthanXOF10,000,000.TherecruitmentprocesslastedthreemonthsbeginningimmediatelyaftertheapprovaloftheTORfortheIAon24JunetosignatureofthecontractinSeptember2016.Threefirmswereshortlisted:CCII(Cabinetd’ExpertiseComptableIbrahimIssoufou);CECAFORConsultandGuilbertandAssociates.Accordingtotheevaluationcommittee,GuilbertandAssociatespresentedthecheapestbidandwasselectedbythecommittee.ThecontracthiringtheIAwassignedbythePermanentSecretaryon8September2016.ThereisnoevidencethattheMSGendorsedthisdecisiontohirethisparticularIA.Accordingtopublicrecords,theMSGmetfivetimesin2016onthefollowingdates:9and17February,16and31Marchand28October.However,lackofMSGmeetingsduringtherecruitmentoftheIAdoesnotmeanthatMSGmemberswerenotinvolved.MSGmembersrepresentingthegovernmentandcompanieswereparticularlyinvolvedintheworkinggroup(commissiondecollecte)andcontributedinthewritingofthereportitself.TheworkinggroupmetuponrequestfromthePermanentSecretary.

TermsofReferencefortheIndependentAdministrator:TheTORfortheIAwasapprovedon24June2016.WhileitbroadlyfollowedthestandardTORapprovedbytheEITIBoard,therewereanumberofdeviations.Forinstance,underTable1ontheIA’stasksrelatedtopreparingthenon-financial(contextual)informationinthe2014EITIReport,theagreedTORonlyrequiretheIAtogiveitsopiniononthedraftingdonebytheMSG.Phase2oftheTORalsowavestheIA’sresponsibilitiesfordatacollection.

TherewerealsoseveralmajordeviationsfromtheagreedTORinpractice.AccordingtotheTOR,theIAwassupposedtocompletetheassignmentinfivephases:phase1,preliminaryanalysisandproductionofaninceptionreport;phasetwo,datacollection;phasethree,initialreconciliation;phasefour,investigationofdiscrepancies;andphase5,productionofafinalreport.Inpractice,thefirstthreephasesoftheassignmentwerecompletedbyaworkinggroupmadeupofMSGmembersandstafffromthenationalSecretariat(commissiondecollecte).TheIAreconcileddataalreadycollectedbythisworkinggroupandpreparedthesectionofthereportrelatedtothereconciliationofthefinancialpaymentsmadebytheoil,gasandminingcompanies.AllcontextualinformationdisclosedintheReportwaspreparedbytheworkinggroup.

Agreementonthereportingtemplates:TheReportstatesthatreportingtemplatesweredesignedbythedatacollectioncommitteeonbehalfoftheMSG(p.29).ThereisnoevidencethattheMSGendorsedthereportingtemplates.




Reviewofauditpractices:TheReportprovidesabriefdescriptionofthestatutoryauditproceduresforcompaniesandgovernmententities(p.23).TheMSGstatesthat“allcompanies”arerequiredtomaintainauditedaccountsinaccordancewithOHADA/UEMOAlaws(p.30).GovernmententitiesareauditedbytheCdCinlinewithINTOSAIstandards.TheReportdoesnotexplainwhethertheserequirementsarefollowedbycompaniesinpractice.TheCdCwasintheprocessofpreparingitssectoralauditofgovernmententitiesfor2014atthetimeofpublicationofthereport.AccordingtotheIA(p.23)onlyfivecompaniesstatedthattheirfinancialstatementswereauditedtointernationalstandards(OHADA)–SOMAIR,COMINAK,IMOURAREN,AREVAMINESNIGERandSML.

TheEITIReportdoesnotadvisereadersonhowfinancialstatementscanbeaccessed,asidefromreferencetotheCdCwebsite(whichdoesnothavethe2014auditedaccountsyet).

Assurancemethodology:TheReportstatesthat,basedonthereviewofstatutoryauditproceduresforcompaniesandgovernmententities,theMSGagreedtorequireasignaturefromahigh-levelrepresentativeofthereportingentityasqualityassurance(p.23).TheMSGdidnotdefinewhatconstitutesahigh-levelofficial.TheReportexplainedfurtherthatthatcompanies’reportingwasbasedonauditedaccountsverifiedbyacompanyofficialfromthefinancedepartment(pp.29-30).Governmentreportingwassignedbyahigh-levelofficial,whiletheauditof2014extractivesrevenuesbytheCdCwasstillongoing.TheIAalsoundertookthereconciliationofpaymentsin“acomprehensivemanner”andexplainedidentifieddiscrepancies(p.30).

TheReportjustifiedthattheseproceduresprovidedsufficientqualityassurancefortheEITIReportanditwasnotjudgednecessarytoundertakeadditionalverificationwork,particularlygiventheIA’smissionwasnotanaudit(p.23).TheIAstatesthatbasedonthefivecompanieswhoprovidedcertificationlettersfromexternalauditors,theIAconsidersthatthisprovidesa“sufficientbasisforthepublicationofanEITIReportthatiscomprehensiveandreliable.”However,thesefivecompaniescollectivelypaidlessthan27%oftotalreportedrevenues.

Confidentiality:NoconfidentialityclausesbetweentheIAandthereportingentitieswerereported.

Reconciliationcoverage:Accordingtothereport,reconciliationcovers21out37companiesrequiredtoreportandaccountsfor99.46%oftotalrevenues(page7).Thiscoverageishardtoverifybecausethenumberofcompaniesshouldhavebeen48insteadof37accordingthematerialitythresholdsetatzero.Basedonthismaterialitythreshold,governmentagenciesdidnotprovidefullunilateraldisclosureforallthecompaniesthatdidnotdisclosedataforreconciliation.TheIAdoesnotgiveanassessmentoffulldisclosurebygovernmentagencieseither,makingitdifficulttoassesswhetherrevenuereportedareexhaustive.

Assuranceomissions:Thereportdoesnotconfirmwhethertheagreedqualityassuranceprocedureofsignaturebyahigh-levelofficialwasfollowed.Itstatesthatfivecompaniesprovidedadditionalinformationandcertifiedaccounts.Thesefivecompaniespayed27%oftotalreportedrevenues.Itdoesnotassesswhetherlackofcertificationof73%ofreportedrevenueshashadmaterialimpactonthedatareliability.Governmentagencieswerenotrequiredtosubmitcertifieddata,butratherasignaturebyahigh-levelgovernmentofficialwasdeemedsufficientbytheMSG.TheIAstates(p.9)thatgovernment




disclosureswereallsignedbyhigh-levelgovernmentofficialsandthatthesectoralcontrolofextractiverevenuesin2014wasdonebytheMinistryofFinance’sletterofmanagementcontroloverthe2014budgetaspartofthe2015BudgetvoteattheNationalAssembly.TheReportnotesthatnotallreportedpaymentsweresupportedbytheactualreceiptorreference.Amongthegovernmentagenciesthatreported,onlytheDGIhadasystemtoidentifyallsupportingdocumentsforeachtransaction.EvenDGIdidnothavetheserecordsforpaymentsmadeattheregionallevel,becauseofalackofinternetconnectionbetweenthecentralofficeinNiameyandregionalDGIoffices.Thematerialityofpaymentsnotsupportedbyreceiptswasnotassessedinthereport.

DatareliabilityassessmentTheIAstates(p.10)thatonthebasisofworkundertaken,thereconciliationtablesreflectareliablepictureofentities’disclosuresforthefiscalyear2014.ThisdoesnotindicatewhethertheEITIReportprovidesacomprehensiveviewofallmaterialextractivesrevenues.Thereportonlynotes(p.30)thatthedefinitionofmaterialcompaniesprovidedacomprehensivecoverageofcompaniesoperatinginNiger’sEIsector.However,theReportsalsostatesthattheMSGdidnotdefineamaterialitythreshold.

TheIA’smissionletter(p.5)describesthescopeoftheworkassignedtoCabinetGuilbert&AssociatesSARL.Theletterstatesthattheworkwasconductedinlinewithinternationalauditingstandards(IFAC,IASBetIFRS).Onlyageneraldescriptionofthestepsisprovided,andthereisnofurtherexplanationofhowtheworkconductedwasofinternationalstandards.Thisisrepeatedonpage6intheReport,whereitisstatedthatunderthedefinitionofISRStheIA’sworkdidnotconstituteanauditoralimitedreviewoftheoil,gasandminingsectors.ItisalsostatedthattheIA’sworkisnotaimedatuncoveringillegalacts.

TheIAwasnotdirectlyinvolvedinthedatacollectionprocess,butthereportprovidesanoverview(pp.28-29)oftheIA’sdatacollectionwork,whichinvolved“directdatacollectiononsiteateachentity’soffices”.Duringthefact-findingmission,theIAadmittedthatdatacollectionwasdonepriortohisrecruitmentandhedidnotdirectlycollectdatafromeachcompany.TheIAcontactedreportingentitiesonlyincasesofdiscrepancies.TheIAstatesthatdespitethediscrepanciesandlackofreporting,99.67%ofrevenueswerereconciled(p.30).TheIAincorrectlystatesfurtherthat21ofthe37materialcompaniesreported,providedareconciliationcoverageof99.46%(p.33),inpracticeonly19companiesprovideddataforreconciliation(p.32).

Sourcingofinformation:Thedisclosedinformationwasnotalwaysclearlysourced.Forexample,exportdataisclearlysourcedwhereasproductiondataisnot.However,mostofthecontextualinformationappearstobeclearlysourced.Inadditiontoproductiondata,informationonreservesandestimatesoftheminingandpetroleumpotentialinNiger(pp.15-19)donotappeartobeclearlysourced.ThecontextualinformationwasdraftedbytheMSG,whichisalsoresponsibleforitsqualityassurance.

Pastrecommendations:TheEITIReportincludesafollow-uponpreviousrecommendationsmainlytoaddresslackoffulldisclosurebyreportingentitiesanddisclosureofsubnationalpayments(p.35).Implementationoftheserecommendationsareongoing.TheIAalsomaderecommendationsthatwerecounterproductive,suchasexclusionoftheartisanalminingduetoitsinformalnature.

Currentrecommendations:The2014EITIReportmakesrecommendationsrelatedtoimprovingthe




cadastresystemtoincludecompanies’uniqueidentificationnumbersanddigitisetheprocessofEITIreporting(p.36).

StakeholderviewsTheIAconfirmedthathisworkwaslimitedtoreconciliationandidentifyingdiscrepancies,andtheToRdidnotadequatelyrepresenttheworktheyactuallyundertook.Inceptionreport,reportingtemplateswerepreparedbyaworkinggroup,whichcollectedfinancialdatapriortohiringtheIA.ThedraftingofthereportwasdonejointlybytheworkinggroupandtheIA,whoinsistedthatallcompanieshaveatleastaninternalauditortocertifyaccounts,butthisappearsmorebasedonlegalrequirementsthanwhatisactuallyobservedinpractice.ExplanationonthequalityassuranceproceduresappearstocontradictswhatwasdescribedintheReport.AccordingtotheIAqualityassuranceproceduresincluded:

- Certificationbyaninternalauditoroffinancialstatement–thisisrequiredforallcompaniesofmorethanXOF10millionincapital.

- Certificationbyanexternalauditorifthecompanydoesnothaveaninternalauditor- Certificationbyahigh-levelofficialforgovernmentagencies.

TheIAconfirmedthatallgovernmentagenciesadheredtothequalityassuranceprocedureofsignaturebyahigh-levelgovernmentofficial.Pressedtodescribeahigh-levelofficial,theIAsaidthatthiscouldbetheSecretaryGeneral,theDirectorGeneralorheadofthegovernmentagencies.TheIAconfirmedthatthegeneralopinionwasbasedonhisexperiencemoregenerallynotontheassessmentofdifferentomissionsinthereportingprocess.Membersoftheworkinggroupthatpreparedreportingtemplatesandcollecteddataconfirmedthattheydidnotaskforthefinancialstatementsfromcompanies.SomememberssaidthatcompaniesaskedtosignalettercertifyingthattheirEITIdisclosuresareconsistentwiththeirauditedfinancialstatements.SomeworkinggroupmembersweresurprisedtohearthattheCdCshouldbeinvolvedincertificationofgovernmententities’EITIreporting.TheIAnotedthatsincethetaxsystemis“declarativesystem”,somecompanieshavedeclaredirregularitiesinthepast.

Allstakeholdersmetnotedthatdespitethemultiplegapsinreporting,theyfindEITIreportsarestilluseful.Accordingtothem,whenCSOsgododisseminationofEITIReports,itshowsthatthestateisdoingsomething.ManybelievethattheEITIReportsshowthatmultinationalsaretakingadvantageofNiger,givinghowlittletaxesarepaid.

Thefact-findingmissionvisitedtheCdCtoinquireaboutauditingpractices.TheCdCisresponsiblefortheoperationsofthestate.Itisstatutorilyrequiredtopublishallitsreports,bothbytheLoiOrganiqueandbytheUEMOATransparencyDirective.

TheCdCstartedpublishingauditreportsonEIrevenuescovering2010duetothegapsidentifiedinEITIreporting,specificallythefirstValidation’scorrectiveactions.Theyhavepublished2010,2011-2012andwerefinalising2013-2014atthetimeofthemission.Thisisafinancialandprocessaudit.Theyuseseveralmeansofcontrolincludingspotinspections.Theyevenrecalculatetaxliabilitiesforeverytaxpayingcompanyattimes,astheydidfor2011-2012,usingthetextoftheoperatingcontracts.The2013-2014CdCreportislatebecauseitgetsreprioritisedwhenothermorepressingprioritiescomealong(eg




budgetaudit)andbecausegovernmentagenciesarenotquickinreactingtotheirrequestsforinformation.

WhentheCdCidentifiesirregularitiesintheirEIaudits,theycomparefiguresfromtheliquidatorandreceivertoestablishwhetherthetaxespaidarethosethatshouldhavebeenpaidandwhethertheliquidatedamonghasbeenrecovered.TheirEIauditfollowsthetraceabilityfromthetaxpayertotheTreasury–thereareseveralreconciliations,includingbetween:(i)LiquidatorandreceiverswithineachMinistry(PetroleumandMines);(ii)MinistryandDGI;and(iii)DGIandthetreasury.

ThecourtalsoreconcilespaymentsbetweenwhatthetaxpayersaysithaspaidandwhattheDGIhasreceived.ThecourtauditorsfollowINTOSAIstandardsaswellasnationallaws.Thismeansthattheydelvedownintojustifyingevidenceoftransactions.

WhiletheaccountingsystemsoftheDGIandcustomsaredigitisedfortheNiameyoperations,theaccountingsystemsoftheseentitiesatthedecentralisedlevelarenot,whichmakestrackingpaymentsfromoutsideNiameydifficult.“Auditreportsofthegovernment’sannualfinancialstatementsfromthesupremeauditinstitutionwerepubliclyavailablewithinareasonableperiodoftime.”(USDepartmentofState,2016)

MSGmembersstatedthatallcompaniesarerequiredtofileauditedFinancialStatementsattheTribunaldeGrandeInstanceHorsClassedeNiamey.MSGmemberswereundertheimpressionthattheseFinancialstatementsareavailabletothepublicuponrequestattheTribunal.Thefact-findingmissionfromtheInternationalSecretariatvisitedthetribunalon27January2017.ItturnedoutthattheTribunalisnolongerthedepositoryofsuchdocuments,whichisnowparttheprerogativeoftheCommerceTribunal.Thisnewtribunalwascreatedin2004,butbecameoperationalonlyinApril2016.Itessentiallyacourtspecialisedinthehandlingofcommercialdisputes.OfficialsattheTribunaldeGrandeInstanceHorsClassedeNiameyconfirmedthetransferofallarchivesrelatedtocommercialactivities,includingauditedfinancialstatementssubmittedbyoil,gasandminingcompaniestothenewcommercetribunal.

Thefact-findingmissionalsovisitedtheCommerceTribunalofNiameyandinquiredaboutaccesstoauditedfinancialstatementsbythepublic.Officialsatthetribunalexplainedthatthecourtrecordsarenotpublic,buttheycangrant“asupervisedaccess”todocumentsbasedonmotivatedrequest.Inordertoaccessthecourtrecords,themissionwouldneedtofilearequestandwaitforapproval.Ifaccesstodocumentsisgrantedbythecourt,itispossibletoreaddocumentinsidethebuildingandtakenotes,butcopyandrepublicationwouldnotbeallowed.ThemissionconcludedthatcontrarytoMSGmembers’belief,auditedfinancialstatementsofoil,gasandminingcompaniesarenotpublic.

Initialassessment

TheInternationalSecretariat’sinitialassessmentisthatNigerhasmadeinadequateprogresstowardsmeetingthisrequirement.TheMSGapprovedtheproceduresforhiringtheIAassetoutintheTORadoptedon24June2016,butitdidnotformallyendorsetheselectionoftheIndependentAdministrator,aftertheevaluationofbidsfromthreeshortlistedconsultants.TheagreedTORsfortheIndependentAdministratorwerebroadlyinlinewiththestandardTORforEITIReports,albeitwithanumberofsignificantdeviationsandtheworkcompletedbytheIAdeviatedfromtheagreedTORsignificantly.Only




thelasttwophasesoftheassignment(reconciliation,andfinalreport)werecompletedbytheIA.AworkinggroupcomposedofMSGmembersandstaffatthepermanentsecretariatpreparedthecontextualinformationdisclosedintheReportandcompletedthefirstthreephasesoutlinedintheTORsfortheIA,includinginceptionreport,designofreportingtemplatesanddatacollection.

TheMSGdidnotformallyapprovethereportingtemplates,whichwerepreparedbyitsworkinggroupondatacollection.TheMSGdidnotundertakeacomprehensivereviewoftheauditingpracticesinNigerpriortoagreeingqualityassuranceproceduresforcompaniesandgovernmententitiesparticipatinginEITIreporting.Theagreedqualityassuranceproceduresdidnotclearlysetoutarobustprocedureforreportingentitiestoensurethecredibilityofthediscloseddata.Thetypesofassurancestobeprovided,theoptionsconsideredandtherationalefortheagreedassuranceswereallmissingfromthereport.

TheIAdidnotverifywhetherreportingcompaniesandgovernmententitieshadtheirfinancialstatementsauditedinthefinancialyearcoveredbytheEITIreportduringthescopingorinceptionphases.TheEITIReportprovidesasummaryofkeyfindingsfromtheIndependentAdministrator’sopinionwithregardstothereliabilityofthedata,butthisopinionwasnotbasedonassessmentofidentifiedgaps.AllcontextualinformationwascollectedandpreparedbytheMSG,butnotallofitwasclearlysourced.Atthetimeofthemission,relevantelectronicdatafileshadnotbeenpublished.SummarydatafromtheEITIReporthadnotbeensubmittedelectronicallytotheInternationalSecretariataccordingtothestandardisedreportingformatprovidedbytheInternationalSecretariat.TheInternationalSecretariatconcludesthatsignificantaspectofthisrequirementhavenotbeenimplementedandtheunderliningobjectiveofdatareliabilityhasnotbeenachieved.

InpreparingthenextEITIReports,theMSGshouldfindaworkablesolutiontotheprovisionofqualityassurancecertificationforEITIdisclosuresfrombothgovernmentandcompaniestoensurethatreconciledpaymentsandrevenuesaresubjecttocredible,independentaudit,applyinginternationalauditingstandards.TheMSGshouldensurethattheTORfortheIAisinlinewiththestandardTORapprovedbytheEITIBoardandthatitsagreementonanydeviationsfromtheTORinthefinalEITIReportsbeproperlydocumented.TheMSGshouldagreewiththeIAarobustapproachforensuringcredibilityofdatadisclosedinEITIReportinaccordancewithEITIRequirement4.9.TheMSGmaywishtoassessthefeasibilityofmainstreamingEITIreportingingovernmentsystemsinlinewithRequirement4.9.c.




Table4-Summaryinitialassessmenttable:Revenuecollection


InternationalSecretariat’sinitialassessmentofprogresswiththeEITIprovisions

Comprehensiveness(#4.1)

TheMSGdidnotdefinematerialitythresholdsforselectingcompaniesandrevenuestreamsspecificallyforthe2014EITIReport.Rather,itfollowedtheapproachadoptedin2010,priortotheadoptionoftheEITIrulesandtheEITIStandard.Lackofacleardefinitionofmaterialityiscompoundedbyalackofanexhaustivelistofcompaniesoperatinginthecountryandlackoffulldisclosurefromgovernmentagencies.TheEITIReportdidnotincludeanassessmentofthematerialityofnon-reporting.

InadequateProgress

In-kindrevenues(#4.2)

TheMSGconcludedthatin-kindrevenueswerenotmaterial.Basedonareviewofthepricingmechanismofvariousmineralproductsandstakeholderconsultations,theInternationalSecretariatagreeswiththeMSGassessmentthatin-kindrevenuesofoil,uraniumandgoldwerenotmaterialin2014.

N/A

Barterandinfrastructuretransactions(#4.3)

TheTORfortheIAadoptedbytheMSGon24June2016referredtoa90-million-europrojectfortheroadIrhazeretobebuiltbyArevathatcouldpotentiallybeclassifiedasaninfrastructureproject(page20).YettheIAstatesinthefinalreportthattheMSGisnotawareofinfrastructureprovisionsandbartertypeagreements.InthestrategicpartnershipagreementsignedinMay2014betweenArevaandtheGovernmentofNiger,Arevacommittedtoprovidefinancialsupportforlocaldevelopmentandinfrastructureprojects.ThisagreementwasnotintheEITIReportinaccordancewithRequirement4.3.

NoProgress

Transportrevenues(#4.4)

TheMSGdidnotagreeadefinitionofmaterialitywithregardstorevenuesfromtransport,butbasedonstakeholders’consultationduringthefactfindingmission,theSecretariatconcludesthattransportrevenueswereimmaterialduringthe

N/A




reportingperiod.

TransactionsbetweenSOEsandgovernment(#4.5)

OnlyoneSOE(SOPAMIN)outoffivereportedtransactionsasanSOE.CNEM,CNTPS,SMLandSONICHARareallmajorityownedbythestatebutwerenotclassifiedasSOEs.TheseSOEsmadematerialpaymentstothegovernment,buttheEITIReportdidnotexplainwhethertheycollectedmaterialrevenuesonbehalfofthestate.

Inadequateprogress

Subnationaldirectpayments(#4.6)

TheMSGdidnotprovideadefinitionofmaterialitywithregardstodirectsubnationalpayments.TheInternationalSecretariatreceivedcontradictoryinformationthatdirectsubnationalpaymentsexistandareconsideredmaterial.Yetdirectpaymentstolocalcommunitiesandthemechanismthroughwhichsuchpaymentsaremadehavenotbeendisclosedinthereport.Stakeholdersappearedconfusedbetweendirectsubnationalpaymentsandsubnationaltransfers.Theconfusionbetweenthesetwopaymentshashinderedtransparencyonbothissuesinsteadofimprovingit.

Inadequateprogress

Levelofdisaggregation(#4.7)

TheReportprovidesdisaggregatedfiguresbyrevenuestreamandbycompany.


Datatimeliness(#4.8)

The2014ReportwaspublishedinNovember2016,whichmeetsthetimelinessrequirement.TheMSGapprovedthereportingperiodandcash-accountingbasisofEITIreporting.


Dataquality(#4.9)

TheworkcompletedbytheIAdeviatessignificantlyfromtheapprovedTORandlacksstrongqualityassuranceprocedures.Disclosedpaymentsandrevenueswerenotcertifiedandthereisevidencethatonly27%ofdisclosedpaymentscamefromauditedaccounts.AllcontextualinformationwaspreparedbytheMSG,someofwhichwasnotclearlysourced.

Inadequateprogress


• TheMSGshouldensurethatallrevenueflowslistedunderRequirement4.1.bareincludedinthescopeofreconciliationandthatthematerialitythresholdforselectingcompaniesensuresthatallpaymentsthatcouldaffectthecomprehensivenessofEITIreportingbeincludedinthescopeofreconciliation.Thelistofmaterialcompaniesshouldalsoclearlybedefined.TheMSGisinvitedtoconsiderwhethersettingaquantitativematerialitythresholdforselectingcompanieswouldensuretheseaimsaremet.TheMSGshouldensurethatNiger’snextEITI




ReportincludestheIA’sassessmentofthematerialityofomissions,itsstatementonthecomprehensivenessoftheEITIReportandthatfullunilateralgovernmentdisclosureofmaterialrevenuesfromnon-materialcompaniesisincluded.

• TheMSGisencouragedtoreviewtheinvolvementofSOEsinthecommercialisationofmineralproductsandimprovetransparencyofthevariouspricingmechanismsofmineralproducts.

• TheMSGisencouragedtoconductareviewofexistingcontractsinfutureEITIreportingtoestablishthematerialityofbartertypeagreements.Inparticular,theMSGisencouragedtoreviewthestrategicagreementbetweentheGovernmentofNigerandAreva,signedinMay2014andconsideraddressingitinaccordancewithEITIRequirement4.3.

• InaccordancewithRequirement4.4,theMSGisencouragedtoconsideradefinitionofmaterialitywithregardstorevenuesfromtransport.Inparticular,theMSGmaywishtoconsiderincludingCNTPSthattransporturaniumconcentratefromArlittoCotonou,BeninandsimilarSOEsinEITIreporting.

• ItisrecommendedthattheMSGincludesallmaterialpaymentscollectedbySOEsonbehalfofthestateandallpaymentsbyallSOEstothestateinfutureEITIreporting,inlinewithRequirement4.5.

• InaccordancewithRequirement4.6,theMSGshouldassessthematerialityofdirectsubnationalpaymentsandincludeareconciliationofanymaterialdirectsubnationalpaymentsinfutureEITIReports.

• InpreparingthenextEITIReports,theMSGshouldfindaworkablesolutiontotheprovisionofqualityassurancecertificationforEITIdisclosuresfrombothgovernmentandcompaniestoensurethatreconciledpaymentsandrevenuesaresubjecttocredible,independentaudit,applyinginternationalauditingstandards.TheMSGshouldagreewiththeIAarobustapproachforensuringcredibilityofdatadisclosedinEITIReportinaccordancewithEITIRequirement4.9.TheMSGmaywishtoassessthefeasibilityofmainstreamingEITIreportingingovernmentsystemsinlinewithEITIRequirement4.9.c.




5.Revenuemanagementanddistribution

5.1Overview

ThissectionprovidesdetailsontheimplementationoftheEITIrequirementsrelatedtorevenuemanagementanddistribution.

5.2Assessment

Distributionofrevenues(#5.1)

DocumentationofprogressTheReportstatesthatallextractivesrevenuesincludedinthescopeofreconciliation,i.e.allrevenuessincethematerialitythresholdwassetatzero,areincludedinthenationalbudget(p.23).Foranyexceptionalrevenueduringtheyear,asupplementarybudgetispassedtoensureitisreflectedinthebudget.,inlinewithArticle152oftheConstitution.However,article152oftheConstitutionallowforrevenuestoberecordedeitheratthecentralorlocallevel.Itstatesthat“revenuefromnaturalandsubsurfaceresourcesareallocatedbetweenthestatebudgetandcommunitybudgets”(p.23).TheEITIReportdoesnotincludeanyreferencetonationalorinternationalrevenueclassificationsystems.

StakeholderviewsTherewasdisagreementwithintheMSGastowhethersubnationalpaymentsarerecordedinthebudgetatthecentralorlocallevel.SomeCompaniesandcivilsocietyrepresentativesstatedthatsubnationaltransferstolocalcommunitiesarerecordedinthemunicipalities’budget.Agovernmentrepresentativearguedthatsinceallrevenuesarecollectedbythecentralgovernment,earmarkedrevenuestolocalcommunitiesarealsorecordedinthenationalbudget.

InitialassessmentTheInternationalSecretariat’sinitialassessmentisthatNigerhasmademeaningfulprogressinmeetingthisrequirement.TheReportindicatesthatallrevenuesfromtheextractiveindustryarerecordedinthenationalbudget,howeverconsultationswithstakeholdersseemtocontradictthisclaim,indicatingthatfurtherworkisneededtodemonstratethattherequirementismet.

InaccordancewithRequirement5.1,theMSGshouldindicatewhichextractiveindustryrevenues,whethercashorinkind,arerecordedinthenationalbudget.Incases,whererevenuesarenotrecordedintheNationalbudget(subnationalgovernments,state-ownedenterprises,andotherextra-budgetaryentities),theallocationoftheserevenuesmustbeexplained,withlinksprovidedtorelevantfinancialreportsasapplicable.

Sub-nationaltransfers(#5.2)

DocumentationofprogressAccordingtoArticle95oftheMiningCode,thefollowingfiverevenuestreams:miningroyalty,areafees,fixedfee,artisanalminingtaxandproceedsfromthesaleofIDcardstoartisanalminers,arecollectedby




thecentralgovernmentthroughDGIthendistributedbetweencentralandlocalgovernments.Thelargershareofcollectedrevenues(85%thetotalcollectedamountforthesefiverevenuestreams)shouldbetransferredtothenationalbudgetandtheremaining15%shouldbetransferredtotheregionsandcommuneswhereproductiontakeplace.TheEITIReportdocumentsthissplit(p.23).TheReportalsostatedthattherevenuesplitbetweennationalandsubnationalgovernmentsisnetofa“fee”forMinistryofMinesagents.Thefeeforgovernmentagentsanditsexactlevelarenotexplained.TheReportnotedthatthesepaymentsarematerialsbutdidnotprovidedetailedinformationonsubnationaltransfers?TheReportstatedthattheMSGdidnothavesufficientinformationontheissueanditwouldbeexaminedinfuturereports.Article146ofthePetroleumCodealsorequiresasimilarrevenuesharingformula(85/15)betweennationalandsubnationalaffectedgovernmentsforthefollowingrevenuestreams:advaloremroyalty,fixedandsuperficialfees.Itisalsostatedthattherevenuesplitbetweennationalandsubnationalgovernmentsisnetofa“fee”forMinistryofHydrocarbonsagents.Thisfeeforgovernmentagentscollectingtaxesanditsexactlevelarenotexplained.TheReportdescribestheprocessofsubnationaltransfers(p.24).AllrevenuesarefirstcentralizedintheTreasury’ssingleaccount,beforetransferringtospecificregionalTreasurersintheirliaisonaccounts,whoareresponsibleforthentransferringfundsontoeachmunicipality,followingmeetingswithmunicipalitiesintheregion.UnderArticle6ofDecree2007-184/PRN/MI/Dof25May2007,municipalitiesreceivingthesefundsarerequiredtospend90%offundsoninvestment,5%onoperationsand5%ontechnicalassistanceormonitoringandevaluationformunicipalities.Theuseoffundsisdecidedduringmunicipalcouncilmeetingsthatareopentothepublic,supportedbyCSOsthataredevelopingparticipatorybudgeting.ItisstatedthattheMSGhasnotsufficientinformationonthisprocessbutitwillincludemoreinformationinfutureEITIReports.ThereisnoevidenceintheEITIReportthatsubnationaltransfersweremadein2014.TheEITIReportdidnotdiscloserevenuestransferredtolocalcommunitiesanditdidnotshowanyoutstandingpaymentsowedtolocalcommunities.

StakeholderviewsCivilsocietyrepresentativescommentedthattheissueofsubnationaltransferswasofparamountinteresttolocalcommunities,metduringdisseminationcampaigns,butreportspublishedbyEITINigerlackedaclearresponsetoquestionsaboutwhetherornotlawsonsubnationaltransferswereapplied.Agovernmentofficialstatedthatthatthestatutory15%subnationaltransfershadbeensuspendedtemporarily,because“therewerenotenoughprojectsatthesubnationalleveltodisbursefunds”,inlinewiththerequirementthat90%ofthefundsbespentoninfrastructureand10%onoperationalcostsatthelevelofeachmunicipality.Thegovernmentofficialconfirmedthatsubnationaltransfershadresumedrecently,butdidnotprovidespecificfigures.

TheIAstatedthattherevenuestreamswereselectedbasedontheapplicablelaws,butnotwhetherthesepaymentswerematerialornot.Agovernmentofficialconfirmedthatthefour“directsubnationalpayments”describedonpage22intheEITIReport,wereinfactpaymentstodecentralisedTaxDepartment(DGI)offices.Thereappearedtobeaconfusioninterminologybetweendirectsubnational




paymentsthatshouldbecollectedatthelocallevelandsubnationaltransfersthatarecollectedatthecentrallevel,thentransferredtolocalgovernments.

Agovernmentrepresentativealsoexplainedthatinadditiontothe85/15revenuesharingformulaforcertainrevenuesstreams,otherrevenuesstreamscollectedbyTaxDepartment(DGI)followdifferentrevenuesharingformula:ProfessionaltaxandBusinesstax(100%tobetransferredlocalmunicipalities);Propertytaxandsynthetictax(thestateretains50%and50%senttomunicipalities).However,theserevenueswerenotrelatedtoextractivesactivitiesandappliedtoallbusinesses,whilesomerevenuestreamsappliedonlytotheinformalsector.

Initialassessment

TheInternationalSecretariat’sinitialassessmentisthatNigerhasmadeinadequateprogresstowardsmeetingthisrequirement.TheMSGdescribedthelegalframeworkofrevenuesharingrequirementsintheminingandpetroleumcodes,butitdidnotdiscloseanymaterialsubnationaltransfersin2014.TheMSGdidnotestablishwhetherthe15%ofstatutorysubnationaltransferswerematerialduringthereportingperiod.Itdidnotrequirerelevantgovernmentagencies(DGI,DGTCP,regionsandmunicipalities)todisclosesuchinformationandtheMSG’sdefinitionofmaterialityregardingstatutorysubnationaltransfersremainsunclear.TheInternationalSecretariatconcludesthatsignificantaspectsofthisrequirementhavenotbeenimplementedandtheunderliningobjectiveshavenotbeenachieved.

InaccordancewithRequirement5.2,theheMSGisrequiredtoensurethatmaterialsubnationaltransfersaredisclosed.TheMSGshoulddiscloseallrevenuesharingformula,aswellasanydiscrepanciesbetweenthetransferamountcalculatedinaccordancewiththerelevantrevenuesharingformulaandtheactualamountthatwastransferredbetweenthecentralgovernmentandeachrelevantsubnationalentity.Themulti-stakeholdergroupisencouragedtoreconcilethesetransfers.TheMSGisalsoencouragedtoreviewthefindingsofthePAMOJEF’sstudyontheformulationofamechanismtoensuretheefficiencyandeffectivemanagementofminingrevenuesreturnedtoterritorialcommunities(June2016)andconsideraholisticapproachforaddressingtheissueofsubnationaltransfers.

Additionalinformationonrevenuemanagementandexpenditures(#5.3)

DocumentationofprogressTheEITIReportdidnotincludeadescriptionofearmarkedrevenues,butincludedmoredetailsonthepreparationandapprovalofthebudgetandthelegalbasisfortheprocess(P.23).TheEITIReportdidnotincludelinkstopublicdocuments,buttheMSGstatesthatthegovernmentwillpublishasimplifiedversionofthebudgettofacilitateitsunderstandingbytheaveragecitizen(p.24).Thecitizens'budgetisasimplifiedversion43ofthenationalbudget“loideFinance”.Itsummarizesthemainfiguresinthelaw,andexplainshowexpendituresareallocatedtofundservicesthatwouldbenefitordinarycitizen.

43http://www.stat-niger.org/statistique/file/MF/Budget_Citoyen_LFR_%202016.pdf




Stakeholderviews

Stakeholdersweresatisfiedwithrecentprogressmadeinimprovingtransparencyoftheresourceallocation,butmanyMSGmembersmethadnotseenthesimplifiedversionofthebudgetpublishedbytheMinistryofFinance.

InitialassessmentTheMSGhasmadesomeattempttoincludinginformationonthebudget-makingprocessintheEITIReport.TheReportsdoesnotincludeadescriptionofanyextractiverevenuesearmarkedforspecificprogrammesorgeographicregions.Adescriptionofthemethodsforensuringefficiencyandaccountabilityintheuseofsuchfunds,inaccordancewithEITIRequirement5.3.a,isparticularlyrelevantinNiger,butthisinformationwasnotprovidedintheEITIReport.

AnAfDBfundedproject,PAMOJEFcommissionedastudy44fortheformulationofamechanismtoensuretheefficiencyandeffectivemanagementofminingrevenuesreturnedtolocalcommunitiesinJune2016.Thisstudyfoundmultipleirregularitiesandlackoftransparencyinthetransfersoffundstomunicipalities.IntheAgadezregionforexample,thestudyestimatedthat76.8%ofthetotalamountduetolocalmunicipalities(XOF1977992953)werestilloutstandinginMarch2016.IntheTillaberiregion,theamounttransferredtoruralmunicipalitiesweresosmall(lessthanUS$10000)thatmayorsarenotabletofollowtoresourceallocationformulathat90%ofthefundsarespentoninfrastructureand10%onoperationalcosts.Thestudyfoundirregulartransfersoffundsbetweencentraltreasuryanditsregionaloffices.Moreover,thetransfersbetweenregionalofficesandlocalmunicipalitiescanalsobedelayedbythreetosixmonthsfollowingthereceptionoffundsfromthecentraltreasuryoffice.TheMSGisencouragedtoreviewthefindingsofthisstudyandconsideraholisticapproachforaddressingtheissueofsubnationaltransfers.

TheEITIReportincludesadescriptionofthecountry’sbudgetandauditprocessesbutitdoesnotincludelinkstopubliclyavailableinformationaboutbudgetingandexpenditure(5.3.b).TheMSGisencouragedtoreviewthe“citizen’sbudget”issuedbytheMinistryofFinanceandprovidemoreinformationrelatedtothebudgetcycle,productionandcommoditypriceassumptionusedinbudgetplanning.TheEITIReportcouldalsoincludecommentsonrevenuesustainability,resourcedependence,andrevenueforecasting(5.3.c).

44Studyfortheformulationofamechanismtoensuretheefficiencyandeffectivemanagementofminingrevenuesreturnedtoterritorialcommunities,June2016




Table5-Summaryinitialassessmenttable:Revenuemanagementanddistribution


InternationalSecretariat’sinitialassessmentofprogresswiththeEITIprovisions

Distributionofrevenues(#5.1)

TheReportindicatesthatallrevenuesfromtheextractiveindustryarerecordedinthenationalbudget.TheMSGgivesinformationaboutdistributionofrevenuesintheorynotinpractice.Revenuesnotrecordedinthenationalbudgetwerenotclearlyidentifiedforthefiscalperiodcovered(p.23).Thereportdidnotreferencenationalclassificationsystems.

Meaningfulprogress

Sub-nationaltransfers(#5.2)

TheMSGdescribedthelegalframeworkofrevenuesharingrequirementsintheminingandpetroleumcodes,butitdidnotdiscloseanymaterialpaymentsin2014.TheMSGdidnotestablishwhetherthe15%ofstatutorysubnationaltransferswerematerialduringthereportingperiod.Itdidnotrequirerelevantgovernmentagencies(DGI,DGTCP,regionsandmunicipalities)todisclosesuchinformationandtheMSG’sdefinitionofmaterialityregardingmandatorysubnationaltransfersremainsunclear.

Inadequateprogress

Informationonrevenuemanagementandexpenditures(#5.3)

TheMSGhasmadesomeattempttoincludinginformationonthebudget-makingprocessintheEITIReport.


• InaccordancewithRequirement5.1,theMSGshouldindicatewhichextractiveindustryrevenues,whethercashorinkind,arerecordedinthenationalbudget.Incases,whererevenuesarenotrecordedintheNationalbudget(subnationalgovernments,state-ownedenterprises,andotherextra-budgetaryentities),theallocationoftheserevenuesmustbeexplained,withlinksprovidedtorelevantfinancialreportsasapplicable.

• InaccordancewithRequirement5.2,theheMSGisrequiredtoensurethatmaterialsubnationaltransfersaredisclosed.TheMSGshoulddiscloseallrevenuesharingformula,aswellasanydiscrepanciesbetweenthetransferamountcalculatedinaccordancewiththerelevantrevenuesharingformulaandtheactualamountthatwastransferredbetweenthecentralgovernment




andeachrelevantsubnationalentity.Themulti-stakeholdergroupisencouragedtoreconcilethesetransfers.TheMSGisencouragedtoreviewthefindingsofthePAMOJEF’sstudyontheformulationofamechanismtoensuretheefficiencyandeffectivemanagementofminingrevenuesreturnedtoterritorialcommunities(June2016)andconsideraholisticapproachforaddressingtheissueofsubnationaltransfers.

• TheMSGisencouragedtoreviewthe“citizen’sbudget”publishedbytheMinistryofFinanceandprovidemoreinformationrelatedtothebudgetcycle,productionandcommoditypriceassumptionusedinbudgetplanning.TheEITIreportcouldalsoincludecommentsonrevenuesustainability,resourcedependence,andrevenueforecasting(5.3.c).

6. Socialandeconomicspending

6.1Overview

ThissectionprovidesdetailsontheimplementationoftheEITIrequirementsrelatedtosocialandeconomicspending(SOEquasi-fiscalexpenditures,socialexpendituresandcontributionoftheextractivesectortotheeconomy).

6.2Assessment

Socialexpenditures(#6.1)

DocumentationofprogressIn2010,Nigerintroducedintoitsmodelminingcontractaclause(Article18.2)requiringcompaniestopaycontributionstothedevelopmentofregionsandcommuneswheretheiractivitiesarebased.Thismandatorysocialpaymentisnotretroactiveandwassupposedtoapplytocompanieshavingsignedaminingcontractafter2010.TheMSGtooknoteofthesedevelopmentsintheEITIReport(pp.25-26)andstatedthatthegovernment’seffortstobetterorganizesocialexpenditureswillbecoveredinfutureEITIReports.TheEITIReportdidnotspecificallydiscussthematerialityofmandatorysocialpayments.

Asforvoluntarysocialpayments,theEITIReportdidnotdiscussanymaterialityofsocialpayments.Itisunclearfromthereportwhichguidelinesifanyweregiventocompaniesfortheirreportingonsocialpayments.Onlytworeportingcompanies(COMINAKandSOMAIR)disclosedtheirsocialexpenditures.Thedisclosedfiguresweredisaggregatedbetweenlocaldevelopmentandotheractivities.Itisunclearwhetherthesesocialpaymentswerevoluntaryormandatory.TheEITIReportdidnotclarifywhetherthesetwocompanieshavesignedcontractsinlinewiththegovernment’snewmodelcontractsince2010.Itisunclearfromthereportwhetheranysocialexpenditureswereprovidedin-kind.TheMSGstated(p.25)thatunderArticle18.2ofthemodelminingcontract,companiesarerequiredto“pay”socialcontributions.

StakeholderviewsIndustryrepresentativesstatedthatmanycompaniesmakevoluntarysocialpayments.Forexample,




stakeholdersnotedthatArevaanditssubsidiariesmakevoluntarysocialpaymentsofXOF500millionperyearsince2006totheregionsofIferouanandArlits.Stakeholdersconfirmedthelackofclarityintheenforcementofthemandatorysocialpaymentprovisionsinthestandardcontractthatcameintoforcein2011.UNDPissupportingtheMinistryofMinetodefineregulationsforimplementingsocialexpendituresprovisionsintheminingsector.Industryrepresentativesalsomentionedsocialpaymentsmadebyoilandgascompaniesthatwerenotreported.Nospecificamountofmoneyorin-kindcontributionsweregiventosubstantiatethis.

InitialassessmentItisconceivablethatadetailedreviewofthisissuewoulddemonstratethatthisprovisionisnotapplicableinNigerin2014,i.e.,thatnoneofthecompaniesthathadsignedminingcontractssince2010hadstartedmakingmandatorysocialexpenditures.However,thereappearstobesignificantdoubtastowhetherthisisthecase.TheMSGdidnotdefinematerialitywithregardstomandatorysocialexpenditures.Notallmandatorysocialexpenditureshavebeendisclosedandreconciledinaccordancewithprovision6.1.a.Adhocreportingonmandatorysocialpaymentsbysomecompanies(COMINAKandSOMAIR)reflectsthelackofaclearlydefinedmethodologyandaqualityassurancemechanismforcompanies’reporting.Therefore,theInternationalSecretariat’sinitialassessmentisthatNigerhasmadeinadequateprogresstowardsmeetingthisrequirement.

TheMSGisrequiredtodisclosesocialexpendituresbycompaniesmandatedbylaworbytheircontractswiththegovernment.Wherepossible,theMSGisencouragedtoreconcilethesetransactions.TheMSGshouldestablishwhethersuchpaymentsareprovidedinkind,andconsiderdisclosingthenatureofthepaymentandthedeemedvalueofthein-kindtransactioninaccordancewithRequirement6.1.

SOEquasifiscalexpenditures(#6.2)

DocumentationofprogressTheReportstatesthatSOEshaveundertakenquasi-fiscalexpendituressuchaswells,hydraulicsystems,schools,healthcentres,roadsandthebuildingfortheMinistriesofMiningandPetroleum(p.26).However,theamountspentbySOEsasquasi-fiscalexpenditureswerenotdisclosedforthe2014reportingperiod.ThereisnoevidencethattheMSGdiscussedthematerialityofsuchpaymentseither.Thereisalsoconfusionbetweenquasi-fiscalexpendituresandsocialpaymentsmadebySOEs.

StakeholderviewsNoneofthestakeholdersconsultedrecalledhavingdiscussedquasi-fiscalexpendituresasaseparateissueintheprocessforEITIreporting.MSGmembersconfirmedthattheMSGdidnotagreeacleardefinitionofmaterialitywithregardstoquasi-fiscalexpenditures.StakeholdersmentionedrevenuesearmarkedtotrainingsofstaffattheMinistryofMine(fraisdeformation).Stakeholdersexplainedthattheserevenuesaretransferredtoanaccountheldbytheministryofmine.TheCdCfoundapositivebalanceofmoreXOF1billioninthisaccountduringtheauditofthe2011and2012accounts.TheCourtnotedthattheministrydidnothavetrainingprogrammesandnotrainingshadtakenplace,despitetheavailablefundingandtheidentifiedtrainingneeds.Itwasunclearwhetherthiswasaccountedforinthenationalbudget,orwhetheritisaquasi-fiscalexpenditure.GovernmentrepresentativesexplainedthatwhenSOPAMINprepareditsbudget,itincludedaline“supportforthestateanditsentities”(“Appuialetatetases




demembrements”),thatcoveredtransferstogovernmententities,buttheyemphasisedthatallprivatecompaniesincludedthiskindoflineintheirannualbudgets,categorisingtheseassocialexpenditures.SOEs’financialstatementswerenotpubliclyavailable.

Initialassessment

TheInternationalSecretariat’sinitialassessmentisthatNigerhasmadeinadequateprogresstowardsmeetingthisrequirement.TheMSGdidnotdefinematerialitywithregardstoquasi-fiscalexpendituresbySOEs,includingSOEsubsidiariesandjointventures.TheMSGgavealonglistofactivitiescompletedbySOEswithoutstatingthecostoftheseactivities.TheMSGdidnotdevelopareportingprocessfordisclosureofquasi-fiscalexpenditures,basedonacleardefinitionofmateriality.GiventhemultitudeofSOEsoperatingintheextractivesectorinNigerandthelackofpubliclyaccessiblefinancialstatementsfortheseSOEs,theInternationalSecretariatconcludedthatsignificantaspectsofthisrequirementhavenotbeenimplementedandtheunderliningobjectiveshavenotbeenachieved.

TheMSGisrequiredtodevelopareportingprocessforSOEstodisclosetheirquasi-fiscalexpenditureswithaviewtoachievingaleveloftransparencycommensuratewithotherpaymentsandrevenuestreams,andshouldincludeSOEsubsidiariesandjointventuresinaccordancewithRequirement6.2.

Contributionoftheextractivesectortotheeconomy(#6.3)


ShareofGDP:TheEITIReportgivesanoverviewoftheextractivesectorcontributiontotheeconomyfrom2009to2014,whichvariedfrom6%in2009to10%in2012to9%in2014(p.11).ThisinformationwasclearlysourcedfromINS(InstitutNationaldelaStatistique)Niger(www.stat-niger.org).

Governmentrevenues:TheEITIReportprovidesgovernmentrevenues,inabsolutetermsandrelativetototalgovernmentrevenues,foreachyear2010-2014(p.27).Theextractivesectorcontributed22.6%ofrevenuestothegovernmentbudgetin2014.

Exports:TheEITIReportprovidesexportfiguresinabsolutetermsandrelativetototalexports(p.27)..Thesectoraccountedfor83%oftotalexportin2014.TheEITIReportalsoprovidestheshareofuraniumandgoldintotalexports,bothdisaggregatedandcombined,foreachyearfrom2010-2014(pp.20-21).

Employment:TheEITIReportincludesinformationaboutemploymentintheminingandhydrocarbonsector.Employmentfiguresaredisaggregatedbycompany(p.28).EightreportingminingcompaniesandCNPCreportedabout3500employees.TheReportdidnotprovideestimateofemploymentfiguresforcompaniesthatdidnotreport.

Location:TheEITIReportprovidedanoverviewofthemainproducingregionsinNiger(p.28).

StakeholderviewsStakeholdersfromallconstituenciesdidnotconsiderexportfigurestobecomprehensivebecauseofthe




significantsmuggling,particularlyofgold.Acompany’srepresentativeexplainedthatartisanalminingofgoldinthenorthisrelativelynewandtheproductionismostlysmuggledoutofthecountryillegally.TheIAconfirmedadvisingtheMSGtoexcludeartisanalmining,becauseoflackofreliablefiguresforthesector.

InitialassessmentTheInternationalSecretariat’sinitialassessmentisthatNigerhasmademeaningfulprogresstowardsmeetingthisrequirement.AvailableinformationaboutthecontributionoftheextractiveindustriestotheeconomyforthefiscalyearcoveredbytheEITIreporthasbeendisclosed,butestimatesofthesector’scontributiontotheeconomydidnotincludelocalcoalconsumption.Onlyninecompaniesdisclosedemploymentfiguresandthesector’scontributiontothegovernment’sbudgetisnotalwaysreliable.TheInternationalSecretariatconcludesthatsignificantaspectsofthisrequirementhasbeenimplemented,buttheunderliningobjectiveshavenotbeenachieved.

TheMSGshoulddisclosecomprehensiveinformationaboutthecontributionoftheextractiveindustriestotheeconomyforthefiscalyearcoveredbytheEITIReport,includingtotalemploymentintheextractiveindustriesinabsoluteandrelativeterms,inaccordancewithRequirement6.3.




Table6-Summaryinitialassessmenttable:Socialandeconomicspending



Socialexpenditures(#6.1) TheMSGdidnotdefinematerialitywithregardstomandatorysocialexpenditures.Despite,partialdisclosureofsocialpaymentsbytwocompanies,thereisnoevidencethatmandatorysocialexpenditureshavebeendisclosedandreconciledinaccordancewithEITIRequirement6.1.a.

Inadequateprogress

SOEquasifiscalexpenditures(#6.2)

TheMSGdidnotdefinematerialitywithregardstoquasi-fiscalexpendituresbySOEs,includingSOEsubsidiariesandjointventures.TheMSGgavealonglistofactivitiescompletedbySOPAMINwithoutstatingthecostoftheseactivities.

Inadequateprogress

Contributionoftheextractivesectortotheeconomy(#6.3)

Estimatesofthesector’scontributiontotheeconomydidnotincludelocalcoalconsumption.Onlyninecompaniesdisclosedemploymentfiguresandthesector’scontributiontothegovernment’sbudgetisnotalwaysreliable.

Meaningfulprogress


• TheMSGisrequiredtodisclosesocialexpendituresbycompaniesmandatedbylaworbytheircontractswiththegovernment.Wherepossible,theMSGisencouragedtoreconcilethesetransactions.TheMSGshouldestablishwhethersuchpaymentsareprovidedinkind,andconsiderdisclosingthenatureofthepaymentandthedeemedvalueoftheinkindtransactioninaccordancewithRequirement6.1.

• TheMSGisrequiredtodevelopareportingprocessforallSOEsintheextractivesectortodisclosetheirquasi-fiscalexpenditureswithaviewtoachievingaleveloftransparencycommensuratewithotherpaymentsandrevenuestreams,andshouldincludeSOPAMIN’ssubsidiariesandjointventuresinaccordancewithRequirement6.2

• TheMSGmustdisclosecomprehensiveinformationaboutthecontributionoftheextractiveindustriestotheeconomyforthefiscalyearcoveredbytheEITIReport,includingtotal




employmentintheextractiveindustriesinabsoluteandrelativeterms,inaccordancewithRequirement6.3.


PartIII–OutcomesandImpact



7. Outcomesandimpact

7.1Overview

ThissectionassessesimplementationoftheEITIRequirementsrelatedtotheoutcomesandimpactoftheEITIprocess.

7.2Assessment

Publicdebate(#7.1)


TheMSGhasundertakenseveralactivitiesaimedatdisseminatinginformationabouttheEITIandstimulatingdebateaboutthefindingsofEITIReports.

Comprehensibility:TheMSGproducedafive-pagesummaryofthe2012EITIReportforthe6thEITIGlobalConferenceinSydneyin2013,an18-pagesummaryofthe2013EITIReportanda12-pagesummaryofthe2014EITIReportinFrench(ITIENiger,2013)(ITIENiger,2014)(ITIENiger,2016).TheMSGhasalsouseditsannualactivityandprogressreportsasameansofsynthesisingkeyfindingsfromthepreviousEITIReport,withroughlyten-pagesummariesincludedineachreportsince2013(ITIENiger,2014)(ITIENiger,2015)(ITIENiger,2016).ThereisnoevidenceofthePermanentSecretariatorMSGhavingpreparedinfographicsbasedonEITIfindings,asidefrommoregeneralinfographicsdescribingtheEITIprocess.WhileNigercountsatleasteightmajorlanguagegroupsalongsidetheofficialworkinglanguageofFrench,theEITIconductsitsbusinessinFrenchinlinewiththecountry’sofficialworkinglanguageandhaspublisheddocumentsexclusivelyinFrenchthusfar.

Promotion:Withthe2014EITIReportpublishedonlyinNovember2016,theMSGhasyettoundertakeanydisseminationactivitiesrelatedtothelatestfindingsandthereappearstohavebeennopubliclaunchannouncementforthe2014EITIReport.Disseminationofthe2013EITIReport,publishedinDecember2015,washighlyconstrainedbythepoorsecuritysituationalonginNiger’sborderareasandinsomeareashostingminingactivities.ThePermanentSecretariatbriefedtheMSGonitsattemptstosecureproject-specificfundingfordisseminationofthe2013EITIReportatits31March2016meeting(ITIENiger,2016).AnationaldisseminationworkshopwasorganisedinTillabéryon5May2016aroundthe2013EITIReport,hostedbytheGovernoroftheTillabéryregionandbringingtogether28representativesfromcivilsociety,miningcompaniesactiveintheregionandthelocalrepresentationsoftheMoF,MMIDandMPE(ITIENiger,2016).

SectionII(pp.9-10)ofthe2015annualprogressreportstatesthattheMSGwasnotabletoanalysethedatafrom2012and2013EITIReportstoestimatethecontributionoftheextractiveindustriestothenationaleconomy,nortotranslatetheanalysisintosimplemessagesaimedatthegeneralpublicthroughbillboards,infographics,TVandradioshowsinthenationallanguages,aswasplannedunderthe2014-




2016EITIworkplan(ITIENiger,2016).Rather,EITINiger’scommunicationsactivitiesin2015consistedonlyinpublishingthe2012and2013EITIReportsaswellasCOMINAK’s2012corporatesocialresponsibilityreportontheEITINigerwebsiteandincludingadditionallinkstootherwebsitessuchasthegoldandpreciousmetalsbuyinghouses(ITIENiger,2016).However,SectionVIII(pp.26-27)ofthe2015annualprogressreportalsostatesthatCSOslikeCCOADandROTABorganizedregionalworkshopsinlocallanguagestodisseminatetheEITIReportsandtheEITIStandard(ITIENiger,2016).Thus,disseminationofthe2013EITIReporthasfocusedonfollowupwithintheMoF,MMIDandMPE.TheEITINigerSecretariatprovidedextensivedocumentationofformalfollowupbytheSecretariatwiththeseMinistriesintheperiodSeptember2013–November2016(ITIENiger,2013-2016).GovernmentdepartmentshavealsostartedpublishingsummariesofkeyofficialdocumentssuchastheBudgetDepartment’sJuly2015citizens’budget,asimplifiedversionofthe2015budget(DirectionGénéraleduBudget,RépubliqueduNiger,2015).

Underthe2016-2018EITIworkplan’sthirdobjective,theMSGplanstodevelopandimplementacommunicationsstrategyforEITINiger(ITIENiger,2016).The2015annualprogressreportstatesthattheMSGwasstillawaitingfundingfromtheAfDBtosupportthedevelopmentofacommunicationsstrategy,althoughaToRforthepreparationofsuchastrategywasdevelopedin2015(ITIENiger,2016).TheToRforthetwo-monthconsultancyincludeddevelopingacommunicationsstrategyforEITINigertosupportpublicdebateandinformmembersofthecountry’snewlegislatureonextractiveindustriesgovernanceandtheroleoftheEITI.FinancedbytheAfDB’sPAMOGEF,theworkwastofocusondevelopingclearandsimplemessagestohostcommunities,disseminationofEITIReports,vulgarisationandsocialisationofkeyEITINigergovernancedocuments,aswellasdefiningtargetaudiences.Theexpectedoutputsbeyondthecommunicationsstrategyincludedactionplansandcommunicationtools(ITIENiger,2016).

Underthe2016-2018workplan’sthirdobjective,tosupportresponsiblepublicdebateabouttheextractiveindustries,theMSGhasplannedtosummarisetheEITIReportsintosimplemessagesforthegeneralpublictobecommunicatedthroughbillboardsandinfographics.Italsointendstoorganisepublicdebates,TVand(particularlycommunity)radioshowsaboutthefindingsofEITIReportsinlocallanguages(ITIENiger,2016).A7-minedutainmentfilmonextractiveindustrygovernanceandtheEITIinNigerwasproducedin2013forthe6thEITIGlobalConferenceinSydney(ITIENiger,2013).EITINigeralsoproducedcommunicationskits,sketchesandbillboardspostedalongthemainroadaxesinNiameyaccordingtothe2014annualactivityreport(ITIENiger,2014).TheMSGalsoproducedcommunicationsmaterialincludingT-shirts,caps,kakemonosandadocumentaryfilmforthe7thEITIGlobalConferenceinLima,asithadforthe6thConferenceinSydney(ITIENiger,2016).However,thedocumentaryfilmhasnotbeenmadeaccessibleonlinegiventhelargefilesize.

Publicaccessibility:ThePermanentSecretariatmaintainsawebsite(www.itieniger.ne),whichwaslastredesignedinlate2014.However,itappearsthatthewebsiteisonlyseldomupdated,withonlyfournewpostingsin2016(fortheEITIReport,annualprogressreport,callfortendersandtheTillabérydisseminationevent).TheEITINigerwebsitealsoappearstobefrequentlyoffline.InadditiontoEITIReportsandworkplans,minutesofMSGmeetingsin2016andEITI-relatedactivitiesarepublishedonthewebsite.However,itappearsthatmostmeetingminutesandgovernancedocumentsofEITINigerarenotaccessiblethroughthewebsite.MeanwhileitdoesnotappearthatEITINigerisactiveonsocialmedia,withnoindicationofapresenceonFacebook,Twitterorothersites.




Contributiontopublicdebate:TheEITINigerhasundertakenatleastoneoutreachayearintheregionssince2013,facilitatedbyCSOs.SectionVIII(pp.26-27)ofthe2015annualprogressreportnotesthatCSOslikeCCOADandROTABorganizedregionalworkshopsinlocallanguagestodisseminatetheEITIReportsandraiseawarenessabouttheEITIStandard(ITIENiger,2016).Yetsuchdisseminationeventshavetendedtobepunctualeventsratherthansustainedrelationships.In2016theMSGheldadisseminationeventinTillabéryinMay2016,asnotedabove.

In2015CSOsengagedintheEITIhelddisseminationeventsfundedbyOSIWA,includingtwotrainingworkshopsinNiameyandMaradiorganisedbyROTABwithsupportfromthePermanentSecretariat,focusingoncivilsociety’sroleinEITIimplementation.TheROTABalsoundertookdisseminationeventsforthe2012EITIReportinAgadez,TillabéryandZinder.TheNGOnetworkCCOADalsoheldacapacitybuildingworkshopfornationalandregionalEITIstakeholdersin2013.TheNGOGRENalsoorganisedasymposiumonextractiveindustriesinNigerinNiamey,incollaborationwiththeUniversityofZinder,followingaworkshoponmanagingextractivesconflictsforpopulationsofDamagaramandMangainZinder(ITIENiger,2016).TherehavealsobeeneffortstopromotetheuseofEITIfindingsaspartofthegovernment’spublicfinancemanagement.SectionVIII(pp.26-27)ofthe2015annualprogressreportstatesthatthe2013EITIReportwassubmittedtotheMinistryofPlanningforthepurposesofIMFreporting.(ITIENiger,2016)

In2014theMSGheldadisseminationandoutreacheventinTillabéryon17-18April2014,organisedbyCODDAEandattendedbyMinisterofIndustrialDevelopmentKafaRekiatouChristelleJackou(Niamey.com,2014).The2014annualactivityreportalsohighlightedtheparticipationofMinistryofMinesandIndustrialDevelopmentrepresentativesinMSGmeetingsandvariousworkshopsorganisedbycivilsociety(ITIENiger,2014).CODDAEheldanEITIoutreachseminarinTillabéryon17-18April2014chairedbyDeputyMinisterforIndustrialDevelopmentKafaRekiatouChristelleJackou(LeSahel,2014).ROTABalsoheldaneventtodisseminatethe2011EITIReportandconductoutreachontheEITIStandardinNiameyon14-16April2014,whiletheMSGheldameetingtofollowuponpastEITIrecommendationsatthePrimeMinister’sOfficeon24June2014.

In2013CSOsROTABandANLChelddisseminationandoutreacheventsintheZinderregionon14-19June,intheDiffaregionon15-23AugustandinNiameyinvolvingparliamentarians,localofficials,civilsocietyandextractivesworkers,withakeyfocusonthelocalimpactsofextractiveindustryactivity(ITIENiger,2014).On22-23January2013,theNGOCODDAEheldadisseminationandoutreachworkshopinTahoua,hostedbySecretaryGeneraltotheMinistryofPetroleumandEnergyMahamanLaouanGaya(CODDAE,2013)(LeSahel,2013)(CODDAE,2013).

Whilethereisevidenceofoutreachtoandtrainingofjournalistsinthepast,asinAugust2007whentheNetworkofJournalistsforHumanRightsandthethen-RevenueWatchInstitutehostedafour-dayworkshopforlocaljournalistsonEITIinNiamey,thereisnoevidenceofmorerecentmediatrainingundertakenbytheMSG,PermanentSecretariatorCSOsinvolvedinEITIsince2011(LiberationNiger,2007).Asix-memberparliamentarynetworkonextractiveindustrieswasestablishedinNovember2012andhashadoccasionalcontactswithEITINiger,receivingtheEITIReportannuallyandparticipatingindisseminationandoutreacheventsin2013and2014.




StakeholderviewsInitsownpre-Validationself-assessmentin2016,theMSGconsideredthatithadmademeaningfulprogressinmeetingthisrequirement,notingthattherehadbeeninsufficientpublicdebateaboutEITIReportsandthattheEITIReportandsummaryreportshadneverbeenpublishedinlocallanguages.WhiletheMSGnotedthatthedevelopmentofanopendatapolicyhadbeenundertakenbyoneoftheMSG’scommunicationssub-committee,ithighlightedplanstointegratetheopendatapolicyinitscommunicationsstrategyunderdevelopmentin2017.Nonethelessitconsideredthatthedevelopmentofbrochures,flyersandsummaryEITIReportshadensuredtheaccessibilityofEITIinformation,whileoccasionalEITIoutreachactivitieshadbeenundertaken.

TherewasaconsensusamongststakeholdersconsultedthatdisseminationofEITIinformationandoutreachhasslowedconsiderablysince2015,duetofundingconstraints.AllCSOsconfirmedthattheyhadplayedthedrivingroleindisseminationofEITIReportscovering2005-2012andhadbeencontractedbyEITINigertoundertakeoutreach,particularlyintheregions.MembersoftheMSG’scommunicationssub-committeeconfirmedtheyhadmetthreetimesin2016todraftaworkplanfordisseminationofthe2013EITIReport,butthattheirplanshadnotbeenimplementedduetolackoffunds.NonethelessstakeholdersconfirmedthattheTillabérydisseminationinMay2016wasamulti-stakeholderactivityinvolvingrepresentativesfromcivilsociety,governmentandlocalcompanyworkers,albeitnotofNiamey-basedcompanymanagement.IndustryMSGmembersexplainedthatwhiletheyparticipatedinNiamey-baseddisseminationeventsbydeliveringpresentations,theytypicallydidnotparticipateinoutreacheventsoutsidethecapital.Oneindustryrepresentativenotedtheywereneverinvitedtodisseminationevents,evenwhenthesewereheldinareaswheretheyoperated.Allcompaniesheldannualinformationopendaysinareaswheretheyoperatedtoexplaintheirperformancetolocalcommunities,buttheyneverusedEITIdatafortheseaccordingtoseveralcompanyrepresentatives.

SomeCSOsnotedthattheycontinuedtoplayakeyroleindissemination,albeitthroughmoreinformalchannelssince2015.AllMSGmembersconfirmedthatthe2014EITIReporthadnotyetbeenpubliclylaunchedanddisseminated,butnotedthatthiswasplannedfor2017aspartofthe2016-2018EITIworkplan.However,oneseniorgovernmentofficialcategorisedEITIdisseminationactivitiesasan“epiphenomenon”,makingitappearthatdisseminationandoutreachwassecondaryinimportancetoEITIreporting.MostCSOsemphasisedthesignificantoutreachanddisseminationundertakenin2013,describingworkshopsandconsultationsinDosso,TillabéryandZinderinlocallanguages.Upuntil2015,thecountrywassplitintotwopartsforthepurposesofdissemination,withonegroupofCSOstaskedwitheachaccordingtotheserepresentatives.SeveralCSOsemphasisedthatthedisseminationeventswereopportunitiestocanvassstakeholdersinhostcommunitiesfortheirfeedbackonextractivesgovernance.WhileseveralCSOsnotedthattheyhadproducedworkshopreportsforeach,itappearedfromconsultationswithMSGmembersthatthesehadneverbeendiscussedattheleveloftheMSG.

Therewassignificantdemandforinformationamongstlocalcommunities,students,governmententitiesandparliamentariansaccordingtostakeholdersconsulted.SeveralCSOsexplainedthatlocalstakeholdersweremostinterestedininformationonsubnationaltransfers,workers’rightsandtheenvironmentalimpactofextractiveindustriesduringsubnationaldisseminationevents.OneCSOexplainedthattheyundertookinformaldisseminationoftheEITIReportwithhigh-schoolstudentsonanannualbasis,althoughthiswasentirelythroughinformaldiscussions.Severalparliamentariansnotedtheirinterestininformationoncalculationsofproductionfigures,contracttermsandsubnationaltransfersbutnoted




thattheirinteractionswithEITINigerhadfocusedontheircapacitybuildingneedsratherthanusingEITIinformationaspartoftheirparliamentaryduties.Therewasalsosignificantinterestamongstseveralgovernmentstakeholdershandlinganti-corruptionandfinancialregulationforEITIinformation,particularlyonbeneficialownershipofextractivescompanies.

StakeholdersfromallthreeconstituenciesconsideredthattheEITIhadhadanimpactonpublicdebaterelatedtoextractiveindustriesinNiger.Therewasconsensusthatpopulardebateoverextractivesgovernancehadgrownconsiderablysince2005,althoughonlycertainstakeholdersfromcivilsocietyandgovernmentconsideredthatEITIdatawasusedasabasisforthisdebate.Bothinconsultationsandinpublicreports,certainCSOshavehighlightedtheuseofEITIdatainpublicdebatesatthetimeoftherenegotiationoftheArevacontractsin2014,notingtheuseofdatafromthe2010EITIReportpublishedinJune2012todemonstratetheunequitablenatureofthepreviousdeal(ROTAB,2015).HowevermostCSOsconsideredthattheEITIhadgeneratedpublicdebateinthecapitalratherthanintheregions,categorisationimplementationas“EITINiamey”ratherthanEITINiger.Thiswasparticularlythecasesince2015whensubnationaldisseminationhadsloweddownaccordingtotheserepresentatives,whohighlightedtheneedtocommunicateinlocallanguagesinareasoutsidethecapital.OnedevelopmentpartnerraisedconcernsoverthelackofvisibilityofEITIinNiger,notingthatEITINigerdidnotseemtocommunicateabouttheirworkplanorannualprogressreportthroughlocalradioandTV,norholdopendaystoinvitecitizensintotheirofficesonceayear,asotherinitiativesandprogrammestypicallydid.

Initialassessment

EITINigerhasensuredthattheEITIReportsareaccessibletothepublic,albeitprimarilyonline,andcontributeinalimitedmannertopublicdebateinthecapitalandinsomeextractivesregions.Disseminationactivitiesinvolvingcivilsocietygroupsappeartohavebeeneffectiveinstimulatinganinformeddebateaboutthemanagementoftheextractivesectorinthepast,butthereisonlyinconsistentevidenceofengagementfromtheindustryandgovernmentconstituenciesinthedisseminationofEITIinformation.Meanwhiletheslowdownindisseminationandoutreachsince2015isaconcern.AccessibilityofEITIdatabeyondthecapitalNiameyremainsweak.StakeholdersaffectedbyminingactivitiesinruralareasarenotinvolvedinEITIimplementationandtheirvoicesarerarelyheardatthecentrallevel,wherealldecisionsaboutthesectoraremade.Giventheseweaknesses,thekeyaspectsofthisrequirementhavenotbeenachieved,particularlyintheareasofgeneratinganinformedpublicdebateaboutthemanagementoftheextractivesector.TheInternationalSecretariat’sinitialassessmentisthatNigerhasmademeaningfulprogressinmeetingthisrequirement.

Tocontinueimproving,theMSGshouldconsiderwaystoensurethatotherstakeholdersareencouragedtoparticipatemoreactivelyintheupstreamdevelopmentofcommunicationsstrategiesinsteadofonlydownstreamdisseminationactivities.TheMSGandcivilsocietyshouldreturntoreachingouttolocalcommunities,especiallythosewherethereareextractiveactivities.Inlightofsignificantlogisticalchallenges,theMSGmaywishtoconsiderdevelopingmoreformalisedconsultationmechanismswithmine-affectedcommunities,perhapsbydevelopingregionalfocalpoints,toprovidethemwithameaningfulvoiceontheMSG.




DataAccessibility(#7.2)


TheMSGhadyettoagreeanopendatapolicyasofJanuary2017.Whileithadpreparedsummarydatabasedonthe2013EITIReportinopendataformat,basedonsummarydatatemplateguidancefromtheInternationalSecretariat,ithadyettodosoforthe2014EITIReportasofJanuary2017.Thesummaryopendataforthe2013EITIReporthasbeenpublishedontheNigercountrypageontheeiti.orgwebsite,thesewerenotavailableontheEITINigerwebsiteasofJanuary2017(EITI,2017).TheMSGhasnototherwisereferencedinternationalrevenueclassificationsystemsinitsEITIreportingordissemination.Whilesummaryofthe2012,2013and2014EITIReportshavebeenproducedandareavailableontheEITINigerwebsite,theyhavenotbeentranslatedintolocallanguages(ITIENiger,2013)(ITIENiger,2016).

ThePermanentSecretariatstarteddevelopinganonlinereportingplatformin2016,usingthepassword-protectedsitewww.itieniger.org.However,whilestillunderdevelopment,thisonlinesystemdoesnotfeatureinthe2016-2018EITIworkplan.

Stakeholderviews

Initspre-Validationself-assessment,theMSGnotedtheongoingdevelopmentofitsonlinereportingsystem.MembersoftheMSGconsultedhighlightedtheirproductionofsummaryEITIReportsineachofthepastthreeyears.WhileseveralCSOsnotedtheneedtocommunicatewithstakeholdersoutsidethecapitalinlocallanguagesotherthanFrench,theyconsideredthatthisdidnotwarrantthetranslationofsummaryEITIReportsfromFrenchgiventhattheirworkshopswereinlocallanguagesandcouldthusbridgetheliteracydivide.Secretariatstaffhighlightedtheongoingdevelopmentoftheonlinereportingplatformandexplainedthattheyplannedtofinalisetheprojectin2017.MSGmembersconsultedwerenotawareoftheproductionofmachine-readablesummaryEITIdatabutsecretariatstaffexplainedthatthepreparationofmachine-readabledatafromthe2014EITIReportwasongoingandwouldbefinalisedinQ1-2017.

InitialassessmentRequirement7.2encouragesMSGstomakeEITIreportsaccessibletopublicinopendataformats.SucheffortsareencouragedbutnotrequiredandarenotassessedindeterminingcompliancewiththeEITIStandard.SomeofNiger’sEITIdataisavailableinmachinereadableformatthroughtheEITIglobalwebsitealbeitnotforitslatestEITIReportcovering2014.Machine-readableEITIdataishowevernotaccessibleontheEITINigerwebsite.

Tocontinueimproving,theMSGisencouragedtofurtherentrenchextractivesectortransparencyingovernmentsystems,andtakestepstomovetowardsmorefrequentproductionofEITIinformationonaroutinebasis.TheMSGmayconsiderundertakingastudytoidentifywhatinformationrequiredtobedisclosedundertheEITIStandardisalreadypubliclyavailableandwhatinformationisnotyetroutinelydisclosed.OpportunitiesforprovidingmoreEITIdatainopendataformatscouldalsobeexplored,forinstancethroughtheEITINigerwebsite.




LessonsLearnedandfollow-uponrecommendations(#7.3)


FollowuponrecommendationsfromEITIreportingandValidationhashistoricallybeenslowinNiger.Article7ofDecree000073/PMrequirestheMSGtoevaluatetheimpactofEITIimplementationonpovertyeradicationandsustainabledevelopment.ThePermanentSecretariatistaskedwiththeoperationaldutiesofproposingcorrectiveactionsunderArticle11ofDecree000073/PM(RépubliqueduNiger,2005).AlthoughDecree000073/PMestablishedahigh-levelten-memberInter-MinisterialCommitteetosethigh-levelpolicydirectionforEITIimplementationandoverseemonitoringandevaluation,thereisnoevidenceoftheCommittee’sexistencesince2008(RépubliqueduNiger,2005).

SincethefirstEITIReportpublishedunderthe2013EITIStandard,covering2012,theMSGhastaskedtheIAtoassessthestatusoffollow-uponpreviousEITIrecommendations.HoweverrecommendationsinthethreeEITIReportspublishedundertheEITIStandardhaveallbeennarrowlylinkedtoEITIreportingandhavenotlinkedtobroaderreforms.Section4.3.3.a(pp.36-37)ofthe2012EITIReportprovidedanoverviewofthestatusoffollow-uponeightpreviousEITIrecommendations,ofwhichsixweredeemedfullyimplementedandtwowereinprocessofbeingfollowedup(ITIENiger,2014).SectionIV.4.A(p.61)ofthe2013EITIReportfoundthatfollow-upontworecommendationsfromthe2012EITIReportwasinprocess,namelyensuringcomprehensivereportingandestablishingaspecificorganisationforEITIdatacollection(ITIENiger,2015).SectionII.4.1(pp.35-36)ofthe2014EITIReportprovidesanoverviewofthetworecommendationsfromthe2012EITIReportandthreerecommendationsfromthe2013EITIReport,notingfollow-uponfourofthefiveEITIrecommendations(ITIENiger,2016).

TheMSGhasalsouseditsannualactivityandprogressreportstotrackfollow-uponEITIrecommendationssince2014.The2015annualprogressreportassessedthestatusofimplementationofthethreerecommendationsinthe2013EITIReport.Itfoundthattheisolationofanextractives-specificlineinthegovernment’sbudgetanalysispreparedfortheIMFhadbeensuccessfullycompleted,evenifthiswasnotyetvisibleintheannualbudgetreleasedtothepublic.InrelationtotherecommendationthatallEITIdisclosuresbecompiledonacashratherthanaccrualaccountingbasis,the2015reportnotedthatfocalpointshadbeennominatedwithineachreportingcompanyforthe2014EITIReport.Finally,italsofoundthatartisanalandsmall-scalemininghadbeenexcludedfromthescopeofreconciliationinthe2014EITIReport,inlinewiththethirdrecommendationinthe2013EITIReport.SectionIV(p.12)ofthe2015annualprogressreportalsonotedtheMSG’smoregeneralconclusionthatallrecommendationsofthe2013EITIReporthadbeensuccessfullyaddressedinthe2014-2016EITIworkplan,albeitwithoutdisaggregatingindividualrecommendations(ITIENiger,2016).

Despiteoccasionalreferencesduringitsmeetings,theMSGdoesnotappeartohaveundertakenanystudiesonimplementationofpastEITIrecommendationsortheimpactofEITIimplementationinNiger.AsaresultofcorrectiveactionsidentifiedduringNiger’sValidationundertheEITIRulesin2011,theCourtofCountshasundertakenauditsofgovernmentextractivesrevenuesfor2010,2011and2012(CourdesComptes,2012)(CourdesComptes,2014).Initsreportcovering2011and2012,theCourtofCountsfoundthatonly9%ofrecommendationsinits2010reporthadbeenimplemented(CourdesComptes,2014).




Stakeholderviews

Initspre-Validationself-assessment,theMSGconsideredthatithadmadeonlymeaningfulprogressinmeetingthisrequirement,notingthatithadestablishedasub-committeetofollowupondiscrepanciesidentifiedinEITIReportsandlessonslearned.Thiswasconfirmedinconsultationswithrepresentativesfromallthreeconstituencies.NoneoftheMSGmembersconsultedconsideredtherecommendationsoftheEITIReportstobetheirown,butratherthoseoftheIndependentAdministrator.However,theynotedthattherewasaclearprocessforfollowuponEITIrecommendations,whichinvolvedtheMSG’ssub-committeeanalysingtherecommendationsandthePrimeMinister’sOfficeDirectorfollowingupwithindividuallineministries.AseniorgovernmentofficialhighlightedthefollowuplettersfromthePrimeMinister’sOfficetolineministriesasevidenceofthisfollowup.

WhileMSGmembersnotedthattheyhadnotbeenformallybriefedonthefindingsoftheCourtofCountsauditsofgovernmentextractivesrevenues,aseniorgovernmentofficialexplainedthattheMSGhadcomparedresultsfromtheCourtofCounts’auditof2012revenueswiththe2012EITIReportexpostfactoandhadnotidentifiedsignificantdiscrepancies.TheMSGhasalsotaskedtheIndependentAdministratortoassessfollow-uponpreviousEITIrecommendationssincethe2012EITIReport,accordingtorepresentativesconsulted.

Initialassessment

TheMSGandthegovernmenthavetakenstepstoactuponlessonslearnt,toidentify,investigateandaddressthecausesofanydiscrepanciesandweaknessesoftheEITIprocessandtoconsidertherecommendationsforimprovementsfromtheIndependentAdministrator.TheInternationalSecretariat’sinitialassessmentisthatNigerhasmadesatisfactoryprogressinmeetingthisrequirement.

However,giventhatimplementationofrecommendationsinpreviousEITIreportsisstillongoing,theMSGandthegovernmentshouldcontinuefollowingupontheserecommendationsandensurethatfuturerecommendationsandfindingsfromEITIReportsareevaluatedandacteduponinatimelymanner.AspartofitsreformoftheinstitutionalframeworkforEITIimplementationinNiger,thegovernmentisencouragedtoconsiderformalisingastructureforfollowinguponEITIrecommendationstoreplacetheInter-MinisterialCommitteeandlinkEITIrecommendationstoongoingnationalreforms.

Outcomesandimpactofimplementation(#7.4)


AnalysisofMSGmeetingminutesandannualprogressreportsindicatesthattheMSGhasonlymadegeneralcommentaryontheimpactofimplementation,buthasnotundertakenanyformalisedimpactassessment.

Niger’s2015annualprogressreportwasapprovedbytheMSGon27June2016viacircular(email)andsubsequentlypublished(ITIENiger,2016).SectionV(pp.21-24)ofthereportprovidesanarrativeofthestrengthsandweaknessesinNiger’sEITIprocess,includingtheestablishmentofthreeMSGsub-committeesinAugust2015.Weaknessesidentifiedwereprimarilyrelatedtocoverageoftheoilsector,miningexplorationcompanies,ASM,customsdutydisclosuresbyreportingcompanies,




misunderstandingofreportingtemplates,lackofgovernmentdisclosuresofstampduties(“ticketsvaleur”).However,thereisverylittledetailedinformationontheMSG’seffortstostrengthenimplementation.MeanwhileSectionI(pp.6-8)providesasummaryofactivitiesundertakenin2015.

The2014-2016EITIworkplanforesawsixmainobjectivesofEITIimplementation:explainingtheextractiveindustries’contributiontotheeconomy;ensuringthestatereceiveswhatitisdue;supportresponsiblepublicdebateontheextractiveindustries;preventconflictsofinterest;contributetobuildingthecapacityofgovernment’sgovernanceandoversightoftheextractiveindustries;andpreventconflictsandimprovethebusinessclimate(ITIENiger,2014).SectionI(pp.6-8)ofthe2015reportalsoprovidedageneralassessmentofprogressinachievingworkplanobjectives,albeitnotdisaggregatedbyworkplanobjective.Theinabilitytocompletepre-Validationworkandstudiesofstructuralchangesintheextractiveindustriesin2015wasexplainedbytheMSG’sfocusonpreparingthe2013EITIReportandthePermanentSecretariat’smovetoanewofficespace.SectionII(pp.9-10)providedamoredetailedoverviewofprogressinmeetingeachofthesixworkplanobjectiveswithprogressagainsteachobjectivealthoughnonehadbeenfullyachieved.

WithrespecttoitscompliancewiththeEITIRequirements,theMSGassesseditselfasperforminghighlyonsome,butnotall,EITIRequirements.The2015reportalsoincludedacursoryassessmentofprogressinmeetingsevenoftheEITIsub-requirements(Requirements7.4.a.ii,5.3,4.4,6.1,5.2,2.5,2.4)inSectionIII(p.11),butdidnotrefertoprogressinmeetingtheotherEITIsub-requirements.Annex2(pp.33-34)providedanassessmentofprogressinmeetingRequirement1.5(classifiedasRequirement1.4underthe2013EITIStandard’snomenclature)andidentifiedspecificelementsofthe2014-2016workplanthataddressedsub-requirements.

AgeneraloverviewoftheMSG’sresponsestopastEITIrecommendationsisalsoincludedinthe2015annualprogressreport.SectionI(p.7)providedanoverviewoftheMSG’sfollow-uponthreerecommendationsfromthe2013EITIReport,notingeffectivefollow-uponeach.SectionIV(p.12)providedacursoryoverviewoftheMSG’sresponsetorecommendationsfromthe2013EITIReport,althoughSection4.1.a(p.12)onlystatedthatthe2014-2016workplanaddressedalloftheIA’srecommendations.Section4.1.b(pp.12-19)providedanoverviewofthemainfindingsofthe2013EITIReport,albeitwithoutadditionalinformationonfollow-up.Section4.2(p.21)linkedeachoftheeightrecommendationsfromNiger’s2010Validationtospecificactivitiesinthe2014-2016workplan.

Thereisonlylimitedevidenceofstakeholders’inputtothedevelopmentofthe2015annualprogressreport.SectionVIII(pp.26-27)ofthe2015reportreferredtostakeholderconsultationsinpreparationofthe2015report,butonlylistedactivitiesthatwereunrelatedtoconsultationsonthereport,includingregionaldisseminationworkshopsinlocallanguagesbyCSOslikeCCOADandROTAB,asectoralreportonmining,oilandgasrevenuesproducedbytheCourtofCountsandthe2014sectoralauditscompletedbytheMinistriesofMiningandPetroleum.ThereisevidencethatthesecretariatseekinginputfromMSGmembersonthedraft2015annualprogressreportthroughemailsdated20Juneand27June2016,althoughfeedbackandcommentswereonlyreceivedfromoneCSOMSGmember.45Generally,Niger’s

45CopiesoftheseemailswereprovidedtousbytheEITINigerSecretariat.




annualactivityandprogressreportshavenotexaminedtheimpactofEITIimplementationinNigerinanysignificantdetail.

Stakeholderviews

MSGmembersconsultedconfirmedthat,similarlytothedevelopmentoftheEITIworkplan,theMSGhadundertakeninternalconsultationswithintheMSGonpreparationsforthe2015annualprogressreportbutnotwiththeirbroaderconstituencies.WhileMSGmembersreferredtotheMSG’sdiscussionsondevelopingkeyperformanceindicatorsforassessingtheimpactofEITIimplementation,theMSGhadyettoagreeasetofindicatorsandhadnotundertakenanyformofimpactassessmentotherthanaspartoftheannualprogressreport.SeveralseniorgovernmentofficialsemphasisedthatthetimewasrightforamoresystematicassessmentoftheimpactofEITIinNigerafteradecadeofimplementation.TheycalledforamorerigorousassessmentoftheusesofEITIinthecontextofthegovernment’sreforms.NoneoftheMSGmembersconsultedhadconsideredtheannualprogressreportasthemeansfortheMSGtomonitorandevaluatetheimpactofEITIimplementation.OnedevelopmentpartnerexpressedconcernthatEITINigerdidnotseemtoconsultonthedraftingofitsannualprogressreportnorundertakeactivepromotionoftheannualprogressreportthroughlocalradioandTVasotherprogrammesandinstitutionsdid.

TherewasconsensusamongststakeholdersconsultedthattheEITIhadhadanimpactinNiger,althoughthereweredifferentviewsonthenatureofspecificimpacts.SeveralCSOsnotedthattheEITIhadcontributedtoimprovingthepublic’sunderstandingoftheextractiveindustriesandidentifychallengessuchasitslowcontributiontothenationaleconomyinparticular.SeveralseniorgovernmentofficialsconsideredthattheEITIwasanimportantdiagnostictoolforthegovernmentandservedtocorrectthemisperceptionthatnaturalresourceswerealwaysassociatedwithacursebytrackingextractivesrevenuescollectedbythestate.ThesegovernmentstakeholdersnotedtheimportanceoftheEITItodemonstratetothepublicthatthegovernmentwaseffectivelyoverseeingthesector’smanagementandtoidentifychallengeswheremultinationalcompaniesweretakingadvantageofNiger.Intermsofreforms,stakeholdersfromcivilsocietyandgovernmentnotedthatoneofthemostimportanttangibleimpactsofEITIimplementationhadbeenthestartofCourtofCountsauditsofgovernmentextractivesrevenuessince2012.SeveraldevelopmentpartnersnotedthattheEITIappearedtohavegeneratedpublicinterestinextractiveindustrymanagement,whichhadbeenweakinthepast.Accordingtotheserepresentatives,theEITIhadprovidedakeyplatformforcivilsocietytoeffectivelyoverseethemanagementoftheoil,gasandminingsectorsandwasgraduallyhelpingtoidentifycapacitybottleneckswithingovernmententities.SeveralindustryMSGmembersagreedthattheEITIprovidedaframeworkforfrankandconstructiveengagementwithCSOs.TheyalsonotedthatcitizenshadbetteraccesstoinformationontheextractiveindustriesthroughtheEITI,whichledtoabetterunderstandingofextractivescompanies’contributiontothenationaleconomy.Therehadbeenimprovementsinrelationsbetweencompaniesandcivilsociety,accordingtocompanyrepresentativesconsulted,basedonbetterunderstandingbetweenthetwoconstituencies.

Initialassessment

TheInternationalSecretariat’sinitialassessmentisthatNigerhasmademeaningfulprogresstowardsmeetingthisrequirement.TheMSGhasreviewedprogressandoutcomesofimplementationonaregularbasis,includingbypublishingannualactivityandprogressreportsoverthepastthreeyears.However,




the2015annualprogressreportfocusedmoreonoutcomesthanonimpactandtheoverallimpactofEITINigerremainsunclear.

TheMSGshouldconsiderdiscussingtheroletheEITIcouldplayinachievingnationalprioritiesinreformsoftheextractiveindustriesaspartofitsannualreviewoftheworkplan.TheMSGmayalsowishtoconsiderundertakinganimpactassessment,withaviewtoidentifyingtangibleimpactstolocalcommunitiesandotherstakeholdersinordertodeterminetheextenttowhichtheEITIhascontributedtoimprovingpublicfinancialmanagementandgovernanceofthemining,oilandgassectors.




Table7-Summaryinitialassessmenttable:Outcomesandimpact


Validator’srecommendationoncompliancewiththeEITIprovisions(tobecompletedfor‘required’provisions)

Publicdebate(#7.1)

EITINigerhasensuredthattheEITIReportsareaccessibletothepublic,albeitprimarilyonline,andcontributeinalimitedmannertopublicdebateinthecapitalandinsomeextractivesregions.WhileCSOshavedrivendisseminationandoutreacheffortsinthepast,theslowdownindisseminationandoutreachsince2015isaconcern.AccessibilityofEITIdatabeyondthecapitalNiameyremainsweak.StakeholdersaffectedbyminingactivitiesinruralareasarenotinvolvedinEITIimplementation.

Meaningfulprogress

Dataaccessibility(#7.2)

SomeofNiger’sEITIdataisavailableinmachinereadableformatthroughtheEITIglobalwebsitealbeitnotforitslatestEITIReportcovering2014.EITIdataisnotaccessibleontheEITINigerwebsite.

Lessonslearnedandfollowuponrecommendations(7.3)

TheMSGandthegovernmenthavetakenstepstoactuponlessonslearnt,toidentify,investigateandaddressthecausesofanydiscrepanciesandweaknessesoftheEITIprocessandtoconsidertherecommendationsforimprovementsfromtheIndependentAdministrator.


Outcomesandimpactofimplementation(#7.4)

TheMSGhasreviewedprogressandoutcomesofimplementationonaregularbasis,includingbypublishingannualactivityandprogressreportsoverthepastthreeyears.However,the2015annualprogressreportfocusedmoreonoutcomesthanonimpactandtheoverallimpactofEITINigerremainsunclear.

Meaningfulprogress


• TheMSGshouldconsiderwaystoensurethatotherstakeholdersareencouragedtoparticipatemoreactivelyintheupstreamdevelopmentofcommunicationsstrategiesinsteadofonlydownstreamdisseminationactivities.TheMSGandcivilsocietyshouldreturntoreachingouttolocalcommunities,especiallythosewherethereareextractiveactivities.Inlightofsignificantlogisticalchallenges,theMSGmaywishtoconsiderdevelopingmoreformalisedconsultationmechanismswithmine-affectedcommunities,perhapsbydevelopingregionalfocalpoints,toprovidethemwithameaningfulvoiceontheMSG.

• TheMSGshouldconsiderdiscussingtheroletheEITIcouldplayinachievingnationalprioritiesin




reformsoftheextractiveindustriesaspartofitsannualreviewoftheworkplan.TheMSGmayalsowishtoconsiderundertakinganimpactassessment,withaviewtoidentifyingtangibleimpactstolocalcommunitiesandotherstakeholdersinordertodeterminetheextenttowhichtheEITIhascontributedtoimprovingpublicfinancialmanagementandgovernanceofthemining,oilandgassectors.

• TheMSGandthegovernmentshouldcontinuefollowinguponEITIrecommendationsandensurethatfuturerecommendationsandfindingsfromEITIReportsareevaluatedandacteduponinatimelymanner.AspartofitsreformoftheinstitutionalframeworkforEITIimplementationinNiger,thegovernmentisencouragedtoconsiderformalisingastructureforfollowinguponEITIrecommendationstoreplacetheInter-MinisterialCommitteeandlinkEITIrecommendationstoongoingnationalreforms.

• TheMSGisencouragedtofurtherentrenchextractivesectortransparencyingovernmentsystems,andtakestepstomovetowardsmorefrequentproductionofEITIinformationonaroutinebasis.TheMSGmayconsiderundertakingastudytoidentifywhatinformationrequiredtobedisclosedundertheEITIStandardisalreadypubliclyavailableandwhatinformationisnotyetroutinelydisclosed.OpportunitiesforprovidingmoreEITIdatainopendataformatscouldalsobeexplored,forinstancethroughtheEITINigerwebsite.

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• Impactanalysis(nottobeconsideredinassessingcompliancewiththeEITIprovisions)

DocumentationofprogressImpact:ObjectivesofEITINiger’ssuccessiveworkplanshaveexpandedtothefightagainstconflictsofinterestandintegratingreal-timedisclosuresinnationalsystems.AccordingtoitsownmetricsofstrengtheningEITIreporting,theEITIhasonlyhadamoderateimpactinNiger.WhileEITIreportinghassuccessfullybeenexpandedtotheoilandgassector,includingmidstreamrefining,itscontributiontopublicdebatehasremainedmarginalatbest.Themosttangibleimpactsofimplementationappeartohavecomeasaresultofcrises,ratherthanthroughreformofnationalsystems,anddonotappearcoordinated.TheCourtofCountslaunchedauditsofgovernment’sextractivesrevenuesforthefirsttimeasaresultofcorrectiveactionsrequiredbytheEITIBoardduringitsfirstValidation,undertheEITIRules.TheresultsoftheCourtofCounts’audits,themselvesdelayedbeyondtheEITI’stwo-yeartimelinessrules,arenotintegratedtotheEITIprocessfromwhichtheyoriginated.TheEITIhasalsohelpedensurespaceforcivilsocietytodemandinformationonextractivesgovernance,withtheEITIBoardinterveningtosecurethereleaseofcivilsocietyactivistsmembersoftheMSGin2014.Yetcivilsociety,companiesanddonorshavetendedtocommissionresearchintohot-topicissuessuchassubnationaltransfers,productionfiguresandenvironmentalimpactsentirelyindependentlyfromtheEITI.BycircumventingthedatacollectionandanalysistoolthatistheEITI,stakeholdershaveonlyweakenedit.

WithMSGmembersonlytangentiallyaccountabletotheirconstituencies,discussionsatMSGmeetingsappeartohaveremaineddetachedfromsocial,economicandpoliticalrealities.DisseminationandoutreachtoareasoutsideNiameythathostextractivesactivitieshavetendedtobeone-waychannelswheretheEITIReportsaredistributed,withoutnecessarilycontentadequatetomeetlocaldemandsforinformation.Whilesucheventshaveprovidedoutletsforpopulardebateaboutextractiveindustrymanagement,thefeedbackmechanismstoMSGdiscussionsandthedraftingofkeyEITIdocumentsappeartohavebeenweakatbest.OnlybystrengtheningitsownrepresentativenesswilltheMSGensuretheinformationitworkstodiscloseispertinenttonationalpriorities.DrivenbythePermanentSecretariat,theMSGhasbeenproactivelyinvolvedindraftinglargepartsofNiger’sEITIReports,accountingforover90%oftheworkaccordingtostakeholdersconsulted.WhilesuccessiveIndependentAdministratorshaveplayedonlyasupportingroleexecutingthequalityassuranceandreconciliationoffinancialdata,thetimehascomefortheMSGtoseektechnically-proficientinputtokeyscopingandmaterialitydecisionsinlinewiththeToRithadadoptedforannualEITIreporting.TheMSG’sonlinereportingprojectcouldbeleveragedintoafully-fledgedonlinedataportal,mainstreamingdisclosuresunderasmanyEITIrequirementsaspossibleintoasingleplatformupdatedinatimelierbasisthanNiger’sEITIReports.Thereisclearscopeforlinkagestoongoingdomesticreformsandsourcesofinternationalsupport,suchastheinitiativebackedby(OSIWA)todeveloponlinedataportalsincertainfrancophoneAfricanimplementingcountries.

Despitesignificantlogisticalchallenges,Niger’svibrantcivilsocietyhasgeneratedarobustnationaldebateonpublicmanagementofthecountry’sresources,fromuraniumtooil.However,thesehavetendedtobemorepunctualactivitiesratherthansustainedoutreach.Thereissignificantscopetoleveragethemoreactivedisseminationandoutreachcharacteristicoftheperioduntil2015,drawingonCSOs’extensiveexperienceandnetworksandmoreactiveengagementfromgovernmentandindustry.WhilstlimitedandcombinedwithbroaderCSOconsultationsonextractiveindustrygovernance,disseminationandoutreachhavehighlightedsignificantpopulardemandforinformationthatEITIReports




couldinpartdisclose,includingsubnationaltransfers,productionfiguresandenvironmentalprovisioning.ThechallengeforEITINigeristoestablishrobustmechanismstochannelvoicesnotdirectlyrepresentedontheMSGintothenationaldebate,fromlocalcommunitiestoparliamentariansandanti-corruptionwatch-dogs,toensureEITIimplementationmeetsdomesticchallenges.TheEITIhastendedtoremaininasiloinNigerasaparallelprocessmorefocusedoncompliancethanonaddressinglocally-importantchallenges.WhileEITIimplementationhasledtoimportantreformssuchasannual,albeitoftendelayed,CourtofCountsauditsofgovernmentextractivesrevenues,theEITIhasnotfulfilleditspotentialasaplatformforintegratingsuchreformsintoacoherentandconsistentprogramme.

Whilethegovernment’srhetoricclearlylinksEITItootheranti-corruptionefforts,theoperationalcontactshavebeenonlypreliminaryinpractice.Inpolicyterms,thegovernmentdrawsonconceptsoftransparencyandgoodgovernanceinitsreformproposals,suchasthelong-mootedCharteronGoodGovernanceintheExtractiveIndustriesortheplannedreformoftheMiningCode,evenifrollouthasbeenslow.SeveralseniorgovernmentofficialsconsulteddrewthelinkbetweenNiger’simprovementsinTransparencyInternational’sCorruptionPerceptionIndexanditsEITIimplementation,evenifsuchlinksappeartangential.NigerremainsatthebottomoftheUnitedNations’HumanDevelopmentIndexandfacessignificantsecuritychallenges.Niger’sscoreintheWorldBank’sDoingBusinessrankinghasimprovedinrecentyears,from174thin2008to150thin2017,butitremainsun-ratedbycreditratingagencies(WorldBank,2017).

Sustainability:Thereissignificanthigh-levelpoliticalsupportforintegratingatleastsomeaspectsofEITIreportingintogovernmentsystems.YetwhileseniorgovernmentofficialsconsultedhighlightedtheneedtointegrateEITIintonationalgovernmentsystems,thereislittleevidencethatthegovernmenthasmovedtodiscloseinaroutinemannermoreinformationrequiredundertheEITIStandardtodateasidefromthroughtheCourtofCounts’governmentextractivesrevenuesaudits(theCourtofCountswasstillworkingonfinalisingits2013-2014auditinJanuary2017).However,thereissignificantscopetoworkwithgovernmententitiestoensurekeyEITIdatamostindemandisdisclosedinatimeliermanner.TheMSGcouldstartbyusingtheEITINigerwebsiteforthelow-hangingfruit.ItcouldreviewthephysicalcopiesoftheJournalOfficiel,scanning,uploadingandcategorisingthefullcopiesofwhatminingandpetroleumcontractshadalreadybeenpublished.TheTaxDepartment’s(DGI)workonsingletaxidentificationnumbersforalltaxpayersshouldalsosignificantlystreamlineEITIreporting,ifrolledouttoallrevenue-collectingentities.TheDGIcouldalsoleveragetheMSG’sworkonsummarydatatablesofEITIdata,alreadyproducedforthe2013EITIReport,tostartimplementingaGFS-typerevenueclassificationsystem,whichwouldallowthegovernmenttodisaggregateextractivesrevenuesinrealtimeinitsFinancialOperationsDashboard(TOFE).TheongoingreformsoftheminingandpetroleumcadastresinMMIDandMPEshouldbeleveragedtopubliclydiscloselicenseinformationinreal-time.TheMSGhasthepotentialtoactasacoordinatingplatformimplementingastandardofopenextractivesdata.

Despitethepoliticalchangeofthe2010-2011period,theprimeministerialdecreesinstitutionalisingtheEITIhavenotbeenupdatedsince2008.WhilethedecreesprovidelegalbackingforEITIimplementation,thereisanurgentneed–recognisedbytheMSGitself–torevisetheframeworkinlightofcurrentpractice.ThegovernmenthasconsistentlyprovidedfundingforEITIimplementationsinceinception,earmarkingfundswithinthePrimeMinister’sOfficetoEITINigerduringtheelaborationbudgetinSeptember-Novembereveryyear.TheAfDB’sPAMOGEF,akeysourceoffundingfornon-coreactivities,wasextendedbysixmonthsfromitsoriginalenddatetoJune2017,buttheMSGwillneedtoapproach




developmentpartnerstosecurefundingforactivitiessuchasdisseminationanddevelopingabeneficialownershipregister.

Innovationsandlessonslearned:TheMSGhasexpandedthescopeofNiger’sEITIreportingbeyondbasicrequirementsevenbeforetheEITIStandardwasagreedin2013,includingtherefinerySORAZinthescopeofreportingsincethe2011EITIReportandsomeinformationonartisanalandsmall-scalemininguntilthe2014EITIReport.Whilethishasinpartaddressedlocalconcerns,thereisscopeforexpandingthegranularityofdisclosuresabouttheZinderrefineryinparticulartosupportthevibrantdebateaboutthefuturedirectionofNiger’soilandgasindustry.WithdebateragingoverthechannelsforexportingpartofNiger’sforecast60,000bpdproductiononcetheAgademoilproductionisexpandedincomingyears,moredetailedinformationaboutpipelinetransportandrefiningasinChad’sEITIreportingcouldwouldservemoremeticulouspublicdebate.

Civilsocietyleddisseminationandoutreachinlocallanguagesuntil2015,despitecapacityandlogisticalconstraints,wasanotherkeystrengthoftheEITINigerprocess.Whilesecurityprioritieshaveaffectedthelevelofresourcesdedicatedtopublicoutreach,thevibrantpublicdebateoverextractivesgovernanceincludinginresource-richareasprovidesfertilegroundforEITIimplementationtoprovideatleastpartoftheinformationinhighestdemand.AshighlightedbymanyCSOsconsulted,thequalityofNiger’slawsandregulationsisrarelymatchedbytheirimplementation.Byprovidingamechanismforpublicoversightoftheimplementationofextractivesgovernance,theEITIshouldprovideaneffectivechannelfordebateamongstthebroadestcross-sectionofstakeholdersincludinggrassrootscommunityassociations,unions,traditionalrulers,nationalNGOsandthemedia.

InaprocessdrivenbythePermanentSecretariat,theMSGhasbeenparticularlyengagedintheprocessofEITIreporting,whichappearstohavebecomearoutinecomplianceprocedureformostcompaniesoperatinginNiger’sminingandpetroleumsectors.TheMSGnowfacesthetwinchallengesofdrawingonthird-partyprofessionalexpertisetoensurethequalityofitsEITIreportingcontinuestoimproveonanannualbasis,whileensuringthatitsfindingsandrecommendationbuildonandfeedintoon-goingreforms.TheMSGishighlyencouragedtodrawontheprofessionalopinionofitsIndependentAdministratorsasitbuildsitsonlinereportingplatform.ItmustalsoliaisecloselywithotherreformersingovernmenttoensureEITIReportsareeffectivetrackersoftheimplementationofreformsandprovidepertinentrecommendationsforfurtherreforms.Tocapitaliseonitspotential,EITINigermustbecomemorethanthesumofitsparts.

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ValidationofNiger:ReportoninitialdatacollectionandstakeholderconsultationAnnexA-ListofMSGmembersandcontactdetails


Annexes

AnnexA-ListofMSGmembersandcontactdetails

Government

AlfaryZarra,DS/MMDI

MahamaneBalarabé,DGI/MF

ZabeirouRabo,ADM/MJ/DH

BoubeMamane,MEN

BoubacarNaladoIdi,ME/P

Industry

DantiaMoussa,CCIAN/CFE

FoureraMaiga,COMINAK

KindoHamadou,SMLSA

HamaSouleymane,SOMAIR

Civilsociety

MmeBagnanAissataFall,ANLC-TI

LokokoAbdou,CCOAD

OmarDiallo,ORTN

SeybouSalah,SYNAMIN

IllaKané,Presseprivée

AliIdrissa,ROTAB

IssaGarbaTahirou,CEQ/VC

SolliRamatou,GREN

AdamouMoussaAbba,SWISSAID


Annexes


AnnexB–MSGmeetingattendance


Annexes


AnnexC-Listofstakeholdersconsulted

GovernmentMahamadouGado,DirecteurdeCabinet,BureauduPremierMinistre

AbdoulAzizAskia,SecrétairePermanentITIENigeretConseillerduPrésidentdelaRépublique

MahamanBallarabéIbrahim,DirectionGénéraledesImpôts,MinistèredesFinances

RahrouBalla,DirectionGénéraledesImpôts,MinistèredesFinances

MahamanOumarou,DirectionGénéraledesImpôts,MinistèredesFinances

SoumanaSorkaMahamadou,DGTCP/RGT,MinisteredesFinances

HamaniDioriAboubacar,DirectionGénéraledesDouanes,MinistèredesFinances

GarbaSidiNassirou,DirectionGénéraledesDouanes,MinistèredesFinances

MmeCapoHadjara,DirectriceAssociationsdedéveloppementetONGs,MinistèreduPlandeL'aménagementduTerritoireetdudéveloppementCommunautaire

MmeAlfaryZarra,MinistèredesMinesetduDéveloppementIndustriel

MmeNouhouSalleyeSoumana,DM,MinistèredesMinesetduDéveloppementIndustriel

MamadouSougouDikouma,SecrétaireGeneral,MinistèredesMinesetduDéveloppementIndustriel

RaboAmani,DGMG/DCM,MinistèredesMinesetduDéveloppementIndustriel

MmeHamzaOusseyeTankaniAmadou,DGH,MinistèreduPétroleetdel’Energie

AmadouHassane,DEPH/DGH,MinistèreduPétroleetdel’Energie

MmeOusseyeTANKARI,MinistèreduPétroleetdel’Energie

BoubacarNalado,MinistèreduPétroleetdel’Energie

HEFoumakoyeGado,MinistreduPétroleetdel’Energie

DanAzoumiMamanLaouali,SecrétaireGeneralAdjoint,MinistèreduPétroleetdel’Energie


Annexes


AbdouMoumouniAbdoulrazakou,SociétédupatrimoinedesminesduNiger(SOPAMIN)

SoulaymanIbrahim,conseillerduprésident,SociétédupatrimoinedesminesduNiger(SOPAMIN)

MmeAlmanAicha,DirectionEvaluationetContrôleetsuividesactivitésminières,SociétédupatrimoinedesminesduNiger(SOPAMIN)

MrHachemou,DirecteurFinancier,SociétédupatrimoinedesminesduNiger(SOPAMIN)

OmarDiallo,OfficedeRadiodiffusionTélévisionduNiger(ORTN)

OumarouMagagi-Tanko,PrésidentPremièreChambre,CourdesComptes

MmeIssoufouLadi,Conseillère,CourdesComptes

IssoufouBourehima,Président,HauteAutoritédeLuttecontrelaCorruptionetlesInfractionsassimilées(HALCIA)

OubandomaSalissou,Vice-Président,HauteAutoritédeLuttecontrelaCorruptionetlesInfractionsassimilees(HALCIA)

CommissaireDivisionnairedePolice,DanBakiYaou,CoordonateurAdjointCelluleNationaledeTraitementdesInformationsFinancières(CENTIF)

CommissaireDivisionnairedePoliceAbdoulayeMaman,CENTIF

NouhouBagouabi,TribunaldeGrandInstance,HorsClasse

MaitreSitaMoussa,GreffierenChef,TribunaldeCommerce,Courd'AppeldeNiamey

ParliamentHon.YahayaLabaran,MP,PrésidentduRéseauParlementairesurlesIndustriesExtractives

HonElh.MazidouBoukari,MP,rapporteurduRéseauParlementairesurlesIndustriesExtractives

Hon.(Mme)AlbouchiraMohamed,MP,membreduRéseauParlementairesurlesIndustriesExtractives

Hon.MamanDjibo,MP,membreduRéseauParlementairesurlesIndustriesExtractives

ColonelHamaniSaley,RéseauParlementairesurlesIndustriesExtractives


Annexes


Industry

AbdoulayeHAMIDOU,SociétédesMinesdel'Air(SOMAIR)

HamadouKindo,SociétédesminesduLiptako(SML)

FoureraMaiga,CompagnieMinièred'Akokan(COMINAK)

MmeToureMariamaGaladima,ArevaMinesNiger/ArevaNC

IbrahimaMahamadou,PanAfricanNiger

AbdouMahaman,SociétédeRaffinagedeZinder(SORAZ)

SalissouMahamanNour,CNPCNigerPetroleum

CivilSociety

WADAMaman,AssociationNigeriennedeLuttecontrelaCorruption(ANLC)

AmadouHassaneDiallo,AssociationNigeriennedeLuttecontrelaCorruption(ANLC)

MmeSolliRamatou,GroupedeRéflexionetd'ActionsurlesindustriesExtractives(GREN)

OusmanaOusseynaHadouyou,GroupedeRéflexionetd'ActionsurlesindustriesExtractives(GREN)

HamaNoma,GroupedeRéflexionetd'ActionsurlesindustriesExtractives(GREN)

OusmaneDjibo,GroupedeRéflexionetd'ActionsurlesindustriesExtractives(GREN)

SeyniDjibo,GroupedeRéflexionetd'ActionsurlesindustriesExtractives(GREN)

ALIIdrissa,Réseaudesorganisationspourlatransparenceetl'analysebudgétaire(ROTAB)

IlliassouBoubacar,Réseaudesorganisationspourlatransparenceetl'analysebudgétaire(ROTAB)

YounoussAbdourahmane,Réseaudesorganisationspourlatransparenceetl'analysebudgétaire(ROTAB)

NarouaTassaou,Réseaudesorganisationspourlatransparenceetl'analysebudgétaire(ROTAB)

IssaGarbaTahirou,CoalitionEquitéQualitécontrelaVieChèreauNigerCEQ/CVC


Annexes


SeybouSalah,SyndicatNationaldesAgentsdesMines(SYNAMIN)

MmeMahamaneMassama,ChambredeConcertatondesONGetAssociationdeDeveloppement(CCOAD)

MmeSaidouAdama,ChambredeConcertatondesONGetAssociationdeDeveloppement(CCOAD)

MamanSaniAli,ChambredeConcertatondesONGetAssociationdeDeveloppement(CCOAD)

SalhaNeïnaHamissou,ChambredeConcertatondesONGetAssociationdeDeveloppement(CCOAD)

BoukasiAboubacar,ChambredeConcertatondesONGetAssociationdeDeveloppement(CCOAD)

AdamouMoussaAbba,SWISSAIDNiger

IllaKané,Presseprivée

JohnnyWest,founderofOpenOil

Independentadministrators

MamanKouroukoutou,expertcomptable,Guilbert&Associates

Developmentpartners

OumarouMassalabi,expertenindustriesextractives,Projetd'appuiàlaCompétitivitéetàlaCroissance(PRACC),WorldBank

DrAbdourhamaneHamidouYoro,expertenenvironnement,Projetd'appuiàlaCompétitivitéetàlaCroissance(PRACC),WorldBank

HousseiniBAKO,CoordinateurNational,Projetd'AppuiàlaMobilisationdesRessourcesInternesetàl'AméliorationdelaGouvernanceEconomiqueetFinancière(PAMOGEF),AfricanDevelopmentBank

Others

MoussaDanMoussa,PermanentSecretariat,EITINiger

DourahamaneIssaDjermakoye,PermanentSecretariat,EITINiger

OusmaneNajada,PermanentSecretariat,EITINiger

JafarDanZoumaHamissou,PermanentSecretariat,EITINiger

123

ValidationofNiger:ReportoninitialdatacollectionandstakeholderconsultationAnnexE-Listofreferencedocuments


AnnexE-Listofreferencedocuments

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