Valuing the Resilience Dividend - GIB-Foundation...disaster preparedness, but also exist during...

GlobalInfrastructureBaselElisabethenstrasse22CH-4051BaselSwitzerland

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ValuingtheResilienceDividend

31March2017

ThisstudywascommissionedbytheRockefellerFoundationandconductedbytheGlobalInfrastructureBaselFoundation.

Authors:Dr.BasilOberholzerAntoniusKnepMarcoVögeliAdditionalcontributors:InstituteforHousingandUrbanDevelopment(IHS),UniversityofRotterdamDanielWienerHans-PeterEglerDr.SebastianvonDahlenGrantNumber2016RLC307

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ExecutiveSummary

Resilienceistheabilityofindividuals,communitiesand,ingeneral,systemstowithstanddisruptions.Forcen-turiessocietieshavefocusedonachievinghighlevelsofresilienceinordertobouncebackandbuildbackbet-ter effectively fromman-made and natural disasters. Given the current environmental challenges, growingpopulationsandincreasingglobalization,resiliencehasneverbeenhigherontheglobalagenda.However,resil-ience ismuchmore thanmeredisasterpreparedness. It isalsoaboutaddingvalue tosociety irrespectiveofdisasters.Thesevalue-addingbenefitsthatarisefromdisasterpreparednessbutalsoexistintimesofnodisas-terscanbereferredtoastheResilienceDividend.InfrastructureresilienceiskeytobothmainaspectsoftheResilienceDividend:disruptionpreparednessandvalue-addingbenefitsirrespectiveofdisasters.

Thepresentstudyexaminesfourconcretecasestudiesindifferentcitiesthroughouttheworld(Manila,Math-baria,Quito,Port-au-Prince).TheresultsindicatethattheResilienceDividenddoesexistandthatinvestmentsin resiliencedopayoff.Themethodology in this study isa combinationofexistingapproaches–mainly theSuReSmartScanandsector-specificindicators–toformonenew,innovativeapproach.Byanalyzingcasestud-iesandcombiningthetwoapproaches,thisstudymarksthefirststepstowardsindicatingtheResilienceDivi-dendinthecaseofadisasterandwithout.

Atpresent,keydecisionmakersintheinfrastructuresectorarelackingfourmainelements:

• Appropriate capacity building to raise awareness about the benefits of resilience and why it shouldthereforebefostered,measuredandenhancedaspartoftheprojectdevelopmentprocess.

• Technicalassistanceintheformofstate-of-the-artexpertknowledgeonthegroundandthroughouttheentirevaluechainandlifecycleofaninfrastructureproject.

• AnappropriatetooltogaininsightsintotheResilienceDividendandidentifywhattheyshouldlookat,whattheyshouldbenchmarktheirprojectsagainst,andwhich indicators theyshouldusetosnapshotresiliencelevelassessmentsbothperiodicallyandafterdisasters.

• Datatoprovethatbetteradherencetoresilienceandsustainabilityfeatureswillyieldbetterrisk-returnparameterssuchasbettereconomicandfinancialperformance.

Overtime, thecreationofan infrastructureproject registrycontainingresilience,sustainability, financialandeconomicdatawillprovidedeeperinsightsintothecharacteristicsofinfrastructureresilienceandhelptoun-lockthemoneyneededtoclosetheinfrastructureinvestmentgapandfosteroverallresilience.

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Content

Abbreviations.................................................................................................................................................5

1 Introduction.........................................................................................................................................7

2 Background........................................................................................................................................10

2.1 TheImportanceofSustainableandResilientInfrastructure......................................................................10

2.2 ExistingResilienceDividendFrameworks...................................................................................................11

2.3 ExistingInfrastructureResilienceStandards...............................................................................................13

3 Methodology......................................................................................................................................16

3.1 TheTheoryBehindtheStudy.....................................................................................................................16

3.1.1 Non-disasterscenario.....................................................................................................................16

3.1.2 Disasterscenario.............................................................................................................................19

3.2 SuRe®Standard...........................................................................................................................................20

3.2.1 SuReSmartScan..............................................................................................................................23

3.2.2 WhatisnotthetargetoftheSuRe®StandardandtheSuReSmartScan?......................................25

3.3 Indicators....................................................................................................................................................26

3.3.1 Backgroundonthesourcesoftheindicatorsandotherfactors.....................................................26

3.3.2 HowtheindicatorshelptoconfirmtheresilienceleveloftheSuReSmartScan............................27

3.3.3 ThecombinationoftheSuReSmartScanandtheindicators..........................................................28

3.4 AdditionalContributingToolsandSources................................................................................................29

3.4.1 SRBA–SustainabilityandResilienceBenefitAssessment..............................................................29

3.4.2 InternationalDisasterDatabase......................................................................................................29

3.5 LimitationsofthisStudy.............................................................................................................................30

4 CaseStudies.......................................................................................................................................32

4.1 Manila.........................................................................................................................................................32

4.1.1 Background.....................................................................................................................................32

4.1.2 Resiliencelevelassessment............................................................................................................34

4.1.3 Post-disasterassessment................................................................................................................37

4.1.4 ResilienceDividend.........................................................................................................................39

4.1.5 InterpretationoftheResilienceDividend.......................................................................................41

4.2 Mathbaria...................................................................................................................................................41

4.2.1 Background.....................................................................................................................................41


4.2.3 Post-disasterstressassessment......................................................................................................44



4.3 Quito...........................................................................................................................................................49

4.3.1 Background.....................................................................................................................................49

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4.4 Port-au-Prince.............................................................................................................................................54

4.4.1 Background.....................................................................................................................................54





5 OverallInterpretationoftheResilienceDividendStudy.....................................................................61

5.1 ComparingtheProjectFindings..................................................................................................................61

5.2 OverallInterpretation–CommunalitiesandOverlaps...............................................................................61

5.3 LessonsLearned..........................................................................................................................................63

5.4 WhatIsMissing?.........................................................................................................................................64

6 Outlook..............................................................................................................................................65

6.1 TheoryofChange........................................................................................................................................65

6.2 Tool.............................................................................................................................................................66

6.3 CapacityBuilding........................................................................................................................................68

6.4 TechnicalAssistance...................................................................................................................................69

6.5 Registry.......................................................................................................................................................69

7 Conclusion..........................................................................................................................................71

References....................................................................................................................................................72

Appendix......................................................................................................................................................77

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Abbreviations

3GF GlobalGreenGrowthForumACCCRN AsianCitiesClimateChangeResilienceNetworkADB AsianDevelopmentBankBHC BenpresHoldingsCorporationC40 CitiesClimateLeadershipGroupCBD ConventiononBiologicalDiversityCCFLA TheCitiesClimateFinanceLeadershipAllianceCIA CentralIntelligenceAgencyCRED CentreforResearchontheEpidemiologyofDisastersDENR DepartmentofEnvironmentandNaturalResourcesDFI DevelopmentFinanceInstitutionEIB EuropeanInvestmentBankESG Environment,Social,andGovernanceESIA EnvironmentalandSocialImpactAssessmentESMS EnvironmentalandSocialManagementSystemFATF FinancialActionTaskForceFIDIC InternationalFederationofConsultingEngineersFPIDC FirstPhilippineInfrastructureDevelopmentCorporationGDP GrossDomesticProductGHG GreenhouseGasGIB GlobalInfrastructureBaselFoundationGIZ DeutscheGesellschaftfürInternationaleZusammenarbeitGRI GlobalReportingInitiativeICLEI LocalGovernmentsforSustainabilityIDB Inter-AmericanDevelopmentBankIFC InternationalFinanceCorporationJICA JapanInternationalAgencyCooperationAgencyHIS InstituteforHousingandUrbanDevelopmentStudiesRotterdamILO InternationalLabourOrganizationIUCN InternationalUnionforConservationofNatureISEAL InternationalSocialandEnvironmentalAccreditationandLabellingAllianceMDB MultilateralDevelopmentBankMNE MultinationalCorporationMNTC ManilaNorthTollwaysCorporationM&E MonitoringandEvaluationNLEX NorthLuzonExpresswayODI OverseasDevelopmentInstituteOECD OrganisationforEconomicCo-operationandDevelopmentOH&S OccupationalHealthandSafetyPNCC PhilippineNationalConstructionCorporationPPP Public-PrivatePartnershipR20 RegionsofClimateActionRPA RegionalPlanAssociationSDG SustainableDevelopmentGoalSRBA SustainabilityandResilienceBenefitsAssessmentTA TechnicalAssistanceUN UnitedNationsUNFCCC UnitedNationsFrameworkConventiononClimateChangeUNISDR UnitedNationsInternationalStrategyforDisasterReductionUSD UnitedStatesDollarWB WorldBank

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WWF WorldWideFundforNature

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1 Introduction

“Asyoubecomemoreadeptatmanagingdisruptionandskilledat resiliencebuilding,youareable tocreateandtakeadvantageofnewopportunitiesingoodtimesandbad.Thatistheresiliencedividend.”

(Rodin,2015,p.4)

Resilienceisanissuethatiscurrentlyrisingrapidlyontheagendaofinternationalorganizations,cityplannersandvariousdecisionmakers.Itisclearthatthistopiccannotbeneglectedintimesofincreasingenvironmentalchallenges, growing populations and increasing globalization.While sustainability (often also referred to as“ESG”, i.e.Environment,SocialandGovernance)topicshavebeenthecentral issueofdebate inthisareafordecades, resilience has emerged as a new term that is necessary to address the present and future issueswhicharegaining in importance.Eventhoughsustainabilityandresilienceshareseveraloverlappingthemes,thelattercanbeclearlydistinguishedfromtheformerduetoitsextensiveemphasisondisruptionsofvariouskinds. In this regard, resiliencegivesrisetobenefits in theformofreduced lossesafteradisaster.However,resilienceismorethandisasterpreparedness.Itisalsoaboutaddingvaluetosocietyirrespectiveofdisasterstakingplace.For instance,havinga safeandstable sanitationsystem inplace isnotonlynecessary toavoidepidemicsaftera flood,butalsoofgreatuseatanygiven time.Thesevalue-addingbenefits thatarise fromdisasterpreparedness,butalsoexistduringtimeswithnodisasters,canbereferredtocollectivelyastheResil-ienceDividend,whichformsthecentralfocusofthisstudy.

Current trends in economics, demographics and globalization are leading to increased migration to citiesthroughouttheworld.Theresilienceofanurbancommunityistoalargedegreedeterminedbythequalityandreliabilityof its infrastructure.This iswhythisstudyanalysestheResilienceDividendof individual infrastruc-tureprojectswithincities. Itunderstands infrastructureasbeingmorethan itsmerephysicalcharacteristics,and explores the environmental, social and institutional conditions underwhich an infrastructure project isdesigned,constructedandoperated.Forinstance:whatinterlinkageexistsbetweensocialcohesionandinfra-structure?

Atpresent, aneffective tool tomeasure theResilienceDividend ismissing. Theapproach introduced in thisstudy– thecombinationofa snapshotassessmentservingasbenchmark,andthesubsequentapplicationofinfrastructure-specific indicators–attempts to fill thisgap.TheSuReSmartScan isan instrument thatallowsthe sustainabilityand resilience levelsof infrastructureprojects tobeassessedata singlepoint in time (theaforementioned ‘snapshot’)as shown inFigure1below.Thehigher theattestedresilience level, thegreaterthenumberofbenefitsthatshouldarise,andthereforethehighertheResilienceDividend.Thishypothesisistestedbyusingtheindicatorsthatmeasurethebenefitsresultingfromresilienceeffortsandinvestmentovertime,andthencomparingthemwiththeinitialsnapshotfindings.

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Figure1 ResiliencemeasurementusingtheSuReSmartScanandindicators

Source:GIBFoundationOnce the relationshipbetween the resilience levels, as assessedby the SuReSmartScan, and thebenefits isconfirmed,theSuReSmartScancanbeappliedtofuture infrastructureprojects.Theresiliencelevelwillthenindicate theResilienceDividend that canbeexpected.This initial study,basedon four case studiesof infra-structureprojectsindifferentcities,revealsclearevidencethattheResilienceDividendexists.However,dataavailability is insufficient.This iswhythisstudyshouldnotbeseenas final,butratherasastartingpoint forfurther and deeper resilience research. In the future, resilience awareness raising via capacity building, andresilienceimplementationviatechnicalassistanceasearlyaspossibleintheinfrastructurelifecycleshouldrootresilience thinkingdeeply in themindsof every stakeholder in the infrastructure industry.Moreover, anewresiliencemeasurementtool,whichcombinesthefeaturesinFigure1,shouldbedeveloped.Itwillgiveindica-tionsonwhattolookforandwhattodoinordertoreachhigherinfrastructureresiliencelevels.Thistoolwillemploy thedataobtained andprovide thedeepest possible insights into the issueof resilience andhow tomaximize the resilienceofprojects. Besides creatingmore resilientprojects, these activitieswill allow resili-ence-specificprojectdatatoaccumulate,whichwillthenbeenteredintoaprojectregistry–afuturedatabaseforprovingtheexistenceoftheResilienceDividend,andthegatewaytoobtainingfundstofinancetheenor-mousfutureinfrastructureneeds.

Theremainderofthisstudyisstructuredinthefollowingway:Chapter2providesbackgroundinformationonresilience,ResilienceDividendaswell as theparticular importanceof infrastructure for resilience.Chapter3develops the methodology of the study and provides the theoretical background. It presents the SuReSmartScanasacentraltoolfortheproposedattempttomeasureresilience.Theindicatorsaswellasadditionalcontributingtoolsandsourcesarealsointroduced.InChapter4,thecombinationofasnapshotresilienceas-sessmentandsubsequentverificationusingindicatorsisappliedtofourinfrastructureprojectsinManila(Phil-ippines),Mathbaria (Bangladesh),Quito (Ecuador), andPort-au-Prince (Haiti) respectively.Eachcase study isindividuallyinterpreted.InChapter5,basedontheindividualcasestudyinterpretations,anoverallinterpreta-tionevaluatestheextenttowhichthesuggestedapproachisareliableassessmentmethodologyforresilience

ResilienceLevel

ResilienceDividend

AllPublicandPrivateInfrastructureProjectsatanypoint

in7me

SuRe

Low

Med

ium

High

Excep2

onal

Increasing

IndicatorstoverifyResilienceLevelandResilienceDividendover5me

Hypothesis:HigherResilienceLevel=HigherResilienceDividendSnapshot

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and sustainability.Moreover, commonalities across the fourprojects and key lessons learnedarediscussed.This lays thebasis forpossible future steps,whichareoutlined inChapter6.Here, strategiesand tools thatshouldbedevelopedinordertofinallymaketheresilienceofinfrastructurenotjustanicefeature,butratherthe“newnormal”areemphasized.Chapter7concludesthestudy.

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2 Background

Inthischapterweprovidebackgroundinformationandaliteraturereviewfocusingonthreemaintopics:first,wediscusstheimportanceofsustainableandresilientinfrastructurewithinacertainenvironment.Second,wepresentexistingresiliencedividendframeworks,andinthethirdpartwefocusonexistinginfrastructureresili-encestandards.Thischapterprovidesthereaderwithabroadoverviewofsustainableandresilientinfrastruc-tureframeworksandoutlineswhytheyareimportant.

2.1 TheImportanceofSustainableandResilientInfrastructure

Infrastructureplaysacritical role in thedevelopmentofmodernequitablesocieties,providingbasicservicessuchasenergy,transportation,waterandsanitation,aswellasinformationandcommunications.Accordingtothe UN (2017), quality infrastructure relates positively to the achievement of social, economic and politicalgoals.Atthesametime,inadequateandundevelopedinfrastructureleadstoalackofaccesstomarkets,jobsandinformation,andcanlimitaccesstohealthcareandeducation(ibid.).

Dependingonthechoiceofinfrastructureandhowitisplanned,constructed,operatedandmaintained,infra-structurecancomeat immenseenvironmentalandsocialcost.Forexample,fossil fuelbasedenergygenera-tionandtransportationresultinemissionsthatcontributetolocalairpollutionandglobalwarming,andthere-byimpacthumanhealthandwell-being.Atthesametime,infrastructureisvulnerabletoshocksandstresses.Forinstance,extremeweatherevents,partiallyduetoclimatechange,riskweakeninginfrastructureandeventhreateningitsveryfunctioningandserviceprovision.Asaresult,theunintendedconsequencesofinfrastruc-tureontheenvironmentandhumanhealth,aswellastheresilienceof infrastructuretonaturalhazardsandman-madechangesneedtobefactoredinattheoutsetofanyinfrastructuredevelopment.

TheWorldRiskReport(2016)statesthatwhenanaturalorman-madedisasterstrikes,“infrastructurecanbeadecidingfactorinwhetherornotthesituationbecomesadisaster”.Forexample,roadsprovideacrucialcom-ponentforemergencyservices,reliefservicesforaffectedcommunities,andevacuationroutesintheeventofadisaster(Pavementinteractive,2012).Rodrigue(2016)arguesthataneffectivewaytoassesshowcriticalaninfrastructureistoanalyzetheimpactsontheflowsandactivitiesoftheinfrastructureintheabsenceofit.

AccordingtotheUSNationalResearchCouncil (2009),economistsgenerallyagreethat(1) infrastructureandcriticalinfrastructure(i.e.infrastructurethatiskeyforthefunctioningofasocietyatlarge)affectthebehaviorofpeopleandbusinesseswhichinfluenceeconomicgrowth,landuse,andqualityoflife;and(2)withoutquali-tyinfrastructure,productivitywillnotreachhighlevels.Therefore,criticalinfrastructuresystemscanaffectthefollowingaspectsofsociety(ibid.):

• Thecompetitivenessofservicesandgoodsintheglobalmarket;• Thehealth,safety,andwell-beingofcitizens;• Theavailabilityandreliabilityofpowerandthemaintenanceoflife-supportsystems;• Thetraveltimerequiredforpeopletogofromhometoworkorotherdestinationsandfortheeffi-

cienttransportofgoodsandservices;• Thereliabilityandspeedoftelecommunications;• Thespeedandeffectivenessofcommunicationsaboutactionstobetakenduringnaturalandhuman-

madedisasters(e.g.regardingevacuationandsafeharbors);• Thetime,cost,andextentofrecoveryforcommunitiesfollowingsuchdisasters.

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SimilartoJudithRodin’s(2015)ideaofreadiness,responsivenessandrevitalization,infrastructureisimportantforcommunitiesintermsoftheiremergencypreparedness,economicrecoveryandinterdependencies(NACO,2014).First,aspreviouslymentioned,infrastructureinterdependenciescanaffectotherinfrastructuresystems–inthewayabridgefunctionsaspartofawholeroadnetwork–aswellascommunities,livelihoods,jobsandthenationaleconomy (Gallego-Lopez&Essex,2016).Second,adisruption to the infrastructure lifeline influ-encesacommunity’sabilitytorecover,tobouncebackandtobuildbackbetterafterandfromadisaster.Forexample,inaregionthatisdependentontourism,resilientroads,airports,railwaysandportsarekeyforthecommunitytoreturntonormalafteradisaster.Andthird,emergencypreparednesscan limit the impactsofdisasters.Aprominentexampleofunpreparedemergencyplanningcanbefoundinthecaseoftheterrorat-tackinNorwayin2011,wherea“lonewolf”terroristwasabletokill77andinjure319peopleduringseveralhoursattwolocations.Chapter5inTheResilienceDividendbyJudithRodin(2015)illustrateshowthelackofhumanemergencypreparednessplayedan important role in the fataloutcomeof thisattack.Rodin’sResili-enceDividendframeworkisintroducedinSection2.2below.

BoxI

Whyresilientinfrastructureisimportant“Sufficient andwell-built infrastructure, such as high-quality power and transportation networks, canlimittheimpactsthatnaturalhazardscancausebothintermsof lossof lifeandeconomicdamage.Atthesametime,thebreakdownofnodalpointsininfrastructure,suchasairportsorpowerplants,canal-socauseimpactsthatreachfarbeyondtheactualextentofthehazard.(…)Wecurrentlyfocustoomuchonshort-termreliefafterdisasters,andpaytoolittleattentiontoensuringthatresilientinfrastructureisinplacebeforehazardsoccur” (Dr.MatthiasGarschagen, ScientificDirectorof theWorldRiskReport,2016).

2.2 ExistingResilienceDividendFrameworks

Theassessmentofresiliencewithineconomic,socialandenvironmentalsystemshasgainedimportanceinre-centyearsandindifferentacademicfields.Assessingandevaluatingresilienceisessentialforidentifyingpossi-ble risks, opportunities and alternatives to conventional management strategies (Liu, 2014; Quinlan et al.,2016;Sellberg,Wilkinson&Peterson,2015).Moreover, theassessmentandevaluationof resiliencecontrib-utestoabetterunderstandingoftheneedsandgoalsofcomplexsystems,suchasurbanareas,andcanshedlightonthecostsandbenefitsofinterventionsdirectedatincreasingthelevelofresilience(Cutter,2016).Theassessmentandevaluationof resilience iscarriedoutusingtwoapproaches.First, top-downapproachesaresuitableforassessingspatialvariability,allocatingresources,andmonitoringprogressatstate,nationalorin-ternational levels. Second, in contrast, bottom-up approaches have the potential to provide greater buy-infromcommunities,butatthesametimedonotallowcomparisonsbetweendifferentlocationsduetothevari-abilityofdataanddifferingmeaningsofresilience.

Whilemost resilience frameworksnaturally cover similar aspects, a varietyof different frameworks are cur-rently inuse,eachofthemwith itsownparticularperspectiveonthe issueofresilience.Thefollowingpara-graphsprovideanoutlineofthemostprominentapproaches.

JudithRodinprovidesaquitecomprehensiveframeworkofresilienceandtheResilienceDividendarisingfromit.Thedefinitionofresilienceisexpressedinonesentence:“Resilienceisthecapacityofanyentity–anindi-vidual,acommunity,anorganization,oranaturalsystem–topreparefordisruptions,torecoverfromshocksandstresses,andtoadaptandgrowfromadisruptiveexperience(Rodin,2015,p.3).”HowevertheResilience

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Dividenddoesnotonlycomeintoexistencewhenadisastertakesplace.Morethanthis“itisaboutachievingsignificanttransformationthatyieldsbenefitsevenwhendisruptionsarenotoccurring”(ibid.,p.4).Tonameaconcretemeasure,onecouldmentiontreeplanting,whichprovidesprotectionagainsterosionintheeventofacatastrophe,butalsoincreasesbiodiversityandairqualityirrespectiveofdisasterstakingplace.Rodindistin-guishesfivecharacteristicsofresilience:beingaware,diverse,integrated,self-regulating,andadaptive(ibid.,p.14).Thesecharacteristicssummarizethekindofhumanorganizationandbehaviorthatisnecessarytobetterwithstandcatastrophes.Itthereforebecomesclearthattheresilienceofasocietyisconsideredfromasystem-icperspectiveasitdependsonvariouscomplexinterrelationsbetweenhumans.Resiliencedoesnotmeasurethedegreeofpermanentstabilityofasystem,butratherthesystem’sabilitytoabsorb“changeanddisruptionwithoutthesystemcollapsingorbeingtotallythrownoutofwhack(…)andachievingsomenewstateofstabil-ity”(ibid.p.47).

Theprocessofresiliencebuildinginasystemtakestheformofanadaptivecycleconsistingoffourparts:rapidgrowth,followedbyconservation,thenadisastertriggersareleasephase,whichgivesrisetoastageofreor-ganization (Rodin,2015,pp.51–54).Thisbuild-back-betterprocessshouldguarantee that thesystemalwayskeepsonfunctioningandthatreorganizationreachesahigherlevelofresilienceineveryloop.Correspondingto the adaptive cycle are therefore three “phases of practice”: readiness, responsiveness and revitalization(ibid.pp.55–63).

Finally,whilemany disruptions are of the same kind as those centuries ago, newer factors that exacerbatehithertodisasters have come intoplay: urbanization, climate change, and globalization (Rodin, 2015, p. 70).Thisiswhythepresentstudyfocusesoninfrastructureincities–theplacewheredisruptionshavethegreatestimpacts.

TheOECD(2014)providesanotherapproachbydefiningasociety’s–monetary,physicalbutalsoimmaterial–wealthasdifferent typesof capital stocks. The referencepoint is theOECD’s (2014) conceptof society’s sixcapitalstocks: financial,human,natural,physical,politicalandsocialcapital respectively.TheResilienceDivi-dendconsistsofbenefits,andthusofincreasesinthesesixcapitals.OnecanthereforesaythattheResilienceDividendisthetotalofthechangesinthesesixformsofcapital.Theoveralldividendisthusdividedintoafi-nancial,human,natural,physical,politicalandsocialdividendrespectively.

AnotherframeworkthatfocusesmoreonthedifferentcomponentsandthecompositionoftheResilienceDiv-idend is theTripleResilienceDividendapproachof Tanneret al. (2015).According to them, thereare threekindsofdividends(ibid.p.14):

1) Thefirstdividend:avoidedlosseswhenadisasteroccurs.Thelossesincludebothshort-andlong-termimpactsandcomprisefatalitiesaswellasdamagetoinfrastructure.ReducingoravoidingtheselossescreatesthepartoftheResilienceDividendthatisbestknownandconventionallyreferredto.

2) Theseconddividend:betterdisasterriskmanagement,whichreducestheamountoffuturelosses.Economicriskdecreasesandinvestmentprospectsimprove.Riskreductionthereforepromotesinno-vation,investmentandeconomicdevelopment,independentofwhetherdisastersoccur.

3) Thethirddividend:co-benefits.Investmentinresilienceyieldsadditionalbenefitsevenwhennodis-ruptiontakesplace.Thisisanalogoustothebenefitsinanon-disastersituationmentionedbyRodin(2015)above.

Finally,thereistheLloyd’sCityRiskIndex(Lloyd’s,2015),whichprovidesanotherapproachnotcoveredbytheaforementionedthreeframeworks. Ithasarathernarrowfocusonresiliencebycalculatingtheshareofeco-nomicactivitythatisjeopardizedbypotentialdisasters.Inparticular,theso-called“GDP@Risk”isanestimateofgrossdomesticproduct(GDP)lossesthatwilloccurinthedefinedtimewindowfrom2015until2025,given

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thereisahighlikelihoodthatanumberofdisruptionswilltakeplaceduringthisperiod.Therefore,itachievesaclear-cutresultindollarterms.Eventhoughthisframeworkignoresmanyimportantqualitativeaspects,itcon-tributesimportantinsightsintoresilienceatthecitylevel.

Thepresentstudyusesasynthesisoftheseframeworks.Inanutshell,itreliesonRodin’s(2015)fundamentaldistinctionbetweenresilience indisasterandnon-disastersituations.Theadditionalcomponent intheTripleResilienceDividendapproachconcernedwith future risk reduction (the ‘seconddividend’) isnot individuallyemphasizedhere,as itwouldrequireextensiveadditionalresearch.However,giventhatthestudytakes intoaccount investment conditions when investigating the Resilience Dividend in times of non-disruption, it in-cludes the ‘seconddividend’at least tosomeextent.Moreover, thestudyrefers to theOECDconceptof sixdividends.Itiscomprehensive,butneverthelessallowsforastrictclassification.Inthespecificcaseofthenon-disaster resilience dividend, the Sustainability and Resilience Benefit Assessment (SRBA) approach enablessome further specifications that are introduced below (see section 3.4). By using a combination of existingmodels,thisstudyisabletoanalyzetheprojectcasesefficientlywithoutneglectingimportantaspects.IthastobenotedthattheLloyd’sCityRiskIndexcannotbeappliedtoindividualinfrastructureprojects.Butitcanhelpembedtheprojectsinitsmesolevelconditions,andisthereforeusedasanintroductiontothethecasestudiesbelow.

2.3 ExistingInfrastructureResilienceStandards

On the project level, many assessment tools regarding sustainability aspects already exist (Grafakos et al.,2016).Manyofthesesustainabilityassessmenttools,however,donotproperlyaddressdisasterriskreductionandclimatechangevulnerabilityaspects.Eventhoughclimatechangerisks ingeneral,andriskreductionas-pectsinparticular,aregainingimportanceintheliterature,moreresearchisneededregardingtheassessmentofdisasterriskreductionandresilienceaspects(CharoenkitandKumar2014).

However,manyoftheexisting(sustainability)assessmenttoolsforprojectshaveonlylittleconcernfordisasterresilienceduetothecomparativelylowriskofnaturaldisastersindevelopedcountries,whichisaresultofthehighqualityofurban infrastructureandurban services there (Charoenkit andKumar2014). This results in aneed,especiallyinlowincomeordevelopingcountries,tointegrateresilienceaspectsintotheexistingsustain-ability assessment tools to allow for a comprehensiveassessmentofnewly implemented infrastructurepro-jects.

Whenitcomestoevaluatingtheimpactsofaproject,ithastoberecognizedthatthereisnosinglemethodtouse.Infact,complementingmethodsprovideanevenbetterpictureofpossibleimpacts.Toevaluateimpactsanddefineindicatorsforprojectevaluation,includingprojectsthataimtoenhanceresilience,itisimportanttounderstandthetypeandthescopeofthe intervention,thus identifyingthe impactofwhat,onwhatandforwhom.Thecostandbenefitsoftheimplementationofaprojectareimpossibletomeasureusingoneparticularmethod(LeeuwandVaessen2009).

Moreover,thequestionofthe“withouttheproject”scenariohastobeconsidered.Thus,theevaluationshouldtakethebaselineintoaccount,ifappropriate,andmeasuretheeffectivenessofthechosenpathwayinrelationtothe‘donothing’scenario(Pringle2011).Itisalsodifficulttomeasurethedirectoutcomesofanadaptationaction,sinceitcanalsocontributetootheraspects.Thus,knowingwhycertainbenefitsoccurredismoreim-portantthanthebenefitsperse(Pringle2011).Thiscancontributetounderstandingthepositiveeffectsofaprojectinthecomplexsysteminwhichitisembedded.Itbecomesevidentthatadaptationactionsshouldsetbaselinetargetsandindicators,monitorcontinuouslyduringtheimplementationprocessandassessobstaclesandimprovethem(Sanahuja2011).

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Inparticular,mostoftheinfrastructureresiliencestandardshaveanarrowfocusonthetypeanddesignoftheinfrastructureinsteadofusingaholisticapproach,ortheyevenpaylittleattentiontothoseissues(Rydge,Ja-cobsandGranoff,2015;Gallego-Lopez&Essex2016).Hence,Gallego-Lopez&Essex(2016)arguethatbuildingor changing infrastructure requires an overall approach regarding resilience (to both climate and disastershocks)andsustainability(includingclimatechangemitigation,thescaleofresourceuseandtheconditionofecosystemservices).Adifferentriskapproachisneededbeforeaspecificdesigncanbechosen(ibid.).Tobet-ter illustrate the issue,Benson,TwiggandRossetto (2007) inGallego-Lopez&Essex (2016)outline twocasestudiesinwhichthedevelopersdidnotconsidertheoverallapproach:

• “FollowingwidespreaddevastationcausedbyHurricaneHugoin1989,anewaid-fundedhospitalwasbuiltatthefootofavolcanointheCaribbeanislandofMontserrat.Thishospitalwassubsequentlyde-stroyedbypyroclasticflowsafterthevolcanobeganeruptiveactivityagaininmid-1995”(p.3).

• “Followingthedevastating2004IndianOceantsunami,somehousinginAceh,Indonesia,wasrecon-structedinflood-proneareas,leavingfamiliesvulnerabletofuturehazardevents”(p.3).

Inotherwords,resilienceininfrastructureshouldbeacombinationoftheabove-mentionedholisticapproachtooverallcommunity/local-level resilience (e.g. long-termsustainability, livelihoods)andadetaileddesignoftheinfrastructure,ratherthanjustadetaileddesign(e.g.physicalrisks)(ibid.).Furthermore,Gallego-Lopez&Essex(2016)explainthatresilienceininfrastructurecanbeachievedbyengineeringstandards(designandlay-out),butincreasinglyrequiresaresilience-ledapproach.

Inaddition,Rydge,JacobsandGranoff(2015)showhowvarioussectorsandtheirinitiativeslacksufficientap-proachesregardingresilientandsustainable infrastructure.Forexample,theG20Global Infrastructure Initia-tivefocusesonimprovinginfrastructure,butdoesnotmentionclimaterisks(ibid.).Furthermore,manycoun-trieshaveseparateministriesforinfrastructurepolicyandplanning,andministriesforclimateanddisasterriskpolicies (ibid.). There is a clear lack of sustainability. On the other hand, multi-lateral development banks(MDBs)anddevelopmentfinanceinstitutions(DFIs)havestartedincludingclimaterisksintotheirinfrastructureinvestments.However,theireffortsarealsolimited.Theauthors(2015)arguethatDFIsandgovernmentshavetoworkmorecloselywiththeprivatesectortoprovideclimatepolicyclarity.Moreover,partnershipswiththeinsuranceindustrycouldalsobebeneficial,especiallyforgovernments.Thisisbecausetheinsurancesectorisalreadyaleaderintermsofresearchtoassessandmanageclimaterisks(ibid.).

Threerecommendationsareoutlined in theworkofRydge, JacobsandGranoff (2015).First, thecurrentap-proachesofgovernments,DFIsandtheprivatesectortoinfrastructureplanningandprojectassessmenthavetobere-assessed.Second,climate-smartinfrastructuredecisionshavetobeintegratedatthreelevels: inthedesignandalignmentofoverallstrategyandpolicy;inthecompositionandbalanceofinfrastructureplansandportfoliosconsideredasawhole;andinrelationtoindividualprojects.Andthird,G20andothergovernmentsandDFIs shouldadopt,andencourage theprivatesector toadopt, twokeyprinciples: to include (1) risksofclimatechangeoverthewholelifecycle,and(2)thegoalofkeepingaverageglobalwarmingtounder2°C.

Additionally,Lamhaugeetal.(2012)arguethatabetterinteractionbetweenresilience/adaptationassessmentson the localorproject level, andassessmentsof thevulnerabilityon the country level,wouldbehelpful. Inturn,aframeworkcouldbecreatedthatincorporatestheassessmentoftheachievementsresultingfromad-dressing specific needsof thepeopleup to the “desiredend results (countries’ becoming less vulnerable toclimate change)” (Lamhauge et al. 2012, p. 44). A combined assessment of actions aimed at resilience en-hancementwouldprovideinformationonthecoherenceofactionsondifferentlevels,thevaryingdistributionofvulnerabilitiesaswellastheoverallperformanceofactions.Thismulti-levelresilienceassessmentapproachcouldenhancetheknowledgeofresilienceatdifferentscalesincludingurban,community,andprojectlevels.

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Inconclusion,theSuRe®Standardincludesthepreviouslymentionedrecommendationsinitsapproach.MoreonthedetailsoftheSuRe®Standardwillbepresentedinthenextchapter.

BoxII

Theimportanceoflong-terminfrastructureplanningWhenitcomestoclimatechange,decisionsmadeinthepresenthaveanimpactonfuturerisks.Thelackofplanningforclimateriskshasalreadyunderminedsomepublic-privatepartnerships(PPPs).In2008,forexample,theWorldBank(WB)affiliatedInternationalFinanceCorporation(IFC)reviewedandhelpedfi-nance theUSD2.3billionexpansionof thePanamaCanal.Even thoughclimateexperts from IFC raisedquestionsabouttheimpactoftheregion’schangingclimateontheproject,theprojectsponsorsdidnotaccountforclimaterisks.Asaresult,thecanalclosedinDecember2010duetoflooding,whenPanamareceivedmore rain than at any time in its recorded history, causing significant disruptions and losses(WorldBank,2016).

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3 Methodology

Thischapter introducesthemethodologythatwillbeappliedtothefourprojectcasestudies.First,thebasictheoryofhowresiliencerelates to inputs,benefits,disruptions, lossesandrisk isdeveloped.Throughthis, itbecomesapparentwhichmeasurementtoolsareneededtosuccessfullytestfortheexistenceoftheResilienceDividend.Thetoolsarepresentedinthesubsequentsections:thecentraloneistheSuReSmartScan.Totestandconfirmitsaccuracy,asecondinstrumentisused–alargesetofindicators.TheSustainabilityandResili-enceBenefitsAnalysis (SRBA) representsa specific and sophisticatedapproach to theuseof indicators. ThisstudywillapplytheSRBAapproachtomeasuretheResilienceDividendcomponentintimesofnon-disruption.Afurthervalue-addingtoolistheInternationalDisasterDatabase.Attheendofthischapterthelimitstothisstudy’smethodologywillbediscussed.

3.1 TheTheoryBehindtheStudy

Thisstudyhypothesizesthatefforts tobuildresilienceyieldvarioustypesofbenefits.Besidesbenefits intheformofsaved lives, therearealsofinancial,human,natural,physical,political,social,andeconomicbenefitsthatcanresult frombothdisasterandnon-disastersituations.Toquantifythem,wedevelopasimplemodelusingtheSuReSmartScan,measurementindicatorsaswellassomeadditionalsupportingtools.

Asalreadymentioned,theobjectiveofanyinputsregardingresilienceandsustainabilityistoobtainreturnsinthe formof benefits.Here “inputs” areperceived in abroad senseandmay comprise costs associatedwitheducation, planning, construction, labor, materials, and opportunity costs arising from the allocation of re-sources.Aninputrepresentsanoutflow,whilebenefitsareinflows–bothcanbe,butarenotnecessarily,ofamonetarynature.Policymakers,investorsandprojectdevelopersareinterestedinhowresilienceexpenditurescomparetotheexpectedbenefits.However,aneffectiveandsimplemeasurementtooldoesnotcurrentlyex-ist.

Inourmodel,acertainamountofinput(I)givesrisetoacertainresiliencelevel(RL).Theresiliencelevelcorre-spondstocertainbenefits(B).Asalreadyoutlined,weperceivebenefitsasflows.Hence,theresilience level,itselfakindofastock,yieldsasteadystreamofbenefits.Wecandescribetheserelationshipsusingthefollow-ingschematicfunctions:

RL = f(I) (1)B = f(RL) (2)

3.1.1 Non-disasterscenario

Letusfirstconsiderthesimplecaseofasituationwithoutadisaster.Function(1)isshowninpanela)ofFigure2.Itisreasonabletoassumethat,insituationswithalowlevelofresilience,smallinputswillhavealargeef-fect.Thehighertheresiliencelevel,thehighertheexpenseofadditionalimprovements.Toillustratethiswithanexample,inacommunitywithawatershortage,constructingapondisarelativelysimplemeasurethatwillhave quite a big impact on the community’s resilience. Once this and other projects are realized, furthermeasures,suchastheinstallationofsmartwatermeters,aremorespecificbutyieldcomparativelylessaddi-tionalutility.Function(2)isshowninpanelb):ahigherlevelofresilienceyieldsgreaterbenefits.Forsimplicity,letusassume linearitybetweenthebenefitsandtheresilience level.Notethat thesecurveassumptionsaremadesimplytodevelopthemodel.

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Figure2 Relationshipbetweenresilienceinputs,resiliencelevelandbenefits

Panela)

Panelb)

Source:GIBFoundationGiventhattheyshareacommonaxis(RL),thechartscanbepresentedtogether.QuadrantIofFigure3isthesameaspanela)inFigure2.Itshowsthatahighamountofresilienceinputsleadstoahighlevelofresilience(seepointH1).BytranslatingthisintoQuadrantIIofFigure3,weobtainthecorrespondingbenefits(pointH3).QuadrantIIIdoesnothaveanymeaninginitself–itsimplytranslatestheflowofbenefitsintoQuadrantIVbymeansof the45° line.Asaconsequence,Quadrant IV reveals the relationshipbetween inputsandbenefits,whichisthecentralaimofthisstudy.Applyingthissameprocesstolowinputsimpliesalowlevelofresilienceandfewerbenefits(seeL1,L2,L3,respectively).

Onemight ask why we do not just consider the relationship between investment and benefits directly, asshowninQuadrantIV.Theanswerissimple:wedonotknowthisrelationshipautomatically.Itisonlybygoinganti-clockwisethroughthefourquadrantsthatweareabletocarryoutthecost-benefitanalysisor, inmoregeneralterms,theinput-outputanalysis.Howdoesthiswork?Thesolutionliesinthecombinationandapplica-tionofthemethodsmentionedabove.ThecentraltoolistheSuReSmartScan.

Policymakers,projectdevelopersand investorswant toknowtheoptimalamountof inputs toachieveade-sired level of resilience. Input expenditures are observable and quantifiable. However,we do not know thelevelofresiliencethatcanbeachievedwitheachinput.Therefore,theSuReSmartScan,derivedindicators,andtheSRBAareappliedtothereal-datacheckofanon-disasterscenario.1First,theSuReSmartScandeterminestheresilienceleveloftheprojectbyassessingtheprojectdesigncharacteristics,therebyconnectinginputstotheresultingresilience.Function(1),exhibitedinthefirstchartor inQuadrantIrespectively,canthusbeas-sessed.Second,thekindandmagnitudeofthebenefitsresultingfromtheresiliencelevelaredeterminedbyusingselectedindicatorsandtheSRBA.Thelattermeasures,andthusquantifies,thebenefitsarisingfromin-putsbycomparingitwithacasewheretherearenoresilienceinputs(projectscenariovs.baselinescenario).ByusingtheSuReSmartScan,andbyapplyingindicatorsaswellastheSRBA,weareabletoconnectinputsandbenefitsandcanthusdeterminethefinalrelationshipshowninQuadrantIVofFigure3.

1Thesetoolsareintroducedinmoredetailinthefollowingsections.

Resiliencelevel(RL)

Input(I)

Benefits(B)

Resiliencelevel(RL)

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Figure3 Detectingtherelationshipbetweenresilienceinputsandbenefitsinthenon-disastercase

Source:GIBFoundationNotethattheSuReSmartScannotonlyallowsthelevelofresiliencetobeassessed.Italsoindicatesthekindofinputsthatshouldbeprovided.Onetypeofinputmayresultinalargerresilienceimprovementthananother.TheSuReSmartScanevaluatesindividualresiliencemeasures,therebyenablingtheircomparison.Indoingso,theSuReSmartScanrevealstherelationshipbetweenresilienceandinputs,andallowsthisrelationshiptobeoptimized.

Why is it notpossible simply to skip the SuRe SmartScanandmeasure the relationshipbetween inputs andbenefitsdirectlyusingtheSRBA?Thisisbecause,inthelatterscenario,itwouldnotbepossibletolocatetheoriginofthebenefits.Inourmodel,theSRBAquantifiesthefinaloutcomeoftheresilienceinputs;itisnotableto judgeandvalue resiliencemeasuresandactions.As anexample, an investor spendsa certainamountofmoneyandtherebyachievesareduction inGHGemissionsof5,000tons,stronglyreducingtheproject’sde-pendenceonfossilfuels.TheSRBAisnowabletoaccountforthedifferenceinemissions.ButitcannotrelatethedifferencetotheactionbehinditifaSuReSmartScanassessmenthasnotbeencarriedout.2

Moreover,thetypesandamountsofbenefitsareoftenunknownwhenaninfrastructureproject isbeingde-veloped.Noteveryinvestmentincreasesresiliencebythesameamount(orevenatall).Itisthusimportanttoassessthelevelofresilienceanditsrelationtoresilienceinputs.Oncetheresiliencelevelisgiven,policymak-ers,projectdevelopersandinvestorswillhaveaclearindicationofthebenefitsassociatedwiththisrespectiveresilience level.Thereal-worlddatacheck intheformoftheprojectcaseanalysis inthenextchaptershowshowthisworksanddemonstratesthatthetoolscanbeappliedtoanyproject.Simplycomparingrandombene-fitswithresilienceexpendituredoesnotprovideapolicymaker,projectdeveloperorinvestorwithatoolindi-

2Tobeclear, theSRBAcoulddosobutonly inanextensiveanddata-richapplicationprior toproject realization. In thisstudy,theSRBAisemployedaftertheprojecthasbeenimplemented.

45°

Inputs(I)Benefits(B)

Resiliencelevel(RL)

Benefits(B)

H1

L3

H2

III

III IV

L2 L1

H3

increasing

increasin

g

increasing

increasin

g

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catingwhichmeasurestotake.TheSuReSmartScanallowstheresiliencelevelofanyinfrastructureprojecttobedetermined.

3.1.2 Disasterscenario

Thisleadsustothenextcase:theanalysisofadisastersituation.Thehighresilienceofaprojectimpliesthatitshouldalsohavehigherbenefits.However,thebenefitsinadisastersituationtaketheformofareductioninloss.Lossesofvariouskindsafteradisasterare,informalterms,negativebenefits.Thismeansthatthebene-fitsarehighestwhenlossesareminimized.

Giventhatdisastersareunforeseeable,itisverydifficulttopredicttheirassociatedlosses.Thisuncertaintycanbeaccountedforbyintroducingariskvariable.TheanalogousbutextendedrelationshipsareshowninFigure4.Thesamehighamountofinputinresilienceyieldsacorrespondingresiliencelevel(pointH1).Thehighertheresiliencelevel,thelowerthedisasterrisk(pointH2).Thehigherthedisasterrisk,thehigherthelossesincurredoveracertaintimeperiod.Thismaybeeitherduetotheseverityofpotentialdisastersortothehighnumberofdisasterevents(orbothofthesefactors).Alowerriskthereforereduceslossesafterdisasters(pointH3).Thisresults in the inverse relationship between resilience inputs and disaster losses in Quadrant IV (point H4).Again, lower inputs implya lower levelof resilience,higherdisaster riskandhigher lossesoveragiven timeperiod(pointsL1,L2,L3andL4respectively).Figure4 Detectingtherelationshipbetweenresilienceinputsandlossesinthedisastercase

Source:GIBFoundationThemeasurementprocedureissimilarinparttothenon-disastercase.Theprojectdeveloperknowsthepro-jectcosts,andtheSuReSmartScanmeasurestheresilience level.Toassessdisasterrisk,weusetheInterna-tionalDisasterDatabaseasasupportingtool(tobeintroducedbelow).Unlikebefore,theSRBAcannotbeap-plied to this scenario. Even though losses have an analogousmeaning to benefits (“negative benefits”), the

Inputs(I)Risk(R)

Resiliencelevel(RL)

Losses(L)

H1

L3

H2

III

III IV

L2 L1

H3

L4

H4

increasin

g

increasing

increasin

g

increasing

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SRBA isunabletomeasurethembecauseabaselinescenario3doesnotexist.Forthisreason,wechoosese-lected indicators like the number of affected people – including fatalities, financial loss/impacts, changes ineconomicgrowthprospectsandotherpotentialsocialandenvironmentaleffects.Inthiswayitbecomespossi-bletorelatethebenefits,thatis,reducedlosses,toresilienceinputs.

Inconclusion,theSuReSmartScanisatoolthatcanbeappliedbyanyoneinvolvedwithaninfrastructurepro-ject.Itshowstheresiliencelevelthatcanbeachievedandgivesanindicationoftheexpectedbenefits.Indoingso,itallowsacost-benefitanalysistobecarriedoutinasimpleandeffectiveway.Whilefinancialandeconom-ic benefits can bemeasured inmonetary terms,many environmental, social and governance (ESG) benefitscannotbemonetized.Nevertheless,applyingtheSuReSmartScanallowstheseESGbenefitstobeestimated.

Thisstudyassessestherelationshipsplottedinthecharts.Inordertofindtheexactrelationshipbetweentheresiliencelevelandthebenefits,itisimportanttotesttheabove-mentionedtheorywithrealdata.Giventhatthisstudyisnotlimitedtofinancialandeconomicbenefits,butalsoincludesthosewhicharemuchmorediffi-culttoquantifyandcannotbeexpressedinmonetaryterms(ESGfactors),itdoesnotapplyeconometrictestsorotherstatisticalapproaches.Inaddition,theamountofdataavailableislimitedformostprojects.

3.2 SuRe®Standard

TheSuRe®Standard isanon legally-binding,voluntary independent thirdparty-certified standarddevelopedthroughamulti-stakeholder approach incorporating inputs fromawide rangeof experts from industrializedandemergingcountries.ItaimstobecompliantwiththeInternationalSocialandEnvironmentalAccreditationandLabellingAlliance(ISEAL)4andintegratesprojectlevelrequirementsderivedfromthemostrelevantinter-nationalframeworks.

TheSuRe®Standardisaratingstandardthat:

• Providesastandardisedapproach to implementingsustainabilityandresiliencecriteria (suchas, forinstance,GHGemissions reductionand resourceefficiency) intoall thedifferentphasesofan infra-structureproject’slifecycle,fromplanninganddesigntoconstruction,operationandthedecommis-sioningphase;

• Offersacommondefinitionof resilienceandsustainability for thepublicsector, the financesectorandprojectdevelopers;

• Providesaplatformfortheobjectivecomparisonofprojects,therebyimprovingprojectselection;

• Guidesprojectdeveloperstocreateprojectsthataremoreattractivetofinanciers.

The SuRe® Standard for Sustainable andResilient Infrastructurehasbeendevelopedbasedon the inputsofexpertsfromthepublicsector,financinginstitutions,projectdevelopers,civilsocietyandacademia–spanningsixcontinents.Itismadeupofatotalof65criteriagroupedinto14themeswhichcoverenvironmental,socialand governance factors, and another two coveringmateriality assessment and reporting requirements. TheStandardisbeingdevelopedinaccordancewithISEALmethodologies,anditcreatesacommonlanguageandunderstandingof sustainable and resilient infrastructureprojectsbetween thepublic sector, financial sectorandprojectdevelopers.Table1givesanoverviewoftheSuRe®criteria.

3Inthiscase,thebaselinescenariowouldbetheinfrastructureprojectwithoutanyresilienceinvestmentafterthedisaster.However,thiscannotbeobserved.4ForfurtherinformationonISEAL,seehttp://www.isealalliance.org

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Table1 OverviewofSuRe®dimensionsandthemes

3dimensions 14themes 63criteria +2

ENVIRONMENT

Climate

19

MaterialityAssessmen

t

Repo

rting

BiodiversityandEcosystemsEnvironmentalProtectionNaturalResourcesLandUseandLandscape

SOCIAL

HumanRights

25LabourRightsandWorkingConditionsCustomerFocusandInclusivenessCommunityImpactsSocioeconomicDevelopment

GOVERNANCE

ManagementandOversight

19SustainabilityandResilienceManagementStakeholderEngagementTransparencyandAccountability

Source:GIBFoundationTheSuRe®Standardcanbeapplied throughout thedifferent stagesofaproject’s lifecycle,enablingprojectimprovementstobemadefromtheearlyplanningandconceptdesignstagesthroughtotheconstruction,op-erationanddecommissioningstages.

WhiletheSuRe®Standardensuresthattheinfrastructureassessedwillmeetminimumrequirementswithre-gardtoEnvironmental,SocialandGovernance(ESG)criteria, italsoaimstohighlightthetruebenefitsoftheinfrastructure,andtopromoteinfrastructureprojectsthatprovidesolutionstosustainabledevelopmentchal-lenges(specificallytargetedtothecontextoftheprojectlocation).ProjectscertifiedwiththeSuRe®Standardwill, inaddition,contribute toachieving theobjectivesof the internationalpolicyagendabyaddressingcoreenvironmental,socialandgovernanceaspects.Forexample,theSuRe®criteriatakeintoconsiderationkeyin-ternationalframeworksandconventionssuchastheEquatorPrinciples,theInternationalFinanceCorporation(IFC)PerformanceStandards,theSendaiFrameworkforDisasterandRiskReduction,theConventiononBiolog-icalDiversity(CBD)andtheInternationalLabourOrganisation(ILO)DeclarationonFundamentalPrinciplesandRights atWork. Furthermore, SuRe® is alignedwith the 2030Agenda for SustainableDevelopment, contrib-utinginparticulartoGoal9“Buildresilientinfrastructure,promotesustainableindustrializationandfosterin-novation”,Goal11“Makecitiesinclusive,safe,resilientandsustainable”,andtosomeextentGoal6“Ensureaccesstowaterandsanitationforall”andGoal7“Ensureaccesstoaffordable,reliable,sustainableandmod-ernenergyforall”(UnitedNations,2015,pp.20–24).Table2containsa listoftheexistingframeworks,con-ventionsandstandardsthataretakenintoaccountintheSuRe®Standard.ByapplyingtheSuRe®Standard,aprojectdeveloper,investororpolicymakercanbesurethatallthesetoolsareautomaticallyincorporatedtoo.

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Table2 InternationalagreementsincorporatedintotheSuRe®Standard

ENVIRONMENT

MontrealProtocolonsubstancesthatdepletetheozonelayerConventiononBiologicalDiversitySendaiFrameworkforDisasterandRiskReductionIUCNRedlistandKeyBiodiversityAreasStandardRotterdamConventionUNFCCCStockholmConventiononPersistentOrganicPollutants

SOCIAL

UNUniversalDeclarationonHumanRightsUNGuidingPrinciplesonBusinessandHumanRightsILOFundamentalPrinciplesandRightsatWorkOECDBRIDGEIndicators(forgenderequality)

GOVERNANCE+overarchingframeworks

SustainableDevelopmentGoals(SDGs)IFCPerformanceStandardsTheEquatorPrinciplesGRISustainabilityReportingStandardsFIDICFATFNationalMoneyLaunderingandTerroristFinancingRiskAssessmentTransparencyInternationalBusinessPrinciplesTheOECDGuidelinesforMultinationalEnterprisesTheMNE(multinationals)Declaration(ILO)

Source:GIBFoundationFollowingthe launchofSuRe®atCOP21 inDecember2015,thestandardentered itspilotphase.Duringthisphase,SuRe®isbeingappliedtorealprojects,withaviewtoimprovingprojectdesignandsimultaneouslyre-fining thestandard.This refinementwillhelp toalign thestandardmorecloselywith localcontexts, therebyprovidingmaximumbenefitsandutilitytoinfrastructureprojectsandtheindustriesthatrelyuponthem.

Currently,GIBispilotingSuRe®onanumberofinfrastructureprojectsinCentralEurope,EasternEurope,Chi-na,IndiaandtheAsia-Pacificregion.Ineachregion,GIBhaslookedathowtheSuRe®criteriacanbeusedtoenhanceprojectdesignand/oroperationandtodemonstratetheseenhancementstostakeholdersandpoten-tialfinanciers.Forexample, inIndia,GIBhasassessedarailcompanytounderstandandimprovetheirreadi-nessforanticipatedclimatechangeimpactssuchasfloodingandheatwaves,whichcancauseseveredamagetorailinfrastructure.GIBhasalsoworkedwitharangeofutilityandwasteservicesonissuessuchasplanningpost-decommissioningandimprovingconditionsforworkers.InEasternEuropeandAsia,GIBhasworkedwithprojectstobetterunderstandandimproveresourceefficiencyintheconstructionphase,forexamplebyidenti-fyingrecycledandrecyclableconstructionmaterialstodecreasetheproject’seffectivematerialconsumptionnowandinthefuture.GIBhasalsoworkedtoenhancetransparencyandstakeholderinvolvement,withaviewtodecreasingtheriskofcorruptionandtoensureinfrastructureadequacyintheeyesofstakeholders.

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BoxIII

Ensuringthecredibilityofthetool:governanceoftheSuRe®StandardToguaranteetransparentanddueprocesssafeguardsaswellasprofessionalindependencefromotherGIBactivities, theSuRe®Standarddevelopment is governedby twomainbodies: theSuRe®StandardCommitteeandtheSuRe®StakeholderCouncil.TheSuRe®StandardCommitteedecidesonSuRe®’s strategy,overall approachandcontent,basedontheirdiverseexperienceandinsights.Committeemembersactivelyprovideinputonthestandard’scon-tent, criteriaandprogram, ifnecessaryby leading thematicworkinggroupsand sub-committees. TheCommitteebringstogetherexpertknowledgefrommanydifferentfields.Forinstance,therearemem-bersfromtheEuropeanInvestmentBank(EIB),WWFSwitzerlandandTransparencyInternational.The Stakeholder Council is a formalmulti-stakeholder forum. It provides feedback and recommenda-tionsonSuRe®toensuretherelevanceofthestandardtotherelevantgroupsofstakeholdersandre-gionsoftheworld.Councilmembersinclude,amongothers,representativesoftheOECD,UN,develop-mentagenciesandlocalgovernmentsfromaroundtheworld,andNGOs.Fulllistsofthecurrentmem-bersofboththeSuRe®StandardCommitteeandtheStakeholderCouncilcanbefoundintheAppendix.Theframeworks,conventionsandstandardsinTable2aretheresultofyearsofmulti-stakeholdernego-tiations.Theyareoftenwellunderstoodatthenationallevel,butnottranslatedwellattheprojectlevel,as theyare ratherdifficult forprojectdesignersandplanners toapply.Therefore, inpartnershipwiththe SuRe® Standard Committee and the Stakeholder Council, the elements of each framework werebroughtdowntotheprojectlevelbyputtingthemintoaformatthatiseasilyunderstoodbyprojectde-velopers.

3.2.1 SuReSmartScan

TheSuReSmartScanisaninfrastructureduediligencetoolthatprovidesaquickassessmentofaninfrastruc-tureprojectagainstresilienceandsustainabilitycriteriacoveringEnvironmental,SocialandGovernanceissues.Like“CreditSuRe”and“SuReUnderwriting”5(seeChapter6),theSuReSmartScanhasbeendevelopedbasedontheSuRe®StandardforSustainableandResilientInfrastructure.However,itprovidesamoresimplifiedap-proach than a full certification under SuRe®, and can be used by stakeholders to carry out a first self-assessmentofaproject.ThreespecificaspectsdescribethecharacteristicsoftheSuReSmartScanandillustrateitscredibility:

• It is based on the SuRe® Standard,which itself is based on international frameworks, and amulti-stakeholder‘filter’whichenabledtheselectionofthemostrelevantcriteria;

5Since70to90percentofall infrastructureprojectsaredebt-financed,atoolservingtheneedsofcreditratingagencies(CRA)isneeded.GIB’s“CreditSuRe”blueprintmightserveasabasisforfuturetools,especiallysinceithasbeendevelopedwithacommercialCRApartner.Additionally,theGIBenvisioned“SuReUnderwriting”toolwouldmakesense.Howtoas-sessresilienceandsustainabilityrelatedinfrastructurerisks?Howtomitigatethem?Whatresilienceandsustainabilityre-latedrisksshouldbefinallytakenonboardbyaninsurancecompany?Thesequestionsexpresstheconcernsofanincreas-ingnumberof insurancecompanies–especiallysince theyoftenplayadouble roleas insurersofand investors in infra-structureprojects.

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• ItisbasedontheGIBGrading(SuRe®Standardpredecessor)experiences,developedtogetherwithutilitycompanies,andusedonover150infrastructureprojectsaroundtheworld;

• ItcomprisesaselectionofSuRe®Standardcriteria,whicharepracticalforaself-assessmentir-respectiveofthepreviousexperienceoftheassessmenttaker.

TheSuReSmartScanconsistsof75questions,dividedinto14themes,andgivesanaggregatedindexvaluepertheme.Furthermore,itdefinestwobenchmarksthatallowforanassessmentoftheresilienceandsustainabil-ityperformancelevelofaninfrastructureproject:thelowerbenchmarkisthe‘reasonablebenchmark’,belowwhichsustainabilityandresiliencearelargelyabsent;theupperlayeristhe‘commendablebenchmark’,abovewhichtheprojectcanbeconsideredexcellent.Betweenthebenchmarks,sustainabilityandresiliencearelarge-lyaccountedfor,butmaybefurtherimproved.

Theprojectmanageranswers75questionsbychoosingacertainlevelforeach(seeFigure5below).Dependingonthedegreeofengagement,theanswermaybelevelzero,one,twoorthreerespectively.Levelzeroappliesiftheprojectmanagerhasneverbeen,orhasalmostneverbeen,concernedwiththecorrespondingcriterion.Thehighest level isachieved if thehighestnormsandstandardsof thespecific fieldareapplied. Ifaspecificcriterionisnotmentionedatall inthedatasource,thereasonmaybeeitherbecauseithassimplynotbeenaccountedfororisnotapplicable(N/A)duetotheproject’sspecificcharacter.Inthisassessment,weonlyindi-catedalevel0orN/Aifthedataprovidedaclearanswertothisquestion.Furthermore,topicslikewater,air,stakeholderengagementetc.mightbefoundinvariousthemesintheE,S,orG(Environment,SocialorGov-ernance)analysisbecauseoftheirmulti-facetedimplications(e.g.stakeholderengagementmightbeanalyzedfromaGandanSperspective).Figure5 SuReSmartScanexamplequestion

Source:GIBFoundationFurthermore,theSuReSmartScanofferscitiesandprojectownersapracticalwaytorapidlytapintointerna-tional best practice and to efficiently flag risks and opportunities for improvement in their projects. For in-stance,theSuReSmartScanaddressesthequestionofwhetherornotanevacuationplanexists.Dependingonthetypeofdisasterstheprojectareaisproneto,suchaplannaturallyconsidersdifferentelements.Inanareapronetocyclones,forexample,theprovisionofasufficientnumberofreliablesheltersmaybeanelementoftheplanandhencedecisivetoraiseresilience.Thispreparesprojects forthescrutinyofpotential financiers,whoincreasinglyfocusonESGcriteriawhenassessingprojects.

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BoxIV

Delhi-Mumbaiindustrialcorridorproject:SuReSmartScanassessmentTheSuReSmartScanhasbeensuccessfullyapplied toan infrastructuredevelopmentwithin theDelhi-MumbaiIndustrialCorridorProject,India.TheIndustrialCorridorisoneoftheworld’slargestinfrastruc-tureprojectsandaimstoaccelerateindustrialactivityacrosssevenIndianstates.Inassessingoneofthedevelopmentsalongthecorridor,theSuReSmartScanwasusedtoidentifydesignimprovementsaswellastodemonstrateareas inwhichthedevelopmentwasalreadyperformingverywell, inaformatthatmatchestheprioritiesofmultilateral investors.This informationwasthenusedto informthemanage-mentleveloftheoverallproject,withtheaimofgeneratingresilienceandsustainabilityimprovementsinfuturedevelopmentsalongthecorridor(pleasealsorefertotheoutlookinChapter6).

3.2.2 WhatisnotthetargetoftheSuRe®StandardandtheSuReSmartScan?

It isessential to remember thatboth theSuRe®Standardand theSuReSmartScan focuson themicro level,thatis,onindividualprojectsinsteadofcitiesorregions.Whilemanysustainabilityandresiliencecriteriaapplytoalllevels,therearesomedifferencesintheassessmentdependingonwhichlevelisaddressed.Aresilienceanalysisonthemesoorcitylevelfocusesontheriskforthecitypopulationandthecityinfrastructureliketraf-ficsystemsortheelectricalpowersupply.Relevantquestionsinclude:Doesthetrafficsystemstillworkwhenan earthquake hits the city, and can it be used to evacuate people? Is there enough electricity tomaintainhealthcare? Is thecity infrastructureefficient inordertominimizeGHGemissions?Hence,onthecity level,networkeffectsanddynamicinteractionsinacomplexsystemareemphasized.

Suchissuesarenotcompletelyignoredonthemicroleveloftheinfrastructureproject,andtheyarealsoad-dressedintheSuRe®SmartScan.Butinthelatter,thefocusismoreontheprojectdetails.Wewanttoknowwhetheraninfrastructureprojectisabletokeepupitsservicesevenwhentherestofcitylifebreaksdowninthefaceofanextremedisaster.Moreover,theSuReSmartScananalysesthedirectconsequencesofasingleprojectontheenvironment,societyandgovernance.

Both, themesoandmicroapproachesare importantandcomplementary inmanyaspects.Theirapplicationcaneachmakeacontributiontoimprovedresilienceandsustainability.However,themicrolevelapproachhasan important advantage:while a city level concept is only feasible for the local government administration,individualprojectscanbasicallybeplannedandrealizedbyanystakeholder.Hence,theSuReSmartScan isatoolforabroadspectrumofpotentialuserswhoareinterestedinmakingacontributiontoresilienceandsus-tainability.Thismakesthetoolhighlypracticeoriented.

The Mathbaria case study outlined below may seem to contradict this argument because it is part of the“CoastalTownsInfrastructureImprovementProject”.However,thefocusoftheprojectiscompatiblewiththeSuReSmartScanbecauseitconsistsofsomesubprojectswithinthecity.Asaresult,theeventualemphasisisonconcreteinfrastructureprojects.

Naturally, themicro level approach requires someconcessions. Severalmacroandmeso levelquestionsareonlypartiallyaddressed.For instance,the issueofmigration is treatedwithrespecttoan infrastructurepro-ject:doestheproject requirearesettlementplanornot?Moreover, resiliencemeasures liketheplantingofmangrovesinBangladeshmayhaveacrucialimpactonpeople’spropensitytomigrate(seetheMathbariacasestudy inthisrespect).However, themacroperspectiveonthemigration issuecannotbecovered:whathap-pensiftherearelargepopulationmovementsfollowingadisaster?Asanexample,adroughtmaygiverisetowholecommunities fleeing thecountrysidetogotocities.Since infrastructureprojectsareusually fixed ina

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certainplace,migrationcanonlybegraspedfromtheproject’sspecificperspective–buildingsdonotflee.Asimilartopicisincomedistribution.TheSuReSmartScancontainsaquestionwhichfocusesonthewagesandworkingconditionsintheprojectbeingassessed.This,ofcourse,hasonlyalimitedimpactontherestoftheeconomy. But the SuRe SmartScan, in its current version, does not target the question of how the newlyachievedsustainabilityandresiliencelevelsaffectincomedistributioninthesocietyasawhole.

3.3 Indicators

Inthisstudy,indicatorsareusedtohelpconfirmtheexistenceofaResilienceDividendfromaninfrastructureproject(microlevel)oracityasawhole(macro/mesolevel)incaseofdisastersandirrespectiveofdisasters.Moreover,theseindicatorsalsohelptovalidatetheSuReSmartScanassessedresiliencelevelofaspecific in-frastructureproject.

Thenextfewparagraphsexplainhowandfromwheretheseindicatorsarederived,howindicatorshelptocon-firmtheresilienceleveloftheSuReSmartScan,howthisstudycombinestheSuReSmartScanandtheindica-torstomeasuretheResilienceDividend,howtheresilienceindicatorscanbeverified,andhowthisapproachcanbeadoptedandadjustedforfutureuseandtomeasuretheResilienceDividendontheinfrastructurepro-jectlevelorevenonthecitylevel.

3.3.1 Backgroundonthesourcesoftheindicatorsandotherfactors

Theindicatorsweremainlyderivedfromthefollowingsources:

• UnitedNationsInternationalStrategyforDisasterReduction(UNISDR;2008)• AsianCitiesClimateChangeResilienceNetwork(ACCCRN;Tyleretal.,2014)• OrganisationforEconomicCo-operationandDevelopment(OECD;2014)• DeutscheGesellschaftfürInternationaleZusammenarbeit(GIZ;2014)• Arup,RPAandSiemens(2013)• Chakrabarti(2013)• Oxfam(2015)• InstituteforHousingandUrbanDevelopmentStudiesRotterdam(IHS)

andother research carried out by theGIB study team.Most of the aforementioned sources refer tomacro/mesolevelindicators.Forthisstudy,however,theindicatorshavebeenadjustedinordertoapplythemtoaninfrastructureprojectcontextonthemicrolevel.Itisalsoimportanttonotethattheindicatorsvaryaccordingtothetype(sector)ofinfrastructureproject.Forexample,aroadinManiladoesnothavethesameindicatorsas an airport inQuito, nor does a road inNigeria necessarily have the same indicators as a road inManila.Moreover,thereisalsoadifferencebetweenindicatorsafteradisasterandindicatorswithoutadisaster.

Thepost-disaster indicators of this studyhavebeen adopted from theOECD (2014) guidelines on resiliencesystemanalysis(seeSection2.2).Theindicatorsaredividedintothefollowingsixcategoriesoutlinedinbold.Asanillustration,somepost-disasterindicatorexamplesareprovidedforanexpresswayinManila.

4) FinancialDividend–Wastheinfrastructureprojectcoveredbyanaturalhazardinsurance?àAmountofmoneysaved

5) HumanDividend–Howwellwasthemanagement/staffpreparedforemergenciesanddisasters?àNumberoffatalitiesandinjuriesavoided

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6) NaturalDividend–Howwastheuseofwetlandsplannedinordertoreducefloodingrisks?àSizeofnaturalareanotnegativelyaffected

7) PhysicalDividend–Howlongwastheroadclosedduetoatyphoon?àUninterruptedaccesstocriticalinfrastructure

8) PoliticalDividend–Wastheretransparencyandaccountabilityintheaftermathofthedisaster?àWerethedecisionsfairandtransparent?

9) SocialDividend–Howwastheaccesstobasicneeds,e.g.food,water,finances,healthcareetc.?àUninterruptedaccesstogoodsandservices

Thesecondsetofindicatorsreferstoascenariowithoutadisaster,whichdifferentiatesbetweenfourcatego-ries: environmental, social, governance, and economic indicators. These four categorieswere adjusted fromIHS’SustainabilityandResilienceBenefitAssessment(SRBA)frameworkandsubsequentlyintroduced.Thein-dicatorsprovideinformationonthereductionofairpollution,thereductionoftrafficcongestion,thecoopera-tionbetweenmultiplestakeholders,orthereductionofmaintenancecosts.

It shouldbenotedthatsome indicatorsmightbeassignedtomorethanoneof thesesix (disastercase)andfour(non-disastercase)categories.Forexample,accesstohealthservicesmightbequalifiedasbothahumandividendandasocialdividend.Inbothcases,werefertothecorrespondingdefinitionsoftheOECD(2014)andtheSRBA.

Asregardsanyotherresilienceapproachandanalysis,thequalityoftheindicatorsisonlyasgoodas:

• thediversifiedknowledgeandexpertiseofthederivedsources;• thequalityandavailabilityofrelevantdata;and• thequalityoftheunderlyingcontextualorriskanalysis(OECD,2014)

3.3.2 HowtheindicatorshelptoconfirmtheresilienceleveloftheSuReSmartScan

Inthisstudy,theindicatorsarenotonlyusedtoassesstheResilienceDividend,theyarealsousedtohelpcon-firm the assessed resilience level of the respective SuRe SmartScans.A specific indicator indicates a specificoutcome after a disaster, which can then be compared with the indicated resilience level of the SuReSmartScan.Indoingso,thisstudycomparestheSuReSmartScanfindingsthatrepresenttheresiliencelevelofaninfrastructureprojectatacertainpointintime(a“snapshot”)withtheoutcomeofhowthisinfrastructureperformedduringadisaster. Itactsasafirststep inthenecessaryongoingvalidationofsnapshotfindings inorder to eventually arrive at correlations between assessed resilience levels prior to a disaster and post-disasteroutcomes.

Forexample,aroadisfloodedduringatyphoonandisclosedfortwodays:“closedroadsduetoflooding”isaroadinfrastructurespecific indicator.Duringtheinitialsnapshotassessmentofresiliencelevels,datademon-strates that the re-routing of stormwater during constructionmade the roadmore vulnerable to floods –whichiseventuallywhathappenedinthisexample.ThepresentstudywouldthencomparethesefindingswiththeSuReSmartScan.Oneofthe75SuReSmartScanquestionsfocusesonstormwater,andwouldindicatethattheinfrastructureprojectdidnotassessstormwaterintheirenvironmentandimpactassessment.Asaresult,if themanagementofthe infrastructurecompanyhad includedstormwater intheirassessment, theywouldhavecalculatedtheriskofstormwaterfloodingintheirproject.Hence,thefloodingoftheroadanditsclosurefortwodayscouldhavebeenprevented.

ThisishowthisstudytriestoconfirmtheindicatedresilienceleveloftheSuReSmartScanwiththepreviouslyexplainedindicators.PleaserefertotheTheorybehindthestudyinSection3.4forfurtherinformation.

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3.3.3 OurapproachtotheResilienceDividendstudy:thecombinationoftheSuReSmartScanandtheindicators

Whyisitimportanttodoaresilienceanalysis,includingapost-disasteranalysis?AccordingtotheOECD(2014),aresiliencesystemsanalysiswillprovidekeystakeholderswith:

1) Asharedviewoftherisklandscapethatpeopleface;

2) Anunderstandingofthebroadersystemthatpeopleneedfortheiroverallwell-being;

3) Ananalysisofhowthe risk landscapeaffects thekeycomponentsof thewell-beingsystem–whichcomponentsareresilient,whicharenot,andwhy;

4) A shared understanding of power dynamics, and how the use ormisuse of power helps or hinderspeople’saccesstotheassetstheyneedtocopewithshocks;and

5) Basedonalloftheabove,asharedvisionofwhatneedstobedonetoboostresilienceinthesystem,andhowtointegratetheseaspectsintopolicies,strategiesanddevelopmenteffortsateverylayerofsociety.

The combination of the SuRe SmartScan and the indicators (with andwithout a disaster) forms the centralframeworkofthisstudy.Asmentionedabove,theSuReSmartScanisimportanttohaveasnapshotofthesitu-ationinthecasestudiesatagivenpointoftime.Inturn,indicatorswillthenassessresilienceandESGtopicsespeciallyafterdisastershavetakenplace.

Thecombinationofthesetwoapproachesiscrucialbecauseoneapproachalonewillnotrevealthewholepic-ture.ThestudyusestheSuReSmartScantoassessaninfrastructureprojectforitsresilienceandsustainabilitylevelaswellasindicatorstobeusedaftertheassessmentthattrytoconfirmtheresiliencelevelaspreviouslyexplained.By analyzing case studies and combining the twoapproaches, this studymarks the first steps to-wardsindicatingtheResilienceDividendinthecaseofadisasterandwithout.

BoxV

SnapshotandassessmentovertimeAnOverseasDevelopment Institute (ODI)mandated reportwrittenby Schipper& Langston (2015) ex-ploredresiliencemeasurementframeworkswithaspecificfocusonindicators.Thestudyanalysed17in-dicatorresilienceframeworksandprovidedwaystoincreaseunderstandingofthem.Theauthors(2015)identifiedthefollowingkeyissuesforresilienceandindicatorsmovingforward:

1) Eachframeworkisstronglyinfluencedbyitsconceptualentrypoint,makingacomparisononlypar-

tiallypossibleandjustifyingthedevelopmentoffurtherframeworks;2) Thereisacleargapbetweenthetheoryonresilienceandthewayinwhichtheindicatorsfocuson

well-beingandgeneraldevelopmentfactors;and3) Indicatorsmaynotalwaysprovideacompletepictureofresilience(ibid.).

GIB’sapproachinthisstudycontributestodiscussionsonhowtosolvetheaboveissues.Itstartsbyfo-cusingontheentrypointofamulti-stakeholderapproachincombinationwiththeleadingresilienceandsustainability standards (see section3.2). In tackling the last two issues raisedbySchipper&Langston(2015),theapproachprovidesacompletepictureoftheresiliencelevelassessmentanditscombinationwiththesector-specificinfrastructureindicators.

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BoxVcontinued

Additionally to theODI paper, recent discussions at an ISEALworkshop in London onMonitoring andEvaluation(M&E)systemsrevealedthatthecombinationofcomplianceindicatorsandM&Eindicatorsiswidelyregardedasthebestwaytomeasureimpacts.Complianceindicatorsareusedtoassesswhetherspecificcriteriahavebeenappliedwithregardtoanoverallstandardatacertainpoint intime.Ontheotherhand,M&Eindicatorsareusedtomeasureachangeovertime.Additionally,theymeasuretheef-fectofcomplianceonaspecificcriterion.This ideaof ISEALon indicatorscorrespondsexactlywiththeResilienceDividendapproachofthisstudy:UsingtheSuReSmartScanasasnapshotassessmentofresili-encelevels(a“complianceindicator”)andsector/project-specificindicatorstosubsequentlyvalidatethefindingsovertime(“M&Eindicators”).

3.4 AdditionalContributingToolsandSources

3.4.1 SRBA–SustainabilityandResilienceBenefitAssessment

The Sustainability andResilienceBenefitsAssessment (SRBA) is amethodology thatmeasures the impactofsustainabilityandresilienceininfrastructureprojectsandservesasthemainsourcefortheabove-mentionedindicators in timeswithout disasters (please refer to section 3.2.2). Itmeasures sustainability and resiliencebenefitsbycomparingtheprojecttothestatusquoortosomehypotheticoptimum(baselinescenario).Themeasurementcriteriacoversustainabilitycategories(environmental,social,governance,andeconomic)aswellasotheraspects(riskreduction,climatechange,efficiencyofresources,learning,institutionalenhancement).Theselectionofcriteriadependsonlocalconditionsaswellasontheirapplicabilityintherespectivecase.Theresultingbenefitsmaybescrutinizedondifferentlevels(individual,localcommunity,city,global).Thebenefitscanbeweightedifdesired/needed.TheInstituteforHousingandUrbanDevelopmentStudies(IHS)6developedthistoolinamandatefromtheWorldBankGroup.

3.4.2 InternationalDisasterDatabase

ThepresentstudyusesdisasterdataforthespecificregionsfromtheCentreforResearchontheEpidemiologyofDisasters(CRED).Thisdatabase“isaglobaldatabaseonnaturalandtechnologicaldisasters,containinges-sentialcoredataontheoccurrenceandeffectsofmorethan21,000disastersintheworld,from1900topre-sent”(CRED,2017).ThedisasterdatabaseisupdatedandmaintainedbyCREDattheSchoolofPublicHealthoftheUniversitécatholiquedeLouvain,Brussels,Belgium.AccordingtoCRED(2017),themaingoals“aretoassisthumanitarianactionatbothnationaland international levels; torationalizedecisionmakingfordisasterpre-paredness;andtoprovideanobjectivebasis forvulnerabilityassessmentandprioritysetting”.Thedatabasecomprisesalldisasterssince1900,whichfulfilatleastoneofthefollowingcriteria:

• 10ormorepeopledead;• 100ormorepeopleaffected;• Thedeclarationofastateofemergency;• Acallforinternationalassistance(ibid.).

6Forfurtherdetails,seehttps://www.ihs.nl/about_ihs/introduction/

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Thedatabaseacquirestheinformationfromvarioussources,includingUNagencies,non-governmentalorgani-zations,insurancecompanies,researchinstitutesandpressagencies.AccordingtoCRED(2017)“priorityisgiv-entodata fromUNagencies,governments,andthe InternationalFederationofRedCrossandRedCrescentSocieties.Thisprioritizationisnotonlyareflectionofthequalityorvalueofthedata, italsoreflectsthefactthatmostreportingsourcesdonotcoveralldisastersorhavepoliticallimitationsthatcouldaffectthefigures”.CREDupdates, reviews and consolidatesdaily so that there areno inconsistenciesor redundant/incompleteinformation.

3.5 LimitationsofthisStudy

Thetheoretical fieldof thisstudy isclearly identified intheprevioussection. It indicateswhichsustainabilityandresilienceeffortsshouldbemade inordertoreachthetargetedoutcome inthemosteffectiveandeffi-cientway.However, thereare limitations thathave tobeaddressed.Theydonotmake theachievementofresultsimpossible,butindicatetheneedforfutureresearch.

The first issue topointout is theexisting limitations toquantification.Quantifying theResilienceDividend isbasicallypossible.Butthisdoesnotnecessarilymeanthattheresultofthisstudyisasinglenumericalvalue.Asoutlinedatthebeginning,andaswillbeseenintheindividualprojectcases,thisstudyidentifiestwoResilienceDividendcomponentsdependingonwhetherornotadisruptionoccurs.Inthecaseofadisaster,sixtypesofcapital (financial,human,natural,physical,political,andsocialdividend)areconsideredandhencetherearesixdividendsthatcombinetoformthetotalResilienceDividendinthedisastercase.Inthenon-disastercase,theSRBAdistinguishestheelementsoftheResilienceDividendcomponentfurther(environmental,social,eco-nomicandinstitutionalbenefits).

Independentofthisstudy’sspecificframework,andirrespectiveofwhichconceptoftheResilienceDividendischosen,itisobviousthatresilienceisamultidimensionalterm.Whileitsfinancialdividendmaybeestimatedinmonetaryterms,thehumandividendisconcernedwiththenumberofsavedlives,andtheenvironmentaldivi-dendis,amongotherthings,abouttheamountofgreenhousegas(GHG)emissions.Thesethreeissuesarejustexamples, and each subcomponent has many more topics and hence many more terms of measurement.AchievingasinglenumberasthefinalresultwouldrequireamergerofDollarunitswithunitsofhumanlives,carbonemissionsetc.Toachievethis,verysubjectivecalculationswouldberequired(for instanceestimatingthevalueofahumanlifewhatperseisanethicalquestion)andconsiderableassumptionswouldhavetobemade.As a consequence, the reliabilityof the final resultwouldbedoubtful.Whether the result has aunitterm,andwhichoneitmaybe,thereforebecomesratherarbitrary.

Thissubstantialshortcomingofempiricalmethodsisthereasonwhymanyestimatesofresiliencefocusononespecificaspect.Measuring the financial returnof resilienceeffortsusuallymeans thatonly the financialdivi-dendand,atthemost,theeconomicdividendareaccountedfor.Environmental,social,physical,governanceandpoliticalaspectsareignored.Thisdoesnotmeanthatmeasuringthefinancialdividendofresilienceisuse-less.Butitrevealsatrade-off:eitheraspecificcomponentoftheResilienceDividendisestimatedinaquantita-tiveway,whilemostotheraspectsareignored,ortheResilienceDividendisinvestigatedinallitsdimensions.Thelatterapproachprovidesamorecompletepicture,buthampersquantificationintheformofasingleval-ue. The SuRe® Standard and the SuRe SmartScan are oriented towards themore comprehensive approach.Thereareseveralreasonsforthis.First,aprojectdeveloperneedsanoverallperspectiveoftheeffectsofhisresilienceandsustainabilityeffortsratherthanjustafractionofit.Second,thisapproachdoesnotimpedeanyquantificationatall.Accordingtothedataavailable,itispossibletoquantifythenumberofhumanlivessavedaswellastheamountofGHGemissionsoreventheimpactsonbiodiversity.However,theseestimatesarenotmerged,andthefinalresultremainsmultidimensional.

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Thesecond limitationofthisstudy isthedataavailable.Asmentioned,allaspectsoftheResilienceDividendmay,inprinciple,bequantifiedindetaildependingonthedataavailable.Unfortunately,thedatarequiredhasonlypartiallybeencollected.Thereisusuallyworkableinformationontheinfrastructureprojects’environmen-tal,socialandgovernanceengagement,whilefinancialflowsareoftenmissing.Itismuchmoredifficulttofindouthowaprojectwillperformafteradisaster.Dataonthenumberoffatalitiesandaffectedpeopleisavaila-ble,butonlyonanaggregatedlevelinmostcases.Inthefuture,weneedmorequantifiabledataonhowapro-jectwillperformduringadisruption,howmanylivescouldbesavedthankstoitsongoingservicesforthepop-ulation,andwhatfinancialandeconomicgainscanarisefromthis.Moreover,additionaldetailsonthebenefitsin non-disruption times would be helpful. Once this data is collected, the core competence of the SuReSmartScanwillbetorelatetheresiliencebenefitstotheresilienceinputsandtomakesenseoftherelationshipinbetween.TheresultsofthisstudywillclearlyindicatetheexistenceoftheResilienceDividendbymeansofthe SuRe SmartScan. However, future research is needed in order tomake further steps towards a clearlymeasurableResilienceDividend.

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4 CaseStudies

ThischapterassessesspecificinfrastructureprojectsinthecitiesofManila(Philippines),Quito(Ecuador),Port-au-Prince(Haiti)andthecoastaltownofMathbaria(Bangladesh).Theinfrastructureprojectsaretwoexpress-ways inManila,an internationalairport inQuito,an international seaport inPort-au-Prince,anda resilienceimprovementcity-projectinMathbaria.ThegoalistopresenttherespectiveResilienceDividendforeachspe-cificinfrastructureproject.WhileitispossibletocomparetwoprojectsofthesamesectorinManila,thereareonlydataofoneproject ineachof theothercasestudies.Therefore,comparison ismadewiththesituationbeforeprojectrealizationorwiththeoldprojectofthesamecharacterthathasbeenreplacedbythenewone.Usually,dataforsuchcomparisonsexistbuttheyareinsufficienttoconductafullsecondSuReSmartScanas-sessment.Forthisreason,specificproceduresareexplainedintherespectivecasestudies.

Theinfrastructurecasesareassessedinthefollowingorder:1)Manila,2)Mathbaria,3)Port-au-Prince,and4)Quito.Eachcaseconsistsofthefollowing:

1) An introduction that provides background information on themacro/meso level, the infrastructureprojectitself(microlevel),andthedatausedfortheassessment;

2) TheapplicationoftheSuReSmartScanontherespectiveinfrastructureprojectinordertodeterminetheresiliencelevelassessment;

3) Selectionofspecificdisastereventsandasubsequentpost-disasterassessmentoftheinfrastructureproject,withthehelpoftheindicatorsandtheinternationaldisasterdatabase;

4) AprojectionoftheResilienceDividendintheeventofadisaster(avoidedlosses)andwithoutadisas-ter(additionalbenefits)withthehelpofindicators;

5) The interpretationof theResilienceDividend, summingupall the findingsof theabove-mentionedsteps.

TheoverallResilienceDividendinterpretationacrossallfourcases,thelessonslearned,andthelimitationsofthisstudyaresubsequentlypresentedinChapter5.

4.1 Manila

4.1.1 Background

MacroandMesoLevel

ThePhilippineshaveastrongagriculturalsector,thankstothetropicalclimate,heavyrainfallandthenaturallyfertilevolcanicsoil.Theagriculturalsectoremploysoverathirdofthepopulation,andthemanufacturingsec-torisconcentratedinthemetropolitanareaofManila(TheColumbiaElectronicEncyclopedia,2017).

AccordingtotheINFORM7countryriskprofile(2017),thePhilippineshavethe4thhighesthazardandexposuretonaturaldisasters in theworld.This isbecauseof thehighexposure toearthquakes, tropical cyclonesandtsunamis.Intheoverallriskindex,itisranked52nd.However,asregardsthelackofcopingcapacity,thePhil-ippinesareonly ranked107th in theworld,whichmeans that theircopingcapacity is relativelyhighdue to,7INFORMisacompositeindicatorthatidentifies190countriesatriskofhumanitariancrisisanddisasterthatwouldover-whelmnationalresponsecapacity.TheINFORMindexsupportsaproactivecrisisanddisastermanagementframework.Itisbasedonriskconceptspublished inscientific literatureandenvisagesthreedimensionsofrisk:Hazards&Exposure,Vul-nerabilityandLackofCopingCapacity.53coreindicatorsrepresentthethreedimensions(INFORM,2017).

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amongothers,DRRplansandthequalityofphysical infrastructure.Theamountofuprootedpeopleandtheinequalityarethemainrisksintermsofvulnerability.

Goingastepfurtherbyconsideringthecitylevel,theLloyd'sCityRiskIndex8(2015)showsthatthecapital,Ma-nila,hasmoderatelyhigheconomicgrowth.However,GDP@Risk,thatis,theshareofGDPthatisthreatenedbypotential disruptionsof various kinds, is extremelyhigh. Theexpecteddisasters between2015 and2025maydestroy50%ofthecapital'seconomicoutput.Asasecondextreme,Table3showsthatabout90%ofMa-nila's riskofdisruptions is due tonatural disasters. Inparticular,wind stormsarepredicted to cause severedamage. In 2013, the Philippines experiencedmore than twenty wind storms, amongwhich the severe ty-phoonHaiyanisstillremembered.

• AverageGDPgrowthrate: 3.46%• AverageannualGDP: USD201.08bn• TotalGDP@Risk: USD101.09bn• ShareofAverageannualGDP:50.28%

Source:Lloyd’s(2015)Table3 GDP@RiskinManila

Threat GDP@Risk ShareorTotalGDP@Risk

Windstorm USD60.66bn 60.01%Earthquake USD13.29bn 13.15%Volcano USD5.81bn 5.74%Flood USD5.46bn 5.40%Marketcrash USD4.79bn 4.74%Humanpandemic USD3.49bn 3.45%Oilpriceshock USD2.39bn 2.36%Drought USD1.86bn 1.84%Terrorism USD0.76bn 0.75%Sovereigndefault USD0.71bn 0.71%

Source:Lloyd’s(2015)

MicroLevel:Expressways

SouthLuzonExpressway(SLEX)

TheSouthLuzonExpressway(SLEX)connectsManilatotheSouthLuzonBatangasprovince.Theprojectcon-sistedoftherehabilitation,constructionandextensionofthisexpressway.Inparticular,itinvolvedtherehabili-tationandextensionofthe1.2kmAlabangviaductandthe27.3kmexpresswaybetweenAlabangandCalamba,aswellas theconstructionofanew7.6kmexpresswaysection fromCalambatoSantoTomas.Thetwonewlanes enlarged the existing capacity of the expressway. Construction began in 2006 and was completed in2010,whentheexpresswaystartedoperating.Theprojectcompany is theSouthLuzonTollwayCorporation,whichisownedbythePhilippineNationalConstructionCorporation(PNCC)andbyMTDManilaExpressways,Inc. (MTDME).The InternationalFinanceGroup (IFC) contributedUSD50million to theproject,whichhadatotalbudgetofUSD214.6million.

8Lloyd’sCityRiskIndex2015-2025analysesthepotentialimpactontheeconomicoutput(GDP@Risk)of301oftheworld’smajor cities from18man-madeandnatural threats. It showshowgovernments,businessesandcommunitiesarehighlyexposedtosystemic,catastrophicshocksandcoulddomoretomitigateriskandimproveresilience(Lloyd’s,2015).

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NorthLuzonExpressway(NLEX)

“In the early 1990s, the Government of the Philippines recognized the need to rehabilitate the 30-year-oldNorthLuzonExpressway(NLEX).Thestate-ownedPhilippineNationalConstructionCorporation(PNCC)hashadthe franchise for thetoll roadsince1977.With fastereconomicgrowth, trafficvolumeswere increasingandNLEXwas congested. Thiswas exacerbated by frequent flooding and the road‘s poor and potholed surface.PNCClackedthefinancialresourcestooperate,maintain,andexpandthetollroadtomeettheprojectedin-creaseintraffic. In1995,PNCCassigneditsrightsandinterestsunderitsfranchisetoconstruct,operate,andmaintaintollfacilitiesonNLEXtoManilaNorthTollwaysCorporation(MNTC).MNTCwasincorporatedunderajoint-venture agreement between the First Philippine Infrastructure Development Corporation (FPIDC) andPNCC for rehabilitationof theNLEX,withFPIDCowning60%of theequityandPNCC40%.FPIDCwasestab-lishedbyBenpresHoldingsCorporation(BHC)toenterintocontractswiththepublicsector.

On26October2000,theBoardofDirectorsoftheAsianDevelopmentBank(ADB)approvedadirect loantoMNTCofuptoUSD45millionwithoutgovernmentguaranteeandacomplementaryloanofUSD25million(allfromADB‘sordinarycapitalresources)torehabilitate,expandandoperate83.7kilometers(km)ofNLEXundertheNorthLuzonExpresswayRehabilitationandExpansionProject.Itinvolvedtheconstructionand/orrehabili-tation of 14 interchanges, 24 bridges, and 31 overpasses from Manila (Balintawak) to the Santa Ines exitprovidingaccesstotheClarkSpecialEconomicZone.Rehabilitationofan8.8kmexpresswayintheSubicSpe-cialEconomicZone,constructedin1996,wasincludedaspartoftheproject”(ADB,2011,p.1).

Useddata(seereferencesforfullcitation)

• EnvironmentalImpactAssessments(retrievedfromADB,JICA,orIFC)• PerformanceEvaluationReports(retrievedfromADB,JICA,IFC)• Variousacademicarticles• Onlinenewsarticles• Variousstakeholderwebsites

4.1.2 Resiliencelevelassessment

TheSuReSmartScanrevealsthefollowingprojectcharacteristics.TheoverallratingfortheNLEXisquitehigh,andisbetterthanfortheSLEX.Forinstance,theNLEXispartiallyconstructedonground-savingstiltsthataresuggestedtoprotectthetollroadagainstfloods.Moreover,theoperatingcompanyoftheNLEXfeaturesara-theroutstandingenvironmentalengagement.Atthesametime, ithastobesaidthattheSuReSmartScanoftheSLEX is respectable, too. IthastobenotedthattheSLEXassessmentwasmainlybasedonex-antedata,whiletheNLEXassessmentmainlyusedex-postdata.Thisisduetothepublicationtimeoftherespectivepro-jectreports.NotethattheSuReSmartScanoutcomeisclassifiedintothreecategories(‘leading’,‘commended’,‘drawbacks/roomforimprovement’).Insection3.2itisexplainedthattheSuReSmartScanquestionsarean-sweredbychoosingoutofthreetofourdifferentlevels(dependingonthequestion)accordingtotheproject’sengagementintherespectivethemes.Thus,thethreecategoriesinthebelowlistoftheSuReSmartScanresultsummarizetheachievedlevelsoftheprojectinthecorrespondingissues.Thesecategoriesareusedinallofthesubsequentcasestudies.

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Figure6 SuReSmartScanassessmentsforSLEXandNLEX

SouthLuzonExpressway(SLEX)

NorthLuzonExpressway(NLEX)

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Leading

SouthLuzonExpressway(SLEX) NorthLuzonExpressway(NLEX)

• Existingsocial,economicandenvironmentalliabilitiesincludedinplanning

• 60-100%ofmaterialstakenfromrecycledorreclaimedsources

• ExecutionofanEnvironmentalandSocialImpactAssessment(ESIA)andmaintenanceEnvironmen-talandSocialManagementSystem(ESMS)

• Clearorganizationalsetupwithseparationofroles• Transparentmulti-disciplinarydecision-making

process• Sustainabilitymanagerandexternalmonitoringin

place• Completionofanenvironmental,socialandeco-

nomicriskassessment• Accesstoservicesfromtheinfrastructureinpoor

areashasimprovedoverthelastfewyearsandef-fortswillcontinue

• 60-100%ofmaterialssourcedfromwithinthespecifieddistances

• Moresafetyagainstfloodingandreducedgreen-fieldconsumptionduetopartialconstructionofthetollroadonstilts

Commended


• CarryingoutofanEnvironmentalandSocialIm-pactAssessment(ESIA)

• Implementationofconcreteresiliencemeasures(naturaldisasters,conflicts,healthepidemicsandemergencymigration)incollaborationwithrelevantactors

• Assessmentoftherisksofflooding,erosionandlandslides

• Stakeholderengagementwithreportingtothemanagement

• Clearoperationalsetup• Compliancewithallrelevantlaws• Complianceofemploymentpolicieswithnation-

alandinternationallaw• Protectionofminoritiesandindigenouspeople

andminimizationofimpacts• Promotionofhiringandtraininglocalstaff• Monitoringofsocioeconomicindicators• Assessmentandmonitoringofimpactsonbiodi-

versity,naturalhabitatsandtheecosystem• Nodeforestationor100%compensation• Wastereusestrategiesinplace• Noimpactonwatersourcevolumeorquality• Geotechnicalassessmentofthesite'ssuitability

fortheproject

• Implementationofconcreteresiliencemeasures(naturaldisasters,conflicts,healthepidemicsandemergencymigration)includingperiodicdrills

• Assessmentoftherisksofwaterscarcity,sea-levelrise,heatwavesandincreasedpopulation

• Evaluationofpotentialsuppliers'sustainability• Stakeholderengagementwithreportingtothe

management• Compliancewithallrelevantlaws• Complianceofcontractors/subcontractorswith

theoccupationalhealthandsafetypolicy• Protectionofminoritiesandindigenouspeople

andminimizationofimpacts• Promotionofhiringandtraininglocalstaff• Monitoringofsocioeconomicindicators• Assessmentofimpactsonbiodiversity,natural

habitatsandtheecosystemwithcontinuousim-provement

• Nodeforestationor100%compensation• Wastereusestrategiesinplace• Noimpactonwatersourcevolumeorquality• Geotechnicalassessmentofthesite'ssuitability

fortheproject

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Drawbacks/Roomforimprovements


• Noassessmentwithregardtowaterscarcity,sea-levelrise,heatwavesandincreasedpopula-tion

• Nosustainabilityanalysisofsupplychains• Limitedparticipationofaffectedcommunities• Nospecificsustainability/resiliencemanager• Nosignsofhumanrightsabusesbutnopublic

disclosureeither• Noparticularpromotionofequalopportunities

andnon-discrimination• Nocomplianceofsubcontractorswithoccupa-

tionalhealthandsafetypolicies• Resettlementofpeopleduetotheproject• NomonitoringofGHGemissions• Nouseofrenewableenergy• Improvementoftheemergencypreparedness

planneeded• Noemphasisonstormwaters

• Limitedparticipationofaffectedcommunities• Noinclusionof“systemthinking”• Improvementinanti-corruptionandtransparency

policiesneeded• Nosignsofhumanrightsabusesbutnopublic

disclosureeither• Noparticularpromotionofequalopportunities

andnon-discrimination• NomonitoringofGHGemissions• Nouseofrenewableenergy• Improvementsintheemergencypreparedness

planneeded

4.1.3 Post-disasterassessment

Tostartthispartofthemeasurementprocedure,wegiveanoverviewofthenaturaldisastersofthelasttenyears in thePhilippines. It shows that theirnumber isquite large. Themostprominentonesare tropical cy-clones,floodsandearthquakes.In2013,theabove-mentionedcycloneHaiyancausedahighnumberoffatali-tieseventhoughitdidnotpassthroughManila.Table4 SummaryofnaturaldisastersinthePhilippines2006–2016

Disastertype Disastersubtype OccurrenceTotaldeaths

Totalnumberofpeopleaffected

Totaldamage('000USD)

Drought Drought 2 0 181,687 84,399

Earthquake Groundmovement 6 344 3,575,801 63,693Epidemic Bacterialdisease 3 53 3,975 0

Epidemic Viraldisease 2 770 130,717 0Flood Coastalflood 2 11 50,034 2,520

Flood Riverineflood 41 565 13,938,182 2,381,338Flood Flashflood 23 204 3,786,769 269,284

Flood -- 9 97 1,620,056 9,520

Landslide Avalanche 1 6 1,200 0Landslide Landslide 9 1,277 20,334 2,281

Storm Tropicalcyclone 100 15,887 84,131,418 16,593,176Storm Convectivestorm 1 0 100 5

Volcanicactivity Ashfall 6 0 153,114 0Source:CRED(2017)

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Forourinvestigation,wehavetomakeaselectionandchoosethedisastersthatwererelatedtoManila.There-fore,we focuson the two tropical stormsOndoy (Ketsana)andPepeng (Parma),whichoccurredwithin twoweeksinSeptemberandOctober2009.ItwasestimatedthatdamageandlossesamountedtoatotalofUSD4.38billion.Thepost-disasterneedsassessment (WorldBank,2011),executedby representativesof thepri-vatesectorandcivilsocietyorganizations,multilateraldevelopmentpartners,bilateraldevelopmentpartners,andthegovernmentsofvariouscountries,presentsanoutstandinglydetailedexplanationofthepost-disastereffectswithinthefollowingsectors:Agriculture 480,000affected farmers;maindamageand losses incrop irrigation;approx.

USD274millionneededforrecovery

Enterprisesector USD1.7billion in forgonerevenues inmanufacturing,wholesale, retail, tradeandtourismcombined

Housingsector 220,000homescompletelyorpartiallydamagedby floodwaters;hundredsofthousandshomeless

Educationsector 3,417schools,36collegesandabout2,800daycarecentersaffectedordam-aged;damagesandlossesofUSD54millionintotal

Culturalheritage Over45culturalheritagesightsweredamaged

Health Recoveryandreconstructionofpublicsectorfacilities-aroundUSD40million

Electricitysector DamagesofUSD32million

Watersupply Morethan50watersupplysystemsdamagedmainlyinMetroManila

Transportsector Totaldamageand lossesofUSD150million; typesofdamage included land-slides, eroded/washed out shoulder materials, embankments, and bridges;Roadinfrastructurewasthemostaffected;recoveryandreconstructionneedsamountingtoUSD233million

Telecommunications Extensivedamagetotelecommunicationsinfrastructure;costofrepairsUSD4million

Impactonemploymentandlivelihoods

Atotalof172millionworkdayswerelost(=664,000one-yearjobs),whichre-sultedinlossesamountingtoUSD1billionofincomein2009

Financialsector Trade volume first fell by50%, and thenby25%during the twodaysbeforeOndoystruck

Source:WorldBank(2011)The following table containsa listofallpost-disaster indicators for these two tropical storms,andalsowithregardstoSLEXandNLEX.Sincetheyoccurredshortlyoneaftertheother,manyindicatorsarepresentedinasummarizedway.

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Table5 IndicatorsofdisastersinManila

TropicalstormOndoy–September2009 TropicalstormPepeng–October2009

Macro andMesoLevel

• Totaldeaths:464• Totalinjured:529• Missing:37• Totalaffected:4,901,234• Immediatesearchandrescueoperations

inthefloodedareas• Requestforinternationalassistanceright

afterthestorm

• Totaldeaths:492• Totalinjured:207• Missing:47• Totalaffected:4,478,284• Earlywarningandevacuationofaround

45,500people

Indicatorsdescribingbothstormsjointly:• Ambiguousimpactoneconomicgrowth• Povertyincidenceincreasedby3percentagepointsinmostaffectedareasofLuzon• Majorityofpopulationaffected,homesflooded• Reconstructioncostperresidencebetween12,000and141,000Pesosdependingonin-

comeclassofhouseholds• Severelossesofhouseholdassetsfor45percentofthehouseholds• Interruptionofwatersupplyfor22days• Incomelossof21,000Pesosperhousehold• Medicalexpensesof6,517Pesosperhousehold

SLEX/NLEX• NLEX:USD1.6millionindamagesandlosses(totaltransportdamagesandlossesUSD150

million)• PartoftheSLEXandNLEXwasflooded

Sources:WorldBank(2011);Porio(2012)

4.1.4 ResilienceDividend

TheResilienceDividendof thetwoManilaprojects isportrayed intwocomponents: first, theavoided lossesafter the two tropical cyclones of 2009 are analyzed according to the above shown indicators. Second, theSRBAassessestheadditionalbenefitsofthetwoanalyzedtollwaysinabsenceofdisasters.ThecomparisonofthesetwoexpresswayswillshowwhethertheResilienceDividendcanbeconfirmed.Iftherearemorebenefitsfortheproject,whichexhibitsabetterSuReSmartScanresult,wegettheconfirmationthatresilienceeffortspayoff.

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Avoidedlossesduetodisruptionpreparedness

Table6 ResilienceDividendinadisastercase

Dividend Description


FinancialDividend

• Avoidedlossesfromdailyoperation • Avoidedlossesfromdailyoperation

HumanDividend

• Securedaccesstobasicneeds • Securedaccesstobasicneeds

NaturalDividend

• Betterdrainoffofwatersubmergedare-asduetoimproveddrainagesystem

PhysicalDividend

• Betterandmorereliableaccesstoprovidebasicneeds(healthandsanitation,food,water,shelteretc.)inastateofemergency

• Betterandmorereliableaccesstopro-videbasicneeds(healthandsanitation,food,water,shelteretc.)inastateofemergency

• Earlywarningsysteminplace,whichpro-ducesalertsbefore,duringandafteranevent

• Constructionofviaductsinthewetlandsonstilts:lessfloodedroads

PoliticalDividend

• Addressingcitizens’requestsforpublicdiscussionsonroadinfrastructure

• Addressingcitizens’requestsforpublicdiscussionsonroadinfrastructure

SocialDividend

• Fasterrecoverytoanormalwork-day • Fasterrecoverytoanormalwork-day

Additionalbenefitsinabsenceofadisaster(SRBA)

Environmental

• AbsorptionofGHGemissionsduetonewtreesalongtheexpressways(SLEXandNLEX)(Santosetal.,2009;DENR,2011)

Social

• SLEX:timesavingofalmost50%,vehicleoperatingcostsavingsof1.38Pesosperkm,NLEX:Improvedsafe-ty,lighting,signageandenforcementoftrafficlaws(ADB,2010)

• NLEX:alertsoncongestionweather,trafficetc.forthewholepopulationduetotrafficmanagementsystem• SLEXandNLEX:reducedtraveltimes• SLEXandNLEX:increasedsafetythroughspeedlimitsandwiderlanes• SLEXandNLEX:improvementingenderequalitywithtraining,publicinformationandprovisionofsanita-

tionfacilities

Governance

• NLEX:benchmarkforothertollroadprojectsinthePhilippines(ADB,2011)• NLEX:RolemodelforfuturePPPininfrastructure

Economic

• NLEX:strongincreaseinthenumberofbillboardsalongtheroadasanindicatorofaneconomicupswing(ADB,2010)

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• NLEX:riseintourism(numberofvisitorsincreasingby24%from2007to2008)(ibid.,2010)• NLEX:creationof5,000newjobs(ibid.,2010)• NLEX:increaseinoperatingrevenues• NLEX:Increaseintaxincomefromexpresswayoperation• SLEX:increaseinoperatingrevenues

4.1.5 InterpretationoftheResilienceDividend

TheSuReSmartScanyieldsagoodresultfortheSLEXandaverygoodresultfortheNLEX. Indeed,there isapositiveResilienceDividendforbothprojects.Afteradisaster,bothareabletokeepupoperationsortore-establishthemsooniftheyhavebeeninterrupted.Thankstoearlywarningsystems,theNLEXisalittlebetterpreparedforemergencies.Bothhighwaysareespeciallyimportanttoenablepeople’smobilityandthedeliveryofemergencyservicesinthedisastercase.WhatismissingfortheSLEX,however,isaclearlydefinednaturaldividendafteradisaster.

Theco-benefitsintheabsenceofadisruptionarealsovisiblewhilemoreindicatorsaremeasuredfortheNLEX.Mostofthemareofasocialoreconomicnatureandconcernsmoothoperationsandusageoftheexpresswaysaswellasbusinessdynamicsthathavebeensparked.Ithastobenotedthat,inametropolisasdenselypopu-latedasManila,thecapacityofthepreviouslyexistingroadnetworkwereoftenexceeded,resultinginregulartrafficcongestion.Hence, thecase tobuildnewtoll roadswaspresent (Boquet,2015,p.460).On theotherhand,additionaltrafficcapacitiesmeanadditionalenvironmentalpollution.ThisproblemisclearlyrevealedintheSuReSmartScanresultsforbothSLEXandNLEXastheybothfeaturequitelowvaluesinrelationtoclimateissues.

4.2 Mathbaria

4.2.1 Background

MacroandMesoLevel

AccordingtotheINFORMindex,Bangladeshhasaquitehighhazardandriskexposure(rank15outofallcoun-tries)(2017).ThisiscloselyconnectedtothefindingsofNationalGeographic,whichstatethatBangladeshandIndia are the two countriesmost vulnerable to the impacts of climate change (2010).On the city level, theLloyd’sCityRisk Indexshowsthat,despitegoodeconomicgrowthprospects,a largeshareofGDP inBangla-desh’sCapitalDhaka is threatenedbypotential disasters (Lloyd’s, 2015).Among the ten riskiest disasters inBangladesh,naturaldisastersaccountforabouthalfofGDP@Risk.

• AverageGDPgrowthrate: 6.19%• AverageannualGDP: USD36.76bn• TotalGDP@Risk: USD6.57bn• ShareofaverageannualGDP: 17.86%


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Table7 GDP@RiskinDhaka

Threat GDP@Risk ShareoftotalGDP@Risk

Marketcrash USD1.57bn 23.95%Flood USD1.07bn 16.29%Humanpandemic USD1.05bn 15.96%Earthquake USD0.94bn 14.26%Sovereigndefault USD0.92bn 14.05%Oilpriceshock USD0.44bn 6.65%Poweroutage USD0.17bn 2.59%Drought USD0.14bn 2.19%Windstorm USD0.10bn 1.54%Solarstorm USD0.06bn 0.86%Cyberattack USD0.05bn 0.79%

Source:Lloyd’s(2015)MicroLevel:theMathbariaProject

TheMathbaria project is part of a large project of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the RockefellerFoundationledAsianCitiesClimateChangeResilienceNetwork(ACCCRN)comprisingresilienceimprovementsin eight coastal towns in Bangladesh. In particular, the project provides climate-resilient infrastructure andaimsatstrengtheninginstitutionalandgovernancecapacities,forinstancebyfosteringtransparencyandanti-corruptionmeasures,aswellasdisasterpreparedness.OverallprojectcostsarebudgetedatUSD117.1million.GIBchoseMathbariaoutof theseeightcitiesbecause it is theproject,whichtakesthemostcomprehensiveaccountofresilienceaspects,i.e.itcomprisesallenvisionedinfrastructuremeasuresinonesingletown:itcon-sistsofseveralsubprojects.First,thereisawatersupplysubprojectbecausethereiscurrentlynopipedwaterinMathbaria.Moreover,anadditionalcycloneshelterisbeingconstructedbecausethecurrentsheltercapaci-ty is insufficient. Furthermore, river embankments are being strengthened and the city’s drainage system isbeingimproved.Andfinally,someroadsandabridgehavebeenrestored.

Mathbaria is the joint case tobe investigatedbyboth theRANDCorporationandGIB. This sectionpresentsGIB’scontribution.It isanexceptionalcasebecauseitanalyzesresilienceonthecity levelratherthanonthelevel of an individual project. However, the tools can be applied in an analogousway.Due to the city-levelanalysis,thenumberofpotentialstakeholdersislarge.Basically,thewholecitypopulationandparticularlythemost vulnerable andpoor people are affectedby theproject. Regional and city authorities naturally have agreatinterestinthisprojectaswell,astheygetfundingsupportandreceivegovernancesupport.Furthermore,thecivilsocietyhasparticularinterestsintheprojectaspectsthatconcernenvironmentalorsocialissues.Oth-erstakeholdersincludelocalslivinginthevillagesaroundMathbaria,sincetheymayforinstancefindshelterwhendisastersoccurintheirregion.

Asstatedrepeatedly,dataavailabilityisthemainbottleneckinthisstudy’sapproachtorealinfrastructurepro-jects.Sincetheprojecthasnotyetbeenfullyrealized,theconcepthastobeadapted.Inparticular,thesitua-tionpriortoprojectrealizationistakenastheinitialsituation.Thedamagesandlossesincurredduringthedis-asters,aswellasmanyadditionalproblemsandchallenges,indicatetheneedforimprovementstoMathbaria’sresilience.GIB investigated how far the project at hand responds to these needs in order to get an idea ofwhetherMathbariawillbeprepared for futurecatastrophes. In thisway, theResilienceDividendcanbeap-proximated.

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DatafortheSuReSmartScanassessmentandtheSRBAarecontainedintheADBprojectreports.Ontheonehand,thereisthemainreportfortheoverallprojectforalleighttowns(GHKConsultingLimited,2013).Ontheotherhand,theMathbariaprojectisdocumentedinthreedifferentreportsconcerningthewatersupplysub-project, a resettlement plan and the cyclone shelter subproject respectively (Government of Bangladesh,2013a,2013b,2013c).Additionalsourcesusedinspecificplacesareindicatedaccordingly.

Dataused(seereferencesforfullcitation)• Projectreports(retrievedfromADB)• Variousacademicarticles• Onlinenewsarticles• Variousstakeholderwebsites


TheSuReSmartScanrevealsthefollowingprojectcharacteristics:overall,therating isquitehighasthecom-mendedbenchmarkisreachedforalmostallthemeswitheithercurrentorfuturemeasures.Specifically,thereisastrongemphasisoninstitutionalandgovernanceissuesasforexamplesophisticatedstakeholderinclusionand sustainability training for employees.Asdescribed above, theproject doesnotonly take resilience intoaccountbutisratherdirectlydedicatedtobuildresilience.Thelistbelowprovidesashortsummaryofthepro-jectsresilienceandsustainabilitylevelaccordingtotheSuReSmartScan.Theinterpretationofthesefindingsispresentedattheendofthiscasestudyanalysis.Figure7 SuReSmartScanassessmentfortheMathbariaresilienceimprovementinfrastructureproject

Leading

• Clearorganizationalsetupoftheproject• Employeesprovidedwithtrainingforsustainabilityskills

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• Establishedanti-corruptionpolicy• Employmentoflocalstaffhasfirstpriority• Project-specificgenderactionplanwithtargetsandmeasures• Complaintandgrievancemechanismtoeliminatediscrimination• Stakeholderengagementisanon-goingprocessthroughouttheimplementationphase• Accountingforabroadrangeofrisksandemergencies:

o Environmental:sea-levelrise,intensifyingcyclonesandfloodso Social:healthepidemics(freshwatersupplyandsanitation)o Governmental:technical/operationalrisks,urbanplanningrisks,governancerisks

• Concreteemergencypreparednessmeasures:o Cyclonesheltero Drainageandfloodcontrols(constructionofearthenchannelsanddrains)o Watersupply(constructionofpipelines,welldrillingetc.,back-upgenerators)o Sanitation(publictoilets,schoollatrinesetc.)o Improvementofriverembankments

• Improvedsanitationconditionsforcitypopulation• IntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange(IPCC)scenariosaretakenintoaccount• Useofhazardousmaterialsminimized• Nothreattoforests,wetlandsormangroves• Floodingcausedbystormwaterflowsprevented• Wasterecycling

Commended

• Separationofrolesintheconstructionandoperationphases• Sustainabilitymanager• EmploymentconditionsaccordingtoILOconventions• Publicmeetingsforinformationdisclosure• PositivespillovereffectsontheareasaroundMathbariathroughincreasedincomeaswellasimprovedre-

silience• Betterfloodandcycloneprotectionraisesinvestmentsecurity• Allrevenue-generatingsubprojectsarejudgedasfinanciallyviable• Impactsonbiodiversityandecosystemsaremonitored• Standardssetforwaterquality,airpollutionandnoise

Drawbacks/Roomforimprovement

• Nospecificemphasisonhealthandsafetyconditionsduringprojectimplementation• Renewableenergiesandenergyefficiencynotemphasized• Resourceefficiencynotemphasized

4.2.3 Post-disasterstressassessment

Disasters

Floodsandstorms(oftenintheformofcyclones)arethenaturaldisastersthathitBangladeshmostoften.AsTable8shows,theyhavealsohavecausedthemostfatalitiesanddamageduringthepasttenyears.

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Table8 SummaryofnaturaldisastersinBangladesh2006–2016

Source:CRED(2017)

Thereweremanydifferentdisastersduringthepasttenyears.ThisstudyfocusesonthosewithadirectimpactonMathbaria.Table9givesanoverviewusingaconsiderablenumberofindicators.Insomecases,effectscanbedirectlyattributedtoMathbaria,whileothershavetorelyonhigher-leveldata.Nevertheless,thelattercanstillyieldconclusionsthatarerelevantforMathbaria.Table9 IndicatorsofdisastersinMathbaria

Disaster Indicators Mathbariarelated

SuperCy-cloneSidr20071

• Numberofkilledpeople:3347and871missing• Numberofaffectedpeople:8,923,259• USD26.309millionofdamagetowaterinfrastructure• Long-termreconstructioncostUSD294million• 12,984watersourcesdamaged(10,412restoredby

endof2007)• 5982pondsdamaged• Totallyruinedcroplandinfourworstaffecteddistricts:

55,950ha,partiallydamaged:472,505ha• Lossofproductioninfourworstaffecteddistricts:

535707MT• Damagedhouses:563,877fully,955,065partially• 4milliontreesdestroyed• Among475jetties,103damaged• 125.40kmofembankmentfullywashedout• 9kmofriverbankheavilydamaged• 8075kmroadsaffected• 3705schoolbuildingstotallyorpartiallydamaged

MathbariawasamongtheworsthitUpazilas(administra-tionunit)inPirojpur(province),whichisitselfoneoftheworstaffecteddistricts

CycloneAila20092

• Numberofpeoplekilled:190• Numberofpeopleaffected:3,037,529• AffectedpeopleinPirojpur:300,000• Monetarylosses:USD269.28million

Mathbariaexperienced6-7feetofwater

CycloneMa-hasenMay20133

• Numberofpeoplekilled:17• Numberofpeopleaffected:1,258,508• Croplosses:USD5.14million

• 1deadinMathbaria• 13’960affectedpeople

Disastertype Occurrence TotaldeathsNumberofinjuredpeople


TotaldamageinUSD(‘000)

Drought 1 Earthquake 2 9 270 270

Epidemic 2 86

284,910Extremetemperature 5 399

327,000

Flood 18 1,634 21,160 29,255,237 314,000Landslide 4 103 153 56,283

Storm 28 5,098 65,523 18,891,544 2,634,000

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Table9 continued

FloodandcycloneKomenJune/July20154,5

• Numberofpeoplekilled:56• Numberofpeopleaffected:2,610,000• Monetarylosses:USD40million• Pirojpur:60’690peopleaffected,1death• Around6000housescompletelyorpartiallydamaged

• Collapseofembankmentduetoriverbankerosion

• Only50shelterswereavail-ableinMathbaria;asheltercouldaccommodatearound200-400persons

Sources:1MinistryofFoodandDisasterManagement,2007;2MinistryofFoodandDisasterManagement,2013;3MinistryofDisasterManagementandRelief,2013;4Nirapad,2015,p.4;5DhakaTribune2015

Stresses

Besidesthedisasters,therearenumerousproblemsandchallengesaspartofawidertrendinsouthernBang-ladeshincludingwidespreadpovertythatspecificallyconcerntheMathbariaregion.Manyexistirrespectiveofdisasters,butoftenhavemutualinterrelationswithsuchdisastersandmayenhancetheirimpacts.Thefollow-ingissuesshouldbetakenintoaccountwhentryingtobuildresilienceinMathbariaandtheADBproject:

• Highlyseasonalhydrology:therearedroughtsinspringandheavymonsoonrainsthereafter.Eachstatehasdifferentissues.

• Cholera: both drought and rainy seasons often give rise to cholera epidemics. Shafqat Akanda et al.(2012,p.11),describeMathbariaasa‘largescaledriver’ofcholeraoutbreaks.Therewerecholeraout-breaksinMathbariain2004and2005(Mahapatraetal.,2014,pp.148–150).

• Salinity:Risingsalinityofsoilsthreatenstheavailabilityofdrinkingwaterandfreshwaterforagriculturalproduction InMathbariacity.65percentof thearea isaffectedbysalinity (Rahman&Rahman,2015,pp.99–100).

• Arsenic:groundwaterofalargepartofthecoastalzoneiscontaminatedbyarsenic.Mathbariaisrightinthecenterofthisarea(ibid.,2015,p.102).

• Spatialexpansion:unplannedurbandevelopmentmakesitmoredifficulttoprovidesanitation,drinkingwaterandeffectivefloodprotection.

• Migration: due to increasing difficulties in agricultural production and the threat of cyclones, floods,droughtsanderosion,thereisastrongmigrationmovementfromthecoastalareastotheCapitalDhaka(ibid.,2015,p.104–105).

Inrelationtothesefacts,thereareadditionalproblemsintimesofnaturaldisasters:

• Waterlogging:relativelylittlerainfallcanfloodlargeareasincoastalcitiesduetoinsufficientandinef-fective drainage infrastructure.Water cannot recede and therefore damages agricultural land. Floodimpacts areworsenedby the constructionof artificial canals used for shrimpproduction andpolders(Rahman&Rahman,2015,p.100–101).

• Mangroves:thereis insufficientcoastalvegetationnearMathbaria.Astudyshowsthata150mbeltofmangroveswouldlowerastormwatersurgeby0.5-1m(InvestigationTeamofJapanSocietyofCivilEn-gineering,2008,p.62).Accordingly,theADBinitiatedmeasuresforthecoastaltownofMathbariaareofutmostimportancetocounterbalancethesechallenges.

Finally,climatechangeamplifiesmanyoftheexistingchallengesandaddsnewones.Cyclonesandfloodstendtobecomestronger.Theexpectedriseinsealevelwillleadtosaltwateringressionintorivers.Theavailability

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of freshwaterwill reduce, and seepageof seawater into the groundwaterwill increase the salinityof soils(Rahman&Rahman,2015,p.100).


Giventhattheprojecthasnotyetbeenfullyimplemented,theResilienceDividendisestimatedinthefollowingway:theindicatorsofthelossesincurredintheabovedisastersarefirstconsidered(refertoTable9)andthencomparedwithaSuReSmartScanassessment.Thisallowsanestimatetobecarriedoutdemonstratinghowfartheprojectgives convincing responses toexisting risksandproblems.ForaResilienceDividend toexist, theproject should containmeasures that correspond to issues that faced bad indicator values in the precedingdisasters.Theprocedure for long-runstresses isanalogous.Since there isno referencedatadue to thepro-ject’songoingrealization,itisnotpossibletoprovidedefinitivenumbers.Nevertheless,thereisaclearindica-tionofthebenefits.Finalquantificationmayoncebecompletedwithmoredata.Thesameisvalidforthevari-ousbenefitsinnon-disastersituations,whichareexhibitedbytheSRBAmethodology.Estimatedavoidedlossesbecauseofdisruptionandstresspreparedness

Table10 ExpectedResilienceDividendindisastercases

Dividends Description

FinancialDividend

• Reducedmaterialdamages,reducedmonetarylosses• Lessfinanciallossesduetoshorterrecoverytimesaslessreconstructionisre-

quiredandcantakeplaceimmediately• Limitedlossoflocalworkforceduetosavedlives

HumanDividend

• Greatlyreducednumberoffatalitiesduetoshelterconstruction• Lesscholeraoutbreaksthankstoimprovedsanitationandwatersupply• Increasedawarenessregardingpersonalemergencypreparedness• Watersupplynotinterruptedduetoback-upgenerators• Fasteremergencydeliveriesasnewroadscanbetterwithstanddisasters

NaturalDividend • Lesserosionalongriverembankments

PhysicalDividend• Lessdamagetoroads,watersupplyandsanitationinfrastructure• Nodestructionofwatersourcesduetosafewatersupply• Nowaterloggingduetoimproveddrainagesystem

PoliticalDividend • Politicalacceptanceduetothoroughstakeholderinclusion

SocialDividend

• Betterandarsenic-freewatersupplyforthecitypopulationinthelongrun• MoresafetyandriskreductionforthegreaterMathbariaareaincludingtheagri-

culturalsector• Reductioninmigrationduetobetterdisasterresilience

Expectedadditionalbenefitsinabsenceofadisaster(SRBA)

Environmental

• Cleanerenvironmentduetominimizeduseofhazardousmaterial• Reducedagriculturalcroplossduetoflooding

Social

• Improvedlivingconditionsthankstoemploymentoflocalstaff

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• Improvedaccesstohospitals,markets,schools,placesofworketc.,enabledbybetterroads• Solidwastemanagement:improvedqualityoflifeduetocleanersurroundings• Accesstoreliablewatersupplysysteminthetownbyallresidents• Positivehealthimpactsofwatertesting/qualitysupply• Increasedaccesstosafesanitationbyallpeople,andspecificallypoorhouseholds,womenandchildren• Increasedsafety,securityanddignityforwomenandfemalechildren(whowillnothavetopracticeopen

defecation)• Potentialraisingofhealthandsocialstatusofmanualworkersengagedindesludging

Governance

• Institutionalstrengthening• Reducedcorruptionduetocorrespondingmeasures• Increasedtransparency

Economic

• Increasedincomeduetoreducedtimespentoncommuting• Savingsinroadinfrastructureoperatingcosts• Increasedincomeduetoemploymentoflocalstaff• Reducedmedicalcostsduetodecreasednumberofsickdaysthankstoimprovedsanitationanddrainage

system• Increaseinsavingsperhousehold(aswaterchargepermonthenvisagedwillbelowerthanpresentdirect

opportunitycostforpurchaseofwater)• Moreinvestmentsecurityduetoriskreduction• Reducedstoragetankcostthankstobetterwatersupplysystem


TheaboveanalysisshowsthattheMathbariaprojectcanbeexpectedtoyieldaclearlypositiveResilienceDivi-dend. Quantification ismore difficult because the project has not yet been completed. However, it can beshownthattheprojectrespondstomanyproblems,whicharerevealedbybad indicatorvaluessuchashighnumbersof fatalities following theabove-mentioneddisasters. Inparticular,wehavegood reasons toarguethathumanliveswillbesavedandmaterialdamagescanbereduced.Thisprojectcontainsmanyelementsthatare recommended to develop a long-term adaptation strategy in coastal areas (see Barbier, 2014p. 1251).Moreover,severalmaindisaster-independentandlong-termstressesareaddressed.Forexample,betterwatersupplyallowspeopletoavoiddrinkingwaterthatiscontaminatedbyarsenicandsalinity.BesidetheResilienceDividendintheformofadisruptionresponse,therearealsomanybenefitsindependentofadisastersuchasemploymentcreation,positive long-termhealth impactsand institutional improvements.Duetotheprojectsongoingimplementation,wecanonlymakeanestimateofwhattheresiliencedividendwillbeinthefirstdis-asterafterprojectcompletion.Nevertheless,therearestrongargumentsthatsupporttheexistenceofthere-siliencedividend.

However,therearestillsomeimportantissuesthatarenottakenintoaccountbytheMathbariaproject.Forinstance,therearenomeasurestopreventthedestructionoftrees,whichhappenedagreatdealduringsupercycloneSidrin2007.Hence,thereseemstobenonaturalResilienceDividendinthisrespect.Similarlyforthelong-termstressofsalinity,thereisnostrategytocopewithitsystematically.Allinall,however,itcanbesaidthatthisbundleofinfrastructureprojectsisquiteeffectiveinaddressingmostoftheidentifiedproblemsandchallengeseitherinadisastersituationorinthelongerterm.

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4.3 Quito

4.3.1 Background

Macro/MesoLevel

Ecuador isexposedtonaturalhazardssuchas frequentearthquakes, landslides,volcanicactivity, floods,andperiodicdroughts(CIA,2017).AccordingtotheOECD(2017),Ecuadorwasthe69thlargestexporterintheworldin 2014. The main exports are crude petroleum (50%), bananas (12%), crustaceans (9.3%), processed fish(4.7%),gold(3.5%)andcutflowers(2.8%).Thisisanimportantissueinthiscontext,sincethechosenprojectofinterestisaninternationalairport–ahubforexports.

According to the INFORM country risk profile for Ecuador (2017), earthquakes, tsunamis and floods are themost prominent hazards for the country. Concerning overall risks, Ecuador is ranked 69th out of 191 in theworld,andthetrendforthenextthreeyearsisstable.AccordingtoLloyd’sCityRiskIndex,Quito’sfast-growingeconomyisexposedtoahighlevelofrisk(Lloyd’s,2015).Inparticular,aboutonethirdofthecapital’seconom-icoutputisatriskduetodisruptionsofvariouskinds.AsTable11shows,naturaldisastersmakeupalmost75percentoftheGDP@Risk.

• AverageGDPgrowthrate: 5.76%• AverageannualGDP: USD35.32bn• TotalGDP@Risk: USD11.70bn• ShareofaverageannualGDP: 33.13%Source:Lloyd’s(2015)Table11 GDP@RiskinQuito


Earthquake USD6.00bn 51.25%Volcano USD2.22bn 18.98%Marketcrash USD1.52bn 13.00%Sovereigndefault USD0.83bn 7.06%Humanpandemic USD0.82bn 6.97%Poweroutage USD0.08bn 0.70%Solarstorm USD0.05bn 0.46%Flood USD0.05bn 0.45%Cyberattack USD0.05bn 0.43%Terrorism USD0.05bn 0.41%Plantepidemic USD0.04bn 0.30%

Source:Lloyd’s(2015)MicroLevel:NewQuitoInternationalAirportProject

TheNewQuitoInternationalAirportprojectedislocatedclosetothecapitalcityandwasdevelopedtoreplaceMariscalSucreAirport.Ithandlesmorethan5millionpassengerseveryyearandservesasanexporthubforupto20millionrosesperday(Chalk&Beane,2014).TheprojectcostforbuildingthisnewairportwasUSD700million.MostimportantstakeholdersbelongtotheexportingsectorsoftheEcuadorianeconomy,thetourismbranch,aswellasthenationalandcitygovernments.Moreover,thepopulationwithintheprojectzone,airportstaff andNGOs– specifically thosewithan interest in thehighbiodiversityof thepreviousgreenfield site–

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each have their own particular interests. Further stakeholders include the city population and internationalfinancialinstitutionsinvestingintheairportproject.

In2016,therewasastrongearthquakewithamagnitudeof7.8 intheareasurroundingQuito.Ataboutthesametime,volcanicactivitythreatenedeconomiclifeinthecapital.Inthisparticularcasestudy,GIBinvestigat-edhowthenewairportrespondedtothesedisruptionsandevaluatedwhetherthespecificresiliencemeasuresobservedintheSuReSmartScanassessmentwereeffective.

TheprojectwaspartiallyfundedbytheInter-AmericanDevelopmentBank(IDB)andpartiallybyothercompa-niesfromvariousAmericancountries.ThedatausedaremainlythoseprovidedbytheIDB’sFinalEnvironmen-talImpactAssessment(Komex,2003).Othersourcesareindicated.

Useddata(seereferencesforfullcitation)• EnvironmentalImpactAssessment(retrievedfromIDB)• Variousacademicarticles• Onlinenewsarticles• Variousstakeholderwebsites


TheSuReSmartScanrevealsthefollowingprojectcharacteristics:overall,theratingforQuitoairportisgood,withthegovernancepartbeingratedverygood.Unfortunately,dataontransparencyandanti-corruptionpoli-ciesarecompletelymissing,whichpreventsanydefinitiveconclusionsbeingmadeinthisregard.However, itcanbeseenthatresilienceaspectsareemphasizedindetail.Ontheotherhand,thereisstillpotentialinsocialandenvironmental themes. Therefore, the airport seems tobewell prepared for disasters butmay still im-proveitsperformanceintimesofnon-disruption.Figure8 SuReSmartScanassessmentfortheQuitoairportproject

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Leading• EnvironmentalandSocialImpactAssessment(ESIA)andEnvironmentalandSocialManagementSystem

(ESMS)• Lifecyclethinkingwhenplanningandoperating(includingimpactsforfutureusers)• Accountingforhighlyrelevantrisksandemergencies:

o Environmental:seismicactivity,landslides,volcanichazardso Social:riskstopublichealthandsafety

• Concreteemergencypreparednessmeasures:o Regionalmonitoringandearlywarningsystemo Trainingdrillscarriedoutjointlywithotherstakeholderso ESGrisktrainingandeducationo Structuredesignedtoresistseismicactivityo Emphasisofevacuationroutesandemergencyprotocols(Georgouliasetal.,2014,p.143)

• Accountingforpre-existingliabilitiesandgrievances• Exceptionalstakeholderengagementduringallphasesoftheproject• Clearorganizationalsetupandtransparentdecision-makingprocess• Employmentofasustainabilitymanager;externalmonitoring• Fairandnon-discriminatoryemploymenttermsandconditionscompliantwithinternationalbestpractice• OccupationalHealthandSafety(OH&S)managementsystem• 10%moretreesthanbeforeprojectrealization

Commended

• Systemsthinkinginrelationtotheoverallmasterplan(national,regional)• Minimizationofthenumberofdisplacedpeople• Studyonculturalheritageandminimizationofpotentialimpactsonculturalheritage• Employmentoflocalstaffandfurthertrainingforlocalskills• Localprocurementofmaterial• Assessmentofpotentialcontributiontowidersocioeconomicdevelopment,forexample:changes,stresses

placedonlocalandregionalinfrastructureandcommunityservicesetc.• Considerationofproject-relatedimpactsonbiodiversity,naturalhabitatsandtheintactnessofecosystems

withcontiguousimprovement(adaptivemanagement)• Nointroductionofspecieswithahighriskofinvasivebehavior• Wastere-usestrategy• Air,waterandsoilbasedpollutiontargets• Noise,vibrationandlightlevelscompliantwithnationaland/orinternationalstandards• Nosignificantimpactonstormwaterflowpatterns


• Nodataregardingtransparency• Noreportingonhumanrightsofcontractorsandsubcontractors.• Noclearconsiderationoflong-termimpactssuchasthosecausedbydecommissioning/climatechange• Nofocusonpoorcustomers• FurthereffortstominimizeGHGemissionsneeded• Noemphasisonenergyefficiency,renewableenergyandembodiedenergy• Negativeimpactsonwatersourcevolumeandquality• Lossofgreenfield

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TheoverviewofdisastersinEcuadorinthepasttenyearsshowsthatearthquakes,floodsandvolcanicactivi-tiesarethemostprominent.Naturaldisasterscausedthemostfatalitiesanddamage.Table12 SummaryofnaturaldisastersinEcuador2006–2016

Disastertype Disastersubtype Occurrence Totaldeaths


Totaldamage('000USD)

Drought Drought 2 0 110,665 1,700Earthquake Groundmovement 3 680 1,230,165 3,300,000

Epidemic Viraldisease 2 15 10,967 0Flood Riverineflood 10 115 491,706 1,002,800

Landslide Landslide 3 31 150 0

Volcanicactivity -- 2 9 140,042 10,000Volcanicactivity Lavaflow 1 0 800,000 0

Volcanicactivity Ashfall 3 5 302,763 150,000Wildfire Forestfire 1 5 1,945 0

Source:CRED(2017)TheQuitocasestudyfocusesonthe7.8magnitudeearthquake in2016andvariousvolcanicactivitieswithinthelasttwoyears.Table13showshowthesedisastershaveaffectedtheregion,andinparticulartheairportofQuito.Theindicatorsinforminhowfartheprojectwasabletowithstandthedisastersandtokeepupitsoper-ations.Table13 IndicatorsofdisastersinQuito

Macroandmesolevelindicators Microlevelindicators

2016Earth-quake(includ-ingafter-shocks)1,2,3

• Totaldeaths:676• Totalpeopleaffected:1,230,000• Totaldamage:USD3,300,000,000• Magnitude:7.8• Partsofthecapitalleftwithoutpower

ortelephoneservice

• Totaldeaths:0• 4.6magnitudeaftershockinQuito:

temporaryinterruptionofoperationsattheairport

• Threedaysaftertheearthquake:airportbacktonormaloperation

• Assessmentoftheairportinfrastructurebycrisiscoordinationcommitteecon-firmsgoodstate

• Suspensionsanddelaysatotherairports

VolcanicActivi-ties2015and20164,5

• Totalpeopleaffected:930,042• Spreadoffinegreypowderinareawith

radiusof30km• Lossofflowerexportsduetoash• Decreaseinmilkproductionduetoash-

esdestroyingacresofpasture

• Approachesinplaceforflightstoavoidvolcanoinsteadofcancellingthem

• Airportoperationsremainopen• Airportcrisiscoordinationcommittee

activetoanticipatechangesinsituation

Sources:1Elgotetal.(2016);2teleSUR(2016);3BreakingTravelNews(2016);4Gupta(2016);5Jean(2015)

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Since there is no reference project,we compare the new airport’s performancewith the suggested perfor-manceinthecasetheresiliencemeasureswouldnothavebeentaken.Thisdoesnotallowforanobservabledirectcomparisonbut isneverthelessbasedonargumentsthatrelyondata:theResilienceDividendcompo-nentintheformofavoidedlossesaftertheearthquakeisjustifiedbytheobservedindicatorvaluesinTable13.Likewise,theSRBAapproachdetectsthebenefitsarisingfromtheairportintimesofnodisaster.Avoidedlossesbecauseofdisruptionpreparedness

Table14 ResilienceDividendinadisastercase


FinancialDividend • Increaseinnationalincomeasflowoftouristscanbemaintained(2015:706,000tour-istsinQuito)

• Securityofoperationsprovidesdailycashflow.Operationdata:167dailyflights,14,730passengersperdayand516tonsofcargoperday1.Anyinterruptionofopera-tionsyieldsacorrespondingloss.

• Financialsavingsduetoreducedreconstructionneeds(reconstructioncostswouldbequiteexpensiveas95%ofthecountry’sinfrastructureisnotinsured)2

HumanDividend • Securityof14,730passengersperday

NaturalDividend • Integrationofwaterbodiesinthesurroundingareatopreventwatercontaminationandflooding(Georgouliasetal.,2014,p.132)

PhysicalDividend • Essentialcontributiontoemergencysupportandrecoveryinareasaffectedbytheearthquakeasmaterialdeliveriesanddonationscanbeimportedthankstosafeoper-ations1

PoliticalDividend • Improvedcoordinationandcollaborationwithpoliticalauthorities

SocialDividend • AccessibilitytoandfromQuito

Sources:1Quiport(2016a);2SMIC(2006,p.7)

Additionalbenefitsinabsenceofadisaster(SRBA)

Environmental

• LesscongestioninQuitocity,wheretheoldairportwaslocated• ProvisionofpublictransportservicebetweenQuitoandairport

Social

• Improvementofairqualityindenseurbanarea• Reducedhealthandsafetyrisksforpopulation• Potentialforarcheologicalfindingsassometraceswerefoundduringexcavationatthenewairportsite• Integrationofwaterbodiesinthesurroundingareatopreventwatercontaminationandflooding(Georgou-

liasetal.,2014,p.132)• Inclusionofthecommunityneedsofthesixneighboringparishesintermsoftraining,employment,new

businessesandindustries(ibid.,p.126)• Investmentsinsportingfacilitiesandequipment,andeducationprogramsinthesurroundingcommunities

(ibid.,p.129).

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• Protectionandpreservationofculturalandhistoricalresourcesthatareimportanttolocalcommunities(ibid.,p.129).

• Reintegrationoftheoldairportinthecity;creationofaparkforleisureactivitiesetc.

Economic

• UpdateofexistingroadfromTumbacotoYaruqui,twomunicipalitiesinthevicinityofQuito• Socioeconomicdevelopmentintermsofgrowthintourism,agriculture,andproductexports(Georgoulias

etal.,2014,p.126)• Establishmentofacommunalenterpriseforsolidwastemanagement• MorepeoplespendtimeinQuito:openingofhotelsandrestaurants(PanamericanWorld,2016)

Governance

• Wildlifecontrolprogram:trainedbirdsofpreyareheldintheairportareatopreventotheranimalsfromenteringtheairportzoneinordertoensurethesafetyofairportoperations(Quiport,2016b)


ItgoeswithoutsayingthatapositiveResilienceDividendcanexistwhenthere isadisasteraswellasduringnormaltimes.EventhoughthedisruptionsdescribedabovetookplacepartiallyinthewiderQuitoarearatherthandirectly inthecenterofthecity, it isclearthattheairportadministrationiswellpreparedfordisasters.Hardlyanyof theairportoperationswere interrupted.Thesestrong institutional skills correspondquitewellwiththehighresiliencelevelachievedingovernancethemesintheSuReSmartScan.Moreover,thestrongem-phasisofnaturaldisastersintheprojectplanningphaseseemstobereflectedinthegoodperformanceduringthedisasters.Eventhoughanindividualinfrastructureprojectisconsidered,thereisaclearconnectiontothecity-levelandevennationalresilienceneeds:aswearedealingwithanairportwhichisthecountry’smostim-portantbottleneckforimportsandexports,theresiliencelevelofthisprojectisimportantfortheresilienceofthewholecountry.ApartoftheResilienceDividendthusconsistsoftheairport’sabilitytodeliveremergencymaterialandaidtotheareasthataremostaffectedbydisruptions.AgainstthebackgroundofthecountryrisksindicatedbytheLloyd’sindex,andthehappeningsduringthestrongearthquake,weseethatresilienceeffortseventuallypayoff.

Thenon-disaster relatedbenefits are clearly visible. Therearebenefits inall areas,but theymainly concernsocial issues.However,therearealsosomelosses,which includethereducedbiodiversityattheairportsite,whichwaspreviouslygreenfield.Moreover,therearenospecificmeasurestoaccountforincreasingnoisepol-lutioninthepartsofthecitysurroundingtheairport.

4.4 Port-au-Prince

4.4.1 Background

Macro/MesoLevel

Haiti isexposedtovariouskindsofdisruptions.IntheINFORMoverallriskindex,it isranked14thofallcoun-tries(2017).Asaconsequence,economicproductionandnationalwealtharejeopardized.Thefollowingnum-bersrelatingtotheeconomyinHaiti’scapitalPort-au-Princeshowthat,despitehighgrowthrates,itisstillverypoor.Additionally,morethanathirdofGDPisthreatenedwithbeinglostduetodisasters.ThisisaquitehighvalueandindicatesthatresilienceisnotverywelldevelopedinHaiti,andparticularlyinPort-au-Prince.Table

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15showsthatthisthirdoftheso-calledGDP@Riskiscausedmainlybythefollowingnaturalcatastrophes:windstorms, earthquakes, human pandemics, floods, droughts and plant epidemics. In particular, 72.13% of theGDP@Riskisendangeredbynaturaldisasters.

• AverageGDPgrowthrate: 5.11%• AverageannualGDP: USD1.43bn• TotalGDP@Risk: USD0.52bn• ShareofaverageannualGDP: 36.06%

Source:Lloyd’s(2015)Table15 GDP@RiskinPort-au-Prince


Windstorm USD0.24bn 45.89%Sovereigndefault USD0.07bn 14.11%Earthquake USD0.05bn 9.16%Marketcrash USD0.04bn 8.26%Humanpandemic USD0.04bn 7.17%Flood USD0.03bn 5.65%Oilpriceshock USD0.02bn 3.29%Drought USD0.01bn 2.57%Plantepidemic USD0.01bn 1.69%Poweroutage USD0.01bn 1.28%Cyberattack USD0.00bn 0.00%


MicroLevel:thePortProject

PortLafitoisthenewportofPort-au-Prince.ItislocatedinLafiteau,whichisavillagequiteclosetothecapital.ThetotalprojectcostwasUSD65million (Haiti libre,2015)andtheportopened in June2015.PortLafito ispartoftheLafitoGlobalEconomicZone,whichisafreeeconomiczoneaimingtoboostregionalandnationaleconomicdevelopment.ThezoneandspecificallytheportarerunbyGBGroup(GoneNativeLLC,2015).Thereis a large spectrum of different stakeholders: local citizens, employees and the local community expect im-provementsinlivingconditions,whileinternationaltransportcompaniesrequireasadvantageousconditionsaspossible.TheHaitiangovernment is involved in theproject realization,which raises theclaims foreconomicbenefits.

TomeasuretheResilienceDividend,GIBfocusedonthePortinternationaldePort-au-Prince,thatis,thehith-ertosinglecapitalport,asthereferenceprojectforPortLafito.Whilethereisenoughdatatoallowforacom-parativeanalysisattheprojectlevel,thedataisnotenoughtoproduceaSuReSmartScanfortheoldPortin-ternationaldePort-au-Prince.Therefore,somemodificationshavetobemade.Theprocedureisasfollows:thedevastating2010earthquakeinPort-au-PrinceisusedtoassesstheResilienceDividend.ThePortinternationaldePort-au-Princewasalmostcompletelydestroyedbythisdisaster.Conclusionsabouttheshortcomingsoftheportinfrastructure’sconditionrevealtheneedforimprovementsinanewportproject.PortLafito,whichwaspartiallyaresponsetotheearthquake,isanalyzedinthissense.Sinceitisquitenew,andnodisasterhastakenplaceinthisareatodate,nojudgmentcanbemadeastowhetherornotPortLafitowillperformbetterinacatastrophe.However,duetothedifferencesbetweenthetwoports,wecanestimatePortLafito’sResilienceDividend.

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Themaindata isprovidedby theproject reportof the InternationalFinanceCorporationof theWorldBank(GoneNativeLLC,2015).ItisaprincipalfunderbesideoftheGBGroup.Whereadditionalinformationismen-tioned,thecorrespondingsourceiscited.

Useddata(seereferencesforfullcitation)• EnvironmentalandSocialImpactAssessment(retrievedfromIFC)• Variousacademicarticles• Onlinenewsarticles• Variousstakeholderwebsites


TheSuReSmartScanofPortLafitoshowsanambiguousresult.First,mostsustainabilityandresilienceactionsare future rather thancurrentpractices.This isdue to theproject report’spublication inadvanceofprojectrealization.Whiletheproject isexpectedtobringnumeroussocialbenefits totheLafiteaucommunity,envi-ronmentalandgovernanceactionsarenotexceptionalinnumberandquality.Figure9 SuReSmartScanassessmentofthePortLafitoproject

Leading

• Locatedonthecoast,anareawithlowerearthquakerisksthaninthecentreofPort-au-Prince,wheretheoldPortdePort-au-Princeislocated(IFC,2011)

• Health,Safety,SecurityandEnvironmentalPlanwithreportingonkeyperformanceindicators• Employeesprovidedwithtrainingonsustainabilityskills• Freedomofassociationandcollectivebargaining• Grievancemechanisminplace

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• Accountingforrisksofdifferentkinds:o Environmental:hurricanes,earthquakes,floodso Social:communityhealthandsafetyrisks

• Focusonlocalsupplychains• Noresettlement• Socialinvestmentandlocalhiringprograms

Commended

• Assessmentofenvironmental,socialandeconomicrisksandopportunities• Sustainabilitymanagerappointed• Publicreportingofsocialandenvironmentalpolicies• Commitmenttogenderequality• Genderopportunitypolicyandprograms• Commitmenttogoodandsafeworkingconditions• Avoidanceofdiscriminationbasedonage,gender,sexualorientation,health,race• Ongoingstakeholderengagementthroughoutimplementationphase• Concretemeasuresforemergencypreparedness:

o Sitespecificemergencypreparednessandresponseprocedureso Spillpreventionandcontrolmeasureso Trainingprogramforemployeeso Coordinationwithlocalauthoritieso Riskassessmentoftheterminal

• Projectlocatedinanareawithhighpovertyandunemployment• Occupationalhealthandsafetyguidelinesconcerningwaterquality,life,transportandfiresafety,hazard-

ousmaterials,diseasepreventionandemergencypreparedness• Limitedimpactonbiodiversityduetobiodiversityconservationbyrevegetationofdisturbedareas• WastemanagementplancompliantwithWorldBankguidelines• Monthlyairandnoisemonitoring• Wastegenerationminimized


• NoaccountofclimatechangeandGHGreductiontargets• Renewableenergiesandenergyefficiencynotemphasized• Resourceefficiencynotemphasized• PuregreenfieldprojectAsmentioned,itisnotpossibletocarryoutafullSuReSmartScananalysisforthePortinternationaldePort-au-Prince.However,someinformationfrompriortothedevastatingearthquakeof2010isavailable.Astudyfoundthatthephysicalconditionoftheportwasquitepoor.Forinstance,aninspectionofthewharfrevealedthathalfofthebentswhereinsufficientlycoveredbyconcreteandmanypileswheredestroyed(Greenetal.,2011,p.S47).Moreover,theseaportfillswerehighlysusceptibletoliquefaction(ibid.p.S60).TheseareclearindicationsthattheresilienceofthePortinternationaldePort-au-Princewashighlyinsufficient.

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AnoverviewofthedisastersinHaitioverthepasttenyearsrevealsthattheyarelargeinnumberandmostofthe catastropheswere the result of floods and storms (hurricanes).Often, the floodswere causedbyhurri-canes.Table17 SummaryofnaturaldisastersinHaiti2006–2016

Disastertype Occurrence TotaldeathsTotalnumberofpeopleaffected

TotaldamageinUSD(‘000)

Drought 2

4,600,000Earthquake 1 222,570 3,700,000 8,000,000

Epidemic 6 7,128 585,253Flood 26 289 395,345Storm 16 1,474 2,769,807 2,254,000

Source:CRED(2017)AmongthemanydifferentsmallerandlargerdisastersinHaiti,oneovershadowsallothersandtookplaceinthePort-au-Princearea.Asalreadymentionedabove,theHaitistudyconcentratesonthiscatastrophe,namelytheearthquakethattookplaceinJanuary2010.Specifically,thestudyfocusesontheperformanceofthePortinternationaldePort-au-Princebothduringandaftertheearthquake.Sincethedataavailableisnotsufficient,theport-relatedindicatorsarecomplementedwithhigher-leveldata.All inall,thePortinternationaldePort-au-Princesufferedseveredamage,whichhadafar-reachingimpactbyhamperingemergencyservicedeliveriestotheaffectedcitypopulationanddelayingrecovery.Table18 IndicatorsoftheearthquakeinPort-au-Princein2010

MacroandmesoLevelIndicators1,2,3,4 Microlevelindicators5,6

• Numberofpeoplekilled:222,570• Numberofpeopleaffected:3,700,000• Damage:USD8billion• Displacedpeople:1.5millionimmediatelyafter

theearthquakeandstillabout55,000inSeptem-ber2016

• 293,383housesdamagedordestroyed• 1.5millionhomelesspeople• 60%ofgovernmentandadministrativebuildings,

and80%ofschoolsdestroyed• Choleraoutbreaksduetoinsufficienthealthsup-

plies

• Extensiveliquefactionofnorthwharf• Largelateralspreadingofsoil• Cranesandconcretemarginalwharfdisplaced

intothebay• Entranceroadsdamaged• Partofthesouthpiercollapsed• Portunabletoreceiveemergencyreliefcargos• Effortstorestoreshippingdeliveriesforhumani-

tarianemergencyresponsestartedonlysixdayslater

• ReconstructednorthwharfonlyreopenedinJan-uary2016

Sources:1NaturalCatastropheDatabase,2016;2CNNLibrary,2016;3DisasterEmergencyCommittee,2016;4Basu,2010;5Greenetal.,2011,pp.S47–S54);6Edward,2012,pp.81,88,114)


ThenewPortLafitohasnothadtoendureadisasteryet.ButGIBcanidentifytheshortcomingsofthePortin-ternationaldePort-au-Prince.TheSuReSmartScanshowshowfarPortLafitotakesthesedrawbacks intoac-count.DependingontheSuReSmartScanjudgment,wegetanindicationofwhetherthelossestohumanlives

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andphysical infrastructure canbeprevented in the future. This estimate allowsus to compare the avoidedlossesofPortLafitoandPortinternationaldePort-au-Princerespectively,andhencetoquantifytheResilienceDividend.Theprocedureforbenefitsinasituationwithoutadisasterisanalogous.Assumedavoidedlossesbecauseofdisruptionpreparedness

Table19 ExpectedResilienceDividendinadisastercase


FinancialDividend

• Reducedinfrastructuredamage,reducedmonetarylosses(oldport’sreconstruc-tioncostssuggestedtobemanymillionsasoverallreconstructioncostsinPort-au-PrinceaftertheearthquakeareestimatedtoamounttouptoUSD14billion1)

• EconomicgainsduetofasterreconstructionandrecoveryofPort-au-Prince• Financialgainsforportsinceoperationscangoon(theoldPorthandled200–250

containersperday2;lossescanthusbecalculatedbymultiplyingthemwiththenumberofnon-operativedays)

HumanDividend

• Humanlivessavedduetofasteremergencyreliefdelivery• Preventionofepidemicsthankstomedicinedelivery• Reducedornofatalitiesandinjuriesamongstaffduetotrainingprogramforem-

ployeesNaturalDividend • NoenvironmentalcontaminationbypotentiallytoxicstoredfreightsPhysicalDividend • Nophysicalmateriallosses

PoliticalDividend • Intactnessofportasaninfrastructuralandeconomicbottleneckfacilitatescoordi-nationofreconstructionofthewholearea

SocialDividend • Nolossofemploymentandincomeofthecommunitywhenportoperationismaintained

Sources:1Reuters(2010);2KInternational(2016)

ExpectedadditionalBenefitsinabsenceofadisaster(SRBA)

Environmental

• Vegetation/landscapingonandaroundthesite• ImprovementstolowheaddamsinSimonette,amunicipalityclosetoLafiteau

Social

• Improvedlocalskillbase

Economic

• Directandindirectemploymentopportunitiesestimatedat25,000(PortStrategy,2015)


AsregardstheportsinPort-au-Prince,GIBfoundevidenceofapositiveResilienceDividendthatisrealizedovertime and assessed as a difference in resilience between the Port international de Port-au-Prince and PortLafito.Whilethephysicalstructureoftheoldportwasoverwhelminglypoorandindicatedalowresiliencelev-el, thenewportdoesnothaveanoutstanding resilienceperformance, buthas implemented several crucialimprovements.Thereisprogressinportoperationgovernanceandinstakeholderengagement.Adistinguishedcharacteristicoftheprojectis itsfocusonemergencypreparednessintheformofresponseprocedures,em-

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ployee trainings and coordinationwith local authorities. Crucially, the chosen locationmeans that the infra-structure isbetterprotectedfromearthquakesandfloods.Therefore, theResilienceDividendmaterializes initsvariouscomponentsasitcanbeexpectedthathumanliveswillbesavedandmaterialandfinancialdamageswillbepreventedinfuturedisasters.SincePortLafitohasnotexperiencedadisasteryet,theResilienceDivi-dendcanonlybeestimatedbasedonexistingdata.

WhilethedisasterpreparednesscomponentoftheResilienceDividendisclearlyidentifiable,theassessmentofthebenefitsintimesofnon-disruptionismuchlesspronounced.Theemploymentprospectisbright.However,otherfreeeconomiczonesinHaitihaveshownthatpromisedemploymentdidbyfarnotrealizeandthatwork-ingconditionsareoftenprecarious(see,forinstance,Thomas,2016).Furthermore,thenewPortLafitoprojectfails toprovide abroader emphasis onenvironmental issues, including climate change andnatural resourceconsumptioninparticular.

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5 OverallInterpretationoftheResilienceDividendStudy

Despitedatalimitations,thefourcasestudieshaverevealedimportantaspectsofresilience.Inthischapter,anoverallinterpretationdiscusseswhethertheapproachtoresiliencemeasurementcanbeconfirmedandwhatthemainfindingsare.Inaddition,itisaboutwhatcommunalitiesinfrastructureprojectshavewithrespecttoresilienceandwhatthemainlessonslearnedare.

5.1 ComparingtheProjectFindings

Overall,theappliedindicatorsfordisasterandnon-disasterscenariosconfirmtheSuReSmartScanfindings.Inorder to achieve a synthesized judgment on the case studies, Table 20 outlines defined performance levels(verybad,bad,medium,good, verygood,excellent).We see that theprojectswithagoodSuReSmartScanoutcomehaveahigherdegreeofdisasterpreparednessandmoreadditionalbenefitsthanthosewithabadormediumSuReSmartScanresult.Thisconclusionisverypromisingforfutureworkregardingresilienceandin-frastructure.Table20Summaryoftheprojectcasestudyresults

Manila Mathbaria QuitoPort-au-Prince

SLEX NLEX SuReSmartScan(Overallresiliencelevelassess-ment)

Good Verygood Verygood Good Medium

RDcomponent:Disasterpreparedness(avoidedlosses)

Medium Medium Good Verygood Medium

RDcomponent:Additionalbenefits(inabsenceofadisaster)

Medium Good Verygood Good Bad

OveralljudgmentMedium-good

Good Verygood Good Medium

Source:GIBFoundation

5.2 OverallInterpretation–CommunalitiesandOverlaps

Even though the case studies are quite different in their character, there are several overlaps and commoncharacteristics.Bydetectingandinterpretingthem,wegainnewinsightsforfutureresilienceresearchandpol-icymaking.Thefirstoverlapoftheinfrastructurecasefindingsclearlyindicatesthatthesecriticalinfrastructureprojectsplayacrucialroleintheoverallwell-beingofacountries’economy.InthecaseoftheairportinQuito,Ecuador,themajorpartoftheimportandexporteconomyreliesonthefunctioningoftheairport.Similartotheairport,theNLEXexpresswayinManilaandtheportinPort-au-Princeareimportantforthesmoothtransi-tionofgoodsandservicesfromandtothecustomer.

The involvement of all stakeholders in the projects of Manila (NLEX), Quito, and Mathbaria (Bangladesh)provedtobeveryeffective,asindicatedbytheSuReSmartScan.Accordingtovarioussources,theoverallac-ceptanceoftheseprojectswashigherthan inPort-au-Prince, forexample. Inotherwords, ifallstakeholders

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areinvolved,theinfrastructureprojectismorewidelyaccepted,whichresultsinabetteroverallresiliencelev-el.

Infrastructureprojectsthathavebeencompletedmorerecentlyhavealargerfocusonresilienceandsustaina-bilitythanolderprojects.ThereisacleartrendthatresilienceandsustainabilityplaysamoreprominentroleinthethinkingofupcominginfrastructureprojectsfinancedbyMDBs.Themostrecentoftheprojectsexamined,thecoastaltownprojectinMathbaria,includesthemostresilienceplanninginitsthinking.Thegoalnowistopromotethiskindofthinkinginthenextdecadestocome.

WhenthefocusofanassessmentisonESGtopics,itisoftenbecausetheprojectownerhascarriedoutanen-vironmentalimpactassessment(EIA).Sometimes,inthecaseofQuitoforexample,anenvironmentalandso-cialimpactassessment(ESIA)iscarriedout.ThefocusofprojectownersonESGcriteriaispreliminarilyontheenvironmentalpart.Thesocialpartisonlysometimescovered,andonlyassessestheamountofpeopleaffect-ed.Thethirdcomponent,thegovernmentalpart,isoftennotlookedattothesameextentastheothertwo.

TheFinancialDividend inthenon-disastercomponentof theResilienceDividend isnoteasytocalculateandquantifyinUSDterms.Inthecaseofaninfrastructureproject,futurequantificationcouldbedoneinthefol-lowingway: forexample,Quitoairporthasacertainnumberofdaily flights thatprovide informationonthenumberofpeopletransportedandtheamountofgoodsimportedandexported.Therefore,theindicatorcoulddetecthowlongtheairportisnotrunningproperly,whilethemonetarylosscanbecalculatedbymultiplyingtheindicatorvaluebythedailyfinancialturnoverattheairport.

Anotherpointtobeemphasizedisthefactthattheavoidedlossesarenotasvisibleastheadditionalbenefits.ThesetwopartsoftheResilienceDividendclearlyplayadifferentrolewhenplanninganinfrastructureproject.Additionalbenefitswillpositivelyaffectthesociety,theeconomy,andtheenvironmentrightaftertheproject’scompletion.Ontheotherhand,avoidedlossesonlycomeintoplaywhentherehasbeenadisaster,whichcanofcoursecomeinallshapesandsizesandcanoccuratanytime.Therefore,thesalespitchfordevelopers,au-thoritiesandinvestorstoinvestinacertainresiliencemeasureisquitecriticalbecauseonebenefitwillcomerightaway,andtheotheronlyinthefuture.However,therewillalwaysbedoubtconcerningwhichbenefitismoreimportant.Inotherwords,long-termthinkingaboutriskandopportunitieshastobeconsideredineveryinfrastructureproject.

Othermajorpointsfordiscussionarethetrade-offsandthesustainabilitycostswithininfrastructureprojects.Intheplanningandexecutionofaninfrastructureproject,trade-offsarecommonplace.Theprojectownerhastodecidewhichfeaturestheinfrastructurewillhaveandwhowillbeaffectedorbenefitfromit.Forexample,aquestioncouldaskwhetherthenewairportinQuitoisbetterbecausethereislesstrafficinthecitycenterorwhethertheairportisworsebecauseitwasbuiltinagreenfieldzone.ThenewairportinQuitoalsoaffectsnewneighborhoodsbecauseoftherelocationofthisimportanttransporthub.Or,inthecaseofPort-au-Prince,issavingtheworkoftraditionalfishermenmoreimportantthanhavingaportinalessdisaster-pronearea?Thenew port increases the noise pollution in the neighborhood and sedimentation in seagrass beds. In otherwords,everyinfrastructureprojecthassustainabilitycostsaswellasbenefits.Asaresult,trade-offswillalwaysbeapartofinfrastructureprojects,whichcanbeseeninallthecasestudiesexamined.Itisunlikelythatanyoneapproachwillbeabletodissolvethistrade-off.ThisisvalidfortheSuReSmartScan,too.However,whiletheGIBmethodologycannotmakethetrade-offvanish,itcanoptimizeit.

Similaritiesbetweentheassessedinfrastructureprojectsalsoincludedthelackofadherencetolong-termcli-matethinking.TheexampleofthePanamaCanalinsection2.3highlightedthatlong-termthinking(>20years)mustbetakenintoaccountintheplanningofcriticalinfrastructure.Onlythenewestinfrastructureprojectofthe coastal townMathbaria took the IPCC climate change scenarios into account. In general, infrastructure

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projectsarebuilttolastalmostalifetimeandtherefore,long-termthinkinginESGhastobeamajorplanningpoint.

Thelastoverlapbetweenthefourinfrastructurecasesisthelackoftransparencywithinthewholeinfrastruc-turelifecycle.Inthedesignandconstructionphase,therearesignsoftransparencyandinclusionoftheaffect-edcommunities.However, all fourprojects lackdataon topics likehuman rights,politicalparticipation,andcorruption.Itisalsouncommonforimpactassessmentstobecarriedoutinatransparentwayonceaninfra-structureprojecthasbeenfinalized.SomeMDBsareabouttostartwithperiodicassessments,whicharepub-liclyavailable.

5.3 LessonsLearned

The next fewparagraphs contain some insights into the lessons learned during this study,which set out toidentifyandmeasuretheResilienceDividend.First,theResilienceDividenddoesexist,andinvestmentsorin-putsinresiliencedopayoff.ThefourinfrastructurecasestudiesclearlydemonstratethatthereisaResilienceDividendinthecaseofadisasterorevenwithout;andthisistrueevenintheeventofinsufficientdata.Futureresearchisneeded,andasolutiontothelackofdataispresentedinthenextchapter.Onecanalsosaythatthemoreresiliencemeasuresaretaken,thelargertheassociatedbenefitswillbe.

Second,theconceptbehindresilience ismultidimensionalandinterdisciplinary. IfonewantstomeasureandquantifytheResilienceDividend,onehastoassessresilienceinastandardizedway,repeatedlyandoveralongperiodoftime.Presumably,ourresearchpartnersattheRANDCorporationhaveachievedthisinsightaswell.“Resilience”isahugeconcept,meaningthatpartnershipswithdifferentbackgroundsandsectorswillbenec-essarytotackletheissueofnotbeingresilient.

Third,and themost importantquestions toask in termsof resilience: ‘resilience forwhomandresilience towhat?’.Beforeassessing resilience,onehas toask thesequestions. It is crucial thatall stakeholdersprovideanswersinthisregardsothateventualtrade-offscanbereduced.GIB’sapproachtoresiliencefocusesonresil-ienceandsustainabilityinthe(ESG)infrastructureassessment.Thisnaturallyhaslimitations,aspreviouslyex-plained.However,criticalinfrastructureplaysanimportantroleinacountry’seconomyandinthewell-beingofitscitizens.

Fourth,therearesustainabilitycostsandtrade-offs intheinfrastructuresector–aspresentedabove.Hence,theResilienceDividenddoesnotequallybenefitallstakeholders;somemightevenexperiencenegativeeffects.ThishastobekeptinmindwhenmeasuringtheResilienceDividendforaspecificgroupofpeople.TheRANDCorporationhassimilarconclusionsregardingthispoint.

Thefifthpointrelatestotheinsufficientdatatoproveand/orvaluetheResilienceDividend.Inthesameman-ner, closing the sustainable and resilient infrastructure investment gap requires compelling risk-return data.Data isneededregardingreturnson investmentforresiliencemeasuresandforthecorrelationbetweentheESGandeconomic/financialperformanceof infrastructureprojects.Thisdatawillhelp tomake resilientandsustainablesolutionsmoreattractivetoinvestors,developers,andpublicauthorities.

Inaddition,decisionmakersandotherstakeholdersneedadditionalinsightsintotheconceptofresilience.Atthemoment,theSuReSmartScangivesinfrastructuredecisionmakerstheoptiontocomparetwoprojectsre-gardingtheESGcostsandbenefitsatacertainpointintime.Forexample,thedecisionmakersoftheNewQui-toAirportcouldhaveassessedtheoldandthenewairportwiththeSuReSmartScantogetanideaofwhichairportismoreresilientandsustainable.

Finally,theresilienceofindividualinfrastructureprojectsiskeytotheoveralldisruptionpreparedness(avoid-inglosses)andthevalue-addingbenefitsinacertainneighborhood,cityorcountry.Inotherwords,whenin-

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frastructure is better prepared for disasters, the communitywill experience a higher Resilience Dividend intermsofvalue-addingbenefitsandintheeventofadisasterwhenlossesareavoided.

5.4 WhatIsMissing?

As indicatedunderthe lessons learnedabove, resilience isamulti-facetedandhighlydynamicanimal that isdifficulttocatch.Inordertocaptureit,theauthorsofthisstudyfoundthatthefollowingelementsaremissing:

1) Aneasy-tousetoolthatcapturesthecomplexandevolvingnatureofresilienceaswidelyaspossible,e.g.thatgoesbeyondthescopeoftheSuReSmartScan.TheSuReSmartScanisatoolforpracticalpro-jectdevelopment,whilethenewtoolwillinadditionbededicatedalsotoresilienceresearchandtheaccumulationofnewconceptionalandempiricalinsights.Whilealigningexistingresiliencelanguages,definitionsandtaxonomies,suchatoolshouldservetheneedsofeveryonealreadyconcernedaboutassessing, fosteringandmeasuringresilience.Thistoolshould likewiseserveasachecklistprovidingananswertothequestion:“Whatdatadoweneedinordertovalidateresilience?”

2) Resilienceawarenesstrainingsforthoseunawareofresiliencebenefitsandnotyetconcernedaboutfostering,measuringandenhancingresilience.Suchtrainingsshouldprovideanswerstothequestion:“Whyshouldweimplementresilienceandcollectdataforitsvalidation?”

3) Resilience implementation trainings on the ground that go beyond awareness raising and help todeeplyrootresiliencethinkingandbehavioramongactorsintheinfrastructuresector–especiallyformultipledisadvantagedgroups.Resilienceimplementationtrainingsshouldprovideananswertothequestion:“How,whereandwhenshouldwecollectdata?”

4) Aregistrycontainingthecollecteddataandservingasasourcetoprovetheexistenceandthevalida-tionoftheResilienceDividendacrosssectorsandcountries.Sucharegistryshouldaddresstheques-tion:“Howcanwestoreandevaluatedataforthebestpossibleuseinthefuture?

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6 Outlook

Thefinalchapterofthisstudyprovidesatheoryofchangeaswellasaderivedpossibleapproachonhowtoprove the existenceof theResilienceDividendmore efficiently andwithmoreprecision in future. The logicbehindtheattempts introducedbelowisdeeplyrootedinGIB’sthinkingonwhat ismissing:Today,actors ininfrastructurelackeasy-to-usetools,resilienceawarenessaswellasthetechnicalexpertiseneededinordertoimplementresilienceaspectsrightatthebeginningofeveryinfrastructureproject’slifecyle.Inaddition,mean-ingful data is rarely collected. Currently available resiliencedata is either completelymissingor inadequate,whichpreventsmanyinstitutionalinvestorsfromfinancingresilientandsustainableinfrastructure.

6.1 TheoryofChange

Atheoryofchangeismorethanalogicalframeworkaboutactivities,outcomes,outputsandgoalsbecauseitnotonlydetailswhatislinked,butalsohowsomethingislinked.Inourfast-paced,ever-changingworld,newknowledge,additionalinsightsandnewtheoriesareemerginginhighnumbers,hencethedevelopmentofanytheoryofchangewillalsobesubjecttochangeandthusrathertimeconsuming.

Accordingly,Figure11belowdemonstrateshowGIB’scurrenttheoryofchangewillneedtobeadjustedovertime as well. The interconnectivity of the several steps mentioned today might be mapped differently orchangecompletelyinfuture.

InlinewiththeGIBFoundation’smission,thefouranticipatedactivitystreamsfocusingon:

1) Tools;

2) Capacitybuilding;

3) Technicalassistance(TA);and

4) Aprojectregistry

willultimatelyleadtoonecommongoal:“resilientandsustainableinfrastructureasthenewnormal”.

Theachievementofthisgoalwillprovidetheresilience-associatedbenefitsofinfrastructuretosocietyintimesof disruptions and times without disruptions. In addition, the four depicted streams of activity will be themeanstoovercometheabove-mentionedobstaclestomeasuringtheResilienceDividend:unsatisfactorytools,insufficientcapacity,knowledgeandtechnicalassistanceaswellasmissingorinadequatedata.

Given theprospect thatmostof the future infrastructureneedshave tobesatisfiedwith infrastructure thathasnotyetbeenbuilt, incorporatingthefinancialsectorandaddressingitsrespectiveneedsalongtheentirefinancialvaluechainwillbedecisive.Themake-or-breakpoint inreachingtheultimategoalof“resilientandsustainableinfrastructureasthenewnormal”willbetheabilitytodemonstratethemeritsofsuchinfrastruc-ture.Giventheclassiccharacteristicsofany infrastructure, i.e.assetheaviness, its long-termnature, specificlocationandrather illiquid investmentcharacteristics,onemight intuitivelyunderstandthatconsiderationofandadherencetoresilienceandsustainabilityaspectswillbearfruitovertime.However, inorderto“unlockthetrillions”ofDollarsneededtosatisfyfuture infrastructuredemands,hardnumerical factsare indispensa-ble.Likewise,adifferentapproachandunderstandingofriskisalsoneeded.Tothisend,andrightontheinter-facebetweeninfrastructureresilienceandsustainabilityassessmentandfinance,appropriateproductshavetobe developed that provide additional insights into the risks and opportunities of infrastructure investmentsfromaresilienceandsustainabilityperspective.Oncetheproofforthesuperiorityofresilientandsustainableinfrastructure isathand,andalldecisiveplayersalongthefinancialvalue-chainusetoolsbasedonthesame

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resiliencelanguage,definitionandtaxonomy,a“ResilientandSustainableInfrastructureAssetClass”–anewassetclassblendingthecharacteristicsofalltypesofexistingassetclasses–mightemerge.Thenumberofin-ternationalactorssharingthevisionofsuchanewassetclassiseverincreasing.

Please note that, in the following, “outputs” are regarded as short-term, “outcomes” asmedium-term, and“impacts”aslong-termachievements.Figure10TheoryofChange(GIB)

Source:GIBFoundation

6.2 Tool

Asdepictedabove,aneasy-to-usetoolshouldbedesignedthat:

1) Indicateswhattolookatinordertoachieveandvalidateresilience;

IMPACTS

OUTCOMES

OUTPUTS

ACTIVITIES

Buildcapacitywithactorsnotyet

awareofresilience&sustainability

benefits

Awarenessoftheimportanceand

meritsofresilience&sustainability

Enhancedeffortsforresilientandsustainableinfrastructure

Realiza=onofinfrastructure’sresilience&sustainability

benefits

CAPACITYBUILDING

Collectproject-specificESG,economicandfinancialdata

Detailedprojectdatabaseacross

sectors,regionsandcountries

Insightsintorisk-returncorrela=onsofESG,economicandfinancialdata

Informeddecisionmaking

PROJECTREGISTRY

Resilienceassessmenttool+sector/project-

specificindicators

Efficientandstandardizedresilience&sustainabilityassessment

Common

denominatorusedbypublicsector,

financialsectoranddevelopers

Increasedandsharedknowledgeonresilience&sustainability

TOOL

Providetechnicalassistanceforindividual

infrastructureprojects

Bestprac=ceresilience&

sustainabilityacrossallinfrastructure

stages

Op=miza=onofresilience&sustainability

measuresacrossallinfrastructurestages

Realiza=onofresilient&sustainableinfrastructure

TECHNICALASSISTANCE

RESILIENTANDSUSTAINABLEINFRASTRUCTUREASTHENEWNORMAL

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2) Providesa snapshot resilience level assessmentatonepoint in timeagainstwhich tobenchmark thesubsequentresilienceandESG-performanceofanyproject inpredefinedcyclesoraftercertaineventshavetakenplace;

3) Providesasetofsector-and,whereapplicable,region-specificindicatorsfortestingandvaluingtheRe-silienceDividend;

4) Isinformedbytheworkofothersandthusincorporatesthefindingsofthecurrentstudyandotherex-istingknowledgeonresilience.

TheFigurebelowshowsthespecifictheoryofchangebehindGIB’sactivitystreamnumber1depictedabove,i.e.“Tool”.Figure11TheoryofChangeforthe“Tool”(GIB)

Source:GIBFoundationThis theoryofchange isbasedonthehypothesis that the levelof resilienceassessedatonepoint in time (asnapshot)willovertime leadtoacorrespondingResilienceDividend: ifan infrastructureprojectmeetsnooronlyveryfewSuRe®criteriaatlowlevels(seesection3.2.2),alowResilienceDividendisexpected.Incontrast,projectsmeetingallcriteriaatthehighestlevelwillindicateanexceptionallyhighResilienceDividend.

Inordertofurtherprovethisassumptionbeyondthefeaturedcasestudies,GIBsuggestsassessingpublicandprivateinfrastructureprojectsusingitsSuRe®criteria.Suchsnapshotassessmentswillsubsequentlyserveasabenchmarkagainstwhichtheresilienceandsustainabilityperformanceofthegivenprojecthastobeconduct-edusinginfrastructuresector-specificindicatorsinpredefinedcycles,oraftercertaineventshavetakenplacesuch as disasters or refurbishments of a particular infrastructure. The repetition of these snapshot assess-ments,withthesubsequentcomparisonof“real-worlddata”suchaseconomicandfinancialperformancedataover time,will not only lead to theproof of corresponding correlationsneeded in order to “unlock the tril-lions”,butalsototherefinementofthetoolused.Throughthis,userswilleventuallybeabletoidentifyresili-

ResilienceLevel

ResilienceDividend

AllPublicandPrivateInfrastructureProjectsatanypoint

in7me

SuRe

Low

Med

ium

High

Excep2

onal

Increasing

IndicatorstoverifyResilienceLevelandResilienceDividendover5me

Hypothesis:HigherResilienceLevel=HigherResilienceDividendSnapshot

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enceandsustainabilitybenefitswithahighdegreeofprobability. Inotherwords,“this levelofresiliencewillyieldthatspecificbenefit”.Accordingly,informed(investment)decisionsonfutureinfrastructureprojectswilltakeplaceandtherebymakeresilientandsustainableinfrastructurethenewnormal.

Indevelopingsuchatool,theenhancementand/oralignmentofexistingtoolsandconceptsisnecessary,9asistheincorporationofadiverserangeofstakeholders.Infact,thecombinationofmulti-stakeholderknowledgeandthealignmentofdifferentactorstowardsasharedandagreedresiliencelanguage,definitionandtaxono-mywillbekeyforthesuccessofsuchatool.

Withsuchatoolathand,anefficient,reliableandstandardizedassessmentandeventualvalidationoftheRe-silienceDividendwillbecomepossible.Thiswillinturnserveasacommondenominatorforthemostdecisiveplayersinanyinfrastructureproject, i.e.representativesfromthepublicsector,financialsectoranddevelop-ers.Thethusachievedincreaseandsharedknowledgeonresilienceandsustainabilityofallinfrastructureac-torswillbe thedecisivesteptorootingresilience in thedesign,planning,construction,operationand finallydecommissioningphaseof any infrastructureproject. In addition, such a toolwill include and align city andprojectmanagement-specificrequirementsandpavethewaytoassessingresiliencebeyondaprojectperspec-tive.Ideallythistoolwillcomeinaset,withahandbookthatnotonlyexplainsitsusagebutalsoshowshowtoconducteffectiveandinclusivecapacitybuildingfordiverseaudiences.

6.3 CapacityBuilding

AsseenintheSuRe®pilotphaseexamplesmentionedaboveinChapter3,carefullydesignedcapacitybuildingprogramsarehighlysought-after.Buildingthecapacityofactorsnotyetawareofresilienceandsustainabilitybenefits is an utmost priority. All too often, those prone to disruptions and stresses have insufficientknowledgeaboutavoidanceoflossesandhowtobettertheirlives.

Everymeaningful capacity building program focuses first on general awareness raisingwhile taking existinglevels of knowledge into account and, second, on project-specific on-location trainings serving the develop-mentneedsof the respective stakeholdergroup. It isdecisive togenerateaconsistentandcoherentunder-standingofwhatresilienceandsustainabilityare,andwhatbenefitscomeattachedtothem.Onceanunder-standingofthesebenefitsisachieved,theeffortstoincreasetheresilienceandsustainabilityofinfrastructureareusuallyincreasedbytheactorsinvolved.Atthisstage,capacitybuildingprogramsaimtoanswertheques-tionconcerninghowtoimplementsustainabilityandresilienceaspects intheplanning,design,procurement,construction,operationanddecommissioningphaseofanyinfrastructureproject.Equally,thequestionisad-dressedconcerninghowtocollectmeaningfuldataforasubsequentevaluationofwhetherthemeasurestakenarebearingfruit.

Acapacitybuildingprogramshouldincorporateaneasy-to-usetool,asoutlinedabove.Itisalsoimportantforthecapacitybuildingprogramtoincorporatestate-of-the-artknowledgefromahugevarietyofinfrastructurestakeholdersaswellascurrentinternationalbestpracticesforparticipatoryknowledgesharing.

9GIBforinstanceiscollaboratingwithQuantisInternationalinordertolinktheSuRe®criteriatothevaluationstandardsoftheNaturalCapitalProtocol(NCP)andtheSocialReturnOnInvestment(SROI).Thisallowsthemeasurementandvaluationofthetotal impactofaSuRe®infrastructureproject.Both,negativeandpositive impactswillbeaccountedforalongthesocial,environmentandgovernancethemes,togetherwiththesubsequenteconomicimpactsthattheseleadto.Theim-pactontheecosystemservicesandonthesocialsystemwillbothbemeasuredinmonetaryunitswhatallowsafullintegra-tioninthefinancialprofitandlossassessmentofaninfrastructureproject.ThisNaturalandSocialCapitalValuationallowsthecomparisonoftheimpactsandbenefitsofthethreepillarsofsustainability,i.e.environment,societyandgovernance.Furthermore,itallowsthedetectionandmitigationofcriticalrisksinanearlystageofprojectplanning.

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GIB’sexamples from India showthat tailoredworkshopswithpublicofficials in theareaofmasterplanning,publicprocurementandpublicprivatepartnership(PPP)design,aswellaswithfinancialinstitutionsandcon-structioncompaniesonrespectivetopics,leadtofavorableoutputs.OnekeyoutcomefortheprojectinIndiawasanincreasedawarenessofclimatechangescenariosthatmightimpacttheprojectandothersinthesamedevelopmentprogram.Subsequent“trainthetrainers”sessionshelpedtoensurethattheknow-howachievedcouldbekeptinthelocation–asdidthefranchisingwithlocalcapacitybuildingorganizations.

6.4 TechnicalAssistance

TechnicalAssistance(TA)goesonestepfurtherthancapacitybuildingbyfocusingontheentirevalue-chainofanindividualinfrastructureproject,andusuallyspansamuchlongertimeperiod.TAisofparticularimportanceinsettingswhereactorsarenotsufficientlyawareofbestpracticeresilienceandsustainabilityapproaches.Ithelpstoimplementresilienceandsustainabilityrightfromthebeginningofanyinfrastructureprojectandthustooptimizeadherencetothesepracticesthroughoutitsentirelifespan.

Typically,TAstartswithadviceonhowtoconducttechnical,economicandsocial(pre-)feasibilitystudies.Sub-sequently,assistanceoncompilingandimplementingabusinessplanandondevelopingafinancingstrategyisgiven,usually followedbysupportondevelopmentof theseplansandstrategies. Inaddition, technologyas-sessmentsandevaluations,aswellasresilienceandsustainabilityassessmentsareconducted.

Basedonthis,localizedmulti-stakeholderprocessesaredefinedanddesigned–usuallyfromtwoangles:bot-tom-up and top-down. The bottom-up approach includes diverse forms of analysis like amulti-stakeholderneedsassessmentsbasedonqualitativeand/orquantitativesurveys,key informant interviews,etc.,whereastop-downevaluationsalsocomprisecontextualanalysis,takingintoaccountdiverseaffectedpoliciesandtar-getgroups, for instanceurbanplanning, landuse rights, economicand socialpolicies.Naturally, subsequentsynthesis and gap-analysis betweenbottom-up and top-down results takes place in close collaborationwithlocalpartners.Onceprocessesareinplaceor launchedrespectively,on-siteobservationsandanappropriatemappingofthecurrentstatustakesplacetocontrasttheplanningwithfuturedevelopmentsofinfrastructureandsociety.Thisdatacollectionprocessisespeciallyimportantinareaspronetonaturaldisasters,andallowsforadjustmentstotherespectiveactivitiesineveryphaseoftheinfrastructurelifespan.

6.5 Registry

Whereasa resilienceassessment tool, incombinationwithsector/project-specific indicatorsclarifieswhat tolook atwhen implementing resilience, Capacity Building and Technical Assistance raise resilience awarenessandpavethewayforthecollectionofdataalongtheentireinfrastructurevaluechainoveritslifecycle.Areg-istry for infrastructure project-specific data finally serves as the ultimate “collecting tank” for this data. Thesmoothandmulti-stakeholderbackedinteractionofallfouractivitystreams–thetool,capacitybuilding,tech-nicalassistanceandtheproject registry– isdecisiveandrepresentsacompellingwaytoachievethegoalofresilientandsustainableinfrastructurebecomingthenewnormal,andtheattachedbenefits.

Aprojectregistrywouldcontaininfrastructureproject-specificresilience,sustainability,economicandfinancialdataacrosssectors,regionsandcountriesinordertoprovideinsightsintorisk-returnparametersandthecor-relationsofESG,economicandfinancialdataandeventuallyallowbest informeddecisionmaking.Compilingsuchaproject registry isahugeendeavor thatwould require theclosecooperationofdiverseactorsoveralongperiodoftime.Theabove-mentionedimportanceofacommonresiliencelanguage,definitionandtaxon-omythereforebecomesevenstronger.

GIBconsidersthatfourstepsarenecessaryfortheimplementationofaprojectregistry:

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1) Ananalysisofthecurrentglobalinfrastructuresituationwithregardtosectors,regions,countriesanditsdevelopmentoverthelasttenyearsinordertodefinetherangeofprojectsthatshouldbecontainedintheregistry.

2) Furtherteaming-upwithreliantandwell-connectedplayers10intheinfrastructurefieldtocreatepersonaltiesandtrustinordertogainaccesstohithertonotpubliclyavailabledata.Thecloseco-operationwitharesearchinstitutespecializingininfrastructureriskwillhelptofurtherdefinetherangeofdatatobecollected.

3) Establishmentoforganizationalstructuresguaranteeinganonymityofentrusteddata.

4) Developmentof amathematicalmodel in cooperationwitha suitablepartner inorder to com-putecorrelationsbetweenresilienceandsustainabilityperformanceaswellasfinancialandeco-nomicperformance.

Dependingonthedataqualityandfeasibility,aretrospectiveanalysis(“expost”)ofcorrelationsbetweenresilienceandsustainabilityperformancewitheconomicandfinancialperformancemaybeconducted.Aforwardlookinganalysis(“exante”),buildingontheworkdoneinthecurrentstudyandinformedbytheworkofotheractorsinthefieldofresilienceresearchshallalsobeconducted.Eitherway,theproofthatresilientandsustainableinfrastructureisafirstchoiceandadecisivesteptoachievingoverallresiliencefortheentiresociety–intimesofdisruptionsandtimeswithoutdisruptions–willbedecisivetounlockthefi-nancialflowsneededtoachievethisgoal.

10ICLEI,C40,R20,CCFLA,GlobalGreenGrowthForum(3GF)

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7 Conclusion

This study has tested the hypothesis that resiliencemeasures in infrastructure projects pay off. The pay-offstemmingfromresiliencemeasurestakenandmaterializingirrespectiveofadisastercanbereferredtoastheResilienceDividend.By applyingGIB’smethodology– a combinationof apractical one-point in timeassess-mentservingasbenchmarkforthefollowingapplicationofinfrastructure-specificindicatorsovertime–tofourconcreteinfrastructureprojectsindifferentcitiesaroundtheworld,thisstudyhasindeedrevealedthatahigh-erresilience levelgivesrisetomanybenefitsofdifferentkinds.Someof thesebenefitsarerevealedwhenadisasteroccurs,whileothersmaterializeevenintimesofnodisruption.Insomeprojects,thebenefitsareob-vious and have been revealed by disasters that have taken place since project realization. In others, as inMathbariaandpartiallyinPort-au-Prince,thebenefitshavetobeestimatedbecauseeithertheprojecthasnotyetbeencompletely realizedorhasnotyetexperienceddisasters– the result in suchcases isan ‘expected’ResilienceDividend.

ApplyingthepracticalSuReSmartScantoassesstheresiliencelevelatacertainpointintimeandrelatingittotheresultingbenefitsviaanindicator-basedmeasurementincluding,amongothers,theSRBA,hasprovedtobeausefulandpromisingapproach.BesidestheResilienceDividenditself,thisstudyhasfoundadditionalinsightsfor futureprojectdevelopmentaswellas for futureresearch.Theprojectsexaminedhaverevealedthatanyinfrastructureprojectfacestrade-offswithrespecttoresilienceandsustainability.Forexample,theremaybeatrade-offbetweeneconomicbenefitsintheformofincreasedemploymentandtheadditionalconsumptionofgreenfieldareascausedbytheproject.Here,theSuReSmartScanhelpstojudgeandoptimizethetrade-offs,thatis,tominimizenegativeimpactswhilemaximizingthebenefits.

Resilienceisamultidimensionalissue.Itcontains,amongothers,manydifferentfinancial,socialandenviron-mentalaspects.Bytakingaccountofresilienceinallitsdimensions,itisnotpossibleforsuchastudytoprovideafinalresultintheformofasinglemonetaryvalue.Measurementresultsremainmultidimensionaljustliketherealworldwelivein.Giventhatoursuggestedapproachsimplifies,quantifiesandallowsforcomparability,wedefenditsmultidimensionalcharacter.Itmaynotbethesimplestapproach,butitislikelytobetheonlywaytogetatrueanddeepideaofresilience.

Themain lesson learned from this study is thatmuchmore resilience research is needed. This contributionshouldnotbeseenasfinal,butratherasthestartingpointforfurtheranddeeperresilienceresearch.Missingdatawillbethemostsignificantobstacleinthisregard.WhiletheSuReSmartScancanbeappliedinpracticalprojectdevelopment,furtherstepsareneededinordertodeepenresearchandsupportfutureinfrastructureresilienceplanning:capacitybuildingtofosterresilienceawareness,technicalassistanceonthegroundtohelpimplementresilience–especially inareaswithlimitedknowledge–aswellasaneasy-to-usetoolcomprisingadviceonwhattolookatwhenthinkingaboutresilienceandprovideabenchmarkagainstwhichtocompare,andindicatorswithwhichtomeasurewillhelptoensureamoreresilientworldforeveryone.Thedatacollect-edduring thesestepsshould feed intoacomprehensive registry thatwillyieldmoreknowledgeandhelp tomakeresilience,togetherwithsustainability,amust-haveforinfrastructureinvestors,projectdevelopersandpolicymakers.

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Appendix

SuReStandardCommitteeMembers

Name Organisation StakeholderGroup

PeterBoswellInternationalFederationofConsultingEn-gineers(FIDIC) ProjectDevelopers

LoaBuchli FederalOfficefortheEnvironment(FOEN) PublicSectorAlejandroEder FundaciónparaelDesarrolloIntegraldel

Pacífico(FDI-GIP)NGO

(CaicedoPérez,Mariana)HervéGuez

Mirova Finance(EmmanuelleOstiari)

ZoranJelic CommunityRealizationEuropeanAidMas-terplan(C.R.E.A.M)Europe

Others

StefanieLindenberg EuropeanInvestmentBank(EIB) FinanceAnaMarques ICLEI-LocalGovernmentsforSustainability NGOBrittaRendlen WWFSwitzerland NGO

PalashSrivastava InfrastructureDevelopmentFinanceCom-pany(IDFC)

Finance

DavideStronati MottMacDonald OthersRainerZah QuantisZürich Others

RuijieZhang ChinaAssociationofPlantEngineeringConsultants(CAPEC)

ProjectDevelopers

MadeleineVarkay AsiaPacificFinancialForum FinanceMarie-LuceGodinot BouyguesConstruction ProjectDevelopersKatharinaSchneider-Roos GIB SuRe®Secretariat

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SuReStakeholderCouncilMembers

Name Organization CategorizationAlexandrinoDiogenes CityofFortaleza PublicSectorAnneMaassen WorldResourcesInstitute(WIR)RossCentre CivilSociety

ArchanaHingorani InfrastructureandLeasing&FinancialServices(IL&FS)

Developers&Con-tractors

BlakeRobinson SustainabilityInstitute Academia

CamilleMaclet EnvironmentalResourcesManagement(ERM) Certifiers&Consult-ants

CarolineHuwilerInstituteforDevelopment,EnvironmentandEnergy(IDE-E) CivilSociety

CedricGrant CityofNewOrleans PublicSector

DarioLiguti GeneralElectric Developers&Con-tractors

DeanAlborough AfricanInfrastructureInvestorsManagers(AIIM) FinancialServicesDorahNteo CityofTshwane(SouthAfrica) PublicSector

DorothéeAllain-DupreOrganizationforEconomicCo-operationandDevel-opment(OECD) Others

EnricoVinkInternationalFederationofConsultingEngineers(FIDIC)

Developers&Con-tractors

IngaBeie GIZ(GesellschaftfürInternationaleZusammenarbeit) OthersJasonZhengrongLu GlobalInfrastructureFacility(WB) FinancialServicesJean-PierreMéan MCELegalAvocats CivilSociety

JörgRüedi PöyrySwitzerlandDevelopersandCon-tractors

KatrinHauser Climate-KICSwitzerland CivilSocietyLindaKrueger TheNatureConservancy CivilSociety

MischaLentzEuropeanBankforReconstructionandDevelopment(EBRD) FinancialServices

NikolajGilbert UnitedNationsOfficeforProjectServices CivilSocietyOliverGreenfield GreenEconomyCoalition CivilSociety

Dr.RenardSiew SimeDarby DevelopersandCon-tractors

RobertKehew UNHabitat OthersProf.ShuaibLwasa MakerereUniversity(Uganda) AcademiaSuhailHajee ArqaamCapital FinancialServices

SilvioLeonardi True&fair.expert CertifiersandCon-sultants

TravisSheehan CityofBoston PublicSectorTimothyGeer WWFInternational CivilSocietyVanessaOtto-Mentz Santam FinancialServicesXiaomeiTan GlobalEnvironmentalFacility(GEF) FinancialServices

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