Van Lier 1994 Forks and Hope - Pursuing Understanding in Different Ways

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Forks and Hope:Pursuing Understanding in Different Ways

LEO VAN LIERMo nterey Institute of International Studies

This paper comm ents on an earlier issue of Applied Linguistics (14/3,September 1993) on the theme oftheory construction in SLA. The points madehere are intended to apply to general assumptions comm on in our field andreflected at various points in the contributions to that issue. A perspective ontheory construction is introduced that is different from those addressed there,but that needs to be included for the sake of balance. In this perspective, som ecommon views are examined critically: the natural sciences as a success storyworthy of em ulation; the merits of diversity and homogeneity; the relationshipsbetween theory and practice; the nature of explanation (and the role of experi-mentation and causality in this); and the evaluation of theories. Ways andpurposes of theorizing are addressed that complement the views expressed inVolum e 14/3 . It is a critical perspective, characterized by the ethicalfoundations of theory construction (and scientific activity in general) and thegrounding of theory in practical activity, and it requires a different approach tojudging the quality of work in our field.

I N T R O D U C T I O NAn earlier issue of Applied Linguistics (14/3) contains a series of thought-provoking papers on the theme of theory construction in SLA. These papersraise a num ber of questions which have been with us for a long time, but whichusually simmer below the surface of theoretical debate in ourfield,as they tendto do in many other fields as well. We must therefore welcome the attempt tobring such perennial questions out into the open and to address them in avigorous way.In this paper, I will discuss several common assum ptions in SLA and appliedlinguistics. I see these assumptions as lying behind much of what is discussed inVolume 14/3, though in no way do I wish to imply that its contributors can belumped together as representing one single view. In fact, I am sure that my pointswill be received quite differently by the different contributors (Beretta,Crookes, Gregg, Long, and Schumann), as they no doubt will be by others in thefield. I hope simply to add a distinct perspective on theory construction, one thatI feel is largely missing from Volume 14/3. Overall, I will have less to say aboutwhat is mcluded in that issue of Applied Linguistics, than what is excluded.Despite a great variety of approaches to research, the re is a broad consensusof basic views in SLA on the nature and purpose of theorizing, and on the placeof this activity and its producta theory or theories of SLAwithin theborders,however drawn or staked-out, of ourfield.I refer to views such as: regarding theApplied Linguistics, Vol. 15, No . 3 Oxford University P ress 1994

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LEO VAN L1ER 329natura l sciences as a success story worthy of emulation; the merit of diversity o rhomogeneity; the nature of explanation (and the role of experimentation andcausality in this); and the evaluation of theories. Below these issues, there is yet adeeper tacit consensus which raises a further layer of basic questions. Thesequestions address such issues as: the definition of the field of SLA; the relationsbetween theory and practice; the separateness of SLA theory from educational(or applied linguistic) theory; the nature of understanding; and, most of all, theaxiological or moral foundations of scientific practice.

In this paper, I will attem pt to get at this second layer of underlying questions,and, in turning over the rock of consensus and exposing them, I will suggest waysand purposes of theorizing that receive little overt attention in the contribu tionsto Volume 1 4/3 .Th e title of my paper, 'Forks and H ope', refers to Lewis Carroll's poem TheHunting of the Snark (Carroll 1929) which, I suggest, should be read at frequentintervals by all of us engaged in the pursuit of understanding, whether by way ofcreating theory or by way of creating praxis. At the risk of stating the obvious,the metamessage of this choice of title is that our pursuit of understanding 1 isinevitably a little like chasing something, but we don't know what, somewhere,though we don't know w here, somehow, but we don't know how. The verse fromwhich my title is taken goes as follows:

They sought it with thimbles, they sought it with careThey pursued it with forks and hope;They threatened its life with a railway-share;They charmed it with smiles and soap.And they still could not find the Snark. 'For the Snark was a Boojum, you see.'ASSUMPTIONS, QUESTIONS, DEFINITIONSIn this section, I will introduce the m ain questions sparked by reading Volume14/3, before examining them in more detail and from various angles in sub-sequent sections.First, and perhaps most basic, is the question of what our 'field' is.2 Thoughthis would seem uncontroversial at first blush (our field is Second LanguageAcquisition, what else?), the way we define ourfield, hat is, where we situate it(vis-d-vis other fields), where we draw its borders, and what we regard as itsmost important attributions and contributions, is crucial to our work. Forexample, for some, the field of SLA is situated within linguistics, for otherswithin education, or it is regarded as an independent field with connections tovarious others. For some, SLA includes a critical em ancipatory dimension; forothers it excludes such a dimension. For some, the most important goal of SLAis to lay bare the cognitive mechanisms of learning a second language; for othersit is to improve pedagogy or p rom ote cross-cultural understanding. For som e,SLA is onefield,and applied linguistics is another (though I will not make such asplit here: indeed, I will argue that it would be counterproductive to do so).There is, thus, a great deal of heterogeneity in ou r conceptualizations of the


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330 FORKS AND HOPESLA field. We all draw a different field, because our purposes, skills, and dis-course worlds (Kommunikationsgemeinschaft, Apel 1981, see below) aredifferent. Given this variety, it is not surprising that there is a corresponding var-iety in ways and purposes of theorizing and practicing. Some might call this aweakness of SLA , a sign of 'immaturity' (in the vague sense in which the term'mature ' is used by Kuhn 1970): with such diversity of work and goals, we mustsurely be in a pre-paradigmatic phase (Kuhn 1970), impatiently knocking onthe gates of paradigm. There is, however, an alternative view. There are m anydifferent kinds of work to be done, and all these kinds of work need theoreticaland practical dimensions. If different purposes, etc., are legitimate (leavingaside, for the moment, the crucial question of who decides legitimacy), then apluralistic view of the field is also legitimate, indeed , necessary. This means thatthe field of SLA cannot be limited to exclude practical affairs or pedagogicalconcerns. While some may (justifiably, perhaps) choose to ignore some aspectsof the field, this is quite different from excluding those same aspects from thefield (in the sense of denying their legitimacy). Related to this, theorists mustaccept the legitimacy of practitioners engaging in theorizing, and practitionersmust welcome participation in practical affairs by theorists . In general, the fieldmust come to realize that theorizing requires participation in practice, andpracticing requires participation in theory. From this perspective, separatingSLA from pedagogy along theory-p ractice lines would be a serious m istake.

Secondly, we need to examine the meanings of, and relationships among,concepts like evidence and documentation, and description, explanation, andunderstanding. Such terms can mean many different things. When areanecdotes and stories adequate documentation? U nder what circumstances areintuitive judgments (e.g. regarding grammaticality), entries in diaries, facialexpressions, or hesitations in utterances, acceptable as evidence? How do wedetermine the relevance of observable or experienced phenomena?As I have pointed out in the past (van Lier 1988: 10-11), a distinctionbetween description and explanation is never clear-cut: whenever we describe,we explain, and whenever we explain, we describe. This is because descriptionimplies interpretation, and interpretation is part of explanation. To m ake somekind of categorical distinction between descriptive and explanatory research istherefore misleading. Further, the process of explaining is not a homogeneousone. F irst of all, a distinction is to be m ade between various kinds of explanation.In G ilbert Ryle's (1949: 86) example of 'Why did the glass break? ', we can givetwo answers to the question. We can answer 'Because a brick hit it', or 'Becauseit was brittle.' Both are explanations, though of a different sort. And then, ofcourse, we may delve into the question of where the brick came from, whichleads us into a whole other dimension of explanation, ending perhaps with thevenerable dictum 'boys will be boys .'

A second consideration is the relation between explanation and under-standing. In Volume 14/3: 282 , Gregg quotes Lipton as saying that explanationdoes not necessarily imply understanding. This works only if explanation isequated with causal attribution; but if we take the view that, unlike physical


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LEOVANLIER 331phenomena, human affairs are never adequately explained by pointing tocauses, then explanat ion becomes impossible without understanding. Under-standing and explanation are fundamentally different processes in the naturalsciences and the human (social) sciences (Geistewissenschaften, see Gadamer1975) .3 Th e co nce pt of cause, so central in physics (though the adven t of chaosand complexity theory (Gleick 1987; Waldrop 1992) has tempered itscentrality so m ew hat), plays only a very min or, if not insignificant, role in socialscience. Un der stand ing the process of learning a second language, for examp le,is no t acco m plishe d by saying (or even show ing) that it is caus ed by ex pos ure t ocom preh ensible input, or by extensive practice, or by a process of gramm atical-ization, even though all these things may play a role. Reac hing u nderstan ding (asocially constituted, dialogic activity, see Habermas 1984) in this context is aprocess of interpretation and reconstruction (Polkinghorne 198 8), and there-fore much m ore in l ine with Gad am er's (19 7 5: 15 8) definition of und erstanding :

. . . to understand means primarily for two people to understand one another. Under-standing is primarily agreement or harmony with ano ther person.This view of understanding as socially constituted echoes Peirce's notion of acommunity of interpreters, and Apel 's related Kommunikationsgemeinschaft( 1 9 8 1 : 7).4 Such a view of understanding (and, by extension, truth) requires aconstant effort to promote openness of dialogue and clarity of purpose. It isdifferent from and transcends ordinary, everyday agreement, in that it is asystematic, methodical examination of all relevant aspects of the activity underinvestigation (Smith 1989).To sum up, theorizing in SLA, to the extent that i t means a principled andsustained attem pt to come to an unders tandin g of phe nom ena in the field, is lessa m atter of looking for cause s, or po siting laws, and m ore a que stion of listening,comm unicat ing, and coming to agreements .T h e third que stion is that of relativism which, in the view of many rese arch ers,stands in the way of progress in SLA,5 and should be replaced by rationalism,which is supposed to be i ts alternative. There is no reason, however, to putrelativism and rationalism into opposition with one another. 6 Rationalism, asdefined by Anthony Flew (1979) is

a commitment to reason as opposed to faith, prejudice, habit, or any other source ofconviction considered to be irrational.This, of course, leaves us to define reason, and to explain why Flew found itnece ssary to add a final circular clause to his definition (the rational is that whichis opposed to the irrational), but 'a commitment to reason' is a broad charac-terization. Thus, unless rationalism is really just a ' tribal creed' (Feyerabend1987: 301), it can, or at least rationality (Hab erma s 19 84; Nozick 199 3) can,include everyon e who has a comm itment to reason , wh ether relativist or univer-salist, or absolutist. A relativist, in other words, is not someone who regardsscientific investigation as being on a pa r with vo od oo , mag ic, or religion. O n theoth er han d, a relativist might recog nize a variety of types of scientific kno wledg e

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332 FORKS AND HOPEand procedures, and not assume, in scientistic arrogance, that scientificsolutions (in thenarrow, experimental sense)7 are always preferable to others. Inparticular, a relativist would be on guard for the sort of reductionism that wouldapply natural-scientific procedures to human and social issues, leading to atechnologization of human affairs and experiences (the reductivefallacy alreadynoted by Peirce, see Apel 1981 : 199).To summarize, one can be a methodological relativist while believing in thevalue of reason and rationality, as that which 'can be defended against criticism'(Habermas 1984:16 ), as well as in the objective existence of the outside world.One can be convinced of the intimate connections between the context of workand the conduct of theory, without denying the importance of evaluatingscientific work (theoretical and practical) in terms of its quality, i.e. its adequacyand value (I will return to the issue of quality below).8 We must take care not toload the relativist with m ore baggage than the poo r chap is willing to carry. Weshould control our tendency to over-categorize, and m ight do well to rememberthat the Greek word kategorein meant 'to accuse in public'.

Finally, related to the issues of field and diversity mentioned above, there isthe matter of specialization. It is often assumed that a field becomes moremature the more its workers specialize in different activities: one practices,another theorizes, a third administrates, a fourth engineers, and so on. Up to acertain point, this is no doubt true. However, soon after that point (whateverthat is) is reached, further specialization turns into fragmentation, and becomescounterproductive. As an example, a separation between SLA and appliedlinguistics would be counterproductive in this sense. In any field, a crucial role isplayed by the generalist who sees the overall picture and should therefore berecognized as the overseer (in a literal sense) and the consciousness of a field. Afield without generalists is a field adrift, like a ship that has lost its moorings.9 Tomy knowledge, the role of generalism as a desirable or even viable professionalstance is not generally acknowledged in our field.SCIENTIFIC METHOD AND THEO RYIn view of the complex issues sketched above, it is not surprising that theory hasbeen defined in a very large num ber of different ways. This in itself should warnanyone against proposals offering one way to construct it, or to evaluate itsquality. In this sense, it is no different from music: you may listen to a piece byMozart, or to a song by Bob Dylan, but it makes no sense to evaluate one interms of the other. I keep returning to the memorable dictum of WoodyHerman, who said 'There are only two kinds of music, good music, and badmusic.'10Views on method range from the extreme position that science is basically aquestion of 'correct' method (the ultimate orthodoxy) to an utter disdain formethod. Even when both extremes are agreed to be untenab le, the precise roleof method is a question of great debate. For example, a quite comm on view isexpressed by Long in Volume 14/3: scientists can reduce external threats andpressures of various kinds by working within 'conventionalized methodological



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LEOVANLIER 333traditions' (1993: 233). Method is thus a defense against the vicissitudes of thesocial system within which the scientist has to work. This view ignores thepossibility that methodological traditions themselves are part of the socialsystem, and may serve to force a false consensus (think, for example, of thepsychom etric tradition which led to massive abuses in intelligence testing).

A method, to keep things simple, is basically a way of doing things. Whenrelated to theory, it means a way of obtaining increased knowledge about somephenomenon. As I will illustrate below, we find that many great scientists arerather blase about method, though one feels that they are scoffing at particularcontrolling or confining versions of 'official' method, or at prevalent 'methodol-atries', to use Gordo n Allport's word (see Bruner 1990: xi). There is little doubtthat, in spite of a clear impatience with talk about method, all scientists wouldinsist on carefully motivated, explicitly documented, and skillfully implementedprocedures app ropriate to the investigative matter at hand.Here is what some prominent scientists and philosophers have had to sayabout method:

T he confusion and ba rren ne ss of psychology is not to be explained by calling it a 'youngscience'; its state is not co m pa rab le w ith that of physics, for insta nce, in its beginnings.( . . .) Fo r in psychology there are experimental method s and conceptual confusion. ( . . . )Th e existence of the experime ntal m ethod make s us think we have the mean s of solvingthe problems which trouble us; though problem and method pass one another by.(Wittgenstein 1958: 232)As for my own methods of investigation, I do not really have any. The only method ofinvestigation is to look hard at a serious problem and try to get some ideas as to whatmight be the explanation for it, meanwhile keeping an open mind about all sorts ofoth er po ssibilities. Well, that is no t a me thod . It is just being reas ona ble, an d so far as Iknow, that is the only way to deal with any problem, whether it is a problem in yourwork as a quantum physicist or whatever. (Chom sky 19 88 :1 90 )... quantitative science errs when it believes that research, which focuses increasinglyon reductionism, can offer a genuine solution. (Lorenz 1990: 71)

Pronouncements such as these, and one can find numerous other examples,show that one does not have to turn to radicals, mystics, or amateurs forskepticism on the preferred or codified methods of scientific research.In contrast to the massive disdain for any form of legislated 'p rope r' scientificconduct on the part of themost brilliant scientists, thefieldof SLA is dominatedby fairly narrowly prescribed research methods, whether they fall in the quanti-tative or the qualitative camp (these camps themselves being, as Bourdieu hasshown in his studies of taste (1984) and academic life (1988), unprofitablepigeon-holings of a variety of empirical and speculative activities which, ifjudiciously combined and juxtaposed, can illuminate a particular field of studymuch more than some canonized scientific p rocedure can do).If wecannot evaluate (or sanction, in both senses of the word) the quality ofresearch efforts in terms of methods that bear the imprimatur of those whodominate the field," then does this mean that we, willy-nilly, open the


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334 FORKS AND HOPEfloodgates to all sorts of dilettante and charlatan activities, promoting medi-ocrity and abdicating from any claim to standards of conduct at all? Can webemethodical (in the best sense of the word) without becoming methodolatrousiThese are troubling questions, because it means that we need to define what wemean by quality without relying on institutionalized (or bureaucratized) normsand evaluation criteria (see also note 8 above). It is as if, in a job-interviewingprocess, we actually have to judge the cand idate on his or her intrinsic know-ledge and potential, rather than on the basis of pieces of paper and scores ontests. This is hard to do, though I would argue that it is the only right thing todo. Quality in scientific work, whether of a theorizing or practicing variety,should be discernible without having to reso rt to a check-list of predeterminedcriteria (compare: how does Woody Herman distinguish good from badmusic?). It requires first of all a clear view of the ideals and principles ofscience, which, to quote Schutz (1970: 2) include 'the theoretical ideals ofunity, simplicity, universality, and precision'. In addition to these basicallyesthetic principles, it requires, as I will argue below, a solid grounding in ethicalprinciples, which are clearly articulated in terms of what constitutes positivevalue and human progress.THE PURPOSE AND CON DUCT OF THEORYMany years ago, in his A Scientist's Credo, Konrad Lorenz (1963) pointed outthat the re are two basic purposes for theorizing: wanting to know, and wantingto help. Both are equally valuable, and can indeed be seen as complementary,though they can also lead to conflicts.

A conflict can arise when a theorist, intent on finding better ways of knowing,is compelled to make practical connections and suggest useful applicationsevery step along the way. Such a theorist naturally feels that these practicalconstraints do nothing but slow down the journey along the road to knowledge,or worse, force detours and layovers. Another conflict arises when a practi-tioner, in the course of solving a problem, feels the need to elaborate a theorythat springs from the practical circumstances of his or her work. In this case,conflicts can come from two quarters: first, superiors or employers, as well aspeers, may feel the practitioner's foray into theory is a waste of time or a faintlyridiculous delusion of grandeur (or both); and, secondly, theorists fromacademic quarters may feel that an unqualified outsider is meddling in com-plicated matters that are outside his or her pro per domain.

Note that these conflicts are social and institutional, not scientifically basedones. It seems to me that when Feyerabend (1975) utters his famed (ornotorious) 'anything goes', or C. S. Peirce (Buchler 1955: 48) says that 'truescience is distinctively the study of useless th ings', both are referring essentiallyto the freedom a scientist should be granted to pursue arguments wherever theymay lead, employing whatever methods appear feasible. Peirce rightly con-sidered himself a rare mind, and for a mind such as his to be employed on thestudy of 'useful things' was, he felt 'like running a steam engine by burningdiamonds'. This remark must be seen in the context of Peirce's tragic life, in


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L E O V A N U E R 3 3 5which he constantly sought after an academic position, only to find his effortsthwarted time and again by a combination of his own bad judgment and themachinations of powerful enemies (Brent 1993). The 'diamond' was forced allhis life to 'run steam engines'. Unless wekeep this personal and social context inmind, remarks such as these appear to contradict the essence of pragmatism(and its subsequent redefinition as pragmaticism), which was for Peirce theinseparable connection between rational cognition and rational purpose, andthe growing conviction that all science should be grounded in ethics.12

From a historical perspective, one can clearly say that all theories andmethods are flawed, but that does not mean they were or are useless, quite thecontrary. As Schumann rightly points out in Volume 14/3, falsifiability is not anadequate guide to assessments of thevalue of theories. In fact, Popper's conceptof falsification is not an improvement over its ancestor, Peirce's fallibilism: 'thedoctrine that our knowledge is never absolute but always swims, as it were, in acontinuum of uncertainty and of indeterminacy' (Buchler 195 5: 356 ). To givean example close to home, we might say that K rashen's input theory is uselessbecause we cannot falsify it, since Krashen is rather good at defending it againstwould-be falsifiers. R egardless of its shortcomings, the usefulness of K rashen'swork for others, whether theorists or practitioners, is quite another matter,largely unrelated to its ultimate survival as a theory.In short, attempts to rule out one approach or ano ther because it does not fitin with some perceived view on evidence, conduct, or documentation, veryeasily degenerate into dogmatism or theoretical totalitarianism (after all, theantonym of relative is absolute). It is useful here to think of theorizing as acontingent process, and theory as a passing theory (Davidson 198 6:442 ), a viewof scientific discourse in which (as in language use) communication, agreement,and understanding derive from 'a convergence on passing theories' (ibid.: 445)rather than from an agreement on prior theory. Theorizing and practicing (andresearching, as work undertaken to assist in theorizing and practicing) can be

envisaged as unfolding in real time, connected to the past through accumulatedknowledge and experience and connecting to the future by way of expectationsand purposes. This process view contrasts to prior theory, which is the store ofknowledge and predictions which the scientist or practitioner brings to thework. Prior theory is constantly revised in the light of passing theory .13If this is the case, then how are we to judge scientific conduct? Ultimately, no

doubt, by results. But how do we judge the results? By their usefulness. Useful towhom? For what? For how long? All these perplexing questions require that weare able to define what we mean by human progress. That is the only way inwhich we can profitably discuss if inventions such as atom bombs, assault rifles,abortion pills, gasoline engines, infomercials, electric chairs, and political actioncomm ittees, are results of scientific progress o r not. Certainly, the phenom enalsuccess that is at times attributed to science, especially by workers in socialscience to the exact sciences, must be seen in perspective. Isaac New ton said thatwe are like little children picking up pretty pebbles on the beach while the wholeocean lies before us unexplored. C. S. Peirce added to this that this remains true


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336 FORKS AND HOPEeven though 'we shovel up the pebbles by steam shovels and carry them off incarloads' (Biichler 1955: 53). Today, we might add that it is still true, eventhough we can now blast the pebbles into intergalactic orbit, show the event liveon CNN, and then turn it into a virtual-reality video game.Ravetz (1 97 1,1 99 0) divides the history of science into three phases:

traditional (academic); industrialized; critical.He assumes that, during the twentieth century, industrial concerns and purposes(note, particularly, the increasing importance of outside funding sources)gradually took over from academic purposes (the pursuit of knowledge for itsown sake, the ivory-tower view of science). Right now, in Ravetz's inter-pretation, science is entering a phase in which critical issues (emancipation,equality, and justice) play an increasing role. Against this optimistic view, onemight place the observation that apart from a critical tendency, there is now alsoa strong bureaucratic streak, with scientific decisions being increasinglyinfluenced by narrow institutional and political concerns.

One might find it rather impractical and somewhat anachron istic to see SLAtheorists wanting to push towards their own academic phase, out of step with allof the rest of science (indeed, rowing mightily against the current, it wouldseem). The reasoning seems to be that in order to become respected it isnecessary to do two things: becom e m ore like the natural sciences (see remarksto this effect by Chomsky, quoted by Beretta in Volume 14 /3), and keep awayfrom participation in practical affairs, such as education (Beretta and Crookesin Volume 14 /3 , particularly note 7). Here , theoretical linguistics, held up as amodel to be emulated, serves as a powerful warning. According to GeoffreyPullum (1991: 20-1) theoretical linguistics (at least in the US) is in such direstraits that a 'Fund for the Future of Linguistics' was recently set up. I wouldargue that the main reason for this plight is the very same aloofness frompractical m atters that some SLA theorists now appear to be seeking.14

A practical option is for SLA researchers to follow the rest of the sciencesboth physical and mentaland include a critical dimension in which well-articulated moral principles influence the direction of the work that is to bedone. The work that needs to be done in language use and language education isurgent and critical (in both senses of the word), so that linguists, both theoreticaland applied, areneeded to put their expertise and energy into the service of real-life concerns, and not just to pursue the Snark of academic respectability.To return to the idea of freedom, and in defense of theoretical diversity, themost mature situation is one in which all workers in a particular field are free topursue theoretical and practical avenues of inquiry in accordance with theirpersonal vision, strengths, and inte rests, based on well-articulated statements ofpurpose and human values, all the while maintaining an openness thatencourages the sharing of ideas and communication. Within such a perspective,the pursuit of theory-for-the-sake-of-theory may be as valid (once the purpose


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LEOVANLIER 337of the theory has been made clear) as a practitioner's theory of practice, or anapplied researcher's problem-solving approach. Indeed, in a mature and openspirit of enquiry, both theoretically and practically minded workers can worktogether as equal collaborators . One of the most imm ature things wecan do is toset up a pecking order in which practice-less theory and theory-less practicebattle for supremacy.THE THEORY O F PRACTICEOne possible view in SLA, as elsewhere, is that research serves to constructtheories, no more, and no less (see van Lier 1991 for more detailed discussion ofthis point). If a further purpose is admitted, it is to advise and prov ide guidance topractitioners. This assumes that there are two separate groups of people: theorists(scientists? SLA researchers?) and practitioners (teachers? applied linguists?),and the job of the former is either to ignore or to guide the latter. The job of thelatter, presumably, is to get on with it and take advice when given.This view can be questioned. It is possible to envisage a way of working whichbreaks down the traditional boundaries between theory and practice. Above, Ihave in several places referred to both theorizing and practicing as scientificactivities. This is different from the traditional view, in which science isassociated with theorizing, rather than with practical work.

When I did a small survey some time ago to see if graduate students andcolleagues associated research with theory or with practice, they almostunanimously chose theory, usually as a matter of course . Yet, there is no reasonwhy practice should not be the focus and source of an equal amount of researchas theory. Further, to pursue theory for the sake of theory is ultimately futile,unless the theory is useful, i.e. furthers some hum an goal, or leads to progress insome tangible way.15 Most people will probably agree with this, so the realcontroversy lies elsewhere. In part it lies, I suggest, in the everyday tensionsbetween theoretical and practical activities, where theorists may be required(against their will) to engage in menial tasks which they feel d o not further theirtheoretical quest, and where practitioners are prevented, for a variety ofreasons, from pursuing theoretical leads that arise from their work. I havealluded to this problem before, pointing out that it is a social/institutional, not ascientific one.It seems that in modern scientific history a separation has grown betweenpractice and theory, so that they have come to be regarded as separate spheresof activity in one and the same field, carried out by different people for differentpurposes using different methods, answering to different institutions, located indifferent places, using different languages, and so on . This differentiationappears to be so deeply ingrained in our perceptions of scientific w ork, that wetend to regard it as natural and inevitable, yet perhaps in reality it should beneither.While it is clear that people ought to be allowed to pursue theory withoutbeing continually pressed to show immediate practical relevance, it should atthe same time b e acknowledged that practical activities are an enorm ous source


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338 FORKS AND HOPEof theoretically relevant data, particularly in the social sciences, and that practi-tioners themselves (for example, teachers), should be in an ideal position to con-struct theories out of their practices. The question is thus not only whethertheory should be relevant to practical concerns (most people agree on this, atleast in the social sciences), but whether practices should be relevant to theory .Going one final step further, however, the existence of two separate entitiescalled practice and theory can be denied altogether. A critical scientific methoduses participation in the practical affairs of thefield o fuel theory, which then isput back into the service of progress in practical affairs, and so on in cyclical,reflexive ways. The theory of practice, then, creates theory out of practicalactivities (in other words, uses practical activities to create theory), and thenuses theory to (re)create practical activities, as exemplified in Bourdieu'sreflexive sociology (1992). Theory is not something that is constructed and sub-sequently applied to practice. Instead, it is nothing but a reflexive dimension ofpractice. In SLA, theorizing includes, for example, coming to an understandingof learning by participating in, observing, interpreting, and changing theteaching-learning encounter.16EPISTEMOLOGY AND AXIOLOGYApplied Linguistics Volume 14 /3 deals almost exclusively with the epistemo-logical (and ontological, to some degree) concerns of our field, and the tacitassumption seems to be that one can engage in theory construction, that one canpush the field forward, without explicitly grappling with ethical issues such asthe articulation of moral principles. As I have pointed out, theory withoutpurpose is useless. (One might, of course, also say that purpose without theory isequally useless, but I'd argue that the true substance of a field resides in purpose-ful activity, and in theory only insofar as this forms part of a larger sense ofpurpose.)SLA deals with issues of second language learning. The ultimate purpose is tounderstand how people learn a second language, and a range of benefits derivefrom such understanding. These include a better understanding of ourselves, ofthe nature of language, of the nature of learning, and, more practically,enhanced ways of learning and helping learning. This much, I assume, is uncon-troversial, so what is all the fuss about?If we focus on theory for the sake of theory, on scientific procedures and theirefficiency, on the epistemological foundations of our conceptual schemes, andon nothing else but these things, we will inevitably end up either in the clutchesof dogmatism, or those of relativism. Relativism, in such a scenario, will slipeasily into nihilism, and then one would have to agree with Long (Volume 14 /3),Beretta (1991), and Laudan (1990), that it is hard to see why such a relativistwould bother to do scientific work at all. Woody Herm an, in an analogous situa-tion, would be unable to distinguish music from cacophony.The only way out of this conundrum is to anchor our epistemological searchfor better theories, clearer concepts, truth, and so on, in something bigger andmore basic, i.e. the axiological universals of our existence. In plain words, we


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LEOVANLIER 339have to put m oral values and ethical principles central in our work (though not, Ihasten to add, in the parochial sense of political or fundamentalist 'back tobasics' campaigns). The basic principles which guide our work should not onlybe conceptually clear, but also morally transparent. Even Peirce, who staked hisentire life's work on his having found a clear way of thinking, came to the con-viction that all of science is grounded in ethics (and ethics, as I mentioned above,in esthetics).Such a way of doing science, embedded in participation, and grounded in adual examination of epistemological (clear thinking) and axiological (clearpurpose, and a commitment to humaneness, or humanization, see Freire 1970)principles, requires a larger theory to orient it, and this larger theory, in thewords of Bertram B ruce,shou ld highlight the historical, social, political, institutional, and c ultural d im ensio ns of

learning, in and out of classrooms. Starting from the whole does not mean never analyz-ing the parts. It does mean considering (the] role of practices such as sense-making,interpretation, value systems, rhetoric, communities, and power relationships. (Bruce1 9 9 1 :1 9 ) 1 7

A re-examination of scientific work in the field of SLA along these linesresults in a shift in our professional stance, and it adds a critical dimension tothe theoretical and practical debate in our field. As a result, the quality ofwork (theoretical, practical, and integrated) can be evaluated in terms of con-duct, purpose, and results, without having to appeal to partisan criteria (seenote 8).AN ALTERNATIVE SLA?To propose an alternative SLA might seem to imply that there is only one SLAand it is doing things wrong. This is not my intention, since it is hard to deny thatthe field (however defined) has made significant progress in the last threedecades or so. However, there do seem to be a few insecurities and fears abroad,and these might be worth enumerating with a view to assessing their grounds.For those who work mainly in the area of research and theory, there are thefollowing fears:1. Fear of diversity (or proliferation). This fear is based on the idea that a singleunifying theory of SLA may be both possible and beneficial. Some claim to beable to count literally dozens of theories (and may look around desperately forclubs to go culling undesirable ones), though I tend to agree with Gregg, who'cannot go beyond the fingers of one hand' (Volume 14/3: 289). As I haveargued in this paper, depending on how we define our field, and on the successof our Kommunikationsgemeinschaft, the answer may well be, the more themerrier. I doubt if the progress in SLA I mentioned above would have been asstriking had it not been for the diversity that has characterized these last fewdecades. Would arigidadherence to one single dogmabehaviorist dogma, forexamplehave given us as much progress? I suggest not, agreeing with


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340 FORKS AND HOPENatsoulas (1990) (who makes a similar argument for psychology) thatpluralism is to be preferred over eliminativism. And, rather than being afraid ofcontradictions and anomalies, we should instead nurture them as resources forfuture insights.2. Fear of practice. As seen above, the theorist may feel hampered by demandsto apply everything immediately. I believe this is justified, but this should notlead the theorist to assume that involvement in practical affairs is either super-fluous or detrimental to scientific progress (even of the 'purest' kind, though Ifind 'purity' a rather empty concept in this context). Theories need to beconstrained by ordinary everyday goings-on, or else they might fly off into therealm of absurdity. As Kant said, complaining of Plato's excessive idealism:

The light dove cleaving in free flight the thin air, whose resistance it feels, might imaginethat her movements would be far more free and rapid in airless space. (Kant 1934:29)Every theorist, especially in a socially embedded field like SLA, should besteeped in practice, while at the same time being able to pursue theoreticalinterests along open paths of enquiry.On the other hand, those who are on the practical side of the fence (a fence, Ihave tried to make clear, that should be demolished at once), are beset by otherfears:1. Fear of reflection (or research). Practitioners tend to be, to adapt a wonderfulphrase of Lee Shulman (1987: 478), missing in action rather than lost inthought. The pressure to act fast and well, to 'perform' well-crafted lessonsor,in less happy circumstances, to go through routinized motions so as to reach theend of the day with the least amount of hasslecreates its own rhythm of move-ment, within which systematic reflection and teacher-research seem to find noplace, except for the most restless and courageous souls. Moreover, as Iindicated above, reflecting and researching teachers may meet with resistanceor lack of comprehension, perhaps even ridicule and active sabotage, frompeers and superiors, as well as from academics who feel their turf is beinginvaded by unauthorized trespassers. The recipe here is, of course, to p romoteteacher research, and genuinely collaborative research, as well as show, byresults, how practice can grow theory.2. Fear of theory. Practitioners are confronted with a barrage of theoreticalliterature that is hurled at them at an ever-faster and more furious pace from therostrums of conferences and the pages of journals. Very often the professionalliterature is couched in technical jargon that seems intelligible only to theresearcher's immediate clan of peers, and does not appear to wish to be under-stood by teachers. The practitioner's fear (or loathing) of theory is thus quiteunderstandable. The twin solutions which I propose are, on the one hand, forteachers to grow their own theories, and, on the other hand, to consciouslypromote a cadre of generalists who are able to oversee (but not simplify!) the


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LEOVANLIER 341field and trace connections in a language that can be unders tood by all.18 Thesedevelopments would assist also in the breakdown of the unhealthy barriersbetween theory and practice.Throughout this paper, I have made it clear that I would like to see the field ofSLA anchored in education. Others, with no doubt equal justification, wouldlike to see it allied with linguistics. Perhaps this gives SLA somewhat of anidentity crisis. If this is so, let us put the blame both on education and onlinguistics (it's always nice to have someone else to blame). Let me make myselfclear. Education, which is conducted through language, depends on language,and stands or falls with language, is woefully and irresponsibly delinquent in itstreatment of language, in the schools, but especially in the education colleges.Linguistics, which should be about something, since language is always aboutsomething, has separated itself increasingly from language-intensive fields suchas education (and anthropology, sociology, and so on). So we have an educationwhich does not know what to do with language, and we have a linguistics whichdoes not know what to say about education (we even have an SLA which doesnot want to know about language education). The solution to this is to forge anew field, educational linguistics, and this would finally allow SLA to cure itsclassic schizophrenia.19

CONCLUSIONResearchers in SLA often complain that there are too many theories: 'Theyshould be eliminated!' they exclaim, adding softly 'except mine'. At the sametime, this fear of diversity masks an enormous pool of toxic soup (see note 11),where crucial concepts float unexamined and taken for granted, perhapsoccasionally rising to the surface on a bubble of perspicuous gas, only to sinkagain of their own weight.I have indicated a few of these concepts, though a thorough examinationwould involve much more time and effort. In overview, wewould do well not tohitch our evaluation of the quality of our theorizing, consisting of conduct,purpose, and results, to the hazy star of a 'maturity' based on grand theory andhomogeneity of aims and methods. Weshould not throw out the healthy baby ofpluralism with the bath water of all that we detest in extreme relativism. Norshould we drown that baby in a tub of extreme rationalism.The consensus of the contributors to Applied Linguistics Volume 1 4/3 seemsto be that SLA will be a better SLA when divorced from pedagogy, that maturitycan only be achieved when all ties with pedagogy are severed. It is my view thatin such a scenario SLA would either disappear into the thin air of absurdity, orelse fall to earth with the dull thud of pomposity. SLA is about language learn-ing. All around the world, billions of people are learning language, millions areteaching language, and they do so with effort, intelligence and ingenuity. Theseactivities are the true data of SLA, they are the air that both constrains the doveof SLA, and keeps it aloft. In short, SLA and language pedagogy are inter-dependent pursuits.Furtherm ore, no academic who has carefully read the literature on the history



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342 FORKS AND HOPEand the philosophy of science can honestly claim that one method to carry thehuman (social) sciences forward has been found. Even in the physical sciences,causality has been put on trial by complexity theory (this was foreshadowed bywriters as diverse as Russell (see Phillips 1987: 74) and Peirce (see Brent1993)). Positivism, the search for causal laws, the iron-clad generalization, andthe forced choice between either objectivity or subjectivity, have been leftbehind in the critical approaches to social science.Every scientific pursuit must be anchored in practical activity. For SLA, enbloc, to fly off on a quest of theory as the u ltimate goal of research, abstractedfrom the social context, and disdainful of practical affairs, would seem, in thelight of these considerations, unwise. Different, even contradictory perspectivesmust not only be tolerated, they must be nurtured. So long as there is opendialogue, they provide the best opportun ities for improved understandings.

'It 's a Snark!' was the sou nd that first cam e to their ears ,And seemed almost too good to be true.Then followed a torrent of laughter and cheers:Then the ominous w ords 'I t' s a B oo - 'Then silence. Som e fancied they he ard in the airA weary and w andering sighThat soun ded like '- jum!' but the others declareIt was only a bre eze that w ent by.

(Revised version received January 1994)ACKNOWLEDGEMENTSIt may have been a reckless and foolish idea to embark on a discussion of scienceand theory construction without being a specialist in these areas. I am sure I amguilty of errors and nonsense, but I hope the message is worth the inaccuracies. Ithank Kimmarie Cole, Rod Ellis, Paul Magnuson, and Applied Linguistics'anonymous readers, for tough questions and helpful comments. If someof theiradvice has not been followed, it probably means that it is beyond my ability atthis time to do so. Or else perhaps I disagreed.NOTES

1 O r tru th: 'Wha t I tell you thre e times is true', as the Bellman said in The HuntingoftheSnark; or 'Truth is a mobile army of m etap hors ' , as Nietzsche said: see Rorty 19 89 :1 6.2 Following Bourdieu ( 19 90 ,19 92 ) I define fields a s ' . . . historically constituted areasof activity with their specific institutions and their own laws of functioning.'3 Althou gh even in the physical sciences unde rstandin g is based upo n language, if webelieve Heisenb erg:We know that any understanding must be based finally upon natural language, because

it is only there we can be certain to touch reality. (Heisenberg 196 5: 21 1 , quote d inRommetve i t 1990 :91)4 Kuh n, in his 1969 Postscript, explains his notion of paradigm in terms of scientific

community, including insightful discussion of group commitment, values, tacit know-ledge, and incommensurability (Kuhn 1970: 174-210). Note particularly his finalsentences:


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LEOVANLIER 343Scientific know ledge, like language, is intrinsically the com mo n pro pe rty of a gro up orelse nothing at all. To und ersta nd it we shall need to know th e special characteristic s ofthe groups that create and use it.5 Long , in Volum e 14 /3 , says that it is not clear to him 'why relativists would bo the r todo research at all'. Such puzzlement is based on one particular view of (extreme)relativism, in which the relativist is turned into a carica ture of him- (or her-) self. 1 doubtthat Laudan's composite relativist, aptly named 'Quincy Rortabender ' (Laudan 1990),adeq uately rep rese nts th e variety of argum ents generally labeled relativist. If the re is one

thing that characterizes all relativists, whether weak or strong, moderate or radical, it isperhaps the view that scientific concepts and judgments are influenced by a particularsocial conte xt, world view, cultural framework, and so on. If som e relativists change 'influ-enced by' to 'shaped by', or 'determined by', they may be right at times, and wrong attimes.

6 Traditionally rationalism is opposed to empiricism, and relativism to realism (seeNola 1988; Smith 1989). Clearly, this whole area is a formidable Gordian knot ofterminology. As Rorty (19 89 :4 4) advises,. . . the distinctions between absolutism and relativism, between rationality andirrationality, and between morality and expediency are obsolete and clumsy tools-remn ants of a vocabulary we should try to replace.7 It may be noted that I use science in two senses. I criticize the traditional, narrowsense, and advocate a wider sense which includes all systematic and sustained inquiry,

including inquiry-in-practice.8 Th ese terms , replacing the narrow co ncepts of reliability and validity, are taken fromRavetz (1 97 1, 19 90 ). Ravetz provides a detailed discussion of quality control in science.9 No te how H ow ard G ard ne r (19 89) also calls for the urgent need for generalists in the

field of psychology, particularly educational psychology. I would say the need is no lessurgent in linguistics, particularly educational linguistics, of which SLA forms a naturalbran ch, given that it is con cern ed with learning language.'" Ve ry interestingly, this can be read as both a relativist and a universalist p osition: a

musical relativism within a universal esthetics. T he im plications for theory ev aluation areclear: the crucial discussion about quality must go beyond partisan issues.1 ' Pe rhap s we cann ot point to a particu lar set of pers ons , rather we are dealing with

doxa, or the universe of the undiscussed, fundamental presupp ositions which are takenfor granted and never questioned (Bourdieu 1992). To try and dig up and turn over thedoxa m ay seem a profoundly subve rsive activity, but m ust neverth eless be do ne if we areto get ahead.

12 And ethics, in turn, on esthetics, which is where we can make the connection withWoody Herman's dictum.

13 Th e precise relationship between passing theory and prior theory, and p articularlytheir applicability to social science research, are not at all well-understood. Suffice it tosay, at this point, that we should beware of assuming that there is only the one kind oftheory, prior theory, to reckon with. Otherwise, we would be like the tourist who onlythinks that sights or restaurants are good if the guidebook says so.

14 I am not trying to put down theoretical linguistics (but, how homogeneous is it,anyway?); in fact, I am ready to join the fund raisers. But, as a linguist, I feel the field'srobustness is damaged by insufficient connecting work both within academia andbetween the academic and the social world. Even so, there are many linguists who dopioneering work in specific areas, from bilingual education (Tucker 1986) to racialdiscrimination (Roberts, Davies, and Jupp 1992; van Dijk 1993) and critical theory


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344 FORKS AND HOPE(Fairclough 198 9), but the se, on e feels, are not the theoretical linguists for wh om th e fundwas established.15 For a recent discussion of this issue in the context of Bourdieu's work, see Jenkins(1992), especially chapter 4. See also Davis's discussion of Peirce's views on this matter(Davis 1972: 139). Particularly interesting, from my perspective, is Davis's suggestionthat 'as many "pu re theoretical" discoveries are m ade in the pursuit of "practical" ends aswould be made in direct pursuit of them, and this is plausible because it appears that anynum ber of the most important of all scientific discoveries have be en hit up on b y acc ident,by men working (as often as not) on some practical problem' (ibid.: 140). This is not allthat different from Fey erabe nd's (1 98 7: 28 4) insistence that ' the knowledge we need toadvance the sciences does not com e from theories, it com es from participation'.

16 As an anonymous reviewer has rightly pointed out, Spinoza already argued thatknowledge (understanding) can only be achieved through the study of entities engaged inactivity. Studying learning, therefore, means studying people engaged in the activity oflearning. A s Bou rdieu (19 77 : 9 6 -7 ) says, 'only insofar as one doe s things is it possib le toknow abou t things'.

17 I am grateful to Jo hn Swales for bringing this pape r to my a ttentio n.18 We do not have to start from scratch here: teacher research is flourishing, andbalanced generalist texts are being published (e.g. Ellis 1 98 5, 19 94 ; Klein 198 5; Larse n-Freem an and Long 1991 ). W hat needs to change is a view of theory construction which,in an entire thematic issue, omits any mention of practice-driven research, except to seepractical concerns as a 'distraction' (Beretta and Crookes Volume 14/3: 267). As aprofessional cho ice based on perso nal preference, one can und erstan d and respect such astance, but as a general recom me ndation , it sounds dogm atic and parochial.

19 Fo r earlier, similar recom me ndatio ns, see Spolsky (1978 ), Stubbs ( 198 6). I believethat there is enough interest, commonality of purpose, and critical mass, to get thisdiscipline off the ground, finally. Particularly promising is the work of Ron Carter andothers on Languag e in the National Curriculum in Gre at Britain, e.g. Ca rter ( 19 90 ).REFERENCESApel, K-O. 1 9 8 1 . Charles S. Peirce: From P ragmatism to Pragm aticism. Amhers t :University of M assachusetts Press.Beretta, A. 1991 . 'Theory construction in SLA: Complementarity and opposition. ' Stud-

ies in Second Language Acquisition 13: 4 9 3 - 5 1 1 .Bourdieu, P. 1977. Outline of a theory of practice. Cambridge: Cambridge Universi tyPress.

Bourdieu, P. 1984 . Distinction. Cam bridge, M A: Harvard Universi ty Press.Bourdieu, P. 1988 . Homo Academicus. Stanford: Stanford University Press.Bourdieu, P. 1990 . The Logic of Practice. Stanford: Stanford University Press.Bourdieu, P. 1992 . An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology. Chicago: The University of

Chicago Press.Brent, J. 1993 . Charles Sanders Peirce: A Life. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.Bruce, B. 1991 . 'The discou rses of inquiry: Pedagogical challenges and response s. ' Pa per

prepa red for the conference: Literacy, Identity, and Mind, University of Michigan, AnnArb o r , MI , Oc t. 3 -5 ,1 9 9 1 .Bruner, J. 1990 . Acts of Meaning. Cam bridge, M A: Harvard Universi ty Press.Buchler, J. (ed.) 1955. Philosophical Writings of Peirce. New York: Dover Publications.Carroll, L. 1929 . 'The Hun ting of the Snark' in J. F. M cD erm ott (ed.): The collected verse

of Lewis Carroll. New York: E. P. Dutton and Com pany.



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LEOVANLIER 345Carter, R. (ed.) 1990. Knowledge about Language and the Curriculum: The LINC

Reader. London : Ho dder and Stoughton.Chomsky, N. 1988. Language and Problems of Knowledge. Cam bridge, MA : M IT Press.Davidson, D. 1986. 'A nice derangement of epitaphs' in E. LePore (ed.) 1986: Truthand Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson. Oxford:

Black well.Davis, W . H. 1972 . Pence's Epistemology. The Hague: Mart inus Nijhoff.Ellis, R. 1985 . Understanding Second Language Acquisition. Oxford: Oxford University

Press.Ellis, R. 1994 . The Study of Second Language Acquisition.. Oxford: Oxford University

Press.Fairclough, N. 1989 . Language and Power. London: Longman.Feyerabend, P. 1975 . Against Method. London: Verso.Feyerabend, P. 1987. Farewell to Reason. London: Verso.Flew, A. 1979 . Dictionary of Philosophy. New York: St. M artin 's Press.Freire, P. 1970 . Pedagogy of the Oppressed. New York: Herd er and H erder .Gadamer, H-G. 1 9 75 . Truth and Method. New York: The Seabury Press.Gardner, H. 1989 . To Open Minds: Chinese Clues to the Dilemma of Contemporary

Education. New York: Basic Books.Gleick, J. 1987. Chaos. New York: Penguin Books.Gregg, K. 1989. 'Second language acquisition theory: the case for a generative

perspe ctive' in S. M. Gass an d J. Schachter (eds.) 1989 . Linguistic Perspectives onSecond Language Acquisition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Habermas, J. 1984. The Theory of Comm unicative Action, Vol. 1: Reason and TheRationalization of Society. Boston: Beacon Press.Heisenberg, W . 19 65. 'The role of mod ern physics in the developmen t of h uma nthinkin g' in F. T. Severin (ed.) 1 96 5: Hum anistic Viewpoints in Psychology. New York :McGraw-Hill .

Jenkins, R. 1992 . Pierre Bourdieu. London: Routledge.Kant, I. 1934. (first published 1781). Critique of Pure Reason. London: J . M. Dent and

Sons Ltd.Klein, W. 1985 . Second Language Acquisition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Kuhn, T. 1 9 70 . The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: The University of

Chicago Press.Larsen-Freeman, D. and M. H. Long. 1 9 9 1 . An Introduction to Second Language

Acquisition Research. London: Longman.Laudan, L. 1990. Science and Relativism: Som e Key Con troversies in the Philosophy of

Science. Chicago: Th e U niversity of Chicago Press.Lorenz, K. 1963 . 'A scientist 's cred o' reprinted in K. Lore nz 197 1 Studies in Animal and

Hum an Behaviour, Vol. II. London: Methuen .Lorenz, K. 1990 . On Life and Living. New York: St. Ma rtin 's P ress.Natsoulas, T. 1990. 'The pluralistic approach to the nature of feelings.' Journal of Mindand Behavior. 11/173-217.Nola, R. (ed.) 1988. Relativism and Realism in Science. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic

Publishers.Nozick, R. 1993 . The Nature of Rationality. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Phillips, D. C. 1987. Philosophy, Science, and Social Inquiry. Oxford: Pergamon.Polkinghome, D. E. 1988 . Narrative Knowing and the Human Sciences. New York :

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346 FORKS AND HOPEPullum, G. 1 9 9 1 . The Great Eskimo Vocabulary Hoax and other Irreverent Essays on the

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Comm unication in Multi-ethnic Workplaces. London: Longman.Rommetveit, R. 199 0. 'On axiomatic features of a dialogical approa ch to language andmind' in I. Ma rkova and K. Fop pa (eds.) 1 990: The Dynamics of Dialogue. New York:Harvester Wheatsheaf. .

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A comm ent from some contributors to Volume14, Issue 3

One expects that a reply to a paper in a learned journal will in fact be about thatpaper, and will contribute to the discussion in that paper. Van Lier's response tothe papers in the Special Issue of Applied Linguistics published in September1993 fails on all three counts. He explicitly states that he will discuss, not whatwas included in those papers, but rather what was excluded, and then takes theauthors to task for not including it; in fact what he discusses was not the subjectof the Special Issue. He attributes to us positions we have not taken and claimswe have not made, here or elsewhere; he even criticizes our joint position whenwe do not have one. Needless to say, then, he makes no contribution to ourdiscussion of theory construction in SLA . Thus this is not a piece that can bereplied to, even if we thought it worth our while. We invite readers interested inour various positions to do what van Lier has not bothered to do: read what wehave written.

Alan B eretta, Graham Crookes, Kevin R. Gregg, Michael H. Long

The Editors comm entIn September 1993, we published a Special Issue of Applied Linguistics, guest-edited by Alan Beretta, and titled 'Theory Construction in Second LanguageAcquisition'. We were delighted to have the opportunity to do so, as this groupof papers constitutes a set of strong, coherent, and timely statements by keypractitioners in the field, which merits wide discussion. While details in theirpositions differ, the authors of the Special Issue papers generally share theessentially rationalist epistemology which predominates in contem porary SLA/applied linguistics. None the less, within ourfield,as in the social sciences moregenerally, alternative epistemologies exist and indeed are arousing increasinginterest.In the hope of promoting constructive discussion on the key issues raised inthe Special Issue therefore, across a variety of perspectives, we invited Leo vanLier to write a commentary on it, and are very pleased to bepublishing the resulthere. Clearly, van Lier brings an alternative perspective to bear on major issuessuch as the nature of theory, explanation, and understanding, the theory/practice relationship, and the role of ethics in scientific enquiry.Several of the Special Issue contributors have now made it clear that theyhave not found our attempt to prom ote discussion helpful on this occasion. Weregret this, but remainfirmlycommitted to dialogue, and to the reflection in thepages of this journal of the widest possible range of applied linguisticsviewpoints.

The Editors


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Van Lier 1994 Forks and Hope - Pursuing Understanding in Different Ways

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