Van Til & The Use of Evidence by Thom Notaro

VAN TIL AND THE USE OF

EVIDENCE

$3.75

by Thom Notaro

What role do evidences play in Cornelius Van Til’s defense of the faith? How can Christians hold dialogue with nonbelievers, whose presuppositions conflict with biblical truth? Is Christianity capable of proof or verification?

The author gathers into this concise and readable volume the often misunderstood or neglected material Dr. Van Til has contributed on the legitimacy and role of evidences within presuppositional apologetics. When put to good use, factual evidences are shown to offer innumerable opportunities to direct sinful minds to the self- attesting Christ of Scripture.

Thom Notaro holds two degrees from Westminster Theological Seminary. His Th.M. thesis there served as the basis for this book.

PRESBYTERIAN AND REFORMED PUBLISHING COMPANYBox 817 - Phillipsburg, New Jersey 08865

ISBN: 0-87552-353-6

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VAN TIL & THE USE OF

EVIDENCE

Thom Notaro

PRESBYTERIAN AND REFORMED PUBLISHING COMPANYPHILLIPSBURG, NEW JERSEY 1980

Copyright 1980 byPresbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company

Unless otherwise stipulated Scripture quotations are from the New American Standard Bible Copyright by The Lockman Foundation 1960, 1962, 1963, 1968, 1971, 1972, 1973, 1975

ISBN: 0-87552-353-6

: \ t h e i nited states of America

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To Carol, Evidence that God loves me

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Contents

P r e f a c e . . . . . ................................................................... 7Part I: Introductory Chapters1 The Legitimacy of Evidences............................. 132 Evidences, Apologetics and Theology ............. 21

Part II: Knowledge and the Covenantal Framework3 Two Senses of “K now ing” .................................. 314 W hat about Epistemological N eutrality?........ 435 Evidence and P roo f................................................ 54

Part III: Presuppositional Verification6 A Close-Up of V erifiability................................. 657 Presenting Presuppositional Evidences ........... 788 Objections and R e p lie s ........................................ 96

Part IV: Biblical Examples and Summary9 Resurrection Evidences at W ork......................... 109

John 20:24-29 ......................... 109Acts 1 :3 ............................................................... 112Acts 2 :14-36 ...................................................... 114Acts 26................................................................. 117I Corinthians 1 5 .............................................. 120

10 S u m m a ry ................................................................. 124

In d ex ............................................................................... 129

Preface

Y' > |H ERE is a lot of confusion concerning the placeof evidences in the apologetics of Cornelius Van T il. It does not seem to matter whether you

have only begun to read his works or you have plowed through several of his m ajor volumes on defending the faith. Nagging questions remain: Does Van T il rule out the use of evidences altogether? If so, what sort of dialogue is possible w ith non-Christians? If not, how can evidences be used in a presuppositional apologetic?

To some avowed Van T ilians such concerns are superfluous. Evidences are out of the question. All that matters is that the nonbeliever be told that his presuppositions conflict with biblical ones. It is that simple. T he very notion of dialogue w ith non-Christians is suspect, according to this view, particularly if that dialogue relates to em pirical facts. And it is an almost sure sign of faulty apologetic m ethod if such discourse reaches any length, since presumably only a few points need to be made before a presuppositional standoff is achieved.

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8 PR E FA C E

Both friends and foes of Dr. Van T il have commonly attributed this outlook to him. And perhaps that consensus is no more pronounced than in the mistaken assum ption that Van T il allows no room for the use of evidences in defending Christianity.

I describe that assum ption as m istaken because, as we shall see, Van T il has had a surprising am ount of favorable things to say about evidences in his writings over the years. You may not be able to find them all in one discussion or under one cover—not even in his Evidences syllabus. And they are not as systematically presented as is his recurrent argum ent against the misuse of evidence. But they are there. And it is time Van T il be recognized for his appreciation of evidences as they are engaged in a presuppositional apologetic.

My prim ary aim in these pages is to gather the often- forgotten or unnoticed material Van T il has contributed on the proper use of evidence and to view it systematically. While this effort will involve some critique of his rivals, that is only incidental to the positive goal of seeing how evidences and presuppositions work together for Van T il. Only a few sam ple remarks from other authors are presented here as they help us focus on that issue.

Since I am trying to be faithful to Van T il’s system, what I say here is not meant to be entirely new. The most original portions of this book are the discussion of the verification controversy (to w hich Van T il has not expressly spoken) and the exam ination of evidences pertaining to Jesus’ resurrection described in five New Testament passages. Besides these, an effort has been made throughout to avoid simply parroting fam iliar

PR E F A C E 9

V anT ilian slogans. W hile paraphrasing some of his central themes, I hope to place old truths under new light so that some which may have been neglected would receive the attention they merit.

But I should stress that what I am seeking is an originality of expression and application, not an originality of com m itm ent m eant to contrast w ith Van T il’s position. As far as I am concerned, the im plications of his system are so rich and pervasive that there is no need to step outside the framework w ithin which those im plications arise. Perhaps this book will help to make explicit a few concerns im plied in the works of the great Westminster apologist.

A nything like an exhaustive survey of types of Christian evidence is well beyond the scope of this little volume. And while it is not strictly an introduction to apologetics, those who have only dabbled in Van T ilian literature are encouraged to have a go at it. Technical language has been avoided where possible, the worst of which appears w ithin the chapter on verifiability. On the other hand, readers fam iliar with Van T i l ’s vocabulary, but still unclear concerning the role he gives to evidences, m ight find in the material gathered here the answers to their questions.

May we all become better defenders of the Christian faith.

P A R T I

In tro d u c to ry Q ia p te r s

1The Legitimacy of

Evidences

MUCH debate has flourished in the arena of apologetics between those who stress the p rimacy of presuppositions and those who em

phasize the em pirical verifiability of Christianity. On the presuppositionalist side Cornelius Van T il and Gordon Clark are prom inent names along with Rousas Rushdoony and Ronald Nash. W ell-known figures identified as evidentialists include John Warwick Montgomery, J. Oliver Buswell, and Clark Pinnock. Many other names could receive m ention here as siding more or less w ith one or the other position: E. J. Carnell, Gordon Lewis, Bernard Ram m, John Gerstner, Francis Schaeffer, and Norman Geisler are a few. T hough some of these figures are difficult to categorize, their contributions generally lend support to either a presupposh tionalist or an evidentialist persuasion.

W ith the line of opposition drawn between these two camps, it may seem odd to suggest that evidences play a legitimate role w ithin presuppositional apologetics, specifically the apologetics of Cornelius Van T il. Has

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14 THE LEGITIMACY OF EVIDENCES

not Van T il repeatedly spurned the very idea of validating the claims of Scripture on the basis of what he calls “brute facts,” facts whose m eaning supposedly does not depend on G od’s revealed interpretation? If Dr. Van T il has made him self clear on any matter, is it not that the case for Christianity cannot rest on direct appeals to physical evidence either in past history or in our current experience? It would appear that evidences have no place in his system.

On the very first page of his Apologetics syllabus Van T il flatly declares, “It is impossible and useless to seek to vindicate Christianity as a historical religion by a discussion of facts only. ’ ’1 T his sort of remark is typical of Dr. Van T il and can be found almost anywhere in his writings. His followers echo the same fam iliar refrain. Creg Bahnsen, for one, states, “T he gospel. . . does not cater to rebellious m an’s demand for factual signs and logical argum entation that will pass the test of au tonom ous scrutiny.”2 Hear also Jim Halsey:

The Christian can point to nothing outside the Bible for verification of the Bible because the simple fact is that everything outside the Bible derives its meaning from the interpretation given it by the Bible.3

These expressions are strongly rem iniscent of Abraham Kuyper whose influence upon Van T il is well known. Kuyper had said,

Cornelius Van Til, Apologetics (Syllabus, 1971), p. 1.2Greg Bahnsen, “Apologetics,” Foundations of Christian Scholar

ship, ed. Gary North (Vallecito, California: Ross House Books, 1976), p. 209.

3Jim S. Halsey, For a Time Such as This: An Introduction to the Reformed Apologetic of Cornelius Van Til (Philadelphia: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Co., 1976), p. 39.

THE LEGITIMACY OF EVIDENCES 15

When the Theologian stands in the presence of God, and God gives him some explanation of His existence as God, every idea of testing this self-communication of God by something else is absurd; hence, in the absence of such a touchstone, there can be no verification, and consequently no room for criticism.4

To those outside the presuppositionalist tradition, claims like these carry the ring of papal pronouncements and are about as arbitrary. For that reason many wonder how such edicts benefit the cause of Christian apologetics. Far from defending the faith, Van T il and com pany disdain evidence to the extent of defecting from the battle over the Bible’s facticity—or at least that is the way some apologists see it. Clark Pinnock, for one, reads Van T il to say that “because [God] transcends the world, no th ing in the world of factuality is capable of revealing him of itself.” 5 W ith that in mind, Pinnock charges that Van T il “ believes he can begin w ith God and Christianity w ithout consulting objective reality.”6

Pinnock is not alone in his interpretation. There is, of course, John Warwick Montgomery who complains that Van T il “eliminates all possibility of offering a positive dem onstration of the tru th of the Christian view.” 7 And the verdict delivered by Gordon Lewis is that Van T il “ has left the faith defenseless.”8

4Abraham Kuyper, Principles of Sacred Theology, trans. by J. Hendrik DeVries (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1954), p. 251.

5Clark H. Pinnock, “The Philosophy of Christian Evidences,” Jerusalem and Athens, ed. E. R. Geehan (Philadelphia: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Co., 1971), p. 423.

6Ibid., p. 420.7John Warwick Montgqmery, “Once Upon an A Priori,” ibid.,p. 387.8Gordon R. Lewis, “Van Til and Carnell,” ibid., p. 361.

THE LEGITIMACY OF EVIDENCES16

The quotations above from those both for and against Van T il all leave the impression that his system is very firmly anti-evidence. His opponents most expressly and with few exceptions have draw n that conclusion. So then, why speak as though evidences possess some kind of legitimacy w ith in Van T i l ’s apologetics? Has not that com bination been ruled out by the very nature of the presuppositionalist versus evidentialist debate?

Contrary to w hat one m ight expect—especially if one commits the com m on fallacy of reading only segments of Van T i l ’s works and ex trapolating his whole system from a few passages—Van T il has more kind things to say about evidences and the use of reason than may at first meet the eye. An exam ple can be found in the seventh and last summary po in t of his “My Credo” :

. . . we present the message and evidence for the Christian position as clearly as possible, knowing that because man is what the Christian says he is, the non-Christian will be able to understand in an intellectual sense the issues involved.9

In another place, we find Van T il supporting Benjam in Warfield’s claim that “ the C hristian faith is not a blind faith but is faith based on evidence.” 10 With Warfield and Charles Hodge he m aintains that “Christianity meets every legitim ate dem and of reason” and “ is not irrational” but “is capable of rational defense.” 11

9VanTil, “My Credo,” ibid., p. 21.10VanTil,^ Christian Theory oj Know ledge (Philadelphia: Presby

terian and Reformed Publishing Co., 1969), p. 250.HVanTil, Common Grace and the Gospel (Philadelphia: Presby

terian and Reformed Publishing Co., 1972), p. 184.


If these statements sound uncharacteristic of Van Til, it is not because he has lapsed m om entarily into a persuasion which conflicts with his better judgm ent and overall com m itm ent. The fact is that V anTilian apologetics reserves a significant place for evidence, for reason, and (most surprisingly) for theistic proof. As he him self pu t it, “ I do not reject ‘theistic proofs’ but merely insist on form ulating them in such a way as not to compromise the doctrines of Scripture.” 12

But how can this apparently pro-evidence, pro-reason, even pro-proof stance be harmonized with the seemingly anti-evidence posture viewed earlier? T he answer to this question should begin to emerge on closer investigation of those earlier statements.

We first noted that Dr. Van T il saw no use or validity in apologetic discussions “of facts only.”13 * T he word “on ly ” is an im portan t qualifier im plying that factual discussions are not absolutely ruled out but are proper when combined w ith other necessary considerations, namely, Christian presuppositions. Sim ilar qualifiers appear in the statement we looked at from Greg Bahnsen: “T he gospel does not cater to rebellious m an ’s dem and” for evidences and reasons “ that will pass the test of autonom ous scrutiny.” Rather, as Van T il has noted, “Christianity meets every legitimate dem and of reason.”

12Van Til, The Defense of the Faith (Philadelphia: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Co., 1955, 1967), p. 197; A Christian Theory of Knowledge, p. 292.

13A11 italics in this and the following paragraph are my emphasesadded to quotations cited above.


T he com m ent from Jim Halsey is a bit more difficult because the qualifying term is am biguous: “T he Christian can poin t to no th ing outside the Bible for verification of the Bible.” A possible problem is that “outside the Bible” can be construed at least two distinct ways.

In one sense, nearly everything m an experiences is “outside the Bible.” Most things are physically outside the pages of Scripture. It may sound as if none of these items (e.g., trees, stars, m ountains, rain, hum an beings and the countless other objects in the created natural world) jo in in m anifesting the tru th of God. Indeed, that is what many regard Van T il to teach. But in another sense, noth ing m an experiences is “outside the Bible.” Nothing in creation is outside the authority of Scripture.

It is in the second sense, and not the first, that Halsey’s statement should be taken if it is to express Van T il’s viewpoint. W hat Van T il denies is the existence of some sort of autonom ous authority independent of Scripture. Were we to qualify the quotation by Kuyper according to Van T i l ’s position, it w ould likewise read: “ . . . in the absence of such [an autonom ous] touchstone there can be no [independent] verification. . . .” 14

T hus, a certain kind of verification is ruled out. But verification is not disqualified altogether. Inasm uch as

14Some warrant for these interpolations is provided by the context of Kuyper’s statement. There he is discussing the “dependent character for Theology.” Yet Kuyper did not himself make the qualifications I suggest here. And as we shall see in chapter 6, Van Til chose to differ with him specifically with regard to Kuyper’s denial of any sort of theistic proof or verification.


all things come under the authority of Scripture, no th ing is epistemologically or ethically outside the Bible. For that reason, the Christian can po in t to things physically or metaphysically outside the Bible for verification, as long as they are understood in accordance with Scripture’s authority.15 In other words, evidences can operate in keeping w ith what Van T il calls the “selfattestation” of Scripture. But that will be developed more fully later.

Perhaps this m uch has been established so far: that Van T i l ’s presuppositionalism is not designed to forbid the discussion of facts, the use of reason, even the offering of proof or verification. To be sure, facts, reason, and proofs are very frequently m isapplied in apologetics, and Van T il has shown tremendous concern over this problem. But his solution is not to exclude evidential considerations from presuppositional apologetics. He writes:

I do not artificially separate induction from deduction, or reasoning about the facts of nature from reasoning in a priori analytical fashion about the nature of humanconsciousness. On the contrary, I see induction and analytical reasoning as part of one process of interpretation.

This rather cryptic remark becomes clearer as one reads on:

I would therefore engage in historical apologetics. (I do not personally do a great deal of this because my col-

15I incorporate the language of an epistemological/metaphysical distinction in order to suggest that the two senses of “outside the Bible” are closely related to Van T il’s contrast between epistemological common ground and metaphysical common ground.


leagues in the other departments of the Seminary in which I teach are doing it better than I could do it.) Every bit of historical investigation . . . is bound to confirm the truth of the claims of the Christian position. But I would not talk endlessly about facts and more facts without ever challenging the non-believer’s philosophy of fact.16

The two, therefore, m ust go together—induction and deduction, facts and the philosophy of facts, evidences and presuppositions.17 Just as there may be a “legitimate demand of reason,” there clearly is a legitimate place for evidences in V anTilian apologetics. The following chapters will attem pt to specify what that place is.

16Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, p. 199.17The name “evidentialist” as opposed to “presuppositionalist” is

recognized as misleading when you see that there is no necessary conflict between Christian evidences and Christian presuppositions.

2Evidences, Apologetics

and Theology

DEBATES over the use of evidences characteristically reflect dissenting views concerning the definition of apologetics. It is generally accepted

that the study of evidences belongs w ithin the parameters of apologetics. W hat is not so readily agreed upon is the relationship of apologetics to systematic theology.

This is more than a merely academic controversy. If apologetics is not dependent on the findings of systematic theology, then the apologist is free to endorse an unspecified concept of God before moving on to urging belief in the God of Scripture. But will Scripture allow us to begin by defending no God in particular? Or must apologetics from the start confine itself to the defense of what the Bible teaches? Just how much overlap of systematics and apologetics is necessary?

The above question comes to bear specifically upon our understanding of evidences, since evidences fall w ithin the boundary of apologetics. It asks, in effect, To what extent do evidences require a theological base? For

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22 EVIDENCES, APOLOGETICS, AND THEOLOGY

an answer to this question we will focus attention briefly on the range and purpose of Christian apologetics. If the next few pages seem a bit tedious, have courage—they will help the rest of the book flow more easily.

According to Van T il, “Apologetics is the vindication of the Christian philosophy of life against the various forms of the non-Christian philosophy of life.” 1 Inasm uch as apologetics examines philosophies of life it is a comprehensive concern. To be sure, apologetics aims more specifically at vindicating Christian theism. But Van T il sharply denies any illusion that theism can properly be considered w ithout at least some attention being given to the other Christian doctrines. With War- field, Van T il opposes the view that apologetics is concerned merely with “ the m in im um of Christianity.” In Warfield’s words, “W hat apologetics has to do with is certainly not any 'm in im u m / but just Christianity itself____”2

Apologetics is an embracive discipline for Van T il because “Christian theism is a u n it.”3 “We are not interested in discussing the existence of a God the nature of whom we do not know.”4 And as soon as we begin to elaborate upon G od’s nature, we enter into a discussion of other Christian doctrines—not only the doctrine of

Wan Til, Apologetics, p. I.2Benjamin B. Warfield, “Introductory Note,’’ in Francis R. Beattie,

Apologetics, Vol. I (Richmond: The Presbyterian Committee of Publication, 1903), p. 31.

Wan Til, Apologetics, p. 1.4Ibid., p. 5.

EVIDENCES, APOLOGETICS, AND THEOLOGY 23

God, but also the doctrines of man, Christ, salvation, the church, the last things, indeed all the foci of systematic theology.

If theism carries direct implications for all of theology, the apologetic task is really a defense of the whole system of Christianity, not just theism in its barest form. T hus conceived, apologetics becomes the shared concern of every theological department. It is not as though one departm ent engages in a form al defense of the faith while the others deal w ith the content of biblical teaching. Van T il states it clearly, “ . . . defense and positive statement go hand in hand.”5 All the various theological departments w ith their specific teachings are enlisted in the apologetic battle. Explains Van T il, “Every attack upon one of these is an attack upon the whole system of truth as we hold it.”6

Thus, for Van T il, apologetics is an extremely broad concern, as broad as the entire field of theology. In turn, theology itself is by no means a narrow field of study. If God had addressed His revealed Word to only a small range or segment of m an’s experience, theology would then be limited accordingly. But to suggest that theology is a confined discipline alongside many diverse non- theological disciplines is to imply that God does not speak with authority to all of life. Are not even the studies of biology, psychology, history, and so on, governed by biblical principles and thereby extensions of theology? T hat seems to be Van T il’s view: “The Bible is

5Ibid., p. 3.Wan Til, Christian-Theistic Evidences (Syllabus, 1961), p. ii.


thought of as authoritative on everything of which it speaks. Moreover, it speaks of everything . . . either directly or by im plication.”7

If theology entails m an’s application of Scripture to every part of life, and the field of apologetics is as wide as that of theology, then the apologetic arena spans all experience and every discipline.8 Like theology, apologetics draws attention to the m anifold responsibilities that grow out of G od’s authoritative revelation, responsibilities which touch every m oment of hum an experience. In short, Christian apologetics has universal dimensions. It concerns nothing less than a total world view. T hat is why Van T il describes apologetics in terms of a conflict between philosophies of life.

But what is it that distinguishes apologetics from the study of theology? A helpful approach to this question has been submitted by John Frame who currently teaches apologetics at Westminster Seminary. He suggests that apologetics and theology be viewed as distinct perspectives on the same body of truths. W hile both disciplines involve the application of Scripture to all of life, the distinct focus of apologetics is its application of Scripture

7VanTil, Apologetics, p. 2.8My indebtedness to John Frame, Van T il’s successor at Westminster

Seminary, would not be a very well kept secret. Here I accept his definition of theology as the “application of God’s word by persons to all areas of life.” While some may object to the notion of theology as "application,” I believe it is strictly in accordance with the Van Tilian correlation between epistemology and ethics. The warrant for Frame’s definition will not be spelled out in this volume, though it is strongly implied in later chapters regarding the covenantal framework for knowledge.

A


to challenges and controversies. As theology, apo logetics has everything to do w ith the doctrines of the faith. But as distinct from theology, it focuses on the defense of the faith. Again, defense and positive statement do not exclude each other. According to Frame, “The difference between the two [apologetics and systematic theology] in practice . . . becomes a difference in emphasis rather than of subject matter.”9

In order to fill out the picture, it could be added parenthetically that Christian ethics and witnessing also provide distinct perspectives on theology and apologetics (not to m ention Jay Adams’s “nou thetic” counseling, which is Van T ilian to its core). Frame views ethics to be theology emphasizing m an’s obligations. I would add that ethics and apologetics overlap most explicitly in the area of elenctics, the study of m an’s moral obligation to believe.

As for witnessing, the focus is on the application of Scripture to Christian character lived before an unsaved world. In effect, witnessing is Christian character on display, exhibited in word and deed. The correlation between ethics and witnessing should be obvious: Christian character m ust develop in keeping with biblical obligations. But there may be some confusion over the relationship between apologetics and witnessing. Are the two related as pre-evangelism to evangelism, d la Clark Pinnock?10 Not according to Van T il—he sees no

9Iohn Frame, Van Til: TheTheologian (Phillipsburg, NT: Pilgrim Publishing Co., 1976), p.4.

10Pinnock, Set Forth Your Case (Nutley, N. J.: Craig Press, 1967), p. 8.


sharp distinction between witnessing and the defense of the faith.11 As for the distinction between apologetics and witness, I am inclined to describe it as this: apologetics is something the Christian does; witness is something the Christian is.12

John Frame has coined the term “perspectivalism” to describe these various relations. T he approach he has developed seems to provide an accurate picture of how Van T il views such closely knit concerns.

Summarizing what has been said so far in this chapter, I have noted that Van T il regards the defense of the faith to be inseparable from the presentation of scriptural dogma. Apologetics and theology are interdependent. T his fact, coupled with Frame’s emphasis on theology as application, gives both theology and apologetics an enormous range. But what is most im portant for this discussion is that the study of apologetics can at no point be extended beyond the governing principles of theology, not if it is rightly to be called Christian apologetics.

From what has preceded, it should be clear by now that, for Van T il, the study of evidences, as “a sub-

nVanTil, Response to Frederick R. Howe’s “Kerygma and Apologia,” Jerusalem and Athens, ed. E. R. Geehan (Philadelphia: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Co., 1971), p. 452.

12I do not suggest that doing is ruled out of witness. I believe, however, the primary focus is that one is constituted a witness. For example, in Acts 22:14, 15, Ananias says to Paul, “The God of our fathers has appointed you to know His will, and to see the Righteous One, and to hear an utterance from His mouth. For you will he a witness for Him to all men of what you have seen and heard.” Do not Christ’s words make a similar point in Matthew 4:19?: “Follow Me, and I will make you fishers of men.” Note also Acts 1:8: “. . . and you shall be My witnesses. . . .”


division of apologetics,” also requires a theological base.13

Those who are at odds w ith Dr. Van T i l ’s position make every effort to disconnect apologetics and evidences from theology. Says John Warwick Montgomery, “Apologetics must never be confused with systematic theology. . . ” 14 Likewise, E. J. Carnell declares, “Statement and defense . . . are not the same thing. Statement draws on theology; defense draws on apologetics.” 15 As we have seen, Pinnock restricts apologetics to the area of “pre-evangelism,” while theology is reserved for the actual evangelistic task. And in a similar vein, “Apologetics and Christian evidences are not the gospel,” says Bernard Ram m, “but if a m an has a prejudice against the gospel it is the function of apologetics and evidences to remove that prejudice.” 16

Zealous as these men are to insulate evidences and apologetics from theology, Van T il would argue that theirs is a zeal not according to knowledge; no such division is possible. Christian evidences, like Christian apologetics, require a particular interpretation, namely, a Christian one.

It rem ains to be seen in w hat ways the study of evidences differs from the broader discipline of apologetics.

13VanTil, Christian-Theistic Evidences, p. i.14Montgomery, “Once Upon an A Priori,” p. 391.15Edward John Carnell, The Case for Orthodox Theology (Phila

delphia: The Westminster Press, 1959), p. 13, cited by Gordon R. Lewis, “Van Til and Carnell,” p. 349.

16Bernard Ramm, Protestant Christian Evidences (Chicago: Moody Press, 1953, 1967), p. 15.


Again it is helpful to call upon John Frame’s perspectival approach, which regards the two studies to be distinct in emphasis or focus. Both disciplines constitute the defense of the faith. But, as Van T il sees it, they are distinguished in that “evidences deals largely w ith the historical while apologetics deals largely with the philosophical aspect.”17 Elsewhere he submits this definition: “Christian-theistic evidences is . . . the defense of Christian theism against any attack that may be made upon it by ‘science.’ ” 18 Here Van T il is using “science” in a wide sense. He adds that “ in evidences it is prim arily the factual question with which we deal.” 19

We may conclude from this that the study of Christian evidences, as understood by Van T il, is apologetics focusing on matters of fact. In other words, evidences is the application of Scripture to controversies prim arily of a factual nature.

Now that we have seen the general relationship between evidences and these various disciplines, the rem ainder of this book will aim to show in more detail how evidences operate in presuppositional apologetics. Some specific questions w hich will require attention are these: In w hat sense are evidences “know n” by non- Christians? W hat barriers m ust be overcome in order to come to an appreciation of the evidences? W hat exactly qualifies as evidence for the C hristian faith? How does one use evidence in accordance with Dr. Van T i l ’s system? T he next two m ajor sections deal w ith these and other closely related concerns.

17VanTil, Apologetics, p. 2.18VanTil, Christian-Theistic Evidences, p. i.19Ibid.

P A R T I I

K now ledge and m e v en an ta l F ram ew o rk

3Two Senses of

“Knowing”

^ > |H E study of evidences owes its complexity partlyto the fact that there are two contrasting senses in which one may know the truth of God. W hen

you read Van T il you find him saying time and again that depraved sinners cannot know or understand what is spiritually discerned. And yet, just as often it seems that Van T il is intensely concerned to point out that the unbeliever rebels precisely against what is know n to him, that which he understands and cannot deny. Unless you realize that Van T il has in m ind two senses of knowing, you can become very frustrated trying to sort out these two kinds of statements.

If there are two senses in which a person may know God’s truth, that will have im plications for the study of evidences. It will become necessary to ask in which way the facts are known and understood by sinners and whether such knowledge is of the sort that the apologist calls for men to embrace. We will need to consider what conditions m ust hold true in order for men to know and understand evidences in the manner required by Scripture.

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32 TWO SENSES OF “KNOWING”

Unless attention is given to these distinct ways of knowing, the knowledge we im part in the presentation of factual evidences may never live up to what the Bible demands.

W hat sort of distinction does Van T il draw between the two types of knowledge? As he sees it, the line of contrast is an ethical one. Man “knows God as Paul says so specifically in his letter to the Romans. . . . Yet ethically he does not know God.”1 Although knowledge is ordinarily considered a strictly epistemological concern, Van T il merges epistemology with ethics: . . by the sinner’s epistemological reaction I mean his reaction as an ethically responsible creature of God.”2 Knowing is an ethical process.

A crucial underlying principle for Van T il is that man is a ‘'covenant personality.”3 In the Bible a covenant is a binding contract issued by a sovereign to his subjects, involving obligations expressed in promises and solemn warnings. Ever since m an was created he has owed undivided allegiance to his Creator. Man belongs to God. He is meant to be subject to the sovereign Lord. And the Lord has revealed to man the ethical requirements that would issue in life if obeyed, death if disobeyed.

Such obligations extend to all of behavior and thought so that all of m an’s life may be characterized as covenantal. In fact, man is personally confronted with the Lord of the covenant—His divine character and His holy w ill—in all

Wan Til, A Christian Theory of Knowledge, p. 245.2Ibid., p. 293.Wan Til, Common Grace and the Gospel, p. 69. See also Van Til,

The Defense of the Faith, p. 152; A Survey of Christian Epistemology(Syllabus, 1932, 1969), p. 98.

TWO SENSES OF “KNOWING” 33

of creation. As Van T il maintains, ‘‘God is m an’s ultimate environment. . . .”4 The surrounding presence of God’s person makes it impossible for man to take a ‘‘moral holiday.” ‘‘Always and everywhere, in whatever he does and thinks as a scientist, philosopher, or theologian, whether learned or unlearned, man acts either as a covenant-keeper or a covenant-breaker.”5

Van T il seems to have two ideas in m ind when he includes knowledge under the heading of ethical or covenantal obligation to God. Obviously he wants to say that men ought to know God. They are responsible to acknowledge the existence of the Creator and Lord. But a second and far more complex idea is related to this first one. It is not only that men ought to know God. All men do know God. The problem is that sinners do not know God as they ought. T hat failure is not confined to ‘‘religious” knowledge—as if religion were a limited segment of one’s life and thought. Sinners fail to know God as they ought in reference to all items of knowledge.

Knowing is therefore an ethical matter because all knowledge—all thought—entails obligation. “Every act of m an’s consciousness is moral in the most comprehensive sense of that term,” says Van T il.6 For Adam, “every fact was the bearer of a requirement.”7

4VanTil, The Defense of the Faith, p. 42.Wan Til, Response to Jack B. Rogers’s “Van Til and Warfield on

Scripture in the Westminster Confession,” Jerusalem and Athens, ed. E. R. Geehan (Philadelphia: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Co., 1971), p. 167. See also Van Til, Apologetics, p. 26.

Wan Til, “Nature and Scripture,” The Infallible Word, ed. Paul Woolley (Philadelphia: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Co., 1946), p. 274.

Wan Til, Common Grace and the Gospel, p. 72.


Facts reveal the will of God. The question of importance is whether man, in his thought life, accepts or rejects God’s will. His knowledge either accords with divine requirements or it does not. It is characterized by either obedience or disobedience, submission or rebellion, wisdom or folly, spiritual discernment or ignorance. Man is a covenant-keeper whose knowledge honors God, or he is a covenant-breaker who knows, yet does not know as he ought. One way or the other, men do know God and are deeply responsible for what they know.

Van T il enumerates several specific items of knowledge of which even the remotest heathen is aware: for example, that God is the Creator of the world, that the world is controlled by God’s providence, that the world manifests a certain nonsaving grace of God, that man is responsible for evil, that there is the need for God’s special grace, and that m an’s failure to recognize God results in eternal punishm ent.8

On this matter Dr. Van T il sets himself clearly apart from most other apologists. They do not commonly hold the natural man accountable for actually possessing this much knowledge. In less specific terms than Van T il uses they will say, as Clark Pinnock says, that every man has certain “moral motions which he can no more eradicate than fly.’’9 T hat is true. Or they may sound very much like Van T il when they explain that sinners willfully reject the otherwise clear evidence. Bernard Ramm, for example, comments that the problem of Christianity’s truthfulness

8VanTil, An Introduction to Systematic Theology (Syllabus, 1971), pp. 79-80.

9Pinnock, Set Forth Your Case, p. 32.


is complicated by the “moral and spiritual disposition of the thinker.’’10 Pinnock agrees that unbelief is “due to m an’s willful autonomy and refusal to bow before the living God.’’11 And Paul Feinberg, a comrade of Montgomery, explains that “ the difficulty is not with the evidence but with a rebellious will,” and that “religious epistemology is related to human volition.”12

These men will grant both that knowledge is in some sense an ethical matter and that certain conclusions persistently suggest themselves to the nonbeliever. But it would be out of character for a Pinnock or a Montgomery to list the items of knowledge that Van T il specifies the sinner indeed knows. As we have seen, these and other opponents to Van T il’s method have denied the close connection between theology and apologetics. Hence, their defense of God is stated in much less explicit terms. Content first to talk about God in the most general categories, they seem reluctant to root the unbeliever’s responsibility in the knowledge he actually holds concerning God’s revealed character.

But as I have noted, Van T il’s method is distinguished in that he affirms sinners do know the Creator God—the One who is holy, who is gracious, who controls the un iverse, who punishes the wicked. Along with Paul in Romans 1:20, Van T il reminds us often that God’s “invisible attributes, His eternal power and divine nature, have

10Ramm, Protestant Christian Evidences, p. 250.1‘Pinnock, Set Forth Your Case, p. 76.12Paul D. Feinberg, “History: Public or Private? A Defense of John

Warwick Montgomery’s Philosophy of History,” Christian Scholar’s Review, 1, No. 4 (1971), 331.


been clearly seen, being understood through what has been made.” And with David in Psalm 19:1, he sees the heavens telling of the “glory of God.”

If all men are aware of the glory, the attributes, the eternal power and divine nature of God, as these verses plainly say, in what sense do sinners know and understand these things? They know in “an intellectual sense,” says Van T il in “My Credo.”13 They have what he calls “ theoretically correct” or “formally correct” knowledge about G od.14 “Granted that those who are covenant-breakers may in a restricted and limited sense see things for what they are,” Van T il explains, “they see all these things, in the final sense, out of context.”15 In other words, while sinners know the truth of God, that knowledge isn’t all that it should be. It is not knowledge embraced by the total man. It is knowledge cut away from its source and framework, emptied of its full significance and confined to a distorted intellectual realm.

By speaking of knowledge in an “intellectual sense,” Van T il does not mean for a moment that knowledge can ever be an ethically neutral matter. T he point is that the sinner will make every effort to evade the ethical implications of the facts. He will somehow attem pt to hold the truth and, at the same time, suppress the covenantal significance of the truth. It is an impossible task and innumerable tensions arise.

The sinner is caught in an approach-avoidance conflict.

13VanTil, “My Credo,” p.21.14VanTil, The Defense of the Faith, p. 17; A Christian Theory of

Knowledge, p.296.15VanTil, Christianity in Conflict, II (Syllabus, 1962), 10.


Since he is the image of God, he is constantly reminded of his need of the One who created him. To deny God and His truth would be literal suicide. Man needs the truth, if only for his own survival. Yet at the same time the sinner will do anything to avoid the implications of the facts all around him. He is set against God’s truth as a matter of principle. Thus he can neither avoid the truth nor accept it for what it is. Desperately he tries to accept the truth for what it is not. The result is that his whole life is an oscillation between the clearly revealed facts and his self- deluding fiction.

Knowledge in an “intellectual sense” contrasts with proper knowledge in that the former refuses to bow to the covenant Lord. Abraham Kuyper located the fundamental problem: “. . . you can receive no knowledge of God when you refuse to receive your knowledge of H im in absolute dependence upon Him .”16 Whereas the Christian’s knowledge is self-consciously dependent, the non-Christian’s knowledge pretends to be independent of God.

Knowledge in an “intellectual sense” lacks the fear of the Lord, which is thebeginning of knowledge (Prov. 1:7). It fails to love God with all of the mind (Matt. 6:24). It does not honor God as God, or give thanks (Rom. 1:21). It is not the “full, accurate, living, or practical knowledge” that Charles Hodge notes Paul to equate with righteousness and holiness (Col. 3:10; Eph. 4:24).17 And since it lacks all of these ingredients essential to genuine biblical knowledge, it is called “knowledge” in a provisional sense

16Kuyper, Principles of Sacred Theology, p.252.17Charles Hodge, Systematic Theology, II (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Wm.

B. Eerdmans, 1973), 100, cited by Van Til, A Defense of the Faith, p. 75.

38 TWO SENSES OF “KNOWING’’

of the term, accenting the sinner’s responsibility to love and submit to the Lord of truth. Ideally, “. . . what is meant by knowing God in Scripture is knowing and loving God,” says Van Til; “this is true knowledge of God: the other is false.”18

It should not be thought, however, that the sinner’s knowledge is of no consequence. His knowledge leaves him “without excuse” (Rom. 1:20). And though such knowledge is a twisted fiction, like all fiction it must borrow heavily from fact. It is what Van T il commonly refers to as “borrowed capital.”

Van Til does not at all deny that “the world may discover much truth w ithout owning Christ as Truth.”19 * But he calls such truth “borrowed” because it is lifted out of its proper context and emptied of its intended meaning.

Ideally, to know something is to know how it relates to other things—to know what it is for, where it is from, what obligations I have concerning it, what is its worth, what it signifies. The non-Christian scientist will give intellectual assent to all sorts of truth statements. But he will not be able to provide any ultimate explanation of the facts in terms of these relationships. The more explanation he gives, the more it will be seen that his interpretation runs counter to G od’s.

For example, as any scientist knows, apples come from trees and are normally good for eating. But where do apple trees come from? Ultimately the secular scientist will say that trees are a product of evolution, that is,

18VanTil, A Defense of the Faith, p. 17.19VanTil, The Case for Calvinism (Philadelphia: Presbyterian and

Reformed Publishing Co., 1964), p. 147.

TWO SENSES OF “KNOWING’’ 39

chance. In other words, apple trees are not designed by God. Thus, for the nonbeliever, apples are Creator- denying apples: to really understand apples is to deny the biblical concept of God; apples prove that the God of Scripture does not exist, and each apple is an evidence against such a God. Ultimately, the nonexistence of God becomes part of the definition of apples.

Of course, the non-Christian rarely states the matter this strongly. He prefers to soften his expressions of rebellion against God in order to project an unbiased profile. At bottom, however, the stance of the nonbeliever is not unlike the portrayal I give it here. And as he is pressed to provide an ultimate interpretation of facts, he will voice increasingly explicit anti-Christian sentiments. Yes, even his definition of apples is affected because he defines all the terms of his experience on the basis of atheistic presuppositions.

According to the two senses of knowing, the nonbelieving scientist both knows and fails to know about apples. He has knowledge from God and of God, yet that knowledge is suppressed in ungodliness. He has truth, yet he holds that truth in untruth. What is evident about God is not accepted as evidence for God. Inventing an interpretation contrary to the significance God has im planted in the world, the sinner turns fact into fiction.

W hen Van Til says that sinners do not understand the deepest significance of any fact, he is talking about no m inor difficulty. An apologist may be tempted to minimize this problematic; he may think he can go right ahead and build upon the sinner’s partial knowledge. He forgets, though, that the sinner’s knowledge is borrowed knowledge; it has been wrenched away from the only episte-


mological and ethical base upon which a Christian understanding can be built. Even the best build ing materials will collapse on a faulty foundation.

But does that mean the apologist may never appeal to the “ theoretically” or “form ally” correct ideas of the nonbeliever? Is there no poin t of contact between C hristian and non-Christian thought?

Since m an remains the image of God, the truth is not totally obliterated by sin. There is a point of contact, and appeals to borrowed knowledge can be effective— under one condition: The nonbeliever’s borrowed knowledge can serve as building blocks of a genuine understanding only when his debased edifice of interpretation is abandoned in favor of the bedrock of Christian presuppositions. As the sinful structure is challenged and forsaken, borrowed truths are returned to their rightful place and significance. Only then does a m an come to know God as he ought. “ If there is no head-on collision w ith the systems of the natural m an,” writes Van Til, “ there will be no po in t of contact with the sense of deity in the natural m an .”20

So w ithou t denying that sinners possess actual knowledge of God, Van T il insists that such an aw areness represents no advance tow ard biblical knowledge if grounded in nonbiblical presuppositions. True knowledge is for the purpose of glorifying God. Any knowledge that disregards that end misses the m ark completely. T he glory of God is no secondary or optional matter.

i

20VanTil, The Defense of the Faith, p. 99.


Dr. Van T il has advanced a dual emphasis which few apologists have been w illing to accept. He has said both that sinners have a wealth of knowledge about God and the world and that sinners know noth ing as they ought. Plenty of apologists have noted that sinners possess some knowledge of a God and rebel against the truth. But few have recognized that rebellion as the great obstacle it is, as if the sinner’s knowledge were merely incom plete.21 Very few apologists are w illing to follow Van T i l ’s twofold stress to its fruition. They seem to th ink it will run them into an insoluble dilemma.

T he fact of the m atter is that Van T i l ’s dual emphasis drives home a crucial apologetic point: since the God of Scripture has so clearly revealed to sinners His truth, and yet men strive to distort it beyond the point of recognition, m an’s problem of know ing therefore centers on his rebellion against the covenant Lord. The C hristian apologist m ust confront men w ith the claims of that Lord.

At every m om ent G od’s natural revelation declares His glory to men. Yet the unbeliever wages perennial warfare by twisting each fact of that revelational flow as it comes to mind. He can never completely rid himself of the knowledge that continually arises. He can never step outside the covenantal context in which he was

21B. B. Warfield wrote in the “Introductory Note” to Beattie’s Apologetics, p. 28, “Sinful and sinless men are, after all, both men; and being both men, are fundamentally alike and know fundamentally alike.” See also Montgomery, “Once Upon an A Priori,” p. 390: “. . . the Fall did not render Adam incapable of comprehending a word from God.”

42 TWO SENSES OF ‘ KNOWING’’

created. With the rem inders of G od’s person surrounding him , he tries nevertheless to cast God out of remembrance.22 But, as Van T il observes, “Deep down in his m ind every man knows that he is the creature of God and responsible to God. Every man, at bottom , knows that he is a covenant-breaker.’’23

22VanTil, The Defense of the Faith, p. 95. 23VanTil, Apologetics, p. 57.

4What about

Epistemological Neutrality?

CHRISTIAN knowledge and non-Christian knowledge were sharply contrasted in the previous chapter. But there may still be a question whether

it is possible for a sinner to suspend disbelief or adopt a neutral standpoin t from which the claims of Scripture can be evaluated and then accepted or rejected.

A word from Clark Pinnock takes us to the heart of the issue: “T he basis on which we rest our defense of the gospel consists of evidence open to all investigators.’’1 T hat kind of statem ent is guaranteed to stir up fast and sometimes furious contention am ong apologists. A typically Van T ilian retort m ight be: “ Yes, but are all investigators open to the evidence?’’ P innock’s claim could easily be laid aside in such short order. But for our purposes a longer look would be worthwhile, because the topic of “openness’’ is central to the question of neutrality.

43

JPinnock, Set Forth Your Case, p. 44.

44 WHAT ABOUT EPISTEMOLOGICAL NEUTRALITY?

Are the evidences “open to all investigators”? There are really two issues involved: one has to do w ith the openness of the investigator; the other has to do with the openness of the evidence. Van T il’s followers have been quick to address themselves to the former issue by denying that sinful investigators are genuinely open. But they have not been nearly so prolific concerning the openness of evidences.

W hat do we mean by the openness of evidences? In the previous chapter Dr. Van T il was seen to have placed great stress on the fact that many things are know n by sinful men, things that are clearly seen and evident to all. Van T il addresses such clarity under the heading of the “perspicuity of natural revelation.”2 H is po in t is that the basic truths about God are plain facts, they are obvious, and the evidences are open to all men.

To be true to Van T il, one cannot very well deny the openness of the evidences. “O pen ,” in this sense, means “apparen t” or simply “evident.” Only when “open” means “neu tral” or “noncom m ittal” does Van T il reject the supposed openness of investigators. P innock’s statement about “evidence open to all investigators” can be very confusing due to this ambiguity. Very clearly, what Van T il denies is “openness” in the sense of epistem ological neutrality.

There may not seem to be anything distinctive about that denial. Do not all Christian apologists charge the sinner w ith prejudice against the truth? W ho would

2Van Til, Apologetics, p. 34. See also p. 35 where Van Til speaks of the “objective perspicuity of nature.”

WHAT ABOUT EPISTEMOLOGICAL NEUTRALITY? 45

allow that sinners are completely unbiased toward G od’s Word? No one who takes sin seriously.

Yet there is no difficulty lin ing up opponents to Van T i l ’s view that certain Christian presuppositions are necessary in order for one to embrace the truth. We have seen that Clark Pinnock is one such adversary. Nevertheless, we find Pinnock now and then speaking out against “ the m yth of neutrality” and m an’s supposed “godlike objectivity.”3 One has to wonder how Pinnock, on the one hand, can deny the sinner’s neutrality and yet, on the other hand, not favor Christian presuppositionalism as the remedy for the sinner’s prejudice against God.

Perhaps Dr. Pinnock believes sinners are capable of a provisional neutrality—something less than absolute neutrality and godlike objectivity, yet not hopelessly subjective or biased. If nonbelievers are not as objective as they ought to be, maybe the apologist’s job is precisely th a t—to urge sinners toward neutrality. Given that concept of apologetics, Pinnock is not likely to view presuppositionalism as the solution. It, too, falls short of genuine objectivity. Van T il’s presuppositionalism , in particular, assumes Christianity “w ithout consulting objective reality,” says Pinnock.4 To prom ote real objectivity, the apologist m ust shrewdly coax sinners into a somewhat neutral halfway house. And then, once this task of pre-evangelism has been accomplished, the nonbeliever is ready to assimilate the gospel w ithout m uch resistance.

3Pinnock, Set Forth Your Case, p. 35.4Pinnock, “The Philosophy of Christian Evidences,” p. 420.


T hat, at least, is the way P innock and Ramm seem to view it. They, along with J. W. Montgomery, seem to believe that the case for C hristianity can be brought before a neutral court. It is not that they say the sinner is unbiased. But they imply that the sinful person can first be reasoned in to a more neutral frame of mind, w hereupon he is friendlier toward the gospel. In this m anner they stop short of requiring a complete overhaul of the sinner’s epistemology. What they seem to allow is that the natural m an is only relatively biased and confused, but that he can still arrive at a genuine understanding before coming all the way over to Christian presuppositions.

By the same token, Montgomery and others devaluate presuppositions and place the m axim um emphasis on presenting the facts themselves. If you argue that facts sire meaningless w ithout their proper interpretation, M ontgomery’s ready response is this: “The facts in themselves provide adequate criteria for choosing among variant interpretations of them .’’5 So, for Montgomery, the facts speak for themselves.

M ontgomery’s motive is clear. He does not want to “naively assume the ‘inspiration’ or ‘infallibility’ of the New Testament records and then by circular reasoning attempt to prove what we have previously assumed.’’ He intends to treat the New Testament “only as documents.’’6

5Montgomery, “Clark’s Philosophy of History,’’ The Philosophy of Gordon H. Clark, ed. Ronald Nash (Philadelphia: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Co.. 1968), p. 375.

6Montgomery, History and Christianity (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 1964, 1965), p. 25.


A sim ilar course had been taken by Benjamin Warfield many years earlier. He did not want to “found the whole Christian system upon the doctrine of plenary inspiration.’’ Instead, the Scriptures must first be proven “authentic, historically credible, generally trustworthy, before we prove them inspired.’’7 Warfield acknowledged that one must take his standpoint “not above the Scriptures, but in the Scriptures.’’ Yet he added, “. . . surely he must first have Scripture, authenticated to him as such, before he can take his standpoint in them .’’8

O ur understanding of the facts does not rely on prior theological commitments, according to this view. Presuppositions about the inspiration or infallibility of Scripture only beg the question, so it is argued. The facts must be allowed to decide the issue on their own merit. Dr. Ramm adds,

If there are errors in Scripture or if there are no errors in Scripture is essentially a factual question, not a theological one. And therefore this issue is going to be settled eventually by empirical, factual studies and not by theological presuppositions.9

But is it true that the facts speak for themselves? What could Montgomery mean when he says the facts provide adequate criteria for their interpretation?

7Warfield, “The Real Problem of Inspiration,” The Inspiration and Authority of the Bible, ed. Samuel G. Craig (Philadelphia: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Co., 1948), p. 210.

8Warfield, “Introductory Note,” p. 24.9Ramm, “The Relationship of Science, Factual Statements and the

Doctrine of Biblical Inerrancy,” Journal of the American Scientific Affiliation, 21, No. 4 (December, 1969), 102.


My sympathies lie w ith Ronald Nash who finds that to be a puzzling notion. M ontgomery’s view is too simplistic, says Nash. We do not merely “discover” the facts of history “out there,” as M ontgomery w ould lead us to believe. We “reconstruct” the past.10 Nash explains, “There is no such th ing as a fact apart from some interpretation and some im puted significance.” 11 He offers this vivid illustration: A father takes his young son to a baseball game in which a player hits a timely home run. The father is ecstatic, whereas the son who is puzzled by all the excitement asks, “W hat happened?” Do both father and son witness the same fact?

A “yes and no” answer is possible. Both father and son are eyewitnesses. Each watches a hanging curveball travel from the pitcher to the batter and thence into the right field seats. But only the father perceives a home run. T he son does not understand the rules of the game or the gam e’s significance w ith in the schedule. In order for the son to re-cognize the fact of a home run , he must first cognize the significance of the visual phenom ena, in tegrating it into m eaningful whole. Unless this takes place, the son may leave the ball park insisting he never saw a hom e run, even though he had witnessed the visual phenom ena necessary for one.

T he po in t of this illustration is expressed concisely by Van T il: “The hum an m ind as the know ing subject makes its contribution to the knowledge it ob tains.” 12

10Ronald H. Nash, “The Use and Abuse of History in Christian Apologetics,” Christian Scholar's Review, 1, No. 3 (1971), 224.

nIbid., p. 223.12VanTil, The Defense of the Faith, p. 67.


Thus, if there is any sense in which facts speak for themselves, it is lim ited by the contribution of the knowing subject.

I would suggest there is a sense in which the facts themselves speak. If, with Van Til, we insist that there are no “brute facts,” then all facts are significant because God made them to fit a particular interpretation. That is to say, all facts signify something. They signify God’s truth. As Van Til comments, “For any fact to be a fact at all it must be a revelational fact.”13 That is the character of general revelation. T he facts of the natural world, including m an, do suggest a particular in terpretation, namely, G od’s, and none other. We may even go so far as to say, w ith Van T il, that m an’s knowledge can be objective: “ If the Christian position with respect to creation . . . is true, there is and m ust be objective knowledge.” 14 Such objectivity, however, should not be confused with neutrality. Objective knowledge depends on G od’s prior interpretation of the objects.15

So, the facts do speak. They do have objective significance. But it is m isleading to say w ithout qualification that the facts provide criteria for their interpretation. To begin with, general revelation was never meant to be understood apart from special revelation. Even before the Fall, Adam and Eve received the two forms in conjunction. As Van T il notes, “ . . . G od’s revelation in nature was from the outset of history m eant to be taken

13VanTil, Apologetics, p. 36.14VanTil, The Defense of the Faith, p. 43. 15Ibid.


conjointly with G od’s supernatural com m unication.”16 You cannot disregard the one and still appreciate the other for what it is.

Furthermore, since sin entered the world, our need for special revelation is even greater. T he presence of sin has made the task of interpreting the facts m uch more complex. As clear as general revelation may be, the sinner, in his rebellion against the revealer of truth, will not accept what the facts clearly signify. O n the contrary, the contribution that the nonbeliever makes to the know ing process is not one that is am enable to what the facts say.

It is not enough to say that the facts speak for themselves. True, the facts speak. But the sinner will not listen.17 Not only does the non-Christian fail to m aintain a neutral outlook, but in doing so he subscribes to an absolute autonomy in his epistemology. Van Til traces the source of this error: “Facts and the tru th about their relationship to one another can be known by man, Satan contended in effect, w ithout getting any information about them from God as their maker and controller.”18

It is for this reason that Dr. Van T il, in contrast to his critics, invariably turns the apologetic discussion back to the matter of presuppositions. T hough Pinnock and others acknowledge the proclivity of sinners toward disbelief, they underestimate the controling effect of that

16Van Til, Apologetics, p. 34; See also Van Til, Common Grace and the Gospel, p. 69.

17Van Til, Apologetics, p. 93.18Ibid., p. 10.


sinful rebellion upon one’s ability to perceive the factual evidences. Dr. Pinnock still seems to believe that the nonbeliever can arrive at some genuine understanding of the truth before giving in to Christian presuppositions.

But to those who hold such a view, Van T il offers this sobering warning: If we accommodate a supposedly neutral scientific method, “ . . . we must allow that it is quite possible that at some future date all the miracles recorded in the Bible, not excluding the resurrection of Christ, may be explained by natural laws.”19

At times apologists who are less than entirely sympathetic w ith Van T il can be found to echo his concern. In that m anner Pinnock observes that “ the fact of the resurrection is an undigestible surd for the naturalist.”20 Ramm likewise notes that for the naturalist, “ the factuality of miracles is ruled out a priori. . . .”21 He further explains that “every historiographer works w ith a form ulated or assumed world view which governs completely what he admits as historical fact.”22 And he adds, “ . . . any discussion of fact involves a doctrine of know ledge and theory of fact.”23

R am m ’s observations sound remarkably in tune with the Van T ilian theme. Nevertheless, something prevents Dr. Ramm from ascribing completely to Van T il’s method. It is essentially the same barrier that stands between Pinnock and Van Til. For although Pinnock comments

19VanTil, Christian-Theistic Evidences, p. 65. 20Pinnock, Set Forth Your Case, p. 63.21 Ramm, Protestant Christian Evidences, p. 150. 22Ibid., p. 129.23Ibid., p. 40.


that “psychologically there is no comm on ground between the Christian and non-Christian . . . ,”24 both Pinnock and Ramm are w illing to proceed as if some comm on epistemological ground remains intact. Their direct appeals to evidence—evidence that is not shaped by a Christian in terpretation—imply that the unbelieving m ind possesses at least a relative neutrality.

Such is the traditional view of apologetics. It was the view of no less a figure than Benjamin Warfield who m aintained that “all m inds are of the same essential structure. . . .”25 But our look at the comparative functions of Christian and non-Christian m inds suggested a different outlook. If to any extent we allow the legitimacy of the natural m an’s assum ption of him self as an autonom ous reference po in t for interpreting the facts, we cannot deny his right to twist the facts of Christianity at any poin t.26 Autonom ous man will not accept G od’s revelation in Scripture—that is agreed. But if we suspect there remains intact an element of neutrality in the non-Christian m ind, Van T il adds, it is “no easier for sinners to accept G od’s revelation in nature. . . .”27

W ithout denying the clarity of the facts, and w ithout

24Pinnock, Set Forth Your Case, p. 6. I understand the denial of “psychological” common ground to mean that sinners have a “gut” reaction against Christianity. The notion is conveniently vague, for it does not rule out a common epistemological ground—something Pinnock would not want to relinquish.

25Warfield, “Introductory Note,” p. 30.26Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, p. 93.27VanTil, Apologetics, p. 36; See also Van Til, “Nature and Scrip

ture,” The Infallible Word, p. 280.


denying the legitimacy of evidences, it must not be thought that epistemological neutrality is possible for sinners. T he facts must somehow be set w ithin their proper theological framework for interpretation.

Evidence and Proof

"^ H E two previous chapters have dealt w ith epistemological problems linked with covenantal

. rebellion. In chapter 3 it was seen that the sense in which a non-Christian knows the truth is characterized by dishonor toward God and is therefore directly opposite to Christian knowledge. In chapter 4 that opposition was seen to allow not even a provisional neutrality by which sinners can evaluate the biblical message.

In view of the nonbeliever’s blindness to what the facts signify, it m ight seem as though evidences are not very useful after a ll—especially for Van Til. Many have suspected that all along. My purpose is to erase that false impression by showing what role evidences play w ithin Van T i l ’s system. But before doing so, som eth ing must be said regarding the impression that sinful rebellion renders evidences to be useless. This chapter will focus on the Van T ilian claim that the Christian system is capable of evidential proof.

As we have seen, the sinful orientation of autonom ous

54

EVIDENCE AND PROOF 55

man results in what Van T il has called the “obscuration” of the facts.1 Would not such obscuration make evidential argum entation a worthless enterprise? It is in this connection that Van T il’s students sometimes conclude he reserves no place for rational or evidential appeals, much less proof.

But Dr. Van T il’s own words should not go unnoticed on the matter: “T his ‘obscuration’ in no wise subtracts from the fundam ental perspicuity of G od’s revelation in nature.”2 In other words, the facts may be obscured and yet remain perspicuous to all. T his is another way of saying that evidences may be open to the investigators even if the investigators are not open to the evidence. Perspicuity is an inherent characteristic of revelation. It does not depend on the disposition of the audience. For the same reason, the blindness of sinners does not lessen the fundamental clarity of God’s revelation.

The conclusion Van T il draws from that premise will surprise some: “G od’s revelation is everywhere, and everywhere perspicuous. Hence the theistic proofs are absolutely valid.”3

To say that Van T il rejects theistic proofs altogether would be to miss his point. He writes, “ . . . it is the difference between theistic proofs when rightly and when wrongly constructed that I have been anxious to stress.”4 Theistic proofs are valid “so far as they reflect

1 Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, p. 79.2Ibid.3VanTil, Common Grace and the Gospel, p. 181, my emphasis.4Ibid., p. 182.

C ro

t c >

a i

56 EVIDENCE AND PROOF

the revelation of God.”5 Properly constructed, “ they are but the restatement of the revelation of God. . . .”6 Theistic proofs fail to convey the revelation of God when they are based on the assum ption of m an’s au to n omy.7 W hat Van T il emphasizes is the “basic difference between a theistic proof that presupposes God and one that presupposes man as u ltim ate.”8 „

P Van T il is w illing to speak of “ true theistic proofs” ' taking the form of “ontological,” “cosmological,” and “ teleological” proofs. Such proofs undertake to show, respectively, that the notions of existence, cause, and purpose are meaningless if they are not rooted in the existence of God.9 Ultimately, the various forms of theistic proof may be reduced to one inclusive proof:“ . . . that unless this God, the God of the Bible, the ultimate being, the Creator, the controller of the universe, be presupposed as the foundation of hum an experience, j

\ this experience operates in a void.”10 w

So, in Christian theism there is “absolutely certain proof” for the existence of God. Such a God necessarily exists. Otherwise, says Van Til, “ the uniformity of nature” and “the coherence of all things in the world” have no explanation.11

It is interesting that Van T il does not hesitate to allude to the uniform ity and coherence of nature. These are notions of the sort that the sinner can no sooner do w ithout and survive than stop breathing. T hat is not to

5Ibid. 6Ibid., p. 181.7Ibid., p. 182. 8Ibid., p. 193.9Ibid., p. 190. 10Ibid., p. 192.11 Van Til, Apologetics, pp. 64-65; The Defense of the Fqith, p. 103.


say that nonbelievers accept a Christian conception of these terms. Sinners are set against a Christian understanding as a matter of principle. Yet in their practical day to day living, they m ust try to salvage some of the benefits of the Christian view—stripped of their covenantal obligations—or else all life would be chaotic.

Nonbelievers must not be allowed the luxury of m ixing and m atching biblical motifs w ith pagan prem ises. If a non-Christian rejects the biblical understanding of uniform ity and coherence, he must face the desperate consequences. The true m eaning and benefit of these terms is realized only when they are set in reference to the sovereign Lord of Scripture. Short of such an existing God, these rational inclinations must give way to the irrationality of a chance universe. In this sense, the uniform ity and coherence of nature require the conclusion that God exists.

Along with this grand, universal proof, Van T il fully endorses Calvin’s claim that man is presented with “innum erable proofs.”12 All the parts of creation offer unanim ous and therefore inescapable evidence that Christianity is true. T he range of proof is unmeasurable. Van T il cites, for one type of example, the Bible’s majestic style and harmony, its fulfilled prophecies and its m iracles, the words of Christ and His works, as objective demonstrations of Scripture’s divinity.13

Van T il finds proof not only in special revelation,

12VanTil, The Defense of the Faith, p. 152, citing John Calvin’s Institutes, Bk. I, Chap. V, Sec. 2.

13VanTil, A Christian Theory of Knowledge, p.228.


but in every fact of general revelation. O n this poin t he could hardly be more explicit:

. . . surely the Reformed believer should stress with Calvin that every fact of history, here and now actually is a revelation of God. Hence any fact and every fact proves the evidence of God and therefore the truth of Scriptures. If this is not the case, no fact ever will.14

Traditionally, the study of evidences has centered atten tion on the unusual features of C hristian ity—odd phenom ena w hich defy naturalistic explanation. As w ould be expected, miracles such as the parting of waters, the feeding of thousands, and the raising of the dead have received frequent m ention along with the amazing growth of the church and preservation of the biblical text. Certainly, Dr. Van T il does not disqualify such types of evidences. They serve as proof when viewed w ithin their proper framework. But the un iqueness of Van T i l ’s system is h ighlighted by his claim that all facts are revelational. It is not only a selected body of unusual phenom ena that defies naturalistic explanation. All facts, w hether natural or supernatural, defy naturalistic explanation. Every fact signifies that it is controlled by G od.15 Otherwise, it signifies nothing. Either God is proven by every fact or we are left with meaninglessness.

T he im plications of this point should be clear. We are now able to answer the question as to w hat qualifies as

14Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, p. 17, Van T il’s emphases! See also, Van Til, Common Grace and the Gospel, p. 72; Apologetics, p. 36.

16Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, p. 195.


evidence. For Van Til, everything is evidence—every fact, every object, every event properly understood is evidence for Christianity. Furthermore, every bit of evidence, as he sees it, proves w ith absolute validity the tru th of G od’s Word.

Here again, Van T il is to be contrasted w ith other apologists. Typically, they have retold the m axim s of J. Gresham Machen or B. B. Warfield (both of whom Van T il highly respected in all other regards), to the effect that probability is the best the evidence can do;16 or as Clark Pinnock would vouchsafe, “ . . . a probable argum ent is better than an im probable one.” 17 They have resigned themselves to presenting evidence which is only probable, and which, in the words of Warfield, “ leaves open the metaphysical possibility of its being m istaken.” 18 *

But from Van T il’s outlook, it is they who have underestim ated the weight of the* evidence. They have not given the evidence credit for carrying absolute proof. In effect, they have inadvertently im plied that God has not clearly revealed Himself in nature.

There appears to be a big difference in the way Van Til and his opponents define “proof.” When Van T il speaks

16J. Gresham Machen, “History and Faith,’’ Christianity Today 8, No. 24 (September 11, 1964), 26; Warfield, “The Real Problem of Inspiration,” p. 218.

17Pinnock, “The Philosophy of Christian Evidences,” p.423. See also Set Forth Your Case, p. 45.

18Warfield, “The Real Problem of Inspiration,” p. 218. When Warfield speaks of the possibility of the evidence being “mistaken,” it is not clear to me whether he means that it may be in error or simplythat it may be misunderstood by the listener.


of proof, he is talking about the objective revelation, regardless of whether m an believes or not. Others, however, seem to view proof as contingent upon belief; hence, to prove is to convince.

Surely Van T il would not deny that theistic proof is capable of inducing belief. For those regenerated by the Holy Spirit, proof does convince. But that differs from saying that proof exists only when men are convinced.

Those who hold the latter view would have to say that the proof offered by the apologist is relative to the listener’s response and therefore not absolute—not all men become believers. W ithout strict proof available, the argum ent for Christianity is only probable. Warfield seems to take this position. T he way he explains it, the sinner’s ability to “m istake” the evidence is linked directly to the fact that the argum ent is not strictly demonstrative.19 Disbelief is traceable in part to the mere probability of the case.

T here is one sense in w hich we m ight concede that absolute proof is beyond the ability of the apologist. Perhaps it should be granted that hum an fallibility prohibits him from form ulating and representing the available proof in all its certainty. But such a lack of cogency would be traceable to the apologist’s presentation. It would not mean that the evidence itself fails to constitute absolute proof, as some maintain.

W hen Warfield advocates a probability argum ent, it is not clear whether he thinks the evidence is somehow

19Ibid.


inconclusive or whether the problem is simply in the apologist’s treatment of the evidence. Perhaps Warfield did not draw that distinction. For whatever reason, he did not acknowledge the availability of absolute proof.

Van T il does: “The argum ent may be poorly stated, and may never be adequately stated. But in itself the argum ent is absolutely sound.”20 Disbelief or “obscuration” of the facts does not detract from the clarity or weight of the evidence. For Van T il proof is not what men uniformly believe but what men ought uniformly to believe.

So it is not just any notion of proof that Van T il supports. Surely he does not condone such proofs as would compromise biblical doctrines. And he clearly opposes those that imply sinners somehow m aintain an excuse for disbelief. As Van T il often laments, the theistic proofs have traditionally committed these errors. They have im plied that sinners are not fully to blame for their ignorance. They have allowed that God can be properly known before one is w illing to submit to His authority. They have been content to prove a god who or which is other than the God who has presented Himself in Scripture. But inasmuch as no god other than the true God exists, the traditional theistic proofs have proved nothing.

The proof Van T il condones is proof that operates in full conformity w ith the biblical notion of God. It is proof that recognizes the evidences for what God has

20Van Til, A Christian Theory of Knowledge, p. 291.


made them. And when seen w ithin the framework of God as the covenantal Lord over all the facts, that evidence is appreciated to constitute no th ing less than absolutely valid proof for the Christian system.

P A R T I I IPresiippositional V e rific a tio n

c

A Close-Up of Verifiability

Yw J f > |H E m ain thrust of the previous chapter should be clear: Dr. Van T il condones a particular sort of theistic proof. I adm it to introducing a flood

of quotations to that effect. Yet more support could have been cited.1 T he frequency with which Van T il defends the notion of proof is alarm ing compared to w hat one might expect.

If Van T il reserves room for theistic proof, w ould he also endorse a type of verifiability? According to one of his advocates, Charles Horne, Van T il “rejects all efforts at verification.”2 T hat verdict seems to find support in

*In addition to the passages I cited, John Frame in Van Til: The Theologian, p. 9 cites Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theol- ogy, pp. 102ff., 196; The Defense of the Faith, p. 196; A Christian Theory of Knowledge, p. 292.

2Charles M. Horne, “Van Til and Carnell,” Jerusalem and Athens, ed. E. R. Geehan (Philadelphia: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Co., 1971), p. 379.

65

66 A CLOSE-UP OF VERIFIABILITY

the fact that Abraham Kuyper, a forerunner to Van Til, disapproved of verification straightforwardly.3

Yet it is im portant to remember that Van T il does not follow Kuyper’s lead uncritically. As Van T il sees it, Kuyper rightly “stressed the natural m an’s ethical alienation from God . . . ” but drew “ the illegitim ate conclusion that the natural m an is unable to understand the intellectual argum ent for Christianity in any sense.”4 In Kuyper’s own words: “Let it not be said, that an infinite num ber of things are manifest and knowable of God, in the works of creation, in history, and in the experiences of our own inner life. . . .”5

Unlike Van T il, Kuyper did not differentiate the two senses of knowing. He did not allow that natural revelation is somehow clearly seen by sinners.6 He regarded rational defense of the faith to be useless and therefore virtually rejected the study of apologetics,7 although he practiced apologetics in spite of his playing it down.8

Van Til, in contrast to Kuyper, affirms that natural revelation provides proof—proof that does not pretend to be autonom ous, but proof that does justice to scriptural teachings. W hat would keep Van T il from endorsing a type of verifiability that would meet these same conditions? Is verification not another way of talking

3Kuyper, Principles of Sacred Theology, p. 251. 4VanTil, A Christian Theory of Knowledge, p.246. 5Kuyper, Principles of Sacred Theology, p. 250. 6VanTil, A Christian Theory of Knowledge, pp. 230ff. 7Ibid., p. 234.8Ibid., p. 253.

A CLOSE-UP OF VERIFIABILITY 67

about proof?9 Of course, both proof and verification can be fallaciously constructed. But when these accord w ith Scripture, Van T il’s method excludes neither.

Not that Dr. Van Til has explicitly condoned the notion of biblical verifiability—he has not discussed that term in writing, as far as I know. And some have criticized him heavily for not addressing the verification controversy, which grew out of recent analytic ph ilosophy. Clark Pinnock, for one, indicts Van T il for “ tragic irrelevance” at a time when philosophers are asking for verification of ultimate claims.10

But just because Van T il has not spoken directly to that philosophic tradition, that in no way indicates that his contributions are irrelevant to that issue. There are many topics to which V anTilian principles have not been applied explicitly, yet to which they are deeply relevant. Van T il has always been concerned w ith a biblical world view, and the im plications of his thought are only beginning to be extended to a wide range of fields and topics under that embracive concern.

Van T il’s apologetic is loaded with repercussions for the verification controversy. A look at recent developments in the notion of verifiability will help to illustrate this point.

The verification controversy originally focused on the question raised by logical positivists in the 1920s as

9As I note below, the meaning of “verification” has undergone several stages of metamorphosis in the history of analytic philosophy. I am content to use the term less technically as a synonym of “proof,” subject to the qualifications assigned by Van Til to that term.

10Pinnock, “The Philosophy of Christian Evidences,” p. 424.

68 A CLOSE-UP OF VERIFIABILITY *

to whether religious and metaphysical language are. m eaningful. For exam ple, does language about God, angels, heaven, and hell or being, substance, and causality say anything about the facts of our experience? Do such terms refer to anyth ing we can experience with our five senses and thus verify? If not, what difference does such talk make in the world we can observe? Would we not be better off if we rid our language of these non-sense expressions?

Early positivists did just that. With rem arkable ease they dismissed theological language from the dom ain of the factually significant. Since God could not be directly observed (seen, touched, heard, smelled, tasted), language about H im failed the test of verifiability. It was considered cognitively meaningless.

There were high expectations of the early verifiability criterion. It would give the edifice of philosophy a long-overdue house cleaning. Speculative notions, which once cluttered rooms of thought, could be p u t out as if for trash collection. Philosophers and scientists could abide together in peaceful harm ony as long as unveri- fiable speculations did not intrude and bog down com m unication.

But before long, the dream house was divided against itself. First, the verifiability criterion could not pass its own test—it could not be verified. Second, the criterion was geared only toward testing statements but did not give adequate account of the m eaningfulness of other types of sentences such as questions, requests, and expressions of attitude or emotion. Third , the criterion originally required conclusive verifiability of assertions. But conclusive verifiability not only eliminated theology


and metaphysics: it threatened to do away with the very sort of scientific findings its inventors sought to protect. T he criterion was modified so that it required observations that w ould “count for or against” a statement though not conclusively so. Fourth, the early criterion naively treated observation as a sim ple, straightforward task. But the inevitable question surfaced with disturbing frequency: w hat qualifies as an observation counting for or against a statement?

The question persists. And it leaves the original criterion far behind. W hile Antony Flew was announcing that theological language died “ the death of a thousand qualifications,” 11 the bell was tolling ever so loudly for the verifiability criterion itself and its counterpart in falsifiability.

A lthough analytic philosophers have not, as a whole, repented in sackcloth and ashes, they have more recently acknowledged that verification by observation is often a very complex process. The line between observation language and nonobservation language is not as clear- cut as it was once thought to be. T h a t makes it m uch more difficult to decide what kinds of language are verifiable and w hat are not. If we gran t that God is not directly observable, could he not yet be indirectly observable, and thus have everything to do w ith the facts of our experience?

In 1964 language philosopher W illiam Alston gave expression to an increasingly popular reply to that sort

nAntony Flew, “Theology and Falsification,” New Essays In Philosophical Theology, ed. Flew and Alasdair MacIntyre (London: SCM Press, 1955), p. 96.

70 A CLOSE-UP OF VERIFIABILITY

of question.12 He suggested that “no nonobservation statement logically implies any observation statem ent by itself, but only in conjunction with other statem ents.” 13 Alston provides this illustration:

Ernie Smith has intense unconscious hostility toward his father.

is considered a nonobservational statement (assum ing Ernie never displayed such hostility directly toward his father). T hat nonobservational statem ent would not necessarily im ply the observation,

Ernie Smith flared up at Mr. Jones.

The lone fact that such a flare-up at Mr. Jones occurred would not “count for” the existence of unconscious hostility toward Mr. Smith. But Alston offers additional conditions providing a link between the supposedly nonobservational statement and the clearly observational one:

Mr. Jones looks enough like Ernie’s father to permit a displacement of the hostility onto him.The repression is not so severe as to permit no expression.The hostility has not all been worked off in other ways.

Given these and other relevant premises, Ernie’s flare-up at Mr. Jones can now be interpreted as observable evidence for his hostility toward his father.

We could draw up an example using theological

12William P. Alston, “Empiricist Criteria of Meaningfulness,” Philosophy of Language (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964), pp. 62-83.

13Ibid., p. 77.


language to give us a h in t as to how A lston’s idea of confirm ability m ight work for Christian evidences:

God is love.

is considered by many to be a nonobservational statement. And most would deny that the observation,

It rained in Philadelphia last night.

would “count for” the assertion that God is love. But what if we introduce additional premises?:

God is the controller of nature.Men deserve no blessings from God.Rain is a blessing resulting from the love of God in Christ.God sends rain on the righteous and the unrighteous.Philadelphia is populated by both righteous and unrighteous people.

These additional premises form a system of understanding wherein rain in Philadelphia is observed as evidence for the love of God.

As Alston explains, “T he presence or absence of a given piece of data counts not just for or against one particular hypothesis, but rather for or against the whole body of premises used in deriving it.” 14 In other words, statements receive verification or (as Alston prefers) confirm ation not simply by direct ties with observable facts: a whole system of interwoven premises determ ines whether so-called nonobservation statements correspond with the factual state of affairs.

14Ibid.

72 A C L O S E -U P O F V E R IF IA B IL IT Y

W hat Alston describes has form al sim ilarities w ith w hat Van T il has said all along, in different terms. W hile Alston says that a hypothesis is derived from a body of premises, Van T il stresses that Christian theistic presuppositions are rooted in a unified system of doctrines , 15 Where Alston speaks of data or observations counting for a hypothesis in conjunction with premises, Van T il speaks of facts or evidences proving G od’s tru th as a system.16 And like Alston, Van T il emphasizes the need for “ind irect” appeals to evidence “rather than direct” appeals.17

Alston is no V anTilian. But he has adopted a m uch more realistic notion of observation and confirm ation than the old verifiability criterion of the positivists. It is remarkable how many parallels there are between Alston’s argum ent and Van T i l ’s. Among other things, it shows that Van T il’s apologetic is not irrelevant to recent discussions of verifiability.

One likely po in t of difference between Van T il and Alston would be on the distinction between observational and nonobservational statements. While Alston regards additional premises to mediate between the two types of language, he does not seem to challenge the distinction itself. It is hard to im agine, on the other hand, that Van T il would be satisfied to call theological language nonobservational—at least in any strict sense. T hough “ no m an has seen God at any tim e” (John

15VanTil, The Defense of the Faith, pp. 114-15.16Van Til, Apologetics, p. 97: “. . . any individual fact of this system

is what it is primarily because of its relation to this system.”17VanTil, The Defense of the Faith, p. 100.

A C L O S E -U P O F V E R IF IA B IL IT Y 73

1:18), Van T il reminds us that “ His invisible a ttributes . . . have been clearly seen” (Rom. 1:20); likewise, “The heavens are telling of the glory of God; and the firm am ent is declaring the work of His hands,” even though “T here is no speech, nor are there words; their voice is no t heard” (Ps. 19:1, 3). T hough God may not be directly observed, He has revealed Himself. H is revelation is perspicuous. T hus, theological language is always observational in some sense.

An analytic philosopher who does challenge the distinction between observational and nonobservational language is Willard Quine. Specifically, Q uine is dissatisfied w ith the fam iliar distinction between synthetic and analytic propositions. A rigid distinction between these is responsible for w hat Q uine calls the “radical reductionism ” of early verificationists.18 In other words, Quine opposes the assum ption that the factual or observational element of language could operate independently of the definitional element.

W ithin any system, explains Quine, some com m itments are more central than others.19 Those that are more central have a defining or controling effect upon the rest. Those more peripheral are more readily altered by experience. The former are less observational and the latter are more observational. But the difference is one of degree. All commitments w ithin the system must somehow answer to experience and are thus more or less observational. At the same time all com m itm ents take

18Willard Van Orman Quine, From a Logical Point of View (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1953, 1964), p. 38.

19Ibid., p. 42ff.


on a definitional character as part of the system and are thus only relatively affected by observations. Generally speaking, it is the system as a whole that is confirmed or disconfirmed by experience.

So, both Q uine and Alston see the verifiability criterion to be too simplistic. They both emphasize the systematic character of language. And both propose an indirect method of confirm ing statements which takes in to account the function of systems in understanding experience. But Quine, even more than Alston, parallels Van T il on the relative interplay between central comm itm ents (or presuppositions) and peripheral ones (or factual evidences). For Van T il, the reciprocal relationship between the two is w hat he endorses in the method of circular argum ent.20

As we noted earlier, Van T il refuses to separate analytic argum ent from factual argum ent but sees them as one process.21 The facts and their proper interpretation w ith in the Christian system of doctrines form a unit, and “every attack upon one of these is an attack upon the whole system of tru th as we hold it.”22 It is according to this interdependence that non-C hristian systems are disconfirmed by their inability to account for the facts.23

T he sim ilarities Alston, Quine, and other language analysts show w ith Van T il are wholly un in tentional.

20VanTil, Apologetics, p. 62; The Defense of the Faith, p. 101.21 Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, p. 199: “I do not artificially

separate induction from deduction, or reasoning about the facts of nature from reasoning in a priori analytical fashion. . . . ”

22VanTil, Christian-Theistic Evidences, p. ii.23VanTil, Common Grace and the Gospel, p. 192.


They represent a positive development in recent ph ilosophy which may be characterized by the V anT ilian term “borrowed capital.’’24 To that extent they help us to understand the possibilities for com posing genuine proof or verification of the C hristian system, using the wealth of evidences available.

W hile Dr. Van T il has not interacted explicitly w ith the verification controversy, John Frame has. As one who is both an ardent disciple of Van T il and a know ledgeable student of analytic philosophy, Frame heartily applauds a particular notion of biblical verifiability.25 According to Frame, religious language is verifiable because it is ordinary language.26 Among other things, this “ord inariness” has to do w ith the fact that G od’s truth is revealed to us in the im m anent field of our experience (for example, the natural world, the pages of Scripture), and that G od’s revelation has bearing upon the facts of our situation.

At the same time, Frame notes, religious language is odd language—it states basic convictions w hich tend

24Another non-Christian whose contribution should not go unmentioned in this regard is Thomas Kuhn, T he Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962). Kuhn accents the role conceptual models play in our interpretation of data. He points out that scientific revolutions occur not so much because of the discovery of new data, but because scientists choose to interpret familiar data according to unprecedented models.

25Frame, “God and Biblical Language: Transcendence and Immanence,” God’s Inerrant Word, ed. John Warwick Montgomery (Minneapolis, MN: Bethany Fellowship, 1974), p. 166.

26Ibid.


to sidestep verification; it transcends the w orld of experience.27

T hus, biblical language is both ordinary and odd, im m anent and transcendent, observational yet not d irectly so; it can be known truly but not exhaustively; it interprets the facts yet is proven by the facts; it is verifiable but not falsifiable.28

Frame notes that when verificationists have opposed the facticity of religious language they have lim ited their attention to the “oddness” of such language. But he comments, “If an analysis of religious language is to be adequate, it must take both features into account, not just one of them .”29 The two, after all, are dual features of one systematic language. They are not two types of language com peting w ith each other. Nor m ust we choose one or the other. We are left neither w ith Barth’s “W holly Other,” which is beyond the ordinary world of experience, nor w ith a god who can be explained

27Ibid., pp. 166-67, 173.28That is to say, Christianity can never be proven false. There is a

sense in which biblical claims could be called “hypothetically falsifiable.’’ That only means that if certain conditions obtained (or failed to), Christianity would not be true. Paul writes, for example, “. . . if Christ has not been raised, your faith is worthless’’ (I Cor. 15:17). Or consider a typically VanTilian manner of speaking: if the God of Scripture were not the Creator and Controller of the universe, human experience would be void of meaning. “Hypothetical falsifiability” simply draws attention to the interdependence of doctrines. And because of the ultimate coherence of the Christian system, it says in effect, “if the biblical message were not true, it would be false.’’ Such “falsifiability’’ is therefore harmless—the hypotheses can never be granted. And Christianity is never really falsifiable.

29Frame, “God and Biblical Language: Transcendence and Immanence,” p. 166.


exhaustively in immanentistic, scientific terms. The “oddness” and “ordinariness” of religious language are correlative features. They speak of the intricate reciprocity between transcendent norms and im m anent facts. The two features are engaged in a circular interplay between Christian presuppositions and Christian evidences.

T he apparent parallels between Frame and Alston or Q uine need not be spelled out. Most im portant is Frame’s willingness to follow Van T il where neither Alston nor Q uine would dare go. For notw ithstanding the formal resemblance the latter bear w ith Van T il’s method, they are very much unlike him in this crucial respect: Dr. Van T il, and Frame w ith him , follows the biblical teaching that language (indeed, all of life) is ethically qualified. Men are obligated to adopt and express certain basic commitments and not others. They are obligated to believe and obey the truth of God, which is made evident in revelation. No other system is evident, and there is no excuse for holding other views.

By direct inference, it must be concluded not only that C hristianity is verifiable, but that it is conclusively so. All the facts declare the glory of God, or they say nothing at all.

Quine and Alston have deliberately substituted confirmability for what they thought was an overly am bitious claim to conclusive verifiability. And they were right in one respect: em pirical observations alone can offer no absolute certainty. But as Van T il would in d icate, not even a probable confirm ability can be achieved w ithout a C hristian system of understanding. Truth claims are verifiable on one basis only, and that basis is the framework of Christian-theistic presuppositions.

7Presenting

Presuppositional Evidences

W H E T H E R we call it “proof” or “verificatio n ” or simply “presenting the evidence,” the method Van T il insists on is an indirect

one rather than a direct one. An indirect approach accounts for the im portance of Christian presuppositions in the interpretation of evidence. A direct one does not; it attem pts to introduce evidences w ithout placing them in a biblical framework. T he problem is that apart from a biblical framework, so-called “evidences” do not really evidence what they are m eant to. And sinners as a matter of course impose on experience an interpretation foreign to what the evidences properly signify. Vainly the unbeliever tries to grasp onto truths while em ptying those truths of their God-given im plications. It is an endless task. Revelation continues to make know n the existence and character of God, but just as continually the sinful m ind is at work producing its own account of what the facts say.

T h o u g h sinful rebellion is a continual process, it is not always flagrant from our hum an po in t of view.

78

P R E S E N T IN G P R E S U P P O S IT IO N A L E V ID E N C E S 79

Non-Christians are often amiable. They may dem onstrate relatively good behavior.1 They may even assent to the existence of a god or the idea of Jesus’ resurrection. But Van T il warns us not to think that a formal assent to these ideas brings a person any closer to a genuine understanding. Non-Christians do not rule out “the strange and the w eird.” 2 3 A resurrection from the dead is just the sort of th ing people are am used to find in R ipley’s Believe It or N ot,5 not to m ention the recent cinema. As Van T il explains, the natural m an “need not hesitate, on his principles, to accept the fact of the resurrection at all. But for him that fact is a different sort of fact from w hat it is for the C hristian. It is not the same fact at a ll.”4

In the same way, nonbelievers may adm it some idea of creation but reject biblical teaching by “substituting another m eaning for the word creation.”5 The pattern extends to all the C hristian doctrines. As a result, says Van T il, the Christian apologist “cannot find a direct po in t of contact in any of the accepted concepts of the natural m an .”6 T his applies not only to “religious” concepts but also to such notions as atom s and the laws of gravitation7—indeed all facts are redefined to mean som ething other than what they truly are.8

1 Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, p. 50.2VanTil, Christian-Theistic Evidences, p. 97.3VanTil, The Defense of the Faith, p. 240.4VanTil, Apologetics, p. 95.5VanTil, Christian-Theistic Evidences, p. 93.6Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, p. 112.7VanTil, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, p. 26.8VanTil, The Defense of the Faith, p. 172.

80 P R E S E N T IN G P R E S U P P O S IT IO N A L E V ID E N C E S

It is as if the sinner tries to create a new world. When he looks at the world around him, he sees the revelation of God everywhere, but he im putes to the world an in terpretation of his own contrivance. It is an understatem ent to say that sinners twist the facts—sinners flatly deny the facts. They may use the same language as do Christians; they may even manifest sim ilar patterns of behavior. But eventually this parallel breaks down. T he sim ilarity extends only as far as the non-Christian is inconsistent with his anti-biblical p rincip les.9 If he were consistent, no com m unication would be possible between believer and nonbeliever. Since m an is the im age of God, he can never completely sever himself from some semblance of the truth w hich is formally, intellectually, or theoretically correct. But ultim ately the sinner prefers to talk about a different set of “facts,” which is to say, he prefers a fiction.

There are no facts other than God’s facts. To substitute any other interpretation of the world for G od’s interpretation is to “exchange the tru th of God for a lie” (Rom. 1:25). Nevertheless, it is w hat sinners do w ith a vengeance: instead of knowledge of God, they prefer futile speculations; in place of the natural, they desire the unnatu ral; rather than accept G od’s will, they pursue vanity.

T h a t is why appeals to evidence cannot be direct. Such appeals would count for nothing. Im plicitly they w ould approve the sinner’s method of in terpreting the

9VanTil,/4 Christian Theory of Knowledge, p. 294; An Introduction to Systematic Theology, p. 27.


facts. Moreover, direct appeals to evidence could not introduce the nonbeliever to the truth of God. T he “ facts” that sinners believe are the opposite of G od’s truth.

An indirect method, on the other hand, takes into view not only facts but the God who created, controls, and interprets the facts. As Van T il assures us, “ . . . w ithout the presupposition of the God of Christianity, we cannot even interpret one fact correctly.”10 An indirect appeal to evidences attem pts to bring the unbeliever’s attention back to the facts by confronting him with the God of the facts. It acknowledges the self-attesting Christ of Scripture to be our apologetic “starting- po in t.” 11

But would this mean that we should announce our presuppositions at the start of every apologetic encounter? Is that w hat Van T il has in m ind when he speaks of starting with the Christ of Scripture?

Some have taken him to mean exactly that. Unless presuppositions are declared in the opening sentences of discourse w ith nonbelievers, some students of Van T il grow uneasy for fear of capitu lating to pagan thought. But that is not w hat Van T il teaches. Of course, his emphasis has always been that we unasham edly subm it to the authority of Scriptures; lest we think, however, that all discussions must open w ith pronouncem ents to that effect, Van T il qualifies his point:

10VanTil, Christian-Theistic Evidences, p. ii.nVanTil, “My Credo,” p. 3. See also The Defense of the Faith,

pp. 113, 179 for language of “starting” or “beginning” with God.


. . . this does not imply that we must always and in every instance bring in the discussion of authority at the Outset of every argument with those we seek to win for Christianity. This may frequently be omitted, if only we ourselves do not fall into the temptation of thinking that we can stand on neutral ground with those who hold to a non-Christian position.12

Here Van T il indicates that our one and only epistemological starting-point must be kept intact, though there are any num ber of topical starting-points which may be discussed before explicit m ention is made of G od’s authority.13 It seems, then, that there are two senses in which we may begin or start an apologetic discussion. The one is a logical or epistemological starting-point, having to do with the u ltim ate point of reference for knowledge. T he other is a temporal starting- po in t, having to do w ith the sequence in which we choose to discuss various topics.

Given that distinction, it is proper to start w ith any fact whatsoever when talking with non-Christians. The discussion need not proceed in a logical progression from the most ultim ate Christian com m itm ents to those of lesser centrality. We need not hold back the evidences u n til all our presuppositions are on the table. The quo ta tion by Van T il, above, would lead us to think that there are other ways to be true to biblical authority, ways in which we can be uncom prom ising presupposi-

12Van Til, Christian-Theistic Evidences, p. 54.lsIn Van Til’s terms, all facts provide a “proximate” or “immediate

starting point,” i.e., metaphysical common ground, whereas the “ultimate starting point” is that epistemological ground not shared withnon-Christians (Survey of Christian Epistemology, pp. 120, 130, 204).


tionalists even when we begin our discussion w ith evidences.

For Van T il, “All knowledge is inter-related.” 14 And “if one knows ‘nature’ truly, one also knows natu re’s God truly.” 15 T h is is another way of saying that nature, when properly understood, provides a perspective on the whole system of Christian theism. According to Van T il, to know one th ing truly, one must know all things truly.16

The po in t is not that Van T il requires us to be om niscient. It is rather that knowledge of one fact in relation to G od’s u ltim ate authority entails implications for all facts, since they, too, m ust come under that same authority. T hus, by what Van T il labelled “ the m ethod of im plication ,” the Christian can know som ething about everything, at least in the broadest outline.17

Take, for example, the fact of C hrist’s resurrection. One cannot truly understand the resurrection of Jesus w ithout also know ing som ething about such other doctrines as the sonship of Jesus and the creation of the universe. T he fact of the resurrection calls into view other doctrines of the faith and thus—in a reduced form—the whole system.

As I have noted before, Frame has called this approach “perspectivalism .” He points out that, for Van T il, “ . . . there are relations of dependence among biblical doctrines.” 18 Any one of several m ajor doctrines could

14Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, p. 26. 15Ibid.16Ibid.17Van Til, Survey of Christian Epistemology, pp. 6-7. 18Frame, Van Til: The Theologian, p. 10.


be considered more or less central to the whole system. And if one central teaching is denied, the whole system is denied. For exam ple, the doctrine of the atonem ent requires a certain doctrine of God, of m an, and of sin. Frame notes also that each of the Ten Com m andm ents offers a perspective on all sin and obedience: to disobey one com m andm ent is to violate in p rincip le each of the rest.19

Another example of perspectivalism involves the fruit of the Spirit. The “fru it” mentioned in G alatians 5:22 is singular, yet it entails a long list of virtues each of which characterizes spirituality. If you have the fruit of the Spirit at all, you will manifest all the virtues to varying degrees. It would be inconceivable to have the fruit of the Spirit and yet be completely lacking in patience or faithfulness or the other forms of spiritual fruit.

It is enlightening to notice the various perspectives on the gospel throughout Scripture. In John 5:24 eternal life is promised to all w ho believe in Jesus’ Word and in the Father who sent H im . Luke 4:18, 19 focuses on the gospel to the poor, includ ing release to captives, sight to the blind, and freedom to the downtrodden. Paul proclaim ed to the C orinthians “nothing . . . except Jesus Christ, and Him crucified” (I Cor. 2:2). T he rich young ruler was ordered by Jesus, “ . . . go and sell your possessions and give to the poor, and you shall have treasure in heaven; and come, follow me” (Matt. 19:21). And in James 1:27, pure and undefiled religion is “ to visit

19Ibid., p. 13.


orphans and widows in their distress and to keep oneself unstained by the world.”20

The most explicit and complete gospel summary, of course, is I Corinthians 15:1, 3-4 where Paul announces, “Now I make know n to you brethren, the gospel w hich I preached to you . . . that Christ died for our sins according to the Scriptures, and that He was buried, and that He was raised on the th ird day according to the Scriptures. . . . ” Yet all the above passages somehow summarize the gospel, at least implicitly, though they do not say precisely the same things. Each reduces the gospel according to a particular emphasis, often suited to a given context. But none of these reductions is m eant to exclude the others. W hen the key terms of each are explicated, all the passages convey the same message. Inasm uch as each focuses on some aspect or aspects of the whole gospel, each implies the rest.21 * *

This slight digression is m eant to illustrate the perspectival relationship between particular beliefs w ithin

20Several of these and the following examples were first suggested in an interesting study on gospel reductions, written by a friend and former classmate, Steve Larson. He submitted the paper in a course concerning the “contextualization” of theology for missionary purposes. See also Micah 6:8, “And what does the Lord require of you but to do justice, to love kindness, and to walk humbly with your God?”; Matt. 18:3, “Truly I say to you, unless you are converted and become like children, you shall notenter the kingdom of heaven.” Also, Matt. 7:7; 10:39; 11:29; 22:34-40; 25:34-40.

21I am using Vern Poythress’s distinction between an “emphasizing reduction,” which may be a legitimate perspectival focus or emphasis,and an “exclusive reductionism,” which wrongly absolutizes one perspective to the exclusion of others; Philosophy, Science, and the Sovereignty of God (Philadelphia: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Co., 1976), pp. 48-49.

8 6 P R E S E N T IN G P R E S U P P O S IT IO N A L E V ID E N C E S

C hristianity and the system as a whole. T he pattern of interdependence holds true not only for the m ajor doctrines of systematic theology, but, as Van T il seems to say, for each and every fact: “ . . . the whole claim of C hristian theism is in question in any debate about any fa c t / '22

So, the Christian apologist may begin w ith any fact because, no matter w hat facts he wishes to discuss, the stakes are ultim ately the same. In every case, Christian theism is in question. Do the facts belong to God or do they not? The challenge for the apologist is to treat the facts in a way that calls the God of Scripture—including the Christian system—into view.

T h a t may sound like an impossible undertaking. How can the whole theistic system be brought to expression in any one discussion of facts? It could take hours, weeks, years, a lifetime to place the whole system of tru th before the nonbeliever. Besides the time difficulty, the apologist w ould have to be a genius to present the total p icture—and the non-Christian, a tenacious listener to take it all in. Moreover, you w ould have to spend nearly all of your time piecing together the theological framework and would never get around to in troducing other evidences. Is this what Van T il wants? Are we back to devoting ourselves almost exclusively to presuppositions with virtually no appeal to evidences?

Van T il must have anticipated that question. His explanation comes right to the point:

22VanTil, Apologetics, p. 73, my emphasis.


This does not imply that it will be possible to bring the whole debate about Christian theism to full expression in every discussion of individual historical fact. . . . It means that no Christian apologist can afford to forget the claim of his system with respect to any particular fact.23

Whether we are able to bring Christian theism to a more full expression or only to a partia l one, the goal is to express the biblical system through the facts. Van T il explains that when the apologist presents his p h ilosophy of fact w ith his facts, “ he does not need to handle less facts in doing so.”24 T h e po in t is that facts should serve as “ m anifestations” of the Christian system .25 The extent to which the system can be unfolded in a particular discussion of facts depends on several variables, inc lud ing the time available, the relative centrality of facts under consideration, and the tolerance of the nonbeliever. But w hat is im portant is that any fact can be the topical starting-poin t for an apologetic confrontation.

One way to depict this principle is to say that the Christian never has to “change the subject” in order to do apologetics. He may start w ith any fact he and his nonbelieving com panion happen to be discussing. No matter where they begin the conversation, they are on G od’s property—the facts are His; they all have im p lications for C hristian theism. And if one understands any fact, he understands that Jesus is Lord over the facts.

23Ibid., p. 75; The Defense of the Faith, p. 118.24VanTil, A Christian Theory of Knowledge, p.298.25VanTil, Apologetics, p. 75.

8 8 P R E S E N T IN G P R E S U P P O S IT IO N A L E V ID E N C E S

Yet there is another sense in which the apologist always has to “change the s u b j e c t He must always change the subject because he is concerned to express God’s facts rather than some fictitious system of “ facts.” He must always tell sinners that the state of affairs is much different from what they im agine. Unless the apologist changes the subject in this sense, he will never get around to portraying the C hristian system. And w ithout that, he will not do justice to any of the facts he endeavors to discuss.

How does one “change the subject” in the sense necessary? How does one show non-C hristians the difference between the truth and lies, especially when these nonbelievers often utter the same truths we do and on the whole use the same language we do to describe the world? How do we tell sinners that they are m istaken not only in “relig ious” matters but in regard to atoms and apples and armadillos and automobiles?

The answer lies in this Van T ilian principle: “ . . . the Christian doctrine of God im plies a definite concept of everything in the created universe.”26 This principle, coupled with a reminder that sinners and believers share no common concepts on which to build, leads to the following conclusion: The task of the Christian apo logist is largely one of redefining the terms of our experience. Those terms may concern such ultim ate notions as “G od,” “ tru th ,” “good,” “rig h t,” “justice,” “ life,” and “m an”; or they may be the language in which we describe the m undane facts of our experience when we

26VanTil, The Defense of the Faith, p. 12.


say, “ It rained in P h iladelph ia last n ig h t” or “Apples grow on trees” or “My car window is broken.” R ain and apples and car windows provide a more tangible, evidential po in t of departure but may and should lead to a discussion of deeper concepts as the occasion allows. A redefinition of rain or apples or broken windows will eventually lead back to a redefinition of God, not according to the nonbeliever’s categories, but according to scriptural categories.

A sample dialogue is taken from an actual conversation I had with a nonbeliever:

non-Christian: My car window is broken!Christian: Things like that happen in a sinful

world.non-Christian: You mean God is punishing me by

breaking my window?Christian: The truth is, all sorts of things go

wrong because man refuses to live God’s way.

non-Christian: Well, the way I look at it, my carwindow is proof that God does not exist: a good God would not permit my window to be broken.

Christian: I agree with you on one point: the god you are talking about does not exist. There is no god who protects all car windows unconditionally. But I’m not defending that concept of God. I’m talking about someone else—a God who allows windows to be broken for a reason, One who is good in all His ways, who opposes evil and yet forgives men who turn from their sin to follow


Christ. You haven’t even considered this kind of God. If you had, it would mean that your view of “good,” too, would have changed, as well as your outlook on what God has to say about the consequences of sin.

This dialogue, of course, is condensed. Much more could be added, some of which we shall consider as we go on. The movement from the fact to the expression of certain Christian commitments is not always so rapid. But the process of *‘changing the subject” is shown here. And the point is that nonbelievers would rather not entertain the biblical concept of God or the biblical notion of good or, for that matter, any item or fact biblically understood. To do so is to accommodate an authority structure that requires a new outlook on all the facts. The world of experience becomes a new creation. All things become new so that even our definitions must undergo regeneration at their root level. In principle, all facts portray experience in terms which by definition prove Christian theism.27

Viewing the apologetic task as a conflict of definitions and categories is not foreign to Van Til’s thought. As long as the apologist remains faithful to the scriptural message, he may even use language coined by the non-

27Van Til explained in Survey of Christian Epistemology, pp. 206-7,“If one really saw that it is necessary to have God in order to understand the grass that grows outside his window, he would certainlycome to a saving knowledge of Christ, and to the knowledge of the absolute authority of the Bible__ the investigation of any fact whatsoever will involve a discussion of the meaning of Christianity as well as of theism, and a sound position taken on the one involves a soundposition on the other.”


believing philosophical community: “Is not the important thing that Christian meanings be contrasted with non-Christian meanings?” asks Van Til.28 When this is done in a discussion beginning with any fact, the apologist is able to “remind” the sinner of the God-given significance which the facts rightfully carry.

Facts or evidences handled in this fashion become the occasion or vehicle on which the Christian system may be introduced. This use of evidences is not at all a substitute for presuppositional inquiry. In the actual discussion of evidences, presuppositions are brought to the foreground increasingly as the dialogue progresses. Hence, presuppositions gain expression through evidences. And evidences derive their meaning from presuppositions. Their relationship is a circle of interdependence.

Van Til makes this point when he talks about general and special revelation: ”. . . revelation in nature and revelation in Scripture are mutually meaningless without one another and mutually fruitful when taken together.”29 Jointly they form “God’s one grand scheme of covenant revelation of himself to man.”30 Both general and special revelation possess divine authority.31 But Scripture, as “the finished product of God’s supernatural and saving revelation to man” carries final authority extending over all of nature.32 After all, Scripture is authoritative in all matters to which it speaks,

28Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, p. 23. 29VanTil, “Nature and Scripture,” p. 269. s0Ibid., p. 267.“Ibid., p. 272f.S2Van Til, Apologetics, p. 36.


and it speaks directly or indirectly to all matters, including all the facts of nature.33 T hus all evidences in the natural world not only bear au tho rity as general revelation—they convey the authority of Scripture itself via its interpretation of the facts. In other words, since the inscrip turation of G od’s Word, the facts belong to Scripture. T h a t is w hat makes them evidences. “Facts” possess genuine evidential im port and im pact to the extent that they present Scripture.

In his endorsement of a type of theistic proofs, Van T il explained, “They are but the restatem ent of the revelation of God. . . .”34 For the same reason, evidences may be described as the “restatement” of Scripture. Christian evidences say what the Scriptures say. Otherwise they are not evidences at all.

Like Van T il, Frame teaches that facts express the m eaning or app lication of Scripture. For example, the biblical doctrine of Jesus’ resurrection means that the tomb was empty, that the risen Jesus was seen by many,35 that the apostles were transformed, and many other observable facts. Those evidences mean what the Scriptures say. With that pattern in m ind, Frame describes evidences and biblical presuppositions as two perspectives on the same body of truth. Fundamentally, he notes, “Presuppositions and evidences are one.”36

33Ibid., p. 2; The Defense of the Faith, p. 8.34Van Til, Common Grace and the Gospel, p. 181.35Paul goes to some length to list the many appearances of the

resurrected Lord in I Corinthians 15. It is of interest that even the appearances seem to come under the heading of “the gospel which I preached to you” (v. 1).

36Frame, “Doctrine of the Knowledge of God” (lecture outline, 1976), p. 10.


But how does a fact, such as that someone’s car window is broken, serve as a restatement of Scripture? What biblical truths are signified by that event?

Among other things, the broken window bears out the biblical teaching that m aterial possessions are not perm anent—“ treasures on earth” do not last (Matt. 6:19). Moreover, it serves as app lication of the principle that the world is abnorm al, having been “subjected to futility” due to sin (Rom. 8:20). At the same time, the incident speaks of G od’s restraint upon the destructive effects of sin: the window may have been broken but the whole car was not demolished. H ad God not issued a promise of redem ption along w ith the curse follow ing Adam’s sin, destruction would have been immediate and total (Rom. 8:20ff.; Gen. 2:17; 3:15ff.).

Other principles speak of the need for a godly response to hardships. As upsetting as a broken window may be, it is not a great loss in comparison to the concerns of G od’s kingdom —life does not consist in earthly possessions (Luke 12:15ff.). Ultimately it is the Lord who gives and who takes away (Job 1:21). After all, He created and owns all things (Gen. 1:1; Ps. 24:1, 2). And for those who love that sovereign Creator, such inconveniences actually work together for the best results (Rom. 8:28; James l:2ff.). Fundamentally, the fact of the broken window represents a challenge or demand to love Christ more than m aterial th ings—“ No one can serve two masters. . . . You cannot serve God and M am m on” (Matt. 6:24).

It may seem farfetched to call these principles in to a simple conversation over a broken window. I do not suggest that they need be brought in all at once. It


would take quite some time to develop these ideas clearly in any conversation. But when a Christian looks at something like a broken car window, these are the principles which ought to shape his understanding. And to whatever extent he is able to discuss the incident with a nonbeliever, those and other biblical principles should begin to receive expression.

If it is legitimate at all to say that God teaches us through troublesome experiences, that is the same as saying that such experiences evidence God’s truth. Not that they provide revelation independent of Scripture— all the norms for interpreting our experience are to be found in the Bible. But when biblical light is cast on events in our lives, as indeed all men are required to walk in the light, our experiences—even troublesome ones—are used by God to tell us something.

In the example above, a broken window exemplifies what the Bible talks about in the verses cited. It becomes more than a brute fact about shattered glass. It becomes a reminder of God’s providence, man’s fallenness, Jesus’ lordship. The doctrines of creation, the fall, and redemption plus all of their corollaries are linked to a proper understanding of this one fact. To see the fact for what it signifies is to recognize it as evidence for the truth of God’s Word.

When a fact is interpreted according to the norms of Scripture, that fact becomes an expression of Scripture’s authority. That is how evidences participate in the Bible’s self-attestation. Christian evidences are the occasion for Scripture’s claim on its own behalf. By invoking the Bible’s interpretation they confront men with the self-attesting Christ of Scripture. His authority is brought


before sinners, thereby challenging them to forsake their pretense of autonomy and acknowledge Jesus as Lord.

Dr. Van Til characterizes the presentation of evidences as a “reminding process’’ because evidences lay before nonbelievers just the sort of thing they wish to forget: that Jesus is Lord; that the facts belong to God; that covenantal obligations are writ large on every fact; and that nonbelievers harbor a spirit of rebellion, which prohibits them from recognizing the facts for what they are. That is why Van Til stresses, “Apologetics [including evidences]... is valuable to the precise extent that it presses the truth upon the attention of the natural man.’’37

The sinner desperately needs to know where he stands before God. Thus, “It is part of the task of Christian apologetics to make men self-consciously either covenant keepers or covenant breakers.’’38 Unless we direct the nonbeliever’s attention to the facts as they are portrayed by Scripture, he will not have reason to suspect his blindness to the truth or his need for Christ.

Christian evidences are able to rise to the occasion. Since they depict the state of affairs according to Scripture, they “tell it like it is.’’ As presuppositional evidences, they call all men to acknowledge the Triune God, the final reference point for all meaning and truth. They are, in the truest sense of the term, “Christian- theistic’’ evidences.

S7V anT il, T h e D e f e n s e o f t h e F a i t h , pp. 104-5.38V anT il, A p o l o g e t i c s , p. 27.

8Objections

and Replies

A look at the more com m on objections raised against Van T i l ’s presuppositionalism , along w ith replies, should help gather in some of the

loose ends that have survived my efforts to be systematic so far. If that aim is achieved, this chapter will better clarify w hat Van T il does and does not m aintain concerning the relationship of presuppositions to evidences.

Van T il stresses the need for “starting w ith G od .” In the previous chapter I discussed two senses of “starting with god” that are not always distinguished by Van T il’s followers. T he issue is raised again in this chapter, this time by his critics—all the objections presented here revolve around this problem atic notion of one’s apo logetic “starting-poin t.” It is of interest to us to see how Van T i l ’s rivals interpret him on this issue, and to compare those interpretations w ith what Van T il would say in reply.

We will look at the criticisms first. Probably the most severe com plaint comes from Clark P innock’s essay,

96

O B JE C T IO N S A N D R E P L IE S 97

“T he Philosophy of Christian Evidences” (although it is difficult to outdo M ontgom ery’s “ Once Upon an A Priori” for sheer wit). First, Dr. Pinnock accuses Van T il of beginning with “ the axiom that God exists and the Bible is true, to which all the other Christian beliefs are deductively appended.”1 Apparently, Pinnock regards the V anT ilian presupposition of G od’s existence to be a pre-supposition, in the sense that one believes it before exam ining the truthfulness of Christianity. So Pinnock adds, “The basis of the choice cannot be known until after the axiom has been espoused.” T h is grievance gives rise to the charge that Van T il’s starting-point is “voluntaristic,” “an existential leap of fa ith .”2 Then, P innock likens Van T i l ’s apologetic to “a form of irrational fideism .”3 Gordon Lewis concurs: “It often sounds as though Van T il voluntarily presupposes the tru th of C hristian claims in a vacuum .”4 Lewis adds that Van T il “ short-circuits the apologetic question.”5

T he list of indictm ents continues w ith Dr. Van T il ignoring Scripture: Van T il “works from a logical construction to Christ and the gospel,” declares Pinnock, “rather than starting w ith actual revelation.” And again, Van T il “has made the objective data of divine revelation inaccessible to the non-Christian. . . .”6 Hence,

‘Pinnock, “The Philosophy of Christian Evidences,” p.422.2Ibid., p. 423.3Ibid., p. 425.4Lewis, “Van Til and Carnell,” p. 351.5Gordon R. Lewis, Testing Christianity’s Truth Claims, Ap

proaches to Christian Apologetics (Chicago: Moody Press, 1976), p. 287.

6Pinnock, “The Philosophy of Christian Evidences,” p.422.

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he has ‘‘disregarded [the Bible’s] contents in his epistemology.”7 Pinnock alleges that Van Til holds a coherence theory of truth, rather than a correspondence view which accounts for the facts.8

‘‘Theology-in-a-circle . . . has no compelling relevance to the world . . . ,” surmises Pinnock in another context.9 And Dr. Montgomery contests that presuppositionalism does not really challenge the assumptions of nonbelievers: “. . . the irresistible force meets the immovable object . . . ,” and neither believer nor nonbeliever is willing to budge.10 Montgomery goes so far as to say that Van Til’s presuppositionalism gives the non-Christian ‘‘excuse” for disbelief by withholding the facts upon which a decision for Christ can be made.11

Others have raised similar objections against Van Til. The criticisms mentioned here should give ample opportunity to shed added light on presuppositionalism and its use of evidences.

The following replies are not necessarily Van Til’s own responses directed explicitly to the charges cited. In most cases, I am reconstructing replies by drawing from his writings, many of which have been cited already. Some other supporting references will be supplied as we go along. In either case, my aim is to repre-

7Ibid., p. 421.8Ibid.9Pinnock, Set Forth Your Case, p. 6.10Montgomery, “Once Upon an A Priori,” p. 387.nIbid., p. 389.

O B JE C T IO N S A N D R E P L IE S 99

sent faithfully Van T il’s position in response to the accusations raised.

Clark Pinnock’s appraisal of Van Til remains as disturbing today as it was in 1971 when it first appeared in Jerusalem and Athens, the Festschrift for Dr. Van Til celebrating his seventy-fifth birthday. Many of the charges raised by Pinnock had actually been denied by Van Til long before that volume was composed. For example, Van Til had held all along that Christian doctrines ‘‘are not to be obtained by way of deduction from some master concept.”12 Although this statement predated the first accusation listed above, it would be hard to imagine a more pointed negation of the charge. Then, too, Van Til had always made the point that ‘‘Christianity is not irrational” and that ‘‘it must not be taken on blind faith.”13

Never does Van Til urge belief in God before considering the reasons or evidence for belief. The conditions under which someone believes Christianity are anything but a vacuum, according to Van Til. There is, first of all, the general revelation, which surrounds man with proof of God’s existence. Added to this is God’s expressed saving revelation, which, as Van Til insists, sinners must hear in order to believe.

Far from a blind voluntarism, Van Til stresses acceptance of what is clearly seen and authoritatively attested to. If anything, he calls men to forsake irrational, voluntaristic rebellion—to turn from autonomous exer-

12Van T il, T h e D e f e n s e o f t h e F a i th , p. 7.18V anT il, C o m m o n G r a c e a n d t h e G o s p e l , p. 184.

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tions of the will and vain speculations, and fall subm issively into the hands of the revealed Lord.

Neither a princip le of coherence nor a principle of correspondence is elevated by Van T il above the Lord's authority. T he systematic coherence of Christianity as well as its correspondence to the factual state of affairs are both results of true knowledge being derived from God who is T hree in One, and who controls the diverse affairs of the world by His unified plan.

Yes, voluntarism is a problem —a greater one than perhaps Pinnock realizes. For it is he who divorces defense from proclam ation, thereby hoping sinners will embrace certain prerequisite beliefs before the gospel message is introduced. To be sure, voluntarism is an apologetic heresy. But the gu ilt does not lie w ith the method of presuppositionalism —it lies with the method of pre-evangelism. The latter method, not the former, deliberately w ithholds the scriptural interpretation of reality by m aking its appeal to brute fact. Since, however, “brute fact” is a contradiction in terms (equaling “m eaningless” or ‘ factless fact” ) such an appeal calls for “faith” of the most blind sort.

On the other hand, Van T il’s apologetic stresses epistemological awareness: “To argue by presupposition is to indicate w hat are the epistemological and m etaphysical principles that underlie and control one’s m ethod.” 14 Here a presupposition is not just one more bias leading to a stalemate between Christians and non- Christians. T hat would make apologetics a futile enter-

14Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, p. 99.

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prise am ounting to either a shouting m atch between insistent opponents or simply a dead silence. Dr. Van Til avoids this kind of hopeless standoff by draw ing on the principle that faith comes by hearing—hearing the Word of Christ. By the very nature of the case, Christian- theistic presuppositions are the bearers of the gospel message. Unlike formal prejudices, they are the ultimate truths which receive m eaningful expression as they interpret the facts of our experience.

Van T i l ’s followers and foes alike should take note: Presuppositionalism is not a matter of intellectual arm- tw isting—its effectiveness does not hinge on the dogmatic disposition of the apologist or his insistence that he is right and his opponent is wrong. Presuppositionalism is effective to the extent to which the dogm a itself is presented. When the Word of truth is proclaim ed the Spirit of God accompanies that Word w ith power to break down rebellion and transform sinful minds.

Far from withholding revelation from sinners, Van T il’s apologetic is designed to draw attention to G od’s Word at every turn. The message and the evidence are presented to provide “ a fertile g round for the Holy Spirit. . . .” 15 And Van T il urges that “by stating the argum ent as clearly as we can, we may be the agents of the Spirit in pressing the claims of God upon m en.” 16

So it is difficult to figure out what prom pted some of the objections voiced by Pinnock and the others. Admittedly, Van T il’s argum ent is circular. T h a t’s because it is

15Van Til, “My Credo,” p. 2E16VanTil, Common Grace and the Gospel, p. 62.

1 0 2 O B JE C T IO N S A N D R E PL IE S

systematic. All systematic argum ents are ultimately circular—they all rely on a particular system which enables some conclusions and not others. Van T il’s po in t is that the C hristian circle of thought can be presented for what it is, because it possesses the power and authority to subdue what w ould otherwise be a vicious circle on the part of nonbelievers. If the non- C hristian will “place himself upon the C hristian position for argum ent’s sake . . . ,” 17 he will be confronted w ith G od’s authoritative interpretation of the evidences, w hich is to say he will be confronted w ith the authoritative Lord. No other challenge or offense is necessary.

T he criticisms issued by Pinnock result largely from a faulty distinction between presuppositions and evidences. He seems to say that one may either argue by presupposition or appeal to historical facts.18 With that dilem m a in m ind, P innock naturally endorses the hard facts. For him, it is a question of whether one offers the message or not. Obviously, Christians ought to present the facts of the gospel. W hat could be w rong with that?

T he problem is that Dr. Pinnock overlooks the in tricate interplay between presuppositions and facts. Both he and Dr. M ontgomery seem unaware that they, as believers, are sitting on a gold-mine of presuppositions. In the past they have dipped into that hidden treasure m ost noticeably when confronted w ith the question of biblical inerrancy, yet w ithout adm itting the cash-value of the presuppositional method. U ntil recently it was

17Van T il, T h e D e f e n s e o f t h e F a i th , p. 100.18Pinnock, “T he P h ilosop h y of Christian Evidences,” p. 421.


Pinnock w ho would say, “ Infallib ility is a necessary inference to be drawn from the biblical doctrine of insp ira tion ’’;19 or else, “Scripture nowhere suggests a canon outside itself by which it is to be judged” ;20 and again, “Inductive difficulties encountered in the text cannot change the fact that the Bible claims not to err.”21

Language like this does not do much to confute Van T il’s position. Indeed, C hristian apologists who oppose his stance have unadm ittedly made it their posture now and then when pressed under the weight of certain issues. Biblical inerrancy is that kind of issue.

It is sad to note, however, that in recent years Dr. Pinnock has bowed in the direction of inerrancy’s opponents. Somehow since his admirable Defense of Biblical In fa llib ility (1967) he has decided that the “inductive difficulties” do underm ine the Bible’s claim not to err. In a volume entitled Biblical Authority (1977) both P innock and Ramm jo in Jack Rogers (ed.), Paul Rees, Berkeley Mickelsen, Earl Palmer, and David H ubbard in their tribute to a fallible Bible.22 “Of course the Bible is error-ridden,” Pinnock announces at one po in t.23 And from there he applauds Barth, a “powerful

19Pinnock, “Our Source of Authority: the Bible,” Bibliotheca Sacra, 124, No. 494 (April-June, 1967), 154. See also A Defense of Biblical Infallibility (Philadelphia: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Co., 1967), p. 10.

20Pinnock, A Defense of Biblical Infallibility, p. 8.21Ibid., p. 18.22Jack Rogers, ed., Biblical Authority (Waco, TX: Word Books, 1977).23Pinnock, “Three Views of the Bible in Contemporary Theology,”

ibid., p. 52.

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ally . . . in the defense of biblical authority,”24 whose critical honesty Pinnock finds preferable to the “War- fieldian theory of perfect errorlessness.”25

It is startling to see where an inductive method will take you as it casts judgment on the trustworthiness of scriptural phenomena independently of biblical presuppositions. The irony is that while Warfield favored that inductive method, others have followed it precisely to a denial of his strong inerrancy position. Daniel Fuller, for one, buttressed his limited inerrancy view by making frequent appeals to Warfield.26

But the crucial difference between Warfield and a Fuller, a Pinnock, or a Ramm is that Warfield, though not an avowed presuppositionalist, remained fundamentally committed to the Bible’s claim not to err. He spoke, for instance, in favor of an “immense presumption against alleged facts contradictory of the biblical doctrine.”27 It is not that Warfield’s “presumption” for Christianity represented a presupposition in the Van Tilian sense. Warfield’s presumption did not boast absolute certainty. Yet one has to wonder: would Warfield or, today, Montgomery ever really allow particular evidences to count against the claims of Scripture? It is hard to imagine that either would.

24Ibid., p. 56.25Ibid., p. 68.26Daniel Fuller, “The Nature of Biblical Inerrancy,” Journal of the

American Scientific Affiliation, 24, No. 2 (June, 1972), 47-51. See also Dewey Beegle, The Inspiration of Scripture (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1963).

27Warfield, “The Real Problem of Inspiration,” p. 214.


Even Pinnock would deny that the claims of Scripture contain error. For although he takes issue with War- fieldian inerrancy, he is happy with the Lausanne Covenant position that Scripture is “without error in all that it affirms.”28 So even Pinnock, the opponent of presuppositionalism, and now the opponent of absolute inerrancy, is held partially in check by remnant biblical presuppositions.

My point is that all Christian apologists presuppose certain biblical commitments, regardless of whether they are willing to call them presuppositions. The wide discrepancy between Christian apologists arises from the varying degrees of consistency with which they honor those commitments in their apologetic method.

Van Til has adopted the best principles of Warfield and Kuyper and has developed an apologetic which is amazingly consistent with Scripture. In doing so, he has ignored neither Scripture nor the facts of experience. He freely invites nonbelievers to search both the Scriptures and the laboratory in order to see the facts for what they are.29 His presuppositions are anything but empty postulates—they make full use of Christian evidences, the interpretation of which is the proclamation of God’s Word.

28Pinnock, “Three Views of the Bible,” p. 68, my emphasis. How then does Pinnock differ from Warfield? Do not they both hold that the Bible is free of error in all it intends to say? Clearly the controversy is over what the Bible does and does not intend to affirm in each context. That being the question, there is no warrant for claiming the Scriptures contain errors, especially since Scripture unmistakably intends to say it is God's Word.

29Van Til, Apologetics, p. 2.

P A R T I V

BiM ical E xam ples

an d Suim m ary

Resurrection Evidencesat Work

ONLY a few illustrations of the use of evidences have been offered until now. This chapter should . help to make u p for that lack by exam ining

several biblical examples. The examples are found in passages which depict, in a variety of ways, the use of evidences pertain ing to the resurrection of Jesus. My purpose is to show not only how evidences can be and have been employed, but also how Van T i l ’s apologetic adm irably accounts for the type of treatm ent evidences receive in these texts.

Five passages will be considered: one from Jo h n ’s Gospel, three from the book of Acts, and one from P au l’s first letter to the Corinthians.

John 20:24-29

John describes Jesus’ post-resurrection appearance to Thom as. In this setting, Jesus is the apologist, and

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110 R E S U R R E C T IO N E V ID E N C E S AT W O R K

Thom as, the disbeliever.1 T he other disciples had already reported to him that they had seen the risen Christ. But Thom as would not believe. In effect, he set up his very own verification criterion: he demanded visual and tangible evidence that Jesus was raised. Thom as would believe only if Christ could pass the empirical test.

W hen Jesus appeared before the doubter, there was no shortage of physical evidence. The correspondence between T hom as’s demands in verse 25 and Jesus’ fulfillm ent in verse 27 is noteworthy:

Thomas Jesus

Unless I shall see in His hands the imprint of the nails,

and put my finger into the place of the nails,

and put my hand into His side,

I will not believe.

see My hands;

reach here your fingers;

reach here your hand, and put it into My side;

and be not unbelieving, but believing.

Yet there is more going on here than simply a physical display. T hom as’s response makes that clear: “ My Lord and my G od!’’ (v. 28).2

‘In a very real sense Jesus is always the apologist—we do not confront sinners. Whenever we do apologetics we draw men’s attention to the claims of the authoritative Lord.

2Leon Morris notes that until this incident, no one had addressed Jesus in such exalted terms. The Gospel According to John (GrandRapids, Mich: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1975), pp. 853-54.

R E S U R R E C T IO N E V ID E N C E S AT W O R K 111

Why did not T hom as answer in a well-what-do-you- know manner? Why was he not sim ply amused, in trigued, perplexed, suspicious? T he answer is that he had been confronted with the Lord. The evidence Thom as observed not only showed him the hands and side of Jesus: the evidence signified the authority of the risen Lord and God. This was no brute appearance. T he divine character of Jesus was expressed in several ways. He had m iraculously entered the room even though the doors were locked (v. 26). His very first words were, “Peace be w ith you’’ (v. 26), indicating that this was the same Jesus who had prom ised peace and who had “overcome the w orld.’’3 He had demonstrated omniscience as well as condescending patience in m atching the demands of Thom as point by point. In hum ility He showed the wounds that would atone for sin. And w ith all this His authority was accented by His com m and to believe.

Thus, the value of all the evidence was its significance w ithin a particular framework of understanding. In the passage there is a pronounced shift away from the physical wounds themselves to the self-attesting Christ who “was pierced through for our transgressions’’ and “crushed for our in iqu ities’’ (Isa. 53:5). The evidence was more than enough, and there is no indication in the text that Thom as ever followed through with his em pirical test. Suddenly that had become unnecessary. T he

3John 14:27, “Peace I leave with you, My peace I give to you, not as the world gives, do I give to you. Let not your heart be troubled, nor let it be fearful.” John 16:33, “These things I have spoken to you, that in Me you may have peace. In the world you have tribulation, but take courage, I have overcome the world.”

1 1 2 R E S U R R E C T IO N E V ID E N C E S AT W O R K

tables had been turned, and now it was time for Thomas to answer to the highest authority.

The problem had not been a lack of evidence. In fact, Jesus implied that Thomas should have believed when the disciples first reported the resurrection to him. The problem had been that he had not appreciated their report in light of Jesus’ divine authority and His many earlier claims that He would return from the grave.4 Had Thomas done so, he would never have thought it necessary to call for more evidence. Thus Jesus’ words, “Blessed are they who did not see, and yet believed’’ (v. 29).

Acts 1:3Like the previous example, this verse depicts Jesus in the role of an apologist. His audience is the apostles whose initial response to His resurrection was disbelief.5 Here Luke reports that Jesus “presented Himself alive” to the apostles “by many convincing proofs.”

The word “proofs” is not too strong a translation of TtK/xTjpioLS. Calvin saw fit to translate it as such, in contrast to Erasmus who favored “arguments.” “Convincing proofs” (NASB and NIV) or “infallible proofs” (KJV) is most proper. The Greek noun reKprjpLov “is used by Plato and Aristotle to denote the strongest proof

4See Matthew 12:38-40; 16:21; 17:23; 20:19; 27:63; Mark 14:58, plus their parallels.

5Mark 16:11; Luke 24:11.


of which a subject is susceptible,” writes J. A. Alexander, in his commentary on Acts.6

The form of the proof is of interest to us. Jesus “presented Himself alive, after His suffering, by many convincing proofs, appearing to [the apostles] over a period of forty days, and speaking of the things concerning the kingdom of God.”

Again the physical appearance of Jesus is placed into meaningful perspective. The proof took the dual form of appearing and speaking, the latter (presuppositions) providing interpretation for the former (evidences). More specifically, Jesus taught His apostles about the kingdom of God, and thereby introduced Himself as King. His kingdom would be characterized by spiritual power (1:5-8). As risen Lord, all power and authority had been granted to Him by the Father; Jesus would therefore send His Spirit with power and abide with His disciples, “even to the end of the age” (Matt. 28:18-20; Cf. John 14:26; 15:26; 20:22; Acts 2:33).

So, Jesus not only “presented Himself alive. ” That in itself would have been interesting, perhaps. But He “presented Himself alive”—His speech gave sense to that strange event. As Van Til would say, it was not the mere fact that a corpse was resuscitated—the that and the what combine to make a momentous resurrection attested to by irrefutable proof.

6Joseph Addison Alexander, Commentary on the Acts of the Apostles (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Zondervan, 1956), p. 5.

Acts 2:14-36This passage helps to illustrate the close interaction of presuppositions with evidences. Here Peter is addressing a crowd of incredulous Jews on the day of Pentecost. The Holy Spirit had been poured out upon the Christians gathered together. When Jews “from every n a tio n ” (v. 5) heard their own languages spoken by this band of Galilean Christians, they were bewildered. Yet some resorted to mockery, a ttribu ting this m anifestation of spiritual power to the intoxicating effect of wine.

Peter’s sermon is, therefore, aimed at setting straight this faulty interpretation of the tongues phenom enon. He begins by denying the charge of drunkenness. W hat the Jews were seeing should be understood as the fulfillment of Joel’s prophecy (Joel 2:28-32) that in the last days G od’s Spirit would be poured out upon all m ankind, producing prophecies, visions, dreams, and w onders. T he clim ax of Joel’s prophecy is cited by Peter in verse 21: “And it shall be; that every one who calls on the name of the Lord shall be saved.”

If the Jews did not understand the significance of the tongues at Pentecost, it was because they did not understand that Jesus is Lord. Peter thus develops an argument for the lordship of Jesus.

T he tone of address to the Jews makes it clear that they bear an immense responsibility for their ignorance. Twice Peter emphatically demands their attention implying that his message ought to have special significance for them .7 He introduces Jesus as “a m an attested to you

7Acts 2:14, “Men of Judea, and all you who live in Jerusalem, let this

114


by God with miracles and wonders and signs which God performed through H im in your midst, just as you yourselves know ” (v. 22). Peter then indicts them for nailing Jesus to a cross “by the hands of godless m en” (v. 23).

From the guilt of the Jews, Peter turns quickly to the m ajor po in t in his argum ent for Jesus’ lordship: “And God raised H im up again, pu tting an end to the agony of death, since it was im possible for H im to be held in its pow er” (v. 24).8 T he resurrection of Jesus gives evidence that He is Lord. Peter elaborates by citing David’s statem ent that God would not allow His Holy One to undergo decay or to be abandoned in Hades (v. 27).9 Lest the Jews th ink that David was merely referring to himself, Peter assures his audience that David “both died and was buried, and his tomb is with us to this day” (v. 29). No, David was not allud ing to himself as a resurrected Lord. Instead, “he looked ahead and spoke of the resurrection of the Christ . . .” (v. 31). T hus Peter announces, “T his Jesus God raised up again, to which we are all witnesses” (v. 32). The im plied conclusion is that Jesus, therefore, is truly Lord.

be known to you, and give heed to my words”; Acts 2:22, “Men of Israel, listen to these words. . . . ”

8Alexander comments, “The verb (KpareCodaL) which in classical Greek denotes conquest or superiority, in the New Testament always means to hold or to be holden fast, either in a literal or figurative sense, but never perhaps without some trace of its original and proper import, as for instance in the case before us, where the sense is that he could not be permanently held fast by death as a captive or conquered enemy” (Commentary on the Acts of the Apostles, p. 72).

9From Psalm 16:8-11.


Logicians may wonder about the soundness of Peter’s argum ent. His reasoning seems to run as follows:

1) The Messiah/Lord was to be resurrected.2) Jesus was resurrected._________________

Therefore Jesus is the Messiah/Lord.

But w ould that argum ent com m it the same fallacy as the following?:

1) My cat is a mammal.2) Your dog is a mammal._____

Therefore your dog is my cat.

The fallacy involves an “undistributed” middle term. W hile it is true that my cat and your dog belong to the class of mammals, they are each a very small part of that class and distinct from each other. Therefore, they are not necessarily connected by the middle term, m am m al. The only way this syllogism could be strictly valid is if all members of the class of m am m als were referred to in at least one premise.

Likewise, in order for Peter’s argum ent to be a valid proof of Jesus’ lordship, he w ould have to show that the M essiah’s resurrection and Jesus’ resurrection were not two distinguishable types.

Peter does just that. Jesus’ resurrection is a one-of-a- kind event. His unique victory over death qualified H im to be exalted to the righ t hand of God and to receive from the Father the promise of the Holy Spirit whose power was displayed that day (v. 33).

Inasm uch as the risen Savior was granted this u ltimate authority, His resurrection corresponds w ith the description found in Psalm 110:1. The Lord would sit


at the right hand of the Father until H is enemies were made a footstool for His feet (vv. 34, 35). T hus, on the basis of the prophetic description of the L ord’s resurrection, and Jesus’ fulfillm ent thereof, Peter’s conclusion is inescapable: “Therefore let all the house of Israel know for certain that God has made H im both Lord and C hrist—this Jesus whom you crucified” (v. 36).

T he interaction between evidences and presuppositions in this passage is intriguing. For example, the diverse tongues are evidence for the lordship of Jesus, given the fact of the resurrection. In turn , the resurrection is recognized as evidence that Jesus is Lord and Christ, given David’s prophecies in Psalms 16 and 110. But then, from another perspective, the tongues serve as evidence for the resurrection, given the character of the Lord described in verse 33.

Does the resurrection act as evidence or as presupposition in this text? It seems to do both. Peter treats it as som ething which is both evident (in some sense, observable) and presupposed (basic to the interpretation of the phenom ena). T he pattern here lends generous support to Van T il’s em phasis upon the C hristian system as a un it and his circular m ethod show ing the authority of the self-attesting Lord.

Acts 26Paul’s defense before Agrippa is recorded in this chapter. T he apostle had been thrown into jail for preaching the resurrection of Jesus. T hus his argum ent is im plicitly a defense of the resurrection, and not prim arily a defense of his life.


T his case helps to show the distinction between a tem poral or topical starting-point and a logical or epistemological one. Paul chooses to ‘"begin” the defense w ith a discussion of his life prior to his conversion. He was “a Pharisee according to the strictest sect” (v. 5). And m uch of the chapter is taken up w ith the events leading to and including his conversion.

Yet, wedged in the midst of this testimony is Paul’s observation of the irony that he was standing trial ‘‘for the hope of the prom ise made by God to our fathers” (v. 6). T his is followed by a penetrating rhetorical question: ‘‘Why is it considered incredible am ong you people if God does raise the dead?” (v. 8).

W hat does this question have to do w ith the broader discussion of P au l’s conversion? T he answer is that P au l’s conversion enabled him to realize the hope of the promise to Israel. And the substance of that hope is the resurrection of Jesus. W hile Paul speaks at length of his former life and conversion, he states in verses 22 and 23,

. . . I stand to this day testifying both to small and great, stating nothing but what the Prophets and Moses said was going to take place; that the Christ was to suffer, and that by reason of His resurrection from the dead He should be the first to proclaim light both to the Jewish people and to the Gentiles.

In other words, P au l’s transformed life, including his preaching of Jesus, serves as evidence for the resurrection of Christ.

Several factors accompany that evidence thereby m aking the resurrection a most credible event. Paul seems to


have made a concerted effort to place the whole question w ithin the framework of Old Testament promise. In effect he asks, W hat is so unbelievable about the fu lfillment of G od’s promises? Surely his Jewish audience would not openly deny the hope of Israel expressed by Moses and the prophets, would they?

But Paul presses the question even deeper. Not only is the credibility of the Old Testament fathers at stake. Ultimately the question boils down to whether God is w illing and able to raise the dead. Paul seems to be saying that his conversion and his preaching of the resurrection are “incredible” to the Jews because they had not really considered the God of Scripture.

P au l’s use of “ if” in verse 8 should not disturb us. He is not suggesting that it is uncertain whether God does raise the dead. His use of “if” (el) carries the sense of “given th a t” or “supposing” or “presupposing.” 10 If one presupposes the biblical God, then the idea of a resurrection from the dead is not incredible at all. Such a God is the presuppositional reference point according to which all other matters are decided.

So the general pattern of P au l’s defense shows his conversion to be evidence for Jesus’ resurrection, given or presupposing the God who revealed His prom ise to Israel th rough Moses and the prophets. The facts of Paul’s conversion supply the topical starting-point for his defense. But ultimately those facts carry their true evidential im port in accordance with his epistem ological starting-point, namely Jehovah God. P au l’s use of

10See also Acts 4:9; 11:17; 16:15, for uses of ei.


' ‘if” brings that God into fresh view. And his appeals to Old Testament promise help characterize the God who alone determines what is or is not genuinely credible.

I Corinthians 15Here Paul highlights the significance of Jesus’ resurrection by exam ining the consequences of denying that fact. In the opening verses of the chapter the apostle places the resurrection of Christ—including His appearances to many eye witnesses—under the description of “ the gospel which I preached to you” (v. 1). T he gospel of Christ means that Jesus was raised—more specifically that He was seen by Cephas, the Twelve, a crowd of over 500, James, the apostles, and finally Paul.

The C orinthian church “received” that gospel (v. 1), so it is ironic that some am ong them disbelieved the resurrection of the dead (v. 12). Paul responds by asking, in effect, how the Corinthians could disassociate the resurrection from other parts of the Christian message. He proceeds to show some of the im plications of that doctrine for the Christian system as a whole.

First, “ . . . if there is no resurrection of the dead, not even Christ has been raised” (v. 13). Second, “ . . . if Christ has not been raised, then our preaching is vain, your faith also is va in” (v. 14), that is, “em pty” or “contentless” (Kevov). T hird , if the resurrection teaching is not true, the apostles are “ false witnesses” (v. 15). Fourth, w ithout Jesus’ resurrection, faith is “w orthless,” that is, “powerless” or “w ithout effect” (juaraia) and believers are still in their sins (v. 17): those who have died “have perished” (v. 18). Finally, under such


conditions, C hristians “are of all men most to be p itied” (v. 19).

Why does Paul devote so m uch attention to the idea of Christ not being raised? Why set forth hypothetical conditions under which the faith would not be true? Does Paul fear that the rem ains of Jesus’ body may someday be discovered and the gospel would be falsified? Can the Scriptures not claim final certainty? Is the resurrection doctrine still in doubt and contingent upon yet unknow n phenomena?

T hat is not P au l’s concern. By speaking in terms of what may be called the “hypothetical falsifiability” of Christianity, he draws attention to the m eaning of Jesus’ resurrection. For example, the resurrection means that the C hristian faith is not an empty belief; it means that the apostles were not false witnesses; it means that believers are not stranded in sin and that those who have died in Christ have not perished. In other words, by im agin ing hypothetical conditions under which C hristianity would not be true, Paul illustrates what the resurrection does mean and what it does not.

At no poin t, however, does Paul h in t that the Bible is actually in danger of ever being falsified. The hypothetical conditions he m entions could not possibly be realized. T hus, im m ediately after listing the consequences of denying the resurrection, he declares u n m istakably that “Christ has been raised from the dead” (v. 20).

Not only is the actual falsifiability of C hristianity ruled out, but Paul is unable to conceive fully of its falsification, even hypothetically. W hat conclusions


could anyone affirm were Jesus not raised? Would there be any human knowledge? Adam would have been struck down immediately were there no genuine hope of resurrection. There would be no human race to contemplate such a condition. The hypothesis is ultimately unthinkable. And if Paul were to follow out the full consequences of denying the resurrection, nothing could be said.

Yet, in this passage Paul includes in his list of consequences, statements about God (v. 15) and about sin (v. 17) and judgment (v. 18), as if these doctrines would somehow remain intact. This indicates that Paul’s mind was captivated by biblical presuppositions all along. His purpose was not to question whether or not Christianity is true. His aim was to declare the Christian gospel by focusing on the significance of the resurrection. That aim is validated unquestionably throughout the remainder of the chapter. Jesus’ resurrection and its rich implications could not be more vividly and convincingly expressed than Paul portrays them there.

The five sample passages we have examined should suffice to illustrate several points emphasized by Van Til: (1) that evidences do have a proper use; (2) that the interpretation of evidence is an ethical, spiritual matter; (3) that whenever evidences are used they are to carry a distinctively Christian significance whereby they express the gospel; (4) that all the facts support Christian theism as a unit; (5) that the relationship between facts and presuppositions is a circular, systematic one; and (6) that the purpose of discussing evidences is to confront sinners with the self-attesting Christ of Scripture.

It is quite possible that other inferences could and


should be drawn from these passages. And innumerable other types of evidences could be considered. My aim has been to illustrate at least the above-mentioned points, drawing from one general area of evidences—the resurrection. Such examples represent only a small segment of the vast field of evidence for the Christian faith. The challenge is to harness more and more of that limitless evidential reserve according to the principles Van Til has developed.

Summary

I have tried to be true to Dr. Van T i l ’s apologetic— both his explicit claim s and w hat is im plied by them concerning evidences. Here is an attem pt to

view, in one brief setting, “ the total picture.’’ An outline form at will help to condense w hat I believe to be a consistent Van T ilian stance on the often misunderstood study and use of C hristian evidences. T he outline is set in parallel colum ns so that the sharp contrast between Christian and non-C hristian positions is most clearly illustrated:

A. T he facts of G od’s revelation are known by all men.1. Non-Christians are covenant-

breakers in their treatment of the facts.a. Non-Christians attempt

to know the facts yet forget God.

2. Christians are, in principle, covenant-keepers in their treatment of the facts.1 a. Christians acknowledge

that the facts reveal God.

xl say “in principle” because Christians do not always, in practice, live up to the principles they have committed themselves to. In this

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b. Non-Christian “knowledge” is characterized by ethical rebellion against God.

c. Non-Christians “know” only in an intellectualsense.

d. Non-Christians treat the facts as “brute” by emptying them of their significance, especially the obligations toward God that the facts require of men.

e. Non-Christians devise a fiction out of the facts.

b. Christian knowledge is attained in ethical submission to the Lord.

c. Christians know with their whole renewed persons.

d. Christians appreciate the significance of the facts as revelation of Christ’s lordship.

e. Christians recognize the facts for what God created them to be.

B. T he facts constitute evidential proof for Christian theism.1. Traditional theistic proof

does not make proper use of the facts as God’s facts.a. Traditional proofs imply

that man is an autonomous reference point for interpreting the facts.

b. With the sinner, traditional proofs appeal to “brute facts.”

c. Traditional proofs regard the factual case for Christianity to be only probable.

2. Genuine evidential proof shows the facts all to be God’s facts.a. Evidences recognize the

Triune God as the ultimate reference point for interpreting the facts.

b. Evidences treat each fact as proof for Christian theism.

c. Evidences constitute absolutely valid proof for Christianity.

life no Christian is fully consistent: a covenant-keeper may at times behave like a covenant-breaker. But if one is a genuine believer, his basic orientation is that of a covenant-keeper and his treatment of facts will show a general pattern of submission to God.

126 SU M M A R Y

d. In effect, traditional proofs allow sinners excuse by minimizing the perspicuity of natural revelation and by withholding Scripture from the non-Christian.

e. In short, traditional proofs compromise all the biblical teachings including the doctrines of God, man, revelation, creation, the fall, and redemption.

d. Evidences allow the sinner no excuse for ignorance.

e. Evidences depend on and reflect their presuppositional framework which is the whole system of scriptural doctrines.

C. Therefore a Christian use of evidence must be by indirect rather than direct appeal.1. Direct appeals to evidence

present no true defense ofthe faith.a. Direct appeals discuss

“facts” rather than present Scripture.

b. Direct appeals carry no authoritative interpretation of the evidence.

c. Direct appeals imply that non-Christians are neutral in their interpretation of facts.

d. Direct appeals attempt to build understanding on common concepts and categories.

e. Direct appeals do not truly present the facts but allow sinners to continue in fantasy.

2. Indirect appeals defend thefaith with unshakable proof.

a. Indirect appeals present evidences as the restatement of Scripture.

b. Indirect appeals convey the authority of the self- attesting Christ of Scripture.

c. Indirect appeals confront the rebellious will of nonbelievers.

d. Indirect appeals challenge the concepts and categories of sinners.

e. Indirect appeals present the facts for what they are and thereby call sinners back to the reality of life in Christ.

S U M M A R Y 127

“Men have not done justice by the facts, by the evidence of God’s presence before their eyes,” says Van Til, “unless they burst out into praise of him who has made all things.”2 Christian evidences declare God’s glory. They implore us to do the same.

2VanTil, A Christian Theory of Knowledge, p.234.

i!

GeneralIndex

Adam, 33, 4In, 49, 93, 122 Adams, Jay, 25 Agrippa, 117Alexander, J. A., 113, 115n Alston, William, 69-72, 74, 77 Analytical reasoning, 19, 74n Analytic philosophy, 67, 75 A priori, 19, 51, 74n Aristotle, 112Authority. See also Self-attestation

of God circularity and, 117 evidences and, 83, 111, 126 over all of life, 23 ultimate, 100, 112, 113, 116

of Scripture Barth and, 103-4 creation and, 18 evidence and, 81 -82, 94, 126 final, 91-92 knowledge* of, 90n verification and, 19

Autonomy of man, 35, 50, 56, 95, 125. See also Neutrality; Rebellion

Bahnsen, Greg, 14, 17 Barth, Karl, 76, 103 Beegle, Dewey, 104n Blind faith, 16, 99-100. See also

Fideism; Leap of faith; Voluntarism

Borrowed capital, 38-40, 75 Brute facts, 14, 49,94, 100, 111, 125 Bus well, J. Oliver, 13 Calvin, John, 57, 112 Carnell, E. J., 13, 27 Cephas, 120. See also Peter Certainty, 77, 104, 121 Chance, 39, 57 Christ. See Jesus Christ Circularity. See also Self-attesta

tionand authority of Christ, 117 Montgomery and, 46 Pinnoc k and, 98 between presuppositions and

evidence, 74, 77, 91, 122 and systematic arguments, 101-

102, 122

129

130 G E N E R A L I N D E X

Clark, Gordon, 13 Coherence of nature, 56-57. See

also Uniformity of nature Common ground, 19n, 52, 82n Confirmability, 71, 77. See also

Verifiability Confirmation, 72 Covenant, 32-34, 36, 42, 57, 95,

124. See also Ethics David, 36, 115Deduction, 19, 20, 74n, 99. See

also Reason Direct appeals to evidence, 14, 72,

78, 80-81, 126 Epistemology, 24n, 32, 35, 46, 50,

98Erasmus, 112Ethics, 24n, 25, 32. See also Cove

nant and knowledge, 32-36, 125 Evangelism, 25. See also Witness Eve, 49Existence of God

alleged evidence against, 39 all ought to acknowledge, 33 and nature of God, 22 presupposition of, 97 proof of, 56, 99 revealed, 78, 99 verification of, 15

Falsifiability, 69, 76n, 121 Feinberg, Paul, 35 Fideism, 97. See also Blind faith;

Leap of faith; Voluntarism Flew, Antony, 69 Frame, John, 24-25, 26, 28, lb-11,

83-84, 92 Fuller, Daniel, 104 Geisler, Norman, 13 General revelation, 49-50, 58,91-

92,99. See also Natural revelation

Gerstner, John, 13 Gospel, the

and apologetics, 27, 100 and the autonomy of man, 14,

17falsifiability of, 121 and neutrality, 43, 45-56 and presuppositions, 97, 101-

102and the resurrection, 120-122 summaries of, 84-85

Halsey, Jim, 14, 18 Hodge, Charles, 16, 37 Horne, Charles, 65 Hubbard, David, 103 Image of God, 37, 40, 80 Implication, method of, 83. See

also Perspectivalism Indirect appeals to evidence, 72,

78, 81, 126 Induction, 19, 20, 74n, 104 Inerrancy, 47, 102-5 Infallibility, 46-47, 103 Inspiration of Scripture, 46-47,

103Irrationality, 57 James, 120 Jesus Christ

the apologist, 109-10n, 112 authority of, 111-12, 113, 116,

126 belief in, 98crucifixion of, 84, 85, 115doctrine of, 23gospel of, 85, 97, 120 jknowledge of, 90nlife in, 126as Lord, 87, 95, 11 Onlordship of, 94, 114-17

G E N E R A L I N D E X 131

love of God in, 71 love toward, 93 need for, 95resurrection of, 51, 79, 83, 85,

92, 109-22 as Savior, 116 of Scripture, 81, 94, 122 self-attesting, 81,94, 111, 122,

126sonship of, 83 the Truth, 38words of, 57, 84, 101, 112, 113 works of, 57

Joel, the prophet, 114 John, the apostle, 109 Kuhn, Thomas, 75n Kuyper, Abraham, 14-15, 18, 37,

66, 105 Language, 77, 80, 88

biblical, 76and definitions, 39, 89-90 immanent, 76 metaphysical, 68 nonobservational, 69-73 observational, 69-73, 76 odd, 75-76 ordinary, 75-76 religious, 68, 75-77 systematic character of, 74, 76 theological, 68-69, 72-73 transcendent, 76

Lausanne Covenant, 105 Leap of faith, 97. See also Blind

faith; Fideism; Voluntarism Lewis, Gordon, 13, 15, 97 Logical positivists, 67-68, 72 Luke, 112Machen, J. Gresham, 59 Metaphysics, 69

Mickelsen, Berkeley, 103 Miracles, 51, 57, 58, 115 Montgomery, John W., 13

on apologetics and theology, 27

on history, 48 and inerrancy, 102, 104 on knowledge of God, 35, 41 n and neutrality, 46-47 and presuppositionalism, 98,

102versus Van Til, 15, 27, 96-97,

98Morris, Leon, 11 On Moses, 118-119 Nash, Ronald, 13, 48 Natural revelation, 41,44, 52, 55,

66, 126. See also General revelation

Neutrality, 43-45, 49, 52-53, 54, 126. See also Autonomy of man

Objectivity, 44n, 45, 49 Obligation, 25, 33, 57,95. See also

Covenant Obscuration of facts, 55, 61 Palmer, Earl, 103 Paul, the apostle, 109

before Agrippa, 117-120 on the gospel, 84,85,92n, 120-

122on knowing God, 32, 35-36,

37on the resurrection, 92n, 117-

119, 121-22consequences of denying,

76n, 120-22 as witness, 26n

Perspectivalism, 26, 83-84. See also Implication, method of


Perspicuity of natural revelation, 44, 55, 126

Peter, the apostle, 114-17, 120 Pinnock, Clark, 13

on autonomy of man, 35 on common ground, 52 on inerrancy, 103-5 on moral inclinations of man,

34on openness of evidence, 43-

44on sinful rebellion, 50-51 versus Van Til, 15, 51, 67, 99,

101on apologetics as pre-evan

gelism, 25, 27 on circularity, 98 on neutrality, 45-46 on presuppositionalism, 96-

97, 102 on probability, 59 on voluntarism, 100

Plato, 112Point of contact, 40, 79. See also

Image of God Poythress, Vern, 85n Pre-evangelism, 25, 27, 45, 100 Presuppositions, 51

atheistic, 39and circularity, 77, 91, 122 and definitions, 39 in dialogue, 91 and epistemological aware

ness, 100 and evidences, 96

independence of 86, 102 interdependence of, 20,74, 77,

78, 91, 92, 102, 114, 117, 122, 126

and the existence of God, 96 and facts, 17, 81 and the gospel, 101 and inerrancy, 102, 104-5 and infallibility, 47 and inspiration, 47 and interpretation, 40, 46, 78,

101necessity of, 13, 40, 45, 50, 81 and starting-point, 81-82 systematic, 72, 122 and verifiability, 77

Prophecy, 57, 114, 117, 118 Probability, 59-60, 125 Proof, theistic, 18n, 19, 67n. See

also Verification absolute, 59, 61, 62 cosmological, 56 evidential, 54, 58, 59, 75, 113,

125-26in general revelation, 58, 99 indirect, 78 infallible, 112 innumerable, 57 objective, 60 ontological, 56 and presuppositions, 113, 126 and Scripture, 17, 56, 61, 66,

92, 126 in special revelation, 58 teleological, 56 traditional, 61, 125-26 valid, 55, 116, 125 Van Til in favor of, 17, 18n,

19, 54-66, 92 Quine, Willard, 73-74, 77 Ramm, Bernard, 13

on apologetics, role of, 27 on inerrancy, 47, 103-4

G E N E R A L I N D E X 133

on knowledge as spiritual, 34-35

on neutrality, 46, 52 and presuppositions, 47, 51

Reason, 16, 17, 19, 20, 99. See also Deduction

Rebellion, 39, 78. See also Autonomy of man

and evidences, 50-51, 54 and facts, 95 irrational, 99and knowledge, 34, 41, 125 overcome by Word and Spirit,

101Rees, Paul, 103 Resurrection of Christ, 79

evidence for, 109-13, 117, 118, 119, 123

and the gospel, 118, 120-22 implications of, 83, 92, 115-

116, 120-22 and lordship, 115-16 and natural law, 51 and presupposing God, 119 proof of, 112

Rogers, Jack, 103 Rushdoony, Rousas, 13 Satan, 50Schaeffer, Francis, 13 Science, 28Self-attestation. See also Jesus

Christ, self-attesting of Scripture, 19, 94

Special revelation, 49-50, 57, 91 Starting-point, 96-97. See also

Common ground epistemological, 82, 118, 119 immediate, 82n proximate, 82n

topical, 82, 87, 118, 119 ultimate, 82n

Theism. See also Existence of God and evidences, 28, 125 and facts, 86-87, 90, 125 implications for other doc

trines, 22-23, 83 proof of, 56, 125 a unit, 122 vindication of, 22, 28

Theistic proof. See Proof, theistic Thomas, 109-12 Uniformity of nature, 56-57. See

also Coherence of nature Verifiability. See also Verification

biblical, 75 of Christianity, 13 conclusive, 68, 77 criterion, the, 68-69, 72, 74 legitimacy of, 65-67

Verification. See also Proof; Verifiability

and biblical authority, 14, 18, 19, 67

of Christianity, 75 controversy, the, 67, 75 criterion, 110dependent or independent, 14,

18direct or indirect, 69, 71, 78 genuine, 75 of God’s existence, 15 legitimacy of, 14-15, 18, 65-66 and religious language, 69,

71,75-76 ;Volition, 35Voluntarism, 99-100. See also

Blind faith; Fideism; Leap of faith


Warfield, B. B.on apologetics, the scope of,

22on blind faith, 16 and inerrancy, 104-5 on inspiration, 47

mind of man, structure of, 52 on probability, 59-61 on sin and knowledge, 41n

Wholly Other, 76 Witness, 25-26

ScriptureIndex

Genesis 1:1—93 2:17—93 3:15ff.—93

Job1:21—93

Psalms 16—117 16:8-11 — 115 19:1—36 19:1, 3—73 24:1, 2—93 110—117 110:1 — 116

Proverbs1:7—37

Isaiah53:5—111

Joel2:28-32—114

Micah 6:8—85n

Matthew 4:19—26n 6:19—93 6:24—37, 93 7:7—85n 10:39—85n 11:29—85n 12:38-40—112n 16:21 —112n 17:23—112n 18:3—85n 19:21—84 20:19—112n 22:34-40—85 25:34-40—85 27:63—112n 28:18-20—113

Mark14:58—112n 16:11 — 112n

*

V

135

136 S C R I P T U R E I N D E X

Luke Romans4:18, 19—84 1:20—38, 7312:15ff.—93 1:21—3724:11 —112n 1:25—80

8:20—93John 8:20ff.—931:18—73 8:28—935:24—8414:26—113 I Corinthians14:27—11 In 2:2—8415:26—113 15-120-2316:33—11 In 15:1 ff.—92n20:22—113 15:17—76n20:24-29—109-12

GalatiansActs 5:22—841:3-112-131:5-8—113 Ephesians1:8—26n 4:24—372:14-36—114-172:33—113 Colossians4:9—119n 3:10—3711:17—119n16:15—119n James22:14, 15—26n l:2ff.—9326-117-20 1:27—84

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Van Til & The Use of Evidence by Thom Notaro

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