seminar on

CYBER SECURITY FOR SUBSTATION AUTOMATION SYSTEMS

byVeena Vijay Kakati

(USN : 2JI14EPS )

Department of Electrical & Electronics Engineering

[Affiliated by AICTE, recognized research center of VTU Belgavi]

Jain Engineering College, Belgavi

J G I

Under the guidance ofProf. Shubha Baravani

EEED,JCE,BELAGAVI

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M.Te

ch., P

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EE, JC

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gavi

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION OVERVIEW OF SCADA

Components of SCADA Common vulnerabilities of scada

RECENT CASES OF THREATS SYSTEMATIC APPROACH TO ENHANCE CYBER

SECURITY Standards to be followed Types of cyber security threats Key requirements for substation

COMMON TECHNOLOGIES FOR CYBER SECURITY

CONCLUSION REFERENCES 2

INTRODUCTION

Many automation and power control systems are integrated into the ‘Smart Grid’ concept for efficiently managing and delivering electric power. This integrated approach has created several challenges that need to be taken into consideration such as cyber security issues, information sharing, and regulatory compliance.

OVERVIEW OF SCADA

SCADA systems lie at the heart of power utility control networks and monitors the entire power control system in real time.

The devices allow utilities such as power plants, to remotely control and monitor power generation devices and substations over phone lines, radio links and, IP networks

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COMPONENTS OF SCADA SYSTEM

A Human-Computer Interface A computer (supervisor) Remote Terminal Units (RTU) Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC) Communication between the RTU and the

computer

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COMMON VULNERABILITIES Category Common Vulnerability

Poor code Quality Use of potentially dangerous functions in the code

Vulnerable Services Poor authentication, Clear text authentication. No password, Weak password

Network Protocol Implementations Buffer Overflow is possible, Lack of bounds checking in the service

Information disclosure Unencrypted communication , weak protection of users credentials

Network component configuration vulnerabilities

Access to specific ports on the host not restricted to required IP address, Port security not implemented on network equipment

RECENT CASES OF POWER THREATS

Chinese PLA hackers are blamed to have accidentally triggered the power shortage in Florida, in April 2009.

In July 2010, the Windows computer worm, Stuxnet, was propagated in the industrial software and equipment. The worm was targeted only to Siemens SCADA with a highly specific payload to reprogram the operation of attached uranium refining centrifuges in Iranian facilities.

WHAT IS CYBER SECURITY REQUIREMENT ?

Confidentiality

Integrity

Availability

Unauthorised access to Infomation

UnauthorisedModification or Theft of Infomation

Denial of Service orPrevention ofAuthorised Access

SYSTEMATIC APPROACH TO ENSURE CYBER SECURITY

Standards Main focus

IEC 61850 Substation Communication Requirements

IEC 62351 Cover Security Information

NISTIR 7628 A tool and set for implementation Smart Grid

NERC CIP It is an international regulatory authority established to evaluate the reliability of the bulk power system

IEEE 1686-2007 Security for IED’s

CYBER SECURITY THREATS TO SUBSTATION NETWORKS

Deliberate threat

Inadvertent threat

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FOR NETWORK SECURITY

For network security, general security mechanism is AAA (Authentication, Authorization and Accounting).

The following technologies can be applied using the AAA standard.

SNMPv3: Simple Network Management Protocol.

RADIUS: Remote Authentication Dial in User Service.

TACACS: TACACS stands for Terminal Access Controller Access-Control System.

SSH: Secure Shell

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OTHER TECHNOLOGIES FOR CYBER SECURITY

The following technologies can address data security issues in substation communication networks.

Switch Level Security Router Level Security Firewall Level Security Gateway Security VPN

OpenVPNIPSec

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CONCLUSION

Cyber Security tools help to protect and control the data that may need to traverse untrusted network paths located near substation networks.

Cyber Security maintains the reliability and safety of control systems and reduces operational expenses in substations.

REFERENCES

[1]. A thesis by Venkatraman Sridharan. Georgia Institute “Cyber Security in Power Systems” of Technology May 2012. [2]. ABB’s Manual & ABB “White paper manual for cyber security”- Dec-2010. [3]. Hirschmann , WP 1004HE – Part 5 , “White Paper – Data Communication in Substation Automation System (SAS)” Cyber security in substation communication network. [4]. S. Siddharth and G. Manimaran, “Data integrity attacks and their impacts on SCADA control system” IEEE PES General Meeting, 2010

THANK YOU