Veresov Forgotten

7/28/2019 Veresov Forgotten

1/31

A d v a n c e s i n C u l t u r a l P s y c h o l o g y :C o n s t r u c t i n g H u m a n D e v e l o p m e n tJ a a n V a l s i n e rSeries Editor

Living in Poverty: Developmental Poetics of Cultural Realit ies (2010)Edited by Ana Cecilia S. Bastos and Elaine P. Rabinovich

Methodologica l Thinking in Psychology: 60 Years Gone Ast ray? (2010)Edited by Aaro Toomela and Jaan Va ls iner

Re lat ing to Environments: A New Look at Umwelt (2009)Edited by Rosemarie Sokol ChangRethinking Language, Mind, and World Dia logica l ly (2009)

By Per LinellInnovat ing Genesis: Microgenesis and the Construct ive Mind in Act ion (2008 )

Edited by Emily Abbey and Ra iner Dir iwachterDiscovering Cultura l Psychology: A Prof i le and Se lected Readings of Ernest E . Boesch (2007)

By Walter J. Lonner and Susan na A . HayesOtherness in Quest ion: Deve lopment of the Se lf (2007)

Edited by L iv ia Mathias S imao and Jaan Va ls inerSemiot ic Rotat ions: Modes of Meanings in Cultura l Worlds (2007)Edited by SunHee K im Gertz , Jaan Va ls iner, and Jean-Paul Breaux

Trust and Distrust: Sociocultural Perspectives (2007)Edited by Ivana Markova and A lex Gi l lespie

Transit ions: Symbol ic Resources in Deve lopment (2006)Edited by Tania Z it toun and Neuchate l

Becoming Other: From Soc ia l Interact ion to Se lf -Ref lect ion (2006)Edited by Alex Gillespie

Chal len ges and St rategies for Studying H uma n Deve lopm ent in Cultura l Contexts (20 05)Edited by Cynthia L ight foot , Maria Lyra , and Jaan Va ls iner


2/31


3/31

CHAPTER 12

F O R G O T T E N M E T H O D O L O G YV Y G O T S K Y ' S C A SE 1

N i k o l a i V e r e s o v

T he XX Ist I nternational Congress of Psychology in Paris was opened byPaul Fraisse, its President, with an address whose first sentence was:T he f iel d of psychol ogy is in a state of crisis. T he crisis is mor e than a parox -ysm of growth, however, because it is theory that is really at stake. We are, infact, in the midst of a scientifi c revolution and, in K uhn's terminol ogy, we arework ing our way toward a new paradigm. ( X X I e Congress International dePsychology, 1978, p. 63)

Since 1978 not so much changes happened.A t the APA A nnual Convention in New Y ork in 1995 almost twenty yearsafter the Paris Congress, David Bakan, among many others, made a strongstatement that the crisis of psychology is not in the lack of psychologists orlack of literature being produced. It is in the poor development of under-standing of human life, the science itself, and the relationship of the scienceto the world. In his paper, Bakan discusses three senses in whi ch there hasbeen loss subject matter, method, and the mission (Bakan, 1996). Suchclaim indicates that the crisis is not historical, but rather methodol ogi cal.A sY urevich (2009) mentions:Even so, in spite of the circumstances that mitigate the sense of crisis muchof the psychological communi ty is highly sensitive to it, and not so muc h to

Methodological Thinking in Psychology: 60 Years Gone Astray?, pages 267-295Copyright 2009 by Inl bi'imil lon Agr Publ ishingAll rights of rcprocliu iliin In miy form reserved. 267


4/31

268 N I K O L A I V E R E S O Vthe symptoms menti oned above but to the lack of progress in overcomingthem. Assessments of the general methodol ogi cal status of psychology givenby Wil li am J ames, Karl Buhler, and others over the past hundred years do notdi ff er much f rom modern assessments of the crisis. T hus, any present-daypsychologi st woul d probably go along wi th J ames' contenti on that psychol-ogy is reminiscent, of physics before Galileo: there is not a single universallyrecognized fact nor a single universall y shared generali zation (J ames, 1890).L ack of progress in overcoming the crisis puts into question the progress ofpsychologi cal science in general (Y urevich, 2009, p. 2).2Y et, it is very comfortabl e crisis, at least for psychologists. I n contrast tophysicians, experimental psychologists feel free from mind-crashing puz-

zles of how to interpret theoretically the data they obtain; as for psycho-logical theoretici ansthey are f ree to mix various concepts and pri nciplesin order to create "the theory" they like to create, as if they are building ahouse out of L ego blocks. For developed3 sciences, for example, physics orbiology, the crisis is extraordinary situation which requires the unificationof efforts to overcome it as soon as possible. For psychology the permanentcrisis is an ordinary state of affairs,which everybody in this science experi-ences as something normal . T he situation looks like the classical anecdoteabout the patient who had a problem, but after visiting psychoanalyst hehas the same probl em, and now he is not worryi ng anymore, but is justproud of it. In some sense such situation in psychology is understandable,especially now, in the so-called post-postmodernist times, when every opin-ion is correct, every truth is the truth and at the same time it is not. Whatelse could we expect in a situation when Culture was gradually reduced toText, then to Discourse and finally to the Narrative, and the personalitywas reduced to the A gent and then to Recipi ent-R eagent? Psychology goeseven further: as Tatsuya Sato has to note, one of the defining features ofcontemporary psychological methodology is to depict a person as a mixtureof many relatively independent "variables." "Ironically speaking, human be-ings are viewed as if they were determined by precisely those many variablesin which psychologists have interest" (Sato et al, 2007 p. 53).

M ore than ten years have passed since the New Y ork Conf erence, andnot everybody is so pessimistic about the future of our science. Thus, inhis paper of 2007, Aaro Toomela presents his view on the possibili ties ofmethodological breakthrough in psychology. As he claims, there are two waysfor overcomi ng l imitations of methods used in psychology. One is to inventnew methods of research. T he other way is to look back into the historyof methodological thought and ask whether methodological principles ap-plied in research long time ago and abandoned in the course of historydisappeared due to purely non-scientific cultural reasons (Toomela, 2007,pp. 6-7) . A ccordi ng to Toomela, "contemporary mainstream psychologyfoll ows the traditions of pre-W orld War I I N orth A merican psychology. Con-


5/31

I o ry o tte n Me th o d o lo g y 269

siderably more insightful methodologi cal principles of German-A ustrianpsychology have moved into periphery of psychological thought" (T oome-la, 2007, p. 18). I cannot completely share his opinion on the geographicaldivision of the psychological mainstream (for example, N orth A mericanpsychology was, in some sense, the result of British philosophy of empiri-cism), but what I agree with is that history of psychology could bring someunexpected surprises to our science. On the other hand, such strong cl aimlooks abstract without certain historical example. I discuss such an examplein my paper. I took historical example of how insightful methodologicalprinciples have moved into periphery of psychological thought. So, my pa-per is a sort of hi storical-methodological case study; that is why it is entided"T he Vygotsky case."

W H Y V Y G O T S K Y ?I have at least two reasons to address to L.Vygotsky's scientif ic legacy onehistorical, and second, methodological. The historical reason is that alreadyin the middle of 1920s he made a deep historical and methodological sur-vey of state of affairs in psychology in "Historical meaning of the crisis inpsychology" (Vygotsky, 1982). Of course, every generation of psychologistshas proclaimed a crisis in psychology or ofpsychology. But Vygotsky's case issomething special; having discovered the historical meaning of the crisis,he proposed an alternative approach in methodology, known as cultural-historical theory. In some sense his cultural-historical theory was a sort ofmethodological proposition of how to overcome the crisis. It might be ofinterest to undertake a survey of, first, what methodological alternative Vy-gotsky proposed, and second, why it still remains partly f orgotten and partlymisunderstood.

My task is not to give a sort of description of the main traits of V ygotsky'spsychological theory; I will focus on the items directly connected to the top-ic of this paper. There are at least two interconnected aspects in Vygotsky'swhich sound extremely crucial nowadays and make possible to speak onhis theory as a really existing methodological alternative for contemporarypsychology.1. Claim against empiricism and descriptive methods. T hus, in his "H istori-cal meaning of Crisis" he wrote:

T here is one fact that prevents all i nvestigators from seeing the genu-ine state of affai rs in psychology. Thi s is the empiri cal character of itsconstructions. I t must be torn off fro m psychology's constructi ons l ikea pellicle, like the skin of a fruit, in order to see them as they really are(V ygotsky, 1982, p. 377). 4


6/31

270 N I K O L A I V E R E S O V

L ater on, in the beginning of 1930s, improving lli is critical posi-tion to empirical theorizing in psychology, he wrote: "Empiricalcharacter of such constructi ons leads to the situation when theylose any theoretical sustainability and eclectically include and as-simi late allogenic elements" (Vygotsky, 1932, p. 12). For Vygotsky,the descriptive explanatory models and principles based on em-pirical methods of investigadon should be replaced by explanatorymodels and principles.

2. Claim of developmental analysis and qualitative research methods. I nsteadof merely describing the stages of development, psychological the-ory should fi nd the ways of how to explain devel opment (includ-ing its sources, laws, condi tions, moving forces, contradi ctions, andunderlying mechanisms). Development is always very complex andcontradictory process, but, first of all, it is a process of qualitativechange.

V ygotsky's claim and basic pri nciple was: "To understand the mental func-tion means to restore both theoretically and experimentally the wholeprocess of its development in phylo- and ontogenesis" (L uria & Vygotsky,1992). L ater on in my paper I shall discuss these matters wi th more detail s,yet here I cannot get rid of the temptation to give an historical example,whi ch shows Vygotsky's approach in condensed form. I n 1966 at the XV II IWorld Psychological Congress there was a short conversation between J eanPiaget and Piotr Galperin, former student and collaborative of Vygotsky.5A fter presenting their materials Pi aget said "Dear Professor Galperin! I seethe difference between our approaches. I investigate things how they are,whereas you investigate things how they could be." Galperin's reply was"T hings as they are is just the private case of how they could be."

U nfortunately, some of Vygotsky's methodological findings (includingthe two I mentioned above) remain undiscovered in contemporary main-stream psychological discourse, and some of them remain misunderstoodby Western and Russian V ygotskians. To make the point as clear as possibl e,I will concentrate on two items f rom Vygotsky the one, which is unknown(general genetic law of cultural development), and the other one, which iswell known (zone of proximal development).

T H E T H E O R Y : S U B J E C T M A T T E R A N D T H E G E N E R A L L A WW hat Vygotsky proposed was a sort of methodol ogi cal alternative to tradi-tional psychology in a sense of the subject matter and in a sense of method. L et usmake a short survey on the first of them.


7/31

I o ry o tten Meth o d o lo g y 271

V ygotsky's theory deals with higher menial f unctions in humans. In il iisrespect it was an alternative to dominating methodological thinking in psy-chology, which entai led Wi lhelm Wundt, that they could not be studied inexperi mental psychology. They could only be studied by historical analysisof various cultural products ( fol ktales, customs, rituals and so on) . Vygotskyproposed something different:H igher mental f uncti ons are not buil t on the top of elementary processes,like some kind of second storey, but they are new psychological systems com-prising a complex nexus of elementary functions that, as part of a new system,begin themselves to act in accordance wi th new laws (Vygotsky, 1978, p.58)For Vygotsky, the subject matter of the theory was "higher mental func-

tions" not as they are, but in the very process of their development. Cultural-historical theory was the theory of the ori gin and development of higher mental func-tions.

T he one-si dedness and erroneousness of the traditional view (emphasis mineNV ) ...on higher mental f uncti ons consist primarily and mainly in an inabil ityto look at these facts as facts of historical devel opment, in the one-sided con-sideration of them as natural processes and for mations, in mergi ng and notdistinguishing the natural and the cultural, the essential and the historical,the biol ogical and the social in the mental development.. .; in short in an in-cor rect basic understandi ng of the nature of the phenomena being studied...

Putting it more simply, with this state of the matter, the very process of de-velopment of compl ex and higher f orms of behavior remained unexpl ainedand unrealized methodologically (Vygotsky, 1997, p. 2)For Vygotsky, the fatal fault of traditional psychology (including empiri-cal psychology, A merican behaviori sm and Russian refl exology) was in de-composing of higher forms and structures into primarily elements, whileignoring the problem of quality, which is not reducible to quantitative dif-ferences (Vygotsky, 1997, p. 4).But what exactly does the "development of higher mental functions"mean from qualitative perspective? What differentiates Vygotsky's approachfrom other developmental theories of that time?T he concept "development of hi gher mental f uncti ons" and the subject ofour research encompass two groups of phenomena that seem, at first glance,to be completely unrelated, but in fact represent two basic branches, twostreams of development of higher forms of behavior inseparably connected,but never merg ing into one. T hese are, first, the processes of mastering exter-nal materials of cultural development and thinking: language, writing, arith-metic, drawing; second, the processes of development of special higher men-tal functions not delimited and not determined with any degree of precisionand in traditional psychology termed voluntary attention, logical memory, for-


8/31

272 N I K O L A I V E R E S O Vmadon of concepts, etc. Both this taken together also form that we...call theprocess of development of higher forms of the child's behavior" (Vygotsky,1997, p. 14, emphasi s mi ne)I could call this "the principle of two streams" or the "principle of twoprocesses." T he second impor tant item here is the general law of the theory.Since the subject matter of the theory is the process of development, corre-spondingly the general law was named "the general genetic law of culturaldevelopment of higher mental functions."It makes sense to look on the formuladon of the general law since thewhole Vygotsky's theory is based on it, and to understand the law means tounderstand the theory. And conversely, any ki nd of misunderstandi ng ofthe law brings deep misunderstanding of the whol e theory. L ater in this pa-per I give an example of such fatal misunderstanding, yet here let us makea brief survey of the meani ng of the law in a form given by Vygotsky:[...] any function in the child's cultural development appears on stage twice,that is, on two planes. It firstly appear s on the social pl ane and then on apsychologi cal pl ane. Fi rstly it appears among people as an i nter-psychologi calcategory, and then wi thin the chil d as an intra-psychological category. This isequally true with regard to voluntary attention, logical memory, the forma-tion of concepts and the development of voli tion. (Vygotsky, 1983, p. 145)A t first glance it looks very close to the famous socio-genetic principledeveloped by Pi erre J anet. Even more, f or many researchers it looks even

obvious. Thus, V alsiner, expressing the wide-spread opinion, wrote that theV ygotsky's main contri bution was in his consistent application of the basicsocio-genetic princi ple, borrowed f rom Pierre J anet to issues of human de-velopment. Therefore, the general genetic law in cultural-historical theory"could be appropri ately labeled the "J anet V ygotsky law" (Valsiner, 2000,p. 40).Y et, I think that such understandi ng is not completely relevant to theori ginal meani ng of Vygotsky's law. Some things here shoul d be clearlyidentif ied. L et us try to make a step to such kind of identification. I under-took a detailed analysis of the formulation of the general genetic law in myprevious publi cations (Veresov, 2005, 2006, 2007a,b), so here I ust repeat itin brief with main emphasis to what is necessary for the topic of this paper.A t first glance, Vygotsky's formulation emphasizes the most important as-pectsocial origins of mind, as fundamental in cultural-historical approachto human development. But, an attentive and careful reader can easily seesome discrepancies here. Actually, if every function appears first in the so-cial relations between peopl e on the social level, and then inside (wi thin)the child, how then mental functions appear in the social relations, and inwhich form they exist? If they do appear in social relations, how then theychange their location moving f rom social to indivi dual? What is the transi-


9/31


10/31


11/31

I o r y o t t e n M e t h o d o l o g y 27 5A n actual dynamic uni t of consciousness, i.e. the compl ete unit which con-sciousness consists of, will be exper i enci ng (perezhi vanie) (Vygotsky, 1983,p.383).So, the principle is quite strict and clear. If an experimental study does

not unfold the initial form of higher mental function (the dramatical eventbetween two peopl e), it hardly could be identified as genetical experiment,it does not belong to the experimental-genetical method. It seems that wehave enough ground for such a strong expression. Wi th this in mind let usturn to the analysis of experimental method of V ygotsky.

T H E M E T H O D : G E N E T I C A L E X P E R I M E N TM ethodologi cal requi rements for the research method foll ow logicallyf rom the general law. Y et, there is one more methodologi cal issue whichshould be taken into account. In order to find an objective scientific ex-perimental method of study of thedevelopment of higher mental functions,Vygotsky principally rejected the way to study the functions which are al-ready matured. T he matured ones ("flowers of development") are closedfor direct investigation and this circumstance requires different approach. 6Even more, when functions become ingrown, i.e., when they "move within,"an extremely compl ex transformati on of all of a functi on's structure takesplace, and their entire structure becomes indiscernible. Galperin describesthis so, that when the functions are developed they "recede into the depths"and are covered by phenomena of a completely different appearance, struc-ture, and nature" (Galperin, 1966, p. 26).7

L et us have a look how Vygotsky characteri zes experimental-geneticalmethod.

T he method we use may be call ed experi mental- genetical method in thesense that it artifi ciall y eli cits and creates a genetic process of mental develop-ment .. .T he princi pal task of analysis is restori ng the process to its ini tial stage,or, in other words, converting a thing into a process. Thi s kind of exper i mentattempts to dissolve every congealed and petrified psychological form andconvert it into a mowing flowing flood of separate instances8 that replace oneanother. In short, the problem of such an analysis can be reduced to takingeach higher form of behavior not as a thing, but as a process and putting it inmotion so as to proceed not from a thing and its parts, but from a process toits separate instances.9 (V ygotsky, 1997, p. 68)W hat does it actuall y mean "restori ng the process to its ini tial stage"?

This means the necessity to restore the ini tial, the original form of the func-tion under study; this means to restore the social relation as primary formin which the menial function originally exists.


12/31


13/31

I o ry o tte n Me th o d o lo g y 27 7W hen the obstacle arises, the neutral stimulus acquires the functi on ofa sign and from that time, the structure of the operation takes on an essen-tially different aspect10 (Vygotsky, 1997, p. 85). Thus, the process of genesisof higher mental f uncti on was experimental ly investigated. The process wasrestored from its initial stage drama, coll ision, an obstacle to its fi nalform. "Traditional" structural analysis (analysis of mediated activity) in thiscase cannot serve as relevant research method. Genetical experi ment in-cludes the structural analysis as an aspect, but even a structure, the combi-nation of components within the whole system is seen from developmentalperspective. I would like to note that, descri bing experi ments, Vygotsky in-

sistently repeats again and again: "...there is no connection at present andwe are investigating the nature of its formation"; "...the problem confront-ing the child usually exceeded his capacity..."; "...when the obstacle arises,the neutral stimulus acquires the function of a sign..." as if he was afraid ofbeing misunderstood.T he general model of genetical method of analysis could be presentedin the followi ng general "two-step" model (F igure 2). T he model presentedin Figure 2 (act of development as "two-step" transition from the collisionto sign creation and then to the use of sign) is a kind of basic principle ap-pli cable to various concrete research programs conducted by Vygotsky andhis co-workers in late 1920s (i ncluding V ygotsky-Sakharov famous researchin creating of artificial concepts (Sakharov, 1994/1930); even more, it un-

derlies all his famous examples of the development of higher mental func-tions appearance of the pointing gesture in child, the "knot for memory,"drawing a lot, etc.W hat is much more important is that this "two steps" model is method-ologically connected with the issues I already discussed in this chapter:

Tool (sign) creation Use of signDramatical c< ~ TRA NSI T IONTHROUGHTRANSFORMAT ION= AC T OK DEV EL OPM ENT

F I G U R E 2 . G e n e r a l M o d e l o f G e n e t i c a l M e t h o d .


14/31

278 N I K O L A I V E R E S O V1. the subject-matter of the theory, since higher mental functi ons aresocial in origin, mediated by cultural signs in their structure andvoluntary in their mode of functioning;2. the general genetic law of development of higher mental func-tions; and,3. the principle of "two streams."So, V ygotsky's methodologi cal alternative proposal to study higher men-tal functions and cognitive processes seems to be not only of historical in-terest, especially in respect to its emphasis on development, and in respect tothe research method aimed on qualitative analysis, instead of quantitativedescriptions. However it remains mostly unknown and unaccepted by themainstream psychology, even by those scientific schools which identifiedthemselves as developmental. Why then, despite obvious methodologicalpotential, cultural-historical theory stays somewhere on the periphery? AsI tried to show, V ygotsky's cul tural-hi storical theory is exactly the case ofhow, in words of A aro Toomela (2007, p. 7), "methodological principle ap-plied in research long time ago abandoned in the course of history and dis-appeared." Sometimes, however, the problem is not just disappearance ofideas without scientific reasons. In other cases, ideas, superficially, are notforgotten. In such cases, ideas can be distorted or misunderstood instead.Such distortion characterizes the percepti on of several V ygotsky's ideas.T he next section of the chapter discusses these items.

V Y G O T S K Y A N D V Y G O T S K I A N S :A D A P T A T I O N A T T H E C O S T O F L O S S ?

T here is relatively large scientif ic communi ty identifying itself as Vygotski-ans.11 No doubt, during last decades the V ygotskians under took an enor-mous amount of efforts to include the cultural-historical theory into theworld psychological discourse.12 T he results are impressive; the splash ofthe interest to Vygotsky and his approach is the best and obvious indicationof the state of affairs.W ho if not V ygotskians are able to open his methodol ogy to the worldpsychology? Closer inspections of the state of affairs reveals, however, con-

fusion and incoherence among those who could be called "V ygotskians".Thus, Seth Chaiklin, the editor of "The theory and practice of cultural his-torical psychology" (2001) says:In this volume, we find chapters that are self-described as "socioculturalpsychology"...."sociocultural studies"..., "sociogenetic psychology"...."socio-historicocultural"..., sociohistorical co-constructivist"..., "cultural-historical",or ref er to "cultural -hi storical activity theory". O ne coul d say that that we arein danger of having as many labels as we have authors (Chaiklin, 2001, p. 24)


15/31


16/31


of development of higher mental functions and second will be about theconcept of the zone of proxi mal development (ZPD).F I R ST E X A M P L E : G E N E R A L G E N E T I C L A W A S A V I C T I MO F S I M P L I F I C A T I O N

In Mind in Society (1978) the formulation of the general genetic law is givenin the following way:...every function in the child's...development appears twice: first, on the so-cial level, and later, on the indi vidual level; fi rst between peopl e (i nterpsycho-logical) , and then inside the chil d (i ntrapsychologi cal). T his appli es equall yto voluntary attention, to logical memory, and to the formation of concepts.A ll the higher mental functi ons ori ginate as actual relati ons between humanindivi duals (V ygotsky, 1978, p. 57)This formul ation was quoted and repeated so many times that it gradu-ally obtained a status of classical formulation for generations of researchersin V ygotskian community. Yet, this formul ation is not Vygotskian, it rather

belongs to translators of Mind in Society.W here is simpli fi cation here? Comparing this with the formulation takenfrom Vygotsky that is presented above, one could see that what is missed is"category," collision, dramatical event between the individuals, which is thekey wordin V ygotsky's formulation and the core of the law. Stressing that the

higher mental function does not first appear in social relation, but appearsas a social relation, it says nothing about the nature of such social relation.Omitting the central concepts from the law definitely looks like simplifica-tion, if not to say more.Second, i t seems that words "on the stage" and "on two planes" V ygotskyuses are not metaphors, which might be omitted or ignored. Stage in Rus-sian means "scene." the arena, literally the place in the theatre where actorsplay. Scene has two planes the front plane (also called "the fi rst plane")and the back plane (often call ed "the second plane"). A ccording to the-atre's traditions, main events of the performance should happen on thefront plane of the scene (the same law we coul d f ind in visual arts). So, itmeans that on the stage of our development, the category appears twice

inter-psychologically (on the fi rst, f ront plane) and then intra-psycholog-ically (on the second internal individual plane). Therefore there are no twolevels in development, but there are two planes on ONE stage, two dimensions of onedramatical event. Higher mental function is not something which is jumpingfrom one level to another, appearing and disappearing without a trace, itappears and exists on the same scene; they all develop according to one andthe same law.

What reall y disappears, or becomes unclear, here is the deep theoreticaldi f ference between the cultural-hi storical approach and neo-behaviorism

\ *


17/31

I o r y o t t e n M e t h o d o l o g y 281

(or social constructivist theoretical constructions). Really, what is the differ-ence between this simplified image of general genetic law and the principleof J anet?M ichael Col e and Vera J ohn- Steiner, the editors of Mind in Society, saythat the aim of the book is to change the "image of Vygotsky as a sort of ear-ly neo-behaviorist of cognitive development an impression held by manyof our col leagues" (Cole & J ohn-Steiner, 1978, p. ix). Does the simplif iedformul ation of Vygotsky's basic fundamental law really change such image?On the contrary, due to this simplification, contemporary social behav-iorists and social constructivi sts often consi der Vygotsky as one of them.15I can understand their appreci ation. Yet, at the same time, thei r answersto questions: What is original in Vygotsky from the theoretical standpoint?What really new does it bring? W here is the methodologi cal novelty here?are not convincing at all. The references of Vygotskians on the items of "thesocial origin of mind" or to "sign mediation" (Cole, 1995, 1996; Wertsch,1985, 1991) do not look convincing, since they were known long beforeVygotsky (V eresov, 2005). Being isolated from the theoretical developmen-tal context (general law of development) in which they only make sense incultural-historical theory, these two ideas lose their explanatory force.So, the given exampl e shows how an adaptati on of Vygotsky's theoreti -cal heritage to the existing traditions in psychology goes through simpli-fication at the cost of its explanatory potential . Such forced adaptations

to inappropriate theoretical contexts may explain why many ideas "...havemoved into periphery of psychological thought", abandoned and nearlyforgotten (Toomela, 2007, p. 18).One coul d say that this example does not reflect the whole picture andthere is nothing more than just sad mistake of translation. Actually, since1978 the correct and complete formulation of the general genetic law ap-

peared twi ce in 1982 (V ygotsky's Collected Works in Russian.) an d i n 1997(partic ularl y i n V ol ume 4 of V ygotsky's Collected Works in English). B ut thepoint is that even after that and until now, researchers (V ygotskians andnon-V ygotskians) refer to the simpli fi ed formulation of 1978. Furthermore,the editors of both books did not provide any kind of scientific commentar-ies of why Vygotsky stressed the term "category" and what it coul d mean.Twenty six years passed and there is no even single article in attempt to findthe correct explanation of Vygotsky's general genetic law. Nobody puts intoquestion whether the formulation of 1978 is correct. Researchers conti nueto create and conduct their experimental programs on the basis of thissimplifi ed image, being sure that they are working in V ygotskian paradigm.

Rare attempts to provide a new and complete explanation of the gen-eral genetic law based on the ori ginal meani ngs of Vygotsky's terms (e.g.,Veresov, 2005) remain i gnored by leading theorists in modern V ygotskiancommuni ty. Such resistance is understandable since Vygotsky's law strongly


18/31

28 2 N I K O L A I V E R E S O Vcontradicts their theoretical constructions, for example, in the "triangleof activity" of Engestrom, which is the basic theoretical model of the socalled "cultural-historical activity theory" (CH A T) there is no place at allfor dramatical collision, i.e. for the initial form of existence of the higheimental functi ons, accordi ng to Vygotsky (cf., Engestrom, 1987, 1990, 2008;Engestrom, M iettinen, & Punamaki , 1999). T he problem, therefore, is nolonly in erroneous translation; the problem is that the Vygotsky's law is asort of "victim" of fatal theoretical and methodologi cal simpli fi cation. Whatis reall y sad is that by doi ng this the V ygotkskian communi ty marginalizesand encapsulates itself and loses developmental perspective of the wholeapproach, which has very high theoretical potential.

S E C O N D E X A M P L E : Z O N E O F P R O X I M A L D E V E L O P M E N TA S A V I C T I M O F F R A G M E N T A T I O NI n contrast to the general genetic law of development of higher mentalfunctions which remains mostly unknown to the modern mainstream psy-chology (and even for those inside the V ygotskian community) , the con-cept of a zone of prox imal development (ZPD) is a sort of the "visit card" ofVygotsky. For example, G. L efrancois writes:

T hree underl yi ng themes unif y V ygotsky's rather complex and f ar-reachingtheory. T he fi rst one is the importance of cul ture, the second theme is thecentral rol e of l anguage, and the thi rd one is what Vygotsky call s the zone ofproxi mal development. (L efrancois, 1994)First of all , ZPD was not the central concept in cultural-hi storical theory.Rather it was a sort of application of the theory and developmental researchmethod to the concrete educational practices, particularly to the problemof the connections of learning and mental/intellectual development (Vy-gotsky, 1934/1987; Vygotsky, 1935). Even the definition of ZPD looks pro-foundly learning-practice oriented. This often-quoted definition of zone ofproximal development presents it as...the distance between the actual developmental level as determined by in-dependent problem solving and the level of potential development as deter-mined through problem solving under adult guidance, or in collaborationwith more capable peers... T he zone of proxi mal devel opment defi nes thosefunctions that have not yet matured but are in the process of maturation,functions that will mature tomorrow but are currently in an embryonic state.T hese functi ons coul d be termed the buds or fl owers of development ratherthan the "f ruits" of devel opment. T he actual developmental level character-izes mental devel opment retrospectively , whi le the zone of proxi mal develop-ment characteri zes mental development prospectively" (Vygolsky, 1978, pp.86-87)


19/31


20/31


21/31

I o ry o tten Me th o d o lo g y 285

These two examples could he consi dered as a kind of methodologi calquery against the fragmentati on of ZPD f rom the whole V ygotsky's theory.A gain, who else, if not Vygotskian communi ty is able to show the method-ological limits of the concept of ZPD when it is artificially stripped from thewhole theory. On the other hand, who else, if not Vygotskian community,is able to show its strong power and efficiency for the educational prac-tices? W ho else is expected to raise their voice against fragmentation of thetheory which destroys its methodologi cal unity?W hat is the approach to the concept of ZPD inside the V ygotskian com-munity? In order to find the answer I choose two papers, publi shed in 1993

and 2003. The reasons of my selection of these two papers from hundredspublished on this topic were that they both summarize and reflect the stateof aff airs with ZPD in Vygotskian community at di f ferent points of time and,second, they both deal with the methodological and theoretical aspects ofZPD. It might help, using S. Chaiklin's (2001) expression, to "identify atradition of problems" in this particular case.J aan V alsiner and Renee van der Veer (1993) begin with the assertionthat the concept of ZPD in whichV ygotsky brought into the focus of attention of psychologi cal discourse inearly 1930s, and that has become widely known in contemporary psychologi-cal discourse... has been captivating the mind of many a contemporary re-searchers. (V alsiner & van der V eer, 1993, p. 37)Furthermore, the methodologi cal aspect of the matter is stressed by theauthors:Psychology has had a long history of semantic transformation of its measure-ment-based descriptive concepts into causal concepts attributed to be "be-hi nd" these measurements (l atent variables or traits). V ygotsky recognizedthat theoretical impasse well before he started to use the ZBR concept.(V alsiner & van der V eer, 1993, p. 39)...the logic of development of V ygotsky's cul tural-histori cal theory led to theneed to conceptualize the developmental processes that operate in the do-main of present-to-future transformation of the functioning structure of thepsychological system, (ibid, p. 37)A uthors provide a nice il lustration of the reasons of V ygotsky's meth-odological arguments against the measurement of intelligence by way ofdocumenti ng the mental functi ons that have already f inished their courseof development. Using the compari son with a cl inician who on the basis ofobservable symptoms can diagnose the underlying causes of a disease, heexplained the need of mental testing to go beyond mere documentati onof the observable symptoms to the explication of the underlying causal sys-tem. I ndeed, the traditional def inition of intel l igence by way of what intel-


22/31


23/31

I o ry o tten Me th o d o lo g y 287understanding of the theoretical approach, which will be more valuable thana dicti onary defi niti on of the concept (C haikli n, 2003, p. 45-46)In Chaiklin's opinion, many issues remain to be discussed; among them

(1) the historical context and methodological basis on which these ideaswere developed; and (2) relations with Vygotsky's theory f the devel opmentof psychological functions (Chaiklin, 2003, p. 58)

So, the whole picture is that the concept of ZPD being stripped from thetheoretical framework was gradually adapted to existing traditional educa-tional practices and its strong methodological potential gradually disappears.We could even say that ZPD being included into various educational practicesdid not change them substantially (which was the original task and purposefor which it was created in the cultural-historical theory); on the contrary,existing traditional educational practices substantially changed the originaltheoretical and experimental content of ZPD.18 T he task of restoring of thelost connections between ZPD and the theory still remains unsolved.

It is not an easy task. It might look like a call for unnecessary and artifi-cial complication of the concept of ZPD. Y et, it might look li ke this for thosewho mostly deal with simplified and adapted versions. Unlikely, amonghundreds papers published, there is no even one research done showingbetter results of use of ZPD taken wi thin Vygotsky's theoretical frameworkin contrast to simplified versions of ZPD stripped from the theoretical per-spective. In my opinion, one of the main obstacles which prevent to under-take such ki nd of study is theoretical fuzziness which Vygotskian scientif iccommunity clearly demonstrates in this case. ZPD, therefore, remains a vic-tim of fragmentation and simplification.

I t seems that in this case it makes sense to come back to Vygotsky in or-der to find if not clear answer, but at least indirect hints, which somehowcreate zone of proximal development for researchers. The hint deals withthe idea of development. Yet, there is one point in Vygotsky's defi ni tion ofZPD which seems to be unclear. On one hand, he defines ZPD as a distancebetween two levels of development.

...the zone of proximal development defines those functions that have notyet matured but are in the process of maturation, functions that will maturetomorrow but are currently i n an embryoni c state. T hese functi ons could betermed the "buds" or "flowers" of development rather than the "fruits" ofdevel opment (Vygotsky, 1935, p. 42).

On the other hand, he says:T he actual developmental level characteri zes mental development retrospec-tively, while the zone of proximal development characterizes mental develop-ment prospectively (ibid.)


24/31


It would be logical to say that in contrast to the level of actual devel-opment, which characterizes the development retrospectively, the level olpotential development is that characterizes the process prospectively, sincethe ZPD is a distance between these two levels. Why then V ygotsky speaksnot about the levels, but about the actual level and a zone (distance)? Inthis case, the very concept of ZPD as a distance loses sense. Furthermore,being applied to learning process this Vygotsky's thought obtains practicalsignificance:...instruction is maximally productive when it occurs at a certain point in thezone of prox imal develo pment" (Vygotsky, 1934, p. 212)I t looks rather strange why V ygotsky did not say that instructi on is maxi-mally productive when it occurs at the level of potential development? "Cer-tain point in a zone of proximal development" is definitely not the level olpotential development, since ZPD is the distance between two levels. This isnot just an inaccuracy. In all texts about ZPD (Vygotsky, 1934, 1934/1998,1935) he practically repeats the same, comparing the level of actual devel-opment not with the level of potential development, but with ZPD.W hat actuall y means and what is this magical "certain point in develop-ment" existing somewhere between the levels in a zone of proximal devel-opment? How is it possible to detect it? Is it just a logical gap? I f there is alogical gap in Vygotsky's considerations, this means that J . B runer is abso-

lutely right when speaking about hidden paradox in ZPD (Bruner, 1985).But what if there is no such gap and the simplicity of definition of ZPD isil lusive? To find the answer let us turn to interconnected methodologicalprinciples of V ygotsky's theory which were discussed in previous sections ofthis chapter:1. development of higher mental functi ons as the subject-matter ofthe theory;2. the general genetic law of development of higher mental functions;3. the "two streams" principle;4. the method of genetical experiment ("two step" model ).If we approach the process of learning in ZPD from this theoreticalframework, we could see quite easily, that it completely corresponds to thegenetic experiment of Vygotsky described above in this chapter. At the be-ginning, the child is placed in a situation in which he was presented with aproblem or the task which exceeded his capacity and directed to the "buds"of "flowers" of development. T he chil d experiences this problem as a sort ofcollision, dramatic event (the category). At a certainpoint the child (with thehelp of adult or in cooperation with more competent peer) finds or createsan appropriate tool for the solution of this collision. In this very point "twostreams" of development meet each other; on one hand, the chil d becomes


25/31


26/31


27/31

I Fo rg o tten Me th o d o lo g y 291

N O T E S1. I woul d li ke to express my grati tutde to K atarina R odi na (Uni versity of Oslo,

N orway), Pentti Hakk arainen (U niversity of Oulu, Fi nland) for their valuablecomments, and A aro T oomela (T alli nn University, Estonia) f or inspi ri ng pro-posals and patiency in working with one of the drafts of the paper.

2. For more detail s see extensive discussion on Y urevich's articl e in Dori a (2009)and Zittoun et al (2009)

3. I use the term "developed" in a sense of post-Galil ean physics, accordi ng toE instein & I nfel d (1976). M ore on this see M ikhailov (2003, 2006)

4. A ll translations f rom Russian in this articl e are mine N ikolai V eresov5. I n the early 1930s, young Galperin was an active parti ci pant of the K harkov

group led by V ygotsky and A . L eont'ev.6. I n this sense traditi onal classical quantitative methods are not valid and mustbe replaced by qualitative ones.

7. T he swerving of vol untary medi ated functi ons as a result of internali sation isdiscussed in A . Nazarov (2008)

8. H ere V ygotsky uses the term "moments" in Russian origi nal text that seems tobe more exact.

9. H ere the same "separate moments."10. ... takes on an essentiall y di f ferent appearance (vid) in ori ginal text - N ikolai

V eresov11. By "V ygotskians" I mostly mean W estern representatives of this communi ty.

Discussion of the appro aches taken by Sov iet/R ussian Vygotskians is beyondthe scope of this C hapter.

12. A mon g many others two impressive books whi ch summarise the current situ-ation inside this community should be mentioned The Cambridge handbook ofsocioculturalpsychology (2007) and The Cambridge Companion to Vygotsky (2007).

13. For mor e detail s of discussion on di ff erences insi de the V ygotskian communi tysee for exampl e M atusov (2008)

14. In fact this book was not the first at that time. A wfully transl ated and terriblyabbreviated version of Thinking and speech under the title Thought and languageappeared in 1962 (Vygotsky, 1962). In this respect I completely agree wi th theopi ni on expressed by one of the reviewers that editors chose the best parts ofthe book and then translated the rest into English.

15. We coul d find in I nternet a lot of statements like: "Vygotsky i nf l uenced mod-ern constructivi st think ing perhaps more than any other indivi dual" (ht tp : //www.indiana.edu/~intell/vygotsky.html )

16. Bri ll iant analysis of destructive consequences of mixtur e of the levels and thezone (di stance) in ZPD is made in Zuckerman (2007) and H akkarai nen &Bredikyte (2008)

17. T his j ob have been brill iantly done by I. V erenik ina (2004) and A . Stone(1998)

18. T her e are many other indi cations of such dissipation and this defi nitel y re-qui res special survey, which was partly made by I. Vereniki na (2004).
http://www.indiana.edu/~intell/vygotsky.htmlhttp://www.indiana.edu/~intell/vygotsky.html


28/31

292 N I K O L A I V E R E S O VR E F E R E N C E S

A smolov, A . (1998). Vygotsky today: On the verge of non-classical psychology. New Y ork.Nova Science Publishers.

Bakan, D. (1996). The crisis in psychology. J ournal of Social Distress and the Homeless,5,4.

Balaban, N. (1995). Seeing the chil d, knowi ng the person. I n Ayers, W. (Ed.) Tobecomea teacher. New Y ork: T eachers Col lege Press.

Bodrova, E., & L eong, D .J . (1998). Scaff oldi ng emergent wri ting in the zone ofproximal development. Literacy Teaching and Learning, 3(2), 1-18.

Brow n, A . L ., & C ampione,J . C. (1994). Gui ded discovery in a communi ty of learn-ers. In K . M cGilly (E d.), Classroom lessons: Integrating cognitive theory and classroompractice (pp. 229-270). C ambridge, M A : M I T Press/B radfor d Books..

Brow n, A . L ., & C ampione, J . C. (1996). Psychological theory and the design of in-novative learning environments: On procedures, principles, and systems. In L.Schauble & R. Glaser (Eds.), Innovations in learning: Neiv environments for education(pp. 289-325). M ahwah, NJ: E rlbaum.

Bruner, J . (1985). Vygotsky: A historical and c onceptual perspective. I n J . W ertsch(Ed.), Culture, communication and cognition: Vygotskian perspectives (pp. 21-34).Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.

Chaiklin, S. (Ed.) (2001). The theory and practice of cultural-l iistoiical psychology. A arhusUniversity press.

Chaikl in, S. (2003) T he zone of proxi mal devel opment in V ygotsky's analysis ofl earning and Instructi on. I n A. K ozulin, B. Gindis, V. A geyev, & S. M ill er. (Eds.)Vygotsky's educational theory and practice in cultural context (pp. 40-63). Cambridge:Cambridge University,

Clay, M. M . (2005). Literacy lessons designed for individuals: Teaching procedures. Ports-mouth, NH: Heinemann.

Cole, M . (1995). Soci o-cul tural historical psychology. Some general remarks andproposal f or new ki nd of cultural-genetic methodology. In J . V. Wertsch, P. DelRi o, & A. Al varez (Eds.), Sociocultural studies of mind (pp. 187-214). NY: Cam-bridge University Press,.

Cole, M. (1996). Cultural psychology: A once and future discipl ine. Cambridge, HarvardUniversity Press.

Dori a, N . (2009) No mor e than conj ectures: Popper and the ethics of scientif ic en-terprise. Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science, 43(2).

Ei nstein, A ., & I nfeld, L. (1976). The evolution of physics, A lbert: T ouchstone.E lhammoumi , M . (2001). L ost or merely domesticated? T he boom in sociohis-

toricocultural theory emphasizes some concepts, overlooks others In S. Chaiklin(Ed.), The theory and practice of cultural-historical psychology (pp. 200-217) . Aarhus,D enmark: A arhus University Press,

Engestrom, Y. (1987). Learning byexpanding: An activity-theoretical approach to develop-mental research. Helsinki: Ori enta-K onsultit.

Engestrom, Y. (1990). Learning, working, imagining: Twelve studies in activity theory.Helsinki: Ori enta-K onsultit.


29/31

I o r y o t t e n M e t h o d o l o g y 29 3

E ngestrom, Y. (2008). T he f utur e of activity theory: a rough draf t. K eynote lecturepresented at the ISC A R C onf erence in San D iego, Sept. 8-13, 2008. http://www.Ichc.ucsd.edu/MC A /Paper/IS Cl /V RkeyE ngestrom.pdf

E ngestrom, Y, M iettinen, R., & Punamaki , R. (Eds.) (1999). Perspectives on activitytheory. New Y ork, NY : C ambri dge Uni versity Press.

Galperi n, P. (1966) K ucheni u ob interiorizatsii . VoprosyPsihologii, 6, 20-30.H akkarainen, P., & Bredikyte, M . (2008).T he zone of prox imal develo pment in play

and learning. Kulturno-istoricheskaya psihologia, 4, 2-11.H ammond, J . (E d.). (2002). Scaffolding teaching and teaming in language and literacy

education. N ewtown, A ustrali a: PET A .H obsbaum A ., Peters, S., & Sylva, K . (1996). Scaff ol ding in readi ng recovery. Oxford

Review of Education, 22(1), p. 17-35J ames, W. (1890). The principles of psychology (vol. 1). C ambridge, MA : H arvard U ni-

versity Press.L ambert, B., & Cl yde. M. (2000). Re-thinking early childhood theory and practice. A ustra-

lia: Social Science Press.L efrancoi s, G. R. (1994). Psychology for Teaching. B elmont, CA: W adsworth P ublish-

ing Company.L uria, A. & Vygotsky, L. (1992). Ape, primitive man, and child: Essays in the history of

behavior. N ew Y ork: H arvester W heatsheaf.M atusov, E. (2008). A pply ing a sociocultural approac h to V ygotskian academia:

"Our tsar isn't like yours, and yours isn't like ours." Culture & Psychology, 14( 1),5-35.

M ikhailov, F (2003). Samoopredelenie kulturi. Moscow. Indrik.M ikhailov, F (2006). P rob l ems of the metho d of cultural-historical psychology. J our-

nal of Russian and East European Psychology, 44(1), 21-54.Nazarov, A . (2008). A bout some concepts of cultural- historical psychology in a mod-

ern context. Psihologicheskii zurnal M ezdunaro dnogo U niversiteta prirody, bsh-estva i cheloveka "Dubna." http://www.psyanima. r U / joi irnal/2008/l/2008nla4/2008n la4.pdf.

Pali ncsar, A . S., Ransom, K ., & D erber, S. (1988). C oll aborative research and devel-opment of reciprocal teaching. Educational L eadership, 46(4), 37-40.

Rodgers, E. M . (2004). I nteractions that scaffol d readi ng perf ormance. J ournal ofLiteracy Research, 36(4), 501-532.

R osenshine, B ., & M eister, C. (2007). Reci procal teaching: A review of the research.Retrieved September 17.

R oth, W-M ., & L ee, Y -[. (2007). V ygotsky's neglected l egacy: Cul tural-hi storical activ-ity theory. Review of Educational Research, 77, 186-232.Sakharov, L. S. (1994/ 1930). O n the methods of investigating concepts. In R. vander V eer & J . V alsiner. The Vygotsky reader. Blackwell (originally published in Psik-hologij a, 3) A vailable in I nternet http://marxists.anu.edu.au/archive/vygotsky/works/comment/sakharov.htm.

Sato, T., W atanabe, Y., & O mi, Y. (2007). B eyond di chotomy T owards creative syn-thesis. Integrative Psychological arid Behavioral Science, 41( 1), 50-59.

Stone, A . (1998). T he metaphor of scaff oldi ng: its utili ty fo r the field of learni ngdisabilities. J ournal of Learning Disabilities, 40(2), 344-364.
http://www/http://www.psyanima.ru/joiirnal/2008/l/2008nla4http://www.psyanima.ru/joiirnal/2008/l/2008nla4http://www.psyanima.ru/joiirnal/2008/l/2008nla4http://marxists.anu.edu.au/archive/vygotsky/http://marxists.anu.edu.au/archive/vygotsky/http://www.psyanima.ru/joiirnal/2008/l/2008nla4http://www/


30/31

294 N I K O L A I V E R E S O VT oomela, A . (2007). Cul ture of science: Strange history of the methodological

thinking in psychology. Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science, 41, 6-20.V alsiner,J . (2000). Culture and human development. L ondon: Sage.V alsiner, J ., & van der V eer, R (1993) .T he encod ing of distance: T he concept of the

zone of proximal development and its interpretations. In R. R. Cocking & K. A.Renninger (Eds). Development and meaning of psychological distance (pp. 35-62).L awrence E rl baum A ssociates Publi shers.

V erenik ina, I. (2004) .F rom Theor y to Practice: What does the metaphor of scaffold-ing mean to educators today? Outlines, 2, 5-15.

V eresov, N . (1999). Undiscovered Vygotsky.Peter L ang.V eresov, N . (2005). M arxist and non-M arxist aspects of the cultural -hi storical psy-

chology of L.S.V ygotsky. Outlines, 7(1), 31-49. Avail able in I nternet http://www.outli nes.dk/contents/O utli nes051/V eresov05.pdf

V eresov, N. (2006). Prostranstvo razvitija i kul turni i contekst obrazovanya. Izvestiya Ros-siskoi Akademii Obrazovaniya, 1, 50-61 A vailable in I nternet http://nveresov.narod. ru/ProstranstvoRazvitia.pdf

V eresov, N. (2007a). K ulturno-i storicheskaya psihologiya V ygotskogo. Trudnaya rabo-ta ponimaniya. Novoye Literaturnoye Obozreniye.85 (in Russian). A vailable in Interne!http://magazines.russ.ru/nlo/ 2007/85/be6.html

V eresov, N . (2007b). Psihologi ya soznaniya v Rossi i na Zapade. Voznozniye tochkiperesecheniya. In G. A kopov (E d.) Psihologiya soznaniya: sovremennoye sostoyaniei perspektivi, Samara (pp. 95-108) (in Russian). http://nveresov.narod.ru/Sa-mara.htm

V ygotsky, L . S. (1932). Pr obl ema razvitiya rebenk a v issledovaniyah A rno lda Gezell a.In Gezell, A. Pedologiya rannego vozrasta. M oscow.V ygotsky, L . S. (1934). M yshlenie i rech. M oscow. Gosizdat.

V ygotsky, L. (1934/1998) . T he probl em of age. The Collected Works of L. S. Vygotsky(Vol. 5, pp. 187-205).

V ygotsky, L . S. (1935). Umstvennoe razvitie detei v protsesse obuchenia. MoscowL enin-grad. Gosudarstvennoe U chebno-pedagogicheskoe izdatelstvo.

V ygotsky, L. S. (1962). Thought and language. M I T Press, C ambridge, M ass.V ygotsky L . S. (1966). I gra i ee rol ' v psik hiceskom razvitii rebenka. Voprosypsikholo-

gii, 6, 62-76.V ygotsky, L . S. (1978) . Mind in society. The development of higher psychological processes.

Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.V ygotsky, L. S. (1982). Sobraniyesochinenii (vol. 1), M oscow.V ygotsky, L. S. (1983). Sobranie sochinenii (vol. 4), M oscow.V ygotsky, L . S. (1987) The collected works ofL. S. Vygotsky (vol.1), Problems of general psy-

chology. Including the volume Thinking and speech. New Y ork: P lenum.V ygotsky, L . (1997). Th e Problem of C onsciousness. Collected Works of L. S. Vygotsky,

Volume III , P art 1: Problems of the Theory and Methods of Psychology (pp. 129-138).http://ww w.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/1934/problem-conscious-ness.htm

Wells, G. (1999). Dialogic inquiry: Towards a sociocultural practice and theory of education.New Y ork: C ambridge University Press.

W ertsch,J . (1985). I ntroduction. In J . Wertsch (E d.). Culture, communication andcognition. Vygotskianperspectives (pp. 1-18). Cambridge University Press,
http://www/http://nveresov.narod/http://magazines.russ.ru/nlo/2007/85/be6.htmlhttp://nveresov.narod.ru/Sa-http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/1934/problem-conscious-http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/1934/problem-conscious-http://nveresov.narod.ru/Sa-http://magazines.russ.ru/nlo/2007/85/be6.htmlhttp://nveresov.narod/http://www/


31/31

F o r g o t te n M e t h o d o l o g y 29 5Wertscli, J . V. (1991). VoktX / thr mind: A xoriocultural approach to mediated action. Cam-

bridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Wi lhelm, J ., Baker, T., & D nbe.J . (2001). Strategic Reading: Guiding Students to Li felong

Literacy. Heinemann, New Hampshire, USA.W ood, D. J ., Bruner,J ., & Ross, G. (1976). T he role of tutori ng in probl em solving.

J ournal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 17(2), 89-100.Y urevich, A. (2009). Cognitive frames in psychology: Demarcations and ruptures.

Integrative Psychological & Behavioral Science, 43(2), 21-27.X X I e Congress I nternational de Psychology/X X I st International C ongress of Psy-

chology: A cts/P roceedings. (1987). Pri ses U niversitaire de F rance. Paris.Zittoun, T., Gillespie, A., & Cornish, F. (2009). Fragmentation or differentiation:

Questioning the crisis in psychology. Integrative Psychological & Behavioral Science,43(2).

Zuckerman G. (2007). Child adult interaction that creates a zone of proximal devel-opment. J ournal of Russian and East European Psychology, 45(3), 38-64.

Date post:	03-Apr-2018
Category:	Documents
Upload:	ivasiton
View:	230 times
Download:	0 times

Veresov Forgotten

Documents