TABLE OF CONTENTS

1 Equity, Efficiency and National Development:The Philippines' Regional DevelopmentStrategy

Proserpina Domingo-Tapa/as

22 Levelsof RegionalDevelopment and LaborMobility

Donna Elinor Dequma

31 ThePsychological Dimensionsof Development:Implications for Polley

Olivia C.caoili

42 Financing Local Development ThroughSpecialAssessments

Ernesto M. Serote

50 Manandthe Land: Landutilization in Antique

Meliton B. Juanico

62 PlanningNews

64 About the Contributors

65 "Urbanism andthe City" A Commentary

Gil Ramos

EQUln, EFFICIENCY AND NATIONALDEVELOPMENT: THE PHILIPPINES'REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT S TEGY

By

PrO$erpina Domingo-Tapales

t

New Dimensions in PbDippine Economic Policy

Like many countries in the Third World, the Pbilippines is in constant searcb for the rightformulathilt will increase the growth of its gross national productin a manner thilt will malte it catcb up with tbefast rate of growth of the developed countries. Time and again, it haslaid down economic policies intendedto solva prevailing national problems, cbanging policies and strategies as time and circumstances warrant.

After the second world war and upongaining political independence from the UnitedStates, it embarked on a policy of import sub­stitution with its attendant polieies of importand exehange eontrols, tax exemptions to newand necessary industrias, and extension of long­term credit to manufacturing endeavors. Thepolicies aimed to discourage the importationof consumer goods and non-essentials whichFilipinos under America hed learned to pa­tronize, and conversely, to encourage the dom­estie manufacture of those commodities.

Removal of controls came in the earlysixtY's in the wake of the unrealistic, over­valued exchange rate of the peso. Other po­licies shifted attention to the developmentof agriculture and cottage industries, at thesame time setting broader incentives for pre­ferred and pioneer industries.

The economic policies in the first twodecades of independence were criticized as in­ward-looking, import-dependent, relying onlyon a few, traditional exports, leading to acondition characterized by overconcentratedregional development at the core, greater in­equality in income distribution, neglect ofwage goods industries, slow growth of indus­trial emploYment, and technical and economicinefficiency.1

1John H. Power and Gerardo P. S.iCl'lt, ThePhilip­oimn: IndustTjaJ~ation and Trade Potici"" {London:Oxford UniversitY Press, 19111. p. 102.

Export promotion thus became a strategyin the seventY's, interwoven with other econo­mic policies like more intensive propagation ofcottage, small and medium-scale industries, andthe new strategy of regional development. Theexport promotion strategy aims to diversifyexports to cure the problem eaused by tooheavy reliance on few traditional crops whichare subject to price fluctuations in the worldmarket. The other policies are interrelated,aiming to generate more employment throughlabor-intensive industries, to disperse industriesin the regions, and to encourage more invest­ment from previously hesitant entrepreneuf$.

Regional development, particularly, isbeing pursued with vigor by the government.The Four Year Development Plan for 1914­1977 prepared by the National Economicand Development Authority (NEDA) whichwas adopted by Presidential Proclamation1157 includes, among its six objectives, regionaldevelopment and industrialization. The Planprovides "for a wider distribution of the be­nefits of economic growth by placing greateremphasis on social development and by in­tegrating the approach to ragional develop­ment.,,2

2National Economic and Development Authoritv.t-our- Year DeVftiopment Plan, 1974-1911. (Manila:1914). Foreword.

Rationale for tbeNew Strategy

The new emphasis on regional develop­ment is based on the NEDA's recognition ofthe glaring imbalance among regions in thecountry, with Manila and its environs lordingit over the country while other regions lagvery far behind.

The import substitution strategy inearlier years favored location of industriesin Metropolitan Manila. The restrictions onforeign exchange made advantageous loeatingnear the seat of government, and the depen­dence of the new industries on undervaluedexports made locating in the principal POrtsfavorable. Manila and the surrounding areasthus became an "import enclave," retaining,if not increasing, its centuries-old dominanceover the rest of the country.

Instead of linking backward to theother regions of the economy it links onthe supply side ":0 the rest of the world.Even on the.demand side, the market byway of the consumption goods dependssignificantly on the free.spending urbanclasses that weill created by the indus­trialintion itself.;;S

The concentration of manufacturing at the corearea has resulted in inequality among the re­gions, and has led to greater inequality in per­sonal income distribution.

Regional Imbalances. NEDA Director­General Sicat, writing on "Dimensions ofEconomic Growth" for the period 1948 to1966 showed the lopsided picture of thePhilippinf/ economy. Using proxy informationfrom GAO local public finance data as surro­gate, on the 8$Sumption that the fiscal datamoves in the same direction as income, he com­Puted the grOSS regional products of ren de­signated regions. He compared his publicfinance figures to data from the StatisticalSurvey of Households and migration figuresand found out that "the Patterns of regionalincome levels follow more closely the onesestimated using proxy figures, except that

3 Power and Sieat, cp. cit., J). 106.

2

Metropolitan Manila appears to be less sharplycontrasted with other regions,,,4 meaning thatother statistics would show even wider gapsbetween the pl'lme area and other parts ofthe country.

Sicat used a modified regional grouping,segregating Rizal province from the SouthernTegalog region and placing it with Manila. Healso used 1961 as the cut-off point, to com­pare any change that may have come with thepolicy on decontrol.

Table 1 shows the distribution of thegross regional product for the years understudy.

The figures above show that for 1948­1961, the gross regional products (GRP) ofCagayan Valley and Batanes, lIocos and Moun­tain Province, and the Bicol region laggedbehind the national growth rate at 3%, 6%,and 6% respectively, as Metropolitan Manilaand Rizal together registered the highest.ate of growth of 23%. For 1961, the sameregions lagged behind (2%, 5% and 5%) andMetro Manila and Rizal forged ahead (27%).By 1966, the figures show the same imbalancein favor of Metro Manila-Rizal egainst the sameregions (at 37, 3 and B)."Translated in terms of

4Gerardo P. Sieat, Economic Policy and Philip­

pine Development IU.P., 1972r.

TABLE I

DISTRIBUTION OF REGIONAL GROSS PRODUCT, 1948,1961,1968*

GRPas% GRPas%of GRPas% GRPas% GRPas%of GRP as % ofof total Island Group's of of Island total Island Group's

GNP tota1 GRP total GNP Group's tOtal GNP total GRP

I. Metro Manila 20 34 22 37 18 30Riul 3 5 5 10 17

II. lIocos81 Mt.ProvInce 5 9 5 4 7

nil. Cageyan Vallay& Batanes 3 5 2 3 2 3

IV. CentNIl Luzon 12 21 12 20 12 20V. Southern Luzon

& Islands 9 16 9 16 8 16VI. Sicol 6 10 6 8 5 8

LUZON 58 100 60 100 59 100

VII. WasternVlsayas 14 64 12 50 12 52

VIIJ. eiimrnVlsayas 12 46 12 60 11 48

VISAYAS 26 100 24 100 23 100

IX. Southern Mindanao &Sulu 10 B2 10 38 12 61

X. NortheasternMindanao 6 38 6 6 33

MINDANAO 18 100 18 100 18 100

.. Source: Gerardo Sieat, E::onomle Policy andPhIlippine Development Table 15.11.

contributions. to the GNP," Sicat says. "theseindicate that Greater Manila, inclUding all ofRizal province, contributes close to one-fourthof the total GNP..• The Bicol, 1I0cos, andCagayan regions. appear to have lost thelraeo­nomic importance when viewed in terms oftheir share of Luzon's GRP to the GNP/,5

When the implied per capita gross pro­duct is computed Manila> still shows a highrate of " 2,371 and Rizal a comparativelyhigh "931 higher than the Philippine's figureat " 705, whereas Cagayan Valley at " 398and Bicol at "413 are very much behind.

5 Ibid., P. 369.

3

The index of GRP per person showedEastern Visayas lowest for 1948 (66.5)r fol·lowed closely by Bicol (68.4); in 1961 re­gistered a low 58.4, CageYan -Valley an un­favorable 61.1; in 1966, Cageyan Valley andBicol ranked lowest and second lowest, res­pectively at 56.4 and 58.6.

From the table above, it is readily seenthat the fastest growing region is Metropoli~

tan Manila-Rizal, and Luzon's GRP is almost59% of the total GNP. The regions seemingto lag behind are the Cagayan Valley and thp.Bicol regions.

More recent data are provided by theNEDA. Using 1970 Census figures on the

TABLE IIREGIONAL GROSSPRODUCTS LEVELS, 1948-66*

Implied per cap Index of GRP!Person

regional gross 1948 1961 1966

product lin currentprices)

l. Metro Manila 2,371 323.8 358.2 336.3

Rizal 931 94.4 88.4 132.1

II. lloces & Mt.Province 654 78.9 103.1 92.8

III. CagayanVallity&Batanes 398 85.7 61.1 56.4

IV. Central Luzon 655 88.9 90.8 92.9V. Southern Luzon

& Islands 657 89.8 91.9 93.2VI.8icol 413 68.4 58.4 58.6VII. Western Visayas 672 88.1 85.1 95.3Vlll. Eastern Visayas 615 66.5 88.0 87.2IX. Southwestern

Mindanao & Sulu 477 130.3 83.2 74.5X. Northeastern

Mindanao 491 84.7 71.6 76.6

Phlllpplnes 705 100.0 100.0 100.0

* Source: Gerardo Sicat. Economic Policy and Philippine De"elopment, Table 15.12.

size and growth rate per annum of the po­pulation by region, 1969 figures on the amountand growth rate per annum of the regionaleconomy (computations by value added),and 1966 income per capita, the NEDA pre­sents a picture that substantiates that shownby Sicat.

Metropolitan Manila's population in 1970grew at the fast rate of 4.7%, higher than thatof the Philippines at 3.0%. While other areasalso grew faster than the countrv's average,Manila's growth rate can be accounted for bymigration from the areas that grew slowly ­ltecos, Western and Eastern Visayas, and theBicol region (the last two register in migrationstatistics a negative rate of growth).

While the value added for the two Min­danao regions are higher than that of MetroManila (7.2% as against 6.1%), Manila's per~ita income is the highest for all the regionsat , 965 [most likely much higher in 1976).

4

Ilocos and Western Visayas registered thelowest rate of growth (3.3% and 3.7%, res­pectively). The lowest per capita incomes arein Cagayan (, 226), Eastern Visayas (, 279),and 1I0cos (, 303). Bicol ranks fifth lowestin per capita income.

I nus, Melro Mantia registers the highestrate of population growth, a high rate of eco­nomic growth based on value added, and thehighest income per capita, while certain regions- Cagayan, Eastern Visayas, llocos and Bicol­lose their populations to the more progressiveregions, register very slow rates of growth, andhave the lowest per capita income.

NEDA's present thrust on regional deve·lopment can be largely explained by the Direc­tor General's concern for developing theregions, to solve some of the country's econo­mic problems. Regional Development is pre­mised on the assumption that it would pro­vide increasing employment opportunities forthe growing population, strike a balance between

TABLE IIICOMPARISON OF POPULATION ANDVALUE ADDED*

By Regions

1970 Population 1969 Value Added Income perArea Size Growth Rat!' Growth rate capita

per annum Amount per annum (1966)

1,000 % PCM) % PCM)

Metro Manila 3,277 4.7 9,977.0 6.1 9551I0c0s 1,259 1.7 358.2 3.3 303Cagayan 2,037 3.3 1,061.1 4.6 226Central Luzon 5,11,')0 3.1 1,790.8 4.1 416Southern

Tagalog 3,880 3.9 2,492.5 6.0 687Blcol 2,967 2.2 908.4 5.3 331Western

Visayas 4,501 1.5 2,086.8 3.7 351Eastern

Visavas 4,700 1.6 1,680.3 5.2 279Northern &

EasternMindanao 3,016 3.5 1,588.6 7.2

Southern &WesternMindanao 4,947 4.1 2,587.0 7.2 327

Phtnpptflll$ 36,684 3.0 24,523.4 5.5 415

*Souree: NEDA, Regional Developmeht Projects.

agricultural and industrial development, andincrease exports and widen the market fornewly established industries through moreInternal demand in the reglons.7

Regional Development and "Cin:ularCausation"

The regional development strategy aimsto develop the nation by first developing theregions. The rationale is that developmentof the regions would provide increasedGRP,increaSed GRP would increase regional co",tributions to the GNP, increased GRP wouldprovide higher per capita income and wouldlessenincome inequality.

Would such a policy achieve these ob­jectives?

7 Power and Bleat, oo. cit.

5

Rich to richer, poor to poorer: TheTheory of Clrculsr Causatlon. Gunnar Myr­dal talks about Winslow'sand Nurske's viciouscircle of poverty, and applias this to economicdevelopment. Thus, a region in a country be­comas richer, a poor region becomes poorerbecause of the cumulative process, whereforces work in circular causation to reinforcedevelopment or underdevelopment. Economicdevelopment in an area may have "spread"and "beckwash" effects on other areas,. de­pending on the prevailing state of economicdevelopment in the region. Myrdal puts for­ward the following postulates:

1. The play of the market forces normallytends to increase, rather than decrease, theinequalities between regions. If things are leftto economic market forces alone, all economicactivities' would cluster in certain localities

and regions.2. The localities and regions where eco­

nomic activity is expanding will attract netmigration from other parts of the country.This movement 'tends to favor the rapidlygrowing communities and disfavor the others:

3. Capital movements tend to have a similareffect on increasing inequality. In the centersof expansion, increased demand will spurinvestment, which in turn will increase incomesand demand and cause a second round of in­vestments, ete.

4. Trade operates with the same fundamen­tal bias in favor of richer and more progressiveregions egainst the other regions. The wideningmarkets will often give advantages to the al­ready established centers which usually workunder conditions of increasingreturns.

5. As industrialization is the dynamicforce in development, the poorer regions re­main mainly agricultural. 'In the rural areas,not only manufacturing industry but agri­culture itself have a much lower level of pro­ductivity than in the richer regions.'

6. Poorer regions, unaided, could hardlyafford medical care, their populations wouldbe less healthy and heve a lower productionefficiency. They would have fewer schools andtheir schools, if any, would be inferior. Thepeople, generally would retain traditionalattitudes which would work against furthereconomic pursuits.8

Myrdal summarizes: 11All these frustrat­ing effects of poverty, operating through othermedia than those analyzed by traditionaleconomic theory, are interlocked in circularcausation • • . The opposite effects of risingeconomic levels in the centers of expansionare in a similar fashion also inter-connectedin a circular causation, sustaining further

"9expansion in a cumulative fashion.Thus, the economic factor - market

forces, capital movement, and trade opera­tions - interact with the non-economic fec-

8DiseuSSed by Gunnar Myrdal In Chapter II,"Principle of Circular and Cumulative Causation,"in Rich Lands and Poor: The Road to WorldProsperity (New York: Harper and Row, 1957).

9 Ibid., p, 30.

6

tors of health, education, and values, to rein­force each other and spur a region to greaterdevelopment or hold it in a state of continuedstagnation. In the relatively developed regions,wealth generates more capital, capital generatesmore wealth; wealth provides better standardsof living, and better standards of living pro­mote values that lead to more economic activi­ty which will bring about more wealth.

The momentum from a center of in­dustry has 'spread effects' over other regionswhich have increased demands for its pro­ducts, and "weave themselves in the same;ashion as the 'backwash effects' in opposition... in marginal cases the kinds of effects willbalance each other and a region will be stag­nating:,l0

He cautions against traditional economictheory which would leave the regions by them­selves, but opts for governmental policieswhichwould "interfere" to achieve regional develop­ment.

Fred Riggs, in a similar vein, talks of cir­cular causation in application to local adminis­tration. Taking his inspiration from Myrdaland from his own theory of prismatic societywhich is focused on values and institutions,Riggs postulates that economic developmentand local administration work in circularcausation. Therefore, a local unit with highlevel of economic development would be in abetter position to sustain efficient local ad­ministration, and local units which are under­'developad, when given more autonomy, wouldonly become areas of what he calls 'negativedevelopment' because

(Administrative) defects. . . are asmuch consequences of underdevelopmentas they are its causes, Consequently,even from the point of view of econo­mic growth itself, economists ought topay more attention to the full circleof interdependence whereby economicfactors affect political and administra­tive conditions which, in turn, have afeedback upon economic development.11

10 lbid; p. 31-32.11Fred Riggs. Administration in Developing

Countries: The Theory of Prismatic Society IBonon,Houghton Mifflin. 19641, p, 80.

Riggs warns against grants of local self-govern­ment which "will only contribute to positiveeconomic development when the ecology be­comes favorable,,,12 and recommends selec­tive decentralization whereby only areaseconomically developed and consequently,competent enough to administer services willbe given subject to a high degree of centraltutelage.

Sieat, who initiated the new regionaldevelopment strategy, recognizes that"a nece&­sary condition for successful regional develop.ment Is national economic policy which isconducive to economic development:' This,however, "will have to work in' a situationwhere vigorous and systematic decisions atthe regional level facilitate development withinthe region, not thwart it."13 While the dyna­mics of regional development, he says, "de­pends on how national policies. • • exercisea discriminatory influence on the flow ofinvestment resources to other less developedregions. . . it also depends on how localgovern­ments harness the advantage that are open tothem:,14

For regional development to be achieved,therefore, our chief economic planner re­cognizes the need for active support of econo­mic policies from the national government,the ability of the regions to provide sounddecisions to facilitate their own development,and going downward, the capacity of the localgovernments to harness opportunities to theirown advantage. It is, in effect, an agreement toRiggs' and Myrdal's suggestions on the need forthe national government to prop up regionaldevelopment through supportive policies,and ateeit obedience to their warnings that econo­mic and non-economic factors must be con­sidered hand in hand in any approach to re­gional and local development.

It isobvious that for the regional develop.

12Fred Riggs. "l::conomJC: lJevelopment andLocal Administration: A Study in Circular CaUll8tlon:'Philippil1l1Jourl1l1lof Public Administration (January.1959). p. 123. Also reprinted in Ibid.

13 Sieet. op. ett; p. 388.14Ibid.. p.410

7

ment strategy to succeed, a lot depends on in­puts from the governments above and belowthe regional level which will provide the policyand administrative support, and, to a largeextent, the financial support needed. It willalso depend on a lot of economic factorsin the regions themselves, without which re­sources the regional development attemptswill fail.

How far can our regional developmentstrategy go?

Components of tileRegional DevelopmentStrategy

While the NEDA's Plan stresses for thefim time the country's policy of regionaldevelopment, the strategy is not entirelynew in the Philippines. In the sixty's , Cong­ress seemed to have a penchant for creatingregional and local development authorities,so that by the time they stopped legislatingfor such, the number created had alreadyreached thirteen.

In 1961 the Mindanao DevelopmentAuthority and the Central Luzon - CagayanValley Authority were created In .1964 fourwere legislated - the Mountain ProvinceDevelopment Authority, the Panay De"elop.ment Authority, the Northern Samar Develop.ment Authority, and the San Juanico StraitTourist Development Authority. The BicolDevelopment Company was established in1966. Other oevelopment bodies created,though not regional but merely local in scope,were the lIocos Sur Development Authl;)rity,the Catanduanes Development Authority, andthe Cavite Communication and ElectricityDevelopment Authority. The Laguna LakeDevelopment Authority was another addition.Much earlier, in 1955, the Tagaytay CityDevelopment Commission was created by lawmarking the fim time an approach of the sortwas used.

Of the thirteen created by law, only fiveactually became operational - the MindanaoDevelopment Authority, the Central Luzon­Cagayan Valley Authority, the Mountain Pro­vince Development Authority, the Laguna

Lake Development Authority, and the BicolDevelopment Company.

The authoritles had the similar functionsof undertaking economic surveys; irrigation,electric power, and flood control projects;and conservation of natural resources. Theywere all entrusted with the task of engagingin industry, agriculture. mining, and otherindustrial pursuits.

Except for the Tagaytay and Caviteauthorities, all those created had authorizedcapitalization ranging from l' 500,000 tol' 300 million, and had five, seven, or nine­member Board of Directors appointed by thePresident with the consent of the Commis­sion on Appointments. Their plans were re­viewed by the then National Economic Councilor the Presidential Economic Staff.

The regional development authoritiesapproach, however, was a failure. Dne criticattributed this to the fact that the few regionaldevelopment authorities which were organizedbecame inutile because of the "high level ofaspirations manifested in their avowed goalsand financing which have been practicallynullified by the paucity of actual support andimplementation."15

On the local level, Provinciel, City, andMunicipal Development Councils were or­ganized, in an attempt to provide a forum forthe coordination of sectoral programs and pro­jects for the development of the localities.Each Development Council was composed ofthe Governor or Mayor as Chairman and headsof local offices as members. This approachagain failed, because the Councils hardlymet, or, if they did, they "did not go beyonddiscussing, setting priorities and approvingthese projeets.,,16 While local planning boardsalso existed, these did not go beyond zoning,and physical planning was largely left to thelocel Engineer's Office.17

Thus, the attempts at regional and localdevelopment through the creation of develop.

15Abelardo G. Samonte. "Regional Develop­ment Authorities: ROel, Structure and Feasibility."PJPA (April, 19681, P. 122.

16Salvador Parco, "Some Factors of Successand Failure of Community Development Councils,"(Bicol Development Planning Board, undated), mimeo.

8

ment authorities and localdevelopment councilsdid not meet popular expectations. By theseventy's, while no new laws were passedadding to the number of regional developmentauthorities, no measures were likewise taker)to organize those legislated, or to increase thelittle releases for those already existing. For thelocal development councils, the trlseetoralapproach {involving the government, theprivate sector, and the church} was tried,but the councils remained asdiscussion forums,meeting, if at all, at their own convenience,

New Approaches. The failure of theregional development authority approach inthe past has led policy-makers to try a newtask in the development of the regions.

1. ;4dministrative Approaches. ImmediateIy upon declaration of Martial Law on SePte~

ber 21, 1972, the President issued PresidentialDecree No. 1 implementing the IntegratedReorganization Plan of the Presidential Com­mission on Reorganization (PCR) which pro­vided, among others, the regionalization of allnational offices and the creation of elevenregions. The regionalization scheme took intoconsideration the existing traditional regions,ethnic homogeneity and geographic considera­tions. Instead of the ten regions previouslyexisting, the PCR's inter-agency committeeopted for eleven regions. and chose, in eachregion, a capital. The regional capitals werechosen on the basis of centrality, accessibility,availability of land, water, and air transport,and the presence of regional offices of nationalgovernment agencies. Through the regionalize­tion of field offices, edministrative decentra­lization is to be achieved.

(Later, the President created a twelfthregion for the Muslim South, and transferredPangasinan from Region III to Region l).

A 'component of the regionalizationscheme is the decentralization of developmentplanning to the regions and the active involve­ment of the politicians in the deliberationson planning policy. A Regional Development

17 Anaya M.. Santiago, "Planning Organiza­tion in the Philippines," Australian Pfenning tns­thu« JourmJl (April, 1969), p. 35.

Council (ROC) was created composed of thelocal chief executives and regional directorsof national offices in each region, each man­dated to meet at least once a year to approvedevelopment plans drafted by the executivecommittee composed of the NEDA RegionalExecutive Director (REO) as chairman andheads of key regional offices (like the Bureauof Plant Industry, Departments of PublicHighways, Public Works, local Governmentand Community Development, and the Bureauof Agricultural Extension), The NEDA'srole in development Rlanning for the regionwas likewise strengthened - the NEDA REOalso acts as ROC Vice-Chairman (the Chairmanis elected by the Council from the local chiefexecutives sitting in) and head of the NEDAtechnical staff which does the actual job ofdrafting plans and conducting researches.

While the government was in the earlyphase of reorganization, the President createdPresidential Regional Officers for Development(PROD) in the regions, to monitor activitiesand projects in their areas. Complementingthe PRODs are the Coordinating Officersfor Performance Efficiency (COPE) in thenational departments, to monitor the imple­mentation of specific sectoral programs. Muchlater, the President deputized the chairmen ofthe ROC's as his Presidential Regional ActionOfficers (PRAOs). The PRODs are supervisedby the Development ManagementStaff (OMS)under the Office of the Executive Secretary(now directly under the Officeof the President).The PRODs, however, are part time designa­tions, each PROD holding another full-timeoffice in the region.

2. Regional Development Projects. As theNEDA's Plan stresses regional developmentand industrialization as an objective, it haspursued this objective through many economicactivities. Its regional development projectsapproech the problem directly. It says in itsRegional Development Projects:

The government has turned towardsa more comprehensive systems approach.to planning which provides for the integ­ration of physical development witheconomic, social, administrative and

9

financial aspects of development into acommon plan frame for a given area.Utilizing space as the medium for in­tegration, a physical development mustbe established to coordinate sectoralinvestments on productive apparatuswith infrastructure, and to relate themto all policies concerning land uses,population distribution and densities,employment, public services, communityfacilities, and ecological balance.18

The NEDA supports several regionaldevelopment projects. Preparation of frame­work development planl: is the aim of thePhysical Planning Strategy for the Philippinesconducted jointly by the Department ofPublic Works, Transportation and Communi­cations, the UP Institute of EnvironmentalPlanning, and the United Nations DevelopmentProgramme. Under the project are the ManilaBay Metropolitan Region Strategic Plan andthe Mindanao Development Studies. Thelatter. however, did not fulfill its objectiveof a framework plan but only succeeded inproviding a profile for the area.

The NEDA's framework planning anddevelopment studies in smaller areas are moresuccessful. Foremost among them is the BicolRiver Basin Development Project, the firstexercise in integrated planning in a basin-widescale in the Philippines. The project centerson the Bicol River Basin area involving thewhole province of Camarines Sur and partsof Albay and Camarines Norte. Other pro­jects are the Pampanga Detta~Candaba SwampDevelopment, Zamboanga del Sur SecondaryRoad Projects. Cotabato Secondary RoadPackage, Bukidnon Secondary Road Pro­jects, Metropolitan Manila Transport SystemPlan, Manila Metropolitan Ring Development,Cagayan land Reform Infrastructure Package,Iloilo land Reform Infrastructure Package,and Regional Capital Development Project.

The Regional Development Package alsoincludes a project on the definition of leadingdevelopment areas and leading tenancy areas.

The approach, according to the NEDA,

18 NEOA, Regionsl DevelO{JmSfYt Projects(Manila, 1973), p, 3.

is to attain both efficiency and welfare inrevenue allocation, and. involves channelingresources to leading strategic growth points,with emphasis on Mindanao.

3. Sectoral Programs. Each governmentdepartment or agency pursues sectoral pro­grams calculated to benefit not only the coun­try on a mecro level, but the regions as well.Sectoral programs on land reform, food pr~

duetion, cooperatives, Infrptructures, housing,tourism, health, rural electrification, educationand manpower development, social welfare,and community development are also aimedto ImpJ:Qve the quality of life of the'· peopleIn .all areas in the country. The larid reform'program, for example, isgeared towards puttinga stop to the age-old tenancy practice, so thatthe farmer can buy his land from the land­lord, giving hJm thereby more returns for hiscrop and a chance for a better lifer and en­couraging the landlord, In the process, tochannel his money to industrial and com­mercial pursuits.

4. Medium and Small-Scale Industries. Anew thrust in economic policy Is the boost

given to medium and small-scale industries.Through the help of the Development Academyof the PhlJipplnes and V.P. Institute for Smell­Scale Industries, technical advica to and train­ing program for small and medium-scale antr.preneu~ are made available in the regions.Medium and Small Industries CoordinatedAction Program (MASICAP) teams and SmallBusiness Advisory Centers are scattered in theregions. Because large-scale industrial activitiesare more difficult to undertake in the regions,medium and small·scale industries which arelabor intensive (and hence, will employ idleagricultural labor) are being encouraged. TheRanis Report emphasizes as well-this thrustin rural mobilization for development. '

5. Cott8!J(J Industries. Cottage Industriesare even, smaller in scope than small-scaleindustries, and employ more labor. This ap­proach aims to utilize raw materials in th8raglons. In Blcol, for example, abaca handi­crafts are made in the schools and in thehomes and farm laborers are paid. on piece­meal basis. The regional thrust of the NationalCottage Industries Development Administration. ;

TABLE IVCOTTAGE INDUSTRIES REGISTERED WITH NACIDA

1973-1974*

Factory WorkersPercent Factory and Estimated

Location a Distribution Workar Number of ContractualWorkers

Totel. 100 194,739 965,786(Total Number - 69,977 Totel capltalizatloo r140,675,902.491

Northern'Luzon 9.83 15,146 86,738Central Luiol'l 14.40 25,270 116,441Tagalog 13.95 24,384 93,612Manila I: Suburbs

I: Rlzal 15.00 42,405 171,90581col 4.29 13,036 52,398Mindoro 7.76 11,336 81,152Eastern Visayas 7.34 11,946 81,067Wastern Visayas 8.45 12,964 65,759Central VISayas 9.33 18,644 105,197Northern Mindanao 4.90 10,243 69,239Southern Mindanao 3.69 6,019 34,644Western MiiidanllO 1.S0 3,468 17,634

" Source: TradeJournal. August, 1974.ft Regions are different from those in the lntegrateed Reorganization Plan.

10

(NACIOA) scheme is seen in the precedingtable.

6. Industrial DisPersal Program. The ceun­try'S program of industrial dispersal has manyaspects. On the national government's part,the construction of super-highways, the ex­tension of railroad networks, the provisionof electricity and water supply facilities, portimprovement, and the development of low·cost housing projects, are aimed at makingavailable the necessary infrastructure and ame­nities to attract industries to locate in therural areas. A labor intensive public worksprogram which supports the same aim, ern­ploYJ exceSS labor in the countryside.

On the financing side, "the governmentbas made it mandatory for banks in the pro­vtnces to allocate 75% of their deposits forlending to projects in areas where they arelocatad. The Board of Investments, (BOI) forits part, has made it a policy to make thegrant of incentives conditional upon a plant'slocating in areas outside the Greater Manila:'However, the BOI, as yet, has no definitecritaria on which industries must ioeate inwhich region. The only criteria it follows, ifat all, are the location of industries outsidethe 5O-kilometer radius from the center whichthe then Task Force on Human Settlements(now Human Settlements Commission (HSC)imposes, and the requirement that the factoryshould, as much as possible, be near its rawmaterial source. Sicat's criticism, done in1969, that the BOI is not really effective inregional dispersal, is still relevant. However,the BOI, at the moment, is engagedin a projectwith the HSC to identify the factories thatwould locate in the regions.

7. Industrial Estates. Another government..policy that aims to disperse industry is thepromotion of industrial estates. The freetrade zone in Mariveles, Bataan, is one suchestate. An industrial estate, located. at thegrowth center where infrastructure and ameni­ties are earlier made available, spurs economicactivity in terms of investments and laboremployed.

More industrial estates are being plannedfor other parts of the country.

B. Local Government Refonn8. Contino-

11

ing reforms in local government are geared toachieve the same objective of regional develop'ment. Apart from the ROC, the protractedcreation of the position of Regional Adminis­trator like those existing in Regions IX andXII hopes to answer the need for coordinationof functions at the regional level. The en­couragement of local development planningthrough the creation of Provincial, City andMunicipal Development Staffs is intended toprop up the planning activity in the regions.

There are, indeed, many programs andprojects geared towards regional development.Their success, however, depends on their im­plementation. There is a need, therefore,to look at the administrative machinery thatimplements the programs, to assesswhere theysucceed or fail, so that defects may be pin­pointed and recommendations may be madefor better and smoother implementation.

Administrative Requirements of the RegionalDevelopment S1rategy

The micro approach is used in thisportion of the study to assess the adminis­trative aspects of regional development. Themicro approach, while it has the limitationof not being able to compare how it is inother areas, nevertheless has the advantageof being able to look at the structures indepth. This studY focuses on the implementa­tion of the regional development strategy inthe Bicol region, one of the depressed areasin the country and a recipient, since 1973,of attention and assistance from the nationalgovernment.

The Region.19 The Bicol region lies onthe southeastern part of Luzon. Lying on thetyphoon belt, it is visited by typhoons at therate of 2Q.30 a year. An area of out-migration,it has been described by a UN expert es a"downwf\rd transitional area," which, despitenatural resources in its fevor, has not beendeveloping.

The 1970 Census places its population at

19souree of Data: UN Centre for RegionalDevelopment. Plan for the Sicol Region, Vol, I (1914).

2,966,881 or 8.1% of the country's population.It has a young population, with 50% being 15years old or younger, due to heavy out-migra­tion of the young able-bodied population (theheaviest out-migration figures are in the 20-24age bracket). In 196Q.1970, its growth differ­entia I was - 0.8%, showing a net migrationof - 0.9%. Its rural population is a high 80.6%,its urban population is 19.3%, much lowerthan the country's rate of 31.1%. While itsliteracy rate is high (86.36%), it is still belowthe national averageof 88%. It is an agriculturalregion, with 83.6% of its labor force in agri­culture, mining, and fishing, 14.6% in manu­facturing, and 21.8% in services. Its averageannual family income is I' 2,201, lower thanthe country's 1'2,541.

The region is composed of six provinces,four on the mainland of Luzon (CamarinesNorte, Camarines Sur, Albay and Sorsogon)and two island provinces (Catand...anes andMasbate). It has three chartered cities (Legazpiin Albay which was chosen as regional capital,Naga and Iriga in Camarines Sur). It has 112municipalities and 2,277 barrios. While itsmain arteries are good, Bicol suffers in lack oftransport facilities. Health facilities in the areaare grossly lacking; in a survey of facilities inBicol, it was discovered that doctors from therural health units are able to visit the barriosonly once a month. Educational facilities donot fare off that badly; however, secondary,collegiate and vocational schools are often onlyin the centers of population, and many abarrio resident is able to finish only the inter­mediate grades.

Before the Tiwi geothermal powerproject was initiated in 1913, only 14.6% ofSicol was electrified.

Few credit facilities (1913) existed forfarmers in Sicol. Two of its provinces, however,(Albay and Camarines Sur) were chosen pilotareas of the Samahang Nayon program, toprovide farmers in the area better sourcesof credit and supplies through the coopera­tives system.

The Regional Development Mechanism.Before the ROC's came into being, Sicol hasits miniature ROC, which was in fact the ins-

12

piratlon of the PCR's recommendation forthe creation of ROC's. The Bical DevelopmentPlanning Board (BOPS) was organized in 1964upon the initiative of the Governors and CityMayors in the area. Executive Order No. 159of President Macapagel gave it the function ofconducting "scientific and systematic surveysof the assets and potentialities of the Sicolregion," planning its development, and poolingnthe resources of the provinces and citiesthereof for the implementation of programsto enhance the social, industrial and commer­cial development and the general welfare ofthe region and its people:'

The SOPS's existence can be divided into

three periods - the first period, from 1964­1967 was its "golden age;" the middle years,from 1967-1911 can be characterized as thestart of its descent, and the years 1912 to1973 as its decline and death.

The first years were marked by the ningas­cogan of the leadership, fired by enthusiasmfrom their own experiment in regional plan­ing, reinforced by financial support from theAsia Foundation (AF) and the Agricu;turalDevelopmentCouncil (ADC) technical supportfrom the UP College of Agriculture, and thegeneral fraternity loyalty to the ruling politicalparty to which all the SOPS members belonged.With Albay's Governor Estevez as chairman

and Jose Oelvo of the Presidential Arm onCommunity Development (PACO) as Exe­cutive Director, the BOPB undertook seminars,information campaigns, and agricultural pro­jects. AF and AOC funds were augmented bylocal government contributions to keep theBOPB ship afloat.

The middle years saw a completely newmembership in the BOPB. All the memberswere new and belonged to the NacionalistaParty (NPl. excapt for the Naga Mayor whoalone was with the Liberal Party (LP). EvenAlbay's Estevez who remained had turned NP.Naga's Sibulo had joined earlier when his Mayorran for Congress, but he was with new mem­bers. Camarines Norte's Vinzons, TOVM (TenOutstanding Young Men) awardee for publicadministration, did not run for reelection, buttook over as Executive Director in 1969.

By 1968, however, the BOPB has startedencountering difficulties. Lack of personnelwas a prime problem; many key positions re­mained unfilled; Peace Corps Volunteersdoing technical jobs finished their tours ofduty, and there wel1l no Filipinos ready to take

their place. By 1970, the problem of financecompounded the Board's problems. Localgovernment members which pledged 1/4 of 1%of their general fund to the BOPS were nolonger contributing regularly. To add to theproblem, AOC and AF supports were term­inating, and the SOPS was in the red. Vinzonsresigned as Executive Director, thinking "plan­ning was ahead in Sicol by 3 1/2 years:'

The SOPS's fall came soon after the 1971elections, when a mixed membership from thetwo parties came into power in the localgovernment units in Bicol. Of the nine mem­bers of the Board, five were NP's and four wereLP's. BOPS meetings became infrequent, anda few meetings were held in Manila with thenational legislators from Bicol. Some meetingsdid not go through for lack of quorum. Evenits Newsletter ceased publication after June1971. The new Executive Director lackedVinzons' dynamism.

A major catastrophe the BOPS met wasthe implementation of the Integrated Reorgan­ization Plan which replaced the SOPS withthe ROC. The SDPB people assumed, however,

13

that they would become the nucleus of theROC. In a frantic attempt to survive the on­slaught of reorganization, the BOPS hurriedlyprepared a Broad Plan for the Bicol Region for1973-77, a staffing pattern for 120 positions(of which only 21 were technical) and a budgetfor'1,251,747.

The creation of the ROC in 1973 was anhonorable exit for the already drowning BOPS.

The leadership's enthusiasm, the capa­bility of its Executive Director and its technicalpersonnel, and the adequacy of financing in itsinitial years, worked in reverse in its last yearsand spelled the Board's decline. Unenthusiasticleaders (most of them were not in the originalBoard), a phlegmatic Executive Director, agross lack of technical personnel, and lack offinancial resources, spelled the doom for theSOPB.

The BIDECO. The creation of the BicolDevelopment Company in 1966 through RA4690 was the national legislature's answer tothe problem of regional development in Bicol.

The BIDECO was established "to pro­mote the balanced and accelerated growth ofthe Bicol region within the context of nationalplans and policies for social and economicdevelopment through the leadership, guidanceand support of the government.,,21

The BIOECO's charter puts it on a super­ior position as far as the BOPB is concerned,with the power given to it to approve develop­ment plans for the region made by any localgovernment, public or private corporation.

It has a Board of Directors of seven ap­pointed by the President for four years, and anauthorized capitalization of , 300 million, ofwhich , 30 million would be released everyyear for nine years.

The Authority was a brainchild of Bicol'sSenator Aytona who made it a holding com­pany, a private corporetion which enabledit to acquire shares of stocks in the corpora­tions and exercise power like other stock­holders.

The BIDECO came out in 1968 with anambitious Four Year Plan for the region. For

20RA4690

agriculture, the aim was greater coordinationand integration with the public sector. In manu­facturing, the BIOECO was to own and operateproductive units in cooperation with the publicsector, emphasis being on the establishmentof basic industries for latter industry. Planpriorities for infrastructure and public utilitiesinvolved the installation of geothermal plantsaggregating 30,000 kilowatts. irrigation of162,360 hectares. flood protection for 10,000heeteres a year, extended highways, improvedrailways and exports. It called for a totalfunding of P 349.30 million, with the govern­ment shouldering P197.2 million, the BIOECOP121.6 million, and local governments P30.6million.

Despite its grandiose plans, however,BIOECO was able to implement only a fewprojects. The rica crash program, funded atP 1.6 million, failed when the typhoons cameand flooded the grains already ripe for harvest.Other projects directly initiated by theBIOECO was the BISUOECO (Bicol SugarDevelopment Corporation); the BlAOCOR(Bicol livestock and Agricultural Develop­ment Corporation); and the Bicol Swine andPoultry Corporation.

The BIOECO lived longer than theBOPB. In fact, for two years, its GeneralManager was a member of the ROC. It hassubsequently been scrapped.

Its dissolution can be explained by thefact that it was, on the whole, a failure. Ay­tona himself attributed the BIOECO's fail­ure to lack of funds and dedicated leader­ship. (His hand-picked political lameducksin the Board were concerned more aboutdeveloping their own private businesses at theexpense of BIOECO). On the other hand,a BOPB official claimed that the releases,though merely in trickles as BIOECO officialssay, could have been utilized well; he saidthe failure of BIOECO was largely due to mls­placed priority. Instead of investing funds forregional development, the BIOECO supporteda personnel complement (1972-73) of 107,with only 18 positions being technical. Italso supported seven Directors getting allow­ances of 1'2,000 each a month.

SDPB-SIDECO Coordination. The BOPB

14

antedated BIDECO by a year. Each one haddifferent functions and could have workedharmoniously. Instead, the two bodies be­came indifferent, even hostile towards eachother, never exchanging data, hardly sittingtogether, except once in 1969 to draft a work­ing agreement which was never followed.

Regional planning in Bicol, therefore,failed because the two planning bodies (onea deliberative body, the other an action body)failed singly and together.

L~ns from the Sicol Experience. Thefailure of regional planning in Bicol pointsto certain prerequisites necessary for the suc­cess of regional planning in the country.

The most crucial factor is leadership.Experience in Bicol shows that programs sankor swam with the dynamism and enthusiasmof the leaders.

The presence of competent technicalpersonnel is another factor. In Bicol, as wellas in other depressed regions, the absence ofinducements (material and other rewards)deters technically competent personnel fromactively partieipating in the development ef­fort.

The lack of adequate financing is alsoimportant. Plans and programs fail because ofinadequate financing, and competent person­flel are not induced to join due to lack offunds to pay them.

A crucial Issue, which does not havemuch to do with finance is the lack, if nottotel absence, of coordination. Where thereare more than one body involved in develop­ment (as in the Bicol case) the need for coor­dination cannot be overemphasized.

These factors must be closely lookedinto in the new administrative arrangementsmade for the development of Bicol and otherregions.

New Administrative Requirements forNew Priorit/e$. From Bicol's earlier experiencein regional planning we can gauge the suitabilityof the new mechanism for development plan­ning in the region.

1. The RDC in Sical. Bicol'. ROC is or-

.. Salaries were adjustad in 1974.

ganized like those of other Regional Develop­ment Councilsthroughout the country.

In Bicol, the Council proper (the delibera­tive body) is composed of six provincial Gover­nors, three City Mayors, the NEDA RegionalExecutive Director, the Executive Directorof the Bicol River Basin Council (the BIDECOGeneral Manager, till lately, was a member),and thirteen regional directors, bringing themembership to a total of 25. The Chairmanelected is Gov. Alberto of Catanduanes, theVice-Chairman Ex-Officio is NEDA RED Al­berto Olaguer who is also Chairman of theExecutive Committee. Members of the Exe­cutive Committee are two representatives ofthe local chief executives and regional direc­tors of the Department of Public Highways(who happens to be the PROD), the Depart­ment of Public Works, the Bureau of Agricul­tural Extension, the Bureau of Plant Industry,the Department of Local Government andCommunity Development and the ExecutiveDirector of the Bicol Riven Basin Council(BRBC). The NEDA RED also heads thetechnical staff composed of staff membersof the NEDA RegionalOffica (NRO).

is as follows:

PositionOffice of NEDA Representative

Regional Executive DirectorSr. Stenographer

Administrative UnitAdministrative OtTtcer IAccountant IClerk-typistDriverMessenger-Janitor

Division of Plan FormulationSr. Professional Economist CProfessional Economist AProfessional Economist BEconomic Researcher CClerk-typist

Division of Program CoordinationSr. Professional Economist CAgricultural SpecialistIndustFl8l SpecialistInfrastructures-Transport

SpecialistSocial Development SpecialistEconomic Reseercher CClerk-typist

SalarylAnnum

., 19,2003,984

7,6085,9283,6123,4323,432

14,40012,00010,2004,8003,612

14,40010,20010,200

10,20010,2004,8003,612

Technical Staff

Executive Committee

The Council is organized as follows:

Regional Development Council

There are eleven technical positionsin the NEDA staff, including that of the RED.A look at their bla-data reveals that the tech­nical staff of the NEDA are qualified in termsof their educational preparation for the job,although there are no tacit NEDA qualifica­tions standards to follow. The hindrance,however, is their youth, which is a disadvan­tage when working with older, career peoplein the sectoral departments. One very youngstaff member complained of her inability toget reports from the aging schools superin­tendent, little realizing that it Is her youthand inexperience that stand in the way.

The NRC's financing comes from theNEDA head office In Manila, which earmarksquarterly allotments to the regions for per­sonnel, maintenance, equipment, and otheroperating expenses. For FY 1974-75, forexample, NEDA Region V (Bicof) had anallotment of , 102,319.00. In addition toNEDA allotmeAts, the ROC received, In thesame year, contributions from each provinceand city in the region amounting to " 5,000

Program CoordinationDivision

Plan FormulationDivision

Administrative & ClericalStaff

While the ROC in Bicol met as eerly asAugust 1973 its technical arm was not com­plately organized until 1974, after the NEDAapproved the staffing pattern for all the regions.The staffing pattern, in Bicol as elsewhere,

15

each for expenses incurred in Council andCommittee meetings.

Appointments for NRO staff membersare centralized, all being issued by the DirectorGeneral in Manila with the RED having onlyrecommendatory powers. Direct supervisionover the NRO's is done by the Regional De­velopment Staff (RDS) in the main office,which has the complementary functions ofcoordinating the planning and implementationof approved regional development plans andprograms, and extending assistance to regiotlaldevelopment authorities.

Financially speaking, therefore, thereare not many problems plaguing the regionaloffice. The salaries provided the staff areattractive enough, considering the lower costof living in some regions (like Bicol) relativeto other regions like Cebu or Davao. (NEDAeven had salary increases recently). Despitesuch incentive, however, NEDA does not seemto get the older, more competent men. Forinstance, some technical people in the defunctBIDECO could easily be absorbed by theNEDA. While educational qualifications can beadequate preparation for a job (a sociologybackground, for instance, for the social de­velopment specialist) a lot of experience onthe kind of job is important as well. This iswhat NEDA staff members lack. Traininghas been done on the regionalscale for regionalpersonnel. In late 1973 a three week courseon development planning was undertaken bythe UP Institute of Environmental Planningin Bicol. However,while the trainees were fromdifferent offices, very few of them ended upworking for the NEDA. In 1974, in the processof plan preparation, the need to train membersof ROC task forces came up in an executivecommittee discussion, but the committeemembers chose to save by asking the traineesof the 1973 course to teach the others, ratherthan import expensive lecturers from Manila.

It is in the aspect of leadership whereNEDA Region V seems very much lacking.The REO, a poor man who rose from clerkto a top DBP regional officer, has a bechelor'sdegree from a local college and an MBA fromthe UP. He makes up with PR and loyaltyof his staff what he lacks in dynamism; he relies

16

3 lot on his staff members, even in too obviousbriefings before·meetings.

The chairman of the ROC, on the otherhand, is dynamic and powerful. His influencein policy-making in his heyday as Appropria- .tions Committee Chairman in Congress is seenin the impressive infrastructures he had "built"for his island province. He tries to have hisway with the REO. Communications betweenhim and the REO show his request for insertionof certain things in minutes of meetings and theRED's weak refusal to do so.

Unfortunately, in an arrangement likethe ROC and the NEDA, the stronger figureintended is the NEDA REO and not the ROCchairman. The REO has the position but lacksthe dynamism to use it to advantage. Theappointment of the Chairman as PRAO callsas wei! for a dynamic personality, which theChairman has. The problem in Bicol, it seamsis the tendency of the Chairman to be paro­chial, and there is the danger that he will swingprolects to favor his own constituents.

2. The BROP. The Bicol River BasinProject is the first effort of the Philippinegovernment in integrated planning and programimplementation on an area-wide basis. It is aninter-agency, multi-disciplinary effort underthe leadership of the Secretary of PublicWorks and the Secretary of Agriculture.

The BRBP area covers 312,000 hectaresof land along the Bicol River; 68% of the areais within the province of Camarines Norte andAlbay.

Started in 1973, the BRBP is pursued"within a 'system' framework, integratingvarious 'means' to attain the program objec­tive as effectively as possible .... Within thesystem's context, the "means to achieve theprogram objectives include ten major activities-- land reform, compact farm development,agricultural credit and rural bank expansion,water resources development, road develop­ment, program organization and management,and project support services:'21

As of 1974 the BRBP has a total staffcomplement of 16 professional staff and 30

21BRBP Annual Report, 1974.

administrative personnel, complemented byeight technical personnel and seven seniorstaff members of the UP Technical AssistanceGroup (mostly from los Banos). A full-timeproject representative from USAID is assignedto the Project Office in Canaman, CamarinesSur. It has a full-time Executive Director fromthe are who mans the office. (The first ED wasOscar Ravanera, a civic leader-businessman,but he has recently been replaced.)

It is a five-year project with a totalbudget of "9,466,210. For personal servicesalone in one fiscal year (1914-15), the totalearmarked was" 1,493,588.00, bringing thetotal. including maintenance and equipmentoutlay, to" 1,100,000.00. Aside from nationalgovernment appropriations for these expenses,the BRBP also taps other agencies for counter­part funds in its feasibility studies; aid for suchcomes 'from the USAID, the NEDA, DPWTC,DA, DNR, DAR, and DlGCD.

The BRBP Council is composed ofcabinet-level persons - the NEDA DirectorGeneral, the Secretaries of the followingdepartments - DPWTC, Finance, Agriculture,Natural Resources, Agrarian Reform, localGovernments, Public Highways, the NIAAdministrator, and the Governor of CamarinesSur. The Secretary of PublicWorks is the Chair­man, although there are moves to give thechairmanship to the NEDA Director General.

The BRBP is a much larger organizationthan the ROC as can be gleaned from thefollowing:

Offices - Board of Directors, Exe­cutive Director, Public Information,General Auditing, legal Staff, Manage­ment Support Services, One DeputyDirector each for Budget and Adminis­tration, Plans and Programs, SocialInfrastructure, and Physical Infrastruc­ture.

Departments - Budget and Adminis­trative with two divisions (Adminis­trative; Finance and Budget); Plans andPrograms, with three divisions (Agri­cultural Development Planning, Agri­business Development Planning, SocialEngineering); Social Infrastructure with

17

three divisions (Agrarian Reform, SocialStructural, Agro-Industrial), and PhysicalInfrastructure with one division (Designand Survey).

The Executive Director gets " 30,000.members of the Board "24,000 each, DeputyDirectors " 24,000 each, heads of divisions" 18,000, and tachnical positions betweenP10,000 and P12,000.

It has a unique set-up, in that it has a re­sident group of technical advisers and a com­muting group of consultants lending its ad­vice. Apart from that, it maintains a SocialSurvey Research Unit based at the Ateneo deNasa which conducts continuing researcheson on-going projects fed back to it for im­mediate action. It maintains coordinationwith sectoral projects through Task Forcesit creates, coopting members from theprivate sector.

The BRBP, therefore, has advantagesover the ROC in terms of financing (its staffare as well-paid, but it has more in number;its projects, especially the expensive feasi­bility studies, do not get snagged due to lackof funds). In terms of technical competence,its staff is probably better off, not in terms ofqualifications only but in terms of training andexperience. Training programs for staff mem­bers here and abroad are funded by USAIDand other sources. External advisers lendexpertise to the pool of technical personnel;moreover, technical advisers in residence pro­vide continuing support. Unfortunately, BRBPis unable to keep its personnel happy, it seems;there are many vacancies and heavy turnover.It ,eems its personnel use it as stepping stonefor still biggerthings.

leadership is also an area where BRBPexceeds the ROC. The cabinet rank of itsdirectors can be said to be a great advantageover that of the ROC directors at the localand regional level. While they may not havethe time to meet as often, they are able to usetheir office and personnel for needed supportto the BRBP; for instance, a staff at the Plan­ning and Project Development Office (PPDO)of the DPWTC helps a lot in data gatheringand monitoring of activities. The first Exe-

cutive Director, for his part, was able to co-optthe private sector by virtue of his position asbusinessman and civic leader. He had a largertechnical staff to depend on as well. (We donot know, however, why he left his officeand who his successoris).

3. BRBP-RDC: The Problem is Coor­dination. While the two regional planningbod.ies in Bicol do not duplicate functionsand activities, coordination between them issadly lacking. The ROC, a deliberative bodyconcerned with planning for the entire region,shows uneoneem for the BRBP, but under­neath, envy is discernible. The BRBP staff, forits part, has an air of superiority over ROC,because of the more prestigious member­ship of its Board and the funds it is able toutilize. In 1974, a Letter of Implementationplaced the BRBP under the NEDA; the ROChas short cause for rejoicing, until it realizedthat the LOI would remain unimplemented,the BRBP, countering that it is under theNEOA Director General and not the NEDARED. Formal behavior characterizes the twoExecutive Directors. In an ROC ExecutiveCommittee meeting held at the BRBP office,a polite civility characteristic only of politiciansprevailed as the NEDA RED and the BRBPExecutive Director dealt with each other. TheNEDA RED claims not to plan for the areacovered by the BRBP; both claim that theylet each other know what they are doingthrough ROCmeetings.

4. The PROD and the Regional PlanningBodies.' The post of the Presidential RegionalOfficer for Development (PROD) was createdfor the purpose of monitoring sectoral programsand projects in the region for the President.In Bicol, the PROD is the Reg(c:mal Directorof the Department of Public Highways. Thus,by virtue of his post as Regional Director of avital agency, h9 is a member of the ROC Exe­cutive Committee. He is not in the ROC in hiscapacity as the PROD.

This is so because the ROC is a crea­tion of the Integrated Reorganization Planimplemented by P. O. No.1, while thePROD was a later creation by the President;hence, his membership in the ROC has notbeen provided.

18

The Bicol PROD as member of theROC Executive Committee participates active­ly in Council deliberations and in the pro­vision of data. His membership makes coor­dination with the ROC possible. He does not,however, coordinate as much with the BRBP,the only tie he has being his membership withthe BRBP Executive Director at the ROC.

The Bicol PROD office, as in many­areas, is not a full-time job, and his staff memobers are all on loan, on detail from some otheroffice. In the organization lies the weakness ofthe PROD.

Moreover, the Bicol PROD is a retireableold man who lacks in dynamism what he hasin humility and sincerity. He subordinateshimself to the NEDA RED at the ROC, byvirtue of the latter's position, not invokinghis Presidential appointment to -get thingsdone at his office.

Summary. In Bicol, therefore, lheadmi­nistrative machinery for the implementationof the regional development strategy leavesmuch to be desired. Three bodies exist in theregion for development purposes - the ROCwhich deliberates on planning policy. for theentire region, the PROD who monitors sectoralprograms in the region, and the BRBP whichplans and implements plans for a sub-region.While the ROC has a strong chairman, it has aweak RED; while the PROD has Presidentialbacking, he utilizes it sparingly. While theBRBP nas a power house of a Council, fundsand personnel, it assumes a superior attitudeand does not work with the other develop­ment planning agencies in the region. Coor­dination among the th!ee is not workable,the only coordination existing between thePROD and the two others being their mem­bership in the ROC.

The ROC has the functions of plan for­muletlen and coordination but has no powerof implementation. The PROD's post, if givento a more dynamic man, can do for the ROCthe implementation it lacks. What is probablyneeded is greater participation of the ROCChairman in his capacity as Presidential Re­giona! Action Officer which is yet undiscarniblein the case' of Bicol, and greater coordination

.between him as the PRAO and the PROD.

Again, the appointment of the ROC Chair­man as PRAO should spell the coordinativerelationship between him and the RED. In theabsence of such, the problem of two leadersaUhe·ROC will crop up.

Regional Planning and Administrative Effi.cieney

The new regional development strategy,with its numerous components, seems to bethe right approach in the attempt to solvethe twin problems of increasing the GNPand redistributing income to regions andfamilies more equitably. The failure of the

. regional development authorities in the pastto really embark on developmental programsfor the regions called for a newer, better.coordinated approach to regional deveJop­ment.

Going back to the circular causation theory,however, can we say that regionaldevelopmentin depressed areas like Bicol will not contri­bute to 'negative development.?

Bicors Expectations. The ROC in Bicolrecently 'came up with a Comprehensive Planfor Bicol. The Cc;>mplan was patterned largelyafter the Four-Volume Plan done by 26 parti­cipants of a training course conducted by. theUnited Nations Centre for Regional Develop­ment who went to Bical in 1974 for field9xercise.

The Complan's basic strategy is the strength­9ning of "sectoral interdependence simul­taneously with the development of agriculture,industry, and trade, to redirect the path ofBicoYs economy away from agricultural rawmaterial exports towards a more sectorallybalanced mix of economic activities in theregion." .

The Complan's scheme is as follows:a.. developing agriculture through increasing

labor and land productivity an!" cropdiversification;

b. establishing light industries with strongbackward linkages to agricultural enter­prises and to indigenous sources hithertounutilized;

c. provision of social and economic over­head capital to support the immediate

19

needs of industrial-cum agricultural de­velopment programs and the expectedneeds based on the spatial and demograp­hic effects of the strategy;

d. provision of employment in industry forlabor rendered redundant by the increasein labor technology;

e. adoption of technological change" on aselective basis so as not to displace labor:

1. particular attention on spatial considera­tions of human settlements, industrial,and agricultural areas, growth poles, andin general, environmental stability; and

g. adoption of integrated area developmentapproach at the micro-regional level;specifically at the Bicol River Basin Area.

The strategy for industry is aimed at in­creasing per capita income through the encour­agement of agro-based industrial raw materialsin the region and providingemployment oppor-­tunities through the development. of inter­mediate and capital goods. The plan envisionsthe establishment of an industrial estate in theTiwi-Tabaoo.Bacacay area in Albay, an areachosen because of the Tiwi Geothermal Pro­jectand the international port in Tabaco.Planned for location in the Tabaco estate areagro- and resource-based industries, exportprocessing and medium and large-scale industries. Other industrial zones chosen 8,"

in Naga, legazpi, Iriga, Oaet, Sorsogon andVirae (the cities and capital towns).

Bicol, indeed, has high expectations. Willthe various programs be able to raise Bicol'slevelof development?

It is obvious that Bicol's efforts alone willnot do. Our earlier study on governmentalaspects of development in Bicol revealed thefollowing: Politically, Bicol -ls run by familydynasties who have long entrenched them­selves in power. Financially, local governmentunits in Bicol have inadequate funds, and havebeen spending scarce resources on misplacedpriorities. Projections on Bicol's income inthe light of new tax measures and sharingschemes, however, point to a brighter picture'for Bicol. Failure of regional planning inBicol earlier was due to "lack of development­oriented leadership, lack of technical expertise,

and lack of funds.Present organizational arrangements in Bicol

planning bodies militate against efficient ad­ministration of planning in the region. TheNEDA's Iesderhsip leaves much to be desired,and the coordination of programs, whichfalls on its shoulders, may be imperilled in thewake of its weak leadership. The PROD, forhis part, lacks the dynamism to monitor pro­grams, and to implement the plan as envi·siened, The BRBP is only existent in an area,and has nothing whatsoever to do with theimplementation of the Camp/an for otherareas. The Camp/an, left to the region onlyfor implementation, will fail, because of theabsence of a single agency to implement itand the lack of dynamic leadership to under­"take it, not to mention the funds that reosources in the area cannot meet.

But the Complan is a plan of action for theregion or for the local government units alonebut for the national government to supportactively. Already, the national governmentis doing its share in support of developmentefforts for the region.

In 1975, the NEDA had a total of "232.1million worth of projects in Bicol, of which1.6% is undertaken through local governmentfunding; 0.4% through foreign financing, anda full 98% being contributed by the nationalgovernment. Of these, 86.6% are in infrastruc­tures, totalling" 200.9 million. Food produc­tion projects account for 62.5% of the "3.8million allotted for agriculture.

Financing and leadership will not dependon Bicol's resources alone. The national govern­ment will contribute a lot to carry the plansinto fruition. The industrial estates program,for instance, will entail a lot of initiative andsupport on the part of the national govern­ment, and the national government is ready togive it. Moreover, projects encompassing theBRBP will be undertaken by and in collabora­tion with it.

The program of development for the regionwill most likely face less difficulties, withnational government support seeing to itthat amibitious development programs do notwork in circular causation against themselves.

The government has extended its programsto other regions, deemphasizing the support

20

to the core city in Manila. The table belowshows the regional distribution of major pipe­line projects of the national government inforeign exchange and local currency.

TABLE VSUMMARY OF MAJOR PIPELINE

PROJECTSBY REGION*(December 31, 1974)

Region Percent Distribution Percent Distributionof Foreign Exchange of Local Currency

I .90 5.40II 4.29 1.93

III 11.81 20.00IV 12.95 5.88V 10.58 1.15

VI 6.48 4.89VII 11.25 10.48VIII 5.44 3.01

IX 3.31 2.33X 9.14 12.11Xl 1.11 1.15

Mindanao 14.16 16.85Nationwide 13.30 8.06Luzonwide 8.84 9.69

TotalPhilippines 100.0 100.00

.. Source: NEDA Development Digest.

As can be seen from the table, less emphasisis given now to the Metro Manila area andits environs (Region IV), which has a per­cent share of foreign exchange projects ofonly 12.95%, and of locally funded pro­jects of 5.88%. Bicol (RegionV), has10.58% and 7.75%, while Mindanao as awhole has 14.16% and 16.85%, respectively,of foreign currency and local currency fundedprojects.

However, national support alone will notsuffice. In Bicol, as in other regions, the pro­blem of coordination of planning activitieswill keep on cropping up. There is need for thecreation of a single structure that will un­dertake the task of coordinating plans andprograms at all levels of government. Thereseems to be wisdom in the proposal for a res­gional Administrator appointed by and res­ponsible directly to the President who willperform the task of coordination for see­toral projects of the National Governmentand multi-level local and regional projects, in

the integrated plan.What is needed as a boost to the Philip.

pines' regional development strategy is sus­tained national support to the administrativeapparatus at the local and regional levels interms of technical and financial assistance andactive tutelage for the local and regional per­sonnel. Without these, regional developmentwill remain merely a concept, and implemen­tation will lag behind given its usual slowpace,

With active national support, the regionaldevelopment strategy will be an instrumentto develop the depressed regions, not work­ing in circular causation to keep them depressedand underdeveloped, but to spur the regionsto contribute largershares to the GNP.

Announcement:

•.. there is a need

for a sustained national

support to the adminis-

trative apparatus at the

local and regional levels

In terms of technical and

financial assistance and

active ,tutelage for the

locarand regional personnel. • •

the offering of

..• the 10-month Special Course in Urban and RegionalPlanning (SCURP)

.•. the 2-year course leading to the degree of

Master In Urban and Regional Planning (MURP)

Address. all inquiries to:

ForSCURP:

For Director of Training

For MURP:

The Director of Graduate Studies

Institute of Environmental PlanningUniversity of the Philippines

E. Jacinto StreetDillman, Quezon City

21

LEVELS OF REGIONAL DEVELOPMENTAND LABOR MOBILITY

Donna Elinor Dequifia

TERMS OF REFERENCE

t. INTRODUCTION

The allocation of human resources tomeet the demands of the developing regionsis a growing concern' among national and re­gional development planners. It is widely heldthat the current pattern of unequal regionaldevelopment perpetuates the present patternof labor mobility. These prevailing patternsof internal migration in turn are responsiblefor the growth imbalance among regions. Itis logical to suspect than regional develop­ment and labor mobility are directly related.More often however, it is the logicalthat posesa great challenge to empirical verification.·

OBJECTIVE

This study aims to:1. cOnstruct an index of regional deve­

lopment so that the twelve regions in the coun­try may be ranked and categorized by levelof development; .

2. assess the extent, distribution andmagnitude of the most recent migrant laborflows for the twelve regions; and

3. establish the relationship betweenlevels of regional development and patternsof migration.

22

For purposes of the study, the countryhas been divided into twelve region~:

REGION I lIocosREGION II . CagayanREGION III: Central LuzonREGION IV: Southern TagalogREGION V : BicolREGIONVI : Western VisayesREGION VII: Central VisaYS$REGIONVlIl: Eastern VisayesREGION IX: Western MindanaoREGION X : Northern MindanaoREGION XI: Southern MindanaoREGION XII: Metro Manila

The Metro Manila region covers thecities of Manila, Caloocan, Pasay, Quezon andthe suburban municipalities of Maketi, Man­daluyong, Navotas, San Juan, Marikina, Mala­bon, Paranaque, Pasig, Taguig,and Valenzuela.

METHODOLOGY

The basic data used in the study isderived from unpublished results of the Na­tional Demographic Survey (NOS) jointlyconducted by the UP Population Instituteand the National Census and Statistics Officein 1913. The survey covered a sample size

of 22,513,942 comprised of members of thepopulation '15 years old and over. Of this,34.9% were recorded migrants.

SCOPE

The paper will cover both the nationaland regional levels but focus will be on thelatter as the main areas of study are levels ofregional development and interregional labormobility. However, as regional interrelation­ships cannot be comprehensively discussedoutside the framework of national develop­ment, the wider national framework is drawninto the discussion.

", • . the prevailingpetterns

of Internal migration are also

responsible for the imbalances

In regional growth . . . II

II. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

A. Measures of the Levels of RegionalDevelopment

To determine the levels of developmentof the country's twelve regions, a compositeindex based on seven demographic and socio­economic indicators was developed. The needfor_ a composite index was dictated by the in­herent inadequacies of basing judgments oflevels of regional development on only onedimension of the deveiopment concept: demo­graphic, social or economic. If one were tomeasure levels of development for insJ:ancepurely in terms of the population size, onewould get a distorted perspective of develop­ment efforts. '

The construction of such an index wasfurther made necessary because of the recog­nition of the interrelationship among themulti-dimensional variables indicative of thelevel of regional development. Not to takecognizance of this interdependence would

23

make inconclusive the results of the study.The indicators tested for correlation with

the level of regional development are:1. level of urbanization (URBAN): urban

population ... total population2. percent employed in manufacturing

(MANUF):employment in manufacturing

total employment3. salary and wage earners as a percent

of the economically active population. (WAGE): salary and wage earners

labor force4. percent employed in the nonagri­

cultural sector (NONAGR):employment in the non-agricultural sector

labor force6. profassionaly ~killed workers as a per­

cent of the economically active population(PTKEAP):

skilled workerslabor force

6. non-manual workers as a percent ofthe economically active population (NMANUAl)

non-manual workerslabor force

'J. average family income, 1971 '(IN­COME):

total incometotal number of families

The choice of indicators waspredieatedon the assumptions that:

1. the urban population of a region growsas development occurs;

2. as a region develops, a bigger percent­age of its labor force is employed in the non­agricultural sector; particularly in the manu­facturing industries;

3. because of the nature of manufactur~

ing activities, professionals and non-manualworkers .make up a bigger portion of thoseemployed; .

4. because the manUfacturing sector ismonetized in contrast to the agricultural sec­tor where a significant percentage of income'is earned and consumed in kind, the rise inindustrial employment leads to a shift in pat­terns of remuneration ... from farm income inkind to wage and salary income from industry;

5. with higher levels of productivity andprofitability in the manufacturing sector con­tributed by advances in technology and trainedmanpower, industrial incomes exceed farm in­comes. Because a large part of the labor forceis employed in comparatively higher payingjobs in industry, the average family incomeincreases as development is pursued by a re­gion.

Table A presents the relative values foreach of these indicators.

"acomposite index to

determine the levels of

development recognizes the

interrelationship of multi-

dimensional variab/es-

demographic, social oreco-

nomic"

TABLE AINDICATORS FOR LEVEL OF REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Level %em- Wage %em- Skilled wor- Non-manualof Urban.- ployed earners ployed in the kersas a workers es Average

REGION izetion In a58%of non-agricul- %ofthe a%ofthe familymftg. the labor force tural sector labor force labor force income

1. 1I0COt 20.6% 8.1% 29.9% 30.1% 6.4% 129% 2931.662. Cagayan 14.3 4.9 21.9 22.2 3.7 8.7 2606.163. Central Luzon 31.0 14.3 49.3 68.8 6.0 19.3 4770.164. Southern

Tagelog 32.0 16.4 42.7 60.6 5:3 17.3 4287.165. Bicol 21.0 11.2 32.3 37.5 4.4 12.7 2783.936. Western

Viseyas 27.6 11.5 54.4 42.4 6.1 14.8 3114.227. Centrel

ViseYll$ 20.5 11.4 37.2 42.6 4.8 15.2 2772.498. Eastern

Viseyas 19.0 7.7 27.1 29.0 3.7 9.1 2261.309. Western

Mindanao 16.2 6.0 21.4 26.0 4.3 10.5 2943.3410. Northern

Mindanao 18.7 10.0 29.6 35.6 4.9 13.1 3063.1111. Southern

Mindanao 21.6 6.4 28.1 28.5 4.3 11.5 3971.1612. Metro

Manila 100.0 22.5 83.1 97.3 12.3 39.4 ·7425.44

Note: These deta are drawn from unpublithed Research Note. No. 57 {UP,PoPUlation Institutesourcas. Among the sourcas consulted are ErnestoPernie, "Indicators of Philippine Urbanization in Tables 3a, 48, 5a); and Task Force on Human.Set-

the Twentieth Century," Research Note No. 47. ~ements, Development Academy of the Philippines,{UP-Population Institute, Table 3, March 19, 1975); Social Equity Study in the Phlllppines: Technical .

Imelda A. Zose, "Some Netionel and Regional 01· Report" {March 1975), Table VI.

mensloll$ of the Philippine Lebor Force In 1910,"

24

To construct the composite index whichwill measure the level of regional developmentin terms of all these seven indicators, factoranalysis is used.' Table B shows that onlyone factor was extracted, l.e., the indicatorschosen all measured only one significantvariable which in this case is the level of rEI-

gional development. The choice of indicatorshas been appropriate as all seven account formore than 93% of total and common variances.Hence, any change in the level of regionaldevelopment may be explained by changes inthese indicators.2

TABLE BFACTOR ANALYSIS OF REGIONAL

DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS

Indicators

URBANMANUFWAGENONAGRPTKEAPNMANUALINCOMEPTVPCV

Factor MatrixFactor'

.98

.94

.96

.99

.96

.99

.9493~3%

93.3%

Note: Rotation was not necessarybecause onlyone factor was derived. Legend: 'PTV - percent oftotal variance;and PCV- percent of common variance.

Applying the relative weights assignedeach indicator (Table 8) to their percentageand peso shares (Table A) by region, indexscores for each region (Table C) are developed.The index scores indicate the level of develop­ment of each region when measured in termsof all the seven indicators. Giventhis composite

1Factor analysis is one way of testing thepossibilitY of deriving a composite measure from aset of interrelated variables or indicators. A$ the sevanindicators were found to be highly inter-correlated,the use of factor analysis is justified. Thetechniauswas applied on the data using a recommended pro­cedure. principal factoring without Iteration.

25

measure, the regions are then ranked from themost developed to the least.

The three- highast ranking regions andhence the most developed are Metro Manila,Central Luzon and Southern Tagalog; whilethe least developed, are Eastern Visayas andCagayan.

To further systematize the ranking ofthetwelve regions, three broad categorizations

2Except for a minimal 6.71 which has to bitaccounted for by other measures. A 93.3% PTV andPCV level is however considered conclusive for cor­relation purposes.

TABLECTHE REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT INDEXSCORES AND THEIR CORRESPONDING

RANKS

REGION INDEXSCORE RANK

1. lIocos 438 72. Cagayan 371 113. Central Luzon 714 24. Southern

Tagalog 642 35. Blcol 41B 9.56. Western

Visayas 471 57. Central

Visayas 41B 9.5B. Eastern

Visayas 339 129. Western

Mindanao 436 B10.Northern

Mindanao 457 611. Southern

Mindanao 587 412. Metro

Manila 1124 1

were used: high, moderate and low levels ofregional development. Category A is composedof the four most developed regions. Category CIncludes the four leest developed. Category Bconsists of the remaining four which are neitherthe most nor least developed.

26

Table 0 shows that the most developedregions are Metro Manila, Central Luzon,Southern Tagalog and Southern Mindanao.Those which are moderately developed areWastern Visayas, Northern Mindanao, lIocosand Western Mindanao.

TABLE DREGIONS CLASSIFIED ACCORDINGTO THE THREE CATEGORIES OF

REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT

CATEGORYA

REGIONHigh Levelof Regional

DevelopmentMetro ManilaCentral LuzonSouthern TagalogSouthern Mindanao

RANK

1234

B Moderate Levelof RegionalDevelopment

Western Visayas 5Northern Mindanao 6Iwcot 7Western Mindanao B

C Low Levelof RegionalDevelopment

Bicol 9.6Cental Visayas 9.5Cageyan 11Eastern Visayas 12

The least developed raglans are Bicol. Cen­tral Visayas. Cagayan and Eastern Visayas.

B. Measures of LaborMobilityTo assess the extent, distribution and mag­

nitude of recent migrant labor flows for eachof the twelve regions. six measures have beenderived. These are:

1. percent distribution of migrant laborin the twelve ragions:migrant labor in ragion Zmigrant labor in all ragions

2. migrant labor as a percent of regionalworkers:migrant labor in ragion Zlabor force of ragion Z

27

3. migrant labor as a percent of migrantsin the ragion:migrant labor in ragion Zmigrant in region Z

4. migrant labor inflow betwean 1970.73and· 1965-70: number of migrantworkers who moved out of the regionsduring the two periods

6. migrant labor outflow between 1970.73and 1965-70: number of migrarrtwork·ers who have moved into the regionsduring these two periods.

6. migrant labor net flow bet1Neen 1970.73and 1965-70: the difference betweenmigrant labor inflow and outflow.

TABLE EREGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF MIGRANT WORKERS, WORKERS

AND MIGRANTS

Migrantwork- Migrantwork- % Dlstrjbu-REGIONS Migrant All All ers as a% ers as a % bution of

Workers Workers migrants of all workers of all mig- mig.rants workers

1. lIoens 119,170 574,100 241,983 20.8% 49.3 3.2%2. Cageyan 106,138 556,543 212,848 19.1 50.0 2.83. Central

Luzon 286,685 1,493,069 716,412 19.2 40.0 7.64. Southern

Tagalog 377,640 1,534,938 800,567 24.6 47.2 9.95. Bicol 198,913 836,664 461,104 23.8 43.1 5.26. Western

Visayas 227,661 1,129,489 478,623 20.2 48.6 6.07. Central

Vlsay8$ 244,055 991,115 532,412 24.6 45.8 6.48. Eastern

Visayas 143,724 760,349 325,583 18.9 44.1 3.89. Western

Visayas 202,920 481,876 390.586 42.1 52.0 5.310. Northern

Mindanao 395,374 882,292 758,348 44.8 52.1, 10.411. Southern

Mindan,.o 624,643 1,075,758 1.235.319 58.1 50.6 16.412. Metro

Manila 884,025 1,245,160 1,703.341 71.0 51.9 23.2

TOTAL 3,810,947 11,561,343 7,857.126 33.0% 48.5% 100.00%

Table E shows where migrant workers arefound, how they are distributed and to whatextent they constitute workers and migrantsin each of the regions.

Of the close to four million migrantsbetween 1970-73, almost one-fourth went toMetro Manila and about one-sixth transferredto Southern Mindanao. Cagayan and EasternVisayas proved to be the most unpopularareas for migratory settlement with less thanone-thirtieth of migrants settling in Cagayanand only one-twenty-fifth migrating to EasternVisayas.

Migrant workers constitute 71%of MetroManila's labor force and more than 58% ofSouthern Mindanao's; while they account forlessthan 19%of the Eastern Visayas labor force

28

and only a little more than 19%of Cagayan'$.Compared to the national average, MetroManila and Southern Mindanao employ abouttwice the number of migrants absorbed else­where in the country while Eastern Visayasand Cagayan provide fewer than two-thirdsthe employment opportunities available inthe average region.

These patterns of migration tend tosupport the observation that migr~nts andmigrant labor are more prevalent in the deve­loped regions rather than in the underdevelopedones.

Correlation analysis was applied to eva­luate the relationship between the index ofregional development and the two measures;the number of migrants sod the percentage

of migrant labor in a region's labor force. Ahigh positive correlation3 was found indicatinga substantial correspondence among thesevariables.

Interregional labor mobility should beassessed not only as a stock variable but moreimportantly as a flow variable - one that canonly be properly understood when viewedwithin relatively long time periods. Two recenttime frames - 1970-1973 and 1965-1970 ­have then been selected to measure the mag­nitude of labor flows among regions.

Table F shows that Metro Manila and

Northern Mindanao, regions considered fairlywelf developed, experienced the highest netgains of migrants during these two periods.Central and Eastern Visayas, among the leastdeveloped regions, sustained high net losses.

Correlation analysis has revealed thathigh positive correlations are found betweenregional development and migrant labor netflows.4 Hence, interregional labor mobilityhas substantial influence on the level of deve­lopment of a region. In tum; regionsof higherlevels of development are more likely to attractbiggermagnitudes of migrant l~bor.

TABLE FMIGRANT LABOR FLOWS IN THE TWELVE REGIONS FOR 1970-1973

and 1965-1970

1910-1913 1966-1970Net Net

REGIONS In-Flow Out-Flow i=low In-Flow Out-FlOW Flow

1. lIocos 10.803 9.346 1,437 14,580 27,706 -13,1262. Cagayan 3.719 1,881 1,898 12,910 7.883 5.0183. Central Luzon 10.002 34.466 -24,444 36,849 • 48.847 -11.9984. Southern Tegalog 24.261 49.507 -25.246 47.649 35,918 11.7315. Bical 8.450 18,442 -9.992 13.636 20.762 -7.1266. WesternVisayas 10.563 12,321 -1,758 10,468 33.370 -22,8827. Central Visayas 10.434 21,596 -11.162 22,297 68,830 -46,5338. Eastern Visayas 8,433 23,421 -14.994 19,756 32.341 -12,5859. WesternMindanao 10.181 5.521 4.664 15.200 12.996 2,20410. Northern Mindanao 27,577 20,448 7,129 56,245 35,572 20.67311. Southern Mindanao 19.694 22.015 -3,321 64,414 26,577 37,89712. Metro Manila 114,088 39,289 74,799 125,591 88,873 36,318 '

SUMMARY

The regional distribution of migrantworkers tends to favor those regions consideredhighly developed by the criteria adopted inthe study. The extent of migrant labor amongregi.onal workers varies directly with the levelof regional development. Net gains of recentmigrant workers are characteristic of highlydeveloped regions. Among these regions areMetro Manila- and Southem Mindanao. Regions

3 r =.658 aU ...05

experiencing heavy net lossesof migrant labor. are Central and Eastern Visayas. These regionsare ranked among the lowest in the regionaldevelopment profile.

CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMEN·DATIONS

The volume and directional pattem of inter­regional migration point to two processes in­volving socio-economic changes. First is the

4 For the 1970-1973, r- .6&3 while for the1965-1910 period. r = .!?38. Both are significant att=.05

29

development of pioneering types of flowsin areas of frontier settlement as evidenced blthe continued exodus to the Mindanao area.

. Second is the emeJlJtoce of a new syste~

of metropolitan-to-suburb flow accompaniedby an accentuated tempo of urbanization asseen in the rapid development of the areesperipheral to Manila.

The observed patterns seem to strengthenthe view that the current patterns of inter1'&­gional migration, if unregulated, will resultin unbalanced regional growth with the train­ed manpower migrating to regions of signifi·cant levels of development. Although therehave been remedial measures to control the in­flow of. surplus labor from depressed regionsto the industrial metropolitan regions, thesehave not been adequate.a To reverse such atrend, the government must re-examine Itsmigration policies and use these as more directpolley tools for gradually eliminating the pre­vailing growth imbalance among regions.

6 Lately, however, although there remains apOSitive migratory net flow to both Western andCentral Mindanao. Southern Mindanao hes experi­enced a negative migratory net flow. This was causedlargely by the current peace and order situation Inthe region.

S Some of these policiesare:1. the 5O-kilometer radius criteria for the

estII5Ti'ibment of new industries which ultimetelylocate such entities outside the apparently "over·crowded" metropolitan canter;

Such policies on migration should helpdetermine priorities favoring those regionswhich lack the manpower required for deve­lopment. They shpuld furthermore sensitizeplanners end decision-makers into promotingprograms which will attract or discouragemigrant labor to specified regions.

These findings would encourage inten­sification of the regional development efforts.Increased development on the regional level,particularly in less developed regions canresult in the redistribution of migrant laborby increasing options for migrant workers.If more areas were developed, these COUldbecome centers for attracting migrant labor.The potential inputs of migrant labor in the lessdeveloped regions should not be undersuessed.

. Because the migrant labor force is skilled,educated and stable7 regional developmentefforts and the increased inflow of migrantlabor can be complementary and productive.

2. the agrarian lend reform program which mayencourage the rural fermer to stay In the ferm endlIVall of the credit facilities and other privileges pr0­

vided by the program; and3. the establishment of regional centers of

.government'administration In an effort to decentra­lize the government servicedeliverysystem.

The migrant labor force Is mlddle-agad endpradomll1antly marrlad so that the chances of thairbeing highly mobile ara reduced.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Task Force on Human Settlements, Development Academy of the Philippines. Social Equity in thePhilippines: Technft:el Report.1976.. .

Pernie, Ernesto. "Indicators of Philippine Urbenlzetion in the Twentieth Century:' Research NotfJ 49UP·Population Institute, 1975.' .

Perez, Aurora. "IMer·Regional Population Movements In the Phlllppinas," Research Note, UP·Popu.. lation Institute, 1976. . ...

Zosa, Imelda. "Some National and Regional·Dimensions of the Phlnpplnes Labor Force In 1970:'Research Note 57 UP.population Institute.

30

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL DIMENSIONS OFDEVELOPMENT: IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY

• Olivia C. Caoili

App...ches to Dmlopment

Development has become associated insocial science literature with a variaty of social,economic, and political changes experiencedby nation-states. It is often linked with suchphenomena as rapid urbanization, increase Inliteracy levels,higher rates of economic growth,development of rational political organizationsandothers.

Various theories have been advanced toexplain causes of thase social, political andeconomic changes In the hope of providingnation-states with possible choice in theirpattern of development. Economists havetended to emphasize the' Importance of ma­terial resources and the necessity of changingrelationshipS among the factors of prodoctlon,such as the rate of savings and capital accumu­lations, to accelerate economic growth. Othersocial scientists have focused on the need toadapt modem institutions - e.g., schools,national organizations, etc. - to facilitatesocial change.

Some writers have shown an Increasinginterest in the role of pSychological factors indevelopment, particuJarly as these influencethe emergence of entrepreneurs and moderni­zing elites in nation-states. They have tried toinvestigate relevant aspects of the socializationand personality formation processes that shapeindividual motives and values which encourageor inhibit widespread innovation and creati­vity in a givensociety.

Personality andSocial Change

One of the influential writers on the PSY­chological dimensions of development is ErikH. Erikson. His psychoanalytic case studies

31

suggest Important aspects of personality for­mation that may be relevant in the explanationof social change. He points out that the inter­actions betWeen the individual's physical,emotional and group experiences, in his searchfor personal identity from childhood, largelyshepe his ultimate perceptions and responsesto fears and anxieties in edulthood. The searchfor Individual identity becomes especiallycritical during the period of adolescence. Theindividual's response to this crisisof adolescencemay heve profound consequences for socialchange. This can be seen In Martin Luther'slife as a reformer.'

Erikson suggests that a reformer is anindividual who during his childhood learneda pattern of solution to a personal problem thatcaused him severe anxiety. When faced with asocial force in his adult life which wes verysimilar to the trouble-some force of his child­hood, his anxiety was aroused. Thus he reactedto this stimulus ashe had learned to react in hischildhood. In the case of Luther, the trouble­some force in his childhood was the tyrannyof an arbitrary father and in his adult life ittook the form of authority (tile Church) whichabusad its power. If enough members of thesociety shere the perception of evil by sutlh anindividual who had become sensitized in hischildhood, they follow his leed. He may theninitiate a great social change and become ahistoric figure as Martin Luther. Eriksonpoints out that the seriousness of the identitycrisis will vary among individuals accordingto the interplay of social and historical circum­stances during their life cycle. Some indivi­duals, like Luther, are able to resolve thiscrisis through participation in ideologicalmovements of a religious or political nature.Others succumb to this crisis and develop

neurotic, psychotic or delinquent behavior.Such variations in behavioral responses to theidentity crisis can be seen in Erikson's clinicalcase studies of childhood experiences and psy­chopathology. In his psychoanalysis of thesecases, he stresses the impact of childhood onsociety:

Every society consists of men in the pro­cess of developing from children intoprocess of developing from children intoparents. To assure continuity of tradition,society must early prepare for parent­hood in its children; and it must take careof the unavoidable remnants of infantilityin its adults. This is a largeorder especial­ly since a society needs many beingswho can follow, a few who can lead, andsome who can do both, alternately orin different areas of Iife.2

In Gandhi's biography, Erikson shows that per­sonality crisis may also occur late in a man'slife.3 Gandhi's response to this crisis may haveinfluenced the behavior of may of his youngfollowers who may have joined him while stillexperiencing their own identity crises. Suchsocial-psychological interactions help to explainthe effectivenessof militant non-violence as aninstrument of the Indian nationalist movement.

Personality andPolitics

Somewhat influenced by Erikson's find­ings, Lucian W. Pye tried to examine the linkbetween the search for personal and collectiveidentities of the Burmese and their problemsin politics and development.4 He juxtaposedthe historical and social background of Bur­mese government and politics with case studiesof the lives of selected administrators and poli­ticians in order to obtain more insights intothe problems faced by a transitional society.

Pye noted the existence of certain con­tradictions in Burmese politics. At one levelpolitics is characterized by gentleness, reli­giosity, a concern for the qualities of virtue,and the need for controlling hostile emotions.At another level it is linked with violence,malicious scheming and devious thinking.5

These contradictions are rooted in the con­flict between traditional social values and

32

ways of doing things and the reqursrte at­titudes and modes of action for a modern,democratic society.

The ambivalent, relatively unpredictableemotion basis of mother-child relationshipin the traditional Burmese family tendedto have important psychological consequencesfor personality development of individualsas participants in the political processes.In the context of their British colonial experi­ence, these aspects of Burmese culture haveled to identity crises on both the personaland societal levels. These crises can be seenfrom opinions of Burmese administratorsand politicians interviewed by Pye. They alsotend to be manifested in the failure of Bur­mese politicians and administrators to relateeffectively to one another and to view theiracts and decisions in terms of their society.This has been observed as a major obstacleto Burmesepolitical development.

Pye concludes that the development oftransitional societies involves a search fornew collective as well as individual identities.A combination of two approaches would beneeded to achieve these goals. First, there is aneed for a charismatic leader, an "ideologicalinnovator." Modelled after Erikson's conceptof a reformer in Martin Luther, sUCh an "ideo­logical innovator" may be able to find in hisideology his own personal sense of identityas well as provide an instrument for peopleto find their collective sense of identity. Thesecond, perhaps more practical approach,would be geared towards breaking the latentpsychological barriers to effective develop­ment. This could be achieved by assistingindividuals to find their sense of personalidentity through the mastery of professionaland technical skills necessary for modernize­tion.6

Psychological Theories of Development

More comprehensive studies of the psy­chological aspects of development have beenmade by scholars investigating the originsof entrepreneurship. They have focused onindividual values and motivations conduciveto the emergence of an entrepren';;.lrial .::lan.Prominent among these writers is Max Weberwho wrote an essay on the Protestsnt Ethic

and the Spirit of Capitalism. 7 He presentedevidence which tended to show that the Pro­testants, particularly the Calvinists, seemed tobe more energetic and successful in WesternEuropean economic activity.

Weber searched for an explanation inthe theoretical writings of the Protestant ~e­

formation. He noted that the Calvinist doe­trine of blessed predestination motivated be­lievers to work hard in profitable economicactivity while at the same time leading dis­ciplined, ascetic lives. Profit was viewed as ameasure of a person's diligenceand was morallyacceptable as long as it did not lead to idlenessand induigence. Success in economic activitywas considered proof of an individual's sal­vation, i.e., he was among the chosen or pre­destined.

Although Weber's theory had limitedvalidity as an explanation of the causes ofeconomic change, it paved the way for moresystematic studies of relevant social or re­ligious values, how these are internalized byindividuals and have become motivations forentrepreneurship.

.A Theory of Social Change: A morerecent theory on economic and social changehas been formulated by Everett E. Hagen.S

Drawing ideas from historical data, economictheories of growth, studies on socialization,psychoanalysis and personality formation,Hagen attempts to explain the relationshipbetween personality change, social change andthe beginningsof economic growth.

Hagen believes that the requirements fortransition to economic growth are: a fairlywidespread creativity - problem-solving abilityand the tendency to use it; and attitudes to­wards manual, technical labor and the physicalworld which contribute to the channeling ofcreative energies into innovation in the tech­nology of production. The key factor in eco­nomic development, therefore, would be thepresence of a considerable number of indivi­duals who possess a creative or innovationalpersonality. A creative personality is definedas an individual with a high need for autonomyor confidence in his own judgment, a lack ofanxiety about' others' appraisals of himselfand a need to find or produce order. The in-

33

dividual also viewsthe world as open to orderlyanalysis and as valuing him provided he achievedeffectively. Thus, his need to receive assurancesof being valued becomes the source of a deepsense of duty to achieve.9

The lack of innovation in traditionalsocieties is attributed to the absence of creativepersonalities. This may be traced to the natureof their social structure which, through thesocializing process tends to produce generationafter generation of authoritarian personalities.The authoritarian individual is characterizedas being dominated by suppressed rage andaggressive needs, perceiving the world as notcapable of logical analysis and not valuing himhighly. Moreover, he sees power as residing inposition rather than resulting from accomplish­ment. He also tends to have little concern forthe welfare of others outside ,of his group andhas little need for achievement.

Hagen suggests that an important factorinitiating social change was some historicalshift which deprived some group of the statusrespect they once enjoyed. This might havebeen brought about by displacement of thetraditional elite by conquest, denigration oftraditional value symbols, inconsistency ofvalue systems, etc, Since status respect is as­sociated with respect for the values and thepurposes of life, its withdrawal may havecaused anxiety, alienation from traditionalvalues and other changes in personality.

Using Erikson's psychoanalytic casestudies on childhood, adolescence and personal­ity formation as his model, Hagen discusseshow this historical shift eventually leads to thedevelopment of creative personalities. Theinitial reaction of members of these deprivedgroups who happen to be fathers of familiesis increased aggressiveness and authoritarianismat home. Their sons internalize their (father's)anxieties, dissatisfaction with society as well asauthoritarian behavior. The process is cumu­lative and in the course of about two or threegenerations, repression of values occurs. Menwho are retreatist will appear but the womenwill develop maternal attitudes conduciveto the development of high need for autonomyand achievement among their children. Thus,a generation of innovational personalitiesarise rr••• who will guit;le institutional reforms

in favorabll directions IJ'ld economic growthwillglin momimum...10 .

Hagen's principal support for his theory~nsift of historical case studiel of the tnmsf.tkm of economic deveioPlft'nt In Engllnd,Japan, Colombie, two Indonesian towns, thecolonial Impact on Burma and the SiouxIndiuns In tha reservations. Interestingly. hisdata .on Engllnd tends to support Webe":sttrller observations on tha predominanceof Protestant leadership In economic activity.11

Hagen's theory $ttmS quite I plausibleexplanation of hiftoricei ctses of sod" chang&.However, its utility for predicting contempo.rery aO'dO'economic change is quite problem. ,tic. One mason for this is its neglect of thtselience of otherflctors, such es soclll struo­ture, stmtification and mobility In explainingsocial and economic chlngl~ Sodal action inhis theoretical fmmework is treated es com­pletely dttarmlnsd by p$y~icalfaetors, ..L.... miMed to predominant ,personality typeswithin the structum, rather than by an lmer- 'ection of psychological and socie-culturalfactors. Moreover, the expllnltion of socialchanga, in terms of soma hlstorlceJ shift which

. resulted .in relative st8tUsdeprivation for somegroup In a sociatv, carries neg8tiVIImplicationsfor planned social change IJ'ld economic deve­lopment.

The theory Is also difficult to oper8tion­alize for methodological masons. it seemsthat this had caused Hagan some difficultiesin explaining the caseof tha catholic minorityIn England during, the 18th and 19th cen-turi..12 . .

Acbiwmnt MoliN • Ee~omk Dtnt:B­lopmfmt. A more systematic IJ'ld mathodolo­!lically rigorous study of the origins of .nva­pmneurship is Presented by DlIWid C. MOoCIeIlIJ'ld .In ThfJ At:hiwing Socitity. 13 Th.work is an Ittempt to explain economicdevelopMent by 'drawing from mults of psy­chological studiel of motivMion. FindingsIn studies of fantasY life Indicates that Indlvl·duals differ significantly in the extent to.which their fantasy life appears to' concern

. wlth "doing wen" relative to some objectivestandard of excellence. Those whose ·fantesi.refllct this need actuai1y tend to perform

34

bitter than, others do in situations In whichtheir performance can be measured againstsuch standard.14 McClelland calls this theneed for achlllWlment (n Ach_ment). Hehypothesizes thllt 8 socJatv with a generellyhigh level of n Achievement wm producemore energetic entrepreneurs who in tum,wm produce greater economic development.Furthermom, . he af9U'$ thM the characterof the sociaty affects motivationel levelsprimarily • they affect ttle family, or morespecJf"1CI11y, the values and chiJd..bearlng prac-tices of theperents. '

To suPport this hypothesis, MccIeIlIJ'ldconducted .thr'ee general types of empiricalresearch. One of these WIS " content analysisof folk talts and children's stories at dlfftrenttime periods in verlous societies to obtaingroup metsUm of n AchlllWlment. AchillWa­ment scom were then correlttad with overall~, of economic' Growth, e.9., electricity'prodtfcad per capite. gelns in nationel incomeper capite. illWel of technology, ate. This tYPe ofanalysis WIS used In comparing Twels of nAchlvement among 46 preliterata tribes and thepresence or' absence of full-time ef\tfIPf.­neural activity .in their respective cutrums:

A similar analysis WIS madS on SIMPlesof children's stori. in 30 selected countriesfor two different periods - around 1925 and1950. The n AchillW.ment scores obt.aJnsd for-these countries were then correleted withestimates of their national economic divelop.ment for the ume period. Positive corral.tions batween n Achievement Ineis and ltvelsof economic development wem found amongboth the prelitemt tribel studied aM the 30countries. Very simUar mults wem obtainedfrom the analysis of n Achievement ImageryIn the imaginative litemture, Pottery designs,etc., In relation to periods of growth, apexand dedine of economic growth in Ancient'Greece, Pra-Incan Peru, Spein in the lateMiddle Ages, and EngllJ'ld. from the laterMiddle Ages to the Industrial, RevoluuQn.

The second type of empirical ramrchWIS OQ the motives and behllWlor of actualbusiness Intrapreneurs alreedy established intheir. ceraars In tha United States. Turkey,Italy and Polend. It was d8f)lgned to test the

hypothesis that men with high n Achievementtend to prefer the entrepreneurial role. Exceptio Turkey, findings showed that managers had"sJgnificantly higher n Achievement scores than~eir professional peers (es lawyers, physicians).The explanation offered for these data is thatmen with high n Achievement, in their concernfor doing well, prefer tasks involving moderaterisk·teking, novel instrumental activity, indivi­dual responsibility and providing some directmeesure of the results of their action (tike pro­fit and firm expansion). Entrepreneurshiptends to fulfill these task requirements.

A third type of empirical survey wasdone on individual motives, Interests, valuesand performance in a sample of mothers andsons In Japan, Germany, India and Brazil. Thisprovldad some data on child-bearing practiceswhich are conducive to the developmert ofhigh n Achievement. Several factors werefound to be important sources of n Achi~

ment among boys: parents who had a highn Achivament, who sat relatively high standardsof excellence and emphasized self-reliance andearly mastery training: and warmth and encour­agement In the falTilly and a father who is notdominating or authoritarian.

Public Policies for A..ratinu Developmeet

McClellend's findings tend to show thateconomic progress Involves not so much a ques­tion of abundance or lack of natural resoutcesas man's resPonse to the challenges posed byhlsenvironment. This in turn is shaped by thedegree of concern for achievement possessedby individuals. His evidence in support of thesources of n Achievement in a given society is,however, much more tenuous and not as con- •vincing as those adduced for his central hypo­thesis. Perhaps for this reason, the policy pro­tlosals offered are very general and tentative.

To accelerate economic growth, policymakers should seek to attain three goals: (1)to break orientation towards tradition andincrease other-directedness; (2) to Increasen Achievement levels In their societies; and(3) to provide for a more optimal use of exist­Ingn Achievement resources.16

Breaking Away from Traditional Orlen-

tatlon - McClelland disCUsses the role of me­dern means of communication and transporta­tion In facilitating the sPread of new normsand ways of doing things In a traditionalsocietY. The government could hasten the breakwith tradition through an achievement-orientedideology which could be disseminated throughthe mass media. Such an Ideological programwould have an additional psychological func>tion of providing a source of emotional securityfor people who have been uprooted from theirtraditional tl. and velues.

To increase other-direetedness or marketmorality, there Is need for an Informed publicopinion, policies to emancipate women, and theuse of group pilY emong children. Moderncommunications media and political guarantetUof freedom of expression would help to createan informed public opinion. Emancipatingwomen would accelerate the break from tra­dition and spread of new norms since womenere highly Instrumental "inshaping the values of'the next generation. Comparing the nationalchara.r and economic development in Turkeyand Iran, McClelland observed that such fun­damental changes in Turkey asa new govern­ment, al?olition of the foz, more rights forwomen and disestablishment of Islam as t statereligion contributed to the break from traditionand increase in n Achievement levelsand other­dlrectedness In the societY. As a result, Turkeyhas experienced more rapid economic growththan Iran, in spite of their very similar social,cultural, and economic characteristics. 17

.Other dlrectedness or responsiveness topeer group norms could also be developedamong children by means of group play. In hisvisit to Russia, a noted psychologist observadhow the Soviet government had effectivelyIncorporated this strategy of personalitydeveiopment in their educational system. Thiswould have important long run implieetions forsocia-economic change.18

l~g n AchitnJemem - Policiesto increase n Achievement levels seem to bemore difficult to formulate and implement.They involve basic chlnges In child-rearingpractices, decrease In father dominance andstrong ideological commitments to achieve.

35

The effects of these methods tend to be un­certain and slow. It might take at least a genera­tion before such changes can be felt. More­over, such methods require decisions whichmay be morally or politically unacceptable ina givensociety.

In most of the examples cited, increasesin the levels of n Achievement seemed to havebeen unintentional, i.e., a by-product of socialand historical circumstances. In Germany andFrance, increase in n Achievement levels wasobserved between 1925 and 1950. This wastraced to a decrease in father dominance, as aconsequence of military conscript during theFirst World War. Children who grew up duringthese years, therefore, tended to find a moreindependent home atmosphere conducive tothe development of self-reliance.

A similar situation arose with the changeof government in Turkey. Some of the institu­tional policies adopted by Ataturk such as theemancipation of women, recruitment of adultmales into the army and sending bright boysaway from their villages to attend governmentteacher training coileges, greatly weakened theauthoritarian power of fathers. Together withthese policies, there was also a general shiftin ideology which sought to transfer individualloyalties from one's father to larger institutionssuch as the state. This is noticeable in thethemes of children's stories of the period.All of these factors contributed to a generalincrease in the n Achivement levels amongthe Turks.19

Ideology, whether of the religious orsecular variety, is considered a potent sourceof high n Achievement. This may be inferredfrom Max Weber's study of the Protestant ethicand entrepreneurship in Western Europe. Mc­Clelland cites similar links between religiousreform or conversion and a general increasein n Achievement levels in some contemporarystates. Studies done in some of the new nationsprovide further evidence of the role of ideologyin increasing the levels of popular aspirationsand mobilizing support for government econo­mic policies: David E. Apter calls this type ofideology, which he observed among newlyindependent African states, "political reli­glon:'20

Communist states seem to be relatively

36

more successful in using ideology to increasen Achievement levels in their societies andaccelerate economic growth. For example,McClelland found that China had greatlyincreased in n Achievement since 1949 com­pared with Taiwan. This is despite their com-

mon cultural and historical origins.21 This car.be seen in the emphasis on specific problemsolving, initiative, perseverance, achievementfor one's country and the use of local heroesin children's stories in China. In Taiwan,children's stories are less specific in achieve­ment orientation and use Western heroes, e.g.,Washington, Magellan, etc.

A recent work on China's economic deve­lopment by an economist, Barry Richman, pro­vides some empirical data on how Communist­Maoist ideology has been used to foster rapideconomic and social development.22 Richmanspent three months in the People's Republic ofChina to study the role of industrial managersor entrepreneurs under the present regime.Using questionnaires, interviews and observa­tions, he noted how ideology has been usedto inculcate a strong sense of national pride,prestige, and power among the general pe­pulace and for individuals, the virtues of self­respect, dignity, self-confidenceand innovation.Achievement has been stressed as both indivi­dual and collective on national responsibility.Traditional familialloyalties havebeen projectedon to the larger collectiveor the state.

The educational system has been instru­mental in further inculcating Communist­Maoist ideology and providing added incen­tives for creativity, innovation and achieve­ment. Moreover, educational priorities havebeen planned to match industrial requirementsand manpower utilization. Richman believesthat China has been able to make optimal useof its managerial resources in this manner whichexplains why it has been able to develop eco­nomically at a faster rate than India.23 Heobserved, however, that whenever ideologicalextremism prevailed over rational managerialconsiderations as in the late 1950's during theGreat Leap Forward, much time, effort andresources were often wasted. Thus too muchpre-occupation with ideological purificationtended to slow down China's rate of economicdevelopment.

Optimal Use of 11 Achievement Resources ­The third policy proposal of McClelland isfor government to provide for a better alloca­tion of existing n Achievement, i.s., entrepre­neurial resources. This would involve efforts tolocate high n achievers in a society and pre­paring them professionally and psychological­ly for entrepreneurial jobs. Russia is given asan example of a state which has attained thisgoal through the centralized economic plan­ning and state operation of key enterprises.Thus the government has directly intervenedin the allocation of entrepreneurial resources.In some countries, the government simplyprovides attractive incentives - credits, co­operatives, tax exemptions, to attract nachievers to assume entrepreneurial roles. Forpurposes of planning foreign aid programs,this implies that guarantees of political free­dom and material aid to underdevelopedcountries may not be sufficient to promoteeconomic development.

Testing the Theory: MotiVating Economic Achieve·msnt

Although the data on n Achievementandeconomic development were very interestingand highly persuasive, The Achieving Societyhas very little to offer policy-makers in solvingsome immediate problems of development.The evidenceshowed that n Achievementcouldbe inculcated only during childhood - theindividual's formative years. It would take atleast a generation for policy-makers to deter­mine the effectiveness of their actions to sti­mulate n Achievement in their societies, a pros­pect few of them would be willing to face.Aware of these limitations of his theory, Mc­Clelland has recently come out with an empiri­cal test of his original hypothesis.24

From 1963 to 1964, McClelland andWinter conducted a series of experiments inselected cities in India to find out whether theachievement motive could be inculcated amongadults. Specifically, they tested whether busi­nessmen, through some form of PSYChologicaltraining programs in small groupS, would havean increase in their n Achievement levels.This increase would be manifested in inten-

37

sified entrepreneurial activity after undergoingsuch training.

The experiments were carried out withthe cooperation of the Small Industries Ex­tension Traininylnstitute (SIET) at Hyderabad.The basic inputs in the achievement trainingcourses were organizedaround four mainthemes:the achievement syndrome, self-study, goal­setting and interpersonal support. Course par­ticipants were taught, for example, how toorganize, produce and score achievement.related fantasies. The training also involvedquasi-group therapeutic attempts at providing"insight," teaching participants how to developtime-bound individual, specific business activityplans, etc. Participants were encouraged toform a new reference group through mutualfriendship bonds with other participants,entrepreneurial associations and informal co­operatives.

The behavioral effects of the traininginputs were measured, within a period of twoyears after the courses were conducted, interms of whether participants had undertakenimprovement of their existing businesses,established a new firm or industry or colla­borated with one another to form new jointenterprises. A comparison of the pre-and post­training measures was then undertaken andshowed that business activity increased signi­ficantly. Personality changes among parti­cipants were also found to be significant.Similar measures were made on a controlgroup, Le., a sample businessmen from the sameareas who did not undergo any psychologicaltraining. Findings from the control grouptended to confirm the results of the experi­ments.

The experimental evidence in supportof the theory is quite impressive. For severalreasons, however, the results of this studyseem more tentative than ccneluslve.. Theomission of certain information makes thevalidity of the findings somewhat doubtful.The authors failed to account for other varia­bles which, along with the training inputs,may have co-determined the expected per­sonality changes among the participants. Forexample, no information was presented on thecharacteristics of the entrepreneurial group inthe towns where the participants came from -

caste, status and other soGio-economic back­ground of individuals making up the presentgroup of entrepreneurs in each town, changesin the composition of the entrepreneurialgroup over time, etc. The relative strength ofsuch influences on individual motivationscan not be ruled out or taken for granted.

Setting aside the question of validity,the significance of the experimental findings,that individual motivations and personalitychanges can still take place among adults, needhardly be stressed. Psychologicel educationbecomes a promising tool tor policy-makersto accelerate economic growth in the shortrun. Indeed, as Richman points out in hisresearch, this is what the euthorlties in Chinahave been trying to accomplish at all levels oftheir educational system and ideology.25

Tumiq OutModern Men: Burne CorroioratingEvidence

Research findings of Alex Inkeles, in con­nection with the Project on Social and CulturalAspects of Econol1lic Development at Harvard'sCenter for International Affairs, provide ad­ditional evidence that significant attitudinal,normative and behavioral changes can, underappropriate circumstances. still be made onadults despite their traditional upbringing.26The study aimad to assess the impact on theindividual of his exposure to and participationin the process of modernization. A total of6,000 men in various occupational groupingsfrom six daveloping countries (Argentina,Chile, India, Israel, Nigeria and then EastPakistan) were interviewed. The survey itemscovered four major questions: (1) whetherthere is l') set of personal qualities that wouldempirically identify the concept of a modernrnan; (2) what influences operate to make aman modern and whether any significantchanges in attitudes and behavior can bebrought about emong adults who grew up withrelatively traditional characteristics, (3) whetherchanges in attitudes are followed by corres.ponding changes in behavior, l.e., modern waysof acting; and (4) whether individual moder­nization inevitably leads to personal disor­ganization and psychic strain.

A modern rnan was defined as mani-

38

testing certain personal qualities that coher­ently formed a syndrome of attitudes. valuesand ways of acting. These include such charlie­teristics as openness to new experience bothwith people and new ways of doing things; theassertion of independence from traditionalauthority figures and a shift of allegiance tosecondary orgenizetions; belief in the efficacyof science and medicine; ambition for one­self and one's children to achieve high occupe­tional goals. IndMduals with these characteris­tics prefer people who are punctual; are interes­ted in advance planning of personal affairs;are involved or active in community affairsand local politics; and strive to keep up withnews, preferring natIonal and internationalitams over those on sports, religion or purelylocal affairs.27

A very substantial number of those inter­viewed in all six countries were found toexhibit this syndrome of values and attitudes.Moreover, these qualities of modernlty did notseem to vary signifICantly across occupationalor cultural groupings. Edueetion was found tobe the single, most powerful variable influ­encing the change from traditionalism to mo­dernity among individuals surveyed. Occupe.tional experience, such as working in large-scaleorgenization in urban set1ing, e.g., the factory,was found to have as much influence in school­ing individuals in modern technical skills.attitudes, values and behavior such as rational­ity, punctuality, ambition or the need to achieve,and interest in current events. The factory orwork organization is thus an effectlva meansfor late socialization towerds modern life formany individuals who grew up in the ruralareas with traditional norms and values.28Those found to have modem attitudes alsoshowed modern behavior - more likely to havejoined voluntary orgenlzations; to keep abreestwith dally news; to have written or talked toan official about a public issue; and to havediscussed polltics with their wives.

Inkeles concludes that modernizing insti­tutions, by themselves, do not necessarily leadto greater psychic stress among individuals.The question of whether the process of societalmodernization generally increases social disOr­ganization and then increases psychic tensions

for individuals experiencing such disorganize.tion was left open.

Coneluding Remarks

The question may now be asked: Of whatvalue are all these psychological theories endreseareh findings for natioMtates struggling todevelop into modern societies? First, they offeran added perspective and some analytical toolsfor a more comprehensive and systemetic studyof development problems. They draw ettentionto factors tllet heve been largely overlookedor teken for granted by other scholars as rele­vant to socio-e<:onomic change. They focuson aspects of personality, ideology and leeder­ship in developing countries which may becrucial in stimulating or hindering prograss to­wards the attainment of development goals.

It may be argued that the practical ap­plication of Erikson's, Pye's and Hagen'sfindings is limited as they are meraly descrip­tions and explanations of historical events.Policy·makers could hardly be expected, forexample, to induce withdrawal of status respecttowards certain groups in order to develop cree­tive personalities in the long run. They do, how­ever, point to areas needing further investiga­tion if we are to understand better the complexprocess of development.

McClelland's theory and empirical evi­dence tend to be mora convincing from thepolicy point of view. Development plannerscould perhaps borrow his measurement tech­nique for determining their respective society'sn Achievement level. They may discover thatthe problem lies not with their economic plansbut with the low level of individual motivationprevailing in their societies. In such case, theycould incorporate in their revised plans variousprograms designed to stimulate highern Achieve­ment which has been discussed in McClelland'sworks, Richman's observations on China andIndia, and Inkeles' survey.

It is interesting to note that in his re­seereh, McClelland found that poor or under·developed countries tended to be higher in nAchievement that the more developed onas.29

This suggests that the problem in these areas isnot a lack of motivation or that of furtherraising the level of aspirations in their societies.

39

Rather, it seems to be a leek of opportunitiesin the social, economic or political systemthrough which these n Achievement could bechanneled for innovation and creativity in theattainment of development goals. Policy-makersshould, therefore, be more concerned in provi­ding such opportunities for individuals withhigh n AchIevement to direct their ingenuity.Moreovar, because of the problem of scarceresources and desire for rapid national pro­gress, governments should inculcate the needfor collective development efforts rather thansimply the satisfaction of individual need forachievement. ,

Jepan', experience in repid transforma­tion from a feudal to an industrial society pro­vides an interesting example of how individualn Achievement{s) were successfully fused withsocietel goals. De Vos' studies on Japaneseparsonality formation and culture tend to showthat this was made possible by the interplay ofpsychological structure and socialization whichresult in the development of Individuals' strongneed for self-realization through work and asense of accomplishment defined in socialterms.30 The genius of the Meiji emperorsmay have been in their ability to capitalizeon the psychological, social and cultural charac­teristics of Japan to mobilize available entre­preneurial talent and sense of social sacrificato foster rapid modernization.31

The Japanese experience in modernize­tion would tend to show that McClelland'sconcapt of a highly individualist n Achieve­ment would be more suitable for the Amer­ican, Western type than for other cultures.The contrast between the sutceSSfu'l immi·grant Chinese entrepreneurs in Southeast Asiaand their counterparts in China before 1949,offers another illustration of this conceptuallimitation. It seems that although the Chinesehave generally high n Achievement level,sociaf,cultural and historical constraints. e.g., narrowfamilial concerns, made them victims of colonialexploitation by Western powers.32 The Chinesewho migrated to other parts of Asia were ableto get away from the socio-cultural constraintsin their need for achievemant. What theseexamples tend to show Is that high n Achieve­ment ievel in a society may not necessarilyproduce high economic development for the

society and that increasing n Achievementlevels of the highly individualistic type in adeveloping society could lead to intense com­petition that would be disruptive of overalleconomic development

The fusion of individual need for achieve­ment and sense of social accomplishment inthe internalized values of the Japanese has notonly produced rapid modernization in Japanbut has also minimized disruptive and costlyindustrial strikes commonly found amongdeveloped nation" in the West. It has beenobserved that Japanese workars tend to havegreat interest in the or;ectives of the firmsthat employ them, paying little attention tospecific jobs. Because of their desire to work,they are satisfied to do what is asked of themat the places to which they are essigned.33

In contrast to Japan, high n Achievementin the Philippines has been effectively directedtowards a collective sense of development. Theearly exposure to Western entrepreneurial ac­tivities, urban residence, an American-typeschool -system (With n Achievement themesrepresented by Horatio Alger success storiesin the textbooks) combined to stimulate higherlevels of economic aspirations and entrepre­neurial activity in the Philippines.34 However,the need for achievement has been highlyindividualistic and femily centered.35 Con­sequently, while there has been an overallincrease in the rate of economic development,the benefits have not been as widespread asin Japan. This may be seen, for example, inthe existing pattern of distribution of thecountry's family inceme. Approximately aD-OOper cent of the aggregate income is concen­trated in about 10 per cent of the population.Many private enterprises tend to be family­controlled, with the husband as corporationpresident, the wife as treasurer and other kins­men occupying key positions in the organiza­tlon, This would have conservative influenceson decisions involving expansion of invest­ments or additional risk-taking. Govemmenteconomic policies have been largely based on afree enterprise philosophy. Nevertheless, familyand political connections have been a signi­fieant aspect of post-war entrepreneurialrole in .the Philippines.36 The deleteriouseffects of these scclo-ecanomic forces on

40

governmental policy-making and administra­tion, such as nepotism, graft and corruption,unrealistic economic plans, have been openlyacknowledged.

A second, more immediate use of thepsychological approaches to development is theplanning and implementation of governmentprograms for soeic-economlc change. The long­run implications of inculcating the need forachievement in children's textbooks, in na­tional ideology and educational planning havealready been discussed. The recent findingsthat significant changes in motivation andpersonality can still be made among adultsmay be applied in improving the quality ofpublic administration in developing countries.Given the scarcity of resources and increasingdemand for more public services in theseareas, administrators who are innovative andachievement -oriented are badly needed. Asidefrom educational and technical qualifications,psychological measures of n Achievementcould be made part of the recruitment, place­ment and promotion polieies in the publicservice.

Moreover, psychological training courses,similar to McClelland and Winter's experiments,could be incorporated as basic features of in­service training and management developmentprograms in the public service. These reformswould seem especially relevant for adminis­trators of government enterprises. The effec­tiveness of these enterprises depends a greatdeal on the systematic use of existing manager­ial resources. Such psychological measuresof n Achievement and training courses wouldalso help to overcome whatever personal,social, or professional prejudices, inimical torational decision-making, may have beendeveloped by bureaucrats during their for­mative years of training. 37

Whatever goals and priorities may be. chosen by developing states, it is readily ap­parent that the successful attainment of theseobjectives hinges on certain necessary changesin the individual psychology, cultural and socialvalues of their respective populations. Thatthese changes, to some extent, can be cons­ciously effected has been shown by some ofthe studies discussed in this paper.

NOTES

1Erik H. Erikson, Young Man Luther:A Study in Psychoanalysis and History, (London:Faber and Faber, Ltd., 1958).

2Erik H. Erikson, Childhood and Society,second ed., (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1963),p.405.

3 Erik H. Erikson, Gandhi's Truth: On theOrigim of Militant Nonviolence, (New York: W. W.Nortof,'",,' 1 ce.. 1969).

4 Lucian W. Pve, Politics, Personality andNation Building: Burma's Search for Identity, (NewHaven and London: Yale University Press, 1962).

5Ibid., Chapter 10.Glbid., pp. 288·289.7Translated by Talcott Parsons, (New York:

Charles Scribner and Sons, 1958).8Everett E. Hagen, On the Theory of Social

Change: How Economic Growth Begins, (Homewood,III.: The Dorsey Press, 19621.

9Ibid., pp;86-11910 tu«. p. 236.11 Ibid., Chapter 13.12 David C. McClelland, "Motivational Patterns

in Southeast Asia with Special Reference to the ChineseCase," The Journal of Social Issues, Vol. XIX, NO.1(January 1963), p. 8.

13 (Princeton, N.J.: D. van Nostrand Co.,196n.14 Ibid., pp.3946.15Jbid., p.205.16 Ibid., pp, 393-394.17 David C. McClelland, "National Character

and Economic Growth in Turkey and Iran," in LucianW. Pve, ed., Communications and Political Develop­ment (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,1963), pp. 152·181.

18 Urie Bronfenbrenner, "The Making of theSoviet Man," Lecture delivered at Cornell University,July 1964.

19 McClelland, "National Character and Eco­nomic Growth in Turkey and Iran," op. cit.

20 David E. Apter, Some Conceptual Ap.proaches to the Study of Modernization, (EnglewoodCliffs, N.J.: Prennce-Hatt, lnc., 19681, pp. 193-232.

21 McClalland, "Motivational Patterns in South·east Asia with Special Reference to the Chinese Case,"op. cit., pp. 6-19.

22 Barry M. RiChman, Industrial Society inCommunist China, (New York: Random House,19691, especiallY chaPters 3-4.

23 Barry M. Richman, "Economic Develop­rnent in Chine and India: Some Conditioning Factors:'Pacific Affairs, Vol. 45, No.1 (Spring 1972), pp. 75·91.

24 David C. McClelland and David G. Winter,Motivating Economic Achievement (New York: TheFree Press, 1969).

25 Richman, Industrial Society in CommunistChina,op. cit.

26 Alex Inkstes, "Making Men Modern: On theCauses and Consequences of Individual Change in SixDeveloping Countries," in David E. Apter and Charles

41

F. Andrain. eds.: Contemporary Analytical Theory,(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc.}, pp.634·651.

27 Ibid., p, 636.28 On the other hand, work experience in a

large-scale, modern organization could also createpersonal insecurity among individuals, such lnseeur­ity could in turn lead to what Victor Thompsoncalls Bureaupathic behaviors which could be dyS­functional from the organization's point of view.See Modern Organization, (New York: Alfred A.Knopf, 1963', Chapter 8.

29 McClelland, The Achieving Society, op. cit,p.102.

30 George De Vos, "Achievement Orientation,Social Self·ldentity and Japanese Economic Develop­ment:' Asian Survey, Vol. V, No. 12 (December1965), pp. 575-589; In another work, de Vos showshow guilt feelings towards parents become a strongmotivation for the individual Japanese to work hardand succeed in life. See "The Relation of Guilt To­ward Parents to Achiavement and Arranged Marriageamong the Japanese, "in Niel J. Smelser and WilliamT. Smelser, eds., Pertfonelity and Social Systems,second ed., (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc..1970), pp. 154-171).

31 An interesting account of this periodcan be taken from Johannes Hirschmeier, The Originsof Entrepreneurship in Meiji Japan, (Cambridge,Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1964), especiallyChapters 4-6.

32 George .de Vos, "Achievement and Inno­vation in Culture and Personality," in Apter and An­drain, eds., Contemporery Analytical Theory, op.en: pp. 67().682.

33 Maurice 8airy, "Motivational Forces InJapanese Life," in Rober J. Bailon, ed., The JapaneseEmployee, {Tokyo; Sophia University, 19661, pp.41·62.

34 See, for example, John J. Carroll, S.J.,The Filipino Manufacturing Entrepreneur: Agent andProduct of Changa. (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell UniversityPress, 1965'; Edward A. Tiryakian, "OccupationalSatisfaction and Aspirations in an UnderdevelopedCountry: The Philippines," JlEconomic Developmentand Cultural Change, Vol. VII, No.4 (January 1958),pp. 431444; end E.A. Tiryakian, "Prestige Evelue­tlon of Occupations in en Underdeveloped Country:The Philippines," "American Journal of Sociology,Vol. LXlIl, No. 4 (January 1958), pp. 39()'399.

35 These values have been discussed in JaimeBulatao, S.J.. "Philippine Values: The Maliileoo'sMainsprings," Philippine Sociological Review, Vol. X,No.3 (July-oetober 19621, pp. 159·164.

36 Carrol, op. en, pp. 179-186,

37 K.B. Sayeed, for example, discusses howsuch pre-judices developed by Pakistan's senior civilservants, as a result of their educational and colonialexperlence, colored their parceptions and decision­making during their national crisis of 1971. "TheBreakdown of Pakistan's Political System," Inter·national Journal, Vol. XXVII, No.3 (Summer 1972),pp. 393-396.

FINANCING LOCAL DEVELOPMENTTHROUGH SPECIAL ASSESSMENTS

• Emesto M. Serote

Introduction

Of late, the national government hastaken an active interest in popularizing theconcept and institutionalizing the practiceof development planning. At this writingmassive national resources in the form oftechnical and financial assistance are beingmobilized to help certain key cities and muni­cipalities evolve their town plans, housingschemes and zoning regulations. Part of thisassistance program involves the upgrading ofmanagement capabilities of local governmentpersonnel. In two years time hundreds ofdevelopment plans will have been completedcovering major urban settlements and growth-::enters throughout the archipelago.

But given a development plan and anincreased management capability of their per­sonnel, the most serious problem of localgovernments - lack of funds - will becomeeven more acute. To implement a developmentplan requires huge capital investments by bothgovernment and private sectors, with theformer usually taking the initiative. Wherewill local units get the funds to implementtheir town plans?

Certainly there is a limit to nationalassistance. The national government cannotcontinually pour investments into each townand city without spreeding resourcestoo thinly.There are other priorities that require greaterconcentration of resources. local governmentscannot always hope to receive national fundsin excess of the regular contributions that theynow receive. They cannot remain dependentas they have. always been1 on the nationalshare to finance the implementation of theirdevelopment programs.

There is therefore a need to developself-reliance among local governments. To this

42

end, they must be mede aware of the vanousalternative and potential sources of funds fordevelopment projects.

It is encouraging to note that since theratification of the New Constitution in 1973there have been a number of PresidentialDecrees which grant more revenue-raisingpowers to local govemments.2 These decreesseek to strengthen the financial and fiscalposition of local governments to give sub­stance to the latter's enhanced status as con­templated by the framers of the New Con­stitution.

The effect of these decrees on the finan­cial resources of local governments remainsto be empirically evaluated. But it may besafe to assume this early that these laws haverelieved to some extent the financial pressuresof provinces, cities, municipalities and baran­gays.

An absolute increase in local revenuesfrom traditional sources however, does notguarantee that the local units will automa­tically acquire tne needed resources to financelocal development. For the increase in col­lections may just be sufficient to offset theeffects of inflation. To be meaningful, theserevenue-raising powers should enable thefinancially hard-pressed local governments toset aside a considerable portion of their re­ceipts for capital investments and revenue­generating projects.

Among those decrees, this article focuseson Presidential Decree 464 otherwise known asthe Real Property Tax Code which embod;~s

provisions that have tremendous pctem.alsfor generating, as it were, local revenues tofuel local development.

Reference is made to Sections 47-55,inclusive, under Chapter V on "Special As;­sessments," The said portion of the decreeempowers local governments (and even the

national government) to levy special assess­ments.3 on properties in the immediate vici·nity of a proposed public improvement projectas a means of raising funds to finance theproposed work.

An Untapped Oil Mine

This provision of law is a veritable oilmine in the backyard that has remained un­tapped despite its existence for decades now.It is a mere carry-over of an old provision inthe Assessment Law (Commonwealth Act470 dated June 16. 1939), yet this power hasnot been exercised by most local governments.4

This article looks into the reasons for thereluctance of local governments to tap thispotential resource, to clarify issues relative tothis seemingly alien concept, to point outthe weaknesses of the law in its present form,and to suggest measures to make the laweasier to implement. Initially, this articleseeks to create public awareness of the poten­tials and possibilities of such a revenue sourceso that eventually, more and more local govern­ments will exercise this special taxing powerwith less resistance from private propertyowners.

Reesons for Local GOVlntmeDt Reluctance

In a sample survey of local governmentsconducted by this writer in early 1976, onlyone municipality. out of the 25 that sent intheir responses was found to have availed of itspower to impose special levy to partly financethe improvements on its public plaza and park,that is, the town of Siquijor in the sub-provinceof Siquijor. The writer believes that a smallerpercentage would result if a census were takenof all towns and cities since the samples in thesaid survey were selected from the more highlyurbanized towns and cities.

The same survey was able to elicit somereasons for the reluctance of local governmentsto exercise this special taxing power, the moreimportant of which are as follows:

1. There is a prevailing pessimismamong local governments that a pro­posed ordinance imposing special as­sessments will prosper because of theexpected oppo.sition by affected land­owners who constitute the social andpolitical elite of the town. These land­owner$ exert a considerable influence on

43

the municipal leadership. In some cases,the municipal leaders are the landownersthemselves and are therefore less inclinedto prejudice their own interests.

2. Local governments believe the lawon special assessments involves highlytechnical procedures which are toocomplicated and tedious for their limitedresources and expertise to undertake.

3. Some local governments are notaware of successful precedents in thecountry. They would much rather waitthan be the first to adopt this obscureidea.

4. Other local governments think thepeople are already overtaxed and anadditional imposition would thereforeantagonize them. A piece of tax legis­lation is usually politically disastrousespecially when enacted during an elec­tion year.

5. A few local leaders confessed tobeing totally unaware of the existence ofthis provision of the law.

To appreciate the foregoing attitudes oflocal governments toward special assessmentsone has to read the law himself. The salientfeatures of the law are highlighted in thefQllowing sections of this paper to provide re­ference for further discussion.

But first, a brief backgrounder on specialassessment

Definition

A special assessment is a "local imposi·tlen upon property for the payment of the costof public improvements in its vicinity andlevied with reference to the property assessed.5It is the equivalent of the betterment levy inBritish planning legislation wherein propertyowners specially benefited by governmentprojects are made to share in the cost of theprojects. In a way, it is an applicetlon of thebenefit principle of taxation which postulatesthat taxes' should be levied upon individualtaxpayers in proportion to the benefits theyreceive from the state. It is also consistentwith the social .objective of real propertytaxation namely, to transfer to the public theunearned increment in private land valuesas a result of general improvements in thecommunity.

What is the nature of special assess­ments?

Special Assessment Vi. Real Property Tax

Commonwealth Act 470 calls the specialassessment a tax. Presidential Decree 464simply calls it "special levy." In Mexico cityand in Colombia where this kind of imposi­tion is successfully administered, it is calledplanning tax (impuesto de planificacion) andvalorization tax, respectively. According toJose N. Nolledo, the special assessment :is,strictly speaking, not a tax.6 His opinion mayhave been based on a Supreme Court decisionin the case of "Apostolic Prefect of Mt. Pro­vince v. the City Treasurer of Saguio" datedApril 18, 1941.7

On the strength of a provision in theAdministrative Code, the City of Saguioimposed special assessments on lots abuttinga drainage and sewerage project. Among theproperties affected was the church land belong­ing to the Apostolic Prefect of Mt. Province.The latter filed a case with the Court of FirstInstance of Baguio City seeking exemptionfrom the special levy, invoking the exemptiongranted it by law from the real property tax, itbeing a property used exclusively for religiouspurposes.

The CFI ruled that since the specialassessment is not a tax, it can be imposed uponproperties normally exempted from the realtytax. The decision of the CFI was upheld by theSupreme Court.

From the Court decision we find thefollowing features of the special assessmentwhich distinguish it from the real propertytax:

1. Special assessment can be levied onlyon land.

2. Special assessments cannot be madea personal liability of the personassessed.

3. Special assessments are based entirelyon benefits.

4. Special assessments are exceptionalboth as to time and locality.

Another distinction between the realty taxand the special levy is the base of computa­tion. The base of the real property tax (in thePhilippines, at least) is the assessed value(ad valorem) while that of the special levy isthe estimated cost of the proposed project.The assessed value is used only to determine

44

the relative share of each affected landownerto the total amount due.

It is interesting to note that the BaguioCity ordinance referred to above used thead valorem as a base just like the real propertytax. Equally worth noting, on the other hand,is the provision of PO 464 which exempts fromthe special levy all properties ordinarily exemp­ted from the real property tax. Thus, in itspresent form, the special assessment is a nybridversion.

IssullS Relative to Special Assessments

At this point certain issues relative tospecial assessments need to be clarified in orderto gain a better understanding of the nature,rationale and advantages that can be derivedfrom this special imposition.

The first of these issues has somethingto do with the relationship or distinctionbetween the special -assessment and the regularreal property tax. Is the special assessmenta better source of development funds thanthe real property tax? Rather than levyingan additional imposition, is it not more prac­tical to intensify the collection of the realtytax? Can the taxpayers who are believed tobe already overtaxed afford this additionaltax?

It is claimed by many that there is in­efficient collection of the realty tax whichaccounts for the low income of local govern·meats, But such a claim is belied by the survey8made by the Joint Legislative-Executive TaxCommissions in 1960 and 1968. Intended tomeasure the tax consciousnessof Filipinos withparticular emphasis on the property tax, thesurveys arrived at the following findings: In1960, 86.8 percent of property owners paidreal property tax. The 1968 survey yielded aslightly lower figure of 82.2 percent. By anystandard, a collection rate of over 80 percentis not too bad a performance in real pro­perty tax collection. Perhaps this level isalreadyoptimal.

The reason, it seems, for the generallylow collections in the real property tax liesRotin the alleged inefficiencY of tax collectorsbut in the rampant underdeciaration of the truevalue of the property by their owners. Presi­dential Decree 76 issued on December 6, 1972,which requires all property owners to fileswom statement of true value of their property,notes that real property and improvements

thereon are "usually underdeclared obviouslyfor the purpose of evading payment of higherand correct taxes due the government." This iseviqenced by the fact that when a property issold to the government for public purposesthe government has had to pay the marketvalue which is "usually ten (10) to twenty (~O)

times more than the value declared by theowners for purposes of taxation."

But even granting a 100 percent collec­tion efficiency and a reasonable amount ofhonesty on the part of landowners in declaringthe true value of their property, still the rI~alty

tax cannot be relied upon as a substantialsource of development funds for the munici­pality. A close scrutiny of the sharing systemof the realty tax among local governmentlevels reveals that the municipal governmentpn whosp. hands liesthe greater bulk of adminis-tering the tax is put at a disadvantage. Here'show: For every peso collected in real pro­perty tax, ten centavos is retained by thebarangays where the real property subject totax is situated and the remaining 90 centavosis shared equally between the municipal andthe provincial governments. Then out of theallotment of 45 centavos the municipal govern­ment remits to the provincial government 23centavos representing the former's statutoryobligation (Which goes into the ProvincialAgriculture Fund, Provincial Health Fund, andthe Provincial Hospitals Fund).This leavesonly 22 centavos net share of the municipalgovernment. Again, this meager sum accruesto the General Fund most, if not all, of whichis allocated for oparational expenses. An in­finitesimal amount is therefore left for capitaloutlays to finance development projects.

On the other hand, the proceeds ofspecial assessment is usedexclusively to financethe cost of specific public improvements.This makes the latter a more desirable sourceof development funds than the regular realproperty tax.

Desirable as it may seem however, canthe people afford to pay an additional im­position?

With perhaps very few exceptions, pro­perty owners are not as financially handicappedas they may claim to be. Land acquisition orownership is generally regarded for its prestigevalue or for its investment potentials. Theformer explains the existence of tracts of landthat are idle or under-utilized which belongto absentee owners doing business elsewhere

45

and living on sources other than the proceedsof their properties. But rare is this type of land­owners who derive gratification in mere owner­ship or in the enhanced social status thatownership entails. Most probably the landsthat are kept idle are put up as collateralsfor loans with banks that the owners use tocapitalize their business elsewhere. Most likely,too, the idle lands are being kept for specula­tion purposes. In any case, real property isheld for its investment potentials. Furthermore,to devote a piece of land to intensive use re­quires considerable inputs in terms of capitaland labor.

The above observations support theview that no landowner is really illiquid. Nolow-income wageearner could afford to acquireand keep land whether for the prestigeattachedto ownership or for the material returns onhis investment.

The more real.obstacle is the fact that insome cases the affected landowners are morelikely the local elite who are close to, or arethemselvesthe municipal leaders. They are notinclined, naturally, to prejudice their ownpersonal or family interests. However, this isnot an insurmountable problem. The people,properly motivated, can and will subordinateselfish interests to the common interest andthe common welfare. One likes to believethat the Filipino is not morally bankrupt noris he totally bereft of civic consciousness.

Another important issue has somethingto do with identifying the beneficiaries of theproposed project. Does the project benefit aparticular 'neighborhood or the entire commu­nity? If its benefits accrue to a specific sectorof the population then it is only fair that thatsector assume a greater part in putting up theproject, If, on the other hand, the project is tobenefit the entire community, then the costmust be borne out of generaltaxation.

In operational terms, it is extremelydifficult to determine whether a given projectbenefits one sector or the other, Most likely,any given project tends to benefit the entirecommunity. The difference perhaps lies in thedegree in which one particular sector benefitsfrom the project over other sectors, Thereforeeach sector must be made to shoulder theproject cost to the extent proportionate to thebenefits it stands to receive as a result of theproject. Theoretically, a new public facility orimprovements made on existing ones will bene-

fit the public at largebut the ownersof abuttingpropertiln will stand to benefit more than therest of the population. An example here willhelp clarify the point.

SuPPOse that a town decides to opena new road connecting the Poblacion to a yetunreached barrio. The benefits if easier accessand more efficient circulation of people andproducts which the new road is expected togenerate will be enjoyed by practically all thetownspeople. But a. certain benefit uniquelyaccrues to abutting property owners: that ofenhanced land values due to increased acces­sibility and increased potential of the lotsfor intensification of their current uses or forconversion into urben uses. This is the 8P6Cialbenefit such sectors enjoy by virtue of theirunique situation relativeto others.

How much advantage they have overthe public at large is a related issue. This isvery difficult to determine since a greet dealof benefits accruing from a public facilitycannot be quantified nor, assigned pecuniary

. value. A faint indication of the comparativeadvantage special beneficiaries have over otherproperty owners can only be inferred fromthe provision of PO 464 that the portion of theproject cost to be financed out of the proceedsof special assessment must not exceed sixty(60) percent; thlr rest to be funded by generalrevenues. Going by the benefit principle, onecan assume that the special beneficiaries enjoy·this much benefit over that of the generalpublic. Perhaps the ceiling set by law is ar­bitrary. But the absenCe of a lower limitpoints to the fact that the extent of benefitshas not been empirically established. The lawtherefore allows a wide range of freedom forconcerned parties to arrive at a fair and reason­able basis for sharing costs reflective of benefitsderived.

HigllfJghts of theSpecill Assessments ProvisionioP.D.484

1. Who may exercise the power to im­pose special assessments?

The authority to impose and collectspeci.a~ levy is vested in the provincial, city ormUniCIpal councilor board through an ordinanceenacted for the purpose. The decree extendsthe same power to the national governmentthrough the mechanism of a department orderissuedby the Secretary of Finance.

46

2. What· types of works are eligible forfinancing through the proceeds of specialassessment?

Section 47 enumerates the different typesof projects that mey be financed out of specialassessment as follows: laying out, opening,constructing, straightening, widening, grading,paving, curbing, walling, deepening, or other­wise establishing, repairing, enlarging, or im­proving public avenues, roads, streets, alleys,sidewalks, parks, plazas, bridges, landingplaces, wharves, piers, docks, levees, reservoirs,

,watelWorks, water courses, esteros, canals,drains and sewers. Earlier, CA 470 only usedthe vague all-embracing term "public improve­ments" which is difficult to operationalizeor implement.

3. How may a municipal council proceedin imposing and collecting the special assess­ment?

a. Planpreparation. Before the M'unicipalCouncil enacts the ordinance, it maycommission the municipal engineer toprepare the plans, specifications andcost estimates of the proposed project.

b. Enactment of ordinance. The Councilpasses the ordinance which containsa description with reasonable accuracyof the nature, extent and locationof the work to be undertaken; the pro­bable cost of the proposed work soestablished, the limits whereof to beindicated by monuments and lines;and the number of annual installments,ranging from five to ten, in which thelevyshatl be payable.

c. Publicetion of the ordinance. The pro­posed special levy ordinance is thenpublished, with the list of affectedlandowners, once' a week for fourconsecutive weeks in English and inthe local dialect, in any newspaperof general cirCUlation. The ordinancein English and in the local dialectis, also posted in the municipalityand in the locality affected and isannounced once a week for fOurconsecutive weeks by a public crier.The Municipal Secretary likewise .;.Ir·nishes a copy of the proposed or­dinance upon request to each land­owneraffeeted or his agent, and. ifpossible sends to all concerned a copyof the ordinance by' mail or mes­senger.

d. Protest against special assessement Aprotest may be filed with the Councilnot later than thirty days after the lastpublication of the proposed ordinance.The protest must be signed by a ma­jority of the landowners affected, set­ting forth their names and addressesand enumeratingtheir argumentsagainst the proposed improvementsor againstthe special levy.

If at the end of the prescribed period nosuch protest is filed, the ordinance becomesfinal and effective in all points after its ap­proval by the Council. If a protest is filed, thedisposition of the protest proceeds as follows:

1. Hearing the protest. The Councildesignates a place and date of thehearing in accordance with the pro­cedures prescribed. A reasonable timeis given to all protestants. Notice ofthe hearing is published for twoconsecutive weeks and posted at theaffected localities.

After the hearing, the Council rendersits final decision confirming, modifying, orrevoking the ordinance, and sends copiesof its decision to all parties concerned andcauses its publication three times weekly fortwo consecutive weeks. The decision publishedagain contains a list of parcels affected by thespecial levy.

2. Appeal of the Council decision. Thedecision of the Council becomes finalif, before the expiration of thirty daysfrom the date of its last publicationno appeal is filed with the Provincialboard against the proposed improve­ment or against the special assess­ment.

An appeal must be signed by at least amajority of the landowners affected. Thelandowners-appellants must furnish a writtencopy of the appeal to the municipal councilimmediately upon filing.

3. Hearing of the decision on appeal.Withinten days after the receipt of thenotice of the appeal, the MunicipalCouncil must furnish the ProvincialBoard excerpts from the minutes ofthe said council meeting and all do­cuments relevant to the case. Theprovincial board then designates aplace and sets the date of the hearingwhich must be within thirty days

47

following receipt of the minutes anddocuments from the Municipal Coun­cil, giving notice to both parties.During the hearing, the MunicipalCouncil is represented and heard,and the provincial board examinesde novo all points involved in theprotest filed, and the decision be­comes final at this level.

e. Fixing the amount of the special levy.Upon the approval of the ordinance,the Provincial Assessor proceeds todetermine the annual amount ofspecial levy against each affectedparcel of land. Written notices aresent by mail. The amount of speciallevy is apportioned, computed andassessed according to the assessedvaluation of such lands as shown Inthe books of the assessor, or Itscurrent assessed value as fixed by thesaid officer in the first Instance ifthe property does not appear ofrecord Inhis books.

f. Payment of special levy. The speciallevy Is payable to the ProvincialTreasurer or his Deputy, in the samemanner as the ordinary real propertytax is paid; is enforced by the samemeans; and Is subject to the samepenalties for delinquency. All saidsums, together with penalties if any,constitute special liens on said landsand have preference over all otherliens with the sole exception of thelien for non-payment of the ordinaryreal property tax.

g. Adjustment of costs. If, upon comple­tion of the work, it should appearthat the cost of the project is greateror smaller than the estimated cost, theProvincial Assessor must, withoutdelay, proceed to correct the assess­ment by increasing or decreasing, asthe case may be, the special levy oneach parcel of land affected, for thebalance of the unpaid installments.IT all installments have already beenpaid, the Provincial Treasurer fixesthe amount of credit to be allowedto,or the additional special levy to becollected from the landowners, as thecase may be. In any case, notice ofsaid rectification must be furnishedall parties concerned.

Criticism oftheSpecial Assessment ProvisionofP.O. 464

In its present form, the special assess­ments provision of P.O. 464 is very volubleon the aspect of protests and appeals but paysscant attention to the critical aspect of pro­cedure to be followed in determining the"district benefited" or the assessment zone,and in computing and apportioning the amountto be levied against the landowners concerned.The law leaves the matter of delimiting theassessment zone entirely to the discretionof the Councilor Board that prepares theordinance, and the task of apportioning theamount of levy among the affected propertyowners in the hands of the ProvincialAssessor.

In the context of a culturally diversecountry like the Philippines, the principle ofprocedural flexibility appears to be a desirableset-up. However, the shortage of technicallycompetent local administrators may pose abarrier since the success of this arrangementhinges heavily on the competence of the localadministrators. There is therefore a need formora uniform standards ana more detailedprocedure to guide. local governments whichcan hardly afford the services of technical per­sonneL

The experience of Mexico City is instruc­tive in this regard. Mexico City successfullyadministers the "impuesto de planificacion"by applying rigid formulas set forth in theMexican planning law.9 The enabling act spellsout the procedural details so that the technicaland administrative difficulties of implementa­tion are drastically minimized. For instance,the extent of the assessment zone is unequl­vocally delimited in the law as follows:

1) For properties along a public way, thezone must be that comprised withina line drawn parallel to the limit ofthe work at a distance equal to 12times the average width of the street.

2} For parks and plazas, the zone ex­tends to 144 meters from the limitof the park.

Using the fraction or multiple of 12 as a basis,the rates to be contributed by property owne~can easily be computed depending on theirrespective lots' distance from the proposedwork.

Details Iike these lend themselves toeasier implementation by local governmentsgiven their common constraint of shortage

48

in technical expertise. As we gain experiencein administrative techniques we may eventuallyshift to greater flexibility and autonomy toallow for our culturel diversities. Indeed inmore advanced localities where technicalexpertise in available, the Colombia model10may well be worth adopting.

In the city of Medellin in Colombia, aseparate department in the city governmentadministers all aspects of the "valorizationtax" with complete autonomy and proceduralflexibility. Unlike in Mexico City, Medallinuses no pre-set formulas. Rather it operateson the basis of consensus, which is arrivedat through consultations with real estatebrokers, the property owners affected, andgovernment officials. So successful is theadministration of the tax that no lessthan one­third of the city's revenues accrue from specialassessments, thus enabling the city to embarkon large scale public improvements projects.

Another criticism that may be leveledagainst the law on special assessment in itspresent form is that it contains built-in road­blocks that render the implementation ex­cruciatingly slow and frustratingly difficult.These built-in roadblocks take the form ofexcessively long periods of publication ofnotices and the overly protective stance of thelaw in favor of property owners as can begleaned from the detailed procedure it outlinesfor the filing and dispOSition of protests andappeals.

Under the present provision, a speciallevy ordinance can take effect after two monthsfrom its enactment; no less than six months ifprotest is filed and the original decision by theMunicipal Council is appealed before the Pro­vincial Board. The greater part of this period isallotted for the information campaign to reachthe parties concerned and the general public.The law specifies the media of communicationto be used which include newspapers,billboards,mail and messenger service, and through theantiquated mode of public crier.

The estimated six months that it takesa speciaf levy ordinance to get implementedis too optimistic indeed. It assumes that pro­tests and appealed are filed, heard and decidedupon with mechanical precision and promptattention by parties concerned as though thesewere the only business they had in hand. Thissimply is not true. And even if it is. the factthat litigations invariably are long windingand require voluminous paper work supports

the concession of additional few months ora year at least. But the legal tussle can dragon for years and the contemplated publicimprovement project may never get off theground.

What Can be Dona

It is generally felt that the law, to bemore implementable, can stand improvementsalong the following lines:

1. Introduce amendments incorporating:a. A clear, definite and systematic

procedure for delimiting the assess­ment zone;

b. A standard and equitable basis forcomputing the rates to be contri·buted by affected landowners sl­milar to the Mexican model;

c. A shorter period of publicationconsidering that this is already anera of fast communications media;and

d. A stronger power to the MunicipalCouncil by making its decision onprotests final. The law extends thispower to the city and provincialgovernments. It will do no harmif the same authority is given tomunicipal gov~nnments.

2. Provide for the organization of an ed­ministrative machinery similar to the Colombi·an model which will have sufficient autonomyand authority to administer the special essess­ment in all its aspects. Perhaps the existingMunicipal Development Council can serve thepurpose. Consistent with its special nature,the special assessment must also be handledby a special body. To involve other officesin this task like those of the ProvincialAssessorand Provincial Treasurer is to saddle them withadditional and unfamiliar burden which theymay not readily welcome.

3. Promulgate a separate decree expresslyon the subject of special assessment. The factthat special assessment at present constitutesa .mlnor provision of the Real Property TaxCode diminishes its importance particularlyat this time when local governments shouldbe In constant search for sources of develop­ment funds. After all, if special assessment isnot. strictly speaking, a tax, then it should notform part of the Real Property Tax Code butshould be the subject of a separate decree.

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FOOTNOTES

l"Survey Shows Increasing Dependence ofLocal Governments on the National Government,"The Tax Monthly, Vol. XII, No. 4 (January 1972)pp.14-15.

2 Refer to Presidential Decrees 144, 231 asamended, 464, 477, 752, 1002, among others.

3 Actually, there are three subjects coveredunder the chapter on Special Assessments in P.O. 464:The Special Education Fund, the Tax on Idle Lands,and the present subject. For purposes of convenience,this article shall use'the terms "special assessments,""special levy," or "benefit taxation" to refer to"special benefit essessment" which should be theproper name for this perticular imposition.

4 1n an article by Luz Dullin that appeared inthe October 15, 1970 issue of the defunct Congres·sional Economic Bulletin, citing reports from the thenGeneral Auditing Office (now Commission on Auditl,the highest recorded receipts from special assessmentsreached "886,000 In 196ft The following year, cityand municipal governments collected only "8,000and "3,000 respactively.

5 Federico B. Moreno, Philippine Law Diction­ary, 1972 Edition, Quezon City: Filipino PublishingCo., Inc.

6 Jose N. Nolledo, Handbook on Taxation,4th Revised Edition, CalOOC8n City, Philippines:Philippine Graphic Arts, loc., 1971.

7 Philippine Reports, Vol. 71.8 Philippines (Rep.) Joint Legislative-Executive

Tax Commission, First Survey on Tax Consciousnessin the Philippines, Manila, 1962, pp. 10-11; andSecond Survey on Tax Consciousne# in the Philip­pines, Manila, 1969, p, 11.

9 Oliver Oldman. at. al., Financing Develop­ment in Mexico City, Cambridge: Harvard UniversityPress, 1967, pp. 108-126. '

10 William G. Rhodes and Richard M. Bird,"Financing Urbanization in Developing Countries byBenefit Taxation: Case Study of Colombia," LandEconomics, Vol. XLIII No.4, November 1967, pp.403-412.

MAN AND THE LAND:UIID UTILIUTION IN ANTIQUE

• Meliton B.Juanico

A cursory examination of. the topo­graphy of the Philippines shows the land­scape of the islands to be dominated by gen­erally north-south trending and centrallylocated mountain ranges, with only limitedportions of level land along the coasts. Despitethe fact that. close to a third of the nationalland area is already planted to crops,1 there isstill everywhere a tendency to increase thecultivated hectarageas the population increases.With the rise of population pressure on theland, however, farm areas decrease in size,the sloping- foothill and mountainous areasare tilled and, as a whole, farmers forciblyutilize different typas of land beyond thelatter's capability and limitations. Withoutconservation measures, therefore, the misuseof the limited soil resource results in theubiquitous phenomena of soil improverish­ment, erosion, floods and, col1$equently, low.productivity.

Focus On Antique

Antique's topography, like that of thewhole country, is also characterized by arugged terrain, broken only by narrow coastalstrips of level land west of anticlinal mountainsthat run meridionally along the west coast ofPanay Island. In such conditions, the landresource problems of the province are nodifferent from those of the country, varyingonly in details in relation to other provinces.

1 Of the Philipplnes'total land al'lleof 29.9404million has.• the area planted to food and commercialcrops In 1971. 1972 and 1973 wei'll: 9.0968, 9.3818and 9.2129 million has., raspaetlvely. See Efl'llnYam­bot, eta!. letts.), Philippine Agriculture Fact Bookand Buyers' Guide IQuezon City: Philippine Alma­nac Printers, lnc., 1976), Po 16

50

This paper shows how amidst a growing po­pulation and a restrictive physical environmentF'ilipino farmers in Antique utilize their landin relation to its different capability classesand the corresponding uses for which theseland classas have been recommended. Alsotaking into account the government's presentthrust in agricultural production, the localprospects for agrIcultural development areassessed and some recommendations are putforth.

Physical O,ographic Aspects

Antique is a comparatively long andnarrow stretch of land running along the en­tire west coest of Panay Island. The provinceis isolated from the mora prosperous centralplain of Panay in Iloilo Provinceby a mountainrange that runs from north to south, ~withpeaks ranging from 900 to about 2;900 metersin elevation, including the more well-knownMt. Baloy. The overall topographic configura­tion of the province is mountainous, with landalmost everywhere sloping in an eest-westdirection towards the sea (Fig. 1).

Between the narrow coestal plains andthe foot of the mountain rangesis a rollinghillyterrain trenched by narrow valleys of streamsoriginating from the uplands. The coastalplains, which have bean formed from sand andsilt, 'are narrow and many parts consist ofsterile beach sand and swampland. Such plainsmake up only approximately 19 percent2 of

2 Fl'llncisco Calimbas, et. aI., Soil SurvtIY of 'Antique Province, Bureau of Soils, Department ofAgrlcultul'll and Natul'lll Resources (Department ofAgriculture) (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1963), p. 31.