Violation of International Laws the Truman to Reagan

Above the Law: Violations of International Law by the U.S. Government from Truman toReaganAuthor(s): Jon FrappierSource: Crime and Social Justice, No. 21/22, INTERNATIONAL LAWLESSNESS AND THESEARCH FOR JUSTICE (1984), pp. 1-36Published by: Social Justice/Global OptionsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/29766228 .

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Global Lawlessness and Justice

Above the Law: Violations of International Law

by the U.S. Government from Truman to Reagan

Jon Frappier

The purpose of this article is to examine the violations of international law

by the United States government since World War II, with a particular focus on the Reagan administration. We detail both violations of international law and the refusal to negotiate treaties in the following areas of international rela? tions: 1) Intervention and War; 2) Arms Control; 3) Economics; and 4) Human

Rights. In addition, two appendices are included: Appendix A lists U.S. inter? ventions and the use of armed force as a political instrument; Appendix B cites the relevant articles from established international treaties and charters that

pertain to the findings of this article. The charges of violations of international law cited in the article are

gathered from a variety of sources. The Nicaraguan government, for example, has brought formal charges against the Reagan administration, and this case

is being heard by the International Court of Justice. Other violations cited have been drawn from law journals and publications of congressional organizations such as the Arms Control and Foreign Policy Caucus. Some of the examples of violations used in the Arms Control section of the article represent charges made against the United States by the Soviet Union; in these cases we have tried to obtain documentation and expert opinion from independent sources.

Finally, in other cases we have documented violations based on our own

reading of the international laws. The authors of this article are not lawyers, and the article does not purport

to be a legal brief for charges contained herein. Our purpose is to document

JON FRAPPIER is a member of the research staff of the Institute for the Study of Militarism and Economic Crisis (ISMEC), 2701 Folsom Street, San Francisco, CA 94110. This research was

conducted in preparation for the Permanent People's Tribunal, Session on Nicaragua, Brussels,

Belgium, October 5-8, 1984, at which ISMEC's Director, Marlene Dixon, presented the case

against the U.S. government's Central America policy. The author wishes to acknowledge the

assistance of June Kress and Sara Theiss.

CRIME AND SOCIAL JUSTICE No. 21-22 1



2 Frappier

the consistent pattern of disregard for international law by the U.S. govern? ment since World War II, and to emphasize in particular the dangerous and

often lawless attitude and actions of the Reagan administration. One of the most striking contradictions that surfaced during our research

is the difference between the rhetoric of the various U.S. administrations about the need for international law and the often total disregard for the most

basic principles of international law, such as nonintervention in the affairs of other countries.

In 1945, participants at the United Nations Conference heard President Truman say, "You have created a great instrument for peace and security and human progress in the world." He added that the powerful nations must

"assume the responsibility for leadership toward a world of peace.... By their own example the strong nations of the world should lead the way to

international justice" (Friedlander, 1984: 47). Indeed, the Nuremberg

judgments were meant to punish the aggressors and violators of international

law; however, we must admit that the lessons have been forgotten. After World War II, diplomat George Kennan took the position that it was

wrong to put the principles of international law above national interest.

Secretary of State Dean Acheson chided his fellow international lawyers that the "survival of states is not a matter of law" (ibid.: 51). Neither Acheson nor Kennan placed much faith in the United Nations. More recently, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger continuously disregarded the role of inter? national law in favor of his "balance-of-power politics" (ibid.: 56-57). Today, however, the disregard for and violation of international law by the Reagan administration has reached an alarming dimension. Reagan has invaded one

of the smallest nations on earth, refused to negotiate treaties of vital concern

to all the world's people, decided unilaterally that the United States will not

abide by the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, and violated numerous international and U.S. laws pertaining to international relations.

Our concern is generated not only by the violations cited below but also

by the attitude behind these violations. During previous administrations there has been more of a willingness (or a responsiveness to pressure) to negotiate with the other side even though violations of international law were being committed. However, the Reagan administration has refused to negotiate, and in fact, those in his administration who have advocated negotiation have been

removed. There has also been a concerted effort on the part of Reagan to

undermine international organizations such as the United Nations, which

embody the principles of international law he is violating. Further, Reagan is reinterpreting international agreements previously accepted by the United States. He has said, for example, that the United States "rejects any inter?

pretation of the Yalta Agreement that suggests American consent for the divi?

sion of Europe into spheres of influence" (New York Times, August 18, 1984). We would argue that there has been a significant shift in attitude toward inter?

national law under the Reagan administration, which has been reflected in

its foreign policy.



US. International Lawlessness 3

A Note About International Law

The term international law refers to various treaties, agreements, customary law principles, and general legal principles that serve to judge the

actions and behavior of various nation-states that have agreed to them. There are many instances of apparent or alleged violations that do not come before

any legal forum or, if they do, have no real consequence for the violators. Yet international law, while not as codified as the laws of individual states, and lacking any ultimate arbiter, is still a force in the world and has potential as a mechanism for world order and justice.

The International Court of Justice looks at treaties, customary laws, and

general principles of law in making its decisions, and these are the standard bases for international law (Statute of the International Court of Justice, Arti?

cle 31 [1]; Akehurst, 1982: 23). Customary law is either determined from the

actual practices of states or is inferred from U.N. resolutions, for example, or certain principles that have been repeated in many treaties. As in legal systems of nations, parties to a dispute will cite different authorities, or inter?

pret doctrines or precedents in different ways, to justify their position. Unlike

legal systems of nation-states, however, there is no ultimate prosecutor or

system of sanctions.

Treaties are a major part of international law. The laws governing treaties were codified at the Vienna Convention of 1969, which came into force in

1980. However, neither the United States nor the Soviet Union are parties to this treaty; and it applies only to treaties coming into effect after 1980

(ibid. : 121). Despite these limits, it does represent the customary international

law regarding treaties. Article 18 of this Convention is significant for this discussion of inter?

national law. It requires a state to refrain from acts which would defeat the

object and purpose of a treaty it has signed but not yet ratified (ibid.: 127). The argument can be made, therefore, that the U.S., which signed but never

ratified the SALT II accords, is nevertheless obliged to abide by them. At different times, nations use the doctrine of "jus cogens" to justify

actions. This refers to the concept of a "peremptory norm of general inter?

national law," e.g., a basic principle that may override particular treaty

obligations. Most experts agree that while there has been much legal debate, the prohibition against aggression is a universally applicable doctrine

(ibid.: 41). (See Appendix B for relevant texts of significant international legal

documents referred to in this article.)

I. Intervention and War

A. Latin America

1. Introduction The history of U.S. military, political, and economic intervention in Latin

America is an extremely long one, beginning with the conflicts with Spain



4 Frappier

and other European countries over the control and annexation of territory, fol? lowed by direct U.S. intervention in the Latin American countries and more

recently the covert and full-scale military operations against established

governments in Central America and the Caribbean. The following list details instances of U.S. interventions specifically

involving the use of U.S. armed forces prior to World War II for the purpose of "protecting American lives and property" and "maintaining order." It includes: Argentina (1833), Peru (1835-36), Argentina (1852-53), Nicaragua (1853-54, 1857), Uruguay (1858), Paraguay (1859), Mexico (1859), Colom? bia (1860), Panama (1865), Mexico (1866), Nicaragua (1867), Uruguay (1868), Colombia (1868, 1873), Mexico (1873), Panama (1885), Haiti

(1888), Argentina (1890), Haiti (1891), Chile (1891), Brazil (1894),

Nicaragua (1894), Colombia (1895), Nicaragua (1896, 1898-99), Colombia

(1901-02), Honduras (1903), Dominican Republic (1903-04), Panama

(1903-14), Cuba (1906-09), Honduras (1907), Nicaragua (1910), Honduras

(1911-12), Panama (1912), Cuba (1912), Nicaragua (1912-25), Mexico

(1913-19), Haiti (1914-34), Dominican Republic (1914, 1916-24), Cuba

(1917-22), Panama (1918-21), Honduras (1919), Guatemala (1920), Hon? duras (1924-25), Panama (1925), Nicaragua (1926-33), and Cuba (1933)

(Foreign Affairs Division, 1975: 59-63). While these interventions did not necessarily represent violations of

specific treaties, they are violations of customary international law, which

upholds the principles of national sovereignty, self-determination, and nonintervention. This article centers on violations after World War II, when the United States became a party to the United Nations Charter, the Organiza? tion of American States Charter, and the Rio Pact (as well as numerous

bilateral agreements). In an earlier period of our history, it is important to point out, the original

doctrine followed by the United States in the Western Hemisphere, the Monroe Doctrine, was not, as is often asserted, a justification for intervention in the internal affairs of other countries. The original doctrine as outlined by President Monroe in 1823 stated that the American continents should not be seen as the area of colonization for European powers. The beginning of a

"legal" justification for interventionist policies came when President Theodore Roosevelt added a corollary to the Monroe Doctrine in 1904 giving the United States the right to intervene to collect the debts Latin American countries owed to European countries. The proclaimed rights of U.S. inter? vention included installing governments to administer the countries' public finances, and if this did not result in debt repayment, seizing control of the customs houses (Boyle, 1984: 5-7).

We have chosen to present this section on Latin America separately because of the special history the United States has had in this region of the world and also because of the alarming number of violations currently being committed by the Reagan administration in Central America.



U.S. International Lawlessness 5

2. Violations from World War II to the Reagan Administration Before the end of World War II, the United States called together its allies

to form an international organization which would not only promote peace but also assist the U.S. to take a world leadership role after the war. In 1945, most of the other nations of the world signed the United Nations Charter in an

attempt to establish a world order free from the massive devastation and cost

in human life wrought by World War II. At the time of the founding of the

U.N., member nations not only signed a charter which established the

organizational structure to maintain world order, but also put their names to a document that endorsed the principles of nonintervention. Shortly after the establishment of the U.N., the United States and the other countries of the Americas created the Organization of American States to serve as a regional body consistent with the principles of the U.N.

This section documents violations by the United States of the principles of nonintervention since World War II and, in particular, the Reagan admini? stration's low regard for the rule of international law. Shortly after World War

II, the United States pursued the Cold War policy towards the Soviet Union.

Consequently, the primary justification for U.S. interventionist policy was the

premise that communists were trying to take over a particular country, which threatened the national security of the United States.

In most instances, very little concrete evidence was presented to sub? stantiate these charges (e.g., the charge that the Nicaraguan government is

supplying weapons to the guerrillas in El Salvador). In many cases of interven?

tion, U.S. private economic interests faced the threat of social and economic reforms implemented by new governments for the benefit of their peoples.

Many of the corporations active in Latin America have historically been able to control and directly influence the governments in power. Whenever there was threat of revolutionary changes or even reforms, the charge of communist takeover became the battle cry of the U.S. government and corporations.

We would argue that the following examples of interventions in the post World War II period through the Reagan administration constitute violations of international law by the United States. Many of the examples cited below are violations either of Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter or of Articles 18 and 20 of the OAS Charter. These contain provisions stating that no country has a right to intervene in the internal affairs of another country.

Costa Rica (1953): After the election of President Jose (Pepe) Figueres in

1953, the CIA worked through opposition forces in the country to attempt to overthrow the government. The U.S. was concerned with Figueres's policy of granting asylum to communists and other leftists. Figueres left the govern? ment after his candidate lost the presidential election in 1958 (Grimmett, 1975:4). Violation: Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter and Article 18 of the

OAS Charter. Guatemala (1954): The CIA under President Eisenhower overthrew

democratically elected President Jacobo Arbenz and installed a military die



6 Frappier

tatorship. President Arbenz had been elected in 1951 after Guatemala had been ruled for many years by a U.S.-supported military dictatorship. One of Arbenz's early policies was an agrarian reform program which affected the United Fruit Company. After public charges in the U.S. that Arbenz had com?

munist tendencies, the CIA recruited a colonel from the Guatemalan military and supplied arms, planes, and pilots to overthrow Arbenz (Jonas, 1983:4-5). Violation: Article 2(4): of the UN. Charter and Articles 18 and 20 of the OAS Charter (Rowles, 1983: 399-400).

Cuba (1961): In early 1960, President Eisenhower approved a CIA-spon? sored operation to train Cuban exiles for the purpose of overthrowing Fidel Castro. In mid-April 1961, under President Kennedy, the CIA directed the unsuccessful attempt to invade Cuba at the Bay of Pigs. During a two-year period there were six attempts by CIA-recruited organized crime figures to assassinate Castro (Grimmett, 1975: 6-7). Violation: Article 2(4): of the

U.N. Charter and Articles 18 and 20 of the OAS Charter and the Neutrality Act (ibid.).

Ecuador (1961): The CIA began efforts to topple the regime of President Jose Velasco Ibarra when he refused to end diplomatic relations with Cuba. He was overthrown in November 1961. His successor, Carlos Julio

Arosemena, also met with disfavor from the United States, and the CIA "destabilized" his government in July 1963. According to CIA agent Phillip Agee, the CIA managed to gain economic and political control over

Ecuador's labor movement during this period (Grimmett, 1975: 7). Violation: Article 2(4): of the U.N. Charter and Article 18 of the OAS Charter.

Cuba (1962): During the missile crisis, the U.S. imposed a naval blockade to prevent the further importation of war materiel. The U.S. had used Article 6 of the Rio Treaty (collective self-defense against aggression): to justify the arms embargo. However, no armed attack had taken place against Cuba and therefore the treaty gave no authorization to the U.S. to "defend" Cuba

against intervention. In the 1975 Protocol of Amendment to the Rio Treaty, there was a change in Article 6 providing the following: "Any assistance the

organ of consultation may decide to furnish a State Party may not be provided without the consent of that State." Therefore it was made explicit that the

only legal way a country could be invaded was if it so requested for the pur? pose of protecting itself from another aggressor (Rowles, 1983: 394-95).

Dominican Republic (1965): Under President Johnson, the U.S. military sent 23,000 troops to the Dominican Republic to prevent the democratically elected government of Juan Bosch from resuming power after a military coup in 1963. Violation: Article 2(4): of the U.N. Charter and Articles 18 and 20 of the OAS Charter (ibid.: 400).

Chile (1973): Under President Nixon and Secretary of State Kissinger, the CIA channeled over $8 million into Chile to "destabilize" the democratically elected government of President Salvador Allende. The money was used to

support opposition groups in Chile. The CIA also infiltrated the Socialist Par?

ty, and among other activities, organized street demonstrations against the




government. Also, at least one U.S. corporation made contributions to the destabilization effort. In September 1973, a military coup overthrew and killed Allende (Grimmett, 1975: 12; Kegley, 1984: 269). Violation: Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter, Articles 18 and 20 of the OAS Charter, and the Neutrality Act (Kegley, 1984: 269).

3. Violations by the Reagan Administration

Grenada (1983): On October 25, 1983, after the overthrow and assassina? tion of Prime Minister Maurice Bishop by Deputy Prime Minister Bernard

Coard, 1,900 U.S. Marines and Army airborne Rangers invaded the island. The United States overthrew the existing government and installed a govern? ment more favorable to U.S. interests.

The Reagan administration argued that it had been requested to intervene

by the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS); however, the OECS could not lawfully authorize the U.S. invasion of Grenada. Article 8 of the OECS requires unanimous agreement among the member states before action can be taken and that condition was never fulfilled. Moreover, if the OECS

thought Grenada was a threat, the appropriate resolution would have been to

raise it to the Organization of American States. Violation: Articles 2(4) and 51 of the U.N. Charter and Articles 18, 20, and 21 of the OAS Charter

(Joyner, 1984: 132; Boyle et al., 1984: 173).

Nicaragua (1981 to the present): Since 1981, the United States has been

using military force against Nicaragua and intervening in its internal affairs in violation of Nicaragua's sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political inde?

pendence. The U.S. has recruited, trained, armed, equipped, financed, sup?

plied, and directed military and paramilitary actions in and against Nicaragua. The U.S. has violated the sovereignty of Nicaragua with armed attacks by air, land, and sea; incursions into Nicaraguan territorial waters; aerial trespass into Nicaraguan airspace; and by efforts through direct and indirect means to coerce and intimidate the Government of Nicaragua (International Court of

Justice, Order, 1984: 5-6). This particular case has been brought before the International Court of Law

by the Government of Nicaragua. The U.S. has announced that it will refuse to accept jurisdiction of the International Court in this case or any case regard? ing Central America for the next 2 years (New York Times, April 26, 1984).

Violation: The Nicaraguan government has charged that the U.S. government has violated the following laws: Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter, Articles 18, 20 of the OAS Charter, Article 8 of the Convention on Rights and Duties of

States, Article I, Third, of the Convention Concerning the Duties and Rights of States in the Event of Civil Strife, and breaches of its obligation under

general and customary international law (International Court of Justice, Order, 1984: 4).

Additional violations that could be cited include the following: ? 22 U.S. Code, Section 2422, which states that the CIA may not engage

in operations in foreign countries (except as necessary to gather intelligence)



8 Frappier

unless and until the President makes a finding that each such operation is

important to the national security of the United States (Application, Annex

A., p. 13). ? 50 U.S. Code, Section 413, which states that the President must fully

inform the Committees on Intelligence of the U.S. Senate and House of

Representatives of any such operations. This is the law that was violated when the committees were not briefed on the mining operation (ibid.: 3; New York

Times, April 16, 1984). ? Article 36(2) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice and

Resolution of August 2, 1946 of the Senate of the United States of America, which establish the recognition by the U.S. of the jurisdiction of the Inter? national Court of Justice. President Reagan declared the U.S. would not abide

by the jurisdiction of the Court (Arms Control and Foreign Policy Caucus, 1984: 37).

? U.S. Constitution (Article 2 section 2), which states that the "President shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make

treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur." President

Reagan never sought the advice and consent of the Senate regarding his deci? sion to not accept the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice (Con?

gressional Record, 1946: 10709). ? The Boland Amendment (passed in December 1982), which states that

funds cannot not be used by the Defense Department or the CIA to "furnish

military equipment, military training or advice, or other support for military activities, to any group or individual," for the purpose of overthrowing the Government of Nicaragua. Violation: Continuing Resolution for Fiscal Year

1983, Section 793 (ACFPC: 4). ? The Convention Relative to the Laying of Automatic Submarine Contact

Mines was signed by both the United States and Nicaragua at The Hague in

1907; the mining of the Nicaraguan harbors was a violation of this law (New York Times, April 21, 1984).

? The Neutrality Act has been violated by the Reagan administration "by planning, recruiting for, and assisting in attacks by Nicaraguan contras on

Nicaragua." There have also been reports of bases in California identified as

training facilities for persons preparing to go to fight with the contras against Nicaragua. The most recent violation is the activities of the Civilian Military Assistance organization in the U.S., two of whose members were recently shot down and killed in a helicopter inside the borders of Nicaragua. Violation: 18 U.S. Code 959, 858 (Harvard Law Review, 1982: 1955; Washington Post

September 6, 1984; ACFPC: 25). ? The CIA is violating firearms laws by "employing unlicensed

individuals and corporations to ship weapons and ammunition to Nicaraguan contra training camps within the United States. . .." Violation: Transactions in Firearms: Unlicensed Dealers, Section 922(a) (ACFPC: 27).

? U.S. law was violated because the CIA spent more than the $24 million authorized for Fiscal Year 1984 for the covert operations against Nicaragua.




The excess included funding for the "mother ship" used to mine Nicaraguan harbors and certain agency overhead costs. Violation: Defense Appropria? tions Act of 1984: Limit on spending in Nicaragua, Section 775 (ACFPC: 5).

? Acts of terrorism have been carried out by the contras against people

(foreign nationals, mariners, and international travelers) protected by OAS

Convention. Violation: Organization of American States Convention on Ter?

rorism: Commitment to Combat Terrorism, Articles 2 and 8 (ACFPC: 42). Honduras: According to the General Accounting Office and others, the

Department of Defense used funds for purposes other than those for which

they were authorized. Monies were used to train Honduran military forces, for the4 'provision of civic and humanitarian assistance,'' and for the construction of facilities and transportation for private organizations. Violation: 31 U.S.

Code 1301(a) states that "appropriations shall be applied only to the objects for which the appropriations were made....

" and appropriations were not

made in the Defense Department budget for the activities cited above

(ACFPC: 1-2). Senator Sasser (D-Tenn.), Representative Alexander (D-Ark.), and the

General Accounting Office (GAO) have charged that the Defense Department used unauthorized funds when it constructed "airfields, access roads, camps and other facilities" at nine locations in Honduras in 1983-84. The Depart? ment of Defense has argued that the construction was temporary and therefore

exempt from the appropriation requirement. Violation: 10 U.S. Code

2802 (b), which states that military construction over $200,000 should only be funded by military construction accounts (ibid.: 5).

Senator Sasser charged that the Defense Department was required to file a complete report, according to law, stating its construction plans for Central

America, which it failed to do. Violation: Military Construction Appropria? tions Act of 1984 (ibid.: 31).

El Salvador: The Reagan administration "has introduced U.S. military

personnel into hostilities or imminent hostilities in Central America without

reporting these introductions to Congress. ..." U.S. military advisers have come under fire in at least 8 incidents and U.S. Army pilots flew recon?

naissance missions over Salvadoran battlefields providing combat operations information. U.S. Navy ships have engaged in "locating and tracking possibly hostile ships for interdiction by the Salvadoran Navy." U.S. troops par?

ticipated in Honduran operations in close proximity to Salvadoran rebel bases.

Violation: War Powers Resolution: Reporting Requirements on Hostilities, Section 4(a) (ACFPC: 33).

The Salvadoran government sold food aid to local consumers and then ille?

gally used the funds for the war effort instead of for agricultural development. Violation: Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act: Use of Local

Currencies, Section 106(b)(2), 206 (ACFPC: 19). The Reagan administration has allowed El Salvador to deposit local cur?

rencies from imported commodities through the Economic Support Fund

directly into its domestic budget rather than into a Special Account, which is



10 Frappier

required by law. Violation: Foreign Assistance Act: Use of Local Currencies, Section 609(a): Special Account (ACFPC: 21).

B. Intervention and War? The Rest of the World

1. Introduction

The examples that are cited here represent the more blatant and public examples of violations; however, a case could be made that the United States is constantly violating international law through the activities of the CIA sta?

tions and U.S. military missions which conduct operations affecting the inter? nal affairs of many countries.

The history of the United States since World War II is one of intervention into the affairs of other countries throughout the world. From 1946 to 1975, there have been 215 instances in which the U.S. armed forces were used as a political instrument. This does not include the actual interventions and wars

in which the U.S. was involved. Rather than using peaceful means of settling disputes, as outlined in the U.N. Charter, the U.S. has tended to rely on its armed might to police the world.

Rules for the conduct of war have evolved through customary law and have been codified in various treaties and conventions since the mid-1800s. The

Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 are important agreements, still in effect, which prescribe humane treatment of prisoners and civilians. In addition, chemical warfare, weapons which cause unnecessary suffering, and the attack?

ing of undefended towns were banned. The Geneva Protocol of 1925 prohibited chemical weapons; the U.S. did

not ratify it until after the worldwide outcry against the use of Agent Orange in Vietnam. The Geneva Convention of 1949 adopted additional provisions for treatment of the wounded and prisoners, and, most relevant to this article, it called for the protection of civilians. During and after the Vietnam War, there has been much debate about how the Convention applies to the case of a local conflict involving an insurgent force (Trooboff, 1975: 13, 15-16).

The following are representative examples of interventions and wars con?

stituting violations of international law by the Reagan and previous administrations.

Chad: The CIA secretly supplied funds and military equipment to the forces of Hissen Habre (starting in 1981), who was fighting to overthrow the

Libyan-backed coalition government of President Goukouni Oueddei

(Peterzell, 1984: 1). Violation: Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter.

Libya: In 1981 an administration plan was presented to the House

Intelligence Committee which included "a 'disinformation' plan to embarrass Muammar Qaddafi, the creation of a 'counter government' of Libyan exiles, and escalation of paramilitary and sabotage operations inside Libya intended to demonstrate that Qaddafi faces active internal opposition.'' The goal was to remove Qaddafi once and for all. It was reported later that an administration




official was in direct contact with anti-Qaddafi Libyan exiles in Europe. The administration then requested that U.S. oil companies withdraw their

employees; after an initial refusal, they complied. The administration plan also called for a U.S. boycott of Libyan oil and B-52 raids on Libyan training camps (Peterzell, 1982: 1-4). Violation: Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter.

Lebanon: The Reagan administration deployed Marines to Lebanon

during the civil war without notifying Congress that there might be "imminent involvement with hostilities." Even after the first two Marines were killed, the Pentagon testified that they were not really involved in hostilities. Viola? tion: War Powers Resolution: Reporting Requirements on Hostilities, sec? tion 4(a).

Iran: In 1981, the Reagan administration started giving support to anti Khomeini forces in Iran, including millions of dollars' worth of arms to two Iranian paramilitary groups in Eastern Turkey. The administration also tried to unify anti-Khomeini forces in France and Egypt. One of the main purposes of the operation was to create an anti-Soviet opposition which would be an alternative to the Tudeh Party in Iran (Peterzell, 1982: 5). Violation: Article

2(4) of the U.N. Charter. Another aspect of the Reagan administration's disregard for international

law is the refusal to negotiate. The Soviets, for example, have submitted a

draft proposal for banning chemical weapons and received a negative response from the United States (Longstreth, 1984: 11).

2. Violations Prior to Reagan

Shortly after World War II, the Truman Doctrine became the established

foreign policy of the United States, and the Cold War with the Soviet Union and all other communist forces throughout the world became the focus of confrontations.

Greece: During World War II the Greek Communist Party had grown

politically and was the main organization fighting the fascists. After the war, it was in a strong position to assume power in the country. This state of affairs did not fit in with U.S. plans to rebuild Western Europe through the Marshall Plan and to oppose the Soviet Union and its allies in other countries. It was in Greece that the Truman Doctrine was first articulated; the U.S. and Britain intervened in the Greek civil war to oppose the communists and prevent them from coming to power. Besides bringing the military into power, the U.S. was able to establish an important military base in Greece. In 1952 the CIA started

channeling money to Colonel George Papadopoulos, who later led the military coup of 1967 (Grimmett, 75: 2). Violation: Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter.

Korea: The U.S. entered the Korean War (1950-53) and engineered a

U.N. resolution authorizing the invasion of North Korea, which was in viola? tion of the U.N. Charter itself. The U.N. Security Council was not convened until after the U.S. had intervened. The U.S. claimed that North Korea had invaded South Korea. Just prior to the conflict, however, John Foster Dulles,



12 Frappier

Chief of Staff Omar Bradley, and Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson met with General Douglas MacArthur. Dulles went on to South Korea and told the National Assembly that the U.S. was ready to supply them with materiel to

fight communism (Kim, 1968: 75-76). Violation: Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter.

Iran: In 1953, under President Eisenhower, the CIA organized a coup against progressive Premier Mossadegh, who had nationalized some of the oil

holdings of the British. The CIA operation was led by Kermit Roosevelt. After the fall of Mossadegh and the installation of the Shah of Iran, Roosevelt became the "government relations" director and vice president of one of the

companies?Gulf Oil Company?that gained direct benefits under the new

government (Wise, 1964: 110-13). Violation: Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter.

Lebanon: President Eisenhower deployed 14,000 U.S. troops to support the government of Chamoun in Lebanon; the invasion was meant to warn the new Iraqi government against nationalizing U.S. oil interests (Spanier, 1973:

125). Violation: Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter. Vietnam War: The history of the Vietnam War is one of gradual escala?

tion. First, the U.S. aided the French during their war against the Viet Minh.

Following the French defeat, the U.S. violated the Geneva Accords by intro?

ducing military personnel and by opposing the elections that were scheduled to be held in 1956. U.S. advisers were then sent and the escalation of ever

increasing numbers of combat troops began. Incidents like the Gulf of Tonkin were created to justify the deployment of more troops until it became a full scale war. The U.S. used a variety of weapons including fragmentation bombs, napalm, and extensive bombing of civilian populations. Agent Orange defoliant was dropped over large tracts of the land and population. Project Phoenix, the CIA program directed by William Colby, assassinated thousands of Vietnamese civilian leaders suspected of being guerrilla sympathizers (Pen? tagon Papers, 1971: 1-2, 80, 234).

In response to the brutality of the war, the International War Crimes Tribunal was called in Stockholm in 1967 and over the course of its pro? ceedings issued the following findings against the United States:

1) Violation of Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter, Article 6 of the

Nuremberg Charter, the U.N. Resolution of 1960, and the Geneva Accords for committing acts of international aggression.

2) Violation of Articles 23, 25, and 27 of The Hague Convention of 1907 and Article 18 of the 1949 Geneva Tribunal for deliberately waging war

against civilian populations (Wells, 1984: 102-07). 3) Violation of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 for the use of chemical

warfare?specifically napalm. The Hague Convention of 1907 also prohibits weapons that cause unnecessary suffering and this protocol is recognized as

customary international law regardless of signature. (The U.S. had not signed it at the time of the Vietnam War.)




4) Violation of the Hague Convention of 1899 for the use of fragmentation type weapons. This is also customary international law even though the U.S.

is not a party to this convention (U.N. International Law Convention, 1954

Draft Code of Offenses Against Peace and Security of Mankind). (See Myrdal, 1976: 232-33, 240, 367-68.)

Angola: After the war for Angolan independence from the Portuguese, the U.S. spent millions of dollars to support two factions trying to overthrow the new government. The CIA supplied weapons, mercenaries, and planes (McGehee, 1983: 60). Violation: Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter.

IL Arms Control: Agreements, Compliance, and the Arms Race

A. World War II to the 1960s This section looks briefly at the history of arms control talks and treaty

violations, which helps give a perspective on the actions of the Reagan admin?

istration. During World War II, it was the U.S. which developed the atomic

bomb in secret. The U.S. remains the only country to have actually used

nuclear weapons. The Truman administration followed up this bellicose begin?

ning by rejecting those (including Secretary of War Stimson) who wanted to

approach the Soviets in a straightforward way to avoid an arms race. Instead, the atom bomb was seen as a key to controlling Soviet behavior and asserting U.S. power in the post-war world.

The Baruch Plan (1946) was the first major U.S. proposal on arms control

after the war. It proposed international management and inspection of nuclear

production. Sanctions were to be set in a way that bypassed the Security Coun?

cil, thus depriving the Soviets of veto power. According to the plan, however, the U.S. was not scheduled to give up its monopoly for two or three years, and would have retained its bombs while the Soviets would have been forbid? den to produce them. The Soviets rejected the Baruch Plan, and the U.S.

rejected their counterproposal. This scenario, in which the Soviets were either locked into an inferior position, or were asked to cut a major military program with no reciprocal action by the U.S., was repeated many times over the next

four decades as the following brief outline illustrates. The U.S. made the next quantum leap in weapons production when it accel?

erated hydrogen bomb development in the early 1950s. The Soviet position

during this period (as well as later) was for total disarmament. In 1952, one

of the next major U.S. proposals suggested linking the reduction of conven?

tional forces and weapons (where the Soviets are stronger) to the elimination of nuclear weapons and again proposed international inspection. This proposal was also rejected by the Soviets.

In 1953, Eisenhower presented the Atoms for Peace plan, along with a pro?

posal to limit military and security forces. Again, this would have locked the

Soviets into a militarily inferior position, so they rejected this plan. In 1954, the U.S. proposed a comprehensive three-stage disarmament

plan. The U.S.S.R. made significant concessions on key issues (including



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international control, partial disarmament, and ceilings on conventional

forces) and came very close to accepting the U.S. position. The Soviet

response was clearly unexpected by the U.S., and the Eisenhower administra? tion (with John Foster Dulles as Secretary of State) did an about-face and pro? claimed that disarmament was no longer feasible. Eisenhower proposed instead the "open skies" plan, which even he later admitted had to be totally unacceptable to the Soviets. This would have opened up the skies of both coun? tries for inspection by the other country and again would have given the U.S. an advantage. Another round of talks ended in failure in 1957, and thereafter there was little discussion of total disarmament.

The Cuban Missile Crisis renewed interest in serious arms talks, since the threat of a nuclear war was very real. The Limited Test Ban Treaty was signed in 1963. There was some discussion during this period of strategic weapons control, but the Soviets would not discuss strategic freezes until parity began to be achieved in the late 1960s (Blacker, 1984: 96-112).

B. Treaties and Compliance

1. Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTB) (1963) This treaty banned testing of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere, in outer

space, underwater, and any underground tests that would cause fallout outside the territory of the testing country. The LTB was signed by the U.S. and the

U.S.S.R. (Blacker, 1984: 130). Violations: Soviets charge fallout has leaked outside the territorial U.S., violating Article I, Paragraph B of the LTB. Retired U.S. officials admit to technical violations (Longstreth, 1984: 11).

2. Outer Space Treaty (1967) This treaty stipulated that outer space was not subject to national appro?

priation. It prohibits military installations and weapons testing on celestial bodies and putting nuclear weapons into orbit. The U.S. has ratified this

treaty. Violations: There are no major violations of this treaty charged (Blacker, 1984).

3. Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) (1968) This treaty prohibits the transfer of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear states.

At the insistence of the non-nuclear states, the superpowers agreed to work toward stopping the arms race and creating a treaty for complete disarmament.

They also promised to transfer peaceful nuclear technology to non-nuclear

weapons states. The right to create nuclear-free zones was assured.

Nonweapon parties are required to accept monitoring by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which includes inspections and audits to assure compliance (Blacker, 1984: 156-157). An important part of the regula? tion of proliferation is the control of nuclear weapons fuel, plutonium, and uranium. The U.S. and the U.S.S.R. have ratified this treaty (Levanthal, 1984:1,6). Violation: The failure of the nuclear powers to negotiate toward an end to the arms race and toward disarmament is well known. The non

nuclear weapons states have also become resentful because, in practice, they




have not received any benefits in terms of technology transfers for having signed the treaty (Dunn, 1982: 144).

The U.S. has also used the treaty to suit its own political aims. Aid was

suspended to Pakistan in late 1976 and 1979 for violations of the treaty. But in 1981, when Reagan wanted to bolster Western security in the region, sanc?

tions against Pakistan were lifted (Dunn, 1982: 105). The Ford and Carter administrations had taken a strong approach to stopping the plutonium trade. The Ford administration took a strong position on the need to control the

reprocessing and recycling of plutonium, but did nothing about it. The Carter administration declared an indefinite deferral of U.S. commercial reprocess?

ing and recycling of plutonium and stopped federal funding for several of these

projects, including the Clinch River Breeder Reactor. Carter did retreat some on this policy, in the face of resistance from Europe and Japan, who saw this as denying them the energy sources they needed. In fact, allowance for a low enriched uranium fuel was made (Levanthal, 1984: 7). The Reagan admin?

istration, however, immediately rescinded the ban on commercial reprocess?

ing and promoting of plutonium use in other countries. In 1983, Reagan announced a plan to get all nuclear-supplier nations to require "comprehen? sive safeguards" before exporting to any nation. However, the administration then arranged the sale of nuclear materials to India, Argentina, and South

Africa, none of whom have signed the NPT. It got around the ban against sell?

ing to non-NPT nations by arranging the sales through other suppliers. The administration has insisted that it needs to be a "reliable supplier" of nuclear materials and technology in order to be able to control possible proliferators. But, in selling to non-NPT nations, it goes against this treaty, which was

supposed to give favored status to those that signed the treaty (Levanthal, 1984: 8,9,13).

Additionally, the administration has been charged with violating the NPT

through the nuclear cooperation agreements it has made. These give long term

(30-year) approvals to foreign reprocessing of plutonium from nuclear fuel

supplied by the U.S. The NPT requires that reprocessing requests be evaluated and approved on a case by case basis. Members of Congress and some public interest groups filed a lawsuit against the administration in May 1984 to stop these practices.

4. Threshold Test Ban Treaty (1974) This treaty limited nuclear underground explosions to 150 kilotons. It was

linked with the Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Treaty but neither were ever

brought up for a vote. One criticism is that it allowed such a high level of

explosion as to be almost meaningless. Another criticism was that the allowance of "peaceful nuclear explosions" (those outside specified areas) was in itself a major loophole. This agreement was signed by Nixon in 1974, never ratified, then abandoned by Carter in 1977 in favor of negotiations on a Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB). Reagan inherited these CTB negotiations, but killed them in 1982 (Blacker, 1984: 137). Violation: The Soviets charge



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repeated violations of this (Longstreth, 1984: 11).

5. Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Treaty (PNET)(1976) This treaty limited "peaceful nuclear explosions" to 150 kilotons and

also spelled out inspection procedures (Blacker, 1984: 137-138). This was

linked to the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, then never brought up for a vote in

the Senate.

6. Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Negotiated 1970-79) This proposal tried to give legal detail on questions arising from space

exploration, and included prohibitions against using the moon as a military base. It declares that the natural resources on the moon are the "common

heritage of mankind." The U.S. has not ratified this treaty (nor have many other countries). The U.S. objects to the "common heritage" limits to

development in the Law of the Sea treaty and in this treaty as well. The Soviets

objected to the common heritage concept until 1978 (Blacker, 1984: 123).

7. Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM Treaty) (1972) This Treaty was a product of the SALT I talks. The ABM Treaty bans

deployment of nationwide systems to defend against ballistic missile attack. An interim agreement set ceilings on certain strategic weapons for five years (Carnesale, et al., 1983:92). The ABM Treaty halted another destabilizing and

expensive spiral in the arms race. The 1974 Protocol to the ABM Treaty limits

the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. to one ABM site of 100 interceptors and 100 launch? ers. It also limits the number of ABM radars. Research on all types of ABM

systems and components is permitted but not advanced development, testing, and deployment of certain types of ABM systems and components. It estab?

lished the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) as the forum for dis?

cussion of ABM treaty issues. Both the U.S. and the Soviets have ratified the

ABM Treaty (Longstreth and Pike, 1984: 6-7).

C. Compliance Issues (Violations)

The U.S. had been putting small "environmental shelters" over ICBM

silos since the 1960s. In 1973, the size of these shelters was increased. In 1973

and again in 1977-78, the Soviets charged that this was deliberate conceal?

ment, which impeded verification as prohibited by Article XII of the ABM

Treaty. In 1979, the U.S. finally stopped using large shelters. In the SALT

II negotiations, the two countries reached an agreement that no shelters that

impede verification could be used (Longstreth, 1984:9; Longstreth and Pike, 1984: Appendix, 3). The U.S. is testing Minuteman ICBMs to give them ABM

capabilities, in violation of Article VI of the Treaty (Longstreth, 1984: 11). Phased array radar systems: These are radar systems that can have func?

tions both for an ABM system and also for early warning. As part of an ABM

system they would track ballistic missiles coming into the country at various

locations as well as provide battle management support. For early warning




purposes the radars would be placed at borders, facing outward, to warn of

attack. The latter is permitted under the treaty. This type of radar can take

several years to put up and is the "long lead time" component of an ABM

system. The concern is that these radars will be put in place (under the guise of being part of an early warning system), then other ABM components could be deployed quickly. The ABM Treaty allowed for these radars for early warning purposes only (Pike and Rich, 1984: 5).

In 1978, the Soviets charged that two large phased array radar systems

being built by the U.S were in violation of the ABM Treaty. The U.S. denied

this, saying the use was for early warning and therefore consistent with the

Treaty. Currently, the U.S. is constructing two more of these systems, which increases the likelihood that the systems could be used for ABM purposes. The

U.S. is also charging the Soviets with violating the ABM Treaty through con?

struction of its own phased array radar system (Longstreth, 1984: 11).

1. Star Wars Weapons System (Nationwide Strategic Defense Initiative) The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) aims at establishing defenses against

a nuclear attack, by intercepting and destroying ballistic missiles in various

stages of attack (Longstreth and Pike, 1984: 1). On January 6, 1984, Reagan

signed National Security Decision Directive 19, which began the multibillion dollar SDI research and development effort. It consolidated many programs

relating to ballistic missile defense and ordered a number of demonstrations of critical missile defense technologies before 1990. Critics, including the

Soviet Union, charge that the SDI is banned by the ABM Treaty (Longstreth, 1984: m). The administration maintains that the program is permitted under

the ABM Treaty. The U.S. and U.S.S.R. have never agreed on a definition

of the word "develop." The Reagan administration has elaborate justifica? tions for interpreting the words "develop" and "component" to allow it to

develop and demonstrate various parts of the SDI system. The justification is

that since each component is not capable of standing on its own as an ABM

weapons component, to develop such components does not violate the ABM Treaty.

The current Reagan administration's interpretation of the word "develop'' is at odds with the way development was conceived during the 1972 Senate

Armed Services Committee hearings on SALT I, which stated that develop? ment was prohibited once it entered the stage of field testing (Longstreth and

Pike, 1984: 16-19).

2. SALT II (1979) This treaty took six and one-half years to negotiate. It permitted many

weapons developments of the 1970s (including super-accurate counterforce warheads and multiple warheads on a single missile [MIRVs]), but put a cap on the number of warheads that could be installed on a missile, and limited ICBM development. This treaty was never brought up for a vote in the Senate

(Carnesale, 1983: 99).



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Violations: Article IV, paragraph 9 of Salt II limits each side to one new type of ICBM. The development of the MX and Midgetman ICBMs would violate this limit. (Both are currently under development by the Air Force.) The U.S.

says that this is permitted since actual deployment of the Midgetman will come

after SALT II expires (Longstreth, 1984: 10). The Soviets charge a "spirit of the law'' violation of the SALT II Protocol, which expired in 1981. This Protocol banned deployment but not development of long-range sea- and land-launched cruise missiles and said that parties were to work out mutually acceptable solu? tions with respect to these weapons. The U.S. has been deploying cruise missiles since the Protocol expired. The U.S. contends that it did not ratify SALT II and is not bound by an expired Protocol (Longstreth, 1984: 10-11).

D. The Reagan Administration and Arms Control

The section above has shown some of the compliance issues raised by the current administration's actions on arms treaties. These and other actions taken

by the Reagan administration raise questions as to whether the administration would rather be free of all treaties and obligations to negotiate. The attitude of the administration toward the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) is a case in point. The SCC was used under Nixon, Ford, and Carter as a forum to discuss and resolve alleged violations of the ABM treaty. During this period, all U.S. charges against the Soviets were satisfactorily resolved through this

process. An interagency committee consisting of staff from the Department of

Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, CIA, State Department, and National Security Council testified during the debates on SALT II that the "specific charge that the Soviets cheated on SALT I is inaccurate. We raised a number of issues with the Soviets in SALT I?as they did with us?but in every case the activity in

question either ceased or subsequent information clarified the situation and

allayed our concern" (Longstreth, 1984: 3, 5, 9). Reagan has undercut this process of compliance diplomacy and has instead

taken a prosecutorial stand. In January of 1984, he issued a report to Congress citing seven arms control violations by the Soviets (Pike and Rich, 1984: 1).

Many of these were the types of violations that in the past had been dealt with

quietly thru the SCC. Other allegations were premature, since all the technical evidence was not in, and Reagan had not waited for a response from the Soviets to the inquiries the U.S. had made in the fall session with the SCC. Four of the asserted violations dealt with "political commitments" to unratified agreements that the administration refused to ratify (Krepon, 1984: 159). Reagan declared that the Soviets are "liars and cheats," and key members of his administration have displayed the same attitude. Former Secretary of State Haig told the Senate

Foreign Relations Committee in 1982 that SALT II was dead. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger declared that U.S. defense programs conformed with SALT I and II constraints by coincidence rather than design; and White House counsel Ed Meese stated that the administration had no moral or legal commitment to abide by expired or unratified SALT agreements. Secretary of State Schultz expressed similar reservations about extending SALT II beyond




its expiration date of 1985 (Krepon, 1984: 164). A review of the status of the recent major weapons negotiations reveals that

the U.S. has stopped all serious negotiations and indeed, as the "Star Wars"

proposal shows, seems intent on destroying the major treaties that exist. In 1979, the "two track" decision to simultaneously plan for, deploy, and

negotiate around the Pershing II and cruise missiles in Europe was announced. The Intermediate Range Nuclear Force talks (INF) started in 1981 with deploy? ment to begin in 1983. Reagan proposed his

' 'zero option plan'' to cancel deploy?

ment if the Soviets dismantled all their SS-20, SS-4, and SS-5 missiles

worldwide. The Soviets wanted the NATO nuclear weapons counted in any

agreements, which the U.S. would not accept. The Soviets wanted all long-range nuclear weapons in a certain area counted. The U.S. wanted only land-based

weapons counted?which were the Soviets' military strength. Though there was some last minute negotiating, the U.S. insisted to the end on some deployment of

the weapons and the talks broke down (Barnaby and Windpass, 1984: 287-289). The Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (START) are also at a standstill. The

Soviets did not set a date for resumption when the last round ended in 1983. The U.S. proposal had called for a big cut in the Soviet ICBMs, along with other basic

changes in their strategic forces. The Soviets proposed that both sides cut their launchers below SALT II limits, so that the Soviets would have had to reduce 700 launchers and the U.S. only 200 (Defense Monitor, 13: 4, 1984: 11).

Three treaties require the U. S. to actively work for a ban on all nuclear explo? sions testing (the 1963 LTB, the 1967 Non-Proliferation and the 1974 Threshold Test Ban). Despite this, the Reagan administration decided in 1982 to stop

negotiations then in progress on a comprehensive test ban (Defense Monitor, 13:

4, 1984: m). The U.S. and U.S.S.R. discussed limited anti-satellite weapons in space from

1977 to 1979 (Blacker, 1984: 122). The U.S. broke off the talks to protest Soviet actions in Afghanistan. The Reagan administration has shown no interest in

resuming these talks, despite several high level Soviet treaty proposals (Deudny, 1984: 105), including proposals for sweeping bans and demilitarization of space (Zhukov, 1984: 56-57, U.N. Press Release WS 1185, June 22, 1984: 2).

In January 1984, Reagan reported to Congress on seven Soviet arms control

violations, but few if any of these can be proven. The charges included findings of probable SALT violations which even SALT critics had previously considered unverifiable or within the permissive boundaries of SALT II. With regard to

violations of the 150 kiloton limit of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, Carter and

Reagan officials drew different conclusions from the same evidence. Reagan also

charged violations of chemical warfare bans in Afghanistan and Asia, but scien?

tific evidence is still divided on this issue (Krepon, 1984: 159-160). The recent new stories of an Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

report on 17 Soviet violations seem to be another part of the administration's

plan to evade its treaty obligations, by proving that the Soviets have violated

treaties so many times that the U.S. should no longer be obligated to respect the treaties it has signed with the Soviets (Washington Post, Sept. 13, 1984).



20 Frappier

Of the 17 violations alleged, however, seven are repeats from the January report, four have been raised and resolved in the SCC, and the remaining six

involved "spirit of the law" type violations which cannot be proven. The report has not been released but its contents have been thoroughly

leaked. The staff members responsible for it are not intelligence and defense

experts but Reagan staff people, known for their anti-arms control attitudes.

They have found violations using the same data three previous administrations have failed to find conclusive.

III. International Economics

A. Introduction

International economics is an arena which, until fairly recently, has been

tightly controlled exclusively by the world capitalist powers. Consequently, there has been a scarcity of international law to regulate the activities of the

large transnational corporations.

After World War II, the Bretton Woods Agreement established the Inter?

national Monetary Fund (IMF), the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and the General Agreement for Tariffs and Trade

(GATT). Since the 1960s, with the convening of the U.N. Conference on

Trade and Development (UNCTAD), there have been attempts to address the North-South polarity in the economic sphere. This is a result of the influence of the nonaligned nations in UNCTAD, and the development of the New International Economic Order perspective. In addition, the U.N. has been

trying for almost ten years to create a code for transnational corporations, since legal action at the national level is inadequate. The transnational cor?

porations "have created for themselves a new, transnational economic space,

which transcends traditional legal, i.e., territorial, boundaries. The corpora? tions possess an increased capability to evade, disregard or subvert national law and policy in any one of the countries in which they operate" (Fatouros, 1984: 102-03).

As has been seen in so many other instances of foreign policy, the United States decides when it will abide by international law and specific international treaties to which it is a party. The area of economics is one where the United States wields a great deal of power since it is the wealthiest nation in the world. For example, many of the laws that do exist in international economics are

written to benefit U.S. economic interests; and at the same time, laws which the poorer nations have tried to get implemented, such as a Code of Conduct for Transnational, have still not been negotiated because the U.S. and other

capitalist world powers do not want to abide by them. In addition, economic relations and influence are often used for political

purposes. This can be seen in the example of the U.S. voting against international loans for Nicaragua even when all the economic requirements are met. The legislation of the various international financial institu? tions (IFIs) prohibits the politicization of the loan process and the U.S.




has been the primary violator of this prohibition. What follows is a listing of the violations of various treaties including

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), World Bank, International

Monetary Fund (IMF), and Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)

agreements as well as examples of treaties the U.S. has refused to sign (such as the Law of the Sea). Also included are examples of U.S. government and

corporate violations of U.N. sanctions against South Africa.

B. Violations by the Reagan Administration

The IFIs have played an important role in U.S. foreign policy. The Depart? ments of State and Treasury maintain an informal list of countries that they try to prevent from obtaining loans from the IFIs. This "hit list" includes

Vietnam, Cuba, Afghanistan, and Nicaragua; until recently, it included

Grenada (ibid.: 2). Currently, there is a stepped-up campaign to use the IFIs

to support U.S. political objectives in Central America and the Caribbean. The

IMF, World Bank, and IDB have been pressured to lend to El Salvador and

to cut off Nicaragua's loans. Grenada was opposed in the IMF and World

Bank, and Cuba in the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) (ibid.: 2-3). The following case studies detail the role played by the

international financial institutions with respect to the Reagan administration's

foreign policy.

1. Nicaragua Starting in 1981, the U.S. officially adopted a position of opposing all

development projects in Nicaragua. It has succeeded in suspending World

Bank lending and slowing down a number of projects in the other IFIs. Since

the U.S. holds veto power over the Inter-American Development Bank's "soft

loan window," Nicaragua has not received any loans of development capital. The U.S. rationale is that "Nicaragua's macroeconomic policies are so bad

that even the best development project would be a waste of money" (ibid.: 4), a position similar to the one taken during the time of the Allende government in Chile, when the U.S. was successful in cutting off lending. However, other

members of the IDB's executive board disagree with this policy and at a recent

meeting, "members of the IDB bitterly took the U.S. to task for vetoing a

routine disbursal to Nicaragua for the completion of a successful development

project initiated in 1978" (ibid.). Criticisms have come from within the IDB from representatives of Canada,

Brazil, and Central American countries. "Sources in the executive branch

indicate that U.S. actions in the MDBs (multilateral development banks) are

a component of a plan to place severe pressure on, and perhaps destabilize and

overthrow, Nicaragua's government" (ibid.). Moreover, "they indicate that

the United States would block any attempt by Nicaragua to improve its poor relations with the IMF in hopes of obtaining a loan" (ibid.).

In October 1983, the U.S. reduced Nicaragua's annual import quota of

sugar from 58,000 to 6,000 short tons without negotiation. This violated the

GATT's nondiscrimination policy; the GATT's 88-member Council voted



22 Frappier

unanimously against the U.S. action. Violation: GATT: Non-Discrimination, Article XIII(2) (ACFPC, 1984: 44).

The Reagan administration vote to deny five loans to Nicaragua from the Inter-American Development Bank, and to act on political grounds instead of economic criteria, is a violation of the IDB charter. Critics charge that the administration's motivation is clear since the loan applications were for non

controversial projects. Violation: Inter-American Development Bank Articles of Agreement: Non-Politicization, Article VIII(5)(f) (ibid.: 45). International Fund for Agricultural Development Articles of Agreement: Non

Politicization, Article 6(8)(e),(f) (ibid.: 46). The Reagan administration has opposed every Nicaraguan loan application

to the World Bank. A 1982 loan request by Nicaragua was considered

economically sound by the Bank's staff, but the administration blocked the loan. Violation: World Bank Articles of Agreement: Non-Politicization, Arti? cle IV(10): Political activity prohibited (ibid.: 49).

2. El Salvador In 1981, the IMF sponsored a $36 million loan to El Salvador; it was the

only loan in the IMF's history to have been brought before the IMF's board without the approval of its staff. Another $36 million loan was approved in

1982, and at the same time, El Salvador received a $48 million standby loan from the IMF. "It qualified for the loan only because the United States had

deposited nearly one hundred million dollars that year directly into the govern ment's treasury" (Rossiter, February 1984: 3).

The U.S. has become a powerful advocate for El Salvador to receive loans from the World Bank and the IDB. Concerned with the safety of its staff, the

World Bank stopped lending money to El Salvador in 1980. However, the U.S. has pressured the World Bank to resume its projects. Because of holding a higher percentage of votes in the IDB, the U.S. has been able to convince the IDB to continue with major projects in El Salvador (ibid.).

3. Cuba Cuba belongs to one IFI, the International Fund for Agricultural Develop?

ment (IFAD). Here, the U.S. Congress has mandated that U.S. contributions to IFAD not be used for projects in Cuba. This' 'earmarking'' of funds violates IFAD's charter. According to one source in the administration, "We hit them

hard, and we don't ever let up" over Cuba (ibid.: 4-5).

4. Grenada

The U.S. executive director of the IMF and his staff opposed two loans

proposed by the IMF's staff for Maurice Bishop's government in 1981 and 1983. Under criticism was Grenada's plan to build an international airport

which the U.S. government claimed would be used for military purposes by Cuba and the Soviet Union. The U.S. was unsuccessful in its attempt to put pressure on the European economic community not to directly fund the air?

port. At that time, the U.S. had already stopped its aid to the Bishop




government and had also tried to decrease the amount of income from tourism

by persuading countries near Grenada to cut the number of tourists using their international airports to get to Grenada. Reported one State Department source: "Haig pounded the table in his office and ordered his top policymakers for Latin America to ensure that there would be 'not one penny for Grenada'

coming from the IFIs" (ibid.: 4).

Eventually, U.S. pressure resulted in the loan being cut from $9 million over three years (as recommended by the IMF staff) to $3 million over one

year. This was a unique case of a violation because the U.S. position "was based on a critique of a particular project which was a breach of IMF rules

(that IMF loans are conditional only on countries meeting macroeconomic

targets directly related to the balance of payments)" (ibid.). In August 1983, the U.S. again tried to block or reduce a $14 million,

three-year, IMF agreement with Grenada. U.S. opposition was based on the

argument that the money had macroeconomic targets that were too lenient. But this was rejected by other executive directors, who supported the IMF staff in approving the loan.

After the U.S. invaded Grenada in October 1983, it removed Grenada from the "hit list" for the IFIs (ibid.).

5. South Africa U.S. transnational corporations and financial institutions have increased

collaboration with the South African government in violation of the U.N.

imposed sanctions against the apartheid regime (U.N. Centre Against Apar? theid, Resolutions, pp. 5, 7, 12).

Seven U.S. corporations recently decided to provide technological and maintenance service to South Africa's nuclear installation. The U.S. is

assisting the South African government to develop its armaments industry and nuclear weapon capability. Since 1981, the U.S. has exported $28 million in

military technology to South Africa. Space Research Corporation has supplied 155mm artillery weapons and shells. Violation: U.N. Arms Embargo Against South Africa (UNCAA, Resolutions, pp. 24-25; UNCAA, Apartheid, pp. 30-31).

6. Namibia In 1974, the United Nations issued Decree No. 1 prohibiting the mining

of Namibian natural resources until there was an end to the South African rule of the country. The Reagan administration has decided not to honor the decree and has given the go-ahead to U.S. mining corporations to extract minerals from Namibia. Violation: U.N. Decree No. 1 for the Protection of Natural Resources in Namibia (Roberts, 1982: 2; Zinn, 1984).

7. Law of the Sea The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea resulted from 14

years of work involving 150 countries, including the United States. It addresses many aspects of regulating the ocean, including access to the sea,



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protection of marine life, research, and sea-bed mining. It is on the issue of sea?

bed mining that the Reagan administration refused to sign the treaty because the ' 'common heritage" concept in the treaty meant that the U.S. would not be able

to exploit the mineral rights at will. Instead, in 1983, Reagan declared a

200-nautical mile exclusive economic zone for the United States (Law of the

Sea, 1984:ix-xxix; Malone, 1984: 44-45; Johnson, 1984: 234-35).

IV. Human Rights Violations by the Reagan Administration

A. Reagans Human Rights Policy

The earliest statements from within the Reagan administration on human

rights policy were no more than attacks on the Carter administration's human

rights program. Indicative of the differences between Reagan and Carter with

respect to human rights was the former's nomination of Ernest Lefever as

assistant secretary of the Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs

(Rossiter, Sept., 1984: 22). Lefever, known in Washington as a "right-wing ideologue,'' urged that the administration's priority be national security rather

than human rights. After his nomination was challenged and subsequently withdrawn, the White House did not offer a further nomination to the post for

several months.

For most of its first year, the Reagan administration did not define its human rights policy. In October 1981, policy was finally addressed in the

Clark-Kennedy Memorandum, which established the Reagan administration's

concept of human rights policy and appointed Elliott Abrams to the post of

assistant secretary of the Bureau. Abrams then set up guidelines for human

rights policy, which in effect stipulated that focusing on the human rights abuses of U.S. allies was "an unfair use of influence" (ibid.: 24). Instead, the

priorities were to "attack Soviet abuses at every opportunity and to avoid the

tendency to highlight and punish violations in friendly countries" (ibid.). Abrams is reported to have sought improvements in human rights in countries like Chile, Guatemala, and Romania. However, the bureau under Reagan has in no way made progress in the area of human rights and, in fact, has engaged in human rights violations by disregarding a number of human rights laws,

especially in the region of Central America, as the following section describes.

B. Violations of Human Rights Laws

1. Certification for Military Aid to El Salvador Numerous members of Congress and human rights organizations have

charged that Reagan falsely certified the government of El Salvador for

military aid on four occasions on the basis of that country having made pro? gress in the area of human rights. The Salvadoran human rights monitors, "Socorro Juridico" and "Tutela Legal," reported that during the period covered by the law in question, over 10,000 civilians were killed by govern? ment forces or death squads and that the Salvadoran government failed to

seriously investigate or terminate the killings. Organizations like the ACLU




have argued that since only a few Salvadorans were ever arrested in connection with these killings and none were ever convicted, certain conditions set out in the law were not met. Further, the fact that Reagan vetoed an extension of part of the law in November 1983 has been interpreted to mean that the administra? tion was increasingly aware that conditions for certification were not being

met (Arms Control and Foreign Policy Caucus Report, 1984: 9). Violation: International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1981: Certifica? tion for Military Aid to El Salvador, Section 728(b).

2. Human Rights Conditions on Security Assistance The Reagan administration has also been charged with providing aid to

Guatemala ($2 million in helicopter parts) and to El Salvador ($325 million in military equipment and services and $345 million in economic aid) without

certifying that extraordinary circumstances justified the aid. The charges are

based on the belief that both Guatemala and El Salvador have engaged in human rights violations: the Guatemalan Army has executed over 10,000 Guatemalans, mostly Indians, while government forces in El Salvador have killed 24,178 civilians without the government seriously investigating or stop?

ping such killings (ibid.: 14). Violation: Foreign Assistance Act: Human

Rights Conditions on Security Assistance, Section 502B(a)(2).

3. Human Rights Conditions on Loans The administration has also been charged with voting for loans from the

World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank to Guatemala and El Salvador despite their violation of human rights. In the case of Guatemala, the administration reversed a policy it had previously followed of opposing such loans. Since that change, it has voted for 12 loans to Guatemala. Critics charge that 10 of these loans, totaling over $250 million, were for projects such as

"industrial recovery" and "telecommunications" that do not meet the defini? tion of service to basic human needs. In the case of El Salvador, since taking office, the Reagan administration has voted for all 9 World Bank and IDB

loans, totaling over $150 million. These were for construction projects that critics also say do not meet the definition of service to basic human needs

(ibid.: 16). Violation: International Financial Institutions Act: Human Rights Conditions on Loans, Section 701(f).

4. Distribution of Humanitarian Assistance Critics returning from El Salvador have charged that U.S. food aid is

being withheld from camps for displaced people in an attempt to force them back to their homes in contested areas. The evidence shows that in one area

of El Salvador, the decision to cut back food delivery to displaced people was made by senior AID officials. Critics are claiming that "the decision to cut back on food aid turns humanitarian food aid into a weapon in El Salvador's civil war" (ibid.: 18). Violation: Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act: Distribution of Humanitarian Assistance, Sections 201(a) and

202(b)(3).



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V. Conclusion

Since World War II, the United States government has consistently violated international law in the pursuit of its own national interests. Various administrations and government officials have made a rhetorical commitment to maintaining international peace and justice throughout the world; but the U.S. government has often placed power politics over and above the principles of international law and the rights of the entire world community.

The Reagan administration has not only been a violator of established inter? national law but, more significantly, has refused to participate in the process of negotiation and treaty-building to ensure a more secure world free from the threat of conventional and nuclear war. Moreover, President Reagan has attacked institutions like the United Nations which embody some of the highest principles of international law. There are also many indications from the viola? tions cited in this article that the Reagan administration may indeed be

preparing for an increased war in Central America, which represents a threat not only to the peoples of Central America but to the global community of nations as well.

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APPENDIX A: HISTORY OF THE USE OF U.S. ARMED FORCES

AS A POLITICAL INSTRUMENT

1945- 49 CHINA?Expeditionary force occupies parts of China with U.S. Air Force support to suppress the liberation of the Chinese people.

1946 YUGOSLAVIA?U.S. aircraft is shot down; six B-29's carrying strategic nuclear

weapons are deployed to Germany and fly along the border of Yugoslavia. 1946- 47 TURKEY?Battleship U.S.S. Missouri and other warships are sent to Turkey in

response to a Soviet presence. 1946-48 ITALY, Security of Trieste?President Truman orders the augmentation of U.S.

troops along the zonal occupation line and the reinforcement of air forces in northern Italy after

Yugoslav forces shoot down an unarmed U.S. Army transport plane flying over Venezia Giulia.

Earlier U.S. naval units are dispatched to the scene.

1946-49 GREECE?U.S. and Britain intervene to crush communist partisans and establish

repressive rule of colonels, securing Greece as key U.S. military base.

1947 URUGUAY?Inauguration of President takes place; strategic nuclear forces are

deployed; U.S. long-range bombers assigned to the Strategic Air Command are flown in to

reassure U.S. allies. 1947 ITALY?Elections take place; U.S. force (an aircraft carrier) is initiated against the

Left preceding the elections. Truman's principal objectives in using armed forces to influence

political developments are to maintain the de Gasperi government in power and to caution the

Italian Communist Party against engaging in large scale violence.

1948 PALESTINE?A Marine consular guard is sent to Jerusalem to protect the U.S. Con?

sular General. 1948 GERMANY?To break a Soviet blockade of surface routes into West Berlin, a massive

airlift is mounted to carry foodstuffs, fuel, and other supplies to Berlin. B-29 bombers are

deployed to Germany and fly along the border. 1948-49 CHINA?U.S. Marines are dispatched to Nanking to protect the American Em?

bassy when the city falls to the popular forces led by Mao, and to Shanghai to aid in the protection and evacuation of Americans; a change of government occurs.

1950 INDOCHINA?The CIA begins operating on Formosa under the cover of Western

Enterprises, Inc., training Nationalist Chinese commandos for raids on the mainland of China.

1950-53 KOREA?Truman sends two divisions of U.S. ground troops to aid South Korean

forces attempting to take over North Korea. U.S. also engineers U.N. resolution to authorize

invasion of North Korea in violation of U.N. Charter. Congressional authorization is not sought. In the aftermath of the outbreak of the Korean War, U.S. strategic bombers are stationed in

Europe. 1950-53 PHILIPPINES?From the early 1950s until 1953, Air Force Colonel Edward

Landsdale, under CIA auspices, gives advice and assistance to Philippine leader Ramon

Magsaysay in his struggle against the local Huk guerrillas. Millions of American dollars are pro? vided by the U.S. secretly for Landsdale's use in this program. The program is instrumental in

bringing about the defeat of the guerrillas. 1952 GREECE?The CIA begins to provide a subsidy to George Papadopoulos, the Greek

colonel who later leads the military coup in Greece in 1967. The CIA also gives subsidies to many Greek military and political figures for years after 1952. The subsidies apparently end in 1972.

1952 CHINA?In the early 1950s, CIA Special Operations Division agents make attempts to develop resistance movements inside the People's Republic of China. On November 9, 1952,



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CIA agents John Thomas Downey and Richard George Fecteau are captured in China where they have been organizing and training two teams of Nationalist Chinese agents to stir up mainland Chinese against the government.

1953 IRAN?U.S.-backed coup to overthrow progressive Mossadegh government. U.S.

gains access to oil and reinstates Pahlevi as Shah to rule Iran as a sub imperialist client regime. Kermit "Kim" Roosevelt is the CIA agent who masterminds the downfall of Mossadegh.

1953 SOVIET UNION AND CHINA?CIA Director William E. Colby stated that from 1953 until February 1973, the CIA "conducted several programs to survey and open selected mail between the United States and two communist countries.'' According to a secret Senate memoran?

dum, the CIA survey focused on mail sent to and received from the Soviet Union and China and was centered in New York City and San Francisco. Colby states that the purposes of the programs are "to identify individuals in active correspondence with communist countries for presumed counterintelligence purposes,'' to attempt4 'to learn the foreign contacts of a number of Americans of counterintelligence interests," and "to determine the nature and extent of censorship techniques."

1953 COSTA RICA?After the election of Jos6 (Pepe) Figueres as President of Costa Rica in 1953, the CIA works with opposition forces in the country in attempts to overthrow the govern?

ment. Of particular concern to the CIA is Figueres's policy of granting asylum in Costa Rica to communists and noncommunists alike. Figueres, a moderate socialist, steps down from power after his candidate loses the Presidential election in 1958.

1953 KOREA?U.S. strategic combat aircraft is deployed to the Western Pacific to reassure

South Korea and Japan in connection with the end of the Korean War. 1954 GUATEMALA?Using the fact that Guatemala is receiving arms from Soviet bloc

countries, among other sources, the U.S. implements a longstanding plan to overthrow the pro?

gressive, nationalist Jacobo Arbenz government. The U.S. supplies arms, planes, and pilots and installs the first of a string of brutal military dictatorships. (Actions include the movement of an

aircraft carrier task group, a reinforced Marine amphibious battalion, and air-wing, land-based

patrol aircraft squadrons, and several related actions.) The coup is led by the CIA; Frank G.

Wisner, CIA Deputy Director for Plans, has the major responsibility for carrying out the opera? tion. CIA agents train and support the forces of Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas, who assumes

power after the defeat of Arbenz. Agency support includes the provision of CIA-piloted World War II fighter-bombers, as well as guns and ammunition.

1954 NICARAGUA?In connection with maneuvers to overthrow the Arbenz government in Guatemala, U.S. long-range bombers assigned to the Strategic Air Command are flown to

Nicaragua, apparently to reassure U.S. allies. 1954-55 CHINA/TAIWAN?U.S. strategic aircraft is deployed, and naval units evacuate

U.S. civilians and military personnel from the Tachen Islands. 1956 EGYPT?Egypt nationalizes the Suez Canal; two U.S. aircraft carriers are positioned

nearby and strategic forces go on worldwide alert; a Marine battalion evacuates U.S. nationals and other persons from Alexandria during the Suez crisis. An overt and explicit threat is directed at the U.S.S.R. through global actions of U.S. strategic forces.

1956 MOROCCO?Security of U.S. military personnel and bases in Morocco is undertaken. U.S. Marine ground forces and transport aircraft are placed in the area.

1956-57 JORDAN?British influence in Jordan is threatened. British General Glubb is

ousted; political-military crisis occurs and U.S. uses force in the area (two aircraft carriers). 1957 SYRIA?Political developments occur in Syria; security of U.S. allies is allegedly

threatened. Marine ground forces, three aircraft carriers and transport aircraft engage in transport and exercise activities in the area.

1958 VENEZUELA?Coup and civil strife in Venezuela; security of Vice President Nixon in Venezuela is undertaken; U.S. Army ground forces and Marine ground forces are present, in addition to one aircraft carrier and transport aircraft.

1958 INDONESIA?In early 1958 the CIA gives direct aid to rebel groups on the island of Sumatra that are attempting to overthrow Indonesian President Sukarno. CIA pilots fly B-26 bombers on missions in support of the insurgents. On May 18, 1958, during such a bombing mis?

sion, CIA pilot Allen Lawrence Pope is shot down and captured by the Indonesians. 1958 LEBANON?Eisenhower sends 14,000 troops to support pro-Western government of

Chamoun and to crush pro-Nasser nationalist Lebanese opposition. An overt and explicit threat is directed at the U.S.S.R. through global actions of U.S. strategic forces.

1958 JORDAN?Political crisis occurs in Jordan; Sixth Fleet aircraft carriers, then playing




a key role in U.S. strategic strike plans, are used to help attain political objectives. 1958 CHINA-TAIWAN?Quemoy and Matsu?A U.S. naval force is deployed in the area

and a world-wide alert is ordered for American strategic forces. 1958 TIBET?The CIA establishes a secret base at Camp Hale near Leadville, Colorado,

where the agency gives training to troops of the Dalai Lama. The Tibetan guerrillas are trained and re-equipped by the CIA in order to support the struggle of the Dalai Lama's forces against the Peking government. Guerrilla raids into Tibet by these forces do occur, sometimes led by CIA contract mercenaries and supported by CIA planes. The training program appears to have ended in December 1961.

1959 EAST GERMANY?Security of Berlin is undertaken; Sixth Fleet aircraft carriers, then playing a key role in U.S. strategic strike plans, are used to help attain political objectives.

1959 LAOS?Civil war in Laos takes place; Marine ground forces, three aircraft carriers, and transport aircraft are deployed.

1959 PANAMA?Fixed-wing maritime reconnaissance/patrol aircraft from the U.S. and two

naval surface combatant units are used for surveillance. 1960 SOVIET UNION?Beginning in 1956, CIA pilots begin flying high-altitude U-2 spy

planes over the Soviet Union to photograph a variety of missile and defense-related installations. On May 1, 1960, Francis Gary Powers, a CIA pilot, has his U-2 plane shot down over Sverdlovsk in the Soviet Union, provoking Khrushchev to cancel his scheduled conference at Paris with Presi? dent Eisenhower.

1960 CUBA AND GUATEMALA?In early 1960, President Eisenhower gives his approval to a CIA-sponsored project to train Cuban exiles for the purpose of overthrowing Fidel Castro. The Guatemalan president, Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes, permits the CIA to use his country for its

training camp. In November 1960, a rebellion breaks out in Guatemala against Ydigoras. Because of his assistance to the CIA to that point, the agency secretly comes to his aid, sending its B-26 bombers against the rebels. The insurgency is crushed and Ydigoras stays in power. Throughout the Caribbean, Second Marine Ground Task Force is deployed to protect U.S. nationals; the

security of the Guantanamo base is undertaken. 1960-61 CONGO (ZAIRE)?Following the Congo's independence, U.S. air and sea sup?

port is provided for the United Nations peacekeeping force sent to replace Belgium's colonial

Army; U.S. Army and Marine ground forces, one aircraft carrier, and transport aircraft are

deployed for evacuation and transport purposes. 1961 CUBA?Prior to the scheduled invasion of Cuba by Cuban exiles in April 1961, the CIA

attempts to have Castro assassinated. To help set up the assassination, the CIA enlists Robert

Maheu, a former FBI agent, who is later to direct billionaire Howard Hughes's Nevada businesses. Maheu recruits John Roselli to arrange for the murder attempt. The CIA assigns two

operatives, James O'Connell and William Harvey, to accompany Roselli on his trips to Miami to put together the assassination teams. The first attempt to kill Castro, made in March or early April 1961, is a failure. Five more assassination teams are subsequently sent against Castro in the next two years. All end in failure. The last attempt is made in late February or early March 1963.

A force of Cuban exiles that have been trained and equipped by the CIA make an unsuccessful invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs in mid-April 1961, in an attempt to overthrow Castro's regime. The person responsible for the overall supervision of the operation is Richard M. Bissell, Jr., the CIA's Deputy Director for Plans. Four Americans flying CIA planes, and nearly 300 Cubans die

during the invasion. Over 1,200 survivors are captured by Castro's forces. Following the Bay of

Pigs invasion, Cuban exiles are directed and paid by CIA agents to compile secret files on and watch over other Cubans and Americans "who associated with individuals under surveillance." It is estimated that at the height of these activities, roughly 150 informants are on the payroll of a Cuban "counterintelligence" office located in Florida.

1961 DOMINICAN REPUBLIC?Trujillo is assassinated; Trujillos refuse to leave the Dominican Republic; U.S. Army and Marine ground forces, Marine combat aircraft, and three aircraft carriers are deployed for exercises.

1961 ECUADOR?According to former CIA agent Philip Agee, the agency begins efforts in 1961 to bring down the regime of President Jos6 Velasco Ibarra of Ecuador after he refuses to sever diplomatic relations with Cuba. Ibarra is overthrown in November 1961. His successor, Carlos Julio Arosemena, soon falls out of favor with the United States and once again the CIA uses "destabilizing tactics" to overthrow his government in July 1963. Agee notes that while on

assignment in Ecuador, he and five other CIA agents manage to gain economic and political



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over Ecuador's labor movement. His CIA team, says Agee, ultimately "owned almost everybody who was anybody." Also in June 1961, there is an unidentified submarine found off Ecuador.

1961 EAST GERMANY?During the Berlin crisis, the planned withdrawal of B-47 bombers from Europe is delayed.

1961 KUWAIT?Iraq threatens to invade Kuwait; Marine ground forces and two aircraft carriers are deployed in the area.

1961- 64 CONGO?In the early 1960s the CIA becomes involved in the political struggle in the Congo. The agency pays cash to selected Congolese politicians and gives arms to the sup? porters of Joseph Mobutu and Cyril Adoula. Eventually the CIA sends mercenaries and

paramilitary experts to aid the new government. In 1964, CIA B-26 airplanes are being flown in the Congo on a regular basis by Cuban-exile pilots who are under CIA contract. These pilots and

planes carry out bombing missions against areas held by rebel forces. The Church Committee

Report of 1975, Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders, deals at length with the murder or attempted murder of five individuals, including Patrice Lumumba. The report con?

cludes that while the CIA was not directly responsible for Lumumba's death, it certainly tried. Mobutu and Adoula handed Lumumba over to his arch-enemies to be murdered.

1962 VIETNAM?Civil war takes place; communist gains occur. U.S. Army ground forces and a transport helicopter are placed in the area for tactical support and transport.

1962- 75 LAOS?From October 1962 until 1975, the U.S. plays a role of military support in Laos. Beginning in 1962, the CIA becomes involved in a "secret war" against the communist forces in Laos. The CIA recruits and trains a private army of at least 30,000 Meo and other Lao? tian tribesmen. This group is known as L'Armee Clandestine. Pilots hired by the CIA fly supply and bombing missions in CIA-owned airplanes in support of this secret army. Expenditures by the U.S. to assist this army amount to at least $300 million a year. Forty or fifty CIA officers run this operation, aided by several hundred contract personnel. U.S. Army and Marine ground forces, one aircraft carrier, a submarine, transport aircraft, and a transport helicopter are placed in the area.

1962 THAILAND?The 3rd Marine Expeditionary Unit lands on May 17, 1962, to support that country during the "threat of communism" from outside; by July 30, the 5,000 Marines are withdrawn.

1962 CUBA?President Kennedy institutes a "quarantine" on the shipment of offensive missiles to Cuba from the Soviet Union. He also warns the Soviet Union that the launching of

any missile from Cuba against any nation in the Western Hemisphere would bring about U.S. nuclear retaliation on the Soviet Union. A negotiated settlement is achieved in a few days. Here, an overt and explicit threat is directed at the U.S.S.R. through global actions of U.S. strategic forces.

1963 DOMINICAN REPUBLIC?President Juan Bosch is inaugurated; conflict with Haiti

occurs; coup then occurs in Dominican Republic; Marine ground forces and less than a squadron of aircraft intervene.

1963 TURKEY?Following the withdrawal of U.S. intermediate-range ballistic missiles from Turkey, the U.S.S. Sam Houston visits Izmir. That port visit, the only such visit to a foreign port by a U.S. strategic submarine, is meant to demonstrate to Turkey that the U.S. retains a

strategic presence in the region. 1964 PANAMA?Security of Panama Canal Zone is undertaken; elections are held in

Panama. 1964-73 VIETNAM?U.S. military advisers have been in South Vietnam for a decade, and

their numbers have been increased as military position of the Saigon government becomes weaker. After attacks on U.S. destroyers in the Tonkin Gulf, President Johnson asks for a Con?

gressional resolution expressing U.S. determination to "support freedom and protect peace" in Southeast Asia. Congress responds with the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, expressing support for "all

necessary measures" the President might take to repel armed attack against U.S. forces and pre? vent further aggression. Following this resolution, and following an attack on a U.S. installation in central Vietnam, the U.S. escalates its participation in the war. The stage is set for involvement of 8.7 million American troops in an Indo-China war over 9 years. Actions include the dropping of 3 million tons of bombs, wide-spread use of chemical herbicides, and a CIA assassination pro? gram which alone kills 20,587 civilians. In January 1964, a coup occurs in South Vietnam; in November 1964, the Viet Cong attack Bien Hoa barracks in South Vietnam. U.S. armed forces that are deployed include: in 1964, Army and Marine ground forces and less than a squadron of

aircraft, an aircraft carrier, and transport aircraft; in 1965, air force combat aircraft, and three




aircraft carriers; in 1972 (on two occasions), air force combat aircraft and seven aircraft carriers for bombing and blockading.

1964 CONGO?The United States sends four transport planes to provide airlift for Con?

golese troops during a rebellion and to transport Belgian paratroopers to rescue foreigners; hostages are held in Stanleyville.

1964 CHILE?The CIA, with the cooperation of the Agency for International Development and the State Department, secretly funnels up to $20 million into Chile to aid Eduardo Frei in his successful attempt to defeat Salvador Allende for the Presidency of the country. Richard Helms, as chief of the Clandestine Services (Directorate of Plans), is actively involved in planning the efforts by the CIA to defeat Allende.

1964 DOMINICAN REPUBLIC?Fixed-wing maritime reconnaissance/patrol aircraft and a ship are sent by the U.S. for surveillance activity.

Mid-1960s PERU?During the mid-1960s the CIA secretly aids the government of Peru in its fight against rebel guerrilla forces. The agency flies in arms and other equipment. Local Peru? vian troops are trained by personnel of the Special Operations Division of the CIA as well as by Green Beret instructors loaned by the U.S. Army. Because of the assistance the Peruvian govern? ment is soon able to crush the revolt against it.

1965 TANZANIA?Relations worsen with Tanzania. Tanzania accuses the U.S. of planning a coup. This is seen as a hostile but nonviolent political act directed at the United States. U.S. naval surface combatant unit has a presence in the area.

1965 VIETNAM?The Viet Cong attack Pleiku air base and Qui Nhon barracks in South

Vietnam; troops are withdrawn from Europe (see Vietnam, 1964-73 for details about activity of U.S. armed forces in Vietnam in 1965).

1965 DOMINICAN REPUBLIC?Some 40,000 U.S. Marines suppress mass rebellion which aims to restore a democratically elected government. Balaguer dictatorship is imposed.

1965 GREECE?It is reported that in 1965, John M. Maury, the CIA station chief in Athens, becomes directly involved in Greek politics. He is reported to help King Constantine buy Deputies of the Greek Center Union Party, thus bringing about the downfall of the George Papandreou government.

1965 VENEZUELA?A U.S. ship has a presence in the region. 1967 GREECE?It is reported that the CIA engineers the Greek military coup of 1967 that

brings Colonel George Papadopoulos to power. It is further reported that the CIA is able to main? tain control of the military regime because it has documentation of Papadopoulos's "wartime col? laboration with the Nazis."

1967 CONGO?The U.S. sends three military transport aircraft with crews to provide the

Congolese central government with logistical support during a revolt. 1967 CYPRUS?Political crisis in Cyprus. A U.S. aircraft carrier has a presence in the

region. 1967 BOLIVIA?The CIA gives assistance to Bolivian soldiers in their successful effort to

track down and capture Ernesto "Che" Guevara, the revolutionary leading a guerrilla movement

against the government. Guevara is captured on October 8 by CIA-advised Bolivian rangers. He is executed shortly thereafter.

1967 SOUTH VIETNAM?The CIA's Far East Division of Clandestine Services develops a program that comes to be known as Phoenix. The program entails a coordinated attack by all South Vietnamese and American military, police, and intelligence units against the infrastructure of the Viet Cong. CIA funds serve as the catalyst for the project. William E. Colby plays the key supervisory role in its implementation. In 1971, Colby reveals that between 1968 and May 1971, the Phoenix program leads to the death of 20,587 persons in Vietnam.

1968 NORTH KOREA?The U.S.S. Pueblo is seized by North Korea. This is seen as a

violent attack on U.S. armed forces. U.S. air force combat aircraft and 3 aircraft carriers are

deployed to the Western Pacific. North Korea attacks South Korean fishing boats. 1969 NORTH KOREA?An EC-121 is shot down by North Korea. This is seen as a violent

attack on U.S. armed forces. U.S. Army and Marine ground forces, air force combat aircraft, one battleship, six aircraft carriers, fixed-wing maritime reconnaissance/patrol aircraft, and

transport aircraft have a presence there and are used in surveillance activity. 1970 JORDAN?As Jordan moves to crush the Palestine Liberation Organization after the

hijacking of three airliners, U.S. planes and ships are deployed and troops are alerted to deter Soviet and Syrian intervention.

1970 ISRAEL?An Arab-Israeli cease-fire agreement (Rogers Plan) is accepted by Egypt,



34 Frappier

Israel, and Jordan. A U.S. fixed-wing maritime reconnaissance/patrol aircraft engages in surveillance activity in the region.

1970 CUBA?The Soviets establish a submarine base at Cienfuegos; this is seen as a hostile but non-violent political act directed at the U.S. Fixed-wing maritime reconnaissance/patrol air? craft and a naval surface combatant unit engage in escort and surveillance activities.

1970 CAMBODIA?U.S. troops are ordered into Cambodia to clean out "communist sanc?

tuaries" from which Viet Cong and North Vietnamese attack U.S. and South Vietnamese forces in Vietnam. The object of this attack, which lasts from April 30 to June 30, is to ensure the conti?

nuing withdrawal of American forces from South Vietnam and assist the program of

Vietnamization. 1970-73 CHILE?Under CIA direction over $8 million is channeled into Chile from 1970

to 1973 to "destabilize" the government of Salvador Allende. The money is used to support various groups within Chile who are opposed to Allende. CIA agents infiltrate the Socialist Party in Chile, and organize street demonstrations against the regime (see 1973 below).

1971 BANGLADESH?In a demonstration of support for Pakistan (a U.S. ally) in war with

India, a U.S. carrier task force moves into waters off East Pakistan (now Bangladesh). Nixon

deploys the U.S.S. Enterprise to the Indian Ocean as a deterrence of an Indian attack on West Pakistan.

1973 LAOS?A civil war occurs in Laos; U.S. Air Force combat aircraft is deployed for

bombing activities. 1973 LEBANON?There is civil strife between Lebanon and Palestinians; a U.S. ship is sent

to have a presence in the region. 1973 ISRAEL?An Arab oil embargo occurs; after an attack on Israel by Egypt, a massive

U.S. airlift is mounted. An overt and explicit threat is directed at the U.S.S.R. through global actions of U.S. strategic forces.

1973 CHILE?The CIA backs the overthrow of President Allende; Allende dies within hours after the coup begins. The CIA establishes Pinochet's bloody military dictatorship with an

estimated 40,000 killed. 1974 CYPRUS?U.S. naval forces evacuate U.S. civilians during hostilities between

Turkish and Greek Cypriot forces. 1975 SOUTH VIETNAM?The U.S.-supported regime collapses; U.S. naval vessels,

helicopters, and Marines are sent to assist in the evacuation of refugees and U.S. nationals from Vietnam.

1975 CAMBODIA?The regime collapses; President Ford orders U.S. military forces to

proceed with the planned evacuation of U.S. citizens from Cambodia. The S.S. Mayaguez, a mer?

chant vessel en route from Hong Kong to Thailand with a U.S. citizen crew, is seized by Cambo? dian naval patrol boats in international waters and forced to proceed to a nearby island; President Ford also orders military forces to retake the Mayaguez.

1975 ANGOLA?U.S. authorizes $14 million to finance an attempt to overthrow the

Angolan government. 1978 ZAIRE?A renewed guerrilla offensive erupts in mineral-rich Shaba province; U.S.

transports airlift Belgian and French troops to crush the uprising. 1979 IRAN?After the seizure of hostages in the U.S. Embassy in Teheran, two carrier task

forces are sent into the Arabian Sea. 1980 PERSIAN GULF?In response to Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, joint military

exercises are staged with Middle East nations, and U.S. naval forces in the Indian Ocean are fur? ther augmented.

1981 ECUADOR AND PERU?To monitor a cease-fire ending fighting between Ecuador and Peru over disputed border territory, 30 military observers and several helicopters are sent to the region.

1981 CHAD?CIA begins supplying funds and military equipment to the forces of Hissen

Habre, fighting to overthrow the Libyan-backed coalition government of President Goukouni Oeddei.

1981-84 NICARAGUA?U.S. begins destabilization campaign against Nicaragua, involv?

ing economic strangulation, attempts at diplomatic isolation, and financing and equipping Nicaraguan counterrevolutionaries who are trained and supervised by the CIA.

1982 SINAI?To monitor the Egypt-Israeli peace accord, the first contingent of 670 American soldiers arrives in Sinai to bolster an international force.

1982 LEBANON?To facilitate the evacuation of PLO guerrillas from Beirut under Israeli




guns, 800 Marines serve for 12 days in a multinational peacekeeping force; they return in

September following a massacre in Palestinian refugee camps. 1983 EGYPT?To intimidate Libya's Qaddafi from backing anti-government forces in the

Sudan, four AW ACS aircraft are sent to Egypt and a carrier task force is stationed in the vicinity. 1983 GRENADA?U.S. Marines invade and occupy Grenada. 1983 EL SALVADOR?U.S. military advisers direct military operations of the Salvadoran

Army against guerrilla insurgents and thousands of civilians.

SOURCES

Blechman, Kaplan, et al. 1978 Force Without War: U. S. Armed Forces as a Political Instrument. Washington D.C:

The Brookings Institution, pp. 47-49, 59-63, 95-98.

Dixon, Marlene 1984 "The Suez Syndrome: U.S. Imperialism in Decline." Contemporary Marxism 9

(Winter).

Foreign Affairs Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress 1975 "Background Information on the Use of U.S. Armed Forces in Foreign Countries"

(1975 Revision). Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, pp. 58-66.

Grimmett, Richard F. 1975 "Reported Foreign and Domestic Covert Activities of the United States Central

Intelligence Agency: 1950-1974." Washington, DC: Center for Defense Infor? mation (February 25).

U.S. News & World Report 1983 "When Military Muscle Accompanies the U.S. Flag" (Main Edition) (April 5),

pp. 7-8F.

APPENDIX B: CHARTERS AND TREATIES

Charter of the Organization of American States:

Chapter IV?Fundamental Rights and Duties of States: Article 18: No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for

any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State. The foregoing principle prohibits not only armed force but also any other form of interference or attempted threat against the personality of the State or against its political, economic, and cultural elements.

Article 19: No State may use or encourage the use of coercive measures of an economic or

political character in order to force the sovereign will of another State and obtain from it advan?

tages of any kind. Article 20: The territory of a State is inviolable; it may not be the object, even temporarily,

of military occupation or of other measures of force taken by another State, directly or indirectly, on any grounds whatever. No territorial acquisitions or special advantages obtained either by force or by other means of coercion shall be recognized.

Chapter V?Pacific Settlement of Disputes: Article 23: All international disputes that may arise between American States shall be submit?

ted to the peaceful procedures set forth in this Charter, before being referred to the Security Coun? cil of the United Nations.

Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice:

Chapter I?Purposes and Principles: Article 2, No. 4: All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or



36 Frappier

use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.

Chapter VII?Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression:

Article 51: Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or col? lective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the

Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems

necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, Rio de Janeiro, September 2, 1947 (Rio Treaty)

Article 1: The High Contracting Parties formally condemn war and undertake in their interna? tional relations not to resort to the threat or the use of force in any manner inconsistent with the

provisions of the Charter of the United Nations or of this Treaty. Article 2: As a consequence of the principle set forth in the preceding Article, the High Con?

tracting Parties undertake to submit every controversy which may arise between them to methods of peaceful settlement to endeavor to settle any such controversy among themselves by means of the procedures in force in the Inter-American System before referring it to the General Assembly or the Security Council of the United Nations.

Article 3(1): The High Contracting Parties agree that an armed attack by any State against an

American State shall be considered as an attack against all the American States and, consequently, each one of the said Contracting Parties undertakes to assist in meeting the attack in the exercise of the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties

Chapter IV?Fundamental Rights and Duties of States Article 18: Obligation not to defeat the object and purpose of a treaty prior to its entry into

force. A State is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty

when:

(a) it has signed the treaty or has exchanged instruments constituting the treaty or has

exchanged instruments constituting the treaty subject to ratification, acceptance or approval, until it shall have made its intention clear not to become a party to the treaty; or

(b) it has expressed its consent to be bound by the treaty, pending the entry into force of the

treaty and provided that such entry into force is not unduly delayed.



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Violation of International Laws the Truman to Reagan

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