STRATEGIC
VISION fo r Taiwan Se c urity
Vo lume 2, Issue 12 w De c e mbe r, 2013 w ISSN 2227-3646
Conidence Building Measures
Moises Lopes de Souza
Military CBMs in the Taiwan Strait
Charles Yang & Aaron Jensen
Taiwan-Japan Fishery Agreement
Taro Kurokawa
Chinese Soft Power
Michael Sun
Policiesfor Peace Remaking the Asia-Paciic Diplomatic Landscape
US Security Presence
Chia-sheng Chen
Submissions: Essays submited for publication are not to exceed 2,000 words in length, and should conform to the following basic format for each 1200-1600 word essay: 1. Synopsis, 100-200 words; 2. Background description, 100-200 words; 3. Analysis, 800-1,000 words; 4. Policy Recommendations, 200-300 words. Book reviews should not exceed 1,200 words in length. Notes should be formated as endnotes and should be kept to a minimum. Authors are encouraged to submit essays and reviews as atachments to emails; Microsoft Word documents are preferred. For questions of style and usage, writers should consult the Chicago Manual of Style. Authors of unsolicited manuscripts are encouraged to consult with the executive editor at [email protected] before formal submission via email. Manuscripts are subject to copyediting, both mechanical and substantive, as required and according to editorial guidelines. No major alterations may be made by an author once the type has been set. Arrangements for reprints should be made with the editor. Cover photograph of the Monument of Peace and Unity in Davao City in the Philippines is courtesy of Jefrey Pioquinto.
STRATEGIC
VISION fo r Taiwan Se c urity
Vo lume 2, Issue 12 w De c e mbe r, 2013
Contents
Taiwan seeking active role in regional security layout ..................4
Conidence building measures as negotiation tool ...................... 9
Cross-strait CBMs pose limitations, challenges .......................... 14
Okinawa ishermen cold to Taiwan-Japan isheries deal ............ 20
China reassures neighbors with sot power .................................27
Chia-sheng Chen
Moises Lopes de Souza
Charles Yang & Aaron Jensen
Taro Kurokawa
Michael Sun
Dr. Fu-Kuo LiuEditor
Strategic Vision
From The Editor
For our final issue of the year, our second year in op-eration, we are pleased to be able to bring you an issue dedicated to the negotiation and peacemaking eforts by
various countries and organizations that are helping to shape the security footing in the Asia-Paciic region.
We begin with an excellent article by Ming Chuan University’s Dr. Chia-sheng Chen, who ofers his insights on how the events that followed China’s recent demarcation of an Air Defense Identiication Zone in the East China Sea illustrate the potentialities of the wider US rebalancing to the Asia-Paciic.
his issue ofers two articles on conidence building mea-sures. National Chengchi University’s Moises Lopes de Souza examines the theoretical foundations of CBMs, and looks at the promise and pitfalls of their employment in Asia, par-ticularly by regional organizations such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the ASEAN Regional Forum. Regular contributor Aaron Jensen and Dr. Charles Yang fol-low this up with an analysis of the potential for military CBMs across the Taiwan Strait, and how well or not the complicated relationship would fare under such measures.
Looking at the groundbreaking isheries agreement between Taiwan and Japan, Taro Kurokawa of National Chengchi University provides a rare glimpse into how the pact, moti-vated by geopolitical realities, is being received by the afected ishing communities in Okinawa.
Finally, Dr. Michael Sun provides an overview of Beijing’s use of sot power and how these techniques are being used to manage perceptions and assuage fears in the region about the rise of China.
We hope this year has been as enjoyable for you as it has been for us, and we wish you a happy new year. See you in 2014!
STRATEGIC VISION For Taiwan Se-
curity (ISSN 2227-3646) Volume 2,
Number 12, December, 2013, pub-
lished under the auspices of the Cen-
ter for Security Studies and National
Defense University.
All editorial correspondence should
be mailed to the editor at STRATEGIC
VISION, Center for Security Studies
in Taiwan. No. 64, Wan Shou Road,
Taipei City 11666, Taiwan, ROC.
The editors are responsible for the
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responsibility for opinions expressed
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© Copyright 2013 by the Center for
Security Studies.
Editor
Fu-Kuo Liu
Executive Editor
Dean Karalekas
Editorial Board
Tiehlin YenRaviprasad NarayananRichard HuFelix WangLipin TienLaurence Lin
Articles in this periodical do
not necessarily represent
the views of either the MCSS,
NDU, or the editors.
China’s recent establishment of an Air
Defence Identiication Zone (ADIZ) cover-
ing much of the East China Sea is a move
that was widely seen as having backired, especial-
ly ater the United States deployed two aging B-52
bombers to transit through the zone without inform-
ing Beijing. he US response has caused waves in the
region and is evidence that Washington is serious
about its rebalancing to the Asia-Paciic.
Asian leaders and policymakers interested in how
the United States will position itself in light of the rise
of China may have caught a glimpse of that with the
ADIZ light, and perhaps for the time being at least,
there are fewer questions as to how the United States
will maintain its security commitments given the
increasing sophistication of an Asia-Paciic security
environment in which maritime and territorial dis-
putes continually risk occasional lare-ups.
In the larger context, the reason for the United States
to focus its attention on the Asia-Paciic region is
simple: its economic and security interests are inex-
tricably linked to this area—an area ranging from the
Western Paciic and East Asia to the Indian Ocean
and South Asia. Rebalancing with regard to protect-
ing economic beneits is an intuitive decision, and the
means to protect these interests is based on military
strength and regional cooperation in dealing with
challenges from the region’s opposing powers.
Dr. Chia-sheng Chen is an assistant professor at the Graduate School of International Afairs of Ming Chuan
University. He can be reached for comment at [email protected].
4 b
photo: Andrew Crawford
A B-52 Stratofortress lies just under the sun. Pilots of the BUFF are required to log light hours and to be ready to “own it” at a moment’s notice.
Strategic Vision vol. 2, no. 12 (December, 2013)
Pivotal Position
US response to China’s ADIZ illustrates larger commitment to Asian pivot
Chia-sheng Chen
US Pivot b 5
Not only does the area present economic opportu-
nities, but it also involves potential military conlicts
originating from territorial disputes and military ex-
pansion, as well as moves like China’s declaration of
the ADIZ and similar attempts to change the distribu-
tion of power in this area, thus creating uncertainty
and forcing regional countries to invest in security
and pursue their own arms buildups. herefore, se-
curity issues remain the core challenge behind the
US rebalancing strategy.
Long-time policy
During his visit to Canberra, Australia, in 2011, US
President Barack Obama addressed the issue of US
foreign policy in the Asia-Paciic region, which has
the overarching objective of sustaining a stable secu-
rity environment, while at the same time maintaining
what Obama called “a regional order conducive to
economic openness, peaceful resolution of disputes,
and respect for universal rights and freedoms.”
he president’s speech outlined the American per-
spective on a future Asia that the United States would
like to see. Former National Security Advisor Tom
Donilon pointed out that the United States has to
bring about a strategy that is not narrowly focused
on the use of force, but a comprehensive as well as
multidimensional plan.
While the rise of China per se may not spook re-
gional countries, Beijing’s military modernization,
coupled with its recent hostile acts and unclear in-
tentions over territorial disputes with its neighbors,
generate great uncertainty region-wide.
US assistance to allies Japan and the Philippines
surely runs contrary to China’s expectations and in-
terests, prompting Chinese Premier Li Keqiang to is-
sue an ominous warning to US Secretary of State John
Kerry, at their meeting during the ASEAN Summit
in early October, not to get involved in Asian afairs.
he leadership in Washington has been careful
to stress that the US pivot to Asia is nothing that
China should interpret as an attempt at containment,
nor should Beijing see it as US dictatorship in Asia.
Rather, Washington wishes to make every efort to
harness all elements of American power—military,
political, and economic aspects, as well as develop-
ment and humanitarian values—to contribute to
peace and stability in the region.
In response to the rapid expansion of China’s mili-
tary and its capabilities, and that country’s demon-
strated determination to assume a leadership role,
former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced
in 2009 that the United States was returning to Asia.
he US Department of Defense, faced with Chinese
eforts to develop anti-access/area denial (A2/AD)
capabilities, formulated the AirSea Battle concept
in response.
he concept suggests a comprehensive use of force
to cope with contingencies posed by China’s military
expansion with a view to winning and stabilizing
Premier of the People’s Republic of China Li Keqiang
photo: Fabrice Debatty
this region. US Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel, in
a speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue security forum
in Singapore in June, conirmed that the deployment
posture of US armed forces in the region would in-
crease, including the placement of 60 percent of the
Navy’s leet in Asia by 2020. he intention is explicit;
the US military is the backbone of the rebalancing
strategy.
Role for Taiwan
Assistant US Secretary of Defense Mark Lippert re-
vealed February 27, 2013, that Taiwan would play a
role in the US rebalancing strategy, and that while
Washington and Taipei had engaged in smooth dis-
cussions of the topic, there is no clear picture of how
Taiwan should act to enhance US-Taiwan relations.
herefore, a common security picture for the two
countries should be established with the irst priority
being Taiwan’s geographically strategic location in the
middle of the irst island chain. his presents at least
two advantages for the United States in its Asia strat-
egy: First, by ofering a geographical shield for US
maritime activities in the West Paciic Ocean against
intimidation by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)
Navy along China’s southeast coast. his is where the
PLA’s Jinan and Nanjing military regions operate, as
does the East Sea Fleet to which China’s irst and only
aircrat carrier—now conducting drills in the South
China sea—belongs. Taiwan’s position in this pro-
tective screen is a crucial link in the chain between
Japan to the north and the Philippines to the south.
Second, Taiwan represents the world’s irst democ-
racy in a culturally Chinese society. he universal
liberal values persistently promoted by the United
States and other Western democracies have been
embraced in Taiwan, allowing the island to connect
with the outside world in a way that China cannot:
through a shared respect for human rights and free-
6 b STRATEGIC VISION
“Taiwan has to persistently and strongly illustrate its resolve with re-spect to national defense issues.”
President Obama stands behind Australian Prime Minister Julia Gillard while she speaks in honor of 60 years of the US-Australian alliance Nov. 17, 2011.
photo: Pete Thibodeau
dom of the individual.
he 2013 Quadrennial Defense Review, released
by the ROC Ministry of National Defense in March
2013, identiies regional cooperation and prevention
of war as key perspectives for Taiwan’s security and
prosperity. hese are common interests shared by
Taiwan and the United States, and hence the need
to work together.
Having understood the intentions and limitations
of the US rebalancing strategy, as well as Taiwan’s ad-
vantages in this particular location of the Asia-Paciic
region, Taipei could manifest some key postures so
as to demonstrate the necessity and uniqueness of
Taiwan in support of the US efort.
Taiwan has to persistently and strongly illustrate its
resolve with respect to national defense issues. his is
particularly important due to some American schol-
ars mistakenly questioning whether Taiwan’s position
makes the US maintenance of stable relations with
China a helpless task. he “abandon Taiwan” dis-
course did not ofer US policymakers a clear picture
regarding how to best respond to the rise of China.
In addition, Taiwan is an important US friend in
this region, sharing common interests in terms of
security and prosperity. here is no reason for the
two to part ways. On the contrary, they should ex-
press unity through a strong bond of shared values.
his could start with a demonstration of Taiwan’s
defensive resolve.
Second, the ultimate success of the US pivot is con-
tingent upon cooperation with regional allies, and
Taiwan can play a crucial role in providing recon-
naissance and surveillance assets. Due to Taiwan’s
particular location, the ability of reconnaissance and
surveillance as strategic warning becomes critical in
monitoring the daily activity of the PLA, including
military exercises and force maneuvers. his coopera-
tion through information- and intelligence-sharing
would consolidate Taiwan’s security, and also con-
tribute to the US capability to provide security in
the region.
hird, another facet of Taiwan’s usefulness would
be for both militaries to enhance cooperation in the
ield of cyber-security. Both countries face severe
challenges from ongoing cyber-attacks launched by
Advanced Persistent hreat units within the PLA—
speciically, the infamous Unit 61398 which operates
out of a nondescript Shanghai oice building.
US Pivot b 7
An ROC Air Force E-2K AEW aircraft at Songshan Air Force Base. Taiwan is well placed to assist the US pivot with surveillance and reconnaissance assets.
photo: Xuan Shisheng
Cyber-warfare is considered a national security is-
sue because of such characteristics as deception, sab-
otage, intrusion, and iniltration, all of which cause
great damage to computer sotware and hardware
systems, not only threatening a country’s military
and intelligence bodies, but its corporations as well.
Taipei must cooperate with the United States to ight
these heretofore covert attacks and intrusions and
increase both countries’ cyber-defensive abilities.
Showing commitment
All in all, it is clearly in the US interests to “return” to
the Asia-Paciic, just as it is in the interests of demo-
cratic nations in the region to facilitate this return.
However, the United States must realize that asking
regional allies to contribute their fair share to Asia-
Paciic security, while entirely reasonable, must be
matched by US actions and displays of solidarity. he
recent light of the B-52 Stratofortresses was a potent
symbol of that solidarity.
At present, the current domestic dysfunction
in Washington runs the risk of impacting its im-
age abroad. Since the government shutdown on
October 1, 2013, coming on the heels of the inancial
sequestration in February (based on which it was an-
nounced that the US military would sufer a US$487
billion budget cut over the next 10 years), President
Obama cancelled an important trip to Asia, includ-
ing planned visits to Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei, and
the Philippines, and participation in the Asia-Paciic
Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit, where he
was to meet most of the leaders of the Asia-Paciic
nations.
As a result, Obama’s absence gave Chinese President
Xi Jinping an opportunity to present himself as the
more outstanding leader at this annual event. It is
events like this that raise doubts among US friends
and allies as to whether the world’s only superpower
can fulill its promises to maintain peace and stability
in the region—doubts that will require more than a
couple of 1950s-era bombers to quell. n
8 b STRATEGIC VISION
photo: APEC 2013
Chinese President Xi Jinping, left, had his image boosted by the absence of President Obama, who sent John Kerry in his stead to the APEC Leader’s meeting.
The negotiating dynamics in evidence
over the South China Sea (SCS) maritime
disputes are unique due to local conditions,
and they resist eforts to implement real and efective
conidence building measures (CBMs) that might
mitigate the rising levels of tension and outright hos-
tility in the region.
Since the 1940s, the states that are stakeholders in
the sea—including Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines,
Vietnam, the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan,
and the People’s Republic of China—have, by difer-
ent means, developed new negotiation tools in claim-
ing either portions of the sea or its entirety. Of these
tools, CBM concepts have played a key role since
the beginning of the regional integration process.
Regardless of intense eforts promoted by diferent
actors, the conidence building measures seem to
have reached a ceiling and now are facing challenges
in taking the next natural step—the implementation
of preventive diplomacy. However, many govern-
ments in the region consider preventive diplomacy
tantamount to interference in their internal afairs.
In “Cross-Strait Conidence Building Measures,”
Brad Glosserman deines conidence building mea-
sures as the “both formal and informal measures,
whether unilateral, bilateral, or multilateral, that ad-
dress, prevent, or resolve uncertainties among states,
including both military and political elements.” hese
measures contribute to a reduction of uncertainty,
misperception, and suspicion and thus help to re-
Moises Lopes de Souza is a PhD candidate in the International Doctoral Program of Asia Paciic Studies at
National Chengchi University. He can be reached for comment at [email protected].
b 9
Strategic Vision vol. 2, no. 12 (December, 2013)
Crisis of Confidence
The use of conidence building measures as negotiation tools in Asian regionMoises Lopes de Souza
photo: Gunawan Kartapranata
The lags of the member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations ly in front of that organization’s headquarters in Jakarta.
10 b STRATEGIC VISION
duce the possibility of incidental or accidental war.
he key to designing efective CBMs “is devising
‘win-win’ approaches that respond to the security
concerns of both sides.”
Security cooperation
CBMs also can be understood as a set of mecha-
nisms developed by two sides in conlict in order
to improve the peace-building environment. hese
mechanisms, according to Michele Maieseb, oten
have the format of agreements between two or more
parties regarding information exchange and verii-
cation, typically with respect to the use of military
forces and armaments. Also known as Conidence
Building Procedures (CBP), CBMs are the irst of
three stages of security cooperation as enumerated
by Ralf Emmers and See Seng Tan: conidence build-
ing (CB), preventive diplomacy, and conlict resolu-
tion mechanisms.
he main concern of the irst steps of CBMs is prin-
cipally found in conlict avoidance (CAM), which can
be attempted even when states have no established
diplomatic relations, as exempliied by the Israeli-
Syrian aerial monitoring agreements along the Golan
Heights. In the second step, CBMs progress to the
more concrete conidence measures described above,
promoting a more intensive and qualitative commu-
nication between the sides in a conlict. In general,
this passage from conlict avoidance to conidence
building requires more political capital given the in-
tensity of steps that can provoke contrary reactions
from strategic groups within governments. According
to Michael Krepon of he Stimson Center, this is the
point at which South Asian and Middle East disputes
are currently stuck.
All eforts to resolve the SCS disputes have faced a
wall of “national sovereignty” serving as a great ob-
stacle to any advancement of dialogue. Furthermore,
“The necessity to engage China be-came clearer when Beijing, little by little, started to take on an ambitious plan to develop its naval capabilities.”
photo: Sompop S
A delegate checks his notes at the 15th ASEAN Summit held from October 23 to October 25, 2009, in Hua Hin, Cha-Am, Thailand.
together with the sensi-
tive issue of sovereign-
ty, a set of formal and
informal rules known
as the ASEAN Way
that was developed and
employed by member
states of the Association
of Southeast Asian
Nations have likewise
acted as obstructions
to CBM implementa-
tion, and they remain
a constant in any ana-
lytical perspective on
the SCS disputes. What
was once the solution
to carrying on the pro-
cess of regional integra-
tion has so far been uti-
lized as a way to avoid
progress on moving
CBMs to the natural
next phase of preven-
tive diplomacy.
Multilateral tools
Although the disputes
over sovereignty in the
South China Sea have
oten been framed—especially by China—as bilateral
problems, there have been several occasions at which
Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam have taken
advantage of the multilateral structure of ASEAN
and its regional forum (ARF) to develop a spirit of
conidence among them. hese countries have used
the multilateral mechanism to reach solutions and
avoid entering into a wider, regional armed conlict.
he ASEAN structure has provided space for de-
mands over national interest and protection of the
member states from any form of intervention. hese
conveniences have been used by the countries in-
volved in the SCS territorial disputes, even though
other members are also able to see that their interests
or preoccupations reach the ears of the diplomatic
staf in charge of the disputes as well.
During its second annual ministerial meeting in
1995, the ARF developed a concept paper that out-
CBMs in Asia b 11
lined the path of the future attributions of the forum.
Essentially, the paper emphasized that the forum
should concentrate on enhancing trust and coni-
dence amongst members and, in doing so, foster
a regional environment conductive to maintaining
the peace and prosperity of the region. Speciically,
the goals were:
Stage 1: Promotion of conidence building measures
Stage 2: Development of preventive diplomacy
mechanisms
Stage 3: Development of conlict-resolution mecha-
nisms
Since its establishment, the ARF has been assidu-
ously developing and sophisticating its approach.
Many of these improvements are the fruit of a long-
term “learn-by-doing” process that has been tailoring
the scope and approaches of the forum. his learning
process has also resulted in an extensive
list of activities that has been composed
of more than 203 track I meetings and 62
track II meetings between 1994 and 2009.
Individual agendas
Although the disputes have developed
under the ASEAN Regional Forum, their
structures still remain under rigid indi-
vidual agendas beholden to the national
interest of each country involved in the ne-
gotiation process. As a result, many of the
activities developed by the ARF via track I
and track II (e.g. the Indonesia Workshop)
diplomacy have invariably foundered on
the great obstacles deriving from the Asian
predilection for maintaining state sover-
eignty, and the ever-present China factor.
Among its several reasons for being,
ARF was also created to be a diplomat-
ic instrument for socializing China into
habits of good international behavior, and
thus the China factor cannot be ignored. Writing in
the Routledge Handbook of Asian Security Studies,
Sheldon W. Simon describes “the hope that the trea-
ty’s peaceful-resolution commitment could be ex-
tended to the other states. his practice would con-
stitute a kind of minimal difuse reciprocity.” hat
is, while ASEAN would not expect outsiders to au-
tomatically come to members’ aid in time of crisis or
to their defense if attacked, at least outside countries
could be asked to renounce the use of force in settling
any conlicts they might have with the Association’s
12 b STRATEGIC VISION
Activists protest the actions of Chinese maritime agencies against Vietnamese ishermen.
photo: Steve Rhodes
“Could the hesitance of ARF possibly inluence the regional military dynamic?”
CBMs in Asia b 13
members. he unstated object of these concerns, of
course, was the People’s Republic of China (PRC)—
the only “extra-regional” state with territorial claims
in Southeast Asia.
Eventually, if successful, it would encourage the PRC
to explain and clarify its security policy and plan-
ning. China’s neighbors, which include such South
China Sea claimants as Malaysia, the Philippines
and Vietnam, could then respond through the ARF
with their concerns about PRC policies in hopes of
modifying them and enhancing regional stability,
suggests Arthur A. Stein.
Furthermore, the rapid economic development of
China gave Beijing the conidence to intensify its mil-
itary modernization. he signiicance of this binomial
becomes evident when the elevation of skirmishes
between Southeast Asia and the other claimants be-
comes more usual. he necessity to engage China
became clearer when Beijing, little by little, started
to take on an ambitious plan to develop its naval
capabilities with a speed that, even if they wanted
to, Southeast Asian states could neither follow nor
ignore. By the year 1999, in consequence of percep-
tions of mutual suspicion, nearly 1,650 troops from
ive state claimants have been deployed to approxi-
mately 45 of 51 land formations that make up the
Spratly archipelago.
Could the hesitance of ARF possibly inluence the
regional military dynamic? here is common ground
among many analysts regarding the current milita-
rization process in Asia, and all would agree that
the reasons for it are varied. Between the motives
for militarization in Southeast Asia, there is a per-
sistent lack of trust, while absence of transparency
in military reports and arms acquisitions are among
the other reasons.
It is important to understand that such transparency
is one imperative of the CBM eforts and a natural
prerequisite to the establishment of preventive di-
plomacy. If there are reliable indicators of a lack of
mutual trust, then it is evident that the CBM eforts
have found their ceiling. n
photo: Timothy Smith
Vietnamese oicers watch as the Arleigh Burke-class guided missile destroyer USS Curtis Wilbur prepares to moor in the Vietnamese port of Da Nang.
The subject of military conidence build-
ing measures (CBMs) between Taiwan and
China has appeared more frequently as ten-
sions between the two sides have decreased. As the
administration of President Ma Ying-jeou edges
closer toward political dialogue with the People’s
Republic of China (PRC), the topic of cross-strait
CBMs could conceivably be put on the table in the
not-so-distant future. While CBMs are oten praised
by scholars as a concrete step toward peace, their
implementation and sustainment is oten undercut
when political will is lacking. For this reason, it is
important to take a closer look at the potential limi-
tations and challenges which cross-strait CBMs could
pose for Taiwan.
he mere establishment of CBMs alone does not
guarantee that they will function as intended. As
Indian scholar Samarjit Ghosh noted, military CBMs
between India and Pakistan have oten failed when
they were most needed. Despite the existence of a
14 b
Cute, cartoon-version dolls of Mao Zedong, right, and Chiang Kai-shek make good souvenirs, but they belie the historical enmity between the two leaders.
Strategic Vision vol. 2, no. 12 (December, 2013)
More Harm Than Good
Notions of cross-strait military CBMs pose limitations, challenges to Taiwan
Charles Yang & Aaron Jensen
photo: GreenArcher04
Dr. Charles Yang is a graduate of NTU’s Graduate Institute of National Development. He served in the ROC
Marines from 2000 to 2002. He specializes in the political-economic development of China and trilateral relations.
Aaron Jensen is a graduate student at National Chengchi University who served as an oicer in the United
States Air Force for seven years. He can be reached at: [email protected].
cease-ire between the two countries, there have been
numerous border incursions even ater the agree-
ment was signed. Even simple agreements such as the
establishment of military hotlines can be rendered
useless when one side lacks commitment. In spite of
the fact that the PRC and the United States have es-
tablished a military hotline, China has oten refused
to use this communication channel during periods
of heightened tensions. hus, a critical factor in the
success or failure of CBMs is the degree of continued
political will on both sides.
hreat of force
A major underlying obstacle and limiting factor for
CBMs between China and Taiwan is the PRC’s re-
fusal to renounce the use of force against Taiwan. For
its part, the PRC has steadfastly refused to renounce
the option of employing its military arsenal to forc-
ibly annex the island. Potential use of force against
Taiwan is seen by Beijing as the inal “safeguard”
against a possible move toward Taiwanese indepen-
dence. For this reason, Zhongnanhai will not take
it of the table, and has continued to build up the
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in such a way as to
eventually be able to conquer Taiwan. Without the
political will required to fully pursue peace, CBMs
will not signiicantly increase the security situation
between these two governments.
While CBMs could provide a minor degree of im-
provement to the cross-strait relationship, it is unreal-
istic to expect that CBMs will fundamentally change
the security problems that Taiwan faces from China.
Military interaction between the two sides, such as
meetings between oicers and combined military
exercises, will not afect the PRC’s decision to alter
its rapid military development or renounce the use
of force against Taiwan. Fundamental change can
only occur when one, or both sides, alters its policy
in a fundamental way. his type of change can only
be brought about by interaction and consultation
between top civilian leaders. CBMs cannot serve as
a bridge to a peaceful conclusion unless fundamental
Cross-Strait CBMs b 15
“The US-Taiwan Business Council has characterized this complete hold on arms sales as a ‘freeze.’”
India’s Border Security Force, right, and Pakistani Rangers take part in the elaborately choreographed Wagah retreat ceremony at the two rivals’ border.
photo: Gordon Dickson
16 b STRATEGIC VISION
change occurs at the highest levels. Without change
at the highest level, CBMs will bear only limited fruit.
In addition to the limitations of CBMs, it is impor-
tant to consider other possible challenges and prob-
lems which could arise if Taiwan pursued CBMs with
China. One likely challenge of cross-strait CBMs is
that the PRC would likely attempt to use them as a
propaganda tool to shape international, as well as
Taiwanese, perceptions of the cross-strait security
situation.
China could tout CBMs as proof that relations be-
tween the two sides have become peaceful and stable.
his would serve several important purposes for the
PRC. First, it could lower US support for arms sales
to Taiwan, a major goal of the PRC.
Some American observers have challenged the
need for arms sales to Taiwan. In 2010, US Senate
Intelligence Committee Chairwoman Dianne
Feinstein questioned the need for them, arguing that
continued arms sales were harming US relations with
China. If CBMs appeared to be successful, the argu-
ment in favor of abandoning arms sales to Taiwan
would be strengthened.
he Taiwanese public, as well as growing numbers
of politicians, could also become less supportive of
purchasing US arms. Despite the fact that China’s de-
fense budget continues to grow, and the PLA becomes
stronger every year, many Taiwanese are not particu-
larly concerned about China’s military development
and they consider the possibility of conlict to be low.
A recent survey by Taiwan’s United Daily News
found that the percentage of Taiwanese who viewed
cross-strait relations as tense had decreased from
31 percent in 2012 to 19 percent in 2013. Successful
cross-strait CBMs could further strengthen this per-
ception and continue to erode public support for
US arms sales and for military funding in gener-
al. Many Taiwanese are already critical of purchas-
An ROC EC-225 Super Puma search-and-rescue helicopter. SAR is one of the proposed avenues for cross-training between Taiwanese and Chinese troops.
“Military morale and sense of pur-pose would become weaker if Beijing could create the false perception that relations are truly peaceful.”
photo: king.f
ing US weapons since they consider
these weapons to be expensive and
ill-suited for Taiwan’s defense needs.
In 2004, Kuomintang Chairman Lien
Chan claimed that Taiwan does not
need military strength to negotiate with
the PRC. In 2005, People’s First Party
Chairman James Song suggested that
money meant for US weapons would
be better spent on domestic projects.
At a time of slow economic growth in
Taiwan, the perception of a stable secu-
rity environment could encourage poli-
ticians to divert more resources away
from the military.
Propaganda tool
If the PRC could successfully use CBMs
as a propaganda tool to inluence pub-
lic perception in Taiwan, then Taiwan’s
military could be adversely afected as
well. Speciically, military morale and
sense of purpose would become weaker
if Beijing could create the false percep-
tion that relations are truly peaceful.
Some Taiwanese security scholars have
argued that rapprochement between the two sides has
already weakened military morale and caused con-
fusion in the minds of some soldiers. In particular,
high-proile visits by retired ROC generals to the PRC
help foster a false sense of peace and trust between the
two governments. his, according to some Taiwanese
scholars, contributes to confusion in Taiwan’s mili-
tary ranks and causes some to question whether the
Chinese military is an enemy or an ally. Similarly,
CBMs could be seen as a further sign that relations
between the two sides have truly entered a peaceful
phase, when in fact China’s growing military and
the willingness to use it had not abated in the least.
China could also attempt to use CBMs to lure
Taiwan into supporting other PRC ambitions, such
as joint security operations in the South China Sea
(SCS). Although the ROC government does not sup-
port such cooperation, the PRC could gradually pres-
sure Taiwan into taking steps in this direction. Some
scholars from Taiwan and China have already sug-
gested, and held discussions, on future cooperation in
the SCS. Moreover, public support in Taiwan for such
cooperation could increase if Taiwanese ishermen
face danger or harassment in the South China Sea.
he killing of a Taiwanese isherman by the
Philippine Coast Guard in May of 2013 provoked
Cross-Strait CBMs b 17
A 1958 Chinese propaganda poster titled “We must liberate Taiwan.”
poster courtesy Chineseposters.net
18 b STRATEGIC VISION
rage and denunciation against the Philippines. A few
commentators suggested that Taiwan should even
work with the PRC to ensure the safety of Taiwan’s
ishermen. he establishment of cross-strait CBMs
could give China a stronger foundation to call for
joint security patrols in the SCS. Maritime search-
and-rescue operations are a basic and common form
of CBMs. If search-and-rescue exercises became a
common occurrence between the coast guards of
Taiwan and China, it would be easier for the PRC to
propose limited patrols of the South China Sea. From
here, Beijing would likely seek to foster incremental
advances in the level of cooperation.
US perception
If Taiwan did enter into CBMs with the PRC, it
would also have to be mindful of how the United
States perceived this activity. Although top US leaders
have generally voiced support for deeper cross-strait
engagement, including CBMs, it is not clear if all seg-
ments of the US government would be comfortable
with Taiwan engaging with the PLA.
In 2009, Pentagon oicials expressed reticence over
possible military ties between Taiwan and China.
heir main concern was that military engagement
with the PLA could allow China to have more op-
portunities for espionage against US-made weapon
systems in Taiwan. hey also suggested that military
PLA(N) marines stand at attention. China has vowed to take Taiwan by force, if necessary, and that political talks cannot be delayed indeinitely.
photo: J.J. Harper
“If Taiwan pursues CBMs with the PRC, it will need to increase its vigilance against PRC espionage efforts.”
engagement with China, if it went too far, could jeop-
ardize US arms sales to the island. More recently, for-
mer American Institute in Taiwan Director William
Stanton argued that the success and frequency of
PRC espionage eforts against Taiwan undermines US
conidence in its security cooperation with Taiwan.
Espionage risk
Should Taiwan pursue CBMs with the PRC, it will
need to increase its vigilance against PRC espionage
eforts. One Taiwanese scholar has suggested that
Taiwan and China could initiate a formal exchange
program composed of low and middle ranking of-
icers and security experts.
his could potentially be a very risky move on the
part of Taiwan given that low ranking oicers, espe-
cially those in the ROC, have very limited experience
dealing with foreign oicers. Unless these oicers
undergo signiicant counter-intelligence training,
they will be at heightened risk for recruitment by
PRC intelligence agencies.
If the ROC ultimately does decide to engage in
CBMs with the PRC, it should proceed very cau-
tiously and be weary of the potential pitfalls which
could result.
Taiwan would do well to reassure its allies, in par-
ticular the United States and Japan that cross-strait
relations were not moving too quickly. Taiwan could
better manage these challenges if it allowed the US
to take some level of advisory role in the process.
Dr. Edward Chen, vice president of the Foundation
on Asia-Paciic Peace Studies, has suggested that the
United States could undertake a supervisory role in
cross-strait CBMs.
Given its experience with such measures, the United
States could certainly help Taiwan better navigate
its engagement with the PLA. Its behind-the-scenes
involvement would also provide Taiwan’s allies with
reassurance that Taiwan was not getting pulled too far
into Beijing’s orbit, and help assuage US Department
of Defense concerns that Taiwan’s US-bought weap-
ons systems would not become exposed to further
espionage threats from the PRC. n
Cross-Strait CBMs b 19
An American-made AH-1W Supercobra attack helicopter releases lares during the ROC’s Han Kuang military exercise held in Penghu, Taiwan in April 2013.
photo: TC Lin
April 10, 2013 saw the long-awaited con-
clusion to largely stagnant ishing talks
between Taiwan and Japan, resulting in a
widely hailed isheries agreement between the two
countries. he pact was seen as a touchstone for the
ishery issue in the hotly contested waters of the East
China Sea by regional security analysts, and both
sides in the agreement regarded it as a diplomatic
accomplishment for their respective governments,
even though it does not address the fundamental
aspect of the territorial dispute over the Senkaku/
Diaoyutai Islands.
For legalistic reasons and to avoid upsetting the
People’s Republic of China, the agreement was one
consented to by two non-oicial organizations—
speciically, the Japan Interchange Association
and Taiwan’s East Asia Relations Commission.
Nevertheless, negotiations seemed to be promoted
by state-centric ideology.
Local communities adjacent to the newly desig-
nated operating waters, especially those situated on
Okinawa prefecture’s Yaeyama Islands and Miyako
Islands, are discontent with the agreement. In the
Yaeyama Islands (especially Ishigaki City, Taketomi
Taro Kurokawa is a PhD candidate at National Chengchi University’s International Doctoral Program in
Asia-Paciic Studies. He can be reached for comment at [email protected].
20 b
Strategic Vision vol. 2, no. 12 (December, 2013)
Something Fishy
Tokyo’s focus on Taiwan isheries deal leaves local ishing communities cold Taro Kurokawa
Fresh ish at a market in Okinawa. Hauls have signiicantly declined over the past few years, and ishing communities are starting to feel the pinch.
photo: slackrhackr
Town and Yonaguni Town), people are still calling for
a revision of the treaty because, they feel, the Japanese
government was in such a hurry to accommodate
Taiwan that local public opinion was not suiciently
absorbed in the negotiation process, and the inter-
ests of the local communities were largely ignored
by negotiators.
Clearly, there is a disparity between national strat-
egy and local strategy in Japan, at least as far as the
isheries agreement with Taiwan is concerned. Just
half a year ater the May 10, 2013 enactment of the
agreement, its efects are already being felt by local
communities.
Key industry
he ishery industry has historically been one of the
most important industries to both eastern Taiwan and
the Yaeyama area in Japan. According to the Ministry
of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF) of
Japan, the total number of ishermen in Yaeyama is
308, with 228 living in Ishigaki City, 50 in Taketomi
Town, and 30 in Yonaguni Town. Recorded ishing
boats number 358.
Despite the importance of the ishing industry to
the local economies, the haul has been gradually de-
creasing over the past few years (see chart). his has
been caused by several factors including a depletion
of ish, the aging of Japan’s ishermen, large-scale ty-
phoons, and fewer ishing expeditions launched due
to the high (and increasing) cost of fuel. As a result
of these diiculties, the total number of catches in
the Yaeyama area has been dropped to half of previ-
ous levels, according to the 2013 Ishigaki Basic Plan
on Ocean Policy.
In Yilan, Taiwan, the ishery industry is much big-
ger than that of Yaeyama, with 1,102 ishing vessels
and a population of 9,013 ishermen, according to
the Fisheries Statistical Yearbook: Taiwan, Kinmen
and Matsu Area. If the number of people deriving an
income from the ishery and its peripheral industries
Fisheries Agreement b 21
Negotiators from Japan and Taiwan, Mitsuo Ohashi, left, and Liao Liou-yi, right, during the isheries agreement signing ceremony in Taipei April 10, 2013.
photo: VOA
“There were major repercussions in Okinawa following the announcement of the isheries deal.”
Japanese Coast Guard ships use water cannon to repel Taiwanese ishing boats ferrying activists to the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands.
photo: ROC Coast Guard
22 b STRATEGIC VISION
are taken into account, that number would be much
higher. hus, the impact of the new rules is not only
limited to ishermen, but to entire communities.
here were major repercussions in Okinawa follow-
ing the announcement of the isheries deal. Over the
two or three weeks following the agreement, the may-
or of Ishigaki and the Okinawan governor expressed
their objections to Tokyo. On April 17, Ishigaki mayor
Yoshitaka Nakayama—whose municipal jurisdiction
includes administration of the Senkaku Islands—ob-
jected to the agreement in a meeting with the secre-
tary of the Cabinet Oice. On April 26, Okinawan
governor Hirokazu Nakaima also visited the Cabinet
Oice, as well as Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Afairs
to convey similar objections.
Taking Okinawa’s anger seriously, Tokyo sent the
director-general of the ishery agency to the Yaeyama
and Miyako islands to explain and apologize. To
soothe the anger and objections in the region, the
agency increased the number of maritime patrol ships
in the region from ive to 10 in order to reinforce
control of the agreed-upon border demarcations and
deter ishing boats from operating illegally inside
Japan’s 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone
(EEZ) south of the Sakishima Islands. As a result, four
Taiwanese ishing boats were seized in May alone for
operating without permission outside the bilaterally
stipulated area.
hree main complaints
he Japanese media has carried stories of the discon-
tent in Okinawa over the isheries agreement with
Taiwan, summarizing their ire into three main com-
plaints: hat Tokyo did not make an efort to listen
to local voices before or during the negotiations with
Taiwan; that negotiators conceded to a signiicant
enlargement of Taiwan’s operating area; and that the
Japanese government allowed the agreement to go
into efect prior to drawing up concrete rules.
he irst problem is the main point of contention
from which most of the other problems with the
agreement stem: Local people feel they have been
ignored, and their needs sacriiced on the altar of
national interests. Ishigaki City, located just 277 kilo-
meters away from Taiwan, has a long, historical rela-
tionship with Yilan County, including a once-thriving
Taiwanese immigrant community there. Indeed, one
of Ishigaki’s main industries owes its existence to the
relationship with Taiwan, as pineapples were irst
brought over by Taiwanese immigrants.
Moreover, the roots of the cultural and economic
ties go both ways: Until the 1960s, Yilan was home
to a village populated by Okinawan ishermen and
their families, most of whom came from the Yaeyama
and Miyako areas. In the mid-1920s, the oice of the
governor-general of Taiwan oicially promoted a ish-
erman settlement project in Su-ao, Yilan. Of course,
Okinawan immigrants had been independently set-
tling in Yilan even prior to this oicial project.
he movement of people between the two sides used
to be quite common, and ishermen have always com-
municated on the ocean. Before Tokyo took action,
the mayor of Ishigaki, along with a ishing industry
delegation, visited Yilan in November 2012 to ex-
change views with ishermen in Yilan. Based on their
historical relationship, Ishigaki has enjoyed direct
channels of communication with Taiwan. he city
concluded a friendship-city relationship with Su-ao
in 1994, and the business communities, through the
Fisheries Agreement b 23
“Many workers in the ishing industry in Okinawa see the agreement with Taiwan as little more than a concession for the sake of national interests.”
24 b STRATEGIC VISION
junior chamber of commerce, have forged a sister-
city relationship.
Given this previously amicable relationship, the
residents of Ishigaki City were understandably frus-
trated when their grassroots eforts were supplanted
and the isheries agreement was imposed from above.
Furthermore, many workers in the ishing industry
in Okinawa see the agreement with Taiwan as little
more than a concession for the sake of national in-
terests in regard to territorial disputes with China.
he agreement establishes newly created operating
waters for Taiwanese ishermen not just from contest-
ed areas, but also from new areas—including of the
northern shore of the Yaeyama archipelago and the
western shore of Kume Island—that the Taiwanese
negotiators did not even ask for.
Moreover, the Okinawa side was not represented
in the negotiation process. According to blogs main-
tained by persons employed in the ishing industry
in the area, the foreign ministry, wanting to con-
clude the agreement smoothly, assumed a leadership
position and removed the Ministry of Agriculture,
Forestry and Fisheries from the negotiations. In its
previously central role in the talks, MAFF had largely
represented the interests of the local ishing industry.
Local communities have called on the government
to set rules for operating in their waters. Many sourc-
es of conlict stem from diferences in ishing meth-
ods, as well as the sheer number of Taiwanese ish-
ermen compared to their less numerous Japanese
counterparts.
Okinawans ishing in the region mostly use long-
lines, oten tens of kilometers long. hey navigate in a
row, leaving ive to eight kilometers of space between
each vessel to avoid the lines becoming entangled. But
in the Taiwanese method, the space between ships is
around four kilometers. his greatly increases the risk
of accident and of ruining the expensive longlines,
making Okinawan ishermen worried about oper-
ating in the designated waters alongside Taiwanese
boats.
Local ishing communities also believe that com-
partmentalization in the area is necessary for safe op-
erations. However, the Japanese government not only
enlarged the operational areas open to Taiwanese
ishermen, but it allowed them to begin operation
before making rules—which was an insistence of the
Taiwanese negotiators. As a result, the agreement got
signed, but the Yaeyama ishermen are angry.
Olive branch backires
his same phenomenon is evident in the negative
local reaction to the September 2012 nationalization
of several of the Senkaku Islands, which proceeded
without input or consultation with the people most
afected by the move: those living on the frontier fac-
ing the disputed islands.
When nationalistic Tokyo Governor Shintaro
Ishihara launched a campaign to purchase the is-
lands from the Japanese family that owned them, the
central government feared this would rile China, and
so Tokyo purchased them to avoid this outcome and
placate China. Instead, Beijing expressed shock and
Fisheries Agreement b 25
Shoppers peruse the catch at a ish market in Miyako, Japan. The ishing communities in Okinawa and Taiwan’s Yilan have historical ties going back decades.
photo: Benny loreleyheart
Tokyo Governor Shintaro Ishihara on board the USS Gary (FFG 51).
photo: Adam York
Hooks used in longlining stored in a ship’s hold. Both Taiwanese and Japanese ishermen use longlines, though their diferent techniques cause friction.
photo: Nick Rahaim
26 b STRATEGIC VISION
outrage and chose to interpret the move as an afront
to Chinese sovereignty.
he Japanese government evaluates the isheries
agreement as a great diplomatic accomplishment. In
the budget committee in the House of Councilors,
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe called the agreement a
great advance for the security environment in Asia,
and explained that it was brought by Taipei’s declara-
tion that it was not ighting against Japan in coordi-
nation with China over the disputed islands.
Incompatible interests
he problem here is that national strategies and those
of local communities—as well as national interests and
local interests—are oten incompatible. he diplomatic
action taken by the Japanese government to prevent
a united front consisting of China and Taiwan on the
territorial dispute proved disadvantageous to local ish-
ing communities that traditionally operate in the area.
Of course, in a democratic country with as diverse
a polity as Japan’s, any international negotiations
will face both support and opposition from various
domestic interest groups. However, this particular
agreement, ostensibly to protect the rights of the
region’s ishermen, essentially shut them out of the
process. Nevertheless, the afected ishing communi-
ties are taking matters into their own hands in order
to solve the problems raised by the isheries agree-
ment with Taiwan.
In September, the concerned parties gathered in
Naha, Okinawa, to seek a consensus at the local level,
before entering into negotiations with Tokyo planned
for next April. Tokyo has stated that it would not
agree to any revisions of the agreement. Nevertheless,
the local people are trying to have their voices heard
in the process of making concrete rules. Whether they
will be heeded remains to be seen. One thing is cer-
tain, though: the Taiwan-Japan isheries agreement,
far from being concluded, has only just begun. n
For several years now, the world’s media
have covered the rise of China, with pundits
commenting on the country’s moderniza-
tion and its impressive economic achievements. All
this efusive praise of Chinese success has been well
received by the Chinese people, but the leadership
remains conscious of concerns among neighbor-
ing countries. he government in Beijing has thus
carefully crated its East-Asia strategy to promote a
stable regional environment in which it can bolster
its national comprehensive power (NCP).
Beijing’s willingness to negotiate within the
ASEAN+China framework and to participate in re-
gional multilateral organizations ofered reassurance
to regional countries that the People’s Republic of
China (PRC) would not pursue a divide-and-con-
quer strategy. China’s eforts rest upon capable dip-
lomats and intellectuals who are able to convey this
message. China’s increased multilateralism is thus a
means of channeling its power in ways that make it
more acceptable to its neighbors. Concerns among
regional countries remain, however, about a rising
Dr. Michael Sun is an instructor at National Defense University and a student in the International Doctoral
Program in Asia-Paciic Studies at National Chengchi University, as well as a former oicer in the ROC Armed
Forces. He can be reached at [email protected].
b 27
photo: KayVee
Leaders in Beijing have employed soft-power devices including so-called panda diplomacy in order to reassure its neighbors of China’s peaceful rise.
Strategic Vision vol. 2, no. 12 (December, 2013)
Soft Power Rising
China reassures neighbors with diplomatic, security and economic measures Michael Sun
China. In attempting to ease the worries of these
countries, China’s East-Asian strategy takes the form
of a series of diplomatic, security, and economic as-
surance measures.
Managing perceptions
Ever since Joseph Nye coined the theory of sot power
in a 1990 book, research on the phenomenon has be-
come a craze in China. Chinese strategists are aware
that its economic and military rise can be perceived
as a threat, and this negative image will undermine
its eforts to foster a favorable regional environment.
hrough the demonstration of sot power, China
can mitigate its threatening image. By pursuing a
sot-power approach toward its East-Asian neigh-
bors, China hopes to assure regional states of China’s
peaceful intentions during its rise. Former Chinese
President Hu Jintao noted that the increase of China’s
international status and inluence rests on hard pow-
er as well as on sot power, emphasizing culture as
the important element of cohesion and creativity in
enhancing NCP. herefore, China urgently needs to
upgrade its cultural sot power. Ater Hu’s emphasis
on the importance of cultural sot power, Chinese
government and academic circles have prioritized
cultural sot power as an essential guideline to meet
the PRC’s national interests.
China’s lourishing economy has been appealing
to foreigners, many of whom have responded with a
rush to learn the Chinese language and read about its
culture. In light of the fever for learning Mandarin,
China has set up Confucius Institutes overseas to
meet the growing demand for Chinese-language in-
struction. he institutes have become the most im-
portant platform for people from East-Asian coun-
tries to learn the Chinese language, and about the
culture of modern China. he institutes can also
showcase the positive facets of PRC foreign policy
in the hope of sharing a similar identity.
he harmonious world that has been central dur-
ing the Hu period extends this theme of a benevolent
China as a rising power. hus, China has actively
participated in the international arena pertaining
to non-traditional security ields such as terrorism,
piracy, illegal immigration, and environmental secu-
rity. Among them, the most prominent activity has
been taking part in United Nations peacekeeping
missions. China has sent more than 7,000 military
personnel in the past decade to carry out missions
in war-prone countries.
he leaders of China want others to view their na-
tion as a culturally advanced and peace-loving coun-
try. he underlying message that China seeks to con-
vey is that its rise will not threaten the existing in-
ternational order. To this end, China has focused on
promoting the non-threatening aspects of its power.
he key external media initiatives that China has
undertaken include engaging international media
organizations and building up an alternative Chinese
perspective. China has built up an alternative Chinese
28 b STRATEGIC VISION
American political scientist Joseph Nye is the father of soft power.
photo: Chatham House
Chinese Soft Power b 29
perspective to the Western-dominated view of the
world. It has supported its state-controlled media or-
ganizations to strengthen their international presence.
China’s increasing economic ties with countries in
East Asia have a great impact on the region. Building
a free-trade area between China and the members of
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
would bring about mutual wealth, and could rival
both the European Union and the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).
China has been an active player in multilateral or-
ganizations in East Asia. One factor that appears
to be in China’s favor is increased regional support
for a more Asia-oriented grouping. Since sustain-
ing economic growth remains Beijing’s top priority,
the promotion of East Asian economic cooperation
will be an integral part of China’s regional strategy.
Beijing has also negotiated closer economic partner-
ships with individual ASEAN states. Southeast Asia’s
total trade with China now eclipses its trade with the
United States or Japan.
Beijing has long been considered to be the primary
economic patron of small but strategically important
nations (such as Burma, Cambodia, and Laos), and
also provides considerable economic aid to Indonesia
and the Philippines. To implement its economic di-
plomacy, China has used economic aid to increase its
inluence in the region. For instance, China’s econom-
ic aid to the Philippines, Laos, and Indonesia is much
greater than that from the United States. Chinese aid
has not only grown in size but also become more so-
phisticated, with Beijing tying assistance to its policy
goals—the promotion of its companies, the cultiva-
tion of political actors, and the mitigation of concerns
about China’s economic rise. For example, Chinese
assistance has been used to bring hai politicians to
China on study trips. It purchased surplus hai agri-
cultural products to calm the fears of farmers. China’s
policy of “non-interference in domestic afairs” oten
Honorary Kuomingtang Chairman Lien Chan shakes hands with Xi Jinping, the general secretary of the Communist Party of China and Chinese president.
photo: gov.cn
“Chinese aid has not only grown in size but also become more sophisticated, with Beijing tying assistance to its policy goals.”
wins friends in foreign governments because it is re-
garded as respectful of their sovereignty.
Not all analysts paint as rosy a picture of China’s rise,
however. Bonnie Glaser of the Center for Strategic
and International Studies has claimed that, in recent
years, China has used coercive economic diplomacy
to compel countries that have territorial disputes to
alter their policies.
Worrisome trend
his growing trend is worrisome. For example,
in September 2010, Japan detained the captain of
a Chinese ishing trawler near the waters of the
Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands. Beijing blocked ship-
ments of rare earth minerals to Japan in retaliation,
and forced Tokyo to release the captain.
Another example is in the April 2012 territorial dis-
putes between China and the Philippines in the South
China Sea. he Chinese government blocked con-
tainers of Philippine bananas from entering Chinese
ports. In both these cases, China used trade as a weap-
on to force other nations to acquiesce, and these ex-
amples suggest that Beijing’s use of economic leverage
to have its way in international disputes will continue.
Ater the September 11 attacks, the United States and
Japan strengthened their combined military power in
East Asia. Some Chinese strategists have expressed
concerns that the expansion of the US military pres-
ence in the region has forged a new strategic encir-
clement of China. Some, however, remain unper-
turbed. A policy of avoiding overt confrontation with
the United States is consistent with China’s political
agenda. here is a realization among China’s leading
strategists that the rise of China must be accompa-
nied by the rise of Asia as a whole, and as such, struc-
tural change in the global balance of power should
place China in a better position vis-à-vis the United
States. he perception of Japan in China tends to be
controversial, but the momentum of regional eco-
nomic cooperation and the North Korean nuclear
issue might ofer opportunities for both countries
to dilute their diferences.
China’s recent territorial disputes with the
Philippines and Vietnam in the South China Sea,
and Japan in the East China Sea (to wit: the Senkaku/
Diaoyutai Islands) has aroused concern among East
Asian countries and the United States, and tensions
30 b STRATEGIC VISION
The Mianyang is a type 053H3 Jiangwei-II class frigate introduced in the 1990s. Some of China’s maritime claims are conlicting with those of its neighbors.
photo: Glenn Crouch
The Beijing Olympics were an excellent showcase for China’s soft power.
photo: Tama Leaver
Chinese Soft Power b 31
between China and claimant countries are on the
rise. If these crises are not carefully managed, any
one of them might trigger a military confrontation.
In spite of recent heated rhetoric, Chinese lead-
ers acknowledge that having a peaceful and stable
relationship with its neighbors is crucial to China’s
image-building. hus, the Chinese government is
likely to adopt a two-pronged (both hard and sot) ap-
proach in dealing with territorial disputes with fellow
claimants. In the hard approach, Beijing will irmly
insist upon Chinese sovereignty over these disputed
territorial waters and covertly increase its military
activities in these areas. In the sot approach, Beijing
will be likely to call for all claimants to engage in dia-
logues and cooperation to resolve their diferences.
hat is to ensure that the disputes in the potential
security conlicts remain manageable.
In brief, China has employed its sot power and
economic diplomacy to bolster its peaceful develop-
ment. China’s East-Asian strategies have taken this
combined approach to serve its national interests.
As China grows in power, its sot power-type con-
cerns assume a renewed prominence, and the exercise
of this sot power attempts to meet the interests of
neighboring countries through trade while putting
forth a less threatening military face.
Taiwan’s role
In spite of the growing inluence of a rising China,
Taiwan still has a role to play in East Asia due to its
value geostrategically, economically, and as a democ-
racy. Of foremost importance for the government in
Taipei is to lay out a grand East-Asian strategy. With a
collaborative efort from government, the opposition
parties, and academia, a consensus of strategy should
be reached from all parties as a guiding principle for
Taiwan’s future engagement with regional countries.
Next, Taiwan can utilize the global fad of Chinese
culture and language-learning to promote Taiwan’s
sot power, such as by actively setting up Taiwan
Academies around the world, and providing more
and better incentives for foreign students to study in
Taiwan. hird, Taipei should seek a balanced relation-
ship with Beijing and Washington. While cross-strait
relations have reached a rapprochement, Taiwan’s
relations with the United States are still crucial in
safeguarding Taiwan’s interests and security.
hus, Taiwan’s leaders need to frequently express
US security commitments as an essential guarantee
of Taiwan security and better cross-strait relations,
which ultimately serves US interests. Finally, in deal-
ing with competing claims in the Senkaku/Diaoyutai
Islands and the South China Sea, Taiwan is required
to engage in a two-pronged approach in resolving
territorial disputes. On the one hand, the govern-
ment should irmly insist on its claims of sovereignty
and increase its military presence on or around these
islands. One the other hand, Taiwan needs to seek
a diplomatic solution by voicing its right to attend
oicial regional security dialogues and forums with
other claimant countries. n
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